



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXV • No. 1944 • September 27, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER MEETS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER
AT ZURICH AND CONFERS WITH BRITISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN LEADERS

Transcripts of News Conferences 377

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES AUGUST 18 INCIDENT AT PANMUNJOM
AND ITS AFTERMATH

Statement by Assistant Secretary Hummel 386

SECRETARY KISSINGER DISCUSSES U.S. POSITION
ON LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 395

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

JUL 28 1976
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXXV, No. 1944
September 27, 1976

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes select press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic \$42.50, foreign \$53.15
Single copy 85 cents

The Secretary of State has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through January 31, 1981.

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Secretary Kissinger Meets With South African Prime Minister at Zurich and Confers With British, French, and German Leaders

Secretary Kissinger left Washington September 3 for a trip to London, Zurich, Paris, and Hamburg. Following are transcripts of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at Zurich on September 6 and a news conference held by the Secretary and Federal German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at Hamburg on September 7.¹

NEWS CONFERENCE, ZURICH, SEPTEMBER 6

Press release 416 dated September 6

Ladies and gentlemen: Let me explain, first, what we are trying to do; secondly, the evolution of these negotiations; and thirdly, the various elements that have to be reconciled in these negotiations. And then I will take your questions.

The United States is making an effort to bring an end to the mounting crisis in southern Africa. The United States is conscious of the fact that an escalating guerrilla war is already taking place in Rhodesia, that conditions in Namibia will inevitably lead to a similar crisis. And of course we are also aware of conditions in South Africa.

The United States is making a serious effort in order to see whether we can achieve the following objectives: majority rule and minority rights; a peaceful end

to the disagreements; and negotiation that enables all of the communities to live side by side under conditions of dignity and progress.

We do so in the interest of world peace, because continuing conflict in Africa will inevitably bring in the interests of outside powers and runs a major risk of turning Africa into an area of contention of non-African countries.

We do so in the national interest of the United States, because of our interest—we have a profound interest in a world of peace, in a world that respects human dignity, and in conditions of economic advance.

And thirdly, and above all, we do it in the interest of the peoples of the area. They will be those who suffer most from a continuation of conflict. They will have to pay the price for any failure of negotiations. And they will have to be considered, as alternatives to peaceful resolution are being considered.

Now to the talks that have been taking place here in the last two days. The purpose of these talks has not been to develop a joint American-South African program. The evolution of these talks and what has brought us to this point is as follows.

On my visit to Africa in April, all African leaders urged a solution to the problems of southern Africa through quiet discussions with the Prime Minister of South Africa; that for many of these problems the policies of his government held the key if a peaceful solution was to be achieved.

¹Other press releases relating to the Secretary's Sept. 3-8 trip are Nos. 411 of Sept. 3; 412 of Sept. 4; 415 of Sept. 5; 417, 419, and 420 of Sept. 7; and 422 of Sept. 8.

Based on these views, we initiated contact with the Government of South Africa.

Prior to my meeting with Prime Minister Vorster in Germany in June, we solicited the views of the black African governments as to the subjects to be discussed and as to the conditions under which they believed a peaceful solution to the problems of southern Africa was achievable. We presented their considerations to the South African Prime Minister in June. Those discussions led to a certain amount of progress.

After those discussions the United States sent two missions to the black African states. The United Kingdom, whose role is crucial in all of these actions, which has a historic responsibility for Rhodesia, and to whose cooperation and wisdom in this matter I would like to pay tribute, also sent two missions to Africa.

On the basis of these two American and two British missions, a new set of considerations was developed which formed the basis for my discussions with the South African Prime Minister over the last two days. Those discussions have been fruitful. I believe that progress toward the objectives which have been jointly developed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the states of black Africa has been made. It is our view that a basis for further negotiations exists, though work still remains to be done.

In assessing the prospects you have to keep in mind that we are dealing with a negotiation of extraordinary complexity in terms of the issues involved and in terms of the parties involved.

In attempting mediation there is, first of all, the United States and the United Kingdom. We have worked together in close harmony and with no significant differences, but we have had to coordinate our positions, and we have done so successfully.

Within Africa we are dealing internationally now with two major problems—the problem of Rhodesia and the problem of Namibia. They both have the same objectives; that is to say, independence, ma-

majority rule, minority rights, and assurances for economic progress.

The United States and, I think I am safe in saying, the United Kingdom strongly support these objectives. But in achieving these objectives we are dealing with two different sets of parties in each case.

The problem of Namibia is between South Africa, the various groups that have formed the constitutional conference within Namibia, and certain outside groups such as SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], which had been excluded from the negotiations up to now plus such neighboring states as Angola that has—with which our communications are not, shall we say, ideal.

With respect to Rhodesia, the problem is between four so-called frontline states—that is, states that are bordering Rhodesia—four black states bordering Rhodesia three independence movements; Rhodesian white authorities that are not recognized by either the United States or the United Kingdom; and South Africa, which does not recognize the Rhodesian authorities as a government and which has given support to it in one way or another.

In other words, we are dealing with two different problems, five states, four liberation movements in black Africa, and South Africa, plus the authorities of Rhodesia and the authorities within Namibia. Nevertheless, with all of these complexities, and while we must expect ups and downs, I believe that conditions for a negotiation exist on both issues.

The United States will work for the objectives that I have described.

The United States is opposed to violence and the United States is opposed to outside intervention. The United States does believe that the objectives of majority rule, minority rights, and economic progress for all the peoples of the area are attainable with patience, with good will, and with dedication. And the United States is prepared, together with the United Kingdom, to offer its good offices in the attainment of these objectives.

And now I will be glad to answer your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say whether you made any progress here toward setting up a negotiating framework for resolving the Namibia question?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to say before I answer any questions that I hope you ladies and gentlemen will understand that at a time before we have had the opportunity to inform the leaders of black Africa of the details of the negotiations, something which we will do in the immediate future, you will understand that I cannot go into details on many of the questions that you may ask me.

I believe—just a minute, I have not answered him yet—I believe that progress has been made toward setting up a negotiating framework, but of course we will have to await also the reaction—in Namibia, the reaction of other leaders.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did Prime Minister Vorster show any signs of a willingness to recognize SWAPO in Namibia?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United States has stated that it favors the participation of all groups in negotiations, and clearly we include SWAPO in this. It is of course up to the Prime Minister to speak for his position. But it is our view that a negotiating process will have to include such groups as SWAPO.

Q. Sir, do you envisage the possibility of your meeting with Mr. Smith [Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian D. Smith]?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no present plans to meet with Mr. Smith, and this would depend entirely on assurance that a successful outcome of the negotiations will occur. But at this moment there are no plans to meet with Mr. Smith, and there are no—it would be totally premature to speculate on it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us if you had any communication with the leaders

meeting in Dar es Salaam and what your plans are regarding your trip to Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: There has been a meeting of the leaders in Dar es Salaam which only began a few hours ago. We have been in touch over the weekend with some of the leaders, but that was prior to their assembling. My own plans are to return to the United States tomorrow. I am ready to continue the negotiations in Africa if the parties should desire. We will communicate the results of these meetings to the parties, and we believe that conditions exist for the continuation of these negotiations.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I have a question in two parts: (a) have you been in contact with black African leaders in Rhodesia, and (b) how do you see the prospects of bringing these black leaders of Rhodesia together?

Secretary Kissinger: On my trip to Africa in April, I agreed with the Presidents of the so-called frontline states, that is, states that border the—that border Rhodesia, that a repetition of Angola should be avoided.

By this we mean that the outside powers, and especially the superpowers, should avoid direct contact with the so-called liberation movements and let the liberation movements be dealt with by the black African states. We therefore have been in only very infrequent contacts with the black leaders of Rhodesia, and we have always informed the leaders of black Africa of these contacts.

We believe that the unification of this leadership is a task not for the United States, but is a task for black Africa. We hope very much that other outside powers exercise similar restraint.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you get an invitation to visit South Africa? Are you in favor of going there?

Secretary Kissinger: Prime Minister Vorster did extend an invitation to visit South Africa.

A visit by me to South Africa would de-

pend on whether negotiations on the solution of problems of southern Africa are going forward. It would, in any event, be preceded by a visit to black Africa; and the program I would take to South Africa would reflect, as did all previous programs, the considerations of the black African leaders that I have met.

In other words, a visit by me to South Africa would be in the interest of peace of southern Africa and would not be a protocol visit by a Secretary of State.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you well know, many of the Africans have said that the time for talk is past and the time is now for fighting. Beyond the general expression of views that you have given here as to the U.S. and British intentions, are you now in a position to propose specific financial, political, and other suggestions that you have been able to agree with Prime Minister Vorster to the black leaders, or were you essentially only holding open the possibility of good offices without any concrete offers?

Secretary Kissinger: We are moving toward a position where we will be able to put to the leaders of black Africa a concrete program by which the objectives that I have described can be achieved for both Namibia and Rhodesia.

We do not yet have all the details, but we are moving in that direction. And the leaders of black Africa at that point will have to decide first whether the program meets those needs, which I would hope it does, and whether they are prepared to go the route of negotiations or whether they prefer the route of armed struggle.

Q. Just to follow that up, does that represent a joint U.S.-South African position, or individual views which vary on the two subjects in some respect on Rhodesia and Namibia?

Secretary Kissinger: I have pointed out that there is no joint U.S.-South African position. The proposals we have put to South Africa have emerged from our discussions with the leaders of black Africa.

Of course those that are then accepted by South Africa would tend to create a consensus. And in any negotiation a point must be reached where all parties agree, if it is to succeed. But the proposals we have put forward had been developed first in consultation with the leaders of Africa and are now being discussed with leaders of South Africa.

Q. In case that the African summit in Tanzania decides on black rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, what will be your next step?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to speculate on decisions that the summit in Dar es Salaam may make. If it recommends majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, the United States has already indicated its support for it. The issue is not what is the objective but how it is to be achieved—one, by what negotiating procedure, and second, under what concrete conditions. And there we have attempted to shape the proposals we have received from Africa and the views we have heard from South Africa into the program which we hope will be acceptable to all of the parties. But of course the solution can only come by the agreement of the parties concerned and not by an imposition by the United States.

Q. Does your program that you are drawing up involve changes in South Africa as well as Namibia?

Secretary Kissinger: The negotiations—the international negotiations at this moment concern Rhodesia and Namibia. The United States has stated its view with respect to South Africa last week and has had a response from South Africa as well.

