

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY MS Appeal 09-67-52; NARA 718/10

BY del NARA, DATE 8/3/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Military Assistant to Secretary Richardson

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, April 11, 1973
8:00 a.m. (Breakfast)

PLACE: The Pentagon

SUBJECT: SALT

Richardson: Dealing with the asymmetries over time could lead to a relative advantage for the USSR.

The asymmetries we face are in MLBM's and numbers; the asymmetries they face are our bombers, MIRV's, and accuracy.

There are three ways to strike a balance: (1) have them offset, (2) an actual balance (numerical equality) or (3) permit a catchup over time.

My conclusion is that a combination of the three is best. The offset would be for the SS-9. The offset of disparate elements could be the SS-9 and heavy bombers, plus a MIRV ban on the SS-9. With freedom to mix.

Then apply equality to all the other systems, separately, like 850 for SLBMs. The same for ICBMs.



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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

To catch up -- let them MIRV their ICBM's and SLBM's.

Then you have to deal with the instabilities introduced by increasing accuracy, MIRV, etc.

These are the problems in a MIRV.

Kissinger: I am now opposed to a MIRV test ban. I have come to similar conclusions.

Richardson: There is a good paper by Archie Wood. Things we could give up. The best thing to give up is the air-launched strategic missile. It scares the hell out of me.

Kissinger: Why give up something which scares them?

Richardson: You could put four Minuteman on a 747. I have asked Foster for a project to develop this and let it leak. I have looked over all the things we are doing in case we want to renounce them.

SCAD/SRAM we shouldn't give up. They are important to the bomber systems.

Kissinger: On SALT I am moving in the same direction.

Yours is an ingenious way of dealing with Jackson.

There are two points on which I may differ: Why not lump ICBM and SLBM together rather than have a separate ceiling?

And shouldn't we try to get our 550 ceiling on the ICBM?

Richardson: How do we verify?

Kissinger: Let's ask CIA.

Richardson: I don't see how we can verify.

Kissinger: Shouldn't we start by agreeing to unequal numbers if they won't MIRV their land-based missiles? They won't agree, but then we could move into your idea.



Their SALT decision-making apparatus is screwed up. They can only react to an outside input. I have found it best to give them a theory rather than a plan.

My position differs from yours only in limiting MIRVs on ICBM.

Let's hold this close. Wait until Alex Johnson gets back, have a small Verification Panel meeting, and then an NSC meeting.

Richardson: Forward based systems: Try to talk in terms of long range, medium range, etc., and we could agree to limit our medium range if they will limit their IRBMs, etc.

Make to the Soviets a distinction between long range and medium range, not where the weapon is based.

This ought to be dealt with by MBFR.

Just raise this with the Soviet Union, don't try to deal with it now.

Kissinger: Try to keep this tight. I will discuss it with the President. We need CIA to tell us whether there is a verification problem on a partial MIRV ban.

We could have a Verification Panel meeting confined to the principals next week. Or just an NSC meeting. Within three days of Johnson's return on the 19th.



HAK - Richardson 11 April

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Wed, 11 Apr 13

8:00 AM

Breakfast mtg
at Pentagon

SALT

R - Dealing w/c asymmetries
asymmetries could lead to
relative advantage for USSR.

Asymmetries:

MIRV } SU
#4

Bombing } US
MIRV }
acc. }

3 ways to balance

- (1) Offset
- (2) Actual (missile equation)
- (3) Permit catching over
time

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R conclusion is that a
combination of C-3 is best
effect would be for SS-9.
Effect of disparate elements would
be SS-9 & heavy bombers, plus
a MIRV bomber SS-9. Feasible
to mix.

Then apply separately to all
other systems, separately
(like SSO for SLBMs)

Same for ICBM's
Catchup - but then MIRV ICBM
+ SBM

Then you have to deal w/
instabilities introduced by
an increasing accuracy, MIRV, etc



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- Think and problems in a MIRA
- K - I am now opposed to a
MIRA test here
I have come to similar conclusion
- R - There is a good paper - Archie
Wood, Things we could give up.
Best thing to give up is an
- ^{part} ~~comprehensive~~ missile. Scarschell
out of one
- H - Why give up something which
scarschell
- R - You could put 4 NNI on a 747
I have asked Foster for project
to do this + let it work.
I have looked over all the things we
are doing in case we want
to re-evaluate them.



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R - Seal/Screen and shouldn't
give up. They are important
to a number systems.

K - ~~Just~~ On SAT I am moving
in some direction.
Yours is ingenious way of dealing
w/ Jackson
2 points on which I may differ:
why not buy ICBNLSLBU
rather than a
disparate ceiling.
Shouldn't we try to get one
550 ceiling on ICBN.

R - How many?

R - Let's ask CIA.

R - Don't see how can we

K - Shouldn't we start by agreeing



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to ~~ensure~~ # if they want
MIRV land based.

They can't open, but then
we could move into your area.

K- Their SPAT claim in making
operations is secured up. They
can only react to an outside
input.

I have found it best to give
them a strong within area
plan.

My position differs from yours only
in limiting MIRV's on
ICBM.

K- better hold this close. Wait until
Johnson gets back, hold small
VP meeting, then on NSC only.



62 miles / 750 missiles
(ceding)
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R. FBS, Try to talk in terms
of LR, Med Range, etc, rather
of limit on med. range if
they will limit IRBM's, etc.

A-

504T 149 - FBS

R. ~~Wade~~ to S.V. destruction but
to R + Med Range, not where
comms based.

This ought to be dealt w/
by MBR.

Just advise this w/SV, don't
try to deal w/it now.

R. Try to keep this tight. I will



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discuss w/ PMS.

Will CIA & tell us whether
rehydration problem or potential
MIA.

K-G & would have P-mtg
referred to principals w/pt work.
On first am NSC mtg.

~~Do not we ask Johnson &~~

come

(w/in 5 days of Johnson)
return on 1/9/68

