

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MR 01-125 #3: order 2/12/02

By dsc NARA Date 3/11/03

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to  
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, January 8, 1975  
9:24 - 10:48 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: Clements is not an intellectual, but he is a square shooter. We used to have fights, but he never bore grudges or leaked. I like him.

President: Let's talk to Don about it.

Kissinger: I have drafted a letter to Brezhnev. I made it general so that if he refuses, he is not rejecting you. State can then tell Dobrynin what has to happen.

The more I think about it, the better I think a Soviet rejection would be good. Byrd thought that a rejection would hurt Jackson. I told him the consequences -- they'd get credits from the Europeans -- and he said, "if you can get that across to the public, many Senators will breathe a sigh of relief."

Perle is a psychopath. You know the emigration issue will be a running sore. Even if Brezhnev's intention is good, you know there will be discrimination.

President: If they reject it, what will Jackson do?

Kissinger: He will try to cut the unused credits and claim it is a gigantic swindle.



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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

President: How about the Jewish Community?

Kissinger: They won't take the blame. They will be shocked and begin to blame us. The leaders who meet with you were already making demands on when the restriction would be lifted. It can't happen fast. If you had \$2 billion in credits to offer them, the Soviets might push, but not for \$300 million.

I said all along that the word "assurances" would get us into trouble. We will come under attack but I think we can easily turn it.

President: This is all involved in Democratic politics and personal ambitions.

Kissinger: I got the impression that Byrd is no great friend of Jackson. The letter to Brezhnev just restates the detente policy, really.

President: Go ahead and send it.

Kissinger: Jackson wants to have hearings on the Vladivostok agreement. He wants to cover.... [reads from paper].

My point is, first, this is a total invasion of Executive authority. The Congressional function is to approve treaties, not to participate in their negotiation.

President: We can't do that. He would want the notes of the NSC meeting.

Kissinger: He wants to know every bureaucratic position and why you made the decisions you did.

President: I think our strategy should be -- if Jackson comes up with a renegotiated resolution we should get our friends to add a clause that if we tried and the Vladivostok agreement failed, the supporters would vote for additional funds for defense.

Kissinger: Mondale and Kennedy have a resolution that is good. It puts the additional negotiation after the agreement is signed. I think you should put out firm instructions to all witnesses as to what they can say.



President: Would you draft them?

Kissinger: You may have to do it orally -- but maybe it should be in writing and confront the issue. If we don't do this, Jackson will unravel the whole thing. Jackson will rake us over the coals. [Described his experience.]

President: Let's do it by letter.

Kissinger: The witnesses shouldn't testify to anything but the final agreement, not internal positions or other options presented to the Soviets.

On air-to-surface missiles, I disagree with Schlesinger. You can't preempt Jackson this way. And if we try to change air-to-surface, the Soviets will ask for inclusion of subsonic cruise missiles. Maybe that is good, but my people think we are ahead in that.

President: I told Schlesinger that cruise missiles only survived because you insisted.

Kissinger: If we need cruise missiles for bomber penetration, they can be on ships and submarines timed to penetrate simultaneously. If we have to show how we screwed the Soviets, Jackson could sink the Vladivostok accord.

Now on the financial issue in the paper. This could be a disaster. Truman was dealing with a different generation with the Marshall Plan. This generation is a group of petty narrow politicians. The Europeans snipe at everything we try -- they object to being screwed.

The Europeans have now accepted Witteveen's second plan. We have resisted because it puts the Arabs in the driver's seat. IMF voting is proportional to the contribution. The Europeans like this because it relieves them of responsibility.

The Europeans will agree to our facility too. We have to keep the Witteveen fund small enough. It is useful only for small and medium countries who are moderately affected. If we could keep it at \$5 billion, it would be useless for the industrial countries or the basket cases. We must keep it at 5-6 and conditional on acceptance of our fund.



President: What leverage do we have?

Kissinger: It can't happen without us. Also we can reject the consumer-producer meeting. Simon agrees, but he won't stick with it. You should meet with us and tell him he can't yield without your approval.

President: Who will meet with....

Kissinger: Five, ten, twenty -- a whole week. Simon agrees. But he talks tough before the meeting and caves in at the meetings.

President: The paper says this is a British [Healey] proposal.

Kissinger: Yes. The Brits need the money now. Britain is a tragedy -- it has sunk to begging, borrowing, stealing until North Sea oil comes in.

We gain nothing by this facility. It is only to give the West the feeling it can master its destiny. That Britain has become such a scrounger is a disgrace -- but Britain will support us.

President: All this argues why we must be tough in the energy program.

Kissinger: I agree. Incidentally, that alleged threat of famine -- the Saudis called their Ambassadors in to say that no European country would be cut off -- just maybe the U.S. No European has told us that. It is okay for us because it will get Europe off our back in a war.

