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Secretary Kissinger Reports to Congress on His Visits to Latin America, Western Europe, and Africa

Statement by Secretary Kissinger¹

I am happy to be able to report to this committee on our foreign policy with regard to three important areas which I have recently visited—Latin America, Western Europe, and Africa.

I believe that our relations with Latin America and with Western Europe are stronger and more promising than they have been in a decade. In Africa we have responded to a dangerously deteriorating situation with a policy that offers hope for southern Africa to undergo peaceful change with justice without submitting to external intervention and opportunities for progress in the rest of Africa without following radical doctrines.

Latin America

Let me take up with you our policy toward each of these areas.

In March, I reported to you on the vast changes evident to me during my trip to Latin America in February. These changes are opening the way to a new constructive relationship between the United States and Latin America. The quality of that relationship was evident at the meeting of the OAS General Assembly in Santiago, from which I have just returned. The atmosphere—of mutual respect and perceived common in-

terest—was better at the 1976 OAS General Assembly than at any other inter-American meeting I have ever attended.

Ours is a special relationship in this hemisphere. The unique experience we share in the Americas—the finding and opening of new continents, the forging of nations free from colonial domination, the shared human and moral principles of the New World—creates special ties for the United States and Latin America.

As in all families, there are periods of creativity and times of stress. Ours is no exception. The United States has passed through a variety of phases in its relationship to Latin America. Not all have been productive in recent years. Sometimes, when we were active, when we attempted to organize massive transfers of resources to meet Latin American development needs directly, we were seen as attempting to dominate the hemisphere. When our policies were otherwise—when we were less involved in Latin American problems and more inclined to let Latin American nations work out their own solutions alone—we were looked upon as neglecting our obligations.

The 1930's, the 1940's, and even the 1950's were decades in which this nation indulged in the pretense of tutelage. In the 1960's the Alliance for Progress rallied the energies and enthusiasms of people throughout the Americas to the development effort. But by 1969 its promises had begun to fade.

Thus, even as Latin America began to realize its own maturity and experience a

¹ Submitted to the House Committee on International Relations on June 17 (text from press release 06). The complete transcript will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

period of massive economic growth—and with it greater self-respect—the United States moved into a period of lower profile, which we maintained until the inauguration of the new dialogue in 1974. That period drew to a close with the meeting at Tlatelolco, in Mexico [February 18–23, 1974], in which we began a process of dialogue with the hemisphere once again.

At the outset, admittedly, the dialogue had a character of inquiring into what the United States could do for Latin America. But it became obvious that, as a result of the major changes and considerable progress in Latin America during the 1960's and early 1970's, we were now able to deal with the major nations of Latin America with a new mutuality of respect and equality of sovereignty quite impossible 20 years ago or even 10.

In the last two years, we have built steadily on this new relationship. We have taken advantage of it to put forward new initiatives in the political and the economic areas which we could not have considered a decade or more ago. The culmination of this new policy effort was the meeting at Santiago last week.

The constructive attitude in Santiago and the remarkably good tone to our relationships throughout the hemisphere are attributable in great part to three factors:

—The United States, since the inauguration of the new dialogue early in 1974, is again active as an equal partner in inter-American councils;

—We have a coherent policy that addresses the entire catalogue of hemispheric issues; and

—We have a vision of the future of our relationship.

It is that, I believe, which has reassured Latin America that the political relationship with the United States—the basic solidarity of the Western Hemisphere—is again increasingly vital.

With our political and moral relationship once again sound, we have a basis for cooperation with Latin America in the area

of most pressing concern, that of economic development.

The countries of Latin America are among the most developed of the developing nations and have been growing rapidly. Latin America has quintupled its collective gross product since 1950. At this rate, in 10 years Latin America will have attained the economic strength which Europe had in 1960. Its economies, furthermore, are increasingly important in world commodity, mineral, and energy markets and in trade in manufactured goods. Success in the struggle for development of the poorer countries of the world, when it comes, will come first in Latin America. For this reason, we must focus our attention and our energies there.

To address the changing nature of our relationship with Latin America and to deal with the expanding range of our common concerns, I set forth in Latin America last February six elements of our policy. I said the United States would:

—Take special cognizance of the distinctive requirements of the more industrialized economies of Latin America, and of the region as a whole, in the context of our efforts to help shape a more equitable international order;

—Assist directly the neediest nations in the hemisphere afflicted by poverty and natural disaster;

—Support Latin American regional and subregional efforts to organize for cooperation and integration;

—Negotiate on the basis of parity and dignity our specific differences with each and every state, to solve problems before they become conflicts;

—Enforce our commitment to collective security and to maintain regional integrity against attempts to undermine solidarity, threaten independence, or export violence; and

—Work to modernize the inter-American system to respond to the needs of our times and give direction to our common action.

Since February, in furtherance of these objectives, the United States has introduced

trade, investment, and technology proposals of special relevance to this hemisphere at CIEC [Conference on International Economic Cooperation] in Paris and at UNCTAD IV [fourth ministerial meeting of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] in Nairobi. We responded to the efforts of the Guatemalan people to recover from the earthquake that devastated their land. We have provided fresh support to subregional cooperation in Central America and are exploring ways of relating more effectively to the Andean Pact. And at last week's General Assembly of the Organization of American States at Santiago, we advanced our common interests in three important areas: cooperation for development, reform of the inter-American system, and human rights.

To speed *cooperation for development* in the Americas, we stressed three major topics for action: commodities, trade, and technology.

The economic aspirations of most countries in Latin America depend upon stable conditions for the production and marketing of primary commodities. At Santiago we proposed a three-point program designed to improve regional consultations on commodities markets; derive greater hemispheric benefits from global commodity arrangements; and improve resource financing, either on a global or regional basis.

To expand trade opportunities and capabilities, we offered proposals to help developing nations expand and diversify exports of manufactured and semiprocessed goods, promote the hemisphere's trade position through the Geneva negotiations, and support needed regional and subregional economic integration.

And we proposed a number of new ideas to stimulate the development, acquisition, and utilization of technology in the modernization of the hemisphere.

To *improve the inter-American system*, we circulated proposals—the most far-reaching the United States has ever put forward—which would simplify the organization by strengthening the foreign ministers meetings in the periodic General Assemblies,

eliminate the standing councils, open the OAS to wider membership in the hemisphere—particularly the new states of the Caribbean—and increase the Latins' share of the budget. Such steps, we believe, could lead to a leaner and more flexible and responsive organization which could better promote the mutual security, economic progress, and human rights of the Americas.

And on the centrally important issue of *human rights*, I addressed the special responsibility of our nations to preserve, cherish, and defend fundamental human values—for if such values cannot be preserved, cherished, and defended in this hemisphere, where the rights and the promise of the individual have played such a historic role, then they are in jeopardy everywhere.

At Santiago, the United States reaffirmed our unequivocal commitment to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. We endorsed the reports presented there by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission: its annual report, which cites the rise of violence and terror in many nations of Latin America, its report on Chile, and its report—submitted too late for official consideration by the OAS Assembly—concerning the inhuman treatment of political prisoners in Cuba and the refusal of Cuba to cooperate with the Commission.

The United States emphasized our belief that the protection of human rights in the hemisphere is an obligation of every nation and not simply of particular nations whose practices have come to public attention or whose ideology—on whichever side of the political spectrum—is unpopular.

The contrast between the respective treatment of the Human Rights Commission's work by the Governments of Chile and Cuba demonstrates the importance of this principle. The Government of Chile cooperated with the Commission; the Government of Cuba did not. The Government of Chile did nothing to prevent widespread publication in that country of information about the Commission's report and about the OAS discussion of the issue. Needless to say, there

has been nothing comparable in the government-controlled media in Cuba. Most important, the Commission noted a quantitative improvement in the situation in Chile since its last report.

For these reasons, I believe we can best enhance the prospects for further human rights progress in Chile by continuing a balanced policy by working in the area of human rights and by assisting that government to meet the economic problems before it. We have made it clear to the Government of Chile that the condition of human rights in that country impairs our relationship. Actions which would further undermine our relationship could eliminate the practical possibilities for betterment of economic conditions.

Mr. Chairman, our efforts in Latin America over the past several months have considerably advanced our practical progress and provided a firm foundation of policy for the years ahead. We have moved into a new phase of profound interest, active initiatives, and comprehensive proposals for altering the inter-American relationship, a phase which is more compatible with the new cooperative spirit in the hemisphere.

We have come to the end of a critical era and are marking the beginning of a new one. The United States can now deal with Latin America in a new spirit. We need not hold back on major initiatives for fear of inspiring old notions of paternalism. With consultation and cooperation, our hopes of meeting the challenges of economic and social progress in an age of interdependence and of building a sound and beneficial relationship between developed and developing nations are brightest and most promising here in this hemisphere.

Europe

Let me turn briefly now to Europe.

In late May I attended the NATO Ministers' meeting in Oslo and held a series of meetings with European leaders.

I do not need to rehearse at length to this committee why the countries of Western Europe are important to the United States

and to all our international endeavors. Throughout the postwar period we have recognized that the security of Western Europe is inseparable from our own. Our economies are inextricably linked; we have had repeated demonstrations that economic performance on one side of the Atlantic will in time affect both. Most of all, these are the peoples who share our most fundamental cultural and political heritage and its values, and they share our vision of the kind of world we want to live in.

While cooperating in a defensive alliance which for durability and vitality is probably unique in the history of sovereign states, the Atlantic nations also have been coordinating efforts gradually to improve relations with regimes in Eastern Europe whose values and aims are very different from our own. We have recognized from the outset that this difficult undertaking could only proceed from a basis of Western strength and cohesion.

Now, with the growth of Soviet military power, with a proliferation of potentially explosive regional tensions, with the emergence of new power centers based on control of vital economic resources, with growing demands for redistribution of the world's wealth, and with common economic and social problems ahead, it is more important than ever that our consultations with our closest allies be constant and our cooperation constant.

This does not mean that the North Atlantic states will see all problems in identical ways or always adopt identical policies. It does mean that only by understanding on another's interests and perspectives can we maintain that essential harmony in our policies which will enable us to deal constructively both with the Communist world and with the demands of the developing states.

Three years ago, the United States called for a reaffirmation of European-American solidarity. We believed that it was imperative to reaffirm the central place of Western unity in all that we were about to do.

Over the course of these last few years, we believe that the West has achieved an extraordinary cohesion and resolve. It is a sign of strength that doctrinal disputes over re

defining our relationship or the modes of our consultation have given way to concerted attacks on the actual problems before us.

Economic, security, and political issues have crowded upon us, and we have responded together: in the solidarity displayed by the Western countries in the declaration at the NATO summit in May 1975; in improving cooperation on defense issues; in unified positions before and during the Helsinki summit in July 1975; in the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions; in continuing allied consultations on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]; in intensified political consultations in refusing to bow to the temptation of protectionism in trade; in the network of common energy institutions created rapidly in response to the challenge of the oil cartel; in the Rambouillet economic summit of last November; and in the continuing series of multilateral negotiations with the developing countries in both new and old international forums.

