THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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America's Permanent Interests

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

I deeply appreciate the honor you bestow upon me today, not only because it is given me by old Massachusetts friends but also for the name it bears. Throughout his long career as legislator, Governor, and Secretary of State, Christian Herter embodied the ideals of selfless public service and responsible patriotism which have always marked our nation's great leaders. Most of all, Christian Herter was a man who had faith in his country and its goodness. He understood the decisive role this nation must play in the world for security and progress and justice.

In this election year, some 10 years after Chris Herter's death, we would all do well to remember his wisdom. For America is still the great and good country he knew it was, and our participation in the international scene remains decisive if our era is to know peace and a better life for mankind. We must never forget that this nation has permanent interests and concerns that must be preserved through and beyond this election year.

This can be a time of national renewal—when Americans freely renegotiate their social compact. Or if the quest for short-term political gain prevails over all other considerations, it can be a period of misleading oversimplification, further divisiveness, and sterile recrimination.

This Administration has for many months been prepared to put its policies, its premises, and its design for the future before the American people. The President has often spoken about our concerns and hopes in the world. In the past 14 months alone, I have given 17 major speeches, some 20 major news conferences, and countless interviews across this country, and I have testified 39 times before congressional committees.

Certainly there is room for differences on the policies to be pursued in a complex and dangerous world. But those who challenge current policies have an obligation to go beyond criticisms, slogans, and abuse and set forth in detail their premises and alternatives, the likely costs, opportunities, and risks.

America has come through a difficult time—when our institutions have been under challenge, our purposes doubted, and our will questioned. The time has come, as Adlai Stevenson said, to "talk sense to the American people." As a nation we face new dangers and opportunities; neither will wait for our decisions next November, and both can be profoundly affected by what we say and do in the meantime. Complex realities cannot be resolved or evaded by nostalgic simplicities.

Throughout the turmoil of this decade, our foreign policy has pursued our fundamental national goals with energy and consistent purpose:

—We are at peace for the first time in over a decade. No American fighting men are engaged in combat anywhere in the world.

—Relations with our friends and allies in the Atlantic community and with Japan have never been stronger.

—A new and durable relationship with the

[1] Made before the Boston World Affairs Council at Boston, Mass., on Mar. 11 upon receiving the Christian A. Herter Memorial Award (text from press release 121).

People's Republic of China has been opened and fostered.

—Confrontation in the heart of Europe has been eased. A four-power agreement on Berlin has replaced a decade and a half of crisis and confrontation.

—We negotiated an interim agreement limiting strategic arms with the Soviet Union which forestalled the numerical expansion of Soviet strategic programs while permitting us to undertake needed programs of our own.

—We are now negotiating a long-term agreement which, if successfully concluded, will for the first time in history set an upper limit on total numbers of strategic weapons, requiring the Soviet Union to dismantle some of its existing systems.

—Significant progress toward a durable settlement in the Middle East has been made. Much work and many dangers remain, but the peace process is underway for the first time since the creation of the State of Israel.

—There is a new maturity and impetus to our relations with Latin America reflecting changing realities in the hemisphere and the growing importance of these countries on the international scene.

—The United States has taken the role of global leadership in putting forward a comprehensive agenda for a new and mutually beneficial relationship between the developed and developing nations.

—We have defended human rights and dignity in all international bodies as well as in our bilateral relations.

This is a record of American accomplishment that transcends partisanship, for much of it was accomplished with the cooperation of both parties. It reflects the ideals of the American people. It portends for this nation a continuing role of moral and political leadership—if we have the understanding, the will, and the unity to seize the opportunity history has given us.

Thirty years ago this country began its first sustained peacetime involvement in foreign affairs. We achieved great things, and we can continue to do so as long as w are prepared to face the fact that we live i a more complex time:

—Today the Soviet Union is a superpowe Nothing we could have done would hav halted this evolution after the impetus tha two generations of industrial and technolog ical advance have given to Soviet militar and economic growth. But together wit others we must assure that Russian powe and influence are not translated into an ex pansion of Soviet control and dominance b yond the U.S.S.R.'s borders. This is pre requisite to a more constructive relationshi

—Today scores of new nations have com into being, creating new centers of influenc These nations make insistent claims on th global system, testing their new economi power and seeking a greater role and shar in the world's prosperity.

—Today the forces of democracy ar called upon to show renewed creativity an vision. In a world of complexity—in a worl of equilibrium and coexistence, of compet tion and interdependence—it is our demo cratic values that give meaning to our sacr fice and purpose to our exertions. Thus th cohesion of the industrial democracies has moral as well as a political and economic sig nificance.

Americans are a realistic people who hav never considered the definition of a challeng as a prophecy of doom or a sign of pessimism Instead, we have seen it as a call to battl ". . . the bravest," said Thucydides, "ar surely those who have the clearest vision o what is before them, glory and danger alike and yet notwithstanding go out to meet it. That has always been the test of democ racy—and it has always been the strengt of the American people.

Equilibrium and Peace

Let me now deal with America's perma nent interests: peace, progress, and justice

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, th world's fears of catastrophe and its hope for peace have hinged on the relationshi

between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In an era when two nations have the power to visit utter devastation on the world in a matter of hours, there can be no greater imperative than assuring that the relationship between the superpowers be managed effectively and rationally.

This is an unprecedented task. Historically, a conflict of ideology and geopolitical interests such as that which characterizes the current international scene has almost invariably led to conflict. But in the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality, humanity could not survive such a repetition of history. No amount of tough rhetoric can change these realities. The future of our nation and of mankind depends on how well we avoid confrontation without giving up vital interests and how well we establish a more hopeful and stable relationship without surrender of principle.

We therefore face the necessity of a dual policy. On the one hand, we are determined to prevent Soviet military power from being used for political expansion; we will firmly discourage and resist adventurist policies. But at the same time, we cannot escalate every political dispute into a central crisis; nor can we rest on identifying foreign policy with crisis management. We have an obligation to work for a more positive future. We must couple opposition to pressure and irresponsibility with concerned efforts to build a more cooperative world.

History can inform—or mislead—us in this quest.

For a generation after World War II, statesmen and nations were traumatized by the experience of Munich; they believed that history had shown the folly of permitting an adversary to gain a preponderance of power. This was and remains a crucial lesson.

A later generation was chastened by the experience of Viet-Nam; it is determined that America shall never again overextend and exhaust itself by direct involvement in remote wars with no clear strategic significance. This, too, is a crucial lesson.

But equally important and too often neglected is the lesson learned by an earlier generation. Before the outbreak of the First World War, there was a virtual equilibrium of power. Through crisis after crisis, nations moved to confrontation and then retreated to compromise. Stability was taken for granted until—without any conscious decision to overturn the international structure—a crisis much like any other went out of control. Nation after nation slid into a war whose causes they did not understand but from which they could not extricate themselves. The result was the death of tens of millions, the destruction of the global order, and domestic upheavals whose consequences still torment mankind.

If we are to learn from history, we cannot pick and choose the lessons from which we will draw inspiration. The history of this century tells us:

—That an imbalance of power encourages aggression;

—That overcommitment cannot be sustained domestically; and

—That an equilibrium based on constant confrontation will ultimately end in cataclysm.

But the lessons of history are never automatic; each generation must apply them to concrete circumstances.

There is no question that peace rests, in the first instance, on the maintenance of a balance of global stability. Without the ultimate sanction of power, conciliation soon becomes surrender. Moderation is a virtue only in those who are thought to have a choice.

No service is done to the nation by those who portray an exaggerated specter of Soviet power and of American weakness, by those who hesitate to resist when we are challenged, or by those who fail to see the opportunities we have to shape the U.S.-Soviet relationship by our own confident action.

Soviet strength is uneven; the weaknesses and frustrations of the Soviet system are glaring and have been clearly documented.

Despite the inevitable increase in its power, the Soviet Union remains far behind us and our allies in any overall assessment of military, economic, and technological strength; it would be reckless in the extreme for the Soviet Union to challenge the industrial democracies. And Soviet society is no longer insulated from the influences and attractions of the outside world or impervious to the need for external contacts.

The great industrial democracies possess the means to counter Soviet expansion and to moderate Soviet behavior. We must not abdicate this responsibility by weakening ourselves either by failing to support our defenses or refusing to use our power in defense of our interests; we must, along with our allies, always do what is necessary to maintain our security.

