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The Western Alliance: Peace and Moral Purpose

Address by Secretary Kissinger¹

On my arrival in Washington seven years ago, one of my first acts was to gather a group of senior scholars of European affairs to have them give their advice to a new President on relations with our allies. The chairman of that group was Alastair Buchan.

He should not be held responsible for the results. But it was only natural to seek his counsel. For Alastair was more than a distinguished expert; he was a consummate man of the West. A Scot by birth, he considered himself, and referred to himself, as a European. He lived many years in the United States and visited us often, applying his incisive mind to the study of America and its role in the world. He was a champion of the importance, indeed, the inevitability, of the transatlantic tie between North America and Europe.

Beneath the skeptical air was a passionate commitment to the values and traditions we cherish as Western civilization. Sir Peter Ramsbotham [U.K. Ambassador to the United States] said in his eulogy of Alastair in Washington that no other countryman of his had contributed more to the understanding of international affairs and the strategic implications of nuclear power in the latter half of the 20th century. But Alastair's focus was not simply the structure of global politics and the roots of war; it was the central role of the West in preserving peace and giving it moral purpose.

This institute is a monument to his quest.

Alastair had that combination of intellect and compassion known as wisdom. It motivated the great contribution he made to scholarship and to a generation's understanding of the transformation of international relationships. He has left his mark on every person in this hall. During the last seven years he never hesitated to scold me, in all friendship, when he thought that American policy did not do justice to the great cause of European-American cooperation.

I would like to think that had he lived he would feel that after many starts we have made great strides in strengthening the unity of the West. And if that were his conviction, I for one would be very proud.

Alastair wrote:

Structural changes are occurring in the relative power and influence of the major states; there has been a quantitative change of colossal proportions in the interdependence of Western societies and in the demands we make on natural resources; and there are qualitative changes in the preoccupations of our societies.

He then posed the question:

Can the highly industrialized states sustain or recover a quality in their national life which not only satisfies the new generation, but can act as an example or attractive force to other societies?

All of us who wish to honor Alastair's memory must do so in the way he would want most of all—by proving that the answer to his question is "Yes." A world that cries out for economic advance, for social justice, for political liberty, and for a stable peace needs our collective commitment and

¹ Made at London on June 25 before the International Institute for Strategic Studies, inaugurating the Alastair Buchan memorial lecture series (text from press release 329).

contribution. I firmly believe that the industrial democracies working together have the means, if they have the will, to shape creatively a new era of international affairs. Indeed, we are doing so on many fronts today, thanks no little to the clarity Alastair brought to our purposes and directions.

A generation ago, Western statesmen fashioned new institutions of collaboration to stave off a common threat. Our progress after 30 years has been striking. Global war has been deterred, and all of the industrial democracies live with an enhanced sense of security. Our economies are the most prosperous on earth; our technology and productive genius have proven indispensable for all countries seeking to better the welfare of their peoples, be they Socialist or developing. Our societies represent, more than ever, a beacon of hope to those who yearn for liberty and justice and progress. In no part of the world and under no other system do men live so well and in so much freedom. If performance is any criterion, the contest between freedom and communism, of which so much was made three decades ago, has been won by the industrial democracies.

And yet at this precise moment, we hear in our countries premonitions of decline, anxieties about the travail of the West and the advance of authoritarianism. Can it be that our deeper problems are not of resources but of will, not of power but of conception?

We who overcame great dangers 30 years ago must not now paralyze ourselves with illusions of impotence. We have already initiated the construction of a new system of international relations, this time on a global scale; we must summon the determination to work toward it in unity and mutual confidence.

For America, cooperation among the free nations is a moral, and not merely a practical, necessity. Americans have never been comfortable with calculations of interest and power alone. America, to be itself, needs a sense of identity and collaboration with other nations who share its values.

Our association with Western Europe,

Canada, and Japan thus goes to the heart of our national purpose. Common endeavors with our sister democracies raise the goals of our foreign policy beyond physical survival toward a peace of human progress and dignity. The ties of intellectual civilization, democratic tradition, historical association, and more than a generation of common endeavor bind us together more firmly than could any pragmatic conception of national interest alone. The unity of the industrial democracies has been the cornerstone of American foreign policy for 30 years, and it will remain so for as far ahead as we can see.

So I would like to pay tribute to Alastair this evening by addressing the issues he raised: Can America, Europe, and the industrial democracies meet the challenge of the world's future? What is the state of our relationship?

The United States and a United Europe

In 1973, with Viet-Nam at last behind us, and fresh from new initiatives with China and the Soviet Union, the United States proposed that the collaboration of the industrial democracies be given new impetus. Military security, while still crucial, was no longer sufficient to give content or political cohesion to our broader relationship or to retain support for it from a new generation. We faced important East-West negotiations on European security and force reductions, a fresh agenda of international economic problems, the challenge of shaping anew our relationship with the developing world, and the need to redefine relations between America and a strengthened and enlarged European community.

It is academic to debate now whether the United States acted too theoretically in proposing to approach these challenges through the elaboration of a new Atlantic Declaration, or whether our European friends acted wisely in treating this proposal as a test case of European identity. The doctrinal arguments of 1973 over the procedure for Atlantic consultations, or whether Europe was

exercising its proper global role, or whether economic and security issues should be linked, have in fact been settled by the practice of consultations and cooperation unprecedented in intensity and scope. The reality and success of our common endeavors have provided the best definition and revitalization of our relationship.

There is no longer any question that Europe and the United States must cooperate closely under whatever label and that the unity of Europe is essential to that process.

In its early days, the European Community was the focus of much American idealism, and perhaps of some paternalism, as we urged models of federal unity and transatlantic burden sharing on our European friends. By now, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have come to understand that European unity cannot be built by Americans or to an American prescription; it must result from European initiatives.

The evolution of European initiatives—both its successes and its setbacks—invariably gives rise to new questions about whether the United States still welcomes European unification. Let me take this occasion to emphasize our conviction that European unity is crucial for Europe, for the West, and for the world. We strongly support and encourage it.

We have perhaps become a little more sophisticated about our contribution to the process. We no longer expect that it will grow from the desire to ease American burdens. If Europe is to carry a part of the West's responsibilities in the world, it must do so according to its own conceptions and in its own interest.

Alastair Buchan wrote:

It is impossible to inspire Western Europe to political unity or to encourage Japanese self-reliance unless they have the freedom and confidence to define their interests in every sphere, interests which must be reconciled with those of the United States but not subordinated to them.

The United States endorses this principle wholeheartedly. It is not healthy for the United States to be the only center of initiative and leadership in the democratic world.

It is not healthy for Europe to be only a passive participant, however close the friendship and however intimate the consultation.

We therefore welcome the fact that Europe's role in global affairs is gaining in vigor and effectiveness. A vital and cohesive Western Europe is an irreplaceable weight on the scales of global diplomacy; American policy can only gain by having a strong partner of parallel moral purposes.

Of course we do not want Europe to find its identity in opposition to the United States. But neither does any sensible European. Of course there will be disagreements between us of tactics and sometimes of perspectives, if not of ends. But I do not believe that we Americans have so lost confidence in ourselves that we must inhibit the role of others with whom we may have occasional differences but who share our highest values. The wisest statesmen on the two sides of the ocean have always known that European unity and Atlantic partnership are both essential and mutually reinforcing.

So let us finally put behind us the debates over whether Europe's unity has American support. We consider the issue settled. Let us, rather, address ourselves to the urgent challenges of mutual concern which a uniting Europe, the United States, and all industrial democracies must face together—common defense, East-West relations, and the international economy.

Security and the Democracies

Security is the bedrock of all that we do. A quarter century ago, the American defense commitment to Europe provided the shield behind which Western Europe recovered its economic health and political vitality. Today, our collective defense alliance—and the U.S.-Japanese relationship—continue to be essential for global stability. But the nature of security and strategy has fundamentally changed since the time when our alliances were founded:

—The Soviet Union has recovered from the devastation of World War II and pressed vigorously ahead on the path of industrial

growth. Possessing resources on a continental scale and imposing on its people enormous sacrifices in the name of its ideology, the U.S.S.R. has developed its economic strength and technology to a point where it can match the West in many sectors of industrial and military power. It shows no signs of changing its priorities.

—For centuries, it was axiomatic that increases in military power could be translated into almost immediate political advantage. It is now clear that in strategic weaponry, new increments of weapons or destructiveness do not automatically lead to either military or political gains. The destructiveness of strategic weapons has contributed to the emergence of nuclear stalemate. Neither side, if it acts with minimum prudence, will let the balance tip against it, either in an arms race or in an agreement to limit arms.

—Beneath the nuclear umbrella, the temptation to probe with regional forces or proxy wars increases. The steady growth of Soviet conventional military and naval power and its expanding global reach cannot be ignored. Conventional forces and military assistance to allies assume pivotal importance. We must insure that the strength and flexibility of all forces capable of local defense are enhanced. And we must conduct a prudent and forceful foreign policy that is prepared to use our strength to block expansionism.

These new realities demand from us steadiness, above all. Democratic societies have always fluctuated in their attitude toward defense—between complacency and alarmist concern. The long leadtimes of modern weapons and their complexity make both these aberrations dangerous. We cannot afford alternation between neglect and bursts of frenzy if we are to have a coherent defense program and public support for the necessary exertions. We need an allied defense posture that is relevant to our dangers, credible to both friends and adversaries, and justifiable to our peoples. And we must be prepared to sustain it over the long term.

It is imperative that we maintain the programs that insure that the balance is pre-

served. But we owe it to ourselves to see the military balance in proper perspective. Complacency may produce weakness, but exaggeration of danger can lead to a loss of will. To be sure, there has been a steady buildup of Soviet military power. But we have also seen to the steady growth and improvement of our own forces over the same period.

—We have always had to face Soviet ground forces larger than our own, partly because of the Soviet Union's definition of its needs as a power in the heart of the Eurasian landmass, with perceived threats on both flanks. Its naval power, while a growing and serious problem, is far weaker than combined allied naval strength in terms of tonnage, firepower, range, access to the sea, experience, and seamanship.

—The United States, for its part, is expanding its Army from 13 to 16 divisions through new measures of streamlining forces; we are increasing our combat forces in Europe; we plan to station a new Army brigade on the critical sector of the north German plain; we are augmenting our naval forces. Our European allies have completed major programs to build common infrastructure. We have undertaken new joint efforts of standardization and interoperability of allied forces.

—U.S. strategic forces are superior in accuracy, diversity, reliability, survivability, and numbers of separately targetable nuclear warheads. We have a commanding lead in strategic bombers. In addition, there are American deployments overseas and the nuclear forces of two Atlantic allies.

—Even with our different priorities, the economic and technological base which underlies Western military strength remains overwhelmingly superior in size and capacity for innovation. The Soviet Union suffers endemic weakness in its industry and agriculture; recent studies indicate that this chronic inefficiency extends even into their military sector to a much greater extent than realized before.

These strengths of ours demonstrate that

our present security posture is adequate and that it is well within our capacities to continue to balance the various elements of Soviet power. To maintain the necessary defense is a question of leadership more than of power. Our security responsibility is both manageable and unending. We must undertake significant additional efforts for the indefinite future. For as far ahead as we can see, we will live in a twilight area between tranquillity and open confrontation.

This is a task for both sides of the Atlantic. Our defense effort within the alliance will be importantly affected by the degree to which the American public is convinced that our allies share similar perceptions of the military challenge and a comparable determination to meet it. The greatest threat to the alliance would occur if, for whatever reason—through misreading the threat, or inattention to conventional forces, or reductions of the defense efforts of allies, or domestic developments within NATO members—U.S. public support for NATO were weakened.

The challenge of building sufficient hardware is easier than those of geopolitical understanding, political coordination, and above all, resolve. In the nuclear age, once a change in the geopolitical balance has become unambiguous, it is too late to do anything about it. However great our strength, it will prove empty if we do not resist seemingly marginal changes whose cumulative impact can undermine our security. Power serves little purpose without the doctrines and concepts which define where our interests require its application.

Therefore let us not paralyze ourselves by a rhetoric of weakness. Let us concentrate on building the understanding of our strategic interests which must underlie any policy. The fact is that nowhere has the West been defeated for lack of strength. Our setbacks have been self-inflicted, either because leaders chose objectives that were beyond our psychological capabilities or because our legislatures refused to support what the executive branch believed was essential. This—and not the various “gaps” that appear in the

American debate in years divisible by four—is the deepest security problem we face.

East-West Relations

As long ago as the Harmel report of December 1967,² the Atlantic alliance has treated as its “two main functions” the assurance of military security and realistic measures to reduce tensions between East and West. We never considered confrontation—even when imposed on us by the other side—or containment an end in itself. Nor did we believe that disagreements with the Soviet Union would automatically disappear. On the contrary, the very concept of “détente” has always been applicable only to an adversary relationship. It was designed to prevent competition from sliding into military hostilities and to create the conditions for the relationship to be gradually and prudently improved.

Thus, alliance policy toward the East has two necessary dimensions. We seek to prevent the Soviet Union from transforming its military power into political expansion. At the same time, we seek to resolve conflicts and disputes through negotiation and to strengthen the incentives for moderation by expanding the area of constructive relations.

These two dimensions are mutually reinforcing. A strong defense and resistance to adventurism are prerequisites for efforts of conciliation. By the same token, only a demonstrated commitment to peace can sustain domestic support for an adequate defense and a vigilant foreign policy. Our public and Congress will not back policies which appear to invite crises, nor will they support firmness in a crisis unless they are convinced that peaceful and honorable alternatives have been exhausted. Above all, we owe it to ourselves and to future generations to seek a world based on something more stable and hopeful than a balance of terror constantly contested.

² For text of the report (annex to the communique issued at the conclusion of the December 1967 ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council), see BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1968, p. 50.

However we label such a policy, it is imposed by the unprecedented conditions of the nuclear age. No statesman can lightly risk the lives of tens of millions. Every American President, after entering office and seeing the facts, has come to President Eisenhower's view that there is no alternative to peace.

Our generation has been traumatized by World War II, because we remember that war broke out as a result of an imbalance of power. This is a lesson we must not forget. But neither must we forget the lesson of World War I, when war broke out despite an equilibrium of power. An international structure held together only by a balance of forces will sooner or later collapse in catastrophe. In our time this could spell the end of civilized life. We must therefore conduct a diplomacy that deters challenges if possible and that contains them at tolerable levels if they prove unavoidable—a diplomacy that resolves issues, nurtures restraint, and builds cooperation based on mutual interest.