At the NATO meeting last month there was firm agreement that our common security rests on the foundation of Western solidarity and strength and that continuing defense efforts will be necessary to counter Soviet assertiveness and induce restraint in Soviet behavior. There was broad agreement that efforts to seek stability and improvements in East-West relations should continue but that such efforts, too, must be based on a clear foundation of military strength and resolve. I was, in addition, struck by the growing appreciation among all NATO members that military, economic, and political developments around the globe can have the most direct impact on the security and prosperity of the North Atlantic states.

At the May meeting we discussed and found basic agreement on a wide range of issues: the importance of peaceful evolution in Africa; the centrality of our commitment to the security of Europe; the importance we attach to implementation of the Helsinki Final Act; the need for close consultations on SALT; the necessity to continue efforts toward mutual and balanced

force reductions; the situation in the Mediterranean; the high-level attention we should give to the question of military standardization; and most important, our continuing commitment to shared values, the basic cement that has held our alliance together for nearly 30 years.

My bilateral visits to Norway, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, and Luxembourg and the London meeting of CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] Foreign Ministers considerably furthered, I believe, the process of strengthened ties between America and Western Europe.

In Norway we discussed that country's growing role as a major oil producer and the importance of close consultations on the complicated question of international exploitation of the considerable resources of the Svalbard, or Spitsbergen, Archipelago.

In Germany we reaffirmed our shared views on East-West relations and the need to approach this subject from a foundation of strength. I believe that U.S.-German relations have never been better.

Swedish-American relations over the past decade have not always been friendly. While we cannot hope to wholly reconcile all our different perspectives, I believe that our talks helped each side better understand the conditions under which the other must conduct its foreign policy. Our relations with Sweden have improved significantly over the past year, and I expressed the hope in Stockholm that this process will continue.

The importance and prestige of Luxembourg in Europe far exceed its size. My discussions with Prime Minister Thorn dealt primarily with international issues, on which I found it valuable to hear the views of an ally that presents a European point of view in an impartial, effective manner. And at CENTO, I conveyed our continued support for the alliance and for peace and stability in the treaty region.

Today, Europe's role on global issues is strong and effective. Europe's interest in the Far East, in the Middle East, and in Africa is growing and welcome to us. [U.K.] Prime Minister Callaghan's initiatives for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia based on ma-

majority rule, [French] President Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for a Western fund for coordinated assistance to African economic development, and [Federal German] Chancellor Schmidt's initiatives in the economic field are examples of creative European statesmanship which the United States welcomes and respects. We gain—and the world gains—from Europe's counsel and long experience in a global framework.

At the NATO meeting in Oslo we took up issues of security; next week I will return to Europe to attend the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] meeting, where we will work to strengthen cooperation among the industrialized countries of the West and on our approach to the developing nations.

In a few days' time, President Ford will meet in Puerto Rico with his colleagues the heads of government of Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Japan in what is now becoming a regular process of economic discussions at the highest political level.

These meetings are symbolic of how far we have come in the last few years in consolidating cooperation among the industrial democracies and extending it into new spheres of common endeavor. They also demonstrate the understanding we share that the complexities of modern global management require, above all, a determined effort by our governments to prove that we have the ability to meet new challenges.

This kind of cooperation is the cornerstone of American foreign policy. It has been so for 30 years. It will continue to be so.

Africa

Finally, let me discuss briefly what we are trying to do in our African policy. Our aims are:

—To avoid a race war which would have inevitably tragic consequences for all concerned;

—To do all we can to prevent foreign intervention in what must remain an African problem;

—To promote peaceful cooperation among the communities in southern Africa; and

—To prevent the radicalization of Africa.

In 1974 President Ford ordered a review of our policy toward Africa. As part of this effort I announced one year ago that I would visit Africa in the spring of 1976. Last September, I set forth the fundamental elements of our policy toward Africa to members of the Organization of African Unity assembled in New York for the United Nations. I said then that America had three major concerns:

—That the African Continent be free of great-power rivalry or conflict;

—That all of the continent should have the right of self-determination; and

—That Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the global economic order, an economic partner with a growing stake in the international system.

Late last year the situation in Africa took on a new and serious dimension. For the first time since the colonial era was largely brought to an end in the early 1960's, external interventions had begun to control and direct an essentially African problem.

In the hope of halting a dangerously escalating situation in Angola, we undertook—until halted by the impact of our domestic debate—a wide range of diplomatic and other activity pointing toward a cessation of foreign intervention and a negotiated African solution.

By the first months of this year, Soviet Cuban intervention had contributed to an increasingly dangerous situation turning the political evolution away from African aspirations and toward great-power confrontation.

—The Soviets and Cubans had imposed their solution on Angola. Their forces were entrenched there. The danger was real that African states, seeing the Soviet and Cuban presence on the scene, might be driven in a radical direction.

—With the end of the Portuguese era in Africa, pressure was building on Rhodesia

regarded by Africans as the last major vestige of colonialism. Events in Angola encouraged radicals to press for a military solution in Rhodesia.

—With radical influence on the rise and with immense outside military strength apparently behind the radicals, even moderate and responsible African leaders—firm proponents of peaceful change—began to conclude there was no alternative but to embrace the cause of violence. By March of this year, guerrilla actions took on ever larger dimensions.

—We saw ahead the prospect of war fed and perhaps conducted by outside forces; we were concerned about a continent politically embittered and economically estranged from the West; and we saw ahead a process of radicalization which would place severe strains on our allies in Europe and Japan.

—There was no prospect of successfully shaping events in the absence of positive programs of our own for Africa.

It was for these reasons that President Ford determined that an African trip which had long been planned as part of an unfolding process of policy development had a compelling focus and urgency. We had these aims:

—To provide moderate African leaders with an enlightened alternative to the grim prospects so rapidly taking shape before them—prospects which threatened African unity and independence and indicated growing violence and widening economic distress;

—To work for a solution that would permit all of the communities in Africa—black or white—to coexist on the basis of justice and dignity;

—To give friendly and moderate African governments the perception that their aspirations could be achieved without resort to massive violence or bloodshed, and that their hopes for prosperity and opportunity can best be realized through association with the West; and

—To promote solutions based on majority rule and minority rights which would enable diverse communities to live side by side.

In short, we sought to show that there was a moderate and peaceful road open to fulfill African aspirations and that America could be counted on to cooperate constructively in the attainment of these objectives.

My trip addressed the three major issues facing Africa:

—Whether the urgent problems of southern Africa will be solved by negotiation or by war;

—Whether Africa's economic development will take place on the basis of self-respect and open opportunity or through perpetual relief or the radical regimentation of societies; and

—Whether the course of African unity and self-determination will once again be distorted by massive extracontinental interference.

I believe that the 10-point policy we set forth in Lusaka in late April and the other proposals we made in Africa to enhance self-sustaining economic growth make up a platform which moderate Africans can support and which serves interests we share—for peace, justice, and progress and for an Africa free from outside interference:

—The possibility for negotiated settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia has been enhanced. Time is running out, and formidable barriers remain. But if continued responsible efforts are made by all sides, the burning questions of southern Africa still can be solved without immense loss of life, suffering, and bitterness and with giving each community an opportunity for a dignified life.

—African hopes for independence and the integrity of their continent have been raised. Big-power intervention can only undermine unity, set African against African, and heighten the risk of conflict. Our policy on this clearly accords with African concerns as reflected in the suspicion and apprehension with which influential African leaders have regarded the large Cuban presence in Angola. We may now be seeing the results of that concern, and our clear position, as we receive an increasing num-

ber of reports that Cuban troops may begin to leave. However, we do not yet have clear evidence that this process is underway in any meaningful fashion. We will be carefully watching the pace and extent of any Cuban withdrawals.

—Our African policy is thus an important element in our overall international effort to help build a structure of relations which fosters peace, widening prosperity, and fundamental human dignity.

Mr. Chairman, Africa is of immense size, strategically located, with governments of substantial significance in numbers and growing influence in the councils of the world. The interdependence of America and our allies with Africa is increasingly obvious. In the past months we have seen a major international crisis develop in this important area of the world, and we have moved to deal with it. We have taken the initiative to offer a peaceful road to the future. We have told much of the world that America continues to have a positive vision and will play a crucial and responsible role in the world.

I believe that our policy initiatives were necessary, that they can be effective, that they are beneficial to the interests of the United States; and I believe that they are right.

But the new beginning in our African policy will require dedication and effort on our part if it is to come to a positive fruition. The Administration is determined to follow through on our initiatives and the promising beginnings that have been made. We look to the Congress for encouragement and for active support in this crucial enterprise.

U.S. Declaration on Official Support for Export Credits Issued

Following is a U.S. declaration on official support for export credits issued on June 9.

Press release 294 dated June 9

At the end of their economic conference in November 1975 at Rambouillet, France, the heads of state and governments of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States declared that their governments would intensify efforts to achieve a prompt conclusion of discussions then underway among themselves and Canada concerning export credits. Renewed discussions among these governments have resulted in a consensus that counterproductive competition must be avoided with respect to government-supported export credits.

Recognizing this consensus, the U.S. Government wishes to declare that it fully supports the principle of cooperation in order to reduce counterproductive competition in government-supported export credits. The guidelines for Eximbank-supported credits for civilian goods and services will be set forth in a declaration by the Export-Import Bank of the United States under its statutory authority. The U.S. Government intends to apply the same guidelines to any other official export credit support program for similar goods and services.

The U.S. Government invites other governments to apply similar guidelines so as to broaden the attempt to reduce counterproductive competition in government-supported export credits.

Department Discusses Allegations of Communist Influence in Certain Western Hemisphere Countries

Statement by William H. Luers

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹

I am happy to be able to discuss with you today some of the concerns arising from recent public allegations about an increase in Communist influence in certain countries in the Western Hemisphere.

I would prefer first to deal with these allegations specifically on a country-by-country basis. Then I will discuss briefly our general perception of social, political, and economic developments in the region. And if you have any patience or time left I will respond to questions you may have.

In discussing the countries where these allegations are pertinent, I hope the committee will understand that we are not sitting in judgment on the performance, the politics, or the economic organization of these countries. They represent themselves. The countries in question are intensely dedicated to their own independence. They are, for the most part, open nations with pluralistic societies and systems. As such we wish them well as they address the problems of social and economic development confronting them. But we are not responsible for the solutions they evolve. Nor are we responsible for keeping ourselves posted in minute detail about

internal developments in the countries of the hemisphere. The period when we could consider ourselves the "watchdog" and "policeman" of the hemisphere has passed.

What we must concern ourselves with are those trends which might:

—Affect the national security of the United States.

—Impact negatively on specific U.S. interests.

—Disrupt the peace and invoke our commitments under international treaties, such as the Rio Treaty [Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance].

Commonwealth Caribbean Nations

With these caveats in mind, let me turn to the Caribbean first. My emphasis here will be on the so-called Commonwealth Caribbean countries and of course on Cuba.

Excluding Cuba and Guyana, none of the independent nations of the Caribbean has a domestic Communist Party of significant electoral strength. Nor do we feel that the extrahemispheric Communist powers exercise significant influence in any of these nations, except for Cuba.