Q. Does South Africa [inaudible]?

Secretary Kissinger: No. It has been publicly stated. And I am certain that the Prime Minister of South Africa will speak for himself when he meets the press.

Q. Has South Africa agreed to help finance any guarantees program in Rhodesia?

Secretary Kissinger: There has been an

extraordinary amount of speculation about this so-called guarantees program. Our concern is not simply to deal with the minority—with the white minority in Rhodesia; our concern is an economic program that brings about the economic advancement of all of Rhodesia and, within that context, to provide opportunities for all races and all communities to live side by side with some security and with some assurances against rapid changes in their position. This program is still in a state of evolution, and its details will have to await the precise discussions, though progress has been made in these and previous talks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported this morning on the radio that if the Dar es Salaam people take the results of your talks quite well, it is thought that there may be a Namibia conference in Geneva quite shortly, by the beginning of October, say.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to go into specifics over negotiations that are still going on. But obviously, if independence for Namibia is to be achieved, there will have to be a conference. There has to be a location, and there will have to be an agreement as to participants. And you can safely assume that this is one of the subjects we are discussing right now. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, you are to meet tomorrow President Giscard d'Estaing. Will you discuss with him about the selling to South Africa of its installations for treatment [inaudible]?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not commit suicide twice in a row. [Laughter.] It's also physically impossible. [Laughter.] And I will attempt to arrive in France for once without outraged statements in the French press.

When I meet the President of France, my primary objective is to review with him the state of these negotiations and the world situation, as we always do, in a spirit of friendship and cooperation. I do not have on my agenda any specific French

commercial transactions, but rather the general strategy that the United States and other countries are pursuing with respect to southern Africa, to get the benefits of the views of a leader whose opinion we value greatly and of whose friendship we are proud.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you used the term "progress" here, and so did Mr. Vorster. "Progress," of course, is a very rubbery term diplomatically. Is there any way under the limitations upon you, with your diplomatic requirements, that you can be in any way any more specific on any one of these spheres rather than telling us that progress has been made? Can you give us any kind of measurement or increment of progress?

Secretary Kissinger: Should I say progress is at hand? [Laughter.] We change the noun every four years.

I would say we have made progress both with respect to procedure and with respect to substance. I would want to repeat again that I measure this progress by the opinions we have previously collected from our various missions to Africa and the objectives which we have stated for the United States and, I believe, for the United Kingdom. And we believe that progress is being made with respect both to the procedures and to the substance, though of course the many parties that I have described previously must make the final judgment on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when will the proposals you have outlined here be presented to the [inaudible]?

Secretary Kissinger: Our tentative plan is to send Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs William E.] Schaufele to Africa, but we may modify this. But this is our tentative plan, and in any event, you can be sure that by one means or another they will be presented within the next 48 hours.

Q. Mr. Secretary, before these negotiations started, before the talks here started, it was generally thought that the Namibian prob-

lem might be a little more tractable than the Rhodesian one. Is that still your view now?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, anybody who makes estimates of the tractability of African problems is being very rash. I would think that the Namibian problem, having fewer parties, and being at an earlier phase, in which procedure is as yet more dominant than substance, may lend itself to more rapid progress. I want to make clear that as far as the United States is concerned we are prepared to move at a pace as rapid as it is possible to achieve agreement among the parties on both of these issues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how [inaudible] will the United Nations come into the negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United Nations has, of course, a role in South West Africa, which some of its representatives carry out very vocally. There will be a role for the United Nations, and this is one of the subjects that is now under discussion. But the United States supports a role for the United Nations in these negotiations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much further do you think your negotiations about Rhodesia can go on without contact or reference to what is the de facto government?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, somebody will have to be in contact with the authorities in Salisbury, and I believe that those possibilities of contact exist, but it doesn't necessarily have to be the United States at this stage.

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FEDERAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT²

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chancellor and Mr. Foreign Minister, let me take this opportunity first of all to thank both of you

for the characteristically warm and cordial reception that we had here.

It is customary for American and German Ministers to consult with each other about international events. We are at this moment engaged in discussions with various African countries, and it was therefore considered very desirable by the President as well as myself to have this opportunity to exchange ideas and to obtain the views of the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister.

We reviewed the negotiations with respect to southern Africa; we discussed the situation in the Middle East; we talked also about the Law of the Sea Conference and about East-West relations in general.

Relations between our two countries are close; the coordination of policies is taking place on every level, including the higher level. The policies of both countries have shown great continuity and will continue to show this. And for all these reasons, it has been a great pleasure for me to be here. I want to thank the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister for giving us this opportunity to exchange ideas.

Chancellor Schmidt: I don't think I have to add much to this, ladies and gentlemen. We have touched upon just about all areas of foreign policy. Secretary Kissinger has already mentioned some of them.

I should add that of course we have talked especially about East-West relations, the continuation of the policy of "relaxation of tensions," about the agreements to which both the United States of America and we are signatory parties and the observance of which by ourselves and by the other treaty partners we both feel is of great importance.

Maybe I should confine myself to this and leave room for questions, which, as I hope, will be directed mainly to Mr. Kissinger, who, as the guest here, will be the more interesting man to answer than the born Hamburger or the Wuppertaler who came to us via Bremen from Saxony to become Foreign Minister.

² Held at Hamburg on Sept. 7 (text from press release 421).

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you both talked about Africa, may I talk about Africa? Can you make it official, sir, that you will be going to an African shuttle, when will you go, to which capitals will you go, and which parties will you negotiate between?

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot at this point make it official. We have had a communication from the Tanzanian Government that they would welcome a visit. I would like to wait, however, until Assistant Secretary Schaufele, who is now on his way to Tanzania, has had an opportunity to talk to President Nyerere and maybe to other Presidents who have been at this meeting before we make the final decision whether to go.

Q. What are the odds, in fact, sir, that you will go, and could you outline the kind of shuttle in which you would engage?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it would depend very much on the decisions of the summit, of which we have not yet been formally informed. What we will attempt to do is to bring together the so-called frontline Presidents that are concerned with Rhodesia, as well as the liberation movements concerned with Rhodesia, on a negotiated program for majority rule and minority rights and an end of warfare in Rhodesia. We would also encourage the process of negotiation that may be possible with respect to Namibia.

The U.S. objective is to avoid violence. We cannot support violence, and we are bound to oppose foreign interventions. But we will support peaceful negotiations between the various parties. Which countries would be visited—I will want to wait until we have had the official communications from the summit.

Q. Mr. Secretary, although you have not had formal notification from Dar [es Salaam], you know that they finished their deliberations with a brief statement that said that they intend to further intensify the

armed struggle. What kind of an analysis do you make of that?

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot make a judgment as to this. The U.S. position is to encourage a peaceful solution, to bring about conditions in which majority rule, minority rights, and economic progress can be achieved without violence.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how soon could you be prepared to leave, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is difficult to speculate, but I would be prepared—if the conditions were right, I could leave perhaps next week sometime. But I want to repeat I would first want to await the report of Assistant Secretary Schaufele.

Q. When would you expect to receive this?

Secretary Kissinger: I would think that I would have heard from him by Thursday morning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think the domestic political impact of the mission would be, whether you succeed or fail?

Secretary Kissinger: The mission has no domestic political implications. The situation in Rhodesia is such that an escalation of violence is probable and at some point events may get beyond the control of negotiations. I think that the promotion of peace is a nonpartisan effort which will be supported by both political parties and is not contentious between the political parties.

Q. Mr. Chancellor, is Germany willing to participate in the new economic aid program in southern Africa, including a guarantee program for the white minority in Rhodesia?

Chancellor Schmidt: German interests are foremost and, generally speaking, the same as those Secretary Kissinger has described for the United States of America; namely, the interest to avoid bloodshed and violence; the interest to avoid outside intervention; third, the interest to bring about

democratic elections and governments in these countries for these two purposes.

I want to add as a fourth point that we Germans are a little bit more interested in Namibia than Rhodesia because in Namibia there are about 25,000 people of German descent with whom we naturally have special links.

We have spoken in a general way about the concepts that the American Government has in mind in order to reach these goals, which we have roughly outlined here. These include, too, as Secretary Kissinger has said, not only majority rule but also the rights of minorities.

To achieve this, possibly economic aid will be needed. The states which are transforming themselves here need economic help in many respects. The Federal Republic of Germany has, worldwide, never refused such help. Whether there will be some special assistance and whether we will join in will have to be seen within some weeks or even months. But at the end of these remarks I want to accentuate again our special interest in Namibia.

Q. Mr. Chancellor, you have also mentioned the topic "Ostpolitik"; could you go into a little more detail and be a little more concrete?

Chancellor Schmidt: The three of us have not used the word "Ostpolitik," but we have, as I have mentioned already, used the expression "relaxation of tensions," but this is the same thing, and we have also discussed the status of the fulfillment of the treaties. In this connection, because of this summer's events, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin has also played a role. But maybe it would be better if I would confine myself to saying that we were in complete agreement, and perhaps the American Secretary of State would like to make a few remarks about this subject.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would say first of all that there was an identity of views between Chancellor Schmidt, the Foreign Minister, and ourselves on the issues of East-West relations.

As far as the United States is concerned, we will consider the policy of relaxation of tension or détente, which has now been again legitimized by the Republican platform [laughter], and because we believe that it is necessary for world peace and for the future of mankind. We also believe, however, that such a policy must be based on the strict fulfillment of the letter and the spirit of existing treaties, and we will insist on this, just as we are prepared to carry out the letter and spirit of the existing arrangements.

The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin is an important aspect of this policy and an important test of the sincerity of Soviet intentions. The United States attaches the greatest importance to the strict fulfillment of the provisions of this agreement and the greatest importance to the integrity and freedom of Berlin, and this is a constant policy of the United States which we shall continue to pursue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what kind of possibility do you foresee concerning Namibia or SWAPO to join in? Is it possible [inaudible]?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not think it would be appropriate for me to give details of discussions that may be taking place. The U.S. position has been that all authentic groups, among whom we would include SWAPO, should participate in any talks that might be held on the future of Namibia. What the framework of these talks should be—that remains to be discussed in any negotiations that could take place over the next few weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you been in contact with SWAPO leaders or Mr. Ian Smith in the leadup to these discussions or during these discussions with Mr. Vorster?

Secretary Kissinger: Under Secretary [for Economic Affairs William D.] Rogers and Assistant Secretary Schaufele on their recent trip through Africa had a conversation with the head of SWAPO in addition to conversations with the Presidents of African states.

