

MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**BY dal NARA DATE 2/17/09**

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
 Assistant to the President for National Security  
 Affairs  
 Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-N. Y.)  
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, November 12, 1973  
 4:00 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: Let me bring you up on the Middle East.

The airlift saved Israel. It was done over the objections of the DOD and State bureaucracy. I did it because I think if you act, you should do it decisively. Also the alert. You will hear it was a grandstand play. Whitlam says that. But I tell you it was a necessity.

They are clever -- they asked us to intervene jointly -- but we couldn't do that, and then they threatened to make a unilateral move. We sent a strong message. This gave them a bad time. I have said we would never have a conflict with them over Vietnam and definitely would over Europe. The Middle East -- it's a maybe.

Israel suffered badly in the war. The critical thing now is we have reached a settlement on the ceasefire. Israel has done well. The October 22 line isn't forced on them. The POW question is worked out, and resupply also. A permanent settlement will be the tough one. But both sides have a vital interest that it doesn't happen again.

The United States is the only country in the world supporting Israel. This doesn't mean Israel is wrong but that we must do our best to work out a settlement so one isn't forced on them. Without arms, Israel is

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finished, but ammunition alone won't save her. Defensible borders is what she needs. It is good we have contacts with Egypt -- we've now restored diplomatic relations -- and even with Syria, because then we rather than the Soviet Union can influence them.

Javits: Let one start with one observation. I appreciate the American aid. It has been 100 percent. Your standing in the Jewish Community is great. I just hope that the negotiations wouldn't come to fruition before Israel's elections. I don't believe the American people would stand to freeze on account of Israel. I believe the American people will be willing to underwrite a guarantee on Israel's security.

I see no problem with the Sinai and Gaza. Maybe with Sharm el-Sheikh. But the big problem is Jerusalem. But Hussein has some ideas that are worth pursuing. Hussein is discussing a federated state. A capital could be a Greater Jerusalem, and the holy places will be like the Vatican.

The only thing I'd like to mention is the economic relationship. The Middle East Commission. This group had some very good people in it. It worked out a three-year development plan for Jordan. It came to \$150 million a year. No one who has seen the traffic across the Allenby bridge could fail to see the economic potential.

Egypt was dissatisfied with the Soviet performance on the Aswan Dam. Egypt wants development. Our help can be a positive inducement.

You personally saved Israel. Henry Kissinger has been magnificent. The Jewish Community must be mobilized. We must remember the economic building blocks -- it's critical for Egypt and Jordan.

The Middle East can be a monument to you. I tell Israel the relations of conservative Republicans, and you, to Israel. I will fully cooperate.

I know your concern with the Jackson Amendment. I hope we can bypass it. If not, we must consider its relation to the Middle East settlement.

Kissinger: We need help with the \$2.2 billion supplemental.

Javits: I testified in support of it.



Now Europe. Here is a report of distinguished committee of the Nine. Brozio, Hastner, Van der Stoel, Peuson. For the United States, it was Wayne Hays and me. The report has been researched deeply. It's privately backed -- \$300,000. Mellon, Ford, and the Foundations. The Report was presented to the European Parliamentary meeting at Ankara. We also brought comments by the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Britain, and Luns.

Now the report. The United States has great credibility in Europe. The French guy was pure Gaullist -- he made a good contribution. You have great credibility in Europe. They do not think your ability to govern is impaired.

The nuclear umbrella we provide is very important. The report says we must resort to tactical nuclear weapons if necessary. It is an enormous thing for the Europeans to say.

The struggle now is for European freedom. The Soviet Union has the possibility of leaning economically on Europe so heavily -- from its needs -- as to Finlandize Europe. The Middle East crisis showed real dangers inherent here.

The report call for summit meetings. Europe isn't keen here.

I think a number of things can be done in the short term: (1) Europe is in trouble for two years on oil. We must be understanding even though they are shortsighted. We could cooperate through a new committee on energy R&D, transportation, storage, resources, etc. They are in trouble on oil and not strong enough to do what we did. This is better than rhetorical reaffirmation on the Alliance. (2) We should place the highest priority on the monetary arrangement with Europe. (3) They hope you can find an emissary to make the rounds of Europe on a continuing basis to exchange ideas and maintain a commonwealth. This could have helped in the Middle East. Does NATO have responsibility outside the NATO area? (4) There should be some modification of the McMahon Act. Europe needs some nuclear capability. This would give them a great sense of confidence and trust.

President: Whatever we planned to do with respect to Europe has been delayed by the Middle East. We'll be meeting probably early next year. What we desperately need is new ideas. We can't keep going to Congress to keep the troops, get offset, etc. You know it's getting tougher each year.



In a broad sense, without commenting on the specifics of your report, we all -- when we were in Congress -- thought of working on cooperation in the world. That was the enlightened liberal approach. Now the intellectuals are becoming the new isolationists. Korea, Vietnam, etc. Vietnam doesn't have the former's appeal. Collective security, multi-lateral assurances, are losing support in Congress. People like you -- who are not hawks, but realists -- must show the need for the Atlantic Alliance, which is greater than ever.

Now we have nuclear parity. In twenty years, the Chinese will be a great power. For the Europeans to go into business by themselves would be a disaster. We would be picked off one by one.

We have got to give life to the Alliance that will appeal to the Liberals. Remember the conservatives -- Taft, Goldwater -- used to be the isolationists. The free nations have to find new reasons to work together until the Communists really change. We must revitalize our alliances, and take advantage of energy crisis for cooperative ventures. We must be self-sufficient by 1980, but this is something to share. Nuclear power -- we have been too worried over that -- we might have to spend \$50-100 billion on energy.

Javits: I agree, and I would like to help. Cooperate on three points -- economics, culture and aid to the Third World -- would serve to revitalize the Alliance.

President: We would like to spend the defense budget on other things. But what the Soviet Union is doing is sobering. We can't allow the Atlantic Alliance, plus Japan, not to see the world threat. The problem of isolationism is not just in the United States; the French, Germans, and British are also. We can't sit here and think we can do it all -- we must cooperate.

Javits: It's in this report.

President: Good.



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Nixon, Kissinger, and Senator Jacob  
Javits meeting

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