The governments of the Commonwealth Caribbean nations have committed themselves to programs of wide-reaching social and economic change. One—Guyana—has announced that it is seeking to create a "Marxist-Leninist" society for its people. There is

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on June 15. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

no indication at the present time, however, that this "Marxist-Leninist" society has much in common with the Soviet, East European, Chinese, or Cuban variants.

Implementation of the programs for change in these Commonwealth Caribbean nations has generally involved increased state participation in, or control of, important sectors of their respective economies. It has also been accompanied by closer relations with Cuba, including acceptance, in some cases, of Cuban technical assistance, exchanges of personnel, and expanded diplomatic and trade relations.

We have not noted, however, an equivalent increase in political authoritarianism. Democratic political and legal institutions, including respect for civil liberties and human rights, have generally been maintained.

The two specific cases you have asked me to discuss are Guyana and Jamaica.

Guyana has just celebrated the 10th anniversary of its independence. The Guyanese Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, has moved steadily toward state ownership of the most important sectors of the economy. Agreements were reached in 1971 and 1975 with the foreign bauxite and alumina producers, including one U.S. company, for government takeover of their facilities. The last remaining large-scale private enterprise in Guyana, a British sugar-producing interest, was recently nationalized. Terms are being negotiated.

It is generally believed that the Guyanese Government has operated its nationalized industries with reasonable efficiency. The overall economy of the country is in relatively good shape, and its international obligations are being met. The United States continues to import calcined bauxite from Guyana (375,000 tons in 1975).

Compared to the tumultuous preindependence society, Guyana today is relatively orderly. It is noteworthy that Prime Minister Burnham's principal opposition, the Communist People's Progressive Party, led by Cheddi Jagan, recently announced a policy of "critical" support for the Burnham govern-

ment and returned to participate in the opposition in the Guyanese elected parliament.

Guyana maintains cordial relations with the Communist nations; and Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban diplomatic missions are located in Georgetown. The Chinese have extended some economic assistance to Guyana, but the Cubans are by far the most active, providing technical assistance and participating in a number of cultural activities.

Prime Minister Burnham has repeatedly expressed admiration for Fidel Castro and for what he regards as the signal accomplishments of the Cuban regime. At the same time, however, he has made it clear that Guyana's political and economic development will not be modeled specifically on any other government. Prime Minister Burnham has also indicated his readiness to increase cooperation with Cuba.

We do have important differences with the Government of Guyana. In international bodies Guyana has in recent years frequently voted against us on issues of importance to us. Guyanese officials have been outspoken in criticizing the United States and its policies. We do not share common approaches to economic and social development. And we doubt that the Marxist-Leninist ideology recently espoused by the governing PNC [People's National Congress] party can be fully compatible with the open and pluralistic Guyanese society.

But an independent Guyana seeking its own path to social progress is no threat to this country. We continue to provide economic assistance to Guyana; we will continue to have a profound interest in the well-being of the Guyanese people. And we will continue to work directly and openly with officials of the Government of Guyana to resolve differences and cooperate whenever possible.

In the case of Jamaica, Prime Minister Michael Manley was elected to office in 1972 committed to a program of rectifying the uneven distribution of wealth in Jamaica and alleviating the chronic unemployment problem which has long plagued that island. A major objective of the Manley govern-

ment has been to renegotiate the terms of operation of the six major bauxite and alumina producers there so Jamaica might receive greater benefits from those important commodities. Some of these negotiations are still underway.

Prime Minister Manley has described his program as one of "democratic socialism." He has consistently stated that he will preserve Jamaica's parliamentary system and its strong tradition of a free press and respect for individual rights.

At the same time, like Mr. Burnham, Mr. Manley has taken steps toward closer relations with Cuba. Following a visit to Cuba last year, Mr. Manley announced that he had accepted a Cuban offer to provide technical advisers in the fields of school and dam construction. On March 17, 1976, the Jamaican Government also indicated publicly that two police officers had been sent to Cuba for training. On April 29, in connection with a parliamentary inquiry, the Government of Jamaica said an additional nine police officers had been sent to Cuba as observers.

Unfortunately, Mr. Manley's economic reform program has been set back by the world recession and by an accompanying fall in the demand for aluminum. It has also been undercut by sporadic political and criminal violence which, though largely confined to certain parts of Kingston, has probably nonetheless had an adverse effect on the island's very important tourism industry.

Developments in Jamaica have received considerable attention and comment in the U.S. and world press. Let me discuss some of this commentary. Press stories have alleged:

—That Cuban agents are entering Jamaica under the guise of technical advisers. Under agreements with the Manley government, about 100 Cuban advisers are in Jamaica to construct an agricultural school and a number of small dams, and additional advisers are expected to arrive in the future. There has been speculation that some of these individuals may be intelligence agents. The Manley government has repeatedly and publicly denied this.

—That Jamaican security personnel are being trained in Cuba. Some press accounts have referred to an agreement between Cuba and Jamaica to train Jamaican security forces. As I said earlier, in March and again in April the Jamaican Government issued clarifications on this question. It said that a total of two security officers have received training in Cuba, with an additional nine having visited Cuba for observational purposes. The Jamaican Government has also pointed out that over 160 personnel have received overseas training in the past 12 months, the overwhelming number of whom were trained in the United Kingdom. The government has also flatly denied the existence of any agreements with Cuba covering such training.

—That several high-ranking Jamaican officials or political advisers are Communists. This claim has been made in newspaper articles which appeared in the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, and elsewhere. The authenticity of this allegation remains open to question. However, it would not be surprising if some Marxists hold positions of influence in Jamaica, as they no doubt do in some other democratic countries.

On the other hand, a different view of developments in Jamaica has also appeared in the U.S. press. The widely syndicated columnist Carl Rowan quoted Prime Minister Manley as saying in January 1976, "I could never be a Communist—I am a profoundly democratic person." Mr. Manley made similar statements to the Wall Street Journal.

The foregoing themes, together with press speculation concerning the increased ties between Guyana and Cuba, have drawn strong reactions from the Governments of Jamaica and Guyana, as well as Barbados. It has been suggested by all three that these reports are somehow a part of a campaign, by implication orchestrated by the U.S. Government, to undermine these governments. The term "destabilization" has in several recent instances been used to describe our intentions.

I would like to use this occasion to state that such allegations are totally false. I

speak for all agencies of the U.S. Government in saying that the United States has complete respect for the sovereignty of other nations and for the right of other people to freely select their own political and economic systems. I wish categorically to deny that the U.S. Government is doing anything to undermine or destabilize the legitimate authorities or governments of those Caribbean countries. If private U.S. citizens are engaged in such alleged activities, we are prepared to cooperate fully with the governments of the area to bring them to justice.

The U.S. Government cannot, of course, be held responsible for the content of press articles and commentary. However, journalists do, on occasion, consult with us on factual matters, as well as seek our views of developments they regard as important. We are well aware of our obligation and responsibility to contribute to balanced and accurate portrayal of events, and we have taken great care to discharge this obligation.

It is our view that the leadership of the Commonwealth Caribbean nations, and I would mention specifically Prime Minister Manley and Prime Minister Burnham, is characterized by a strong interest in bringing about the modernization of the region. The societies involved have emerged from a recent environment of colonialism, and their leaders are zealously interested in preserving their hard-won status of independence. On the whole, the governments in question have shown no inclination to violate the basic human rights of their people, and they have shown respect for international legal norms in their efforts to reorganize and redirect their economies. We believe that any conclusion that these nations may be or have become the tools of Cuban and/or Soviet masters omits these important factors.

It is true that the Guyanese Government has indicated a strong distaste for capitalism, it has endorsed Cuba's Angola adventure, and it has established close ties with Cuba. The Jamaican democratic system is profoundly non-Communist, and the Jamaican economy is still geared almost completely to trade with non-Communist countries. Its

government faces serious social and economic problems, but we hope and trust that it will manage to deal effectively with these, at the same time preserving an open political system and maintaining close and friendly relations with the United States.

Mexico

With regard to Mexico, we believe that recent allegations that the Mexican Government is taking Mexico down the Chilean and Cuban road to socialism are unfounded. Those who make these allegations cite what they characterize as government-supported land seizures, policies directed against foreign investment, and the influence of Chilean exiles on government policies.

In discussing Mexico, it must be borne in mind that Mexico is a proudly independent country. The tenacity with which it holds to its independence is heightened by geography—it is our neighbor and highly sensitive to us and signs of any designs to undermine its independence. Decisions Mexico takes to respond to what it perceives as its internal problems are purely *Mexican* decisions. It does not seek or accept influence from foreign sources or proponents of alien ideologies. Its political system, which has evolved over the 66 years since the Mexican Revolution, is eclectic and unique.

The allegation that Chilean exiles are influential in the development of Mexican policy and actions can be looked at in context. Mexico has a long record of liberalism in granting political asylum. At the end of the Spanish Civil War, Mexico accepted many Republican exiles. It did the same after 1960 in accepting anti-Castro Cuban exiles; and following the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile, it accepted more than 100 prominent Chileans, plus a large number of their dependents, and assisted them in finding gainful employment.

Some of these exiles were given government positions. But there is no evidence that these or any other foreign advisers have significantly influenced the policies or programs of this large and resourceful nation. Mexico

has a highly organized governing political party and a vast reservoir of educated technicians who are fully competent to run the nation.

With regard to internal far-leftist organizations in Mexico, Communist and radical Marxist parties are legal but are small and weak. The government party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), has been successful in encompassing a wide spectrum of political thought and activity. Because Mexico's own revolutionary tradition is expressed by the PRI, it is difficult for the Marxist parties to build a following.

The Mexican Communist Party (PCM) has only an estimated 5,000 members, not enough under Mexican law to qualify for registration. Since 1968, when the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia, the PCM has followed a line relatively independent of Moscow. There is also evidence of strain within the party over the issue of the degree of support to be given to student activism.

The Popular Socialist Party (PPS) is a loosely organized party which claims 75,000 members. It has carefully refrained from advocating violence or opposing the goals of the Mexican Revolution. It has endorsed the PRI Presidential candidate since 1958, while running some of its own congressional and gubernatorial candidates.

The PCM and the PPS have disavowed terrorism. The principal terrorist organizations in Mexico are the 23d of September Communist League (which has been disavowed by the PCM), the Poor Peoples Army, and the Peoples Armed Revolutionary Army. Strong Mexican Government antiterrorist measures resulted in an abatement of terrorism during 1975.

The 23d of September Communist League is apparently the only group still active. They have claimed credit for several bombings, the murder of a police patrolman, and the recent kidnaping of the Belgian Ambassador's daughter. The 23d of September League is an irritant to the Government of Mexico, but not a threat to political stability. We know of no current Cuban connection with these terrorist groups.

Allegations that recent measures and actions by the Government of Mexico are "Communist inspired," and against private domestic and foreign investment, do not hold up under scrutiny. There has of course been some controversy within Mexico over some of the government's recent proposals, a phenomenon that is inevitable in an open society in which various sectors do not always have identical interests.