It is true that we cannot be the world's policeman. Not all local wars and regional conflicts affect global stability or America's national interest. But if one superpower systematically exploits these conflicts for its own advantage and tips the scales decisively by its intervention, gradually the overall balance will be affected. If adventurism is allowed to succeed in local crises, an ominous precedent of wider consequence is set. Other nations will adjust their policies to their perception of the dominant trend. Our ability to control future crises will diminish. And if this pattern is not broken, America will ultimately face harder choices, higher costs, and more severe crises.

But our obligation goes beyond the balance of power. An equilibrium is too precarious a foundation for our long-term future. There is no tranquillity in a balance of terror constantly contested. We must avoid the twin temptations of provocation and escapism. Our course must be steady and not reflect momentary fashions; it must be a policy that our adversaries respect, our allies support, and our people believe in and sustain.

Therefore we have sought with the Soviet Union to push back the shadow of nuclear catastrophe—by settling concrete problems such as Berlin so as to ease confrontations and negotiating on limitation of strategic arms so as to slow the arms race. And we have held out the prospect of cooperative re lations in the economic and other fields political conditions permit their implementa tion and further development.

It goes without saying that this proces requires reciprocity. It cannot survive a con stant attempt to seek unilateral advantag It cannot, specifically, survive any mo Angolas. If the Soviet Union is ready to fac genuine coexistence, we are prepared t make every effort to shape a pattern of re straint and mutual interest which will giv coexistence a more reliable and positive cha acter making both sides conscious of wha would be lost by confrontation and what ca be gained by cooperation.

And we are convinced that when a vigo ous response to Soviet encroachment is calle for, the President will have the support the American people—and of our allies— the extent that he can demonstrate that th crisis was imposed upon us; that it did n result from opportunities we missed to im prove the prospects of peace.

No policy will soon, if ever, eliminate th competition and irreconcilable ideological di ferences between the United States and th Soviet Union. Nor will it make all interes compatible. We are engaged in a protracte process with inevitable ups and downs. B there is no alternative to the policy of pe alties for adventurism and incentives for re straint. What do those who speak so glib about "one-way streets" or "preemptive co cessions" propose concretely that this cou try do? What precisely has been given u What level of confrontation do they see What threats would they make? What risk would they run? What precise changes our defense posture, what level of expen ture over what period of time, do they advo cate? How, concretely, do they suggest ma aging the U.S.-Soviet relationship in an e of strategic equality?

It is time we heard answers to thes questions.

In short we must—and we shall—pursu the two strands of our policy toward th Soviet Union: Firmness in the face of pre sure and the vision to work for a better fu ture. This is well within our capacities. We

owe this to our people, to our future, to our allies, and to the rest of mankind.

The World Community

The upheavals of this century have produced another task—the fundamental need of reshaping the structure of international relations. For the first time in history the international system has become truly global. Decolonization and the expansion of the world economy have given birth to scores of new nations and new centers of power and initiative.

Our current world, numbering nearly 150 nations, can be the seedbed for growing economic warfare, political instability, and ideological confrontation—or it can become a community marked by unprecedented international collaboration. The interdependence of nations—the indivisibility of our security and our prosperity—can accelerate our common progress or our common decline.

Therefore, just as we seek to move beyond a balance of power in East-West relations, so must we transcend tests of strength in North-South relations and build a true world community.

We do so in our own self-interest, for today's web of economic relationships links the destinies of all mankind. The price and supply of energy, the conditions of trade, the expansion of world food production, the technological bases for economic development, the protection of the world's environment, the rules of law that govern the world's oceans and outer space—these are concerns that affect all nations and that can be satisfactorily addressed only in a framework of international cooperation.

Here, too, we need to sustain a complex policy. We must resist tactics of confrontation, but our larger goal must be to shape new international relationships that will last over decades to come. We will not be stampeded by pressures or threats. But it is in our own interest to create an international economic system that all nations will regard as legitimate because they have a stake in it and because they consider it just.

As the world's strongest power, the United States could survive an era of economic warfare. But even we would be hurt, and no American true to the humane heritage of his country could find satisfaction in the world that confrontation would bring in its wake. The benefits of common effort are so apparent and the prospects of economic strife so damaging that there is no moral or practical alternative to a world of expanded collaboration.

Therefore, at the World Food Conference in 1974, at the special session of the U.N. General Assembly last September, and in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation now underway in Paris, the United States has taken the lead in offering programs of practical cooperation. We have presented—and are vigorously following through on—a wide range of proposals to safeguard export earnings, accelerate industrial and agricultural growth, better conditions of trade and investment in key commodities, and meet the plight of the poorest countries. In every area of concern we have proposed forms of collaboration among *all* nations, including the other industrial countries, the newly wealthy oil producers, and the developing countries themselves.

It is the West—and overwhelmingly this nation—that has the resources, the technology, the skills, the organizational ability, and the good will that attract and invite the cooperation of the developing nations. In the global dialogue among the industrial and developing worlds, the Communist nations are conspicuous by their absence and, indeed, by their irrelevance.

Yet at the very moment when the industrial democracies are responding to the aspirations of the developing countries, many of the same countries attempt to extort what has in fact been freely offered. Lopsided voting, unworkable resolutions, and arbitrary procedures too often dominate the United Nations and other international bodies. Nations which originally chose nonalignment to shield themselves from the pressures of global coalitions have themselves formed a rigid, ideological, confrontationist coalition of their own. One of the most evident blocs in the world today is, ironically, the almost

automatic alignment of the nonaligned.

The United States remains ready to respond responsibly and positively to countries which seriously seek justice and an equitable world economic system. But progress depends on a spirit of mutual respect, realism, and practical cooperation. Let there be no mistake about it: extortion will not work and will not be supinely accepted. The stakes are too high for self-righteous rhetoric or adolescent posturing.

At issue is not simply the economic arrangements of the next quarter century but the legitimacy of the international order.

Technology and the realities of interdependence have given our generation the opportunity to determine the relationships between the developed and developing countries over the next quarter century. It is the quality of statesmanship to recognize that our necessity, our practical aspirations, and our moral purpose are linked. The United States is ready for that challenge.

The Moral Unity of the Great Democracies

Our efforts to build peace and progress reflect our deep-seated belief in freedom and in the hope of a better future for all mankind. These are values we share with our closest allies, the great industrial democracies.

The resilience of our countries in recovering from economic difficulty and in consolidating our cooperation has an importance far beyond our immediate well-being. For while foreign policy is unthinkable without an element of pragmatism, pragmatism without underlying moral purpose is like a rudderless ship.

Together, the United States and our allies have maintained the global peace and sustained the world economy for more than 30 years. The spirit of innovation and progress in our societies has no match anywhere, certainly not in societies laying claim to being "revolutionary." Rarely in history have alliances survived—let alone flourished—as ours have in vastly changing global and geopolitical conditions. The ideals of the industrial democracies give purpose to our efforts to improve relations with the East, to th dialogue with the Third World, and to man other spheres of common endeavor.

Our ties with the great industrial democ racies are therefore not alliances of conven ience but a union of principle in defense o values and a way of life.

It is in this context that we must be con cerned about the possibility of Communis parties coming to power—or sharing i power—in governments in NATO countries Ultimately, the decision must, of course, b made by the voters of the countries con cerned. But no one should expect that thi question is not of concern to this govern ment.

Whether some of the Communist par ties in Western Europe are in fact independ ent of Moscow cannot be determined whe their electoral self-interest so overwhelm ingly coincides with their claims.

Their internal procedures—their Leninis principles and dogmas—remain the antithe sis of democratic parties. And were they t gain power, they would do so after havin advocated for decades programs and value detrimental to our traditional ties. By tha record, they would inevitably give low prio ity to security and Western defense effort which are essential not only to Europe's fre dom but to maintaining the world balance c power. They would be tempted to orier their economies to a much greater exter toward the East. We would have to expec that Western European governments i which Communists play a dominant rol would, at best, steer their countries' policie toward the positions of the nonaligned.

The political solidarity and collective de fense of the West, and thus NATO, would b inevitably weakened, if not undermined. An in this country, the commitment of th American people to maintain the balance o power in Europe, justified though it migh be on pragmatic geopolitical grounds, woul lack the moral base on which it has stoo for 30 years.

We consider the unity of the great indus trial democracies crucial to all we do in th world. For this reason we have sought t expand our cooperation to areas beyond ou

mutual defense—in improved political consultation, in coordinating our approaches to negotiations with the East, in reinforcing our respective economic policies, in developing a common energy policy, and in fashioning common approaches for the increasingly important dialogue with the developing nations. We have made remarkable progress in all these areas. We are determined to continue. Our foreign policy has no higher priority.