Q. Mr. Chancellor, while I recognize that your discussions with Mr. Kissinger may be preliminary on this point, could you clarify, sir, whether your conception would be of a German national contribution to financial guarantees for southern Africa, or are you speaking possibly in terms of a European Commission contribution or support?

Chancellor Schmidt: You were right in your introductory remark, that we were treating this matter in preliminary talks, but I want in any case to go so far as to say that up to now we have not spoken about a common European contribution through the EEC [European Economic Community].

President Ford Discusses U.S. Efforts in Southern Africa

Following is a statement made by President Ford at the opening of his news conference of September 8.¹

White House press release dated September 8

I met this morning with Secretary Kissinger to discuss his report on his meetings with [South African] Prime Minister Vorster and with European leaders. On the basis of this report, I believe that good progress has been made on the problems concerning southern Africa.

It is important to understand that in this diplomatic process now unfolding, the

¹ For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 13, 1976, p. 1314.

United States is offering its good offices as an intermediary. We are willing to present ideas on how progress can be achieved, but we are not—and I emphasize “not”—trying to develop a specific American plan.

We have three objectives: First, to prevent an escalation of the violence, which in time could threaten our national security; second, to realize popular aspirations while guaranteeing minority rights and insuring economic progress; third, to resist the intervention in the African situation by outside forces.

In his discussions with Prime Minister Vorster, the Secretary put forward some ideas conveyed to the United States by black African leaders, and Prime Minister Vorster gave us his reactions. As a result of these discussions, Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs William E.] Schaufele is currently in Africa discussing the situation.

On the basis of his report, I will decide whether further progress can be made through a visit by Secretary Kissinger to Africa, starting with black African countries most concerned. We want to create the opportunities and conditions for all races to live side by side.

The United States cannot solve by itself these complicated problems. We need the continued good will and dedication of the parties involved.

The process that is now beginning is an extremely important one. It is extremely complicated. There is no guarantee of success. But I believe the United States must now make a major effort because it is the right thing to do. It is in our national interest, and it is in the interest of world peace.

Department Discusses August 18 Incident at Panmunjom and Its Aftermath

*Statement by Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs¹*

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before these subcommittees and to testify on the August 18 incident at Panmunjom and its aftermath.

As members of the subcommittees are fully aware, the Korean Peninsula has been in an armed truce since 1953, with the political problems that caused the Korean hostilities still unresolved and two heavily armed forces facing each other across a four-kilometer-wide demilitarized zone. Over the past 23 years of the armistice the consistent goal of the United States has been to prevent the outbreak of new hostilities and contribute to stability in an area where the interests of four great powers—ourselves, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and the People's Republic of China—all intersect. The security of Korea remains vital to peace in Northeast Asia and is closely linked to the security of Japan, a major ally.

Throughout the long period since the end of the Korean war, North Korea has not given up its goal of reunifying the peninsula on its own terms and views the use of force as one measure of achieving this goal. The North has remained intransigent on all the political issues which divide North and South and has posed a constant military threat. The demilitarized zone has thus been an area of major tension since the armistice agreement, with frequent military clashes which, over the years, have taken 49 American and over 1,000 Korean lives.

The United States, which was of course a major participant in the Korean hostilities, is firmly committed to the security of Korea through its important interests in the peninsula and the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with the Republic of Korea. We continue to maintain forces in the Republic of Korea under this treaty to preserve the peace by deterring renewed aggression from the North.

You will recall that after the fall of Viet-Nam there was a period of time during which there was the possibility that the North Koreans might miscalculate our commitment to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and our commitment under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 to the security of the Republic of Korea. This commitment was strongly restated by the President, Secretary Kissinger, and other high-level U.S. Government officials. We believe that this commitment, together with the state of readiness of the United States and the Republic of Korea forces, continues to deter any renewed major aggression by North Korea. We believe that

¹ Made before the Subcommittees on International Political and Military Affairs and on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on Sept. 1. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

neither the People's Republic of China nor the U.S.S.R. wishes to see North Korea make any move that would destabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

At present there is on the peninsula a rough military balance between the forces of South Korea and the United States on the one hand and those of the North on the other. It has been a major goal of the North Koreans to destroy this balance by securing the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Republic of Korea. North Korea has repeatedly called for such a withdrawal, trying to win international support for this goal by depicting the U.S. presence as a source of tension in the area.

Intensified Campaign Against the U.S.

Immediately prior to the August 18 incident, P'yongyang embarked upon a major intensification of this longstanding campaign. On August 5 they issued a strongly worded government statement attacking the United States and the Republic of Korea. The statement was accompanied by a supporting memorandum purporting to document the statement's allegations that the United States was about to make war on North Korea.

The statement said the United States had completed war preparations and was entering into a "phase of directly triggering war" from a "phase of directly preparing for war." It demanded that the United States withdraw all its military equipment from the Republic of Korea, abandon what it called a "two Koreas" policy, disband the U.N. Command, withdraw all foreign troops under the U.N. flag, and replace the armistice agreement with a peace agreement.

From earlier North Korean statements we know that the phrase "foreign troops under the U.N. flag" also means all U.S. forces in Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea arrangements. The statement claimed that the reunification of Korea could then be achieved by the Korean people through a national con-

gress. There was no recognition of the Government of the Republic of Korea. The statement also appealed to other nations to condemn alleged U.S. attempts to trigger a war in Korea.

This statement was also the culmination of anti-U.S. efforts among the nonaligned nations which were about to hold their nonaligned summit meeting in Colombo. At the nonaligned meeting, which took place in mid-August, we believe the North Koreans hoped for endorsement of very harsh anti-U.S. and anti-Republic of Korea language which they could subsequently utilize in lobbying for a resolution submitted by their supporters at the U.N. General Assembly.

As you may recall, the U.N. General Assembly last year approved two contradictory resolutions on Korea—one submitted by supporters of North Korea and one submitted by ourselves and other supporters of the Republic of Korea. We believe that at this year's U.N. General Assembly the North Koreans hope to score a diplomatic victory which would contribute to isolation of the Republic of Korea and its supporters by securing approval of its own propagandistic resolution and the defeat of the friendly resolution. I shall return to the U.N. General Assembly situation later.

The Joint Security Area

The August 18 incident came in the context of this heightened propaganda campaign. Before I describe this incident, let me make some comments on the Joint Security Area. This is a small, roughly circular area of the demilitarized zone some 800 yards in diameter in which the Military Armistice Commission meetings are held. It is a neutral area, maintained and patrolled by both sides. Each side is permitted to have 35 armed guards in the area at any given time. Larger groups of unarmed work personnel are permitted. Specific maintenance and groundskeeping tasks, such as the pruning of trees, have

been carried out by each side without prior consultation with the other.

The North Koreans have frequently caused incidents in the Joint Security Area, harassing U.N. Command personnel, engaging in verbal threats and on occasion in physical assaults. In 1975 a U.N. Command officer was knocked to the ground and severely injured with a kick to the throat.

The August 18 Incident

With respect to the tree involved in the August 18 incident, it was found that the foliage on this tree was obstructing the line of sight between two U.N. Command guardposts. One of these guardposts was near the North Korean side of the military demarcation line near the Bridge of No Return. It was felt that if this guardpost were not fully visible from the other, the chances for its being subject to harassment or attack by North Korean personnel were increased. It was decided, therefore, to remove the obstruction.

On August 5 a work party went to the tree, which is located on the U.N. Command side of the military demarcation line, for the purpose of felling it. North Korean guards told them to leave the tree alone, although they did not lodge a formal protest over the matter. Subsequently, it was determined that guardpost visibility could be improved by trimming the tree rather than cutting it down.

On Wednesday, August 18, 1976, at approximately 10:30 local time, a U.N. Command work crew of five Korean laborers accompanied by three U.N. Command officers (two U.S. and one Republic of Korea) and a seven-man security force arrived in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. Their purpose was routine and nonthreatening; namely, to prune the tree.

Shortly after the party began its work, two North Korean Army officers and about nine enlisted men arrived in a truck. They inquired about the work in progress. After being told that the tree was to be trimmed,

not cut down, one North Korean Army officer stated that this was "good." Work continued for 10-15 minutes during which some North Korean Army personnel tried to direct the U.N. Command workers on how to prune the tree. At about 10:50, some 20 minutes after work began, one North Korean Army officer told the U.N. Command officer to halt work. After a short discussion, the North Korean Army officer threatened the U.N. Command personnel. The U.N. Command officer told his men to keep working. The North Korean Army officer then ordered the Korean laborers to stop working. The U.N. Command officer indicated that work would continue, at which point the North Korean Army officer sent a guard across the bridge, apparently to summon reinforcements. Several minutes thereafter the number of North Korean Army guards on the scene had increased to approximately 30.

At this point, one North Korean Army officer put his watch, which he had wrapped in a handkerchief, into his pocket. Another rolled up his sleeves. One officer yelled "kill" and then struck Captain [Arthur G.] Bonifas, knocking him to the ground. Five other North Korean Army guards jumped on Bonifas and continued to beat him. Other North Korean Army guards attacked the other U.N. Command guards, beating them with ax handles and clubs. U.N. Command witnesses reported that North Korean Army guards picked up the axes used by the tree pruners. Captain Bonifas was beaten with the blunt heads of the axes while he was on the ground. All U.N. Command personnel received repeated beatings even though they tried to break contact and leave the area.

Casualties from this incident—which lasted less than five minutes—were two U.S. Army officers killed, four U.S. Army enlisted personnel wounded, and four enlisted Korean augmentees to the U.S. Army wounded.

We believe that the August 18 incident

may have been an attempt by North Korea to underscore the theme of its propaganda campaign: that tensions were high in Korea as a result of the U.S. presence. The number of North Korean personnel involved in the incident, the ferocity of their attack, and their readiness to spill blood in the Joint Security Area, an area in which there had been no deaths during the 23 years of the armistice, all indicate that this was meant to be a major provocation. As a result, we believe that the North Koreans may have been seeking an incident which could be used extensively in their propaganda efforts to depict us as seeking war on the peninsula.

We also believe the incident was intended to test whether in the midst of a national election campaign we would firmly maintain our security commitment to the Republic of Korea. It threatened our goal of maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula.

U.S. Response and North Korean Reaction

We believe our response was sobering to the North Koreans. Our reactions were measured and calculated. Our military moves—the deployment of the F-4's from Okinawa, and the F-111's from Idaho to Korea, the dispatching of the Midway task force to the area, the raising of our defense alert status to DefCon 3, and daily B-52 flights from Guam to Korea—were swift and coordinated. They demonstrated to P'yongyang that we were willing and able to move decisively to counter any threat in this area.

