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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum of Conversation

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BOX NUMBER 65

FOLDER TITLE December 8, 1973 - General Moshe Dayan

DATE WITHDRAWN 11/18/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST WHM



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

December 7, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Moshe Dayan
Saturday, December 8th

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan will be calling as a courtesy and to inform you of Israel's outlook as it prepares for the peace conference. Moshe Dayan's popular image was tarnished by the Israeli Defense Force's performance in the October war, but he retains the confidence of the Prime Minister and of a large number of conservative politicians from various political parties on questions of security. His assessment and advice, which tend to be pragmatic, will remain critical as Mrs. Meir moves Israel into negotiations. His public support for Israeli compromise would be an important factor in developing a national consensus behind any settlement, particularly among conservative Israelis.

Dayan sought and received Cabinet approval for his meetings in Washington. He may, therefore, be working under constraints as to the subject matter he is authorized to discuss. We would expect him to be preoccupied at this time with Israeli's security and the U.S. perception of its role in assuring that security.

The problems the IDF encountered during the initial phase of the October war have probably not altered Dayan's basic ideas about his country's security needs. While Dayan has been a staunch advocate of the need for new borders for Israel, he has never been enamored of the popular tendency in Israel to equate security solely with territory. He has been more

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inclined to define security in terms of sophisticated weaponry designed to meet specific challenges. When the October war began, Israel lacked both complete control of the sky because of the SAMs and an accurate stand-off weapon to blunt an armor attack in the absence of that control. Israel had requested weapons (Lance, glide bombs, Maverick, etc.) from the U.S. to meet these challenges but the requests were still under review at the time the war broke out. Thus, the war might not compel Dayan to revise his strategy except in terms of the urgency of its full implementation, which depends on the U.S.

Dayan's emphasis on sophisticated weapons and on meeting specific challenges permits him a degree of flexibility on security matters not shared by many Israeli civilians, nor by a number of military figures wedded to their particular branch. He was an early advocate (1970-71) of disengagement through some Israeli pullback in Sinai under an interim agreement. His approach in the present Kilometer 101 negotiations and in the forthcoming peace conference has been and will be to seek strategic comparability. Whatever concessions Israel makes in terms of territory must not reduce Israel's overall strategic security. Dayan does not appear particularly concerned about how this is done, whether by Arab concessions such as thinning out of forces or by technological means such as an effective long-range early warning system, provided Israel retains the deciding say in its own defense.

Secretary Kissinger is conducting intensive discussions with the Israelis and other parties to the peace conference.



Mike Dunn





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 7, 1973

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL JOHN M. DUNN
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Vice President's Meeting with
General Moshe Dayan, Saturday, December 8.

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan will be calling on the Vice President as a courtesy and to inform the Vice President of Israel's outlook as it prepares for the peace conference. Moshe Dayan's popular image was tarnished by the Israeli Defense Force's performance in the October war, but he retains the confidence of the Prime Minister and of a large number of conservative politicians from various political parties on questions of security. His assessment and advice, which tend to be pragmatic, will remain critical as Mrs. Meir moves Israel into negotiations. His public support for Israeli compromise would be an important factor in developing a national consensus behind any settlement, particularly among conservative Israelis.

Dayan sought and received Cabinet approval for his meetings in Washington. He may, therefore, be working under constraints as to the subject matter he is authorized to discuss. We would expect him to be preoccupied at this time with Israel's security and the U.S. perception of its role in assuring that security.

The problems the IDF encountered during the initial phase of the October war have probably not altered Dayan's basic ideas about his country's security needs. While Dayan has been a staunch advocate of the need for new borders for Israel, he has never been enamored of the popular tendency in Israel to equate security solely with territory. He has been more inclined to define security in terms of sophisticated weaponry designed to meet specific challenges. When the October war began, Israel lacked both complete control of the sky because of the SAMs and an accurate stand-off weapon to blunt an

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
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By WJA NARA, Date 11/7/11

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Secretary Kissinger is conducting intensive discussions with the Israelis and other parties to the peace conference. We do not recommend that the Vice President get into these details but for his background we are providing a summary of where we stand on some of the key questions, as well as some suggested talking points.


Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Issues and Suggested Talking Points.
2. Biographic information, Dayan - Ambassador Dinitz.
3. Cable from Tel Aviv (9895).



ISSUES/TALKING POINTS

1. Courtesy Talking Point: Ben-Gurion's Death

Dayan was a protege and close political associate of David Ben-Gurion.

Suggested Talking Point:


-- Express your personal sorrow at Ben-Gurion's death.

2. The Cease-fire and the Peace Conference

The Six-Point Agreement for the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was negotiated by Secretary Kissinger and has been implemented in all its major features, except one: The Israelis and Egyptians have been unable to reach agreement on the disengagement of their forces. Their talks--their first real face-to-face negotiations since 1949--at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road have been suspended. The Kilometer 101 talks may be resumed, we just don't know at this time, or it may be necessary to transfer the disengagement issue to the top of the agenda for the Geneva conference. Israel has been willing to work with Egypt toward some form of limited disengagement in order to reduce tension on the front lines but has not been willing to go along with Egypt's tendency to link cease-fire-connected disengagement to future Israel withdrawals from occupied territory.

Israel has agreed to participate in a peace conference but feels strongly that the talks with the Arab states should be direct and separate even though they may progress simultaneously. It is our interpretation of Security Council Resolution 338 that it calls for direct negotiations, a goal long sought by Israel but not accepted by the Arabs until they accepted Resolution 338. Israel wants U.S. and Soviet participation to be as pro forma as possible. Israel will balk at Palestinian representation since it could imply the creation of a separate Palestinian state, an idea Israel rejects.

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Suggested Talking Points:

-- The President is firmly committed to doing whatever is within our power to assure the present opportunity for peace in the Middle East is not lost.

-- I think it would be useful for me to hear your views on the cease-fire situation and how you see the negotiations developing in Geneva.

3. Military Supply


In the October war Israel felt the absence of a strategic reserve of equipment which forced it to pull or delay some of its punches for fear of further equipment losses. Israel is asking the U.S. to provide such a strategic reserve particularly in tanks, aircraft, and trucks. It is further asking the U.S. to provide an effective and relatively risk-free counter to Arab SAM defenses. Israel is trying to negotiate an agreement with DOD to exploit captured Soviet equipment, such as elements of the SAM 6, which would give Israel the benefit of any technology and weapons developed as a result of this joint exploitation. Israel continues to firmly oppose any attempt to relate weapon deliveries to political performance and is extremely sensitive to any hint along these lines.

Suggested Talking Point:

-- The U.S. is determined to see that Israel receives the arms it needs to defend itself both now and in the future. It is the policy of the Administration and the will of Congress that Israel's security be ensured.

4. Economic Support

While Israel's economy has appeared to have come through the war in reasonable condition, it is still very early to have a complete picture of how the situation will develop. Israel has estimated the cost of the war at \$5 to \$6 billion, which is a total figure involving both direct and indirect costs such as exports and production foregone, housing and other construction not



completed. One Israeli estimate puts the loss of civilian production due to the war at \$450 million and anticipates an eventual loss in the export of goods and services in 1973 of \$200 to \$250 million. Israel estimates its assistance requirement to be at about \$3 billion and has indicated its hope that the entire \$2.2 billion which the Administration has requested from Congress be in the form of grant aid. We have already shipped Israel arms worth about \$1 billion in our war and post-war resupply effort which would be paid for out of this special appropriation.

Suggested Talking Points:

-- Both the Administration and Congress want to provide the financial assistance necessary for Israel to finance its strong armed forces while maintaining a high level of growth, absorbing new immigrants and helping the needy.

-- We are hopeful that Congress will pass the necessary \$2.2-billion special appropriation which we have requested. It is unclear now to what extent Congressional action will give the President discretion to decide how much of our assistance will be grant and how much will be loans.

5. U.S.-Israel Security Treaty

Note: We suggest the Vice President not raise this issue but Dayan may and the following is provided in the event he does so.