This policy has critics in all our countries. Some take for granted the relative absence of serious crises in recent years, which the policy has helped to bring about, and then fault it for not producing the millennium, which it never claimed. Some caricature its objectives, portraying its goals in more exalted terms than any of its advocates, and then express dismay at the failure of reality to conform to this impossible standard. They describe détente as if it meant the end of all rivalry; when rivalry persists, they conclude that détente has failed and charge its advocates with deception or naivete. They measure the success of policy toward adversaries by criteria that should be reserved for traditional friendships. They use the reality of competition to attack the goal of coexistence, rather than to illustrate its necessity.

In fact, this policy has never been based on such hope or gullibility. It has always been designed to create conditions in which a cool calculus of interests would dictate restraint rather than opportunism, settlement of conflicts rather than their exacerbation. Western policies can at best manage and shape, not assume away, East-West competition.

A pivot of the East-West relationship is the U.S.-Soviet negotiation on limitation of strategic arms. Increasingly, strategic forces find their function only in deterring and matching each other. A continuing buildup of strategic arms therefore only leads to fresh balances, but at higher levels of expenditures and uncertainties. In an era of expanding technological possibilities, it is impossible to make rational choices of force planning without some elements of predictability in the strategic environment. Moreover, a continuing race diverts resources from other needed areas such as forces for regional defense, where imbalances can have serious geopolitical consequences. All these factors have made arms limitation a practical interest of both sides, as well as a factor for stability in the world.

We have made considerable progress toward curbing the strategic arms race in recent years. We will continue vigorously to pursue this objective in ways which protect Western interests and reflect the counsel of our allies.

In defining and pursuing policies of relaxing tensions with the East, the unity of the industrial democracies is essential. Our consultations have been intensive and frequent, and the record of Western cohesion in recent years has been encouraging—in the negotiations leading to the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, in the SALT negotiations [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], and in the preparation for the European Security Conference.

Allied cooperation and the habits of consultation and coordination which we have formed will be even more important in the future. For as the policy of relaxing tensions proceeds, it will involve issues at the heart of all our interests.

No one should doubt the depth of our commitment to this process. But we also need to be clear about its limits and about our conception of reciprocity:

—We should require consistent patterns of behavior in different parts of the world. The West must make it clear that coexist-

ence requires mutual restraint, not only in Europe and in the central strategic relationship but also in the Middle East, in Africa, in Asia—in fact, globally. The NATO Foreign Ministers, at their Oslo meeting last month, stressed the close link between stability and security in Europe and in the world as a whole. We must endorse this not only by our rhetoric but above all by our actions.

—We should make clear the tolerable definition of global ideological rivalry. We do not shrink from ideological competition. We have every reason for confidence in the indestructible power of man's yearning for freedom. But we cannot agree that ideology alone is involved when Soviet power is extended into areas such as southern Africa in the name of "national liberation" or when regional or local instabilities are generated or exploited in the name of "proletarian internationalism."

—We should not allow the Soviet Union to apply détente selectively within the alliance. Competition among us in our diplomatic or economic policies toward the East risks dissipating Western advantages and opening up Soviet opportunities. We must resist division and maintain the closest coordination.

The process of improving East-West relations in Europe must not be confined to relations with the Soviet Union. The benefits of relaxation of tensions must extend to Eastern as well as Western Europe. There should be no room for misconceptions about U.S. policy:

—We are determined to deal with Eastern Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of each of its countries. We recognize no spheres of influence and no pretensions to hegemony. Two American Presidents and several Cabinet officials have visited Romania and Poland as well as non-aligned Yugoslavia, to demonstrate our stake in the flourishing and independence of those nations.

—For the same reason, we will persist in our efforts to improve our contacts and de-

velop our concrete bilateral relations in economic and other fields with the countries of Eastern Europe.

—The United States supports the efforts of West European nations to strengthen their bilateral and regional ties with the countries of Eastern Europe. We hope that this process will help heal the divisions of Europe which have persisted since World War II.

—And we will continue to pursue measures to improve the lives of the people in Eastern Europe in basic human terms—such as freer emigration, the unification of families, greater flow of information, increased economic interchange, and more opportunities for travel.

The United States, in parallel with its allies, will continue to expand relationships with Eastern Europe as far and as fast as is possible. This is a long-term process; it is absurd to imagine that one conference by itself can transform the internal structure of Communist governments. Rhetoric is no substitute for patient and realistic actions. We will raise no expectations that we cannot fulfill. But we will never cease to assert our traditional principles of human liberty and national self-determination.

The course of East-West relations will inevitably have its obstacles and setbacks. We will guard against erosion of the gains that we have made in a series of difficult negotiations; we will insure that agreements already negotiated are properly implemented. We must avoid both sentimentality that would substitute good will for strength and mock toughness that would substitute posturing for a clear conception of our purposes.

We in the West have the means to pursue this policy successfully. Indeed, we have no realistic alternative. We have nothing to fear from competition: If there is a military competition, we have the strength to defend our interests; if there is an economic competition, we won it long ago; if there is an ideological competition, the power of our ideas depends only on our will to uphold them.

We need only to stay together and stay the course. If we do so, the process of East-West

relations can, over time, strengthen the fabric of peace and genuinely improve the lives of all the peoples around the world.

Our Economic Strength

One of the greatest strengths of the industrial democracies is their unquestioned economic preeminence. Partly because we are committed to the free market system which has given us this preeminence, we have not yet fully realized the possibilities—indeed, the necessity—of applying our economic strength constructively to shaping a better international environment.

The industrial democracies together account for 65 percent of the world's production and 70 percent of its commerce. Our economic performance drives international trade and finance. Our investment, technology, managerial expertise, and agricultural productivity are the spur to development and well-being around the world. Our enormous capacities are multiplied if we coordinate our policies and efforts.

The core of our strength is the vitality and growth of our own economies. At the Rambouillet economic summit last November, at the Puerto Rico summit next week, in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and in many other forums, the major democratic nations have shown their ability to work together.

But an extensive agenda still summons us. We will require further efforts to continue our recovery and promote noninflationary growth. We will need to facilitate adequate investment and supplies of raw materials. We must continue to avoid protectionist measures, and we must use the opportunity of the multilateral trade negotiations to strengthen and expand the international trading system. We need to reduce our vulnerability and dependence on imported oil through conservation, new sources of energy, and collective preparations for possible emergencies. And we must build on the progress made at Rambouillet and at Jamaica last January to improve the international monetary system.

Our central challenge is to pool our

strengths, to increase our coordination, and to tailor our policies to the long term. On the basis of solid cooperation among ourselves, we must deal more effectively with the challenges of the global economy—such as our economic relations with the centrally planned Communist economies and with the scores of new nations concerned with development.

East-West economic interchange, while small in relative scale, is becoming an important economic and political factor. This growth reflects our fundamental strength. It carries risks and complications, both political and economic. But it also presents opportunities for stabilizing relations and involving the Communist countries in responsible international conduct. If the democracies pursue parallel policies—not allowing the Communist states to stimulate debilitating competition among us or to manipulate the process for their own unilateral advantage—East-West economic relations can be a factor for peace and well-being.

We must insure that benefits are reciprocal. We must avoid large trade imbalances which could open opportunities for political pressure. We should structure economic relations so that the Communist states will be drawn into the international economic system and accept its disciplines.

When dealing with centrally controlled state economies, we have to realize that economic relations have a high degree of political content and cannot be conducted solely on the normal commercial basis. Obviously, profitability must be one standard, but we need a broader strategy, consistent with our free enterprise system, so that economic relations will contribute to political objectives.

The industrial democracies should coordinate their policies to insure the orderly and beneficial evolution of East-West relations. To these ends, the United States has proposed to the OECD that we intensify our analyses of the problems and opportunities inherent in East-West trade with a view to charting common objectives and approaches.

If the economic strength of the industrial democracies is important to the Socialist

countries, it is vital for the developing world. These nations seek to overcome pervasive poverty and to lift the horizons of their peoples. They ask for an equitable share of global economic benefits and a greater role in international decisions that affect them.

The process of development is crucial not only for the poorer nations but for the industrial nations as well. Our own prosperity is closely linked to the raw materials, the markets, and the aspirations of the developing countries. An international order can be stable only if all nations perceive it as fundamentally just and are convinced that they have a stake in it. Over the long term, cooperative North-South relations are thus clearly in the interest of all, and the objectives of industrial and developing countries *should* be complementary.

However, the North-South dialogue has been far from smooth. Tactics of pressure and an emphasis on rhetorical victories at conferences have too often created an atmosphere of confrontation. Such attitudes obscure the fundamental reality that development is an arduous long-term enterprise. It will go forward only if both sides face facts without illusions, shunning both confrontation and sentimentality.

Far more is involved than the mechanical application of technology and capital to poverty. There must be within the developing country a sense of purpose and direction, determined leadership, and perhaps most important, an impulse for change among the people. Development requires national administration, a complex infrastructure, a revised system of education, and many other social reforms. It is a profoundly unsettling process that takes decades.

For many new countries it is in fact even more difficult than similar efforts by the Western countries a century ago, for their social and geographic conditions reflect the arbitrary subdivisions of colonial rule. Some face obstacles which could not be surmounted even with the greatest exertions on their own. Their progress depends on how well the international community responds to the im-

peratives of economic interdependence.

It is senseless, therefore, to pretend that development can proceed by quick fixes or one-shot solutions. Artificial majorities at international conferences confuse the issue. Confrontational tactics will in time destroy the domestic support in the industrial countries for the forward-looking policy which the developing countries so desperately need.

The industrial democracies have special responsibilities as well. Development requires their sustained and collective cooperation. They represent the largest markets and most of the world's technology and capital. They have an obligation to show understanding for the plight of the poorest and the striving for progress of all developing nations. But they do the developing countries no favor if they contribute to escapism. If they compete to curry favor over essentially propagandistic issues, contributions will be diluted, resources will go unallocated, and unworkable projects will be encouraged.

The developing countries need from us not a sense of guilt but intelligent and realistic proposals that merge the interests of both sides in an expanding world economy:

—First, we must develop further the mechanisms of our own cooperation. To this end the United States has made a number of concrete proposals at the recently concluded OECD meeting.

—Second, the industrial democracies should coordinate their national aid programs better so that we use our respective areas of experience and technical skill to best advantage. [French] President Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for an integrated Western fund for Africa is an imaginative approach to regional development.

—Third, we should regularly consult and work in close parallel in major international negotiations and conferences. The Conference on International Economic Cooperation; the multilateral trade negotiations; U.N. General Assembly special sessions; world conferences on food, population, environment, or housing; and UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] all can achieve much more if the industrial democ-

racies approach them with a clear and coherent purpose.

—Fourth, we should stop conducting all negotiations on an agenda not our own. We should not hesitate to put forward our own solutions to common problems.

—And finally, we need a clear longer term strategy for development. The diverse elements of the process, including various forms of assistance, technology transfer, and trade and financial policy, must be better integrated.

Cooperation among developed countries is not confrontation between North and South, as is often alleged. The fact is that a responsible development policy is possible only if the industrial democracies pursue realistic goals with conviction, compassion, and coordination. They must not delude themselves or their interlocutors by easy panaceas, or mistake slogans for progress. We make the greatest contribution to development if we insist that the North-South dialogue emphasize substance rather than ideology and concentrate on practical programs instead of empty theological debates.

The Future of Democratic Societies

In every dimension of our activities, then, the industrial democracies enter the new era with substantial capacities and opportunities. At the same time, it would be idle to deny that in recent years the moral stamina of the West has been seriously challenged.

Since its beginnings, Western civilization has clearly defined the individual's relationship to society and the state. In southern Europe, the humanism of the Renaissance made man the measure of all things. In northern Europe, the Reformation, in proclaiming the priesthood of all believers and offering rewards for individual effort, put the emphasis on the individual. In England, the sense of justice and human rights and responsibilities evolved in the elaboration of the common law. Two hundred years ago the authors of our Declaration of Independence drew upon this heritage; to them every hu-

man being had inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The state existed to protect the individual and permit full scope for the enjoyment of these rights.

Today in the West, 30 years after the Marshall plan, our deepest challenge is that a new generation must explore again the issues of liberty and social responsibility, in an era when societies have grown vastly in size, complexity, and dynamism.

The modern industrial society, though founded in freedom and offering prosperity, risks losing the individual in the mass and fostering his alienation. The technical complexity of public issues challenges the functioning of democracy. Mass media and the weakening of party and group structures further the isolation of the individual; they transform democratic politics, adding new elements of volatility and unpredictability. The bureaucratic state poses a fundamental challenge to political leadership and responsiveness to public will.

Basic moral questions are raised: How do we inspire a questioning new generation in a relativistic age and in a society of impersonal institutions? Will skepticism and cynicism sap the spiritual energies of our civilization at the moment of its greatest technical and material success? Having debunked authority, will our societies now seek refuge in false simplifications, demagogic certitudes, or extremist panaceas?

These questions are not a prediction but a test—a test of the creativity and moral fortitude of our peoples and leaders.

Western civilization has met such tests before. In the late 15th century, Europe was in a period of gloomy introspection, preoccupied with a sense of despair and mortality. The cities which had sparked its revival following the Islamic conquests were in decline. Its territory was being diminished by the depredations of a powerful invader from the East. Its spiritual, economic, and cultural center—Italy—was a prey to anarchy and dismemberment.

And yet Europe at that very moment was already well launched on one of the world's periods of greatest political and intellectual

advance. The Renaissance and Reformation, the great discoveries, the revival of humanistic values, the industrial and democratic revolutions—these were all to create the character and the dynamism of the Western civilization of which we, on both sides of the Atlantic, are the heirs.

Similarly today, the West has assets to meet its challenges and to draw from them the material for new acts of creation. It is our nations that have been the vanguard of the modern age. Intellectually and morally, it is our societies that have proven themselves the vast laboratory of the experiment of modernization. Above all, it is the Western democracies that originated—and keep alive today—the vision of political freedom, social justice, and economic well-being for all peoples. None of us lives up to this vision ideally or all the time. But the rigorous standard by which we judge ourselves is what makes us different from totalitarian societies, of the left or the right.

This, then, is our moral task:

—First, as democratic governments we must redeem, over and over again, the trust of our peoples. As a nation which has accepted the burden of leadership, the United States has a special responsibility: we must overcome the traumas of the recent period, eradicate their causes, and preserve the qualities which world leadership demands. In Europe, wherever there has been a slackening in governmental responsiveness to the needs of citizens, there should be reform and revival.