In the context of this military response, the tree-cutting operation itself [August 21] made it clear to P'yongyang that we would not tolerate interference with our rights in the Joint Security Area under the armistice agreement and that we were determined to protect U.N. Command personnel in the area in order to maintain the viability of the armistice agreement.

Let me make a few further points with regard to the tree cutting. We are aware

of critical comments to the effect that we took massive and expensive military moves simply to cut down a tree. This is not the case. The military augmentations were precautionary deployments designed to make it clear to P'yongyang that we were determined to meet any larger military threat which they might pose. The tree-cutting operation, as I have indicated, was meant to uphold the rights of the U.N. Command in the Joint Security Area and to help insure the future safety of the U.N. Command personnel.

P'yongyang was clearly taken aback by both our military response and the tree-cutting operation. It put its own forces on a so-called "war footing" and took certain defensive measures, but gave no indication that it was contemplating any military reaction to our moves. In the Joint Security Area, North Korean guards watched the tree-cutting operation without attempting to interfere.

A few hours later, North Korean President Kim Il-song took the unprecedented step of conveying a message through the Military Armistice Commission to the Commander in Chief of the U.N. Command, General [Richard] Stilwell, expressing regret that the August 18 incident had occurred and urging that further incidents in the area be avoided. Kim's conciliatory message has been widely viewed as an implicit acceptance of responsibility for the incident, particularly when contrasted with P'yongyang's usual rhetoric.

At subsequent Military Armistice Commission meetings, the North Koreans have been uncharacteristically subdued and businesslike and have reiterated Kim Il-song's expression of regret. They have also suggested a proposal for new security arrangements at Panmunjom to avoid incidents in the Joint Security Area.

The U.N. Command is now considering the proposal—which it put forth itself in 1970 and which the North has now picked up. One important element of this plan will be the removal of four guardposts which the North Koreans now have on the

U.N. Command side of the military demarcation line. The U.N. Command has no guardposts on the North Korean side of the line.

We think the North Koreans have been chastened by the incident. It is not certain that the lesson will stick; however, it is evident that P'yongyang now has a clearer picture of our readiness to maintain the security of the Korean Peninsula and to uphold the armistice agreement. We believe the North Koreans may also fear that our response to any future incidents of the kind that occurred on August 18 could well be costly to them.

World Reaction

World reaction to the August 18 incident and its aftermath has of course varied according to the predisposition of the countries involved, but there has been widespread support for our position on the incident and for our subsequent moves.

Most significantly, both the Soviet and Chinese media were very restrained in their handling of the issue. They gave it only limited attention and confined themselves to quotes from the North Korean press, avoiding any editorial comment of their own. This clearly indicated a lack of enthusiasm for the North Korean provocation and a reluctance to be sharply critical of our response.

It is not clear to what extent the August 18 incident affected the language adopted on Korea at the nonaligned conference, which was in its final sessions at the time the incident occurred. The North Koreans were successful in ramming through the hard-line language they wanted, largely because the drafting committee was composed of P'yongyang's supporters. However, many countries recognized the one-sided nature of this language, and for the first time on any question in the nonaligned meetings, specific reservations to the language of the political declaration and resolution on Korea were entered. We do not yet have a full list of countries which did so, since reserva-

tions are still being submitted, but the total may reach 20 to 25. It well may be that the brutal murders in the Joint Security Area were seen as evidence of North Korean belligerence and not aggressiveness on the part of the United States.

Forthcoming U.N. General Assembly

It is also unclear at this point how the incident and its aftermath will affect the U.N. General Assembly's vote on the two resolutions which have been submitted on the Korean question.

We had made it clear this year that we, the Republic of Korea, and many other countries hoped to avoid another sterile Korean debate although we were prepared to meet the challenge if one was mounted by North Korea and its supporters.

North Korean supporters, however, submitted a harsh and inflexible resolution even before the nonaligned had finished their debate on a Korean position, thus demonstrating that North Korea was more interested in maintaining its inflexible position than in obtaining a true nonaligned consensus on Korea.

This resolution, which draws heavily on the August 5 government statement, calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces under the U.N. flag. North Korea made clear last year that this also means the withdrawal of all U.S. forces in Korea under the bilateral arrangements with the Republic of Korea. There are now only about 300 personnel in Korea under the U.N. flag, of whom about 250 are Americans. It "demands" the withdrawal of "new" types of military equipment from the Republic of Korea and an end to alleged acts aggravating tensions and increasing the danger of war.

The resolution also calls for the unconditional dissolution of the U.N. Command. North Korea has said that if the Command is dissolved, the armistice agreement, the only legal document binding the parties to keep the peace, would cease to exist.

It also calls for the replacement of the

armistice agreement with a peace agreement. The latter means an agreement with the United States and is an attempt to negotiate future security arrangements on the peninsula without the participation of the Government of the Republic of Korea, which represents two-thirds of the peninsula's population.

The resolution further "hopes" for reunification through a "great national congress." The Government of the Republic of Korea is not mentioned; this provision is an attempt to obfuscate North Korea's refusal to accept the necessity of South-North discussions and its failure to respond to repeated offers by the Republic of Korea to resume without preconditions the South-North discussions which both sides agreed to in 1972 and which were broken off by North Korea in 1973.

Through this resolution the North is attempting to isolate our ally the Republic of Korea, precipitate American troop withdrawal, and dissolve existing legal arrangements without substituting suitable arrangements to maintain peace and stability. We will not accept such proposals. We will not negotiate on future security arrangements on the Korean Peninsula without the participation of the Republic of Korea.

To meet this challenge, the United States and 18 other countries introduced on August 20 a noncontentious resolution on Korea which calls for the resumption of the South-North dialogue to achieve by negotiation the resolution of the outstanding problems between them. It calls on both sides to exercise restraint so as to create an atmosphere conducive to peace and dialogue. It also urges that South and North Korea and the other parties directly concerned, ourselves and the People's Republic of China, enter into early negotiations permitting the dissolution of the U.N. Command by adapting the armistice agreement or replacing it with more permanent arrangements to maintain the peace.

This provision refers to a major U.N. General Assembly initiative which we and the Republic of Korea undertook last year.

On September 22, 1975, Secretary Kissinger proposed that we and the Republic of Korea meet with the other parties directly concerned, the People's Republic of China and North Korea, to discuss ways of preserving the armistice agreement and of reducing tensions in Korea. We said that in such a meeting we would be ready to explore possibilities for a larger conference to negotiate more fundamental arrangements to keep the peace.

This invitation was not accepted then and was dismissed by North Korea in its statement August 5, 1976, after the Secretary restated the proposal in a speech July 22, 1976.

U.S. Policy on Korea

Our position on Korea is clear:

—We urge the resumption of serious South-North discussions, which both sides agreed to in 1972 and which North Korea has broken off.

—If North Korea's allies are prepared to improve their relations with South Korea, we are prepared to take reciprocal steps toward North Korea.

—We continue to support proposals that the United Nations give full membership to both South and North Korea, without prejudice to eventual reunification.

—We are prepared to negotiate a new basis for the armistice or replace it with more permanent arrangements in any form acceptable to all the parties concerned.

As a result of North Korea's intransigence, we thus again face a tough and time-consuming confrontation in the U.N. General Assembly on Korea which is likely to be both contentious and unproductive. The effect of the August 18 incident on what will follow in the U.N. General Assembly confrontation, as I have said, is difficult to judge. We believe few countries take seriously the charge that the United States is about to make war on North Korea. The pattern of North Korean propaganda, together with the brutality of the North Korean assault, the measured

United States Condemns Murder of American Officers in Korea

Following is a statement by the White House Press Secretary issued at Kansas City, Mo., on August 18, together with a statement read to news correspondents that day by Frederick Z. Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations, Department of State.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

White House press release (Kansas City, Mo.) dated August 18

The President condemns the vicious and unprovoked murder of two American officers last night in the demilitarized zone near Panmunjon in Korea.

These officers were peacefully supervising a work detail in the neutral zone when they were subjected to a brutal and cowardly attack totally without warning.

Total responsibility for the consequences of these murders rests with the North Korean Government.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

On the morning of August 18, Korean time, North Korean military personnel made an unprovoked attack on the U.N. Command personnel in the Joint Security Area (JSA) in the demilitarized zone, brutally murdering two American officers and injuring four Americans and five Republic of Korea military personnel.

The details regarding this act of aggression are contained in a statement issued by the U.N. Command, which I will now read to you:

Two United Nations Command officers were murdered in an unprovoked assault by North Korean guards this morning at the Joint Security Area Panmunjom.

The two army officers, both Americans, died from massive head injuries and stab wounds inflicted by an estimated thirty North Korean guards who attacked a small United Nations Command work party

response from our side, and the subsequent backing down on P'yongyang's part may serve to convince some nonaligned countries that continued support of the North's inflexible position is not productive and may well increase tensions. We also believe many nonaligned countries recognize that there cannot be progress on the Korean question until South and North resume direct discussions and that the North's refusal to talk with the Government of the Republic of Korea is an unrealistic and self-defeating posture. The reservations on the Korea language at the nonaligned meeting that I mentioned earlier are a sign of this view.

We believe that our firm and judicious response to the August 18 incident has shown the North that we are prepared to resist aggression.

We do not view the August 18 incident as having a major effect on decisions regarding U.S. force levels in Korea. As then-Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip C.] Habib said before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee April 8:

... the specific level of our forces in Korea is not immutable. It is a function of the North Korean threat, the ability of the Republic of Korea forces to meet that threat, and the prevailing international situation.

Mr. Habib went on to say that we intended to honor commitments and maintain our presence in the area and in this context we had no present plans for significant force reduction in Korea. Our response to the incident of August 18 has demonstrated that we will meet our commitments.

We would hope that the firmness we demonstrated in the aftermath of this incident will eventually cause the North to reassess its inflexible position of seeking to reunify the peninsula on its own terms. Meanwhile we and the Republic of Korea are prepared to seek the easing of tensions and more permanent security arrangements on the peninsula through negotiation rather than confrontation.

with axes, metal pikes and axe handles, about 10:45 a.m.

A Republic of Korea Army enlisted man, a security guard assigned to the U.S. Army Support Group, JSA, sustained stab wounds and is in the 121st Evacuation Hospital in Seoul.

A Republic of Korea Army officer, four other U.S. soldiers and three additional Republic of Korea Army soldiers were treated for minor cuts and bruises.