Israel has more or less rejected out of hand any concept of external guarantees for its security and tends to lump the idea of a treaty relationship with the U.S. into this category. In the past weeks, however, an Israeli newspaper commentator (Dan Margalit) who is often identified as speaking for Dayan, wrote an article stressing that Israel should look more closely at the possibility of a treaty relationship, particularly in the context of a document ratified by the Senate and thus



binding on future administrations. Israel's, and particularly Mrs. Meir's greatest concern is that the U.S. thinks of a security guarantee as a substitute for defensible borders for Israel.

Suggested Talking Point:

-- This is one idea that has been mentioned in the past which has its advocates in Congress. The important point, however, is that the U.S. has no intention of denying Israel the right and wherewithal to defend itself and does not want to assume the burden itself. At the same time, we want to keep an open mind about any forms of guarantees the parties may agree on which would bulwark a settlement.



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FOLDER TITLE December 8, 1973 - General Moshe Dayan

DATE WITHDRAWN 11/18/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST WHM

Simcha DINITZ
(Phonetic: DInnits)

ISRAEL

Ambassador to the
United States

Addressed:
Mr. Ambassador



Simcha Dinitz, one of the more successful younger men in Israel's government, presented his credentials as Israel's Ambassador to the United States on April 9, 1973. He was born in Tel Aviv on June 23, 1929. He attended the Herzlia secondary school, served with the Jewish Settlement Police and took an army officers' training course prior to 1950, when he came to the United States to obtain his higher education. After briefly attending the University of Cincinnati (1950-51), he received a B.S. degree (1954) and an M.S. degree cum laude (1957) from the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. While earning his master's degree, Dinitz worked as a night watchman and messenger at the Israeli Embassy. In 1957 he became an information officer at the Embassy.

Returning to Israel in 1958, Dinitz was assigned to the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry. Appointed Deputy Director of the Director General's office in the Ministry in 1960, he was later promoted to Director. In 1962 he was named Political Secretary to then Foreign Minister Meir and the following year, Director of her office. After Mrs. Meir resigned as Foreign Minister in January 1966, Dinitz was appointed Minister at the Embassy in Rome. In 1968 he was transferred to the Embassy in Washington as Minister of Information.

Dinitz was appointed Political Secretary to the Prime Minister in the summer of 1969. In that capacity he handled Mrs. Meir's appointments, wrote a number of her speeches, often represented her at official meetings, and supervised routine office business. As the ailing Yaacov

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Herzog, Director General of the Prime Minister's Office, became increasingly incapacitated, Dinitz assumed many of his duties. Upon Herzog's death in April 1972, Dinitz was named to the post.

During the early 1960's Dinitz attended several sessions of the UN General Assembly. He accompanied Mrs. Meir on visits to the United States in December 1971 and March 1973. In May 1972 he traveled with Mrs. Meir on her state visit to Romania, and the following month he attended the Conference of the Socialist International held in Vienna.

The Ambassador has been described as pragmatic, energetic and articulate. He is a very cordial and outgoing individual. His wife, Vivian, who was born in Cincinnati, is quiet and charming. Both the Dinitz' speak fluent English. The couple has three children: Dorit, born in 1955; Tamar, born in 1956; and Michael, born in 1962.

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ACTION NEA-12

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E.O. 13526, 13527, 13528, 13529, 13530, 13531, 13532, 13533
State Dept. Guidelines
By Ha NARA, Date 11/17/11

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, IS
SUBJ: WHERE DAYAN STANDS TODAY

BEIRUT POUCH BAGHDAD

1. DURING FIRST MONTH AFTER CEASEFIRE DAYAN EMERGED AS STATESMANLIKE ADVOCATE OF REALISM AND FLEXIBILITY, ONE OF FIRST TOP ISRAELI LEADERS TO EXPRESS PUBLICLY A PERSONAL VIEW THAT OCTOBER WAR MIGHT HAVE CREATED OPENING TO DURABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT. DAYAN WAS ELOQUENT IN HIS APPRECIATION FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE, COGNIZANT OF IMPORTANCE OF GOOD US-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP AT TIME WHEN ISRAEL STOOD VIRTUALLY ISOLATED IN WORLD COMMUNITY, AND CONSTRUCTIVE IN HIS VIEW THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE FAR REACHING CONCESSIONS AT PEACE CONFERENCE.

2. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, AT DECEMBER 5 LABOR PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING DAYAN RESTATED THAT ISRAEL IS GOING TO PEACE CONFERENCE PREPARED TO MAKE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR A PEACE AGREEMENT. HE



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REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE INTERLOCKING ELEMENTS FOR DETERMINING FUTURE ISRAELI BORDERS--PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC DEPTH, STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT FO IDF, AND A US TREATY OR GUARANTEE. PRESS QUOTES HIM AS ADDING: "I DO NOT EXCLUDE ANY OF THESE COMPONENTS FROM THE SUM TOTAL FOR DETERMINING ISRAEL'S FUTURE BORDERS". HE ALSO IS SAID TO HAVE STATED, " I WOULD LIKE US TO BE IN THE PICTURE IN SOME WAY. I WOULD NOT LIKE THEM TO PULL OUT AND LEAVE ONLY THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR POEOPLE HERE."

3. AT SAME MEETING DAYAN ALSO STATED THAT HE ACCEPTED LATEST LABOR PARTY PROGRAM (TEL AVIV 9619) BECAUSE IT OPPOSED RETURN TO JUNE 4, 1967 BORDERS AND REJECTED IDEA OF CREATING INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN. EMERGENCE OF SUCH A STATE, HE SAID, WOULD SIGNAL BEGINNING OF DESTRUCTION OF STATE OF ISRAEL.

4. DURING PAST SEVERAL WEEKS DASAN HAS ALSO MADE SEVERAL HEARDLINE SPEECHES REAFFIRMING HIS SUPPORT FOR PRINCIPLES OF GALILI DOCUMENT. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE CHANGED HIS VIEWS ON LEGITIMACY AND IMPURTANCE OF JEWISH SETTLEMENT POLICY INCLUDING HIS PET PROJECT FOR CITY OF YAMIT IN RAFAH JUNCTION AREA. HOWEVER, HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID DEC 5 THAT CURRENT DICUSSION OF GALILI DOCUMENT'S VALIDITY IS MOOT.

5. DAYAN'S MORE HARDLINE STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN IN PART AN EFFORT TO SHORE UP HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL FORTUNES. IN WAKE OF WAR, AND PARTICULARLY AS PUBLIC HAS BECOME MORE AWARE OF LEADERSHIP FAILURES CONCERNING IDF PREPAREDNESS AND CONDUCT OF WAR, DAYAN'S DOMESTIC POSITION HAS BEEN SIGNI- FICANTLY WEAKENED. POLLS SHOWED MARKED DROP IN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN HIM, SEVERAL COMMENTATORS AND MEMBERS OF LABOR PARTY CALLED FOR HIS RESIGNATION, AND ISSUE OF WHETHER HE SHOULD BE DROPPED FROM NEXT CABINET BECAME IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF LABOR PARTY DEBATE ON HOW TO REGAIN PUBLIC SUPPORTM.

6. DAYAN'S FUTURE CLEARLY IS UP IN THE AIR. AT DEC 5 CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING HE REPEATED HIS READINESS TO TENDER HIS RESIGNATION IF MRS MEIR OR LABOR PARTY ASKS FOR IT. HE ADDED THAT HE HAS NEITHER ASKED NOR BEEN ASKED TO PART OF NEXT CABINET. WHAT HAPPENS TO DAYAN (AS TO REST OF TOP

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LEADERSHIP) DEPENDS IN LARGE MEASURE ON OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS AND ON ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGRESS TOWARD MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. MRS MEIR'S PERSONAL PREFERENCE DOUBTLESS IS TO KEEP HIM ON, BUT HER FREEDOM IN THIS REGARD WILL BE CONDITIONED BY WHAT HAPPENS ON DECEMBER 31. AS OF NOW, NEITHER DUMPING OF DAYAN IN FORMING NEXT GOVERNMENT, NOR DRAMATIC COMEBACK BY HIM AS SECOND MOST INFLUENTIAL PERSON IN GOI CAN BE EXCLUDED.
KEATING

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