The Debate at Home

This, then, is the design of our foreign policy:

—We have the military and economic power, together with our allies, to prevent aggression.

—We have the self-confidence and vision to go beyond confrontation to a reduction of tensions and ultimately a more cooperative world.

—We have the resources, technology, and organizational genius to build a new relationship with the developing nations.

—We have the moral courage to hold high, together with our allies, the banners of freedom in a turbulent and changing world.

The challenges before us are monumental. But it is not every generation that is given the opportunity to shape a new international order. If the opportunity is missed, we shall live in a world of chaos and danger. If it is realized we will have entered an era of peace and progress and justice.

But we can realize our hopes only as a united people. Our challenge—and its solution—lies in ourselves. Our greatest foreign policy problem is our divisions at home. Our greatest foreign policy need is national cohesion and a return to the awareness that in foreign policy we are all engaged in a common national endeavor.

The world watches with amazement—our adversaries with glee and our friends with growing dismay—how America seems bent on eroding its influence and destroying its achievements in world affairs through an orgy of recrimination.

They see our policies in Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, in Latin America, in East-West relations undermined by arbitrary congressional actions that may take decades to undo.

They see our intelligence system gravely damaged by unremitting, undiscriminating attack.

They see a country virtually incapable of behaving with the discretion that is indispensable for diplomacy.

They see revelations of malfeasance abroad on the part of American firms wreak grave damage on the political structures of friendly nations. Whatever wrongs were committed—reprehensible as they are—should be dealt with in a manner consistent with our own judicial procedures and with the dignity of allied nations.

They see some critics suddenly pretending that the Soviets are 10 feet tall and that America, despite all the evidence to the contrary, is becoming a second-rate nation. They know these erroneous and reckless allegations to be dangerous, because they may, if continued, persuade allies and adversaries of our weakness, tempting the one to accommodation and the other to adventurism.

They see this Administration—which has been condemned by one set of critics for its vigorous reaction to expansionism in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa—simultaneously charged by another group of opponents with permitting unilateral Soviet gains.

They see that the Administration whose defense budgets have been cut some $39 billion by the Congress in the past seven years is simultaneously charged with neglecting American defenses.

The American people see all this, too, and wonder when it will end. They know that we cannot escape either our responsibilities or the geopolitical realities of the world around us. For a great nation that does not manage events will soon be overwhelmed by them.

If one group of critics undermines arms control negotiations and cuts off the prospect of more constructive ties with the Soviet Union while another group cuts away at our defense budgets and intelligence services and

thwarts American resistance to Soviet adventurism, both combined will—whether they have intended it or not—end by wrecking the nation's ability to conduct a strong, creative, moderate, and prudent foreign policy. The result will be paralysis, no matter who wins in November. And if America cannot act, others will, and we and all the free peoples of the world will pay the price.

So our problem is at once more complex and simpler than in times past. The challenges are unprecedented but the remedies are in our own hands. This Administration has confidence in the strength, resilience, and vigor of America. If we summon the American spirit and restore our unity, we will have a decisive and positive impact on a world which, more than ever, affects our lives and cries out for our leadership.

Those who have faith in America will tell the American people the truth:

—That we are strong and at peace;

—That there are no easy or final answers to our problems;

—That we must conduct a long-term and responsible foreign policy, without escape and without respite;

—That what is attainable at any one moment will inevitably fall short of the ideal;

—That the reach of our power and purpose has its limits;

—That nevertheless we have the strength and determination to defend our interests and the conviction to uphold our values; and finally,

—That we have the opportunity to leave our children a more cooperative, more just, and more peaceful world than we found.

In this Bicentennial year, we celebrate ideals which began to take shape around the shores of Massachusetts Bay some 350 years ago. We have accomplished great things as a united people. There is much yet to do. This country's work in the world is not a burden but a triumph—and the measure of greatness yet to come.

Americans have always made history rather than let history chart our course. We, the present generation of Americans, will do no less. So let this year mark the end of our divisions. Let it usher in an era of national reconciliation and rededication by all Americans to their common destiny. Let us have a clear vision of what is before us—glory and danger alike—and go forward together to meet it.

U.S. Increases Economic Assistance to Portugal

Press release 128 dated March 16

At the conclusion of a meeting on March 16 between the Secretary of State and the Portuguese Minister of Finance, it was announced that the United States would increase its program of economic assistance to Portugal by $40 million to a new total of $240 million over the next 12 to 18 months, if Congress approves. This assistance is to support Portugal's economic recovery while the country continues its progress toward democratic government and economic stability. That portion of the assistance requiring congressional approval has already been sent to the Congress in budget requests for fiscal years 1976 and 1977.

The $240 million includes development loans and technical assistance grants, Public Law 480 loans, housing investment guarantees and agricultural commodity imports arranged through the Commodity Credit Corporation, as well as a $35 million grant to assist in the resettlement and relief of Portuguese nationals from Africa.

The United States and the Soviet Union

Address by Arthur A. Hartman
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs [1]

My announced theme tonight is détente—what it is and what it isn't. The word "détente" has aroused strong emotions among Americans—in some, a favorable reaction; in many, an unfavorable one. In some cases the meaning of "détente" has been misunderstood; in other cases it has been misrepresented. Indeed, several days ago President Ford said he found the word so unhelpful that he has stopped using it altogether.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to bring the debate on the subject down to specifics. I ask you to put the *word* "détente" out of your mind and join me in taking a sober look at the fundamental and sometimes intractable aspects of our policy toward the Soviet Union. It is a policy of unique importance for all of us because it relates to the only other superpower existing today or likely to exist for many years to come. I propose to examine:

—First, our military relationship with the Soviet Union, including the strategic relationship;

—Second, the areas of bilateral U.S.-Soviet cooperation, particularly the economic area; and

—Third, our relationship with Moscow in world areas of possible confrontation, like Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

Mistakes have been made in our policy toward the Soviet Union. All history is a record of opportunities gained and opportunities lost. But I am convinced that the basic lines of our present policy are the only ones we can reasonably pursue. And I invite each of you to ask yourself at every point in our discussion tonight the same questions I consistently ask myself. Are there feasible alternatives to what we are trying to do? And is it possible to summon a national consensus around those alternatives?

Let me begin our discussion by asserting that the basic international problem of our time—perhaps of this whole half-century—is dealing with the consequences of the fact that the U.S.S.R. has become a superpower with the ability to project its military strength in global terms. The growth and expansion of Russian continental power began long before the Bolshevik Revolution brought the Communists to power. But this thrust has been accelerated by the Soviet regime, which has taken a country with a large and talented population, given it an ideology that pretends to universalism, and ruled it with an authoritarian devotion to the acquisition and retention of power.

This historical drive to superpower status is not a process which was or is in our power to stop. Let us recall that the Soviets exploded their first nuclear bomb in 1949, during the Administration of President Truman, and that they launched the first vehicle which could deliver it to intercontinental targets in 1957, during the Administration of President Eisenhower. Neither Administration was "soft" on communism or on the Soviet Union. The fact is that no U.S. Administration could have stopped this development of

[1] Made at Rice University, Houston, Tex., on Mar. 4.

Soviet strategic power short of using our preponderant nuclear strength to try to wipe out the Soviet Union and most of its people —an option which I trust no responsible American leader would ever seriously consider.

Having developed the two essential strategic weapons, it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union reached the military status of a great power. Today we Americans must cope with the implications of this inevitable accretion of Soviet strength. It is perhaps the most complex task we have ever faced in our foreign policy, because we must deal with a state which has the strength to destroy us, just as we have the power to destroy it. Today the Soviet leaders have the capacity to refuse to make concessions to us simply because we demand them, just as we have always had the capacity to refuse to accept any demands they make of us.

I ask you to ponder the implications of one simple statement which applies to all relationships between adversaries who are equals or near-equals—whether they be individuals or political groups or states—and which describes the reality of our current problem with the Soviet Union. The statement is this: We can get nothing that we want from the Soviets except by taking account, in one way or another, of Soviet interests. This means that our policy toward the Soviet Union—to a far greater degree than in earlier periods—must often proceed by a balancing of interests, which will mean accommodation or compromise by both sides. This new imperative may seem obvious. Yet it is ignored by many people who express themselves on U.S.-Soviet relations—people who concede on the one hand that the U.S.S.R. is now a superpower but seem to expect, on the other hand, that we can pursue negotiations with the Soviets as if they had just lost a war and were about to sign a document of surrender.