The U.N. Command has called for the 379th Military Armistice Commission meeting to convene at 11:00 a.m., Thursday, August 19. North Korea has not yet replied.

The three U.N. Command officers and the enlisted guards were escorting five Korean Service Corps workers who were routinely trimming branches from a tree some 35-40 yards from U.N. Command Checkpoint Number 3, at the south side of the Bridge of No Return.

Two North Korean officers and several guards came to the area of the work. After some discussion during which a North Korean officer expressed no objection to the tree trimming, the North Koreans suddenly demanded that the Korean Service Corps personnel stop work.

Shortly afterwards, a North Korean vehicle brought additional guards and the North Korean officer was heard to tell them "to kill" the U.N. Command personnel and the fight ensued with many of the North Koreans joining in.

These murders were the first deaths ever in the Joint Security Area, site of the joint Armistice Commission meetings. It is a neutral area within the Demilitarized Zone where free access and movement are guaranteed by the Armistice Agreement.

The North Koreans also damaged three U.N. Command vehicles during the melee.

Identification of the casualties is pending notification of the next of kin. U.N. Command continues to investigate the incident.

The North Koreans have falsely charged that the personnel of the U.N. Command first assaulted North Korean guards. This is a lie and a flagrant attempt to deceive. We find it significant that the North Korean account does not claim that any North Koreans were wounded or that reinforcements from the U.N. Command side were sent into the Joint Security Area.

This brutal behavior by the North Korean regime tells us something of its true nature and demonstrates the hollowness of North Korea's alleged desire for a peaceful resolution of the differences that exist between it and South Korea.

The U.S. Government considers these cowardly acts of murder a serious violation of the armistice agreement. The North Koreans have committed violent acts in the Joint Security Area before, but these murders are the first such deaths that have occurred in that area since the signing of the armistice agreement 23 years ago.

The United States views this brutal and unprovoked assault with gravity and concern and warns the North Koreans that such violent and belligerent actions cannot be tolerated. North Korea must bear full responsibility for all the consequences of its brutal action.

U.S. and Republic of Korea Welcome New Joint Security Area Arrangement

Following is a joint statement by the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea issued at Washington and Seoul on September 6.

Press release 413 dated September 6

The Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea welcome the signing of the agreement amending the Military Armistice Commission Headquarters Agreement at Panmunjom, September 6, 1976. The two Governments believe that the new arrangement, restricting movement of military personnel of both sides to their respective portions of the Joint Security Area (JSA), eliminating contact in the JSA infringing on personal safety, and removing the North Korean guard posts from the UNC [United Nations Command] side of the JSA, are realistic and constructive steps which when implemented will better assure the security of personnel of both sides in the Joint Security Area. The two Governments will make every effort to see that these new arrangements are implemented effectively. They expect that the signatories of the Armistice Agreement for the other side will

do the same. The two Governments for their part will continue to avoid provocative acts and will abide, as in the past, by the terms of the Armistice Agreement along the full length of the DMZ [demilitarized zone] as well as within the JSA. In the spirit of the new agreement, they will hold the North Korean side responsible for avoiding future provocative actions. As the response of the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea to the August 18 incident has demonstrated, the two Governments are determined to respond firmly to North Korean provocations. North Korean leaders should have no doubt about this fact in determining their future actions.

Nonaligned Summit Meeting Position on Korea and Puerto Rico Rejected

*Department Announcement*¹

The Colombo nonaligned summit meeting addressed a number of current international issues to which we will be giving careful attention in the months ahead. I would like, however, to restrict my comments now only to two issues in which the

¹ Read to news correspondents on Aug. 25 by Robert L. Funseth, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations.

United States is directly involved and which are before the United Nations.

The conference addressed the issue of Korea, which for reasons of both historical involvement and recent events is of deep concern to the United States, in words which were so tendentious and one-sided as to be unacceptable to a substantial number of participants at Colombo, who entered written or oral reservations. We find the endorsement of North Korea's completely unfounded charges against the United States particularly unseemly, coming as it did immediately following the brutal murder of two U.S. officers of the U.N. Command in the Joint Security Area of the demilitarized zone in Korea by North Korean Army personnel. We do not believe that any country which supports the highly partisan language on Korea contained in the declaration, and even more so in the separate resolution on Korea, can be considered nonaligned on this issue.

With regard to Puerto Rico, the conference called for discussion of this matter by the United Nations as if it were a colonial issue. We consider any such declaration as interference in U.S. domestic affairs. Since the recognition in 1953 by the United Nations of Puerto Rico's act of self-determination, there are no legal grounds for discussion or action with respect to this issue by any international body. And we will ignore any action taken by an international body on this issue.

Secretary Kissinger Discusses U.S. Position on Law of the Sea Conference

Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at U.N. Headquarters on September 1 following a meeting with Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, President of the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, and his remarks at a reception that evening for heads of delegations to the conference.

REMARKS FOLLOWING MEETING

Press release 409 dated September 1

I came here first of all to pay tribute to the President of this conference for the impartial and thoughtful way in which he has conducted what is probably the most important negotiation that is now going on anywhere. With three-quarters of the world's surface being put under the possibility of some international legal system, the stakes could hardly be higher. And the issues are, of course, extremely complicated.

The United States will make a major effort to bring these negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion. "Satisfactory" must mean, as the President correctly pointed out, a solution that all groups and all nations can accept. And it is not possible for one nation or for any group of nations to seek to impose its views on the others.

Now, in the three committees that are working—in Committee II, dealing with the so-called economic zone, and in Committee III, dealing with scientific research, we believe that reasonable progress is being made, and we are quite optimistic that an agreed solution of at least a general outline can be found at the end of this session.

In Committee I, it is our view that the negotiating tactics have been too confrontational and that there has been too much of a tendency to seek to approach it by means of bloc approaches. That will not work. No group can impose its preferred solution on the other.

The United States proposed at the last session the so-called dual-access system, in which one part of the ocean is available for nations and their firms and the other is mined by an international Enterprise and all of it is put under a general international Authority. We cannot give up this principle, but what we can do—and what I'm here to discuss with my colleagues is how the international Enterprise can in fact function so the international Enterprise will in fact have the financial resources and the means to proceed.

We are also prepared, since we are talking about a long-term future, to agree to periodic reviews of that issue, all the more so as we cannot in any event begin mining for about 10 years.

The President and I agreed, I believe, or at least I suggested to the President and he is considering it, that we should strive at the end of this conference to have some common text which becomes then the basis for a final conclusion and that some means be found within the remaining two weeks to reduce the various positions to a common text to which formal amendments can then perhaps be offered but which will provide a framework for the negotiation. The President and I are going to meet again for breakfast tomorrow, at which time I will review with him my impressions of my consultations today.

I would like to stress the commitment of the United States to come to a solution that is in the interest of all mankind. We know that no agreement can last that is not freely accepted by the overwhelming majority of mankind. We hope that others here come to the same view, and we hope that everybody will realize that if we can establish a peaceful and legal solution to the problems of the ocean, a great step will also have been made toward peace on land.

Thank you very much.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some countries here want to stand pat, think that they will have better prospects under a new Administration. What can you tell me?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, there won't be a new Administration, and secondly, I will tell them that the foreign policy of the United States is conducted on the basis of the best judgment of the permanent interests and values of the United States and I'm confident that any group studying this problem is going to come roughly to the same conclusions.

I think it would be a great mistake for foreign nations to attempt to second-guess the American domestic political process.

On the views that we have expressed here, I find a wide consensus, and I have not encountered any significant disagreement among any of the experts that we have consulted about the American position, and I think that this would be a great mistake; and if the negotiation deadlocks completely, there is a much greater danger that the United States will act unilaterally than that the United States will change its position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said last night that you were coming here with a new proposal. Will you tell us what those new proposals are?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have indicated the areas in which we will keep discussing it; that is, financial—how do you make the Enterprise financially operative?—review clauses. And we are willing to discuss other aspects of the views of our colleagues.

I think it would be more appropriate if I had the discussions and then made it public than if I announce now, because this might inspire the rhetorical impulses of other delegations. [Laughter.]

Q. Are you going to address the conference tomorrow?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no such plans, but I'm giving a reception for the delegations tonight, and I plan to address them then informally.

Q. With the extension of the exclusive economic zone to 200 miles and the power to search vessels within that zone, without use of the hovering vessels [inaudible]

Secretary Kissinger: I'll tell you the truth, this is a degree of detail my associates have not yet revealed. [Laughter.]

Q. Are you working on a consolidated text?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I tried to avoid the words "consolidated text," because I want to leave the nomenclature to the conference. I believe that some common text that brings together the work of the three committees in a document that can then be the basis of negotiation would be supported by the United States and would be a logical outcome of this conference, and we are hoping that the President of the conference will take leadership in that direction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, referring to the funding of the Enterprise, are we speaking in terms of U.S. grants or loans, or are we thinking of somehow convincing U.S. companies to invest?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are two aspects. One is the principle of finding financing for the Enterprise; second, the means by which this is achieved. I think the second issue is subsidiary to the first because, if we agree to find financing, it will be negotiated in such a way that it is acceptable to the countries concerned.

We think it is a reasonable proposition on the part of some of the developing nations to be sure that the Enterprise does

not become a paper institution but that it has an opportunity to function in what has been called the common heritage of mankind. The details of how we do this are open to negotiation.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS AT RECEPTION¹

I believe very deeply, and so do all of my colleagues, that the negotiation in which all of you are engaged is the most significant international negotiation that is now taking place. It is not as dramatic as some other events that catch the daily headlines, but what other group has had the opportunity to establish international norms for three-quarters of the earth's surface? When else has a group of diplomats been able to assemble and establish a legal order for a part of the globe that contains so much of our resources and that will affect so much of our future?

And I know that in the tedious negotiations that go on daily we will never lose sight of the fact that we're engaged in a historic enterprise and it is an enterprise that simply cannot afford to fail.

We therefore should not deal with each other with threats of confrontation, because the advantages that can be gained on this or that issue pale in significance compared to the long-range benefits—not just to this or that nation but to all of mankind—that are inherent in this process.

This is the basic attitude of the U.S. Government. This is the reason—and not any economic necessity nor any negotiating pressures—that compelled us to make a maximum effort to bring matters forward to some sort of conclusion.

I believe, therefore, in the two weeks or so that are left in this conference it is extremely important that we move matters to a point in which we can say to ourselves, can say to our people, that on the law of the sea the nations of the world are mak-

ing progress and that we do not export into the sea all of the conflicts that have made life complicated on land.

And, conversely, if we should succeed in that arena, it must have the profoundest significance on our other relations as well.