—Second, we must confront the complexities of a pluralistic world. This calls for more

than specific technical solutions. It requires of leaders a willingness to explain the real alternatives, no matter how complicated or difficult. And it requires of electorates an understanding that we must make choices amidst uncertainty, where the outcome may be neither immediate nor reducible to simple slogans.

—Third, we must clarify our attitudes toward political forces within Western societies which appeal to electorates on the ground that they may bring greater efficiency to government. But we cannot avoid the question of the commitment of these forces to democratic values nor a concern about the trends that a decision based on temporary convenience would set in motion. At the same time, opposition to these forces is clearly not enough. There must be a response to legitimate social and economic aspirations and to the need for reforms of inadequacies from which these forces derive much of their appeal.

—Finally, the solidarity of the democratic nations in the world is essential both as material support and as a moral symbol. There could be no greater inspiration of our peoples than the reaffirmation of their common purpose and the conviction that they can shape their fortune in freedom.

We cannot afford either a perilous complacency or an immobilizing pessimism. Alastair Buchan posed his questions not to induce paralysis, but as a spur to wiser action and fresh achievement.

We know what we must do. We also know what we can do. It only remains to do it.

Leaders of Major Industrial Democracies Meet in Puerto Rico

President Ford and Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany, Prime Minister Aldo Moro of Italy, Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan, and Prime Minister James Callaghan of the United Kingdom met at Dorado Beach, Puerto Rico, June 27-28. Following are remarks by President Ford upon arrival in Puerto Rico on June 26, his remarks prepared for delivery at the opening session of the conference on June 28, and the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger and Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon on June 28, together with the text of a joint declaration issued at the conclusion of the conference.

PRESIDENT FORD'S REMARKS UPON ARRIVAL, SAN JUAN AIRPORT, JUNE 26

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5

Mr. Governor, distinguished members of the welcoming committee: I thank you for the very warm welcome upon my arrival at the summit. It is an honor for the United States to be the host of this conference. I know that world leaders who are joining me will be as appreciative of the beauty and the hospitality of Puerto Rico as I am.

In recent years, the industrialized democracies have become increasingly concerned with the questions of economic growth and stability. The linkages between our nations have multiplied. Our economies have become more closely interrelated. Last November at Rambouillet, we began a dialogue which recognized our mutual concerns and our interre-

lationships. Today, we come together to continue that dialogue. We are fully aware of how important it is for us to work together to shape policies, to achieve stable economic growth, and to respond to the new challenges and opportunities which face us all.

Since we last met, we have witnessed significant economic improvements throughout the world. Certainly in the United States our progress has been better than many predicted, but some old problems remain and new ones confront us. The very speed of the recovery itself serves as a major test of our ability to insure long-term stability in our economy.

This is not a test, however, for the United States alone. It is the special challenge facing the people of all the industrialized democracies. I welcome the opportunity to meet again with the leaders of our major economic partners. I am confident that these discussions will help us to continue our current economic progress and move us ever closer to our goal of economic growth and stability throughout the world.

Mr. Governor, this is my first visit as President to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. It is a fitting moment to reflect on the rich and long history of cooperation and participation which this island and its people share with the United States. That history has been built on a simple but fundamental concept—the right of the people of Puerto Rico and the United States freely to determine the nature of their ties with one another. Over the years we have chosen to have a close relationship. We have built this relationship around a common citizenship, a common defense, a common currency, and a common market.

Today, we find that the nature of our relationship is again, as in the past, a subject of free discussion and free debate. This in itself is the best testament to the strength of what we have built together, and it is the best promise that what we together choose to do in the future will be beneficial to the people of this island.

There are those, however, who seek to distort the facts, to mislead others about our relationship with Puerto Rico. The record is clear; the record is open. We are proud of the relationship that we have developed together, and we invite the world to examine it. We commend to its critics the same freedom of choice through free and open election which is enjoyed by the people of Puerto Rico.

Those who might be inclined to interfere in our freely determined relations should know that such an act will be considered an intervention in the domestic affairs of Puerto Rico and the United States and will be an unfriendly act which will be resisted by appropriate means.

In the midst of this beautiful setting, we cannot forget that problems, both political and economic, still remain. As we base our hopes on freedom of choice and expression to help resolve the political problems, so we look to cooperation and interdependence to overcome our economic problems.

Mr. Governor, I am hopeful that the work of this summit will give a new impetus to the growth of our worldwide economy and improve international cooperation, and thus we will have a positive effect on both the United States and Puerto Rico.

Again, I thank you, Mr. Governor, for your warm welcome and for your help in hosting this summit.¹

PRESIDENT FORD'S REMARKS PREPARED FOR OPENING SESSION OF CONFERENCE, JUNE 27

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5

On behalf of myself and my colleagues and the people of the United States, I welcome you to Puerto Rico. We have a formidable task ahead of us in these next two days—to address major common concerns and to iden-

tify areas in which improved cooperation among us can contribute to the well-being of our citizens and to a more secure and prosperous world.

As we all know, meetings of this sort raise anticipations of dramatic results. But the important thing about Rambouillet and our meeting here today is that they are part of an essential and continuing bilateral and multilateral effort by the leaders of key industrialized democracies to address common problems and to improve mutual understanding.

The complexity of our nations' economies, individually and collectively, means that we as leaders cannot afford to allow major difficulties to arise and then, by dramatic meetings, attempt to resolve them. It requires instead that we concert our effort to prevent problems from arising in the first place—to shape the future rather than reacting to it. It is with that objective in mind that this summit is being held.

The central economic, political, and security importance of our countries to one another and to the world confers upon us special responsibilities. In the economic area, on which we will focus today and tomorrow, our strong commitment to shape constructive approaches can contribute to the prosperity of our peoples, strengthen our broader relationships, and prove highly beneficial to the world at large.

Recent experience has clearly demonstrated that because of the interdependence of our nations, common problems are unlikely to be solved unless we apply our mutual efforts. They have, in addition, shown that our common interests are far more significant than the differences which arise among us from time to time. We have, therefore, wisely approached recent problems with a political will and spirit of cooperation which have not only helped us resolve them but which have in fact strengthened considerably relations among our nations and

¹For a reply by Governor Rafael Hernández-Colón of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5, 1976, p. 1088.

among the industrialized democracies as a whole.

This conference builds on and can help us continue the progress already made. This vision and sense of shared purpose which results from our meetings will help each of us pursue constructive policies at home, with respect to our economic partners, and in dealing with major global issues.

I am confident that the same positive spirit that was developed at Rambouillet will extend through our meetings here in Puerto Rico and beyond. Much of the world's future depends on our constructive cooperation.

PRESIDENT FORD'S REMARKS AT CONCLUSION OF CONFERENCE, JUNE 28

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5

We have just concluded two days of very productive discussions on a number of issues of great importance to us all. Our talks were characterized by a seriousness of purpose, a firm desire to improve our understanding of one another's views, and a common commitment to strengthen constructive cooperation among all nations.

During the course of our discussions, we reached agreement in several significant areas. These are set out in the declaration that we have just adopted.

First, we are confident about the future economic and financial outlook for our countries. All of us are committed to achieving sustainable growth which will reduce unemployment without jeopardizing our common aim of avoiding a new wave of inflation. We recognize that the sustained economic expansion we seek and the resultant increase in individual well-being cannot be achieved in the context of high inflation rates.

We agreed that our objective of monetary stability must not be undermined by the strains of financing payments imbalances. Each nation should manage its economy and its international monetary affairs so as to correct or avoid persistent or structural international payments imbalances.

We have recognized that problems may

arise for a few developed countries which have special needs, which have not yet restored domestic economic stability, and which face major payments deficits. We agreed that if assistance in financing transitory balance-of-payments deficits is necessary to avoid general disruptions in economic growth, it can best be provided by multi-lateral means, in conjunction with a firm program for restoring underlying equilibrium.

The industrialized democracies can be most successful in helping developing nations by agreeing on and working together to implement sound solutions to their own problems, solutions which enhance the efficient operation of the international economy. Our efforts must be mutually supportive rather than competitive. We remain determined to continue the dialogue with the developing countries to achieve concrete results.

We agreed on the importance of maintaining a liberal climate for the flow of international investment. We agreed to examine carefully the various aspects of East-West economic contacts so that they enhance overall East-West relations.

Together, the results of our discussions represent a significant step forward in cooperation among the industrial democracies. They establish positive directions which will benefit not only our peoples but the international economy as a whole.

In conclusion, let me add a personal note. I was greatly impressed with the candid and friendly atmosphere here. Our countries have come through a difficult period. Our cooperation during this period has not only contributed to the resolution of problems but has in fact significantly strengthened relations among our countries and among the industrialized democracies as a whole.

We can be proud of this record and of our nations' abilities to meet the severe challenges we have faced. In my view, the spirit of Rambouillet, which was carried forward to these meetings in Puerto Rico, has strengthened prospects for progress by the industrialized democracies in a number of key areas. If we nurture the sense of common purpose

and vision which has characterized these discussions, we have an opportunity to shape events and better meet the needs of our citizens and all the world.

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND TREASURY SECRETARY SIMON, JUNE 28

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5

Secretary Kissinger: Let me say that basically the purpose of this conference was to enable the leaders of the industrial democracies, a group of nations that between them have 60 percent of the world's GNP, to discuss a number of economic issues and to discuss a number of issues where economic and political considerations merge, such as East-West and North-South issues. They discussed them in a very free and relaxed atmosphere.

It was not a question of reading prepared statements at each other; but as Prime Minister Callaghan said, there was usually one of the leaders who introduced one of the issues, and then there was a free and easy discussion.

We believe that on the major issues confronting these countries a large degree of understanding was reached that should help encourage the economic processes, and it should also enable the countries represented here to work together on international issues such as those that were mentioned in the communique. But what no communique can reflect is the many conversations that took place at the side, the attitude of the participants that reflected the conviction that they represented parallel values and the realization that their destinies were linked together.

With this, let us answer your specific questions.

Q. Can any of you quantify the type of assistance that is in mind for Italy?

Secretary Kissinger: There was no specific discussion of any particular amount nor indeed of the framework within which assistance can take place. There is a general statement in this document that we would apply

to all circumstances in which there are persistent or temporary disequilibria and perhaps Bill can explain its significance better.

Secretary Simon: Well, there is an existing agreement in the International Monetary Fund that loans can be made on a supplementary basis when resources are needed to forestall or to cope with a temporary problem in the international monetary system that is impairing its proper functioning, and we discussed the possibility of, if something like this were needed—as I believe the communique says verbatim—what type mechanism should be brought into place for transitory financing for balance-of-payments purposes under very stringent economic conditions.

Q. May I ask the first Secretary [laughter]—given the fact that you said we should not expect any dramatic developments out of this, can you give us an idea of any changes that might come about as a result of this meeting, or any new directions that U.S. policy might take?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, one cannot expect that the foreign policy of major countries can be redesigned every six months, and if that were to happen, that would be a reason for alarm rather than for congratulations.

On the economic side, all of the countries face the situation now that the recession which seemed to be the dominant problem at Rambouillet has turned to a greater or lesser degree in the various countries into a recovery problem, and the problem that had to be discussed was how to sustain this recovery without inflation.

On the East-West trade, this was not discussed at Rambouillet at all, and we agreed to study the various implications of the relationship between state economies and market economies so that commerce can develop to the mutual benefit and cannot be used for political purposes.

With respect to North-South, there was a very full and detailed discussion in the light of the experience which we have all had at UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and

Development] in Nairobi and at the meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris as to how the industrialized countries, the industrialized democracies, that between them contribute almost the entire development effort—the Socialist countries contribute nothing—how those countries can cooperate for the mutual benefit of both developed and developing countries and for the benefit of the world economy. That, too, was not an entirely new direction, but a new emphasis on which very fruitful discussions took place.

Q. Can you tell us anything, Mr. Secretary, about the President's talks with Giscard, Moro, Callaghan, Miki?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, one of the great benefits of these meetings is the ability to exchange ideas not only in a meeting room but on a bilateral basis. And with the various leaders there was an exchange because, obviously, with the Italian Prime Minister, there was a discussion of the implications of what political developments might occur in Italy that could be most conducive to reform, and we got the assessment of the Italian leaders.

We will see the Japanese Prime Minister again on Wednesday in Washington, so this was more in the nature of a preliminary talk.

The talk with President Giscard d'Estaing concerned the review of the entire world situation, including some topics that were not discussed in the general session, such as the Middle East and Africa. And you will remember I said it is only to point out why there were no bilaterals with certain other people, that the President has seen Prime Minister Trudeau two weeks ago and will see Chancellor Schmidt two weeks from now. So, this is the essence of his conversations.

Q. Did you get any further in the North-South deal, on getting a common approach?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it is possible—nor did we attempt—to get all the details of a common approach in a meeting of a day and a half, but there was a general understanding that there should be a com-

mon approach or at least a parallel approach.

There was also a general understanding, as the communique reflects, that the developed countries can make their best contribution by putting forward sound positions rather than wait for proposals to be put to them and let themselves be driven by the negotiating tactics of a particular conference, and it was agreed that we would work closely together in preparation for other meetings.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that much of the developing payment deficit results from oil, was that discussed, any stand to be taken on that question?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there was a general discussion of the energy problem but more from the point of view of what the industrial democracies can do to reduce their dependence on it, and there were general discussions of the economic aspects of balance-of-payments deficits which I will let Secretary Simon answer.

Secretary Simon: There was one important point, if I understand your question and statement correctly, that the balance-of-payments problem stems entirely from oil—that is not correct. Obviously the quadrupling of the oil price had a significant part to play, but there are those countries who have not sufficiently adjusted their economic policies to compensate for the increased cost of oil, and these adjustments, while difficult politically and socially, must indeed be made. And it was in that framework—of the responsibilities of nations in surplus as well as in deficit—that we discussed the balance-of-payments problems, that President Ford explained to the participants this year the United States is going to have a dramatic swing of \$15–\$16 billion in our current account balance, from a \$12 billion surplus last year to approximately \$3 billion deficit this year. We view this with equanimity and indeed—as other countries in surplus positions should, too.

Q. Mr. Secretary Simon, should we interpret the communique to indicate that Prime Minister Miki is receptive to the idea of revaluing the yen?

Secretary Simon: When we talk about revaluation of a currency, the Japanese yen is a floating currency that is subjected to the market evaluation, if you will, and that is what occurs. Now there are occasions which—I don't say the Japanese have been guilty of—where one can artificially attempt for a time to peg a rate, but I have not seen this occur, no. Floating rates, the market sets the rate.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion at all of southern Africa and Rhodesia?