Soviet power has developed unevenly, with large gaps, disparities, and weaknesses. The Soviets' new military status should not obscure in our own minds the many problems they still face. The Soviet commitment to defense priorities has exposed and exacerbated the economic difficulties which have dogged them ever since the Bolshevik Revolution. Their agriculture is singularly unproductive; their consumer sector is stunted and their gross national product is only half of ours though their population is greater. They have a continuing nationality problem which will increase now that non-Russian nationalities are a majority, and a growing one, of the population. Externally, their control of Eastern Europe to the west is inherently unstable since it is based not on affinities but on force. They confront a hostile China to the east. Their authority in the Communist movement is being further eroded as the rift with parties in Western Europe widens. And their recent victory in Angola is balanced by setbacks over the past few years in countries like Egypt and Portugal.

The Soviet Union is thus not a fully developed superpower in every sphere of international activity. This uneven development of Soviet power offers us opportunities as well as problems. But Soviet military strength still confronts us with the need to deal with the U.S.S.R. in different ways than we have before.

This is not a problem which confronts this Administration only. It will be a problem for the next Administration and the next one after that. Indeed, I think that it will be a problem for Americans for at least the lifetime of every person in this room.

Military Aspect of the Relationship

Thus the importance of our military relationship with the Soviet Union, the first aspect of our relationship I want to discuss tonight. How do we deal with this new Soviet power? History offers us no precedents. In the past the rise of a major new military power—Napoleon's France, Bismarck's Prussia, Hitler's Germany, Tojo's Japan—has usually led to full-scale war. But war is not an option for us anymore, because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

Surely the only sane course in today's cor

ditions is to try to preserve our security and promote our national interests in a way that minimizes the risk of nuclear conflict. That, in our view, is the first and most vital objective of our policy toward the Soviet Union. And we must pursue it regardless of uncertainties in the other aspects of our bilateral relations.

This Administration is not the first to reach that conclusion. President Truman in 1946 advanced a plan to put under international control the entire process of producing atomic weapons. President Eisenhower in 1955 proposed to the Soviet Union flights by planes of one nation across the territory of the other to prevent surprises in military preparations. The Soviets rejected both proposals. It was Eisenhower who 21 years ago said that "Since the advent of nuclear weapons, it seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace. . . ." [2]

The first major arms control agreement we reached with the Soviet Union—the treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, and under water—was signed in 1963 during the Kennedy Administration.

Ever since, successive American Administrations have steadfastly pursued additional agreements to limit the strategic arms race. To have done otherwise would surely have meant accepting the inevitability of a never-ending arms race with all its destabilizing implications.

Would Americans have accepted this? I do not think so. And that is why I profoundly disagree with those who say we should be prepared to withhold a SALT agreement from the Soviets until they improve their behavior in areas of tension or on human rights or on some other unquestionably important issue. Such an attitude assumes that SALT agreements are somehow a concession we make to the Soviet Union, that they benefit Moscow but don't benefit us. On the contrary, while the Soviets see the limitation of strategic arms to be in their interest—for otherwise they would not enter into a negotiation—it is surely also in our own interest and, above all, in the interest of peace.

Remember what I said about the necessity of balance and accommodation in achieving our objectives. Remember, too, that we cannot expect the Soviets to consent to an arms control agreement which creates a net military disadvantage for them. Arms control agreements must contain a balance of advantages, or they cannot be negotiated.

In SALT, as in every agreement between two dedicated parties, there's no such thing as a free lunch—you can't expect your adversary to make unilateral concessions. What is important is to look at the overall strategic balance and to ask, first, whether we have the ability to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on our country and, second, whether we will continue to have that ability if we are able to negotiate the ceilings on strategic weapons which are the essence of our current SALT Two negotiation.

There is no doubt in my mind that we can answer both questions in the affirmative. In some aspects of strategic power we are ahead of the Soviets, in some we are behind—as is only natural, since each side freely made different strategic choices years ago. For example, the Soviets decided that their path to strategic security lay through building heavier weapons than we were building. They decided on this direction because of their strategic doctrine and because their accuracy and explosive technology were not as advanced as ours. We, on the other hand, developed an advantage in reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophistication.

In the SALT One offensive-weapons agreement signed in 1972 and running until 1977, we froze the total number of strategic missile launchers on each side. We continued to enjoy our advantage in reentry vehicle numbers and in heavy bombers and thus in deliverable weapons, which after all, are what do the damage. This imposed no special restriction on us, because we had no plans for additional launchers for the duration of the agreement. But it did stop the continued growth in numbers of Soviet

[2] For remarks by President Eisenhower at a Department of State honors award ceremony on Oct. 19, 1954, see BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1954, p. 636.

launchers. The U.S. lead in warheads has actually increased in the four years since the SALT One agreement was signed; it is now 8,500 to 2,500, or more than 3 to 1.

In negotiating SALT Two, provided we can resolve the cruise missile and "Backfire" bomber problems, we will have an agreement which sets the same ceiling for each side on total strategic vehicles and MIRV'ed [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] launchers and puts us in a position to seek significant reductions in SALT Three. If we decide in the future that we will need missiles as heavy as the Soviet missiles, nothing in the SALT Two agreement will prevent us from building them, just as nothing in the SALT One agreement prevented us.

What if we fail to get any kind of SALT Two agreement and the SALT One offensive-weapons agreement expires next year? Quite simply, we will be back to Square 1, with no agreed limitations of any kind on offensive strategic weapons. We will then have two choices. We can let the Soviet Union, unrestrained by an agreement, possibly pass us in the strategic areas in which it trails and increase its lead in the areas in which it is ahead. Or we can match the Soviets in a new spiral of the arms race. That would obviously carry a high price tag, which, considering the difficulty of getting another SALT agreement following a period in which new and more complex weapons are deployed, would involve not only money but tensions and dangers as well.

Surely it is both safer and cheaper to make our best efforts to reach an agreement. And those who disagree, it seems to me, owe the American people an explanation of just how they would deal with the inevitable consequences of the failure to reach a SALT agreement.

Before I leave the security aspect of our relationship with the Soviet Union, I want to stress the importance of keeping both our strategic and our conventional forces strong enough to deter Soviet aggression. That means second to none. We cannot afford to base our relationship with the Soviet Union on blind faith, in view of the continuing massive Soviet military buildups and of statements such as General Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] made last week that "relaxation of tensions does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change, the laws of the class struggle."

Preponderant Soviet military power could quickly translate itself into political pressures which could have a destabilizing effect on Europe and perhaps even on ourselves. When Stalin asked Churchill how many divisions the Pope had, he was expressing a view that only military power is ultimately translatable into political influence. Moreover, Soviet military superiority would make arms control far more difficult, since we would never agree to a treaty enshrining an actual Soviet superiority and the Soviets would never agree to a treaty dismantling that superiority. Thus, the preservation of an equilibrium of power is not contradictory to our policy of seeking arms control measures with the Soviets. On the contrary, it is vital to that policy.

The Trading Relationship

Let me now turn to the second aspect of our relationship with the U.S.S.R.—to the aspect of bilateral cooperation, in which the most important factor is trade.

Imagine a mythical country with a strong interest in trade with the United States. We begin a trading relationship with it, which burgeons quickly to an annual trade of $2.1 billion a year. Furthermore, the balance of trade results in a large export surplus to the advantage of the United States. Indeed, in one year we export $1.8 billion and import only $0.3 billion, for a trade surplus of $1.5 billion, or about 15 percent of our overall trade surplus worldwide for that year. Moreover, the prospects for the year to come are even better, due largely to a new trade agreement which guarantees U.S. exports in the value of $1 billion a year for the next five years.

Would such a trade situation be generally

acclaimed in the United States as an unmitigated asset for us? Logically it would. In fact it is not, because the country is of course not mythical. It is the Soviet Union; those are the trade figures for last year; and the agreement is the grain agreement we negotiated last fall. Let us look at the facts on that grain agreement.

In 1971 the Soviet Union imported 2.9 million tons of grain from the United States—literally chickenfeed. In 1972, in an uncontrolled U.S. market, it imported 13.7 million tons—over four times as much. You remember what happened. The price of bread and the price of meat rose. As consumers we all had to pay more at the supermarket for basic foodstuffs. The objective of the U.S. negotiators in the 1975 grain negotiations was to prevent this from happening again—to guarantee a market in the U.S.S.R. for our farmers' grain while safeguarding the interests of consumers like you and me. And that is exactly what we did.