With regard to alleged attacks on private property, the Government of Mexico has made it clear that it does not accept or tolerate violence as a means of furthering land reform any more than it will tolerate private land holdings in excess of the limits imposed by its Constitution. It has also acknowledged that the so-called "land invasions" are in part a result of the frustration of small farmers over their lack of adequate land. In a visit to Sonora on April 21, President Echeverría forcefully stated that the Government of Mexico would not tolerate land invasions and reaffirmed his government's commitment to the rule of law in regard to both squatters and property owners. The same theme has been sounded by José López Portillo, the Presidential candidate of the ruling PRI. Thus, while there have been land invasions, on occasion stimulated by leftist agitators, there is no official endorsement of such invasions.

Those who allege a drift toward communism in Mexico also cite recent Mexican legislation—a Law on Human Settlements, which was opposed by some sectors in Mexico as an unconstitutional attack on private property. This law essentially gives authority to the government to regulate exploding urban growth through land use planning measures accepted in some industrialized countries. The Government of Mexico, in heeding the criticism expressed by some groups in Mexico, proposed some modifications of the original proposal by expressly stating that the law would not be used to expropriate private residences, by creating mechanisms to afford relief to property owners who might be affected, by excluding retroactivity, and by reaffirming its commit-

ment to the concept of private property.

With regard to the general question of foreign investment, the Government of Mexico has made it clear that it wants and needs foreign investment that will be of benefit to Mexico's economy and development but does not want investment that does not meet its needs. Foreign investors, including U.S. investors, continue to find investment attractive in Mexico under the ground rules established by the Mexican Government. Mexico has a healthy and mixed economy with both private and public enterprise. The private sector within Mexico accounts for the largest part of total industrial production apart from petroleum, and the government continues to encourage its mixed economy. The long-range trend in Mexico, as in many countries of Western Europe, may well be toward greater state involvement in the dominant sectors of the economy. But we see little chance of dramatic shifts and anticipate that the private sector will continue to play a key role.

With regard to allegations that an amnesty of persons jailed as a result of student riots in 1968 is evidence of a trend toward communism, it should be noted that most of the several hundred persons apprehended at that time have long since been released from jail on bail. The amnesty legislation was welcomed by both the left and right in Mexico as a measure which finally put the tragic events of 1968 to rest.

In discussing Mexico, it should be mentioned that some people allege that the United States is attempting to "destabilize" Mexico. This allegation is of course totally false. Mexico's interests, as well as ours, are best supported by a stable and economically prosperous Mexico, and we are supportive and understanding of efforts by the Government of Mexico to come to grips with the problems it perceives the need to solve to assure its economic and social advancement.

As a final note, relations between the United States and Mexico are excellent. We have engaged in effective consultation and cooperation on numerous questions of mutual interest. And when bilateral problems arise,

as they inevitably must when two sovereign countries share 2,000 miles of border, we have been able to discuss these problems in a frank and friendly manner and together seek mutually acceptable solutions. We do not foresee any change in this mutually advantageous relationship.

Panama

As you know, the United States and Panama have been trying to negotiate a new treaty concerning the Panama Canal for the past 12 years. We hope that the new relationship that will emerge as a result of this effort will be one of cooperation and partnership.

Recently there have been allegations that the Government of Panama is under Communist influence. Some of this speculation resulted from the fact that Chief of Government Torrijos visited Cuba in January of this year. Because of the importance of the treaty-negotiating effort, we believe it imperative that the record show that the charges of Communist influence cannot be sustained by a careful examination of the facts.

The present government of Panama, led by Gen. Omar Torrijos, came to power in 1968 by military coup after a period of intense political agitation. Since then, the Panamanian Government has expressly rejected doctrinaire ideology in favor of reformist programs which it believes address Panama's social and economic needs. In this sense, the government's political orientation can be described as nationalistic, pragmatic, and populist. Through the political structure created in the 1972 Constitution, Panama has developed a high degree of popular participation in public decisionmaking, even at the local level. Today the government still appears to enjoy considerable popular support.

Since the 1968 coup all political parties have been banned in Panama. This sanction applies to the *Partido del Pueblo*—Panama's Communist Party—which never attracted many adherents. We do not expect any increase in its strength in the foreseeable future.

Internationally, Panama has attempted to broaden its diplomatic contacts in order to generate wide international support for its canal treaty aspirations. For example, Panama recently became a member of the nonaligned group of countries, and it maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Although General Torrijos was cordially greeted during his recent visit to Cuba, there is no evidence that the Panamanian Government will pattern its political, military, or economic system along Cuban lines. Prior to and during Torrijos' visit, there was speculation regarding Cuban arms sales to Panama and Panamanian support for the Cuban intervention in Angola. Not only have these events not materialized, but General Torrijos has expressly separated his government from the policies of the Cuban regime. On his return to Panama he announced publicly that Cuba had chosen its road to social progress but that Panama had chosen another. Also, recent allegations regarding a sizable covert Cuban military presence in Panama are rumor and, as such, do injustice to the integrity and independence of the Panamanian state.

Despite its attempts to garner international support for its national aspirations, there is nothing that suggests that Panama has succumbed to Communist influence. Panama does not maintain diplomatic or economic ties with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Of the Eastern European countries, only Poland and Yugoslavia have diplomatic representation in Panama; and their missions are modest.

Today, Panama's economy is one of the prime examples of the free enterprise system in Latin America. Since colonial days, Panamanians have utilized the commercial advantages of the Isthmus of Panama. In fact, public regulation of the financial sector of the economy is scant, and government policies seek promotion of private investment. These factors and Panama's close monetary ties to the United States have made Panama City—with 73 commercial banks—a major financial center in Latin America.

Peru

Let me now say a few words about Peru, whose military government has been identified in this country from time to time as pro-Communist or tending toward communism.

The military officers who seized power in Peru in 1968 were, and remain, highly nationalistic. Their aim was, and is, to transform Peruvian society to bring into the life of the nation the great bulk of the population which was perceived to be the most disadvantaged.

To this end the revolutionary government opted for a form of socialism that borrowed as freely from Marx as it did from the papal encyclicals. The eclectic system that is evolving is a unique Peruvian synthesis of many models. The revolution's interpreters define it as neither capitalist nor Communist but containing elements of both.

In all aspects of its statist approach to the organization of the Peruvian economy, the government has insisted that it is motivated by the principles of humanism and Christianity. While political activity is limited by the authorities, parties continue to exist, although they have no voice in government. The press increasingly has been allowed greater freedom, especially over the past few months.

While the revolutionary government has largely taken over the national means of production and has instituted a rather thorough-going agrarian reform of the old oligarchic *latifundia*, a private sector is permitted to function. Practically all foreign investment has been nationalized, but compensation has been paid the owners; in the latest expropriation of an American firm, the Marcona Mining Company, last year, compensation negotiations are coming, we believe, to a successful conclusion. Yet nearly \$1 billion in U.S. investments in Peru, in copper and oil production, have been left untouched and as a consequence are expanding. Except for this, however, it must be said that Peru's nationalization policies have dried up new foreign investment.

As a leader of the nonaligned movement,

Peru's public postures frequently are in opposition to our interests; yet Peru has played a constructive role in the Third World, helping to moderate the more extreme positions of the radicals in the movement. Still many Americans are offended by what they interpret as Peru's "anti-imperialist" rhetoric in these fora. Peruvians will say their anti-imperialism in foreign policy is not anti-American. They insist it is nationalist and independent, since they are neither Communist nor capitalist.

Peru's new and innovative attempt at restructuring a society was recognized by Secretary Kissinger when he visited Lima in February. Acknowledging that Peru has chosen a nonaligned path, he said: ²

The United States accepts nonalignment as a legitimate national course. Indeed, our global interest is well served by a world of thriving independent states, secure in their national destinies against the hegemonial designs of any nation.

He also said that while our two countries differ in ideology, culture, and governmental structure, we are "fully sympathetic with Peru's struggle to create a social democracy attuned to the needs of all its people."

Peru's large acquisitions of Soviet arms beginning in 1973 have created some concern about the direction and orientation of Peruvian policies. The increased Soviet presence in Peru, along with a continuing Cuban presence, raised additional questions. But there is no sign that Soviet and Cuban influence within the military government has increased.

The Communist Party of Peru (CPP) is split into feuding factions: a dominant pro-Soviet faction of approximately 2,000 members and an ultramilitant so-called Maoist faction of approximately 1,500 members—which itself has split on the issue of militance. The primary issue which divides the factions is support of the military government's Socialist revolution. The pro-Soviet CPP supports it as an intermediate step to Marxist socialism, while the ultraleft fac-

tions favor direct action to create a Marxist state.

The main area of strength of the Peruvian Communists is in labor, where Communist-controlled unions have demonstrated the capability of paralyzing key industries—notably the mines and metallurgy industry—for limited periods of time. Recent government decrees, however, may have curbed the unions' strength in the mines. Ultramilitant Communists and other Marxists also dominate the national teachers unions and student organizations on several major university campuses.

Cuba and the U.S.S.R. support the pro-Soviet CPP and its affiliated organizations, primarily with cadre training. There are 100-200 Cubans in Peru, most of whom are assigned to the Cuban diplomatic mission or are their dependents. In addition, groups of Cuban fishermen, who operate off the Peruvian coast under terms of the Cuba-Peru fishing agreement of 1973, frequently take shore leave in northern Peruvian ports. Despite occasional unsubstantiated reports, we do not believe that there are Cuban military advisers or Communist bases in Peru.

Soviet and Cuban Policies and Programs

I hope these statements have served to deal satisfactorily with your concerns about specific allegations of Communist influence. But they are incomplete without some discussion of Cuba and the Soviet Union and of the general political and economic environment in Latin America, how that shapes our perceptions, and what policies we have evolved.

The official Latin American Communist parties, never really major political forces in most countries of the hemisphere, are now divided and without important influence. They attract very little indigenous support.

As for the Soviet Union and Cuba, they have in recent years pursued policies and programs aimed at improving relations with established Latin American governments. As a parallel to this approach, they have tended to channel their active support to legal and "legitimate" local Communist parties and

² For Secretary Kissinger's toast at a dinner at Lima on Feb. 18, see BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1976, p. 331.

have largely broken off support for guerrilla and terrorist groups. We do not at this time believe they are contemplating a change in this policy or preparing for armed intervention in the hemisphere. At the same time it should be said that not a few Latin American governments which experienced serious guerrilla outbreaks in the 1960's and 1970's continue to believe that terrorist organizations now operating in their countries are supported from abroad.

Cuba's attempts have not been all that successful on the state-to-state level. During 1975, Cuba seemed to be making real headway toward wide acceptance by Latin American governments and a significant role in the affairs of the hemisphere. Latin American governments welcomed the more pragmatic Castro of last year in their drive for all-embracing Latin American unity and solidarity. By last fall Cuba had diplomatic relations with 12 countries in the hemisphere.

However, Castro's Angola adventure revived some old suspicions about Cuba and created some new anxieties. Some Latin American governments have never dropped their objections to Castro, regarding him as a tool of the Soviets. Other governments which may have been inclined to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba have had second thoughts following Castro's decision to intervene in Africa.

It is mainly in certain black English-speaking Caribbean countries that Cuba's actions in Africa are approved and applauded as putting new momentum into the anti-colonial and antiwhite struggle in the southern part of that continent. Themselves confronted by massive problems of modernization of their societies, the leaders of these countries are impressed by the clean streets, law and order, and egalitarianism of Cuba.