Secretary Kissinger: Not in the meetings as such, but at the fringes of the meetings.

Q. Was there anything decided about it?

Secretary Kissinger: There was no attempt made to decide anything. As I pointed out after my meetings with Prime Minister [of South Africa John] Vorster, he has now to consider several problems with his colleagues, and we are consulting various black African states and various of our allies before we can formulate the precise next move, but we also insist that the process which was set in motion is still underway and in our view has a chance of continuing.

We also have called attention in Britain, and I want to do it here, about the central role that Britain can play with respect to Rhodesia, and it is a responsibility which we have the impression—indeed the British Government has said it is willing to exercise.

Q. Aside from having the agreement that there should be a common approach to it, do you know already or do you have a hint in which direction the North-South—

Secretary Kissinger: There was a rather full discussion of various of the topics that have been on the international agenda, and experts and others will work on that in the spirit of this meeting in the weeks ahead.

Q. I would like to ask Secretary Simon what the prospects are for the British pound and how this was discussed at the meeting.

Secretary Simon: Number one, we don't discuss other currencies of other countries.

That is for obvious reasons. Going back to the Jamaica agreement, one of the basic tenets of that agreement was that exchange rate stability would only be achieved when we achieved underlying economic stability; and as countries adjust to the durable inflation problems and other problems today their currencies indeed will stabilize, and actually most currencies in recent months, since the Jamaica agreement, have been remarkably stable. There have been a few notable exceptions, due to the fundamental economic problems which are being corrected.

Q. How much of the \$5 billion have the British drawn down?

Secretary Simon: I don't have that figure, and if I did I am not sure that that figure should not be announced, if indeed it should be at all, by the U.K. officials, not by an American finance official.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion with Giscard on the possible French force to Lebanon?

Secretary Kissinger: That issue is not at this particular moment acute. The French Government knows our attitude, and it is parallel to their own, which is to say that, if under conditions of cease-fire, if all of the parties should invite a French force, and if the French Government were prepared to send one, it could play a potentially useful role, but it is not now being discussed, and our impression is that the Arab League force will be the principal international instrument that is being used.

TEXT OF JOINT DECLARATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, JUNE 28

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5

The heads of state and government of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America met at Dorado Beach, Puerto Rico, on the 27th and 28th of June, 1976, and agreed to the following declaration:

The interdependence of our destinies makes it necessary for us to approach common economic problems with a sense of common purpose and to work toward mutually consistent economic strategies through better cooperation.

We consider it essential to take into account the interests of other nations. And this is most particularly true with respect to the developing countries of the world.

It was for these purposes that we held a broad and productive exchange of views on a wide range of issues. This meeting provided a welcome opportunity to improve our mutual understanding and to intensify our cooperation in a number of areas. Those among us whose countries are members of the European Economic Community intend to make their efforts within its framework.

At Rambouillet, economic recovery was established as a primary goal and it was agreed that the desired stability depends upon the underlying economic and financial conditions in each of our countries.

Significant progress has been achieved since Rambouillet. During the recession there was widespread concern regarding the longer-run vitality of our economies. These concerns have proved to be unwarranted. Renewed confidence in the future has replaced doubts about the economic and financial outlook. Economic recovery is well under way and in many of our countries there has been substantial progress in combatting inflation and reducing unemployment. This has improved the situation in those countries where economic recovery is still relatively weak.

Our determination in recent months to avoid excessive stimulation of our economies and new impediments to trade and capital movements has contributed to the soundness and breadth of this recovery. As a result, restoration of balanced growth is within our grasp. We do not intend to lose this opportunity.

Our objective now is to manage effectively a transition to expansion which will be sustainable, which will reduce the high level of unemployment which persists in many countries and will not jeopardize our common aim of avoiding a new wave of inflation. That will call for an increase in productive investment and for partnership among all groups within our societies. This will involve acceptance, in accordance with our individual needs and circumstances, of a restoration of better balance in public finance, as well as of disciplined measures in the fiscal area and in the field of monetary policy and in some cases supplementary policies, including incomes policy. The formulation of such policies, in the context of growing interdependence, is not possible without taking into account the course of economic activity in other countries. With the right combination of policies we believe that we can achieve our objectives of orderly and sustained expansion, reducing unemployment and renewed progress toward our common goal of eliminating the problem of inflation.

Sustained economic expansion and the resultant increase in individual well-being cannot be achieved in the context of high rates of inflation.

At the meeting last November, we resolved differences on structural reform of the international monetary system and agreed to promote a stable system of exchange rates which emphasized the prerequisite of developing stable underlying economic financial conditions.

With those objectives in mind, we reached specific understandings, which made a substantial contribution to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] meeting in Jamaica. Early legislative ratification of these agreements by all concerned is desirable. We agreed to improve cooperation in order to further our ability to counter disorderly market conditions and increase our understanding of economic problems and the corrective policies that are needed. We will continue to build on this structure of consultations.

Since November, the relationship between the dollar and most of the main currencies has been remarkably stable. However, some currencies have suffered substantial fluctuations.

The needed stability in underlying economic and financial conditions clearly has not yet been restored. Our commitment to deliberate, orderly and sustained expansion, and to the indispensable companion goal of defeating inflation provides the basis for increased stability.

Our objective of monetary stability must not be undermined by the strains of financing international payments imbalances. We thus recognize the importance of each nation managing its economy and its international monetary affairs so as to correct or avoid persistent or structural international payments imbalances. Accordingly, each of us affirms his intention to work toward a more stable and durable payments structure through the application of appropriate internal and external policies.

Imbalances in world payments may continue in the period ahead. We recognize that problems may arise for a few developed countries which have special needs, which have not yet restored domestic economic stability, and which face major payments deficits. We agree to continue to cooperate with others in the appropriate bodies on further analysis of these problems with a view to their resolution. If assistance in financing transitory balance of payments deficits is necessary to avoid general disruptions in economic growth, then it can best be provided by multilateral means coupled with a firm program for restoring underlying equilibrium.

In the trade area, despite the recent recession, we have been generally successful in maintaining an open trading system. At the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] we reaffirmed our pledge to avoid the imposition of new trade barriers.

Countries yielding to the temptation to resort to

commercial protectionism would leave themselves open to a subsequent deterioration in their competitive standing; the vigor of their economies would be affected while at the same time chain reactions would be set in motion and the volume of world trade would shrink, hurting all countries. Wherever departures from the policy set forth in the recently renewed OECD trade pledge occur, elimination of the restrictions involved is essential and urgent. Also, it is important to avoid deliberate exchange rate policies which would create severe distortions in trade and lead to a resurgence of protectionism.

We have all set ourselves the objective of completing the Multilateral Trade Negotiations by the end of 1977. We hereby reaffirm that objective and commit ourselves to make every effort through the appropriate bodies to achieve it in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration.²

Beyond the conclusion of the trade negotiations we recognize the desirability of intensifying and strengthening relationships among the major trading areas with a view to the long-term goal of a maximum expansion of trade.

We discussed East-West economic relations. We welcomed in this context the steady growth of East-West trade, and expressed the hope that economic relations between East and West would develop their full potential on a sound financial and reciprocal commercial basis. We agreed that this process warrants our careful examination, as well as efforts on our part to ensure that these economic ties enhance overall East-West relationships.

We welcome the adoption, by the participating countries, of converging guidelines with regard to export credits. We hope that these guidelines will be adopted as soon as possible by as many countries as possible.

In the pursuit of our goal of sustained expansion, the flow of capital facilitates the efficient allocation of resources and thereby enhances our economic well-being. We, therefore, agree on the importance of a liberal climate for international investment flows. In this regard, we view as a constructive development the declaration which was announced last week when the OECD Council met at the Ministerial level.

² For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyo on Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450.

In the field of energy, we intend to make efforts to develop, conserve and use rationally the various energy resources and to assist the energy development objectives of developing countries.

We support the aspirations of the developing nations to improve the lives of their peoples. The role of the industrialized democracies is crucial to the success of their efforts. Cooperation between the two groups must be based on mutual respect, take into consideration the interests of all parties and reject unproductive confrontation in favor of sustained and concerted efforts to find constructive solutions to the problems of development.

The industrialized democracies can be most successful in helping the developing countries meet their aspirations by agreeing on, and cooperating to implement, sound solutions to their problems which enhance the efficient operation of the international economy. Close collaboration and better coordination are necessary among the industrialized democracies. Our efforts must be mutually supportive, not competitive. Our efforts for international economic cooperation must be considered as complementary to the policies of the developing countries themselves to achieve sustainable growth and rising standards of living.

At Rambouillet, the importance of a cooperative relationship between the developed and developing nations was affirmed; particular attention was directed to following up the results of the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly, and especially to addressing the balance of payments problems of some developing countries. Since then, substantial progress has been made. We welcome the constructive spirit which prevails in the work carried out in the framework of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, and also by the positive results achieved in some areas at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi. New measures taken in the IMF have made a substantial contribution to stabilizing the export earnings of the developing countries and to helping them finance their deficits.

We attach the greatest importance to the dialogue between developed and developing nations in the expectation that it will achieve concrete results in areas of mutual interest. And we reaffirm our countries' determination to participate in this process in the competent bodies, with a political will to succeed, looking toward negotiations, in appropriate cases. Our common goal is to find practical solutions which contribute to an equitable and productive relationship among all peoples.

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Die Zeit of Hamburg

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger on June 25 by Theo Sommer which was published in the weekly newspaper Die Zeit of Hamburg on June 30.

Press release 336 dated June 30

Mr. Sommer: Mr. Secretary, the United States is celebrating its Bicentennial. During the past two centuries, it's been vacillating between isolationism and expansionism. What does America mean to the world on the threshold of its third century?

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't agree that America has been consciously expansionist. I think America has been alternating between isolationism and a kind of conception in which we assumed great responsibility for the world's security and economic progress. This got us involved in many places, but it was not based on a conscious strategy of expansionism.

It is my belief that the biggest change in American foreign policy has been that we are now permanently involved in foreign affairs. This is a new experience for America. Previously, whether we were isolationist or interventionist—it was always justified in America on the grounds that we were dealing with specific crises which had particular solutions, after which we could return home. At least we had the option of noninvolvement. That is now over.

Mr. Sommer: You don't think we are going to see another retreat of America?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that even if we were to see another retreat of America the consequences would be so grievous—it would have such traumatic consequences—that it would only underline what I have

said. But I don't believe we will see another retreat of America.

Mr. Sommer: Does the intrusion of domestic politics and the conflict between the legislature and the executive branch maim your capacity to conduct a rational and calculable and reliable foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: The conflict is not simply an executive-legislative conflict. It was produced by the weakening of executive authority as a result of Viet-Nam and Watergate. It reflects also the disorganization of the Congress, where there are no longer any clear power centers and a large number of congressional committees can assert jurisdiction. And any number of individual Congressmen can push their preferences. So we are dealing here with a more fundamental problem than an executive-legislative conflict.

Mr. Sommer: Do you regret the passing of "the imperial Presidency" and of the "Grand Vizier"?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think "the imperial Presidency" is a phrase that was invented after the fact. You cannot conduct foreign policy without authority or without some central focal point. And in fact it has been conducted this way even in the midst of executive-legislative conflict.

The real problem these days is not the dismantling of the central point of authority, but how a central point of authority can relate itself to congressional concerns. That has to be worked out. I regret a state of affairs which made possible events like the Turkish arms embargo, the manner in which the Angolan problem was handled, and several other setbacks.

Mr. Sommer: Is America going to be a reliable partner? Is it? Does it have the means and the resolve to pull its weight, and more specifically, what kind of a situation in a foreign country would justify a U.S. intervention?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that after the present turmoil is over the United States will probably be an even more reliable partner, because it is through this turmoil that the post-Marshall Plan generation is getting its feel for foreign policy and adjusting to the new realities of international life. I am basically optimistic that when this debate is behind us—and we are in its last phase—our foreign policy will be steadier.

On your second question, it depends on what you mean by intervention. I think what any great power needs, and what America needs, is to understand which geopolitical changes are against our interests and should be resisted. What to resist and how to resist it, you cannot do in a blueprint in the abstract.

Mr. Sommer: Are we back to containment?

Secretary Kissinger: Containment has always been one aspect of foreign policy in the sense that we cannot permit the Soviet Union to gain a preponderant strategic advantage. On the other hand, whereas in the forties and fifties containment was considered an end in itself, it is now just the beginning of wisdom; it is the condition on which other constructive policies have to be based.

We used to think that if the Soviet Union could be contained long enough, peace would break out at some magical moment and all problems would disappear. Today we know that we cannot permit the Soviets to gain military and strategic preponderance. But that doesn't solve our foreign policy problem.

Mr. Sommer: Which side is the United States on? Zbigniew Brzezinski, an academic and political critic as well as a rival of yours, has recently said that the curious thing is that the nation committed from its birth to independence now feels troubled and even

threatened by a world based on self-determination and striving for equality, and he says that the Administration is taking refuge in the notion of a hostile world as it used to take refuge in the notion of the cold war.

Secretary Kissinger: This is an election year, and many people have to say things to distinguish themselves from the present policy. I recognize no element of our foreign policy in this description. Nor could it be supported by anything I have been saying in my speeches.

Where do we say we are living in a hostile world? This is not reflected in our policy toward Europe, toward Latin America, toward Africa. Our initiatives at the seventh special session of the General Assembly and in other international forums were all based on the assumption that the United States has a particular responsibility to help construct an international environment in which nations can develop themselves along their own lines.

I simply do not recognize this description as applying to our policies.

Mr. Sommer: How do you reconcile the postulates of realpolitik and moral considerations in your handling—no, let's say stabilizing—the colonels' regime in Greece, destabilizing Allende, or in your, some people feel, rather late awakening to the African problems?

Secretary Kissinger: First, I can't accept your description either that we stabilized the colonels' regime in Greece or that we destabilized Allende. This is a bit of folklore that, after having been repeated so often, is now an unshakable part of general mythology. You can say that we did not move all-out against the colonels, but both our military aid and our diplomatic contacts were reduced; to say that we actively "stabilized" the colonels is totally incorrect.

The same is true with Allende. Allende destabilized himself. We did not produce the inefficiency of his regime. We did not procure the decisions of the leadership of the National Assembly. And the President of the

Supreme Court declared his acts unconstitutional and refused to vote for his programs. Those were Chilean decisions. We did try to keep the democratic parties alive in the face of much governmental harassment so that they could put forward candidates in the election of 1976. But we also kept open the economic pipeline to Chile, and Allende received over \$200 million of aid, plus \$100 million of debt rescheduling to which the United States agreed. That is a lot more aid disbursements than his successors have received from the United States.

