

Scowcroft file
(original to NARA) 1A

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS-3

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel

Vice President Nelson Rockefeller
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday - January 17, 1975
10:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Vice President's Office
Old Executive Office Building



[The press was admitted for photographs. There was light conversation about their meeting the previous Tuesday night at the concert and reception given by the Israelis at the Kennedy Center. The Vice President and Minister Allon recalled their meeting during the Minister's previous visit to Washington. There was light banter about Amb. Dinitz. All agreed he was a good Ambassador. Minister Allon noted that he was one of the youngest. The press departed].

Allon: When I saw President Ford as Vice President [in early August] was it here?

Scowcroft: Yes, it was.

Dinitz: Dayan saw him on his first day as Vice President and you saw him on his last day.

Allon: We have in a way similar positions.

Vice President: Except that you have an operating responsibility. As a matter of fact, I ran a study for Ike on how to utilize the Vice President, when I was his assistant. Our study decided there was no way to do it!

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/75, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 144 NARA, DATE 5/10/04
State Review 3/10/04

Allon: When I met Vice President Ford last summer, to my surprise he was well briefed on the Middle East. It was not just a courtesy call. I felt already I was speaking to a President.

I spoke to him again last month -- it was pleasant, but it was a little tough because he thought our proposals were slim. Yesterday not only was he briefed beyond what a President should be expected to be, but his mind was working and he was dealing with issues he didn't know before-hand would come up.

I feel now that we should move with a visit by Henry to the area. Without that, the negotiation will be sterile. Each side will just stick to his position. I know there is some risk to Henry's prestige and America's prestige when he comes out, but it is the only way.

Vice President: It's beyond prestige. We are down to the wire now, here and in the world. You saw the Broder article in the paper [Tab A] on power and the use of power. We have a situation of virtual anarchy here and even the liberals are beginning to realize that. So prestige isn't the issue. You know how devoted I am to Henry. Everyone here is. Arthur Burns said he's a genius. Henry's great ability is his strategic grasp and his ability to go to the heart of the problem.

Allon: If he had been Secretary of State during World War II, the world would be very different now.

Vice President: I mention prestige only because I think Henry is for all of us. I am impressed by the way you described President Ford. I do not know him well, but I am terribly impressed with his group, his willingness to listen, his perception. I am proud to be a silent partner.

Allon: Don't underestimate yourself. I remember your remarks a while back on energy and how to respond. I reported back to Israel your deep grasp of the issues. So was President Ford's State of the Union speech; I was very impressed by it.

Vice President: But unless we can get hold of the situation, we will fall into the anarchy that Broder described. I sat through Roy Ash's briefing on the budget and the social programs. We always thought we had money for everything. But we face bankruptcy. This is the most serious problem at home. We are in a critical wartime situation and we need the powers a President needs in a war. I say this because the issues are beyond prestige.



If we are very good we may be able to pull through. If not, the democracies may not be able to survive. The speed of changes, the discontinuities are unprecedented today. This is a new situation. That's why I wanted to come down here to help the President and help Henry as a junior partner. I hope to help on the domestic side without creating problems.

What you have done at home is good.

Allon: We have a tough economic situation.

Vice President: But you have taken courageous steps.

Dinitz: In the coming years domestic and foreign policies will become closer together. You will either master the situation or become the dependency of Abu Dhabi. The U.S. is a superpower, but we are as vulnerable as we never anticipated.

Allon: I think you are getting hold of it, as the President's speech indicated.

Vice President: George Woods said that crises always have to get serious for democracies to act. It is a crisis for the executive now, but I am not sure it is yet for Congress. What they have been doing in foreign policy is unbelievable. But back to Henry.....

Allon: The rising oil prices have nothing to do with Arab-Israeli conflict. It is an economic issue.

Vice President: I would agree partly. Iran had its own development program and Venezuela and we may have benefited unfairly from cheap oil. But the October war solidified OPEC.

Allon: But when the Shah was asked about it, he said oil is business, not politics. The embargo did harm, but the prices did not. Italy, who goes out of its way to please the Arabs, is weak. Germany, which is tougher, gets the petrodollars. It's economic, not political.

Vice President: But we can't kid ourselves. The use of oil can be politicized just as the embargo was. This crisis can give them control not just over oil, but finance.