President: Will you give me a talking paper to talk with Simon?

Kissinger: If he can say he has no authority to give, he will be okay.

Sadat says I should go out on 3 February and stay there until it is finished; in the meantime we should send him our proposal. I am reluctant to do that. He looks desperate -- we could wake up and find him overthrown. If we give him a paper, he may say it is insufficient and publish it or he may accept and we may not be able to sell it to Israel.

If I go to Cairo on the 3rd in this circumstance....

It also is a sign of the times that Fahmy can go to Moscow but not here. Allon will give us nothing new. But I think we must tell him the U.S.



relationship depends on making a deal with Egypt. I think we have to tell them we need a promise of the passes and oil fields and rely on me to get what I can.

We need an agreement so that when Geneva reconvenes it won't be a two-bloc situation. We must also back Sadat and let him show that his method gets results.

Third, if we get a deal, it will take six to nine months to implement. This gives us 1975 to build our energy and economy. It doesn't solve our problems, but it gives us time and shows that those who work with us can make progress.

If we could get five kilometers on the Golan, we could keep it going for five years.

President: Should you tell Allon that we cannot approve the long-term authority if they don't go along?

Kissinger: Absolutely. And if the leaking doesn't stop, we will have to adjust our foreign policy. Maybe you should do it as well as I, so they really know.

Good news -- the political talks have started on Cyprus.


President: One quick thing on Vietnam.

Kissinger: We had a WSAG. Here is the situation. The cuts last year put them on static defense. You know that the GVN needs mobility and firepower to survive. If we don't get a supplemental, the WSAG think it will unravel.

President: Let's ask for one.

Kissinger: And I would mention in the State of the Union that here is a people who agreed to peace on the assumption of our support.

The only thing North Vietnam knows is massive brutality. There are signals we can give, but all it would cause is a little hell here. B-52's to Guam or Thailand. The problem in Thailand is elections -- I don't agree. We could put a carrier into the Tonkin.



The Pentagon should stop signalling carrier moves. We could move F-4's to Clark.

Another problem is that South Vietnam doesn't have mines. They could mine if things get out of control. But the DOD lawyers oppose it on the basis of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. That is insane. North Vietnam hasn't obeyed Article 7 at all. My people want to be able to claim we have obeyed Article 7.

President: I think we should do it.

Kissinger: One other thing. State wants a contingency paper in case we don't get the Supplemental, and we will face negotiations. But negotiations are useful only if there is a real military stalemate. [He described the "Ducky" example.] They are the toughest in the world to deal with.



Conditioned as by written doc.

Gen. Wolf -  
Answers to

PK 8 Jan 75

Wednesday  
9:24 - 10:48 AM

K Chromo not an intellectual, but he is a genuine scholar. We used to have fights, but he never swore, gesticulated, etc. I like him.

P Let's talk to Dean about it.

K I have ~~to~~ drafted a letter to Bug. Demand it go if he refuses, he not rejecting you. State can then tell us what has to happen.

None I think about it, better I think. See rejection would be good. Beyond that rejection would hurt Jackson. I told him <sup>(Euro credits, etc.)</sup> emergency & to say if you can get that across to public, many Senators would breathe a sigh of relief.

Perk is a psychopath. You know the emigration issue will be a recurring one. Even if Bug will is good, you know there will be discrimination.

P If they reject, what will Jackson do?

K He will try to cut unsecured credits & claim it a government scandal.

P How about Jewish community.

K They won't take blame. They will be shocked & begin to blame us. The leaders who met w/ you were already making demands on when restriction would be lifted. It can't happen fast & if you had 2 bil in credits, I might push, but not for 300 mil.

I said all along that a good agreement would get us into trouble. We will come under attack but I think we can easily turn it.

P This all involved in Dean's politics & pres. ambitions.

K I got impression beyond no great period of Jackson. The letter just restates details policy early.

P Grabner's send it.



K Jackson wants to have hearings on the agreement  
He wants to cover . . . . (read from paper)

My point is <sup>is</sup> that this is total invasion of your authority.  
<sup>Such</sup> the function is to approve treaties, not to participate  
in their negotiation.

P We can't do that. He would want notes of NCC only.

K He wants to know every bureaucratic position &  
why you made a decision you did.

P I think our strategy should be - if Jackson comes  
up w/ a negot. resolution, we should get our  
peers to add clause that if we fail to deal agreement  
passed, supporters would vote for additional funds.

K Mandate, Kennedy - have a resolution is good -  
put additional expts. after agreement signed.  
I think you should put out firm instructions to  
all witnesses as to what they can say.


P Would you do that?