Now with respect to your specific question on the relationship between realpolitik and morality. This is usually stated as a dichotomy: Either you conduct realpolitik or you conduct a moral policy. The fact is that all foreign policy actions, whatever their motivation, whether moral or cynical, take place in some objective context. And it is the obligation of the statesman to understand what that objective context is. However principled he may be, if he cannot use the material at hand, he cannot be effective.

On the other hand, a policy based only on so-called realpolitik is likely to be driven by events. And it's likely to become totally random. I would argue that without strong moral conviction it is very difficult to conduct a realpolitik, and I believe that you need strong moral convictions and a clear sense of moral purpose to define the objectives of foreign policy. Then in every individual case you still have to determine what you can achieve and how to go about it. And the dilemma of the statesman, as contrasted with professors, is that a professor can afford to put down the full complexity and elegance of his moral elevation; a statesman has to achieve his objectives by stages, each one of which is likely to be imperfect. So there is no inevitable opposition between realpolitik and moral principles entirely.

Mr. Sommer: If you look at the African situation in this context—

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, let's take the African situation. When foreign policy is discussed today, people speak totally in the

abstract, as if all foreign policies could have been conducted simultaneously and as if nothing else were going on in the United States. People forget now that we went through internal upheavals that had revolutionary manifestations during the Viet-Nam war; that when we came into office we found 550,000 Americans in Viet-Nam, that we confronted a total freeze in our relationship with the Soviet Union and no relationship at all with the People's Republic of China, and that relations with Europe were in rather poor shape. It was inevitable that we had to settle the Viet-Nam war first, re-do our relationships with Western Europe and with the Communist countries before we could turn, with energy, to the problems of the developing world. No one in America would have understood if we had suddenly turned our full energies to Africa at a time when we had all these other priorities.

Mr. Sommer: But now you do.

Secretary Kissinger: Now we do.

Mr. Sommer: And what are the yardsticks by which you measure the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: There are several aspects to our African policy: of course there is the overwhelming problem of southern Africa and the challenge of the basic orientation of the rest of Africa; and finally there is the relationship of Africa to the rest of the world.

With respect to southern Africa, we are attempting to bring about a situation in which the solution is found through negotiations rather than conflict, and by African nations rather than by outside powers. Hopefully, such a solution will achieve the aspirations of the African peoples and protect the rights of minorities. And if that succeeds, that will remove one of the greatest incentives, in fact almost the only opportunity, for outside intervention. Simultaneously, we are trying to encourage the elaboration of programs that give the aspirations to development a positive content by such proposals as the Sahel development scheme, support for [French] President Giscard

d'Estaing's idea of an African fund, and by the expansion of our own development program. And so far I'm rather encouraged by the progress we are making with respect to southern Africa, or at least I think it is possible we can make progress.

Mr. Sommer: Did your meeting with Mr. Vorster [Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa] yield any prospects for improvement?

Secretary Kissinger: It's an extremely delicate situation which presents everybody with serious dilemmas. I therefore do not want to characterize it at this moment, except to say that the process which I've described to you is still going on, that is to say, the possibilities of achieving what I described exist, and I would say that with the full knowledge of my conversation with Prime Minister Vorster.

Mr. Sommer: What is the role in all this for Europe, and what future do you see for the transatlantic relationship?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, today I'm giving a perhaps excessively long speech on that subject at the Institute for Strategic Studies. I believe that Europe, finding its political unity, should become a major participant in many global problems.

I would think with respect to southern Africa, for example, the cooperation of Europe is almost essential. It cannot be done effectively as a purely American policy.

I think Great Britain, with respect to Rhodesia—Great Britain, the Common Market, and the United States, with respect to other aspects of southern Africa—can give perhaps an element of guarantee and of stability that the United States by itself could not provide.

On the whole issue of development, the close cooperation between Europe and the United States is essential. And I think reality will bring us to a point where, in East-West relations, both political and economic, we will have to synchronize our strategy.

Mr. Sommer: Given the difficulties of pro-

gressing toward greater unity in Europe, given the problems on the northern and the southern flanks, and given the specter of Eurocommunism, do you still believe that Europe will be Marxist in 10 years' time?

Secretary Kissinger: I have never believed that Europe will be Marxist in 10 years' time.

Mr. Sommer: The sentence is ascribed to you.

Secretary Kissinger: The sentence may be ascribed to me, but it is part of a general mythology of—

Mr. Sommer: You never said it.

Secretary Kissinger: I never said it and—

Mr. Sommer: And you don't believe it.

Secretary Kissinger: And I don't believe it.

Mr. Sommer: There are some people in the United States who feel that Europe is just too bothersome, and probably it will break up anyway, and NATO might come unstuck, and that our best bet would be a strengthening of a Bonn-Washington axis. How do you feel about that?

Secretary Kissinger: Throughout my public life I have been a strong advocate of the closest ties between Bonn and Washington. German leaders, in and out of office, are personal friends of mine. Nevertheless I think it would be unfortunate for the Federal Republic, unfortunate for NATO, and not in anybody's interest to turn NATO into a special Bonn-Washington relationship. It would be too heavy a burden on the Federal Republic. It would raise all the suspicions in the rest of Europe that a generation of responsible German foreign policy has erased. And it would encourage the splitting up of the West rather than be an element of stability. I don't believe it is necessary. I don't favor it. I know no German leader who favors it.

Mr. Sommer: Do you see a special role for Germany?

Secretary Kissinger: Germany, because of its strength, inherently plays a vital role. And you don't get a special role by being handed a piece of paper. Germany has a very major role which it has exercised responsibly and which it should continue to exercise in the existing framework.

Mr. Sommer: You've involved yourself in so many election campaigns this year. Would you care to comment on the German election campaign?

Secretary Kissinger: [Laughter.] I said I'd confine myself to one election campaign at a time, and I have to give preference to the United States.

Mr. Sommer: What is your comment on the Italian election results?

Secretary Kissinger: The Italian election result has polarized the situation that led to the election by having in effect an anti-Communist party and a Communist Party with the intermediary parties substantially weakened and some of them brought to the edge of extinction. There is now almost exactly the situation that produced the election except that now most of the opposition forces have moved toward the Communists and the anti-Communist forces have moved to a slightly lesser extent toward the Christian Democrats. But the electoral arithmetic is almost the same as in the previous parliament.

Mr. Sommer: So we are not, in your view, any nearer to a solution, or to greater stability.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the dilemma remains exactly the same. Major reforms are necessary in Italy. If they are carried forward with the Communists, will it set a precedent for many other situations? On the other hand, can the non-Communist forces create sufficient cohesion to carry out the necessary reform programs? We, of course, hope that the democratic forces will form a government without Communist participation and carry out the necessary reforms.

Mr. Sommer: Looking back at nearly eight

years formulating and implementing American foreign policy, which were your greatest satisfactions and which your deepest frustrations?

Secretary Kissinger: I have to begin by saying that my present judgments are quite unreliable, because when you are in this office you react almost athletically. Events keep crowding in on you and you have to respond—

Mr. Sommer: Athletically—

Secretary Kissinger: —almost like an athlete, and I'm sure that once I'm out of office I will be more reflective. The danger is that if I am out of office a long time, I may be reflecting on things that never happened.

But I would think the greatest immediate dramas were the first time I met Chou En-lai, or the moment when Le Duc Tho handed over the proposals which permitted the existing governmental structure in Saigon to survive, and therefore I knew that the settlement of the Viet-Nam war had at last become inevitable. People forget now the enormous emotional investment we all had in ending the war in Viet-Nam. Other great sources of immediate satisfaction were the moments when the various Middle East agreements were achieved.

What will probably give me satisfaction in the longer term are structural achievements: the attempt to create a foreign policy based on permanent values and interests. In this category I would evaluate our relations with Western Europe and Japan, as well as our relations with Latin America, quite positively.

Mr. Sommer: Isn't your China policy in tatters already with the death of Chou En-lai?

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely not. Everything depends on what you understand by our China policy. I believe that without Watergate we probably could have made more rapid progress in the China policy. But on the other hand, it is remarkable how well the China policy has survived all the turmoil in both countries. And the basic rela-

tionship between China and the United States, which is based on certain fundamental common interests in the world situation, has been—for all practical purposes—unaffected. Things like cultural exchange, trade, these are symptoms. They are not the underlying reality.

Mr. Sommer: Do you have pangs of conscience at night about Viet-Nam, or about Cambodia, or about other things?

Secretary Kissinger: What is there to have pangs of conscience at night about with Viet-Nam? We found 550,000 American troops in Viet-Nam, and we ended the war without betraying those who in reliance on us had fought the Communists. And to remove 550,000 troops under combat conditions is not an easy matter.

Mr. Sommer: You don't think it took too much time?

Secretary Kissinger: It was important that the war not be ended with the United States simply abandoning people whom we had encouraged to resist the Communists. No one could foresee that Watergate would so weaken the executive authority that we could not maintain a settlement that in itself was maintainable. And if you look at what our opposition was saying during that time, their proposals were usually only about six months ahead of where we were going anyway. Some said we should end the war by the end of '71. Well, we ended it by the end of '72. After all, it took De Gaulle five years to end the Algerian war. And it was a very difficult process.

Now, with respect to Cambodia. It is another curious bit of mythology. People usually refer to the bombing of Cambodia as if it had been an unprovoked, secretive U.S. action. The fact is that we were bombing North Vietnamese troops that had invaded Cambodia for many years, that were in unpopulated areas of Cambodia, that were killing many Americans from these sanctuaries, and we were doing it with the acquiescence of the Cambodian Government, which never once protested against it and which, indeed, encouraged us to do it.

I may have a lack of imagination, but I fail to see the moral issue involved and why Cambodian neutrality should apply to only one country. Why is it moral for the North Vietnamese to have 50,000 to 100,000 troops in Cambodia, why should we let them kill Americans from that territory, and why, when the government concerned never once protested and indeed told us that if we bombed unpopulated areas they would not notice, why in all these conditions is there a moral issue?

And finally, I think it is fair to say that in the six years of the war, not 10 percent of the people were killed in Cambodia as were killed in one year of Communist rule.

Mr. Sommer: To change the tack, how do you account for the fact that so many of your policies which used to be widely acclaimed are now rather unpopular? For instance, détente. Is that due to shifts in public mood, or is it due to problems inherent in these policies? Has détente been a one-way street? What is the position of the U.S.S.R. today, compared to what it was when you started? Has détente reached the end of the road? How is it going to continue?

Secretary Kissinger: I would judge that a year from now, the policy that has been called détente will be seen to be reflecting the existing realities, and the only realistic and, for that matter, moral policy that the West can pursue.

Memories are brief. Think back to the period of the fifties and sixties, when we had endless crises over Berlin and other issues, crises that led to the edge of confrontation.

It seems to me axiomatic that when two countries possess the capacity to destroy civilized life, they cannot conduct their affairs on the basis of a constant test of strength with nuclear weapons. They have an obligation to attempt to avoid crises, if possible, to moderate crises if they occur, and to search for a constructive relationship.

If they do not do this, it will demoralize their publics. They will create "peace movements," in every country, that accuse their governments of having failed in its principal obligation of protecting them against a nu-

clear catastrophe. The very fact that there are no significant such movements in any Western country today is an important tribute to existing policy.

Secondly, where, exactly, has détente been a one-way street? What concrete agreement was to the unilateral benefit of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Sommer: Your critics quote SALT.

Secretary Kissinger: What was the alternative to SALT? And indeed, what was the essence of SALT? In 1971 the United States was involved in the war in Viet-Nam; the United States had for five years not begun one single new strategic launcher program. The Soviet Union was building 120 sea-based and about 90 land-based missiles a year. The numerical balance was therefore shifting with every month against the United States. Given long leadtimes, the United States had no possibility for at least five years to redress it. I therefore fail to see why an agreement that stopped ongoing Soviet programs but no U.S. programs, could have been against the interests of the United States. A much more persuasive case can be made that it was unilaterally to the Soviet disadvantage. But what the Soviets obviously calculated was that they were balancing our capacity for long-term buildup, not what we were actually doing.

Mr. Sommer: You said in your Dallas speech that détente is not paradise, that as far as you can see ahead we will be living in a twilight between tranquillity and confrontation.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. That is inherent in the large nuclear arsenals, the conflicting ideologies, and in the reality that the Russia of its present extent and power, even with a different leadership, would still be a security problem for us. It is not, after all, an invention of the Communists that Russia has been a security problem for Europe. It has existed at least since the Napoleonic war, if not before then, but every statesman has an obligation to ease this condition or confrontation. And I have every

confidence that whoever is President next year will, in this respect, pursue substantially the same policies.

Mr. Sommer: For Germans, the Berlin problem is a litmus test of détente. Are you satisfied with the situation in and around Berlin?

Secretary Kissinger: I have to separate two issues: the legal situation and how agreements are being carried out. I believe that the Four Power Agreement was a big step forward in regularizing the status of Berlin and in ending the cycles of crises that existed in the fifties and sixties. In the implementation of that agreement I believe improvements are possible and, conversely, that opportunities remain for what have up to now been minor harassments.

On balance I prefer an existing explicit agreement to a potentially explosive situation. The Western powers must insist on the scrupulous observance of the agreement. And they must defend with great tenacity the right of Berlin to live. That was true in the fifties, and it is true today. But we have a better legal basis to do it today, and on the whole I think the situation from the legal and political point of view is better than it was previously.

Mr. Sommer: Now our recurrent squabbles about the West German right to strengthen the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, to establish institutions or offices there. Did the Russians say that this was not what they had bargained for and this is not the meaning of the Quadripartite Agreement? How do you feel about this, and how do you feel about the suggestion that has been made recently that perhaps there should be a second round of negotiations trying to refine the finer points?

Secretary Kissinger: A new negotiation on Berlin may generate new demands by the other side. Our general policy has been to support the Government of the Federal Republic. The management of the situation for them requires wisdom and restraint by all parties.

Mr. Sommer: Restrained in putting more—

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to say restraint in putting institutions there, because obviously the viability of Berlin has to be demonstrated. Our general policy has been to support the Federal Republic.

Mr. Sommer: You have never counseled taking it easy in that respect.

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly not as a matter of principle. We may have on individual occasions expressed our views to the other two allies with special responsibilities for Berlin.