Allon: But when they make a long-term investment, they have to be careful or they will jeopardize their own economic position.



Vice President: They don't think in such long-range terms. And there's another thing: We don't control the seas everywhere. The Soviet Union is now in a position to interdict the essential supplies we need. The supertankers are sitting ducks for attack from hundreds of miles away.

Allon: The Soviet Union knows the balance of terror paralyzes strategic war; so they have gone back to the concept of control of the seas as a way to extend their influence.

Vice President: I completely agree.

Allon: They have an advantage now because their navy is new, but when you get going, yours, in time, will far outclass them.

Dinitz: And I think the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf will be critical and therefore you shouldn't want us to leave Sharm el-Sheikh.

Allon: There are two strategic straits controlling the Red Sea. Sharm el-Sheikh and Bab el-Mandeb. If we control Sharm el-Sheikh we can interfere with their routes if they try to close off Bab el-Mandeb.

Vice President: But we can't force new realities from the status quo and that is why Kissinger is so important. I know the turmoil your government is going through. As a politician I understand it.

Allon: We listen politely to Americans. In '49 we were forced back from the Northern Sinai in exchange for vague assurances which led to war in 1956. In '56 we left the Sinai in exchange for nothing, on U. S. advice. The Russians got the credit because Egypt thought the U. S. acted because of Soviet pressure. Kissinger and Ford are different [from Eisenhower], but this fear is deep within us. We trust all three of you.

I think we know the Arabs better, and I think it's possible to get more than can be judged from the first reaction. It's good Semetic bargaining tactics.

We may not get all we want, but we need to get things moving.

Vice President: I think that is essential.

Allon: But Israel must get in return for a withdrawal something which will satisfy its people. Israel must not look as if she is being pushed into a corner.



Vice President: We are partners in this and partners don't pressure each other. Our only concern is that the partnership may not remain close enough to generate common positions and common understandings.

Allon: I told Henry that once I feel under pressure, I cease to negotiate.

Dinitz: We know it isn't so, but it must not appear so.

[Dr. Kissinger arrives]

Vice President: What worries me about the U. S. is that we will get in some abstract professorial types who will mean well in the abstract sense, but will be disastrous in the real world.

Allon: I don't feel pressure. We know what you want. Once Henry begins to move, it will work out. It is impossible to know beforehand what is obtainable. It is time to move to the practical phase. He should come to the area, first to Jerusalem, then to Cairo.....

Vice President: If you can get unofficially the support of you and the two other important people [Rabin and Peres] that is the thing.

Kissinger: But if we can get what you want, then it is easy. But you must think about the alternatives if we can't get what you want.

Allon: Before saying bood-bye, let me mention the Chase-Manhattan Bank matter.

Vice President: My brother says he doesn't see how, with the number of loans domestically under water, that he can extend more credit.

Allon: It would be nice if he could arrange \$150 million when he visits Israel, because the other banks are waiting to see what Chase does.

Vice President: I can't really get into the family business. We have a banking liquidity problem here. If they call some of the loans, we would have a collapse.

Allon: What should we say now to the press? I'm having a press conference before I go.

Kissinger: You can say you have invited me, that I have accepted in principle, with the date to be worked out.



Vice President: Without Henry here, the possibility of developing cohesiveness in the West would be very small.

Allon: Henry told me all about you in 1957, when I was at Harvard in his Seminar. Why don't you come to Israel?



David S. Broder

The Flight From Power

As the work of the year begins in Washington, the most self-evident and the most significant fact about the national government is the weakness of its leadership. What is not so well understood is that this weakness—with all its fateful implications for the ability of the government to cope with the challenges facing this society—is not simply the result of historical accident. It is the direct byproduct of the negative attitudes toward the exercise of power that now dominate American thinking.

It is not just coincidence—a quirk of history—that neither the President nor the Vice President can claim a popular mandate and that the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate are so terribly tentative about exercising the mandate voted them by their fellow-legislators.

That Gerald Ford rejects comparisons with Franklin Roosevelt, despite Monday's "fireside chat"; that Carl Albert says he will never become another Joe Cannon; and that Mike Mansfield refuses to run the Senate as his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, did—all this says something, not just about those men, but about the times.