We are working essentially in three committees. I believe that in Committee II, the debate of whether the economic zone is *sui generis* or whether it has attributes of high seas status can, in my view, after the discussions we have had this morning, be resolved in a manner practical and satisfactory to all of the parties concerned. It will require further efforts, but I believe that an understanding can be reached.

Similarly, with respect to scientific—marine scientific—research of Committee III, if all of the delegations work with the spirit that has characterized them so far, I believe that a satisfactory conclusion can also be reached.

We must keep in mind in both of these negotiations, first, that we are starting a new international regime in these 200-mile zones that has not existed previously but also that there are certain practical problems that must be solved if the interpretation of our texts is not to lead to endless future disputes.

Now, let me say a few words about Committee I and the deep seabeds. And you notice I did not say that if Committee I continues to work in the spirit it has exhibited up to now, success is probable. [Laughter.]

I believe that Committee I has clearly the most novel and the most complicated issue. And it is important that in solving it we do not approach it too much from a theoretical point of view and that we do not attempt to use it to prove ideological points which there are many opportunities to vindicate.

With respect to the deep seabeds, we face two realities. One is that the developed countries—a few developed countries at this moment—alone possess the technology with which to exploit the seabeds—why don't I use a more happy word?—to "mine" the seabeds. [Laughter.]

¹ Text from press release 407 (opening paragraphs omitted).

On the other hand, there is the concept that the deep seabeds represent the common heritage of mankind, and therefore there is a certain conflict between the realities of the capabilities of certain countries and the theoretical conviction of many other countries.

From the point of view of those who possess the technology, many of the proposals that have already been made represent very significant concessions in the sense that they represent self-imposed restrictions on what would otherwise be an unrestricted freedom of action.

From the point of view of many of the developing countries some of these concessions, in view of their convictions, are not considered concessions at all but tend to be taken for granted.

At the last session, the United States proposed the system of parallel access in which, concurrently with any state or private mining of the deep seabeds, a similar site would have to be set aside for the international community to be exploited or mined by the international community. And this concept was reflected in the negotiating text which emerged from the last session.

On reflection, many countries have expressed reservations about this concept on many grounds—more familiar to the delegates here than to me, I'm sure—but one of the principal grounds was that it did no good to set aside a part of the mining sites for the international community if the international community did not possess the financial resources with which to mine or to put its Enterprise into business and if there were no provisions for the transfer of technology to the international community.

We have taken these views into serious consideration. And, therefore, on the occasion of my meeting with some of the members of Committee I, I proposed on behalf of the U.S. Government that the United States would be prepared to agree to a means of financing the Enterprise in such a manner that the Enterprise could begin its mining operation either concurrently with

the mining of state or private enterprises or within an agreed timespan that was practically concurrent.

We proposed also that this would include agreed provisions for the transfer of technology so that the existing advantage of certain industrial states would be equalized over a period of time.

We have also taken into account the views that have been expressed by some delegates that it might be premature to establish a permanent regime for the deep seabeds, for the exploitation of the deep seabeds, at the beginning of a process of technology and to freeze it for an indefinite period of time.

For this reason we have proposed today that there could be periodic review conferences at intervals to be negotiated—for example, 25 years—in which the methods by which mining in the deep seabeds takes place and the apportionment between various sectors could be periodically reexamined.

In other words, the United States has made a serious effort to move forward on this deep seabed question.

I have heard, since I was here, the view that perhaps a settlement is premature in the light of our unsettled domestic situation. [Laughter.] Of course, some of us consider our domestic situation more settled than others. [Laughter.] But I would believe—I would consider it highly unlikely that the basic principles are likely to be changed that I have put forward with respect to the deep seabeds.

And I do not have the impression that they are the subject of partisan discussion as is reflected by the bipartisan composition of the congressional delegation that participates in these meetings.

We obviously will not be able to settle all of the issues now. And this afternoon for example, some proposals were made—including by the distinguished delegate from Nigeria—in the discussions of Committee I that we will examine with great care. But I would urge that the time has come to put aside the theoretical debates

I believe the issues are too crucial to try to prove abstract ideological points.

The United States has made its proposals, which represent significant restrictions on our freedom of action, for the sake of international peace and international harmony and for the purpose of demonstrating that in this new area of mankind's activities we will make every effort to avoid the sort of rivalries that characterized colonial exploitations of the 19th century.

But there are limits beyond which no American leader can go. And if those limits are attempted to be exceeded, then we will find ourselves in the regrettable and tragic situation where at sea—just as previously on land—unilateralism will reign supreme.

We in the United States would not, in the short term, have any disadvantages

from this—quite the contrary. But we are part of mankind, and we believe that an opportunity would be lost that may not come again.

So, on behalf of the American delegation, I want to assure you that in all of the committees, and on the crucial issue of dispute settlement, we will work with dedication and conviction and with a profound sense of responsibility that what we are doing here—or rather, what you are doing here—is of historic significance. And we hope that in this spirit we can use the next few weeks to move matters forward to a point from which a final solution in the early part of next year becomes so inevitable that even the brilliant negotiators assembled here cannot find enough fine points to interfere. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger Meets With U.N. Secretary General Waldheim

Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger and U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim following their meeting at U.N. Headquarters on September 2.

Press release 410 dated September 2

Secretary General Waldheim: Ladies and gentlemen, I had a useful and very interesting exchange of views with the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, on the international situation in general and special problems concerning the United Nations. We discussed the Middle East, the situation in southern Africa, the question of Cyprus, and of course the Law of the Sea Conference.

I am most grateful to Dr. Kissinger for this opportunity, especially because all of the problems we have discussed this morning are on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations. It was therefore most helpful to me to

know the position of the Government of the United States.

This is all I wish to say, and I now give the floor to Dr. Kissinger.

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to express the appreciation of the U.S. Government for the distinguished role which the Secretary General is playing on all of the key issues with respect to peacekeeping and improving the international climate in which he is involved. And we talked about the Middle East, about Cyprus, about southern Africa, about the law of the sea. And I would only add to his description—to his adjective “useful”—the adjective “cordial” for our talks.

Thank you very much. I'll be glad to answer some questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did your discussions about economic financing of the regime go well last night?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, all of the delegations will have to speak for themselves. I had a good discussion yesterday with about 16 members of Committee I. I met this morning with the head of the Mexican delegation and with the Peruvian delegate in Committee I, Sri Lanka, Norway.

And I have the impression that there is now an understanding that some progress will have to be made on all sides and that our proposals of yesterday may provide a basis for some counterproposals by some others—and, even if not for some precise counterproposals, to move forward perhaps toward a consolidated text which can be an instrument of negotiation at the next session.

With respect to Committee II and III, I am very hopeful that we will reach a substantial conclusion of the effort. So, altogether, if the conference continues on the course which we believe possible, it will have made a significant step forward.

Q. Are you prepared to state what that economic proposal was?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have proposed that we would see to the financing of the international Enterprise; and also we have agreed to a 25-year—or some agreed period—review clause. Considering that the particular concern of many of the Group of 77 was that the international Enterprise might not have the financing or the technical capability to proceed, our offer to put it into business concurrently, or nearly concurrently, with private or state enterprises should go a long step toward meeting their needs. And you have to remember that in a situation in which the United States at this moment possesses practically a monopoly of technology, we have agreed to put all of it under an international regime—half of it under an international Enterprise—and to provide the financing for the international Enterprise, and to provide a review after 25 years. So we think we have made a significant contribution.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the question of the admission of Viet-Nam is coming to the United Nations again next week. Could you tell us whether the United States intends to use the veto again?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would not want to deprive you of the suspense that is inherent in this question prematurely. For us, the issue of the missing in action is of course a key issue, and we want to see whether any progress can be made there.

Q. When you see [South African] Prime Minister Vorster at the end of this week, are you prepared to press him hard on these two points: First, that elections in Namibia come off in a matter of months, not years; and secondly, that they come out—that they are undertaken—not just under international supervision, as I believe Mr. Vorster has mentioned, but under U.N. supervision?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have made several statements this week about our position with respect to southern Africa which have achieved the unique result of being criticized both by some black members of the Congress and by Prime Minister Vorster. I think, considering that I will be meeting him within 48 hours, I should not go beyond what I have already stated publicly and leave something for the discussions that will then take place.

Q. Mr. Secretary, terrorism is an issue that has been before the United Nations for some time now. An effort is being made, has been made. Do you, as the U.S. representative, see any prospect for a solution to this issue here?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we believe that terrorism is an issue that affects the whole international community and which must be solved by the international community. The use of innocent people to affect decisions in which they have absolutely no role and in which they have no capacity for action is unconscionable. And the United States will support any effort by others—and failing that, will make major efforts of its own—to get an international agreement that will

bring the common action of the world community to bear on the issue of terrorism.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States changed its position on admission of Angola to the United Nations?

Secretary Kissinger: As we pointed out repeatedly, our concern with Angola is not the regime that is in power in Angola. Our concern is the issue of the presence of a Cuban expeditionary force of very substantial size in that country. That, too, is an issue in which informal consultations are taking place here now, and we are not prepared to state our position now.

Q. Have any of the Cuban troops been withdrawn?

Secretary Kissinger: We, frankly, have great difficulty determining whether there has been a net outflow of Cubans. Some Cubans have been withdrawn; others seem to have arrived. And we do not have a clear perception of whether there has been a significant net outflow.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your planned trip this weekend when you talk to Prime Minister Vorster, is it your plan also to talk with the black African leaders on this particular trip—and (2) is there any likelihood of your having any discussion with Ian Smith [Prime Minister of Rhodesia] himself directly which might lead to repeal, for example, of the Byrd amendment?

Secretary Kissinger: Whether I will go on from Zurich to Africa has not yet been completely decided. I want to have consultations with the Government of Great Britain, which has itself been in consultation with key African countries and which has an important role to play there—especially in Rhodesia—and I want to make an assessment of where we stand after those talks. There is a possibility that I will go to discuss the issues, especially of Namibia and Rhodesia, with the Presidents of black African states and see whether some progress can be made.

I do not think a final solution of these

issues is likely in the very near future. But if I believe that some progress can be made, I may undertake the trip.