But here I must digress. We understand, as I indicated, that attraction of Cuba to the Commonwealth Caribbean nations, led by proud, intelligent, and highly educated men. Their social and economic problems are crushing. Their urban unemployment and population growth are critical. They find economic dependency on tourism and certain

agricultural crops a reality but also a residue of the colonial past. Perhaps even more than other developing nations they, because of their relatively high literacy and intense contact with the developed world, seek a formula for rapid modernization.

Yet the United States has not been of great assistance. We have taken many of their citizens as immigrants, we have invested in their industrial, tourist, and agricultural enterprises, and we have spent lavishly in visiting the lovely islands. But as a government we have not, aside from a few small AID [Agency for International Development] programs and our substantial support for the Caribbean Development Bank, devised special economic programs to support the modernization aspirations of these very special neighbors in the Caribbean.

These leaders doubtlessly also are aware that the Cuban experiment was carried out, and was only possible, with an enormous amount of aid from the Soviet Union. And if the Soviet Union was not prepared to give that kind of assistance to Chile under Allende to establish a second "Socialist" model in the Western Hemisphere, it may also be reluctant to do so for possible additional candidates in the Caribbean. Moreover, the Caribbean nations know that with that type of economic dependency come political costs which they, as recently independent nations, are not prepared to pay.

Soviet policy toward the nations of the hemisphere in recent years has been designed to:

—Strengthen diplomatic and commercial ties with most of the Latin American and Caribbean states (the Soviets have diplomatic relations with 15 states in Latin America and the Caribbean).

—Support leftist trends and anti-U.S. actions of governments through propaganda and other means.

—Expand trade and military sales to increase influence in certain countries and promote cultural and educational exchanges.

But the Soviets have not significantly increased their influence in the hemisphere

outside of Cuba. Independent thinking and acting nations of the hemisphere have proven themselves fully capable of maintaining relations with the Soviet Union, taking advantage of some trade and credits, but not succumbing to increased Soviet influence.

Increasingly it appears that the Soviet Union is irrelevant to much of the Third World except as a commodity purchaser and a supplier of arms. However, in Latin America, only Cuba and Peru have thus far elected to purchase Soviet weapons. As a source of technology and capital its role is minor. In the North-South dialogue over trade, commodities, monetary reform, and debts, the Soviets have made virtually no contribution.

U.S. Approach

While Communist parties have not prospered in the hemisphere, terrorism, urban and rural guerrilla movements, increased crime, and social unrest have continued to plague the hemisphere. Virtually no country is without problems of this kind. Genuine social and economic grievances play a large part in this unrest. This is accompanied by a global counterpoint of disappointed expectations on the part of the politically impotent and economically disfranchised throughout the world. Troublesome issues in U.S.-Latin American relations—trade, Panama, Cuba—offer opportunities for “anti-imperialist” forces to mobilize opinion against us and, in some cases, the government in power in their own country.

Some of the less stable governments in the region have sought to capitalize on radical sentiment, or at least defend themselves from it, by deflecting it externally; i.e., at the United States. They are firing at the wrong target, however. For it is a plain fact, stated often by Secretary Kissinger and Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American Affairs William D.] Rogers, that we are not in the business of intervening in the internal affairs of Latin American states.

Discussing his earlier trip to Latin America with the House International Relations

Committee on March 4, Mr. Kissinger made the following statement:

We accept the sovereignty of each Latin American state. Our policy . . . is to support the aspirations and objectives of their program of social change, to conciliate differences before they become conflicts. . . .

On the same occasion, touching on the themes he emphasized on that trip, Mr. Kissinger also repeated our pledge to “negotiate our differences with any nation or nations on the basis of mutual respect and sovereign equality.”

Obviously this is a policy which accords with our own values and history. We have been able to adopt this approach because we no longer perceive, as we once did, that an extrahemispheric power will be able to mount a significant threat to our own vital interests in Latin America or to the stability of Latin American states.

As for Cuba, we are not taking at face value the pieties of self-serving statements currently emanating from Havana. The Cubans should indeed withdraw promptly from Angola. They should never have gone there in the first place. They should never have intervened in a distant conflict better resolved by African effort alone. If their speedy and complete withdrawal becomes a fact, we will welcome it. In the meantime we will watch events and check our intelligence with great care.

There should also be no question, as Secretary Kissinger pointed out in Costa Rica during his February trip, that we will honor our treaty commitments and security obligations in Latin America. As you know, these are largely embodied in the Rio Treaty of 1947, article 3 of which commits signatories to regard an armed attack on any American state as an attack on all the American states and to “assist in meeting the attack.” Article 6 further provides for immediate consultation to agree on measures for the common defense and maintenance of the peace and security of the continent in cases not involving armed attack. I regard the existence and the reiteration of these commitments as an important contribution to the defense and internal stability of hemisphere states.

U.S. Joins Security Council Consensus on Resolution on South Africa

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on June 19, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SHERER

First Statement of June 19

USUN press release 64 dated June 19

The tragic events occurring in South Africa are a sharp reminder that when a system deprives a people of the basic elements of human dignity and expression, only the bitterest results can be expected. In 1960, over 16 years ago, this Council met to consider a similar tragedy and called upon the Government of the Republic of South Africa to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality in order to assure that the present situation did not continue or reoccur and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination.

Mr. President, my government supported that resolution—and in the intervening years we have made repeated pleas, together with other members of the United Nations, to the Government of the Republic of South Africa to abandon the policies which were inevitably leading to the events we have witnessed in the last few days. In the present circumstances the frustrations of the black people could only find an expression in the form of rioting which has brought such dire consequences. That is part of the tragedy of South Africa.

My delegation has stated on other occasions that the basic facts about human rights in South Africa are clear and may be stated in two propositions: First, the majority of two Africans live under a system which deprives them of their basic human rights and, second, the South African system of laws is designed and administered so as to prevent that majority from taking

effective peaceful action to alter this condition of fundamental deprivation.

We call on the Government of the Republic of South Africa to take these events as a warning and to learn from them. They must abandon a system which is clearly not acceptable under any standard of human rights. There can be no dream of a future for a nation of South Africa that does not include both white and black working together in harmony and equality. Together with other members of the Council, we want to assure that the dream will not become a nightmare such as that we have witnessed in recent days.

Second Statement of June 19

USUN press release 65 dated June 19

My government has joined the consensus in support of the resolution because of our strong conviction that apartheid is wrong and that tragedy can only follow if South Africa persists in its racial policies.

In joining the consensus, we do so on the clear understanding that the language, particularly that in operative paragraph 3, falls under chapter VI of the charter and does not imply any chapter VII determination. We would not want our support of this consensus to be understood by anyone as meaning that the United States is prepared to contemplate chapter VII action.

In agreeing to this resolution, the United States is sensitive to the limits on Security Council jurisdiction imposed by article 2, paragraph 7, of the charter. By that article's terms, no organ of the United Nations is authorized to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state except in cases in which enforcement measures under chapter VII are to be applied. The Council, of course, is not applying enforcement measures in this resolution.

One final point, Mr. President, but a point to which my government attaches paramount importance. South Africa in its policy of apartheid represents a flagrant violation of human rights. But it would be wrong, indeed it would be hypocritical, were it not said to this Council that South Africa is not

the only government which pursues deliberate policies which result in flagrant violations of human rights.

I stress this point concerning violations of human rights, Mr. President, in order to suggest to this Council that, by being arbitrary and selective in its concerns and its condemnation, it brings the United Nations into disrepute and may even encourage those governments which pursue deliberate policies whose cruelty in some cases exceeds that of apartheid to believe they can do so with impunity.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter by the representatives of Benin, the Libyan Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania, on behalf of the African Group at the United Nations, concerning the measures of repression, including wanton killings, perpetrated by the apartheid régime in South Africa against the African people in Soweto and other areas in South Africa (S/12100),

Having considered also the telegram from the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12101),

Deeply shocked over large-scale killings and wounding of Africans in South Africa, following the callous shooting of African people including school children and students demonstrating against racial discrimination on 16 June 1976,

Convinced that this situation has been brought about by the continued imposition by the South African Government of apartheid and racial discrimination, in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly,

1. Strongly condemns the South African Government for its resort to massive violence against and killings of the African people including school children and students and others opposing racial discrimination;

2. Expresses its profound sympathy to the victims of this violence;

3. Reaffirms that the policy of apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and seriously disturbs international peace and security;

4. Recognizes the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and racial discrimination;

5. Calls upon the South African Government

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/392 (1976); adopted by the Council by consensus on June 19.

urgently to end violence against the African people, and take urgent steps to eliminate apartheid and racial discrimination;

6. *Decides to remain seized of the matter.*

Congress Asked To Approve Defense Cooperation Agreement With Turkey

Message From President Ford¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I am hereby requesting that Congress approve and authorize appropriations to implement the Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey Relative to Defense Cooperation Pursuant to Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty in Order to Resist Armed Attack in the North Atlantic Treaty Area, signed in Washington, March 26, 1976, and a related exchange of notes. Accordingly, I am transmitting herewith draft legislation in the form of a Joint Resolution of the Congress for this purpose.

The United States and Turkey have long enjoyed a close mutual security relationship under the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as bilateral cooperation in accordance with Article III of that Treaty. The new Agreement, like its predecessor, the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 which this Agreement would supersede, implements the Treaty. It has been signed as an executive agreement. The Agreement was negotiated with the understanding that it would be subject to Congressional approval and expressly provides that it shall not enter into force until the parties exchange notes indicating approval of the Agreement in accordance with their respective legal procedures. Full Congressional endorsement of this Agreement will give new strength and stability to continuing U.S.-Turkish security cooperation which has served as a vital buttress on NATO's southeast flank for more than two decades.

¹ Transmitted on June 16 (text from White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 94-531, which includes the texts of draft legislation and the agreement and a related exchange of notes.

The new Agreement is consistent with, but not identical to, the preceding Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969. Founded on mutual respect for the sovereignty of the parties, the Agreement (Articles II and III) authorizes U.S. participation in defense measures related to the parties' obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is understood that when the Agreement enters into force pursuant to Article XXI, activities will resume which were suspended by the Government of Turkey in July 1975, when the Turkish Government requested negotiation of a new defense cooperation agreement.

The Agreement provides a mutually acceptable framework for this important security cooperation. The installations authorized by the Agreement will be Turkish Armed Forces installations under Turkish command (Articles IV and V). Article V clearly provides for U.S. command and control authority over all U.S. armed forces personnel, other members of the U.S. national element at each installation, and U.S. equipment and support facilities.

The installations shall be operated jointly. In order to facilitate this objective, the United States is committed to a program of technical training of Turkish personnel.

Other provisions of the Agreement deal with traditional operational and administrative matters, including: operation and maintenance of the installations; ceilings on levels of U.S. personnel and equipment; import, export and in-country supply procedures; status of forces and property questions.