Mr. Sommer: Let me ask you a two-pronged question. If President Ford wins and if he offers you the job again, would you take it? And the other part of the question— if not, what are the tasks you leave to your successor?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I can't go beyond what I've already said on this subject. In terms of tasks, I think it is fair to say that in foreign policy you can never define a terminal point after which problems end. I think that the problem of arms control, even if there should be a SALT agreement, will remain before us. I think that while considerable progress toward peace in the Middle East has been made, the task will have to be completed. We have moved the African policy in the right direction, but it would be arrogant to pretend that it could be finished in a three- to six-month period. So a successor of mine will not lack excitement.

Mr. Sommer: Will the rules of détente have to be extended to outlying areas?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. In fact I'm speaking about that tonight at the Institute for Strategic Studies.

Mr. Sommer: What nefarious developments do you fear most? Do you foresee a North-South confrontation?

Secretary Kissinger: What worries me most is a possible loss of will by the industrial democracies. I believe that the industrial

democracies should mobilize their resources and coordinate their efforts to deal with the vast range of problems before them. They have the means to do so. The North-South problem can be moved increasingly in a positive direction, because it will become increasingly clear that it is a long-term process requiring complex solutions and therefore particularly susceptible to the kind of solutions that the industrial democracies are particularly well able to produce.

Mr. Sommer: How do some of the tenets held by Dr. Kissinger at Harvard look in the light of your experience in Washington? You complained about statesmen being mired in the crises of the moment. You said there was a conflict between short-term goals and long-range purposes. And you said the 20th century was not a time for statesmanship. Does your experience bear that out?

Secretary Kissinger: If you conduct foreign policy, you cannot avoid dealing with details, because if you do, you get overwhelmed by events. The problem is whether you have enough of a long-range conception so that the details do not become ends in themselves. I have tried—with what success historians will have to judge—to have an overriding concept. It can be found in innumerable, maybe pedantic, speeches I have given over the years. I don't think it is for me to judge the success. It should be done by others.

Mr. Sommer: You criticized Castlereagh for ignoring the domestic situation of his country and Metternich for overtaxing his. Now, didn't you sometimes simultaneously commit both mistakes?

Secretary Kissinger: But you have to remember the evolution of our domestic situation. I went through a period of maybe exorbitant praise and then through a period of maybe exorbitant criticism. But my public opinion polls have held remarkably steady at about 60 percent support even in the middle of an election year. So when you speak of public support, it hasn't been all that lacking, and much of the debate of foreign policy

has resulted from domestic conditions that were substantially extraneous to foreign policy.

Mr. Sommer: You once told Scotty Reston that as a historian you were inclined to look at the fate of mankind in deep pessimism. But as a statesman you were battling every day to justify a more optimistic view. Now has the result of your own labors changed your pessimistic outlook?

Secretary Kissinger: I have never said that I have a pessimistic outlook. I have said, what is after all empirically true, that most civilizations that we know anything about have eventually declined. All you have to do is travel around the world and look at the ruins of past cultures to confirm that fact.

As a historian one has to be conscious of the possibility of tragedy. However, as a statesman, one has a duty to act as if one's country were immortal. I have acted on the assumption that our problems are soluble. The agenda we have set—in East-West relations, in arms control, in development, in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and Japan, all on the same canvas and more or less at the same time—shows considerable optimism that our problems are soluble, that our country can master its problems. If setting big tasks is a sign of confidence, then I would say we have conducted an optimistic policy. But I would be irresponsible to pretend that success is guaranteed.

Mr. Sommer: But you do not in your policies, in your actual policies, indulge in Spenglerian visions of a decline of the West and a rise of the new barbarians.

Secretary Kissinger: These quotations are invented by overambitious and unscrupulous political candidates. These are not my views.

Mr. Sommer: How much freedom would a new Secretary of State or, for that matter, a new President have to conduct a new foreign policy, American foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: It would be basically unfortunate for the United States to pretend that every four to eight years it has the opportunity to begin a new foreign policy.

Nothing could disquiet our friends more than the belief that every eight years, no matter what they do, the United States starts on an entirely new course.

A great power lives in the real world. At some point its assessment of that world must reflect permanent realities. And therefore its margin for maneuver is limited. Of course, new people coming in can bring new ideas to familiar problems. They may be able to be more imaginative about achieving agreed ends.

I'm not saying that a new Secretary is bound by the same tactics, only that one of the most important necessities for American policy is to give other countries a sense of stability. If we bring new people in from time to time, they must not rip up every tree to see whether the roots are still there.

Whenever I leave office, I would certainly do my best to help my successor achieve this continuity. I do not believe that the basic references of foreign policy should be regularly challenged, unless there is an overwhelming moral issue involved.

Letters of Credence

Brazil

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federative Republic of Brazil, João Baptista Pinheiro, presented his credentials to President Ford on June 22.¹

Guatemala

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Guatemala, Federico Abundio Maldonado Gularte, presented his credentials to President Ford on June 22.¹

Malaysia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Malaysia, Zain Azraai Bin Zainal Abidin, presented his credentials to President Ford on June 22.¹

¹ For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated June 22.

U.S. Gives Views on UNCTAD IV and Commodities Resolution

The fourth ministerial meeting of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development was held at Nairobi May 5-31. Following are a joint statement by Secretary Kissinger and Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon issued at Washington on June 1, statements made at the final plenary session of the conference at Nairobi on May 31 by Paul Boeker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development, and a U.S.-Group B (developed market-economy countries) statement, together with a summary of the resolution on commodities adopted by the conference, prepared by the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs.

JOINT STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND TREASURY SECRETARY SIMON, JUNE 1¹

The United States went to UNCTAD IV at Nairobi in a serious and cooperative spirit. In preparation for the conference, we conducted a thorough review of U.S. international economic policies in which all agencies of the government participated. There was agreement on a series of proposals of special relevance to the developing countries, which we presented at UNCTAD. We were represented by the most senior delegation in the history of UNCTAD meetings, and for the first time, the U.S. position was set forth in an opening statement by the Secretary of State.² In that statement, the United States put forward its proposals to deal with the problems of the developing world, including proposals directly related to commodities,

and at the same time indicated that there were certain proposals that we could not accept. Throughout the four-week meeting, the United States cooperated with other nations and important progress was made on a number of matters before the conference.

In our review of international commodity policies in preparation for the UNCTAD meeting, and otherwise, we have tried to find ways of meeting the concerns of the developing countries, within the framework of an efficient international market system. As we have made clear at the U.N. conference, we are prepared to participate in a case-by-case examination of arrangements to improve the functioning of the international commodity markets through a broad range of measures appropriate to specific commodities, but we have opposed mechanisms to fix prices or limit production by intergovernmental action.

One of the most significant of the U.S. proposals addressed the problem of increasing investment in mineral development. For that reason, the United States, in an effort to meet the interests of the developing countries and the world economy at large, proposed an International Resources Bank (IRB) to facilitate the continued flow of essential capital, management, and technology for the development of new resources in the LDC's [less developed countries].

As the conference progressed, a senior interagency group in Washington reviewed all proposals before the conference with a view to accepting as many as possible of the suggestions being made by the LDC's and other countries consistent with our basic principles.

At the final plenary session an LDC resolution on commodities was adopted by con-

¹ Issued at Washington (text from press release 279).

² For Secretary Kissinger's statement at Nairobi on May 6, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1976, p. 657.

sensus. The interagency group authorized reservations about parts of this resolution, which were read at the conference. Nevertheless, we joined the consensus because we wanted to contribute to the spirit of harmony in the closing sessions of the conference and because the resolution contained a number of elements of our own comprehensive approach which had been agreed within the government and advanced by Secretary Kissinger in his address to the conference three weeks earlier. As our reservations indicate, we did not believe that all aspects of the LDC proposals were practical and feasible. However, we committed ourselves to the search for concrete, practical solutions to commodity problems that will be in the interests of both producers and consumers.

It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that the resolution proposing further study of the International Resources Bank was defeated by two votes, with 31 votes in favor. Ninety countries at the last minute abstained or absented themselves.

A substantial number of the 33 votes against were the Socialist countries, whose contribution to the development of the poorer countries of the world is negligible.

Forty-four countries cooperated in this effort by abstaining on the International Resources Bank, and 46 absented themselves—almost all of which were the developing countries. This does not augur well for the future of the dialogue of the worldwide development effort. The United States, whose role is so vital, does not expect, when it makes major efforts to cooperate, that its proposals will be subject to accidental majorities.

If the dialogue between the developing and developed countries, to which we attach great importance, is to succeed, suggestions put forward by the developed nations, such as the IRB at UNCTAD, must be treated on the merits and with serious consideration. The LDC's must not lend themselves to parliamentary manipulation by those states who contribute nothing to the development of the poor nations of the world.

We will be addressing the problems of re-

source development financing again in later meetings, including the preparatory conferences contemplated by the commodities resolution of UNCTAD IV. We will advance the IRB proposal again, and we expect that it will be considered with the same respect and care which the United States will lend to the study of the proposals which the LDC's will table.

The United States went to Nairobi with a wide range of other proposals aimed at dealing constructively and pragmatically with the urgent problems of the developing world. We are gratified that the conference embraced a number of these suggestions, dealing with resource and technology transfer and trade expansion. We will continue to elaborate these proposals—as well as the proposal for the Resources Bank—in appropriate fora, because they are right for the profound problems we are addressing.

STATEMENTS BY MR. BOEKER, NAIROBI, MAY 31

Statement of Reservations, Explanations, and Interpretations³

Now that the plenary session of the Fourth UNCTAD Conference has completed action on the resolutions before it, the U.S. delegation would like to express some views on certain aspects of those resolutions. My delegation has been pleased to join the consensus on a number of important resolutions which we are confident will contribute to international economic cooperation and development. The United States, knowing the hopes attached to UNCTAD IV by the developing countries, has expended significant effort to make constructive contributions toward the success of this conference.

The Nairobi Conference marks another significant step forward in the era of constructive negotiation launched at the seventh special session of the General Assembly. We

³ The statement includes U.S. reservations on the commodities resolution and explanations and interpretations of other resolutions.

have taken major steps by consensus in such essential fields as commodities, trade, transfer of technology, debt, special measures to assist the poorest and least developed of the developing countries, and in strengthening UNCTAD itself.

The spokesmen for Group B have made certain statements on behalf of the group as a whole. The United States was associated with those statements.

In addition, Mr. President, I wish to make several supplementary observations on particular resolutions. These observations are made in a constructive spirit. We believe it important there be no uncertainty as to the views of any country as we increasingly broaden areas of agreement.

Commodities

The consensus resolution on commodities [TD/RES/93(IV)] is a central element of this conference. We are all aware of the massive effort, by all parties, which has led to this text. We can be satisfied that on a matter where such disparate views exist, the common desire to reach agreement has produced consensus. We particularly welcome the practical elements of the program of work on commodities which it has been for some time our policy to support.

With regard to section IV of this resolution, our understanding of the request to the Secretary General to convene preparatory meetings is that the purpose of such meetings is to determine the nature of the problems affecting particular commodities and to determine, without commitment, the measures which might be appropriate to each product. Such meetings will indicate the cases where we can enter into negotiation of agreements or other arrangements which could encompass a broad range of measures to improve trade in commodities.

It is our further understanding that the Secretary General in convening preparatory meetings will utilize existing commodity bodies. Where there are no such bodies, ad hoc groups will be convened. We interpret this section to mean that preparatory meet-

ings will be convened on individual products and that the preparatory meetings are consultations prior to a decision whether to enter negotiations.

A decision on a financial relationship among buffer stocks will need to be considered in the light of developments on individual funds. However, since there may be advantages in linking the financial resources of individual buffer stocks, we will participate, without any commitment, in preparatory meetings to examine whether further arrangements for financing of buffer stocks, including common funding, are desirable. After the outcome of these preparatory discussions we will decide on our participation in any negotiating conference.

We have accepted this resolution on the understanding that its various positions, including those on commodity arrangements and compensatory financing, do not alter our reservations on the concept of indexation.

We are not indicating in this or other resolutions of this conference, as far as the United States is concerned, any change in our known views on the new international economic order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

We would emphasize the difficulties we see related to the concept that production of synthetics and substitutes should be harmonized with supplies of natural resources.

We regret that this resolution, which is supposed to deal with commodity problems in an overall sense, does not address the problem of supporting development of resources in developing countries. Failure to adopt the proposed resolution regarding the International Resources Bank represents a similar lack of attention to this task.

We accept this resolution on commodities with these reservations and explanations.

Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN)

Regarding resolution L.113 [TD/RES/91(IV)] on the multilateral trade negotiations, we do not view the MTN as the appropriate forum for the consideration of the nature or operation of the generalized sys-

tems of preferences, despite the importance we attach to these systems as a means to increase trade opportunities for developing countries.

Economic Cooperation Among Developing Countries

With regard to the resolution on economic cooperation among developing countries (L. 117) [TD/RES/92/(IV)], particularly paragraph (b) (iii), my delegation will support decisions taken by developing countries in the understanding that such decisions are consistent with international obligations and standards.

Institutional Arrangements

With respect to the resolution on institutional arrangements contained in TD/L.118 [TD/RES/90(IV)], we are pleased to be able to join in the consensus.

The United States believes that this resolution affords an opportunity to transform UNCTAD into a more effective organization which will serve the interests of all member states within its important mandate. We urge that the Secretary General of UNCTAD undertake early consultations pursuant to paragraph 5 of section B with the Secretary General of the United Nations so that the results can be thoroughly considered before the October meeting of the Trade and Development Board.

We also believe that it would be useful for the United States to reiterate its position on certain issues raised in L.118 and in certain other resolutions of the conference. The United States, while not supporting the Declaration and Program of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, has recognized that majority decisions of the General Assembly place obligations on the subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly to respond.

While the United States firmly maintains its reservations on these two matters, we will

continue to work cooperatively to carry out those portions with which we agree in UNCTAD and elsewhere.

We have adopted the same attitude toward the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action.

Debt

The United States supports the resolution [TD/RES/94(IV)] passed on the important question of debt. The policy of the United States remains that of engaging in debt-rescheduling negotiations in the creditor club framework only where there is some presumption of imminent default.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States wishes to make clear, with regard to all of the resolutions passed at UNCTAD IV, that it will honor the undertakings it has accepted during this conference to the full measure permitted by relevant laws, policies, and international obligations.