The current grain agreement stipulates that the Soviet Union must buy at least 6 million tons of grain a year—about a billion dollars' worth—and that it must transport at least a third of it on American ships. It cannot buy over 8 million tons without consulting us so we have a chance to assess the potential effect on U.S. food prices. And if our own grain stocks run low, we can reduce the amount of grain the Soviets buy. This helps our farmers. It helps the makers of farm machinery. It helps our shippers. It helps our trade and payments balance. And it should considerably moderate effects on food prices.

Moreover, there is a political value which, indeed, applies to our whole trading relationship with the Soviet Union. In creating incentives for the Soviet economy to move from its historical emphasis on self-sufficiency, we are creating a pattern of Soviet economic dependence on ourselves and on other Western countries. This pattern does not in itself totally preclude the possibility of war; after all, the two World Wars of this century were between major trading partners. But it does make it necessary for Soviet policymakers to consider the potential costs in economic terms of expansionist or aggressive policies. In effect we are introducing—for the first time—a major Western economic factor into their decisionmaking process. The larger the economic relationship, the larger the factor. In time it could become a major incentive for Soviet political restraint.

Thus, while we support an increase in emigration from the Soviet Union—a subject I will want to discuss a bit later—for both economic and political reasons we have opposed the action of Congress to link trade with Soviet emigration policy. Congress has made improved Soviet performance on letting people leave the U.S.S.R. a condition of substantial Export-Import Bank credits—credits which are designed to stimulate U.S. exports. It has also made emigration a condition of granting most-favored-nation treatment to Soviet exports to the United States—treatment which 100 other countries get. Every economic tool at our disposal is a potential asset in both our political and our economic relationship with the U.S.S.R. It is a misfortune that, even for the best of motives, we have denied ourselves the use of such tools.

Bilateral Cooperation Programs

Other aspects of our bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union, principally the 11 bilateral cooperation agreements we signed at summit meetings, also have a long-term purpose from the U.S. point of view. The idea is to create patterns of cooperation in a society which for hundreds of years has been suspicious of, and resistant to, Western influences. We are not sanguine about sweeping early results, but the process seems to us a useful one as long as its importance is not exaggerated. We now have over 150 joint projects underway with the Soviets—on space, health, energy, environment, transportation, and many other problems.

It is sometimes argued that in strictly technological terms the Soviets are benefiting more from these agreements than we are. Obviously it is impossible to draw an overall balance sheet. But we carefully vet every

project to make sure it does not involve the export of U.S. goods or technology which could make a significant contribution to Soviet military potential in a way detrimental to our national security. And remember that the Soviets made the major military breakthroughs of the 1940's and 1950's, which I have already described, at a time when there was virtually no trade or technological exchange with the West.

Moreover, we ourselves are gaining a great deal from these programs. For example, in the field of energy, which is of such concern in the United States, the Soviets are doing important work in developing efficient ways to burn conventional fossil fuels; to transmit electricity over long distances; and to use, by way of controlled thermonuclear fusion, heavy hydrogen—of which there is a plentiful supply in ordinary water—to generate electric power. The United States is plugged into all of these developments through our joint agreements on energy and on atomic energy.

The Guatemala tragedy has reminded us of the destructive dangers of earthquakes. The Soviets are ahead of us in the theory of earthquake prediction; using Soviet expertise available through the environmental agreement, we were able to predict earthquakes in New York State and California in 1974.

I don't need, in Houston, to recall for you the Apollo-Soyuz program. You may be interested to know that, also under the space agreement, the Soviets have provided us with pictures of Mars, taken by their orbiting satellites, which will help us to select alternate landing sites for our own Viking spacecraft when it lands on Mars this July.

Finally, in De Bakey country, it's surely superfluous to mention the sophisticated work the Soviets are doing, paralleling ours, on artificial hearts and the cooperative effort which Dr. De Bakey himself is leading under the heart agreement.

These are long-range programs of bilateral cooperation whose effectiveness as an element for political restraint will develop only over time. Of course we have it in our power to suspend or cancel them at any moment, and in any case the Soviet Union certainly knows that the programs would not survive a period of intense hostility. But, considering their long-term purposes and possibilities from the point of view of U.S. interests, we would certainly want to weigh the pros and cons carefully before we tried to use them to advance shortrun or immediate goals.

Areas of Possible Political Confrontation

I come now to the third aspect of our relationship with the Soviet Union, and the most difficult to assess. It is our relationship with Moscow in areas of possible political confrontation. At the Moscow summit of 1972 the United States and the U.S.S.R. pledged to do all they could to keep situations from arising which would increase international tensions and pledged not to seek unilateral advantage at the expense of one another.

We could not expect Moscow to set aside immediately and completely its radically different concept of the world, its global policies which are often in conflict with ours, or its ideology. But we *can* expect the Soviets to initiate a process of moderating their international conduct, and we *can* expect to use our broadening relationship with them to offer rewards for moderation and exact penalties for aggressive behavior. Realistically, progress will only be slow. But we have made clear to the Soviets one overriding reality: that the American people could not support a long-term cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union if it did not employ restraint in its international behavior.

The Soviet record has been mixed. A large plus was the Berlin Agreement, which was negotiated in 1971 before the first Moscow summit and came into force in 1972, just after it. Many of you do not remember the attempt by Stalin in the 1940's to starve out the people of West Berlin by closing the access routes across East Germany and the threats by Khrushchev in the 1950's and 1960's to turn West Berlin and its 2 million free citizens over to the Communist rule of Walter Ulbricht's East Germany. Those of us who do remember those crises know how

close we may have come to war over Berlin.

Today Berlin is no longer a flashpoint of East-West tension. The four-power agreement commits the Soviet Union to see that traffic along the access routes from West Germany to West Berlin is unimpeded and even facilitated and that the ties between West Germany and West Berlin are maintained and developed. Since the signing of the agreement, there has not been a major incident on the access routes.

The Middle East, another major potential area of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, illustrates clearly the need for a U.S. policy of carrot and stick. During the Middle East war of October 1973, the Soviet Union put three of its divisions in Eastern Europe on airborne alert—potentially for use in the conflict area—and then informed us that it might send Soviet troops unilaterally into the Middle East. We felt we had to make a strong response, considering the potential consequences for peace of the intrusion of Soviet troops for the first time in the Middle East. Our own alert, which was criticized at the time as overreaction, seems to me entirely justified. As it happened, no Soviet troops were sent.

But it has been necessary to mix firmness with restraint. We could not have ended Soviet influence in the Middle East had we wanted to. It has genuine interests in the area, as do we, and a close relationship—though a rather unstable one—with a number of Arab countries and movements. We have therefore encouraged the Soviets to use their ties in the area to assist the political process, or at least not to impede it. In 1974 and 1975, when the United States took the lead in mediating negotiations between the Israelis and the Arabs, the Soviets, though not having a direct role in that process, accepted the process with relatively good grace.

I don't want to turn this into a catalogue of trouble spots, but I do want to say a word about Angola. Here the major issue was the intrusion of massive Soviet power into an area remote both from Soviet borders and Soviet interests. The 200 million dollars' worth of military equipment which the Soviets have provided the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in the past year exceeds *all* the other military equipment supplied by all parties to all of sub-Saharan Africa in the previous year. The Soviets and their Cuban cohorts were clearly the interventionists, mixing in the tensions of southern Africa directly in the face of the Organization of African Unity's declared opposition to foreign interference. We felt we had to respond, and we wanted to do so where it would have the most effect—directly on the ground, not through denial of grain or other such indirect measures which would be both ineffective and disproportionately costly to our own interests.

Our failure to win congressional support for this action could set an unfortunate precedent. I don't argue that we should necessarily try to contain the Soviets automatically at every place on the globe where they choose to press. But we must make clear to them—and actions speak louder than words—that they cannot expect to use their power with impunity to seek unilateral advantage. This is a challenge which will face future American Administrations. And they will need the understanding and support of the American people and Congress, just as this Administration does.

Think for a moment of how secure we in America, and our friends in Western Europe, would feel if the Soviets felt that they could push their power outward without any risk of resistance. In my view, a policy of moderating Soviet behavior and lessening the dangers of conflict must include a readiness to let the Soviets know that we have the means and the will to protect our interests anywhere in the world.

Human Rights and Human Values

Before ending, I want to say a word about the role human rights and human values play in our relationship to the Soviet Union. Let me begin by asserting that Americans are never likely to be indifferent to the way another country treats its own people. To the extent our revolution and our history stand

for something in the world, we will remain concerned about the human condition everywhere. That is how we are built. Our Declaration of Independence pledges a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind," and we tend to subject other countries to the same scrutiny which we have received, and welcomed, ourselves. We are an open society in an increasingly open world.