I have no plan now to talk with Ian Smith, and I consider it almost out of the question that I would be meeting with him.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Lebanon, you now have two emissaries working with the Christian side. Does this indicate that the United States is moving toward recognizing a partition?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The United States is opposed to the partition of Lebanon. It maintains the independence and sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. However, our Embassy in Beirut has found it impossible to communicate with the Christian part of Lebanon; and when our Ambassador attempted to cross over, as you know, some months ago, he was assassinated. We have therefore found it technically more convenient to send in people via Cyprus. They will be there for about a week of consultations, and they will then return. And our hope would be that conditions will soon exist in which the Embassy in Beirut can perform its functions in both parts of Lebanon and not force us into the present measures.

We will not support partition of Lebanon, and this visit is simply an opportunity to get the views of the Christian leaders that we have not had an opportunity to obtain for the last few months.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you assess the passage of the Magnuson bill and the unilateral extension of a 200-mile conservancy zone at this particular time on the bargaining position of the United States and upon the success of this particular conference?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we were opposed to the unilateral extension of the 200-mile zone as an Administration, and we went along with it because we were afraid that it would lead to a set of unilateral moves by other countries—which, indeed, it has contributed to.

However, I believe now that Committee II, which is dealing substantially with that issue, is close to a solution. And if that should prove to be the case, then I would have to say that even though we did not favor the Magnuson bill it has not impeded the progress of the negotiations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech in Philadelphia you stated that the United States would not accept what you call the one-sided and unilateral declarations that were issues at the Colombo nonaligned summit. In those declarations the nonaligned countries stated that unless there was substantial progress at the Paris North-South talks that they were prepared to take some unilateral steps, particularly on the question of—the question of general debt moratorium.

What would be your response to a declaration along those lines by either a group of or a number of Third World countries?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not saying that every last statement that was made in Colombo had the character of a one-sided declaration.

In general, we do not believe it is appropriate for any country or group of countries to proceed with the threat of a unilateral action in issues that require really multilateral solutions. We have been opposed to a general debt moratorium because it is our belief that this will penalize those countries that have made a major effort to put their houses in order.

We are prepared, however, to engage in discussions about general principles of debt relief that can be applied on a case-by-case basis; we are prepared to let others put forward their proposals in the North-South dialogue and to examine them with an open mind.

What our reaction would be in a hypothetical case that hasn't arisen, I cannot now predict, because it isn't possible for debtors to put a debt moratorium unilaterally into operation without serious consequences to themselves.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last year the United States proposed a resolution at the General

Assembly calling for amnesty for political prisoners. Do you foresee any similar initiatives being taken by the United States this year in the United Nations?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet decided the full range of the initiatives that we are going to put forward at the General Assembly.

Q. Will President Ford address the General Assembly?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not know whether I want to deprive myself of an opportunity to speak to all of my colleagues here. This is a decision that the President has to make in the light of his other schedules here. There is no present plan for him to speak at the General Assembly.

Q. The question of the Middle East was discussed between yourself and the Secretary General. Can you tell us whether any new initiative—either on your part or on the U.N. part or anything—was discussed and you knew of the making or sensed it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the Secretary General was kind enough to give me his impressions from the nonaligned conference and of the attitude of those Arab leaders that he had an opportunity to exchange views with at the nonaligned conference. And I would not expect a specific initiative—at least, on our part—and the Secretary General would have to talk for himself in the immediate future. But our general concern that progress in the Middle East toward peace is necessary, that negotiations will have to be resumed, and that the current situation should not be frozen—we have reaffirmed this position and we will be continuing to exchange views on how to bring progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what degree might this—an election year—help or hinder your efforts in South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have not noticed that its being an election year greatly helps the efforts.

The reason for action in southern Africa has nothing to do with elections in the United States, because any study of our electoral arithmetic makes clear that this is not a significant issue. The reason we are concerned with making progress in southern Africa is that there is a guerrilla war going on in Rhodesia today, that it is certain to escalate—the loss of life is going to increase, the complexities are going to mount—and it simply cannot wait for our electoral process.

With respect to Namibia, which is a separable problem, there is a time limit before the international community. And there, too, the situation is going to deteriorate substantially, both on the ground and internationally, unless a serious effort is made.

We are conducting our policy in order to bring peace to a troubled area and to serve the national interests of the United States. It can have no impact on our election that I can discern.

OECD Declaration on Investment Commended to U.S. Businesses

Following is the text of a letter dated August 19 from Secretary Kissinger, Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon, and Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson, which was sent to more than 800 chief executives of major U.S. corporations.¹

AUGUST 19, 1976.

On June 21, 1976, twenty-three governments of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) jointly adopted a Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, which we believe will contribute significantly to an open and stable environment for international investment.² Maintenance of such an environment over

coming years depends on strengthening mutual expectations of governments and enterprises regarding responsible policies and practices.

This balance of governmental and enterprise responsibilities is the core of the approach to international investment which is reflected in the OECD Declaration and the related decisions providing for continuing consultation and cooperation among the industrial countries of the OECD on the basic principles of the Declaration.

The main elements of the OECD investment declaration and related decisions, which are enclosed, are the following:

—affirmation by OECD Governments of their basic orientation toward international investment, stressing that such investment increases general welfare and should be facilitated;

—a recommitment by OECD Governments to their obligations vis-a-vis multinational enterprises, including undertakings to accord them "national" or non-discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis domestic firms, and to treat them in accordance with international law and agreements as well as contracts to which they have subscribed;

—a recommendation that enterprises operating in OECD countries voluntarily observe those guidelines of good business practice contained in an annex to the Declaration;

—a pledge by OECD Governments to closer consultation and cooperation on international direct investment issues, including problems arising from official incentives and disincentives for such investment.

In our view, this Declaration represents a major step in support of a favorable environment for direct investment among the industrial countries. Throughout the negotiation of this Declaration, the U.S. Government consulted closely with private sector representatives because the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are voluntary—as the United States held they should be—and in order to assure that the Guidelines and the entire Declaration

¹ Text from press release 402 dated Aug. 30, which includes an announcement of the release of the letter.

² For texts of the declaration, annex, and related decisions, see BULLETIN of July 19, 1976, p. 83.

would be fair and balanced. We believe our objectives have been achieved. The U.S., therefore, joined the other OECD Governments in recommending to enterprises operating in the OECD countries observance of the Guidelines, in the context of the governmental assurances contained in the Declaration. We commend these Guidelines to all enterprises in the United States.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Secretary of State

WILLIAM E. SIMON
Secretary of the Treasury

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
Secretary of Commerce

Fifth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, I am submitting my fifth periodic report on the progress of the Cyprus negotiations and the efforts this Administration is making to help find a lasting solution to the problems of the island. In previous reports I have emphasized my strong desire to see a just and lasting settlement. I have reviewed in detail the efforts this Administration has made to help realize that achievement, and the progress that has been made thus far. I have indicated that while a Cyprus solution cannot be dictated by the United States, or imposed by any outside party, there are certain elements which are considered essential to an equitable settlement. These I detailed for the Congress in my report of December 8, 1975.

¹ Transmitted on Aug. 6 (text from White House press release).

These essential elements have not changed. Nor has my conviction, voiced in earlier reports, that real progress can be achieved provided mutual distrust and suspicions are set aside and both parties forego rhetoric which needlessly hinders the search for a just settlement.

We have lost no opportunity to contribute to our common goal of achieving a Cyprus solution. I have discussed the Cyprus problem at length with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey. At the Summit Conference in Puerto Rico in June 1976, I spoke about Cyprus with leaders of the major industrial nations. Secretary Kissinger has also devoted considerable effort to achieving a favorable atmosphere for discussions, continuing personally to press our views at the highest levels in Athens and Ankara. Our Ambassadors in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus have worked unstintingly to help bring the two sides together in an atmosphere of true negotiation; and we have strongly and continuously supported the efforts of United Nations Secretary General Waldheim to achieve this same end. In spite of all these efforts, we have been unsuccessful thus far in getting the parties to set aside procedural problems and to move on to discussions of the key substantive issues, such as territory.

The process of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem has been carried forward through intercommunal talks between the two Cypriot sides, under the aegis of Secretary General Waldheim. These talks have been in recess since February. Lower-level "humanitarian" talks, now also in recess, have produced limited progress on subsidiary issues, but have left the central points of contention unresolved. Meanwhile new frictions continue to arise on the island as each side seeks to maintain or improve its position, either locally on the island or on the wider international stage.

We continue to seek solutions for the ongoing humanitarian problems of those who

were displaced from their homes on Cyprus by the conflict of 1974. The United States, through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has contributed some \$25 million in each of the past two years to help to alleviate these problems. On Cyprus, new programs to provide housing for those displaced are underway. With these programs, we would hope that most of those Cypriots still living in temporary dwellings—now down to about 10 percent of the original number of refugees—could be in new homes by early next year. In support of this effort our program of humanitarian assistance will continue in the coming year.

Secretary General Waldheim's Special Representative on Cyprus, Ambassador Perez de Cuellar, has recently engaged in discussions in Ankara, Athens and Nicosia with a view to developing a basis for an early resumption of the intercommunal talks. The United States has strongly supported these efforts and will remain in close contact with the Secretary General in the days immediately ahead.

On July 29 of this year I met with Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish opposition leader, and stressed the compelling need for a more conciliatory approach by both sides. Moreover, we have again been active with our European allies to insure that all avenues are explored in the search for a settlement.

Though there are many proposals for a settlement of the situation on Cyprus, the only solution which will restore domestic tranquility for all the citizens of that island is one which they work out among themselves. We are dedicating our efforts to assisting in the resumption of negotiations which will achieve the goal we share—an equitable and just peace on Cyprus. This Administration, with the support of the Congress, will continue actively to encourage that process in every way possible.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 6, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger Praises Work of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty

Following is the text of a letter dated August 28 from Secretary Kissinger to David M. Abshire, Chairman, Board for International Broadcasting.

Press release 400 dated August 30

AUGUST 28, 1976.

DEAR DAVE: I understand that the Board for International Broadcasting will hold its first annual review conference of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty programming in Munich later this month. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate to all participants the United States Government's firm commitment to the free flow and dissemination of information through international broadcasting.

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed by 35 Governments, declared that, "The participating States . . . make it their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds," and that "The participating States note the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express the hope for the continuation of this process, so as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples and the aims set forth by this Conference."¹

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasts can admirably serve the stated aim of the participating states "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds." The comprehensive coverage, quality reporting, and objective news analyses of the broadcasts are a uniquely meaningful and often vital source of information and encourage the "constructive dialogue with the peoples of East-

¹ For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.

ern Europe and the USSR" mandated by the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973.

The "jamming" of international broadcasts continues in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and, sporadically, in Poland. It must be eliminated if the goals of the CSCE Final Act are to be met.