Explanation of U.S. Abstention on Resolution on Transnational Corporations⁴

We would like to explain why we cannot support this resolution. Developing countries, which consider that transnational corporations as well as other private investment can be a positive contribution for their development process or plans, should endeavor to promote an appropriate investment climate. We recognize that the transnational corporations should conduct their operations in accordance with local laws and in harmony with local policy, but we would also like to underline the importance of local laws being stable and consistent with international laws.

In regulating the activities of transnational corporations, governments should be guided by an understanding of the legitimate methods of an entity that is often

⁴The resolution (TD/RES/97(IV)) was adopted on May 31 by a vote of 84-0, with 16 abstentions.

privately owned; otherwise the positive contributions from such activities to development could be diminished.

Cooperation among governments can improve the foreign investment climate, encourage the positive contribution which transnational corporations can make to economic and social progress and minimize and resolve any difficulties which may arise from their various operations.

For this reason we welcome the decision by ECOSOC [U.N. Economic and Social Council] to establish a Commission and a Center on Transnational Corporations for "comprehensive and in-depth consideration of issues relating to Transnational Corporations." We hope UNCTAD will be available to help in this work, particularly through its work in fields of restrictive business practices and transfer of technology.

Explanation on Resolution on Manufactures and Semimanufactures

Regarding the resolution on expansion and diversification of exports of manufactures and semimanufactures of developing countries (L.115) [TD/RES/96(IV)], we support that provision of the resolution which states that the generalized system of preferences (GSP) should continue beyond the initial period of 10 years originally envisaged. Since the legislation authorizing our scheme expires in 1985, our GSP will continue four years beyond the period envisaged in the original GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] waiver. As we approach the expiration of our legislation, we will make a decision as to its prolongation, taking into account the evolving needs of beneficiary countries.

The United States views on redeployment of industries (section E), as expressed in the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly, are unchanged. While we favor policies which will facilitate the normal evolution of industrial production in response to market forces, our government

cannot intervene directly in this process.

With regard to restrictive business practices and their international regulation and control, we welcome the decision to continue work in this area. We believe that in this area we should focus principally on situations where there is an adverse effect on international trade. Other criteria would be insufficient, in our view. We also believe that multilaterally agreed principles and rules should be voluntary. With regard to notification and exchange of information on restrictive business practices, it is our understanding that these procedures should be reciprocal and at the intergovernmental level.

Mr. Chairman, we are pleased that it was possible to adopt this resolution by consensus. I should like to state for the record, however, that if there had been a vote we would have abstained on paragraph (d) of section I.,A. We do not accept the possible implication that some countries are using the GSP for coercive purposes.

U.S.-GROUP B STATEMENTS ON RESOLUTIONS ON TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology

Mr. Chairman: We are pleased to note that notwithstanding initial divergent positions on questions relating to a code of conduct for the transfer of technology, the conference has reached a consensus on a resolution which enables concrete work on this matter to go forward. We are ready and willing to engage in negotiations, in accordance with the resolution contained in TD/L.128 [TD/RES/89/(IV)], toward the end of establishing a code of conduct which sets reasonable standards for both governments and enterprises.

We remain convinced that the establishment of a voluntary code of conduct would best serve the transfer of technology and that such a code of conduct should be uni-

versally applicable—covering all international transfer of technology—and be directed to source and recipient enterprises and their governments. The conference agreed not to prejudge the legal character of the code, and the resolution contained in TD/L.128 is also compatible with the concept that the code may be entirely voluntary in character and may be adopted as a U.N. resolution.

It is with these understandings in mind that we look forward to participating in the work of the intergovernmental group that has been established by this conference. We believe that a code can be produced which will make a major and positive contribution to the international transfer of technology, as well as to strengthening the technological capacity of all states, especially developing countries.

We hope that negotiations to come will permit further progress and facilitate full agreement on this most important matter.

Strengthening the Technological Capacity of Developing Countries

The members of Group B lend their full support to the resolution on strengthening the technological capacity of developing countries (TD/L.111 and TD/L.111/Corr. 1) [TD/RES/87(IV)], which we believe contains positive and meaningful measures aimed at improving the technological infrastructure and capability of developing countries.

Mr. Chairman, the members of Group B wish to make clear their interpretation of paragraph 5(b)(i) of this resolution. We support appropriate exchange of information on technological alternatives between developing countries. It is recognized that much of the technological information available to governments is developed by enterprises. Therefore, we affirm that "appropriate" exchange of "available" information must be consistent with contractual agreements and, where relevant, respect confidentiality of technological information.

SUMMARY OF RESOLUTION ON COMMODITIES

In the resolution on commodities, the conference took two significant actions:

1. It established a timetable for preparatory meetings and a negotiating conference on the possible establishment of a common fund to finance buffer stocks and other measures; and
2. It established a timetable for preparatory meetings and, as and when required, negotiating conferences on a series of commodities.

Regarding the first of these actions, the conference agreed that a negotiating conference should be convened by the Secretary General of UNCTAD no later than March 1977. This negotiating conference will be open to all members of UNCTAD; there is no advance commitment by the United States (or other UNCTAD members) to attend this conference. Before the conference is held, two series of actions are specified in the commodities resolution:

1. By September 30, 1976, member countries are invited to transmit to the Secretary General of UNCTAD any proposals they may wish to make on the objectives and operations of the fund; and
2. The Secretary General is to convene preparatory meetings on the fund proposals to discuss:

- (a) elaboration of objectives;
- (b) financing needs;
- (c) sources of financing;
- (d) mode of operations; and
- (e) decisionmaking and management.

The commodities resolution noted that differences of view persist regarding the objectives and modalities of a common fund.

The UNCTAD Secretary General was also requested by the conference in its commodities resolution to convene a series of preparatory meetings on 18 commodities specified in the resolution in the period beginning September 1, 1976, and ending no later than February 1977. The commodities included in the resolution are: bananas, bauxite, cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton and cotton yarns, hard fibers and products, iron ore, jute and products, manganese, meat, phosphates, rubber, sugar, tea, tropical timber, tin, and vegetable oils, including olive oil, and oilseeds. Although the resolution refers to the meetings as "preparatory meetings for international negotiations," the resolution also makes clear that actual negotiating conferences to be completed by the end of 1976 will be called only "as and when required." These commodity meetings are to take place "in consultation with international organizations concerned."

Congress and Foreign Policy

*Statement by Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations¹*

Dean Acheson, who, among his other considerable achievements, served for a time as what is now called Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, often remarked that what he looked for in the liaison between the Congress and the executive was a "fair wind." What he meant, of course, is that combination of forces in nature without which the ship of state has no bearing. On infrequent occasions, I have experienced that invigorating, heady feeling that comes with "fair wind." I'm not certain that I can summon quickly to mind the issues that refreshed the air, but I recall the exhilaration.

Perhaps it needn't be said, Mr. Chairman [Representative Lee H. Hamilton]; however, I am certain we would both agree that our national interest would prosper if there were more clear weather to guide our relationship. I see that horizon clearing.

The genius of the American political system grows out of the simplicity with which it is defined in our Constitution. The writers of this extraordinary document demonstrated uncommon wisdom in determining that power should not be concentrated in any one of our three branches of government. That was well and good. However, historical evolution has complicated this design by

introducing new responsibilities and complexities into the affairs of our respective institutions, particularly into the creation and conduct of foreign policy.

As the United States became more involved in the world the simplicity which defined the roles of the Congress and the executive opened the way not only to ambiguity and dispute but to an entire new world of scholarship. This is not a premise from which to argue for a more definitive organic law any more than it is a defense of the axiom that "the President proposes, the Congress disposes." More to the point, it is an acknowledgment of the judgment of scholars like Professor Edward S. Corwin, who argue that the Constitution presents the two branches with "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." There may be other words to describe the issue, but this characterization draws it close enough, in my view, for this discussion.

Even without the traumatizing American experience in Indochina, the dilemma which concerns us was earlier taking shape. What Viet-Nam did was to inject fever into the struggle and bring it to a confrontation. And now our present efforts are directed at moving us in the direction of greater reason. If we can agree that willingness to compromise must be at the heart of any successful policy, we will at least be looking in the same direction. As vital as compromise is to the political process, so is it to the conduct of affairs by governments. All this is more reason,

¹ Made before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations on June 22. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

then, why we should work to effect it between branches of the same government.

Improper assumptions of power have now been acknowledged by the executive as they related to foreign affairs and to domestic issues as well. I do not need to catalogue the transgressions of various Administrations. If all haven't been officially acknowledged, they are well known and will serve to remind that tampering with the truth risks nothing less than the life of an Administration. Congress has demonstrated its outrage and vowed it will not tolerate abuses of a similar nature again.

Mr. Chairman, we in the executive branch understand that. We are acting scrupulously to eliminate the causes of mistrust. We are dedicating ourselves to the elimination of any cause for mistrust. And I believe we have begun to make some repairs in our relationship.

I take some encouragement that our two branches are working more cooperatively now across a range of issues: new policy initiatives for Africa; enhanced U.S. relationships in the Iberian Peninsula; submission of military base agreements for formal congressional approval; participation by Members and staff in important international conferences.

Insuring the Congressional Role

Mr. Chairman, your letter of invitation addressed several questions which go to the heart of the relationship between our two branches in this period in our history. I would like to discuss each in turn as we see them from the Department of State.

The role of Congress in foreign policy and how it may be insured: If, as I believe, the attitude in the executive toward Congress was one of neglect or worse, that is no longer the case. Indeed, I could prove it hasn't been for some time.

I am here to reaffirm the belief of the Department of State that the role of the Congress is quintessential to the formulation of foreign policy. Foreign policy must respond to the interests, and receive the support, of

a great majority of our people. In a representative democracy the Congress must be involved both in speaking for the people it represents and in helping to create within its constituencies the consensus necessary for the support of foreign policies, once decided upon.

In the ideal sense, it should be possible to construct what I tend to think of as an architectural partnership between the Congress and the executive, one that is designed to stimulate the *creation* of foreign policy. This, it seems to me, would maximize the benefits to the country. The *administration* of these policies in turn would be conducted by the agencies of the Presidency, with primary stewardship at the State Department. As its part of the coordinating process, Congress would from time to time call for a review of the policies it helped to create as a means of insuring that they are consistent with the interests of the electorate.

The fixed vehicles for insuring the congressional role already exist in the traditional committees—International Relations, Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Armed Services. Another important, less formal, institution would be a close cooperative relationship between congressional leadership and the Presidency. Even though the textbook relationship is an adversary one, Congress should be able to rely on the word of the executive branch, which promises to insure a proper legislative involvement in the policy process. The Presidency will be more encouraged in this direction if it can assume that congressional leadership can speak with confidence on behalf of significant numbers of Members.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths and weaknesses of Congress in foreign policy: Thinking about commenting on this reminded me of the man who, after his conviction, was told by the king: "I intend to sentence you to death, but not for two years, and I will reconsider if by then you have taught my horse to talk." Later, to his puzzled friends, the man explained his acquiescence: "In these two years I may die

a natural death. Or the king may die. Or the horse may talk."

"Weakness" is not the first word that comes to mind these days when I think about the Congress and foreign policy. I am well aware that the Congress imposed its considerable strength—a show of force—as a result of executive action with which it disagreed. The question is whether it is in the national interest to strike with the ax or seek remedy with the scalpel.

Profound questions arise when legislative actions are taken like the anti-OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] amendment last year, which harmed our relations with Latin America but carried little or no real penalty for the countries which sponsored the oil boycott; or the amendment to the trade bill which provoked Soviet rejection of our trade agreement and rejection of their World War II lend-lease debt, coupled with a *decrease* in the flow of emigres; or the military assistance embargo against Turkey, which did not stimulate diplomatic progress on Cyprus.

The obvious strengths of the Congress reside in its unilateral power to legislate for or against policy. Ideally, its actions should reflect the majority will in the country. It is an important trust which the Congress enjoys. Its other strengths are less tangible and representative of the whole than of individuals or subcommittee-size groups. This has to do with the level of knowledge among Members and staff of particular foreign policy issues. My colleagues and I at the State Department have been used to dealing with individual Members and staff officers who are impressively well informed and who possess highly qualified opinions on given subjects. So, in its "strengths," Congress is formidable.

Having said this, we find it increasingly difficult to identify a foreign policy objective or position shared by large majorities in Congress. More often than not we find ourselves under roughly equivalent pressures on both sides of most issues. When this occurs, we frequently encounter inactivity or paralysis, which places us in the unenviable position of

having to attempt to broker differences between Members or committees.

The multiple interests and responsibilities of most Members have led to what may fairly be regarded as "weakness" in Congress. Members keep tyrannical schedules and oftentimes are not available for that briefing or background talk which could throw an issue into perspective and permit a more considered vote when the buzzer sounds. Too often, I fear, votes on international questions are squandered because there wasn't enough time to examine the problem.

Improving the Consultative Process

Improvement of the consultative process and how procedures and mechanisms can be improved: Ideally, I envisage a joint committee of the Congress which assigns itself responsibility for leading the Congress on foreign policy issues across the board. This joint group would represent all those committees which now play a role in international affairs—Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and the others who, because of the increased complexity of our agenda, have an acknowledged interest. It would enable the Congress, by pooling its resources, to create the capacity to treat foreign policy in its entirety. I can see many advantages growing out of such an arrangement, the most important of which could be a genuine partnership at senior levels between the Congress and the executive. I know some Members of both Houses who would support such an establishment.

On our side, I can see being spared the often conflicting demands of the large number of committees and subcommittees before whom we are driven to present repetitive testimony because lines of jurisdiction between and among the many committees are in some cases indistinguishable. One advantage to the Congress might be the time saved for Members. Another could be the pooling of some of the superb staff officers who now work for individual Members or the many committees. Equally important, such a prestigious com-

mittee would greatly influence legislative initiatives that depart from the main lines of policy in which the Congress and the Administration would find adequate basis for agreement.

In your letter you also ask how congressional input in crisis management can be insured. If the executive were permitted to deal continually with such a congressionally mandated joint committee, I believe that inevitably the relationship would guarantee such an end.

Having said that, I believe it unrealistic to expect any form of consultation—as we in the executive branch and you in the Congress see it from our differing perspectives—to ever satisfy everyone, especially in crisis situations. Nothing short of full participation in the minute-to-minute planning for and reacting to a fast-breaking situation would merit description as consultation by some. Perhaps we should recognize at the very outset that any arrangement will be an imperfect one in need of continuing improvement. But we should begin by agreeing on a mechanism.

Despite what I regard as a quantum improvement recently in the general consultative process, it could be better. While it will require sustained performance on our part, at the same time we look for response from the Congress. I have to say that sometimes it is not there. We would like the privilege of coming to the Hill with issues we're interested in as well as being summoned because of a special interest up here.