The Soviet regime consistently asserts that, whatever the state of our bilateral relations, the ideological struggle will continue. I believe that Americans have nothing to fear from such a struggle. For, while we don't have—and don't want—an ideology, the power of the ideas expressed in our Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights is far stronger and more durable than the doctrines of Lenin or the thoughts of Mao. So our answer to the Soviets is: "Let the struggle of ideas go on; we will continue to let your ideas into our country and we challenge you to let our ideas into yours."

Realistically, however, we can expect at best only slow and meager progress from the Soviet Union in this area. Ever since the 16th century, foreign travelers to Russia have noted and described the degree to which individual rights have been subordinated to the all-powerful interests of the state. There is nothing distinctly Soviet about this approach to government and society. It is profoundly Russian. And the forces for change are contending with half a millennium of Russian tradition.

This means, it seems to me, that we must put the greatest weight of our policies on objectives where we *can* have a real effect, such as advancing our security interests and moderating Soviet international behavior. In areas which the Soviets assert to be their internal affair, we must do what we can—but in the sober realization that our efforts will meet stubborn resistance, even to the point of being counterproductive if pushed too far too fast.

Let me cite an example. In a significant incident, the American Congress called on the Administration to severely restrict the U.S. trading relationship with the Russian Government because of the way that government treated Jews. The vote was almost unanimous. The one Congressman who voted against the legislation complained that such pressure would not benefit the Jews and would harm American business.

I have not just described the passage by Congress in 1974 of legislation to tie the U.S.-Soviet trading relationship to Soviet emigration policy; I have described a resolution passed by the House of Representatives in 1911 to terminate a bilateral trade treaty with the Russian Government of Czar Nicholas II. The point—as drawn by our wisest expert on the Soviet Union, George Kennan, who has told this story in one of his books—is that some differences between Russia and the United States may never be reconciled.

The modern counterpart of that story is perhaps even more poignant. In 1972 and 1973, when there were strong behind-the-scenes pressures on the Soviet Union from the United States, Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. averaged 2,600–2,900 per month. In 1974, when the claim became more explicit that congressional trade legislation was a potent tool to force internal changes in the U.S.S.R., the rate dropped to 1,700 per month. In 1975, following the passage of legislation to restrict trade, the rate fell further, to 1,100 per month. Those figures tell the story. By trying to force the Soviets to take actions —however important in moral terms—which they considered within their sovereign competence, we repeated the mistake of 1911.

If the lesson to be learned is that we can not expect overnight change from the Soviets in the human rights field, it is nevertheless also true that, besides the 1972 and 1973 emigration figures, we have made some progress in other areas touching on human rights.

I refer, for example, to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—the so-called Helsinki Conference—which ended at summit level last July. Since this conference has been misunderstood by many in the United States, let me take a minute to make clear what it did and did not do.

The Helsinki Conference—or CSCE, as we

ureaucrats perversely call it—began as a oviet initiative in 1969 designed to con-rm the territorial and political status quo in urope, which would mean confirming also oviet hegemony over its Eastern European eighbors. That is not how the conference nded, however. Indeed, for simply agreeing o go to the CSCE negotiation at all, the West xacted a price from the Soviets which *al-eady* altered the status quo in Europe in uman terms.

The price was the Berlin Agreement, hose conclusion NATO made a precondition o starting the CSCE talks. Apart from the uaranteed access I have already described, ie agreement made it possible for the people West Berlin to make visits to East Berlin id East Germany, often to see relatives, iends, former homes—something which the ast German government had not allowed iem to do before. Since the Berlin Agree-ent went into effect in June 1972, some 12 illion visits have been made by West Berlin-s to East Berlin and East Germany through e infamous Berlin Wall—a dramatic change the status quo and one with a direct effect i several million people whose isolation had en one of the most tragic remnants of the ld war.

Even when CSCE began, the Soviets found e ground had shifted under them. They id hoped for a fuzzy declaration that would eate a sense of euphoria in the West and nore the real reasons for division in Europe. stead, the NATO members, aided in certain stances by pressures from neutrals and en Eastern Europeans, introduced a list of solutions to promote freer contacts between oples in the Eastern and Western halves of urope and freer exchanges of ideas and in-rmation. The Soviets didn't want any of is, but in the end they had to take some of

In the process of compromise, the West d not get all the Soviet concessions we anted. But we *did* get explicit Soviet ad-ission that Europe would not have to be cked into a territorial status quo but that ontiers could be changed by peaceful means id by agreement. We *did* get the establish-ment of a principle that there should be freer East-West contacts. And we *did* get the Soviet Union to admit—for the first time ever—that its internal policies, and those of the Eastern European Communist countries, which affect those contacts are a legitimate subject for East-West discourse.

I don't want to exaggerate the importance of CSCE. The conference will be significant only if its words are turned into actions. At the least, CSCE is part of a process of opening up the East to Western influences and views. Far from confirming the status quo, the Helsinki Conference is part of the process of looking to the future and laying the groundwork for the kind of contact between East and West in Europe which has positive implications not only for peace but also for human rights. Surely the United States has been right to engage in this process rather than revert to the physical and ideological barriers which have kept Europe divided for 30 years.

A Complex Relationship

This, then, is an account of our complex relationship with the Soviet Union. In describing it, I have not once used the word "détente." That word can only get in the way of understanding the problems involved. Let me conclude by summing up what our policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union is and what it is not:

—It is not a luxury which we can choose to pursue or not pursue. It is a necessity brought about by the fact that the Soviet Union has become a superpower in military terms.

—It is not the pursuit of summit meetings or joint communiques or paper agreements. It is the pursuit of a long-term relationship with the Soviet Union which will reduce the threat of war.

—It is not a profit-and-loss sheet in which a plus for one side is necessarily a minus for the other. It is a recognition that there must be a mutual U.S. and Soviet interest in the primary objectives of arms control agree-

ments and political restraints to make the world safer in a nuclear age.

—It is not based on a pleasant atmosphere or good will or trust. It is based on a U.S. defense second to none, on the preservation of an equilibrium of power, and on verifiable agreements which must be in our national interest.

—It is not a matter of being tough for the sake of toughness or being soft for the sake of not offending Moscow. It is a necessary combination of incentives for Soviet restraint and penalties for Soviet aggression.

—It is not a blind eye turned to human rights and liberties. It is a desire to advance those rights and liberties within the limits of the possible and in the understanding that the major influence we can exert on the Soviet Union is in moderating its international, not its internal, behavior.

—It is, finally, not a short-term or a partisan policy. It is, and must be, a national policy which will have to continue for a generation or longer—for as long, in fact, as the Soviet Union remains a military great power.

The problem of the Soviet Union, then, is a problem for all of us and will be a problem for a long time to come. I, for one, am confident that we can manage it successfully, though perhaps it will never be really solved. As Secretary Kissinger has said: [3]

> We have a design and the material assets to deal with the Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move forward as a united people.

In the final analysis, the conduct of our relationship with the Soviet Union depends upon the support of the American people—upon your support. I have described tonight a policy which I believe is worthy of that support. The choices, now and in the future, will be yours.

[3] For Secretary Kissinger's address at San Francisco, Calif., on Feb. 3, see BULLETIN of Feb. 23, 1976, p. 201.

International Tin Agreement Signed by the United States

Department Announcement [1]

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Acting Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, signed the Fifth International Tin Agreement on behalf of the United States on March 11. The signing took place at the United Nations, which has been designated as the depository for the agreement. The President plans to transmit the agreement to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The Fifth International Tin Agreement is scheduled to come into force for a five-year period on July 1, 1976, and will replace the Fourth International Tin Agreement, which is scheduled to terminate on June 30, 1976. The United States was not a member of the fourth or earlier tin agreements. Like its predecessors, the fifth agreement aims to stabilize tin prices within limits agreed upon jointly by its producer and consumer country members by balancing tin supply with demand.

Stability of tin prices is important both to its producers, many of whom are developing countries that rely on tin exports in order to finance economic development programs and to its consumers, for whom it is a vital industrial raw material used in the production of tinplate for food canning and for a range of other products.

Like the International Coffee Agreement which we signed on February 27, the tin agreement is another important element in the program presented by Secretary Kissinger at the seventh special session of the General Assembly. As the world's leading consumer of tin, the United States looks forward to participating in the work of the International Tin Council, which administers the agreement.