Article XIX specifies the amounts of defense support which the United States plans to provide Turkey during the first four years the Agreement remains in force. We have provided such support to this important NATO ally for many years to help Turkey meet its heavy NATO obligations. The article provides that during the first four years the Agreement remains in force, the United States will furnish \$1,000,000,000 in grants, credits and loan guaranties, to be distributed equally over these four years in accordance with annual plans to be developed by the Governments. It further provides that

during the first year of the defense support program, \$75 million in grants will be made available, with a total of not less than \$200 million in grants to be provided over the four-year life of the program. The Article also sets forth our preparedness to make cash sales to Turkey of defense articles and services over the life of the Agreement.

The related exchange of notes details defense articles we are prepared to sell to the Republic of Turkey at prices consistent with U.S. law. It further provides for Turkish access to the U.S. Defense Communications Satellite System, and for bilateral consultations regarding cooperation in modernizing Turkish defense communications.

The defense support specified in Article XIX and in the related exchange of notes will be provided in accordance with contractual obligations existing and to be entered into by the Governments, and with the general practices applicable to all other recipient countries. The accompanying draft legislation accordingly provides that the generally applicable provisions of our foreign assistance and military sales Acts will govern this defense support, and that it will be exempted from the provisions of section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended. The draft legislation further provides that it fulfills the requirements of section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act as amended and section 7307 of Title 10 of the United States Code with respect to the transfer of materiel pursuant to the related exchange of notes.

The Agreement will have a duration of four years, and will be extended for subsequent four-year periods in the absence of notice of termination by one of the parties. As the four-year defense support program comes to an end, the Agreement provides for consultation on the development of a future program as required in accordance with the respective legal procedures of the two Governments. Article XXI stipulates the procedures under which the Agreement can be terminated by either party, and provides for a one-year period following termination during which the Agreement will be considered to remain in force for the purposes of an orderly withdrawal.

This Agreement restores a bilateral relationship that has been important to Western security for more than two decades. I believe it will promote U.S. interests and objectives on the vital southeastern flank of NATO and provide a framework for bilateral cooperation designed solely to reinforce NATO and our common security concerns. To the extent that the Agreement restores trust and confidence between the United States and Turkey, it also enhances the prospects for a constructive dialogue on other regional problems of mutual concern.

I therefore request that the Congress give this Agreement and the accompanying draft legislation prompt and favorable consideration, and approve its entry into force and authorize the appropriation of the funds necessary for its execution.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 16, 1976.

Fourth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress

*Message from President Ford*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, I am submitting my fourth periodic report on the progress of the Cyprus negotiations and the efforts this Administration is making to help find a lasting solution to the problems of the island. In previous reports I have detailed the Administration's efforts to revitalize the negotiating process so that the legitimate aspirations of all parties, and particularly those of the refugees, could be accommodated quickly and in the most just manner possible.

Differences on procedural issues have long prevented the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities from broaching such critical issues as territory, the form and

function of the central government and other constitutional issues. Throughout the period since the hostilities of 1974, we have consistently urged serious consideration of these issues. As my most recent report indicated, an agreement was reached at the February round of the Cyprus intercommunal talks in Vienna, held under the auspices of United Nations Secretary General Waldheim, to exchange negotiating proposals on the key substantive issues of the Cyprus problem. When both sides submitted proposals in April to Secretary General Waldheim's Special Representative on Cyprus, a new impasse developed which delayed a complete exchange on the territorial question. Additionally, in April, Glafcos Clerides resigned his position as the Greek-Cypriot negotiator. These developments, with the subsequent appointment of new Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot negotiators, resulted in the postponement of the next negotiating round which had been scheduled to take place in Vienna in May.

On April 15, I invited Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios to the White House for a very useful exchange of views on developments relating to Cyprus.

In addition, the United States and other interested parties maintained close contact with Secretary General Waldheim to support his attempts to resolve these difficulties and resume the intercommunal negotiating process. These efforts culminated in discussions on the occasion of the Oslo NATO Ministerial meeting in late May where Secretary of State Kissinger held separate meetings with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil and Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios, following which the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers met together to discuss outstanding bilateral issues including Cyprus. In the course of this process, the Secretary of State stressed the absolute need to move expeditiously to discuss the key outstanding Cyprus issues.

The Secretary of State also publicly emphasized our continuing concern that a rapid solution of the Cyprus dispute be achieved and reiterated the firm position of this Ad-

¹ Transmitted on June 7 (text from White House press release).

ministration that the current territorial division of the island cannot be permanent.

Following the meetings in Oslo, views on territorial issues were exchanged by the two Cypriot communities, and it should now be possible to reinitiate the negotiating process under the auspices of UN Secretary General Waldheim.

The United States will continue to contribute actively to these efforts aimed at a solution to the Cyprus problem. I remain convinced that progress can be registered soon if mutual distrust and suspicions can be set aside and each side genuinely tests the will of the other side to reach a solution. For our part, we shall remain in touch with Secretary General Waldheim and all interested parties to support the negotiating process. Our objective in the period ahead, as it has been from the beginning of the Cyprus crisis, is to assist the parties to find a just and equitable solution.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 7, 1976.

U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended for Six Months

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on June 15, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER

USUN press release 62 dated June 15

Tonight's renewal of the mandate of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) marks the 30th time that the Security Council has taken this action. As he has so often done before, the Secretary General has stressed the need for flexibility and good will in the negotiating process. Once again in the report that is before us he urges

the parties to take into account "not only their own interests but also the legitimate aspirations and requirements of the opposing side."

Members of this Council must surely echo the Secretary General's appeal for greater energy, flexibility, and dedication to the success of the intercommunal negotiations. Over the years too many opportunities have been lost because the concessions necessary for agreement required high political risks. As the body charged with the maintenance of international peace—and through its long involvement in the Cyprus question—this Council has the right to expect that serious risks be taken in the search for a lasting settlement.

The Secretary General has again earned our admiration for the tireless and imaginative way in which he has carried out his mission of good offices. The last six months have presented very special difficulties. My government fully understands, and shares, the Secretary General's view that "Before reconvening the talks, it is obviously necessary to have reasonable assurances that they will be meaningful and productive." The Secretary General will, we are certain, lend the prestige of his office and his personal ingenuity to obtaining the assurances necessary to insure the success of the Cyprus talks.

In straightforward terms, the Secretary General has in paragraph 65 of his report expressed concern over the situation of Greek Cypriots in the north. My delegation shares the hope expressed by other members of the Council that this situation will improve in accordance with past agreements covering Greek Cypriots in the north.

In the last two years, Mr. President, the United States has doubled its annual contribution to UNFICYP from \$4.8 million to \$9.6 million a year. We have done this in order to maintain quiet on the island and insure conditions supportive of the intercommunal negotiations. It is accordingly with deep concern that we have read in the Secretary General's report that the future of the Force is imperiled because "voluntary

contributions have continued to be made in insufficient amounts and by a disappointingly small number of Governments . . .” Surely the time has come for governments interested in a just Cyprus settlement to donate their fair share to UNFICYP. Permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility to contribute to international peace and security. That high responsibility cannot be diminished by peacekeeping doctrinal considerations stemming from different circumstances and an earlier era.

Mr. President, my government remains convinced that a just and durable peace in Cyprus is not only possible but is deeply desired by Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. At the last General Assembly, Secretary of State Kissinger outlined five principles which the United States considers essential to a permanent settlement. Let me repeat these principles, which are consonant with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Cyprus:

—A settlement must preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

—It must insure that both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs.

—The present dividing lines cannot be permanent. There must be agreed territorial arrangements which reflect the economic requirements of the Greek Cypriot community and take account of its self-respect.

—There must be provision for the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under the authority of international agreements.

—And there must be security for all Cypriots; the needs and wishes of the refugees who have been the principal victims and whose tragic plight touches us all must be dealt with speedily and with compassion.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to pay tribute to those who make the U.N. operation in Cyprus the remarkable combination of peacekeeping and peacemaking that it is. The Secretary General's Special Representative, [Javier] Perez de Cuellar, Under Secretaries General [Brian G.] Urquhart and [Roberto Enrique] Guyer and their fine staffs, General Prem Chand [Lt. Gen. D. Prem Chand] and the officers and men of UNFICYP—these people represent, in my

government's estimate, the very highest standards of international service. Their conduct reflects the ideals of this organization, and we salute them.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The Security Council,

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 5 June 1976 (S/12093) that in existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is essential not only to help maintain quiet in the island but also to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful settlement,

Noting from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

Noting also from the report that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and its civil police (UNCIVPOL) is still restricted in the north of the island, that progress is being made in discussions regarding the stationing, deployment and functioning of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and expressing the hope that those discussions will lead speedily to the elimination of all existing difficulties,

Noting further that, in paragraph 70 of his report, the Secretary-General expresses the view that the best hope of achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem lies in negotiations between the representatives of the two communities and that the usefulness of those negotiations depends upon the willingness of all parties concerned to show the necessary flexibility, taking into account not only their own interests but also the legitimate aspirations and requirements of the opposing side,

Expressing its concern at actions which increase tension between the two communities and tend to affect adversely the efforts towards a just and lasting peace in Cyprus,

Emphasizing the need for the parties concerned to adhere to the agreements reached at all previous rounds of the talks held under the auspices of the Secretary-General and expressing the hope that future talks will be meaningful and productive,

Noting also the concurrence of the parties concerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1976,

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/391 (1976); adopted by the Council on June 15 by a vote of 13-0, with Benin and the People's Republic of China not participating in the vote.

1. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and decisions on the establishment and maintenance of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;

2. *Reaffirms once again* its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unanimously on 1 November 1974, and calls once again for their urgent and effective implementation and that of its resolution 367 (1975);

3. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint to refrain from any unilateral or other action likely to affect adversely the prospects of negotiations and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;

4. *Extends once more* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1976, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force;

5. *Appeals again* to all parties concerned to extend their fullest co-operation so as to enable the United Nations Peace-keeping Force to perform its duties effectively;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution by 30 October 1976.

U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Hold Eighth Meeting

Following is the text of a communique issued at the conclusion of the eighth U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON VIII) at Washington on May 28.¹

I. The Eighth United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange was held in Washington, May 26-28, 1976. Delegates and specialists representing the governments, academic communities, mass media, businesses, political communities, foundations, and creative arts of the two countries reviewed the state of cultural and educational interchange since the last Conference in Tokyo two years ago and agreed to a number of recommendations designed to deepen and widen mutual understanding.

II. The Conference agreed that cultural and educational ties between the two countries were at the heart of the overall U.S.-Japan relationship; that the single most effective means of strengthening that already vigorous relationship was to further improve the quality and variety of programs and exchanges over an increasingly broad spectrum of both societies. In this connection, the Conference was stimulated by the CULCON Symposium held in New York on May 24-26. This Symposium, held in connection with the Bicentennial, was sponsored by the Japan Society in cooperation with the International House of Japan. Its purpose was to "explore issues of significant concern to the cultures of Japan and the United States". Especially noteworthy was the Symposium's success in bringing together outstanding younger Japanese and American specialists for substantive discussion.

III. The Conference agreed on the vital importance of fostering dialogue between a wider spectrum of our two societies and found that the development of new intellectual communities, based upon common aspirations, but not necessarily similar experiences, is worthy of pursuit. In this connection, it was agreed that the 1977 Joint Committee should consider organizing in 1978 a Symposium or similar event involving representatives from various segments of our two societies. It was suggested that this event should involve the mass media in such a way as to maximize its impact on both societies.