What it says is that the dominant ethic in America today is anti-authority. Most of us have concluded that the only way to "keep the big boys honest" is to chop down their power. And, as a result, we have produced a set of leaders whose common characteristic seems to be a deadly aversion to the risks and responsibilities of wielding power.

In this, they are true representatives of the American people. For we have come to feel over the past decade that strong leadership is likely to be wrong leadership. What we recall getting from our last two powerful Chief Executives is swollen government, inflation, Vietnam and Watergate—and we want no more of that.

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So, we have by our votes divided power and responsibility between a Congress of one party and an executive of the opposite party, and then given to each branch a political mandate to diffuse and subdivide its own quotient of that government power.

What we have not yet done is to recognize how effective that new mandate has been—and what its consequences are likely to entail. Mr. Ford's reaction to the excesses of his predecessor's concentration of power is to decentralize decision-making in his administration, to downgrade the size and the role of the White House staff, and to delegate decision-making to the departments and agencies. Whether that helps or hinders effective policymaking remains to be seen.

The Senate is what it has been for 14 years under the benign stewardship of Mike Mansfield, a body where every subcommittee chairman is a king, a place which encourages political dilettantism and the philosophy of "do your own thing." The cost in legislative productivity is high.

The House, which chafed under the control of Sam Rayburn and of the committee barons who divided power after his death, now is in full rebellion against its remaining power-wielders.

The entire thrust of the reform efforts in the House (as in the Democratic Party from which its majority is drawn) is to diffuse power as equally as possible among the newcomers and the veterans in the legislative-political game.

All of this has happened so quickly that the literature and rhetoric of American politics has been outdated by events. In the public mind, the "enemy" is still the political boss, the arbitrary chairman, the iron-willed leader, the imperial President—all of whom have either vanished from the scene or are being given the bum's rush out the front door.

The real enemy in Washington today is not arbitrary power but anarchy. The real question is whether there is sufficient leverage left for anyone to lead; whether anybody can truthfully be said to be minding the store.

Washington today is dominated by its freshmen—the new President and Vice President, the 103 first-term representatives and senators. They are a talented group, but they will need all of their talent—and some luck—to meet the challenge ahead.

Beginning this week, they will be measured, not against the fading public memory of the "tyrants" they replaced, but against the urgent public concern with the problems that remain. Those problems—the economy, energy squeeze, and the shifting international balance—require powerful remedies. And the freshmen who reflect America's flight from power now must find the means to harness power for the work that is at hand.



✓ VP/ Allan / Dinty / K (later)
Jan 17 75

Pass in

Small talk - Party at Kennedy center

- Last time they met.

- Dinty - good ambassador - youngest

Paras out

A - when I saw Ford as VP, was it here

S yes

D Doyon saw him ~~at~~ ^{at} day & you on his that day.

~~Q~~ ~~R~~ ~~P~~ We have in a way similar parties

VP Except you have operating exp.

As matter of fact I see a study for the on how to utilize - VP. Our study should show was no way to do it.

A when I met VP Ford last summer. To my surprise Ford was well briefed on NK - not just country call. I felt already I was speaking to a Pro. I spoke again last month - it pleasant but tough because he that own proposals since yesterday not only was he briefed ~~by~~ ^{on} what a P should be expected to be but that his mind was working & dealing w/ issues I didn't know before would come up.

I feel now we should move w/ a visit by K. P/O that, we get will be sterile - each will stick to his position. There is risk & K + OI prestige but it only way

R it is by ~~and~~ ^{prestige}. We are down to a wire now, but in a world. Under cent on power & use of power. We have democracy & some liberals are beginning to realize that. So prestige - you know how devoted I am to K - (Bureau story about K [he a genius])

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 10/10/04

BY llg NARA DATE 5/10/04



Broder

K's great ability is that group stability & get the heart of job

A If he had been SFS during WW II, would be the big man

R I mention prestige only because I think K is for all of us ... as you described Ford. I not know him well, but I truly impressed w/ his group, his listening, his perception. I proud to be a silent partner

A Don't underestimate yourself. Remember your remarks a while back during meetings, reported had you deep stuff. So was Ford so I speak

R Best odds we can get hold for a set, we will fall into a anomaly Broder described. I don't know Ash being on social prog. We always that we had money for everything. But we face bankruptcy - a trust series jobs at home. We are in a virtual wartime situation & we need a partner a few weeks in a war. I say this because that series are beyond prestige - if we are very good we may be able to pull them. If not, differences may not be able to survive a spell of change, a discontinuity. That is why I wanted to come down here to help L & R as a joint partner. I hope to help on domestic scene w/ a country press.