[1] Issued on Mar. 11 (text from press release 12

he Role of the United States in the United Nations

Statement by Samuel W. Lewis
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs [1]

I greatly appreciate your invitation to ap-ar before this committee on behalf of the dministration to discuss U.S. policy toward e United Nations.

We are passing through a time of turbu-ce in that organization, and these hear-gs can help all of us, public and Adminis-tion alike, to steer a firmer course.

Consultation between the executive branch d the Congress on U.N. matters is growing, d we welcome that trend. Within the last f year there has been a particularly close d productive cooperation between mem-s of Congress and the executive branch connection with U.S. participation in the enth special session of the General As-bly, held last September, on the subject world economic cooperation. Several from s committee and other interested mem-s of Congress met with Secretary Kissin-on several occasions during the months preparation, commented on our ideas, and forward many creative suggestions of ir own. Many were reflected in the pro-als we put forward in New York. A large nber of Senators and Congressmen then ed our delegation at the session itself, ticipating actively in the negotiations.

The seventh special session endorsed a prehensive agenda for action by con-sus, a resolution which the United States was happy to support. We are convinced that the collaboration between the congressional and executive branches had a major bearing on the success of our efforts to shape the outcome. This example should surely provide the model for our efforts in future major U.N. endeavors.

But we are equally aware of more worrisome trends. The regular session of the General Assembly last fall was marked by high contention. The United States and some of its friends, particularly Israel, seemed to take it on the chin. Among other actions, a resolution was adopted which Americans fundamentally reject, which they rightly believe to be a wholly unjustified distortion of basic truths—the resolution equating Zionism and racism. And other hostile resolutions were adopted in an atmosphere of confrontation—raising serious questions in the minds of many Americans about the United Nations itself and about the utility of U.S. participation in its work.

Indeed, throughout recent decades there have been large-scale changes in the political environment at the United Nations, especially in the General Assembly. Originally, the organization consisted of about 50 countries, most of which practiced a fairly polite brand of diplomacy—along 19th-century lines. Now, however, membership has expanded to nearly 150 with the addition of about 100 new nations. These countries share a deep dissatisfaction over the cards they were dealt when they became independent. They want to narrow the great gulf of economic inequality. They want a weightier po-

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[1] Presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign tions on Mar. 18 (text from press release 134). complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-d by the committee and will be available from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government ting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

litical role in the international state system. They are impatient, and many are eager to dramatize their causes even if this involves a disregard for traditional niceties of diplomacy. Americans understandably are affronted when our country is attacked, or repeatedly outvoted, by small new nations whose independence we championed.

At the same time, many Americans understand that global cooperation is more than ever essential to meet inescapable global problems. We are all increasingly aware that the interdependence of nations in both the economic and security spheres can have a direct effect on the lives of our citizens.

The oil embargo that followed the last major Middle East conflict produced serious hardship in many countries, including our own. Many saw vividly for the first time the inescapable facts of economic interdependence—that political decisions by other governments can damage America's prosperity, can impact on whether millions of Americans have jobs or suffer the economic and social hardships of unemployment, on whether our businesses and our economy grow and flourish, on whether or not our budget can readily sustain vital social, educational, and health programs.

In addition to these pragmatic concerns, there is another factor which makes your current review particularly important. Our government was the chief architect of the U.N. system. We acted in the shadow of a global disaster whose incalculable cost had convinced men and women in every land that a new basis for global cooperation had to be established. Through all the disappointments and setbacks of the past 30 years, we have remained among the chief supporters of constructive and innovative work within the U.N. system. This is because, as President Ford has said: [2]

> The United States retains the idealism that made us the driving force behind the creation of the United Nations over three decades ago as a worldwide system to promote peace and progress.

Any assessment of the role of the United States in the United Nations must therefore take into account not merely the issues of the moment but our fundamental interes and the basic ideals of the American peop

Moreover, it is essential that we view o role in the United Nations as an integ part of our overall foreign policy, not as separate segment. The United States see on many fronts to build an international sy tem congenial to the pursuit of our natio foreign policy goals. Our participation in t United Nations represents only one part although certainly an important part— that larger effort.

If this central point is accepted, it mea that we can approach the United Nations a practical way. We should ask ourselves:

—Not whether the United Nations c solve all of the world's evils, but whether can contribute significantly to the achie ment of American purposes.

—Not whether the United States can v every dispute in the United Nations, b whether through firm, imaginative, and p tient participation we can help the Unit Nations to play its role in building a wo order in which all countries, rich and po new and old, feel a genuine stake.

To help find answers to these fundamen questions, I would like today to review h we see U.S. interests in the U.N. system a whole; second, how the General Assem fits into this picture; third, where we sta now in our effort to encourage more resp sible participation in the United Nations other states; fourth, what future course would be in our interest to follow; and las what paths we should avoid if we are to p tect our basic interests.

The Nature of the U.N. System

The United Nations is often seen as simple, single entity. As a consequence, si plistic judgments too often affirm that United Nations is either good or bad, gett

[2] For President Ford's remarks on Mar. 15 at swearing-in of William Scranton as U.S. Represe tive to the United Nations, see Weekly Compila of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 22, 1976.

rse or better, in the U.S. interest or con-
ary to it.

The U.N. system, however, is composed of vast array of institutions embracing an tremely wide spectrum of activities. It in-des bodies of nearly universal member-ip and relatively small subgroups. It ludes specialized agencies handling the gulation of daily international intercourse technical fields like shipping, aviation, mmunications, finance. It includes bodies rking on highly political security issues d others wrestling with the complexities international economic policy. It includes gans which funnel development and hu-nitarian aid to many countries. Within ny of these institutions there are different es of subbodies—conferences, executive rds, expert groups. Clearly, regarding this ge of activities, no single, simple judg-nt of success or failure can be made.

believe, however, it may assist in our re-w to consider U.N. activities in two broad eres: First, those relating directly to the intenance of international peace and se-ity and, second, those relating to eco-nic and social cooperation.

In the *security area*, the United Nations, d the Security Council in particular, has de vital contributions to maintaining rld peace. Let me illustrate by recalling ent peacekeeping efforts in the Middle st.

During the fourth Arab-Israeli war in 73, our efforts to achieve a cease-fire and oid dangerous escalation of the conflict countered enormous difficulties. In the ne-tiations it became clear that disengage-nt between the opposing forces would de-nd upon the availability of an independent, partial organization that could provide acekeeping forces and observe compliance th the disengagement plan. This was an ement regarded as indispensable by all es. The United Nations provided that lispensable element.

This experience, incidentally, underscores key point in any overall assessment regard-g the value of the United Nations. It would completely misleading to attempt to tally apparent successes and failures within the U.N. system and then draw a conclusion based on a comparison of the totals as if all of these events were of roughly equal importance. In fact, they are not.

The U.N. operations in the Middle East were an essential ingredient in terminating the fourth Arab-Israeli war. We all know that the conflict, had it continued, would not only have deepened the misery within the area, but it would have gravely jeopardized world peace. No one can be certain that another world war including the United States would not ultimately have ensued. The United Nations performed a role of incalculable importance to the United States.

The United Nations continues to play such a role. The mandates of the U.N. forces both in Sinai and on the Golan Heights have been extended. These forces remain integral elements in preserving options for negotiations toward a just and lasting peace.

As Secretary of State Kissinger recently said: [3]

> If this organization had no other accomplishment than its effective peacekeeping role in this troubled area, it would have well justified itself.

In other areas of political tension, the Security Council has also played an important role. It has served increasingly as one of the mechanisms through which a growing crisis may be defused or negotiated or at least kept from erupting. On a number of occasions, it has permitted a government being pressed toward a military reaction or intransigence to allay such pressures by taking the issue to the Council. This was true, for example, of a number of the sessions devoted to Cyprus, to the Spanish Sahara, to Djibouti, and to Iceland as well. In Cyprus, a peacekeeping force has been deployed at the direction of the Council since 1964. The Force, in addition to patrolling the lines of confrontation, has contributed to the satisfaction of humanitarian needs.

The Security Council continues to be occu-

[3] For Secretary Kissinger's address before the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 22, 1975, see BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1975, p. 545.

pied with important business, including the problems of southern Africa and the thorny Middle East dispute. Although inevitably there will be conflicting viewpoints, we find that the Council has been conducting its proceedings in a serious and responsible atmosphere, employing relatively new informal procedures which reduce somewhat the temptation for delegates to play to world propaganda galleries.