K You may have to do it orally - but maybe it  
should be in writing & explicit issues of what  
do this Jackson will unravel a whole thing.  
Jackson will take no over a comb. (Bevin's  
his experience)

P Let's do it by letter.

K Witnesses shouldn't testify to any thing but ~~the~~  
the final agreement, not initial positions or other  
options presented to us.

Air-surface missiles of ~~the~~ & charges of ~~the~~ <sup>Schles</sup>  
You can't preempt Jackson this way. <sup>Only</sup> if we try  
to ~~change~~ change A-S, Sen will ask inclusion of  
SS cruise missiles. Maybe that is good, but  
any people think out one ahead.



P I told Schlos that cruise missiles only survived because you wanted it insisted.

K If you need cruise missiles for broader penetration, they can be on ships & subs trained to penetrate simultaneously. If we have to show how we screwed & sure, Japanese could sink Vlad.

Wider financial issues in paper. This could be a disaster. Truman was dealing w/ a big generation w/ Marshall Plan. This generation is pretty narrow political. E was wise at everything we try - they object to being heard.

E was have now accepted Witterman II. We have resisted cause it puts Arabs in high seat.

If all entry proportional to contribution. E was like this because it relieves their cap.

E was will agree to own facility too. We have to keep Witterman small enough it is useful only for small & medium countries who are immediately affected. If we could keep it at 5 but it would be useless for industrial countries as a basket case. We must keep it at 5-6 & essential on acceptance of our funds.

P What leverage

K Can't happen w/o us. Also can even reject 5-10 mtg. Sirin agrees, but he won't stick w/ it. You should meet w/ us & tell him he can't yield w/o your approval.

P who meet w/

K 5, 10, 20 - a whole creek. Sirin agrees, but he talks tough before a mtg & comes in a mtg.

P Paper says this as Brit (Hewley) proposal

K Yes. Brits need money now. Brit is a trader -



it has sunk to logging, burning, stealing  
until N Sea oil comes in.

We gain nothing by this possibility. It only to give  
a West feeling it can master its destiny. That  
he has become such a scavenger is ~~such a~~  
disgrace - but he will support us.

P All this argues why we must be tough in a  
energy prog.

H I agreed. Incidentally, that alleged threat from  
Soviet called this out. in to say no Euro country  
would be cut off - just maybe - US. The Euro has  
told us that. It's ok for us because it will get Euro off  
our back in a war.


\* P Will you give me a Turkish people to talk at / Union  
K If he can say he has no authority to give, he will  
be ok.

Sedat says I should go out on 3 Feb + stay til it  
finishes - meantime send him <sup>my</sup> proposal.

I reluctant to do that. He looks desperate - we could  
come up + find him elsewhere - so we give him  
a paper, he may say it in ref. + publish it a  
may accept + not be able sell to T.

If I go to Geneva on 3<sup>rd</sup> in this evening...  
I have sign of time Feb 10 says to know but not time.  
Dobler will give us nothing now. But I think  
we must tell him a US relationship depends on  
making a deal for W/E. I think we have to tell  
them we have a promise of power + oil fields +  
why we want to get what I want.

We need agreement so when Geneva it won't be  
a 2 hr situation. We must also arrange  
Sedat + let him show his method get results



3- If we get a deal, it will take 6-9 mos to implement. This gives us 1975 to build our budget & economy. Don't let the one problem, let give us time & show that those who work w/ us can make prog.

If we could get 5 here we could not could keep it going for 1 year.

P Should <sup>we</sup> tell them you cannot agree a long time ever if they don't go along

K Absolutely. And if nothing doesn't stop, we will have to adjust our F.P. Maybe you should do it as well as I, so they really know.

Good news - pub. talks have started on Cong. press.

P One quick thing - VN.

K We had US AG. Here set. Cuts last year don't you know - GVN needs stability & firepower to survive & put them on static leg. If we don't get a supplemental, US AG think it will unravel. ~~But~~

P ~~at~~ here ask for one

K and several countries in SEU that here is a people who agreed to peace on assumption of our support.

Only thing NUN knows is massive brutality. There are signals we can give, but all cause a little hell here. 2-52 is to Guam or Thailand. Part in Thailand is Vietnam - I don't agree. We could put carrier into Tonkin.

→ Pentagon should stop signaling carrier moves. We could move 5-40 to Clark.

Another prob is JVN doesn't have mines. They could mine if things get out of control. But DOD lawyers oppose on basis of article 9. That's insane. NUN hasn't



changed out 7 at all. Any people want to be with them  
we have changed out 7.

P I think we should do it.

K One other thing, State wants creating paper in  
case we don't get a supplemental, we will face  
negotiations. Negotiations are valuable if a real  
real statement. (Described Dunbar example). They  
are the toughest in a world to