What you have done at home is great

A We had to get some set.

R Best you have taken courageous steps. D & the coming years character of P will become clear together. You will return

whether a set or become a member of Abu Dhabi.
US is a superpower but not an invulnerable
one when embargos.

Q I think you are getting budget, or I speak
indicated.

R George Bush said crisis how to get answer for demand
to act. It is for the world, but don't know
it is for Iraq. What they have been doing in IP
is not suitable. Get back to X...

Q The rising oil prices have nothing to do w/ Arab-
I conflict. It is an economic issue.

R I would agree partly. Iran had its own days
prey & New York & no way times benefited
especially from export, but it was sold by
OPEC

Q But when Iraq was asked, to send out is
business, not politics. Embargos did harm, but
a price, not. Itally, who gets out of way to please
Arab, it weak. Germany, which together, gets
a petrodollars. It is economic, not political

R But we can't hid ourselves. Use of oil can be
political just as embargo was. This crisis
changed them control not over energy but
finance

Q But when they make long term investments, they
have to be careful as they will jeopardize their
own own position

R They don't think in such long range terms. Another
thing, we don't control a gas supply where the
S. & Am. oil is intended essential to the
world. Superpowers are sitting ducks for
attack from 100's of trucks away.

A This is because balance of terms paralyzes strategies
now, they have gone back to concept of control of seas
as a way to stand their influence.

R I completely agree.

A They have an advantage now because their navy
is now, but when you get it going, yours in terms
will be far outclass them.

D And I think Indian Ocean + Persian Gulf will be
critical & - you should not want to leave
Sham al Shakh.

A There are 2 that straits in Red Sea. Sham +
Mandeb. If we control them, we can interfere
w/ their routes if they try to close off Bab el Mandeb.

R But we can't force new relations from Statesmen
& that is why it is so important. I know & know
you just got them as politician. I know.

A We have policy to American. In '49 we were pulled
back from U. Sinai in exchange for vague
assurances which led to war in '56. In '56 we
left Sinai for nothing on US advice. Russia got
credit because E that US acted because of Sov
pressure. K + Ford are diff; but this has no
deep w/in us. We trust all 3 of you.

I think we have a good letter & it possible to get
more than can be judged from 1st reaction.

It's a general Security buying.

US may not get all we want, but we need
to get things moving.

R I think that is essential.

A But I must get in return for w/ several months
which will satisfy. I must not look as if
being pushed into a corner.

R Postures don't pressure. One only concern is
~~know~~ that partnership may not remain but want
to generate common partners & understandings.

Q I talk R, once I feel brother's presence, I leave
a message. >

D We know it isn't so, but it must not
appear so.

R (K enters)

R What concerns me about VS is that we will get
in some abstract professional type who will
understand in abstract sense but not the
distinctions in real world.

// (Discussion of R's hearings.)
(Fr. Durian story)

Q I don't feel pressure. Who knows what you want.
Once R begins to move, ~~and~~ it will work
out. It is possible to know beforehand what is
obtainable. It time to move to a practical phase.
First Jerusalem, then Cairo, ...

R ~~if~~ If you can get unofficially a support of you & 2
other important people, that is a thing.

R But if we can't get what you want, then it's easy. But
you must think about alternatives if that works.

Q ~~if~~ Before saying goodbye, let me mention Chase's letter
back.

R My brother says he doesn't see how, w/ # of
loans already under water, that he can
stand more credit.

Q It would be nice if he could arrange 150 mil
when he visits I, because other banks are
wondering to see what Chase does.

R I can't really get into a family business. We have

a banking department part time, if they call some of
class, we could have a colleague

A What say to pros

K You can say you have invited, I have accepted
in principle, as/dates to be worked out.

R W/o K here, a possibility of dropping enthusiasm in a client
would be very small.

A K told me about you in 57 when I was in
in his seminar.

Why Why don't you come to I