The United States Government categorically rejects allegations made by Soviet and East European officials and media that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty contravene the aims of the Helsinki Declaration, or that either is associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. The Radios are independent, highly professional operations which make a vital contribution to the free flow of information between peoples.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 2d Session

Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. G, 94-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-28. June 15, 1976. 8 pp.

Annual Report of the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S. Rept. 94-947. June 15, 1976. 79 pp.

Treaty With the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. F, 94-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-29. June 17, 1976. 10 pp.

Report of Secretary of State Kissinger on His Visits to Latin America, Western Europe, and Africa. Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations. June 17, 1976. 31 pp.

Protocols for the Third Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the protocols. S. Ex. I. June 18, 1976. 8 pp.

Continuation of Temporary Suspension of Duties on Manganese Ore and Related Products. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance to accompany H.R. 12033. S. Rept. 94-994. June 25, 1976. 3 pp.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year

1977. Report of the committee of conference to accompany S. 3168. H. Rept. 94-1302. June 25, 1976. 42 pp.

Petroleum Industry Competition Act of 1976. Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, together with additional views, minority views, and additional minority views, to accompany S. 2387. S. Rept. 94-1005. Part 1; June 28, 1976; 185 pp. Part 2; July 1, 1976; 92 pp.

Making Appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary. Report of the committee of conference to accompany H.R. 14239. H. Rept. 94-1309. June 28, 1976. 12 pp.

Aeronautics and Space Activities. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the annual report for calendar year 1975 on U.S. aeronautics and space activities. H. Doc. 94-541. June 29, 1976. 112 pp.

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, together with additional views, to accompany H.R. 14260. S. Rept. 94-1009. June 29, 1976. 160 pp.

Status of the Baltic Nations. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Res. 319. S. Rept. 94-1018. June 30, 1976. 2 pp.

Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). Volume II; 81st Congress, first and second sessions, 1949-50; made public July 1976; 840 pp. Volume III, part 1; 82d Congress, first session, 1951; made public August 1976. 639 pp.

Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1975. Report of the committee of conference to accompany S. 2145. H. Rept. 94-1333. July 1, 1976. 16 pp.

Corrupt Overseas Payments by U.S. Business Enterprises. Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs to accompany S. 3664. S. Rept. 94-1031. July 2, 1976. 17 pp.

A Review of the Environmental, Economic and International Aspects of the Garrison Diversion Unit, North Dakota. Twenty-eighth report of the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 94-1335. July 2, 1976. 161 pp.

Establishing Certain Accounting Standards Relating to the Panama Canal Company. Report of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to accompany H.R. 14311. H. Rept. 94-1342. July 14, 1976. 35 pp.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976. Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, together with additional and minority views, to accompany S. 3197; S. Rept. 94-1035; July 15, 1976; 179 pp. Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, together with additional views; S. Rept. 94-1161; August 24, 1976; 77 pp.

Negotiation of Voluntary Restraints on Palm Oil Imports. Report of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry to accompany S. Res. 487. S. Rept. 94-1036. July 15, 1976. 3 pp.

Foreign Payments Disclosure. Message from the President of the United States urging enactment of proposed legislation to require the disclosure of payments to foreign officials. H. Doc. 94-572. August 3, 1976. 3 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.

Accession deposited: Singapore, September 10, 1976.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Ratification deposited: Zaïre, July 15, 1976.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with statement), August 24, 1976.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

Accession deposited: Zaïre, July 15, 1976.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Notification of withdrawal: Republic of China, September 10, 1976, effective December 10, 1976.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Notification of withdrawal: International Telecommunication Development Corporation, Ltd. of the Republic of China, September 10, 1976, effective December 10, 1976.

Scientific Cooperation

Memorandum of understanding for a transatlantic balloon program. Signed at Washington July 21 and 22, 1976. Entered into force July 22, 1976.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.

Ratification deposited: Singapore, September 10, 1976.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into force October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.

Accession deposited: Singapore, September 10, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

Accession deposited: Ireland, September 7, 1976.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

Accession deposited: Ireland, September 7, 1976.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement extending the agreement of November 16 and December 18, 1970, as extended (TIAS 7024, 7686), concerning activities of the United States at Churchill Research Range. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 8 and July 30, 1976. Entered into force July 30, 1976, effective July 1, 1976.

Agreement extending the agreement of April 2 and May 9, 1974, as extended (TIAS 8137), relating to the construction, installation, and maintenance of a seismograph station at Klwane Lake, Yukon Territory. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa July 14 and August 5, 1976. Entered into force August 5, 1976.

El Salvador

Agreement terminating the agreement of April 19, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7284, 7644), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at San Salvador July 15, 1976. Entered into force July 15, 1976.

¹ Not in force.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement relating to mutual cooperation regarding restrictive business practices. Signed at Bonn June 23, 1976.

Entered into force: September 11, 1976.

Spain

Treaty of friendship and cooperation with related notes and supplementary agreements. Signed at Madrid January 24, 1976.¹

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: September 4, 1976, with declaration.

Zambia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Lusaka August 24, 1976. Entered into force August 24, 1976.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

"... To Form a More Perfect Union . . ." Justice for American Women. Report of the National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year, 1976, appointed to "promote equality between men and women." Parts I-III contain actions recommended by the Commission as a whole; Part IV

¹ Not in force.

lists Commission members; and Part V contains findings and recommendations of working committees. Pub. Y3.W84:1/976. Stock No. 040-000-00350/9. 382 pp. \$5.20.

Air Charter Services. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany extending the agreement of April 13, 1973, as amended and extended. TIAS 8210. 2 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8210).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Dominican Republic. TIAS 8215. 10 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8215).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with the Netherlands extending the agreement of July 11, 1978. TIAS 8216. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8216).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics amending the agreement of November 4, 1966, as amended and extended. TIAS 8217. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8217).

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. Agreement with the Republic of China modifying the agreement of May 21, 1975. TIAS 8218. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8218).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Mexico extending the agreement of August 15, 1960, as amended and extended. TIAS 8219. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8219).

Narcotic Drugs—Assistance to Curb Illegal Production and Traffic. Agreement with Costa Rica. TIAS 8220. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8220).

Fisheries—Certain Fisheries Problems on the High Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics extending the agreement of February 26, 1975. TIAS 8221. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8221).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with Haiti. TIAS 8222. 10 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8222).

Trade in Cotton Textiles and Cotton Textile Products. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8223. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8223).

Drought Recovery Program. Agreement with Mauritania. TIAS 8224. 17 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8224).

Africa
 President Ford Discusses U.S. Efforts in Southern Africa (news conference opening statement) 385
 Secretary Kissinger Meets With South African Prime Minister at Zurich and Confers With British, French, and German Leaders (Kissinger, Schmidt) 377
 Secretary Kissinger Meets With U.N. Secretary General Waldheim (remarks to the press) 399

Congress
 Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 406
 Department Discusses August 18 Incident at Panmunjom and Its Aftermath (Hummel) 386
 Fifth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress (message from President Ford) 404

Cyprus. Fifth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress (message from President Ford) 404

Economic Affairs. OECD Declaration on Investment Commended to U.S. Businesses (letter from Secretaries Kissinger, Simon, and Richardson to corporate executives) 403

Europe. Secretary Kissinger Praises Work of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (letter to Chairman, Board for International Broadcasting) 405

France. Secretary Kissinger Meets With South African Prime Minister at Zurich and Confers With British, French, and German Leaders (Kissinger, Schmidt) 377

Germany. Secretary Kissinger Meets With South African Prime Minister at Zurich and Confers With British, French, and German Leaders (Kissinger, Schmidt) 377

Information Policy. Secretary Kissinger Praises Work of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (letter to Chairman, Board for International Broadcasting) 405

Korea
 Department Discusses August 18 Incident at Panmunjom and Its Aftermath (Hummel) 386
 Nonaligned Summit Meeting Position on Korea and Puerto Rico Rejected (Department statement) 394
 U.S. and Republic of Korea Welcome New Joint Security Area Arrangement (joint statement) 393
 United States Condemns Murder of American Officers in Korea (White House and Department statements) 392

Law of the Sea
 Secretary Kissinger Discusses U.S. Position on Law of the Sea Conference 395
 Secretary Kissinger Meets With U.N. Secretary General Waldheim (remarks to the press) 399

Lebanon. Secretary Kissinger Meets With U.N. Secretary General Waldheim (remarks to the press) 399

Namibia. Secretary Kissinger Meets With South African Prime Minister at Zurich and Confers With British, French, and German Leaders (Kissinger, Schmidt) 377

Presidential Documents
 Fifth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress 404
 President Ford Discusses U.S. Efforts in Southern Africa 385

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 408

South Africa. Secretary Kissinger Meets With South African Prime Minister at Zurich and Confers With British, French, and German Leaders (Kissinger, Schmidt) 377

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Kissinger Meets With South African Prime Minister at Zurich and Confers With British, French, and German Leaders (Kissinger, Schmidt) 377

Treaty Information. Current Actions 407

United Kingdom. Secretary Kissinger Meets With South African Prime Minister at Zurich and Confers With British, French, and German Leaders (Kissinger, Schmidt) 377

Name Index

Ford, President 385, 404
 Hummel, Arthur W., Jr. 386
 Kissinger, Secretary 377, 395, 399, 403, 405
 Schmidt, Helmut 377
 Waldheim, Kurt 399

**Checklist of Department of State
 Press Releases: September 6-12**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
413	9/6	U.S.-Republic of Korea joint statement.
*414	9/7	Women leaders from 19 countries to participate in 30-day program on "The Role of Women in the Political Process."
416	9/6	Kissinger: news conference, Zurich.
*417	9/7	Kissinger: arrival, Paris.
*418	9/7	Operation of citizens band radio equipment in Mexico.
*419	9/7	Kissinger: remarks to press, Paris.
*420	9/7	Kissinger, Genscher: arrival, Hamburg.
421	9/7	Kissinger, Schmidt: news conference, Hamburg.
*422	9/7	Kissinger: arrival, Andrews Air Force Base.
†423	9/9	Kissinger: news conference.
*424	9/10	Study Group 6, U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee, Amherst, Mass., Oct. 14.
*425	9/10	Advisory Panel on Music, Oct. 6.
*426	9/10	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Maritime Law, Oct. 15.
*427	9/10	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on subdivision and stability, Oct. 6.
*428	9/10	Robert J. McCloskey sworn in as Ambassador to the Netherlands (biographic data).
†429	9/11	Kissinger: news conference.

* Not printed.
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.