I readily admit that too often Administrations have abused the word "consultation" when describing what in fact has been notification to Congress with regard to an action or a decision already taken. But like the mule that was slammed on the head, we're now alert—you have our attention. We can and will continue to do better. What we ask for is improved organization at your end.

In the absence of the kind of joint committee to which I referred above, we will need at least a better match-up of our available resources. The executive *conducts* for-

eign policy through several agencies, with the State Department theoretically preeminent among them. Regardless of which agency motivates a proposal for Presidential decision, the policy must be implemented in terms of the area or country involved. With respect to Europe, as an example, the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs is the principal protagonist at the Washington end. Likewise, in functional terms in the Department, the office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs is central to the development of international trade policy, U.S. economic policy in international institutions, and other related policies.

Until a few years ago, your committee had a subcommittee system which paralleled our own divisions. The subcommittee which you headed, Mr. Chairman, corresponded organizationally with our Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Today, the subcommittee structure presents us with bureaucratic difficulties in matching up our resources. As a result it is more, not less, difficult to keep Members and staff of the subcommittees tied to a close and continuing relationship with our bureaus and thereby insure maximum cooperation. As matters now stand, our people are repeating testimony before different subcommittees with overlapping areas of jurisdiction.

Developing Broad Consensus on Goals

What is needed to develop the broadest possible consensus on foreign policy goals: Many observers of the legislative-executive relationship yearn for the kind of harmony that would exist if the participants were singing from the same sheet of music, like a choir of angels. Such a scene is perhaps as unrealistic as it is unworldly.

Shrewd and skeptical judges of human nature that they were, our forefathers allowed for constitutional disharmony and rivalry, which is to say they wittingly established an adversary relationship. This, we presume, was intended to promote liberty and good

government, and at the same time prevent tyranny. While this is understandable, we must avoid provoking situations in which the branches become enemies and spokesmen publicly attack one another's motivations. It deserves better than for one or the other party to cry, "Your end of the boat is sinking." There is then the risk that the people will tend to believe the charges, which could lead to a breakdown of public faith in the system.

Polls today are replete with evidence of the discouraging opinion the American public has of government—Congress as well as the executive. We owe it to ourselves and to all Americans to construct—I hesitate to use the word—a consensus on foreign policy issues. This cannot be beyond our reach.

I do not look for "bipartisan foreign policy" as a euphemism for congressional surrender of its role in the formulation of foreign policy. To the contrary, you were elected to represent the will of the people and to exercise your judgment on their behalf. When there is a conflict between the articulated view of the constituents, guidance of party leadership, and your own best judgment, you face hard choices. I am encouraged at the choices you and most of your colleagues frequently make. Seldom are these choices reached on a strictly partisan basis. Certainly the International Relations Committee does not line up on a party basis on votes of interest to us.

But we are still a long way from the kind of consensus we became comfortable with in the 1950's and early 1960's. Détente, arms transfers, human rights, the Middle East, and the complex issues of trade, aid, and commodities in our relationship with the less developed countries will continue to generate major policy debates within and between the two branches. There is more that is worthy of us.

As this debate continues, what we should hope is that it be conducted with an improved spirit of trust that both sides are participating with honesty and the best interests of the whole country at heart.

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Resolution on Palestinian Rights

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on June 29, together with the text of a draft resolution which was vetoed by the United States that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER

USUN press release 71 dated June 29

I take this opportunity to thank once again all those in this Council who have so generously expressed their sympathy to the United States on the death of the American Ambassador to Lebanon, his Economic Counselor, and their driver. This terrible act brings to reality, as often our words do not, the seriousness, the explosiveness, the tragedy, of the whole situation in the Middle East.

The subject that is before us today, the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, is an effort to come to grips with one aspect—a very central aspect—of the Middle East conflict.

My government does not doubt that the effort has been well intentioned and that members of the committee have worked hard and seriously to develop recommendations that will promote a Middle East settlement. But I must say in all candor, as my delegation has said before, that the basic approach that has been followed strikes us as misguided.

The Middle East conflict is probably the most complex dispute in the international scene. Is it realistic to assume such a problem can be resolved by committees, no matter how well meaning? Or is it not the duty of the United Nations to encourage the parties to resume negotiations on the serious issues that confront them?

Peace will come about through a negotiated comprehensive settlement taking into account all the issues involved in the Arab-

Israeli dispute. The framework for this settlement exists in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In the numerous meetings of this Council since the beginning of the year touching various aspects of the Middle East situation, the United States has made clear its position on the principles that must underlie a Middle East settlement, on the Palestinian question as a whole, and on the situation in the territories occupied by Israel.

Our position is also clear on the report that has occasioned our meeting. We voted against General Assembly Resolution 3376 of November 10, 1975, which created the Committee of 20, just as we voted against General Assembly Resolution 3236, which it seeks to implement.

Our reason is not lack of concern for the Palestinian people. We have consistently made clear our concerns on this score and our conviction that there must be a solution to the Palestinian issue if there is to be a lasting settlement. We are convinced that resolutions and committee reports are not the most effective way of dealing with the question of the political future of the Palestinians. The United States will do its utmost to bring about the early resumption of serious negotiations looking toward a settlement of all the issues, and we believe that it is through such negotiations that we must seek a solution to the issue of the Palestinians.

Mr. President, I should like to explain my government's position on the draft resolution that is before the Council. There are, in our view, two fundamental flaws to this resolution.

First, the text is totally devoid of balance, stressing the rights and interests of one party to the Middle East dispute and ignoring the rights and interests of other parties.

Second, the draft "affirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine . . ." The political interests of the Palestinians and their role in a final Middle East settlement constitute, in my government's view, a matter that must

be negotiated between the parties before it can be defined in resolutions of this Council.

For these reasons, Mr. President, my delegation intends to vote "No" on the resolution before us.

In closing I would like to second the appeal made by my British colleague for special contributions to UNRWA [U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East], to enable it to continue its humanitarian work touching the daily lives of Palestinians in need. We are heartened by the news of the generous contribution of Saudi Arabia and the intentions of the Governments of Japan and the United Kingdom. President Ford has submitted a request to Congress for substantial additional money to add to the U.S. contribution to UNRWA for 1976. We believe this is an appropriate way to deal with immediate Palestinian needs as we resolve to make a better future for the Palestinian people and the Middle East as a whole.

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION¹

The Security Council,

Having considered the item entitled "The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights", in accordance with the request contained in paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975,

Having heard the representatives of the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian people,

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (document S/12090), transmitted to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX),

Deeply concerned that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved, and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Arab-Israeli conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security,

¹ U.N. doc. S/12119; the draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council, the vote being 10 in favor, 1 against (U.S.), with 4 abstentions (France, Italy, Sweden, U.K.).

Recognizing that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, *inter alia*, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people,

1. Takes note of the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (document S/12090);

2. Affirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

U.S.-Indonesia Consultations Held at Washington

Following is a joint U.S.-Indonesia press statement issued at Washington and Jakarta on June 29.

Foreign Minister Adam Malik of Indonesia met today with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at the conclusion of three days of meetings between officials of the two governments in Washington. This was the first of a series of periodic consultations agreed upon by President Suharto and President Ford during the latter's visit to Indonesia in December 1975. The two Presidents saw the consultations as a way of expanding the dialogue between the two governments and of strengthening the close and friendly ties between them.

Following a lunch given by Secretary Kissinger for Foreign Minister Malik, the two met with their advisers for a wide-ranging review of relations between the two countries and of the major international issues of interest to them. Secretary Kissinger stressed the importance attached by the United States to its relations with Indonesia. Particular emphasis was given to an exchange of views on developments in Southeast Asia. Foreign Minister Malik described the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries' plans for regional development projects and the need for external assistance for such projects.

The two Ministers discussed the various aspects of economic relations between the United States and Indonesia, including trade and investment matters. Indonesia's development requirements were discussed, and the United States described its recent proposals for greater cooperation with the developing nations of the world.

The Ministers agreed that the next round of consultations would be held in Jakarta at a mutually convenient time.

During the preceding two days, officials of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and other agencies met with their Indonesian counterparts for reviews of the specific policies and programs of the two governments.

U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Convention Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith for Senate advice and consent to ratification the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income signed at London on December 31, 1975, together with an exchange of notes modifying certain provisions of the Convention signed at London on April 13, 1976.

I also transmit for the information of the Senate the report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention and the exchange of notes.

This Convention and exchange of notes are designed to modernize the relationship with respect to taxes on income which has evolved between the United States and the

¹ Transmitted on June 24 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. K, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the convention and exchange of notes and the report of the Department of State.

United Kingdom from a similar Convention signed at Washington on April 16, 1945.

The Convention with subsequent exchange of notes is similar to other recent United States income tax treaties, although it does have some new features which are described in the enclosed report of the Department of State.

Such tax conventions help promote economic cooperation with other countries. I urge the Senate to act favorably on this Convention and exchange of notes at an early date and to give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 24, 1976

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 2d Session

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations. March 23-April 5, 1976. 253 pp.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend title 18, U.S. Code, to authorize applications for a court order approving the use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information. H. Doc. 94-422. March 24, 1976. 6 pp.

International Security Assistance. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on fiscal year 1977 international security assistance programs. March 26-April 8, 1976. 148 pp.

East-West Foreign Trade Board Fourth Quarterly Report. Communication from the Chairman of the Board transmitting the Board's fourth quarterly report on trade between the United States and nonmarket economy countries, pursuant to section 411(c) of the Trade Act of 1974. H. Doc. 94-430. March 30, 1976. 109 pp.

Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1976, and Period Ending September 30, 1976, and for Other Purposes. Report of the committee of conference to accompany H.R. 12203. H. Rept. 94-1006. April 2, 1976. 14 pp.

Guatemala Relief and Rehabilitation Act of 1976. Report of the committee of conference to accompany S. 3056. H. Rept. 94-1009. April 6, 1976. 5 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. Files Notice of Intent To Withdraw From ICNAF

Press release 322 dated June 22

The United States on June 22 filed notice of its intent to withdraw from the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF).

Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, had announced on June 8 in a Montreal speech to delegates of the 18 member nations of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries that the United States would file the notice of intent to withdraw.

Unless the notice of intent to withdraw is revoked prior to December 31, 1976, U.S. withdrawal will be effective on that date under the terms of the convention.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Ratification deposited: Gabon, June 29, 1976.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.¹

Signatories: Denmark, Dominican Republic, June 30, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.¹

Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, June 30, 1976.

¹ Not in force.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, June 29, 1976.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Notification of succession deposited: Surinam, June 30, 1976, effective November 25, 1975.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.²
Accession deposited: Ethiopia, June 23, 1976.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Accession deposited: Mali, July 6, 1976.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Signature: Télécommunications Internationales du Mali (T.I.M.) of Mali, July 6, 1976.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976.

Notification of approval: Kenya, April 23, 1976.

Ratification deposited: United States, April 21, 1976.³

Entered into force for the United States: April 21, 1976.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973.

Ratification deposited: United States, April 21, 1976.⁴

Entered into force for the United States: April 21, 1976.

Telephone regulations with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 21, 1974.

Ratification deposited: United States, April 21, 1976.⁴

Entered into force for the United States: April 21, 1976.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ With reservation.

⁴ With declarations.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975.

Ratifications deposited: United Kingdom, June 28, 1976; Canada, Denmark, June 30, 1976.

Entered into force provisionally: July 1, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, July 8, 1976.

Approval deposited: Norway, July 7, 1976.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports from Australia during calendar year 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 25 and 28, 1976. Entered into force June 28, 1976.

Brazil

Agreement relating to reciprocal acceptance of airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia June 16, 1976. Entered into force June 16, 1976.

Egypt

Loan agreement to assist Egypt to increase its industrial and agricultural production. Signed at Cairo May 22, 1976. Entered into force May 22, 1976.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement relating to mutual cooperation regarding restrictive business practices. Signed at Bonn June 23, 1976. Enters into force one month from the date of an exchange of notes wherein the parties inform each other that all the domestic legal requirements for entry into force have been fulfilled.

International Telecommunications Union

Special arrangement permitting third-party exchanges between International Telecommunications Union and amateur stations under U.S. jurisdiction. Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva and Washington April 28 and June 7, 1976. Entered into force June 7, 1976.

Japan

Agreement providing for Japan's financial contribution for U.S. administrative and related expenses for Japanese fiscal year 1976 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo June 18, 1976. Entered into force June 18, 1976.

Jordan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 14, 1975 (TIAS 8197). Effected by exchange of notes at Amman June 23, 1976. Entered into force June 23, 1976.

Mexico

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports from Mexico during calendar year 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco April 26 and June 11, 1976. Entered into force June 11, 1976.

Poland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with related notes. Signed at Washington October 8, 1974.

Ratifications exchanged: June 22, 1976.

Entered into force: July 23, 1976.

Saudi Arabia

Project agreement for technical cooperation in manpower training and development, with annexes. Signed at Riyadh June 12, 1976. Entered into force June 12, 1976.

Tanzania

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Dar es Salaam June 15, 1976. Entered into force June 15, 1976.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol to the treaty of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 7503), on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974. Entered into force May 24, 1976.

Proclaimed by the President: July 6, 1976.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 8189. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8189).

Social Security. Agreement with Singapore. TIAS 8190. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8190).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 8191. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8191).

Trade in Textiles—Consultations on Market Disruption. Agreement with Malta. TIAS 8192. 4 pp. 35¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:8192).

Tarbela Development Fund, 1975. Agreement with Other Governments. TIAS 8193. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8193).

Maritime Matters. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 8195. 131 pp. \$2. (Cat. No. S9.10:8195).

Scientific Cooperation. Agreement with Italy extending the agreement of June 19, 1967, as extended. TIAS 8199. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8199).

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**Checklist of Department of State
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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†339	7/6	Kissinger: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Mid-America Committee.
*339A	7/6	Remarks introducing Secretary Kissinger, Chicago.
†339B	7/6	Questions and answers following address, Chicago.
†340	7/6	Availability of advisory committee reports on closed sessions of 1975.
*341	7/7	Viron P. Vaky sworn in as Ambassador to Venezuela (biographic data).
*342	7/8	Shipping Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on ship design and equipment, Aug. 3-5.
*343	7/9	Program for the official visit of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany.
†344	7/9	Kissinger: toast at luncheon for Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia, July 8.
†345	7/10	Kissinger: news conference.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.