IV. The Conference welcomed the establishment in October, 1975 of the United States-Japan Friendship Commission which now joins the Japan Foundation, established nearly four years ago, as a new and major contribution to expand cultural relations between the two countries.

V. Recognizing the need to more fully utilize the varied experience of its Panel members on both sides, and to plan future CULCON activities with a clearer understanding of areas of cultural communication needing attention, the Conference agreed that:

1. The Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan Cultural and Educational Cooperation, meeting in the years between these biennial Conferences, would set aside time for discussion of future developments in our two cultures.

2. A survey would be undertaken in both countries to identify possible structural impediments inhibiting a smooth flow of cultural exchange and com-

¹ Paragraph XII of the communique, which includes a list of CULCON delegates from the United States and Japan, is not printed here. Dr. John W. Hall, chairman, Department of History, Yale University, was chairman of the U.S. panel; Yoshinori Maeda, former president of and now honorary adviser to Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corp.), was chairman of the Japanese panel. A complete list of delegates was also included in press release 265 dated May 24.

munication, for consideration by the 1977 Joint Committee meeting.

VI. The Conference, in keeping with earlier CULCON discussions, agreed to establish Library and News Media Subcommittees and to further consider formation of a separate Television Cooperation Subcommittee.

VII. In order to achieve a sharper focus and more effective collaboration by both sides, the Conference agreed upon a "Statement of Mission" for each of the Subcommittees, describing also current areas of emphasis.

VIII. Recognizing the increasing exchange of business and professional representatives between the two countries, the Conference discussed the need to assure that in each country there are adequate programs providing training and orientation on the society and culture of the other. Several reports describing current programs in Japan and the United States were submitted to the Conference. The Conference expressed the hope that this subject would be considered at the Japan-U.S. Economic Council meeting in Japan in June, 1976. It offered to cooperate with the Council in this endeavor. It further agreed to discuss developments in this area at the 1977 meeting of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee on Cultural and Educational Cooperation.

IX. In the course of deliberations by various Subcommittees, it became clear that the number of translated works of a literary and scholarly nature from Japanese into English remains seriously inadequate. The Conference recommended that both sides explore means of alleviating this situation on a systematic basis, including the possible establishment of a joint mechanism to this end. It was agreed that progress in this area would be reviewed at the 1977 Joint Committee meeting.

X. Recognizing that eight years of experience with Joint Committee activities has led to certain minor modifications in Committee operations, and being aware of the need to describe more clearly the relationship between the Joint Committee and CULCON meetings, the Conference recommended that both governments clarify certain essentially administrative aspects of the 1968 Exchange of Notes.

XI. The Conference considered a series of topics in the following areas of specialization:

A. AMERICAN STUDIES

The Subcommittee notes with deep regret the passing of one of its members most fondly regarded in Japan and the U.S., Professor Norman Holmes Pearson of Yale.

Since the 1975 Joint Committee Meeting, the most important single event was the Bicentennial Conference on American Studies hosted by the Japanese Association for American Studies for the Asia and Pacific area. From September 4-7, 1975, some one hundred scholars gathered in Fujinomiya

to discuss the American Revolution, the meaning of America to that portion of the globe, and American Studies methods. Proceedings have already been published in Japanese and at least some of the papers will also appear in English.

The extraordinary success of that conference was a primary topic of the Subcommittee as it was convened in the Foreign Ministry, Tokyo, September 8, 1975. Other primary concerns were the remarkable proliferation of American studies in Japan, as revealed by the survey sponsored by the Fulbright Commission, and the future of the Kyoto American Studies Seminar.

The Subcommittee has concurred on a revised statement of mission which expresses both a theoretical rationale, as well as a sense of priority issues.

The Subcommittee was pleased to have contributed in some measure to the Symposium of May 24-26, 1976, at Japan House in New York City. We feel that this series of meetings confirms a direction of interest the Committee has consistently sought to encourage: namely comparative study and cooperative projects involving groups, individuals, and institutions in the two cultures.

The Subcommittee, both as a group and as a collection of individuals, has continued to involve itself in teaching, research, and publication which bear on the improved understanding of American culture from the Japanese point of view and which elicits cooperative efforts and comparative results.

Recommendations:

1. Secure support for the Kyoto American Studies Summer Seminar.
2. Achieve the translation into English and publication of Japanese works dealing with American civilization.
3. Realize full regional participation in *American Studies International* as it endeavors to facilitate regular communication between non-American scholars in American Studies.
4. Develop an agenda of mutual interests with both the Japanese Studies and the Library Subcommittees.

B. EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

The Joint Subcommittee on Education for International Understanding developed a project designed to provide a framework of significant ideas pertinent to a greater mutual understanding of both Japan and the United States. The project brought together small teams from each of these countries made up of educators and scholars from the U.S. and Japan. The goal of the project is to produce a thematic, conceptual structure upon which will be based accompanying instructional materials that will promote mutual understanding and awareness among Japanese and United States elementary and secondary school teachers and students.

To achieve this end, a Meeting of Representative

Experts on Education for International Understanding was held in March, 1975 at the East-West Center in Hawaii. The schedule and methods of implementing the proposed three-year joint project were discussed. Subsequently, the Phase I (Japanese-American joint workshop in the summer of 1975 in Hawaii) and the Phase II (field research in each other's country) were undertaken. Each team is currently preparing a report on the findings.

In the summer of 1976, a workshop will be held at Duke University (North Carolina) where the experts of the two countries will review the first drafts and prepare final versions of materials for use in schools.

The joint project, which has thus far been successfully implemented, has achieved, among others, the following two objectives: (1) A teachers' manual and resource materials, the first of this kind to better understand each other's country, are currently being developed in Japan and the United States respectively; and (2) The project has greatly stimulated interest in the need for understanding each other's country, while concurrently marking great progress in developing specific ways and means both in research and training.

Recommendations:

1. This three-year project should be regarded as only a beginning for a long-range project in this kind of effort. Thus, it is of utmost importance to capitalize on the achievements of this project and to undertake further practical research in each of the two countries on several important problems which have been identified in the present on-going research project. In relation to this, a new program should be considered jointly and/or in each country promoting education for mutual understanding between the two peoples. It is hoped that feasibility of the following projects will be considered in this regard: (a) The Japanese side would inventory existing programs of educational materials development in Japan as a basis for possible joint efforts in making selections for use in promoting international understanding in the American educational system; and (b) Establish effective ways to expand and improve the exchange of teachers, students (especially those of teachers' colleges), teachers' education, and educational administrators; also, to prepare adequate facilities for hosting visitors to each other's country.

2. Based upon the significant progress achieved by the cooperative effort of the Joint Education Subcommittee to date, it is hoped that the natural relevance of the follow-up activities proposed for the future would lead to positive consideration by various organizations whose financial assistance might be required.

C. JAPANESE STUDIES

Responding to an invitation extended at the meeting of the Joint Committee in Hawaii last summer,

the Japanese Government sent a high level Survey Mission to the United States for a three-week period this Spring to study and report on the state of Japanese studies in America. Some six organizations and twenty-four universities were visited.

Parallel with this Mission, the American Japanese Studies Subcommittee commissioned a questionnaire which was sent to all institutions known to be engaged in Japanese studies in the United States. An interim draft of their findings was made available to the Survey Team.

The analysis of data and the sorting out of impressions is still in progress, but preliminary reports of both surveys were presented at CULCON VIII. That the area of Japanese studies had expanded significantly was obvious. Over the past five years, while American higher education generally registered a growth of enrollment of only 14 percent, Japanese language course enrollments, for example, have gone up three fold; and the number of American institutions offering courses on Japan has climbed over the same period by 40 percent to reach nearly 200.

On the other hand, even a preliminary analysis of findings reveals a number of problem areas. Attention must be given to: (1) Assisting institutions with minimal Japanese programs; (2) Expanding Japanese language libraries; (3) The improvement of Japanese language instruction; (4) Checking the erosion of interest in the social sciences; (5) Supporting publications of research finds; and (6) The more effective introduction of Japanese studies into the secondary school system and also institutions training practitioners in business, law, journalism, education and other professions.

Recommendations:

1. Each Subcommittee should revise its draft report for wider distribution. Thereafter, both Subcommittees might consider singularly and together what steps and priorities should be taken to advance Japanese studies in America. The two Subcommittees have, however, already identified certain areas for future attention. These areas include: (a) The identification of abstracting, translating and other services needed to improve the accessibility in the United States of the products of Japanese scholarship; (b) The determination of how Japanese studies can more effectively be integrated into the education of businessmen, lawyers, journalists, secondary school educators and other professionals in the United States; and (c) The study of the adequacy of facilities in Japan for visiting American students, researchers and teachers.

2. In areas of overlapping concern, the Subcommittee looks forward to close cooperation with the American Studies, Library and other CULCON Subcommittees.

3. The need is recognized to expand joint research

activities and stabilize their financing, particularly through the program recommended earlier to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Societies, and the two Subcommittees have agreed to include concern for such joint research as an ongoing part of their responsibilities.

D. LIBRARY

The Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan Cultural and Educational Cooperation meeting in Hawaii, June 21-23, 1975, recommended *inter alia* the establishment of a Library Subcommittee "to improve access of Japanese to American material and American access to Japanese materials", and suggested that the Subcommittee, when established, should maintain close liaison with other CULCON Subcommittees in the formulation and implementation of Library programs.

A joint preparatory conference, held in Kyoto on October 27, 1975, discussed the following general areas of possible activity though without agreement on priorities: (1) Interchange of personnel and publications; (2) Inter-library cooperation; (3) Japan documentation center/American documentation centers; (4) Specialized bibliographies; and (5) Other areas of binational cooperation in library and information science.

In a subsequent exchange of views, a statement of mission and functions was agreed upon incorporating the following points: (1) The basic mission should be to strengthen mutual understanding through encouragement of improved library services relating to the two countries; and (2) The basic functions should include improving access to library materials, assisting in the development of quality collections for the study of Japan and the U.S., encouraging the exchange of professional ideas, information, and library materials, and the publication of specialized bibliographies.

Recommendations:

1. The Library Subcommittees, working closely with other CULCON Subcommittees, and other existing organizations and committees in both countries, should seek to accomplish the above stated mission.

2. The question of current emphases should be determined after further study by the Subcommittees, in consultation with each other. This process should take into consideration special needs as identified and expressed by interested parties inside and outside CULCON, and be carried out in full awareness that unique library and information needs in the two countries require differing responses as appropriate.

E. MUSEUM

The Subcommittee on Museum Exchange is pleased with the progress made since CULCON VII. Tangible evidence of this progress is found in these specific activities: (1) The Japan Bicentennial exhibition of "Collected Masterworks from Art Museums of the United States", now being developed under the leadership of the Cleveland Museum of Art with the important cooperation of the Agency for Cultural Affairs in Japan; (2) The first meeting of the study group on the care of works of art in traveling exhibitions and the drafting of a tentative report; (3) The enactment by the Congress of the United States (and signed into law by the President of the United States) of legislation providing a program of insurance for art exhibitions brought to the United States and for exhibitions from the United States under certain conditions; (4) The increase in the number of one-man shows and smaller exhibitions being exchanged by both nations; and (5) The plans now under development for further exchanges in the months and years ahead.

While much remains to be done to encourage the continued growth of museum exchange programs between the two countries, the progress is pleasing, substantial, and the projects encouraging.

Recommendations:

1. Implementation of the major Bicentennial exhibition in Tokyo.

2. Development and implementation of the Shinto art exhibition which will be sponsored in the United States by the Japan Society and the Seattle Museum.

3. Finalization of the report from the study group on the care of works of art in traveling exhibitions. This may require a second meeting to resolve outstanding issues. After this adjustment is achieved, the results should be widely disseminated to institutions in both nations.

4. Encouragement of an expanded program of museum exchanges between the two countries and a monitoring of such activities.

F. NEWS MEDIA

Following discussions at the Joint Committee Meeting in Hawaii in June 1975, thorough consideration has been given to the formal establishment of a joint Subcommittee in the News Media area.

The exchange of journalists has continued to move forward with the realization of the fifth meeting of Japanese-American Editors, as sponsored by the International Press Institute, which was held in November, 1975 at Wingspread, Wisconsin.

Finally, it was noted that a limited number of U.S. news editors took advantage of the exchange program with visits in Japan in March, 1975 and

that a group of Japanese news editors came to the United States for the counterpart orientation program in November, 1975.

Recommendations:

1. Members of the Subcommittee should periodically assess the various exchange programs concerned with the media, with a view toward the improvement and expansion of these programs, both in intensity and scope and degree of coverage.

2. Full utilization be made of The Japan Foreign Press Center which is scheduled to be opened this coming October in Tokyo's Nippon Press Center. This institution will assist the news gathering activities of correspondents from all countries.

G. TELEVISION

The third U.S.-Japan Television Program Festival was held in Washington, D.C. in conjunction with the 51st National Convention of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters from November 16th to 19th. A Japanese delegation of 15 television executives attended the Festival and also participated in the Fourth U.S.-Japan Broadcasting Executives' Joint Conference on November 21 in New York at Japan House.

Fifteen sister-station relationships, six of which had been newly realized since the last Joint Committee meeting, have been established. It was agreed to work toward the regular publication of a newsletter dealing with sister-station activities.

During the past year, PBS [Public Broadcasting Service] broadcast the 60-minute program "Tenno", produced by the BPCJ [Broadcast Programming Center of Japan] for the Japan Foundation. It was broadcast on the eve of the Emperor's arrival. The series entitled "The Japanese Film" has been distributed nationally by PBS for a second time in the winter of 1976. The series "Journey to Japan" was rebroadcast for in-school use in the fall as well.

The production of the TV "Japan Study Course" by University of Mid-America has progressed with the cooperation of the Hoso Bunka Foundation, the Japan Foundation, NHK [Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corp.)] and commercial stations. By March, 1976, six pilot programs (30 minutes each) were completed, and the American production team visited Japan two times to collect materials. This series is expected to be completed early next year.

Recommendations:

1. The establishment of a Japanese Subcommittee similar to the existing American Subcommittee will be considered after consultation with the Broadcast Programming Center of Japan (BPCJ), the Jap-

anese Secretariat for Television Cooperation which has been functioning as a Subcommittee.

2. For the Fourth Television Program Festival, representatives of the country in which programs are intended to be shown should be involved in a pre-screening of programs. This pre-screening would be for the purpose of giving suggestions and advising on the most suitable American and Japanese programs to be shown at the Festival.

3. During the Fourth Festival, further exploration of issues related to the professional concerns of television executives could be made. In this respect, discussion of news presentations and visits to experimental television laboratories might be of interest and stimulate further exchange.

4. Time should be allocated during the Fourth Festival for visits to sister-stations by the American broadcasters to continue and further cultural exchanges.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975.¹

Signature: Papua New Guinea. June 10, 1976.

Economic Cooperation

Agreement establishing a financial support fund of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.¹

Ratification deposited: Iceland, June 15, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.

Accession deposited: India, May 25, 1976.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes.

¹ Not in force.

Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.

Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, June 25, 1976.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Accession deposited: Qatar, June 3, 1976.

Slave Trade

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. Concluded at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. TS 778.

Notification of succession: Bahamas, June 10, 1976.

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva on September 25, 1926, and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force December 7, 1953, for the protocol; July 7, 1955, for the annex to protocol; for the United States March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.

Notification of succession: Bahamas, June 10, 1976.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957; for the United States December 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.

Notification of succession: Bahamas, June 10, 1976.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 21, 1976.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975; for the United States April 7, 1976.

Ratifications deposited: Bangladesh, April 6, 1976;² Madagascar, March 17, 1976.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976.³

Notifications of approval: Iraq, March 8, 1976;⁴ Tanzania, March 15, 1976.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes.

Done at Geneva June 21, 1975.¹

Signatures: Nigeria, April 22, 1976; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 23, 1976;⁴ Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, April 26, 1976; Czechoslovakia,⁴ Yugoslavia, April 27, 1976; Australia, Ireland, April 28, 1976.

Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 11, 1976.

Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Colombia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva July 23, 1975. Entered into force January 22, 1976; for the United States May 1, 1976.

Acceptances deposited: Egypt, March 17, 1976;

Poland, April 20, 1976; Chile, April 28, 1976;

Nicaragua, May 11, 1976.

Tenth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 21, 1975. Entered into force January 8, 1976; for the United States January 19, 1976.

Acceptances deposited: Egypt, March 17, 1976;

India, March 18, 1976; Poland, April 20, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Accession deposited: Ireland, June 24, 1976.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Accession deposited: Ireland, June 24, 1976.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

Declarations of provisional application deposited:

Guatemala, June 15, 1976; Costa Rica, June 23, 1976.

¹ Not in force.

² With reservation.

³ Not in force for the United States.

⁴ With declarations.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the suppression of the white slave traffic. Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Notification of succession: Bahamas, June 10, 1976.

Protocol amending the international agreement for the suppression of the white slave traffic, signed at Paris May 18, 1904, and the international convention for the suppression of the white slave traffic signed at Paris May 4, 1910. Done at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force May 4, 1949; for the United States August 14, 1950. TIAS 2332.

Notification of succession: Bahamas, June 10, 1976.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Joint communique relating to trade, investment, and financial matters. Issued at Brasilia May 11, 1976. Entered into force May 11, 1976.

Egypt

Loan agreement to assist Egypt to increase its industrial and agricultural production. Signed at Cairo May 22, 1976. Entered into force May 22, 1976.

Ethiopia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Addis Ababa June 15, 1976. Entered into force June 15, 1976.

Honduras

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 5, 1975 (TIAS 8037). Signed at Tegucigalpa June 9, 1976. Entered into force June 9, 1976.

Italy

Agreement relating to the provision of assistance to earthquake victims of Italy. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome June 9, 1976. Entered into force June 9, 1976.

Japan

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports of specialty steel from Japan, with annexes, related note, and agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 11, 1976. Entered into force June 11, 1976.

Republic of Korea

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to

taxes on income and the encouragement of international trade and investment, with related notes. Signed at Seoul June 4, 1976. Enters into force 30 days following the exchange of ratifications.

Lebanon

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of September 1, 1972 (TIAS 7546), subject to certain understandings. Effected by exchange of notes at Beirut and Washington March 29, May 18 and 25, 1976. Entered into force May 25, 1976.

Mauritania

Agreement relating to the transfer of agricultural commodities to Mauritania to assist in alleviating the shortage caused by prolonged drought. Signed at Nouakchott May 28, 1976. Entered into force May 28, 1976.

Niger

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grains to Niger to assist in alleviating the shortage caused by prolonged drought. Signed at Niamey February 7, 1976. Entered into force February 7, 1976.

Agreement amending the agreement of February 7, 1976, relating to the transfer of food grains to Niger to assist in alleviating the shortage caused by prolonged drought. Signed at Niamey April 28, 1976. Entered into force April 28, 1976.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the continuation of medical and scientific research projects conducted in the Philippines by the United States Medical Research Unit-Two (NAMRU-2). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila May 12 and 21, 1976. Entered into force May 21, 1976.

Agreement amending the agreement of April 4, 1974 (TIAS 7814), relating to the use of the Veteran's Memorial Hospital and the provision of medical care and treatment and nursing home care of veterans by the Philippines and the furnishing of grants-in-aid by the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila May 12 and 21, 1976. Entered into force May 21, 1976.

Portugal

Loan agreement relating to M48A5 tanks and M113A1 armored personnel carriers. Signed at Washington June 11, 1976. Entered into force June 11, 1976.

Spain

Supplementary treaty on extradition. Signed at Madrid January 25, 1975.¹
Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 21, 1976.

¹ Not in force.

Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with related notes and supplementary agreements. Signed at Madrid January 24, 1976.¹
Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 21, 1976, with declaration.

Switzerland

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters with related notes. Signed at Bern May 25, 1973.¹
Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 21, 1976.

United Kingdom

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signature, and exchange of notes. Signed at London June 8, 1972.¹
Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 21, 1976.

¹ Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 8164. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8164).

Prevention of Marine Pollution. Convention with Other Governments. TIAS 8165. 83 pp. \$1.35. (Cat. No. S9.10:8165).

Development of Agricultural Trade. Protocol with the Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 8167. 12 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8167).

Cultural Relations. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 8168. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8168).

Suez Canal—Clearance of Mines and Unexploded Ordnance. Arrangement with Egypt amending the arrangement of April 13 and 25, 1974. TIAS 8169. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8169).

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles and Textile Products. TIAS 8179. 18 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8179).

Checklist of Department of State

Press Releases: June 21–27

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†311	6/21	Kissinger: OECD, Paris.
*313	6/21	Habib: remarks at funeral of Ambassador Meloy and Robert O. Waring, National Cathedral, Washington.
*314	6/21	Kissinger: remarks following meeting with President of France, Paris.
*315	6/22	Kissinger, Valeriani: interview, Paris.
*316	6/22	Kissinger: remarks with CBS correspondent, Paris, June 21.
†317	6/22	Kissinger: news conference, Paris.
*318	6/22	Harry W. Schlaudeman sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (biographic data).
*319	6/23	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, July 29.
*320	6/23	Study Group 6 of the U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee, Boulder, Colo., July 14.
*321	6/23	Advisory Committee for U.S. Participation in the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat), July 13.
†322	6/22	U.S. announces intention to withdraw from ICNAF.
*323	6/23	Kissinger: remarks following meeting with Prime Minister of France, Paris.
*324	6/23	New directorate for international women's programs established in Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
*325	6/23	Kissinger: remarks following meeting with Prime Minister of South Africa, Grafenau, Federal Republic of Germany.
*326	6/24	U.S.-Indonesian consultations begin June 25.
†327	6/24	Kissinger, Genscher: news conference, Munich.
†329	6/25	Kissinger: International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
†330	6/25	U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany sign antitrust cooperation agreement, June 23.
*331	6/25	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), July 26.
*332	6/25	U.S. National Committee for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee Study Group 5, July 21.
*333	6/25	SCC Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on bulk chemicals, July 21.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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