The Security Council will continue to be available in the event of unforeseen crises—ready to meet at all times and at a moment's notice. Its constant availability provides an appropriate check against efforts by other bodies to issue recommendations bearing on security matters. Since the charter has assigned the Council primary responsibility in the area of peace and security, recommendations of other bodies remain only that. It is only the Council—in which the United States retains its veto—which can take binding decisions.

Let me turn now to the U.N.'s activities affecting *international economic and social cooperation*. This is a vast realm involving both the conduct of day-to-day work in regulating the world's continuing business and also the development of goals and concrete programs regarding global problems of economic interdependence, as at the seventh special session.

I would like first to sketch several examples of continuing day-to-day business within the U.N. system which are of intrinsic importance to our citizens:

The International Civil Aviation Organization, for example, helps to set and maintain high standards for international air transportation. Needless to say, for our citizens, who probably use international air transportation more than the citizens of any other country in the world, international cooperation in improving safety and efficiency is of vital, direct importance. And the standards developed by the ICAO will assist many countries to take measures that can lessen the occurrence of aircraft hijacking.

For many years the World Health Organization has worked patiently and with dete mination to rid the world of the highly co tagious and age-old disease smallpox. The endeavors have been outstandingly succes ful. The WHO also maintains a worldwi alert system to warn governments of t outbreak of serious contagious diseases an where in the world, and this activity clearly of great value to our own health of cials and to Americans—millions of them who travel abroad.

The Food and Agriculture Organizati maintains programs which directly less the threat of introduction into the Unit States of foreign plant and animal diseas and pests. This organization has establish a program in which over 100 countries pa ticipate to maintain internationally accept food standards. The United States, as major food exporter and importer, direct benefits, not only because international tra is facilitated, but also because the heal and safety of Americans is better protecte Moreover, new research programs sponsor by the FAO are expected to improve t varieties of our food crops.

Several bodies within the U.N. system a encouraging programs to control producti of opium and other dangerous drugs and curtail international drug trafficking. The efforts largely respond to priorities we ha urged, and they are of undoubted benefit the overall U.S. effort to counter drug abu among our citizens.

The International Monetary Fund, anoth organization within the U.N. system, pla an indispensable role in promoting intern tional monetary cooperation, facilitating i ternational trade and finance, and promo ing world economic stability. These are are in which our own country has huge interes which would be difficult to exaggerate.

A little known body within the U.N. sy tem is the U.N. Disaster Relief Office. helps to coordinate assistance from ma parts of the world when a country has be overwhelmed by natural disaster.

The International Atomic Energy Agen plays an indispensable role in the effort prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Th

gency is responsible for establishing safeuards standards and carrying out internaonal inspections to insure that nuclear maerials are not being transferred from peaceul uses to weapons uses.

The World Meteorological Organization aintains a World Weather Watch—a global etwork of meteorological stations collecting nd exchanging weather information on a ntinuous basis. This program has made ssible improved forecasts for U.S. passenr jets crossing the Atlantic and the Pacific. has also enabled more accurate forecasts hurricanes originating in the Caribbean hich affect the eastern half of the United ates. Large-scale research programs coornated by this U.N. body will improve our derstanding of climate changes which are ndamental to agricultural and economic anning.

The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultive Organization is developing standards hich nations are generally following to prent pollution of the seas. This organization's ork in the field of safety at sea has long en recognized as of the highest value to countries whose ships and peoples travel e oceans.

This list of examples could be extended alost indefinitely. I have mentioned only a w to illustrate the range of work being ne within the U.N. system today which ects directly the interests and concerns our citizens.

I have already referred to last September's venth special session of the General Asmbly on world economic cooperation. At at session our government presented a mprehensive set of proposals which reslted in the adoption of a wide-ranging actical program for improving economic operation between the developing countries d the industrial world.

The important point to bear in mind about e special session is that it provided an portunity for us to see whether it was posble to fashion approaches to current ecomic problems which would be *in the mutal interest of all countries.* I cannot stress this point too strongly. What the U.S. Government was proposing at the special session was a nonideological approach to problems of economic interdependence, based on concrete steps of benefit to poor countries and rich countries alike. We found an overwhelming majority of governments in the Third and Fourth Worlds ready to try this path with us.

Since September, we have been vigorously following up on our special session proposals. At meetings of the International Monetary Fund in Jamaica two months ago, the United States took the lead in achieving adoption of measures to stabilize the earnings of developing countries and to help meet the severe balance-of-payments problems which many of them are experiencing. We have gotten well underway in the North-South dialogue at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation taking place in Paris. At the multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, we are vigorously promoting our special session proposals. And in anticipation of the fourth UNCTAD, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in May of this year, the Department of State is working intensively on further practical proposals to implement more of the broad negotiating agenda adopted at the special session.

Let me conclude this part of my statement with this observation: As we build on the program begun at the seventh special session, we will not merely be assisting the less fortunate; we will be helping to create healthier conditions throughout the world which provide more opportunities for American business. The long-term results will create more jobs for American workers and also lessen the danger of raw material scarcities which can fuel a worldwide inflation that would erode the real income of consumers in the United States and throughout the developed world.

It is easy for most Americans to agree that bodies like the World Health Organization or the Security Council are indispensable and continue to merit full American support. But many question the usefulness of the General Assembly or other parts of

the U.N. system whose utility is less obvious; they are prone to call on our government to cease participating or to reduce our financial support.

This issue has recently arisen with respect to the General Assembly because of parliamentary abuses which have taken place there and because that body has recently taken a number of irresponsible actions—such as passage of the resolution equating Zionism and racism. The question is a valid one. But in order to answer it, we must first take a careful look at the overall activity of the General Assembly to see how it fits with other activities of the United Nations and how American interests are affected by its work.

The Role of the General Assembly

The General Assembly is the central body of the United Nations. It considers and disposes of certain subjects which are dealt with nowhere else in the U.N. system, but it also provides guidance and coordination for many activities handled by specialized and technical bodies. Moreover, many of the activities of the United Nations which we strongly support are financed through decisions taken by the General Assembly.

The best way for me to explain the Assembly's role might be to provide a series of illustrations showing the interconnection between the General Assembly and other activities:

Support for Middle East peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and elsewhere have been financed in accordance with decisions of the General Assembly. While the members of the Security Council take policy decisions which set the basic lines of action, *all* U.N. members have a responsibility to contribute to the costs. All members jointly determine the amount and apportionment of the assessed expenses and in fact have done so through the General Assembly. Needless to say, the essential peacekeeping operations in the Middle East could not be carried out unless there were successful cooperation in determining how to pay for the troops, supplies, and other burdens inherent in these large operations. We are pleased that a pattern of cooperation in providing financial support for Middle East peacekeeping has continued within the General Assembly.

Consideration of security issues. It is often thought that security issues are dealt with seriously only within the Security Council. This is not so. Many of the most important security issues of significance to the United States have been considered by both the Security Council and the General Assembly, and there is unavoidable interaction between the two bodies. This has, for example, been the case with the Middle East, with Korea, and with Cyprus. In the latter case, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions which the United States considered moderate and constructive and which have had a direct influence in stimulating talks between the Greek and Turkish communities. It is encouraging that talks have recently resumed under the auspices of the Secretary General, who is pursuing his mission with skill and dedication. I should also mention in passing that the Security Council and the General Assembly are further interconnected because it is the General Assembly which elects the nonpermanent members of the Security Council.

Promotion of economic and social cooperation. Within the United Nations, the General Assembly has not merely a partial role, but a predominant one. I have already cited the seventh special session of the Assembly on world economic cooperation. A meeting of that sort could only have taken place in the General Assembly. It will be the General Assembly and some of its subsidiary bodies, the Second Committee and the Economic and Social Council, which will monitor implementation of many of the concrete measures for economic cooperation which the United States has proposed.

U.N. involvement in international drug control. As the result of a U.S. initiative, the General Assembly adopted in 1970 a resolution authorizing establishment of the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control. The technical and executing personnel for many of the

jects financed by the Fund come from the vision of Narcotic Drugs, part of the U.N. retariat, which is supported by the budget the United Nations as voted by the Gen- l Assembly. The Fund's most important ject has been its assistance to Turkey in ting up strict controls over its poppy pro- tion. It was not so long ago that it was ered that heroin from Turkish opium ght once again appear on the streets of erican cities. In 1975 the Fund-supported rkish program prevented this from hap- ing. Today the Fund is helping the Turk- s Government to make this success per- nent.

he General Assembly is also responsible supporting unprecedented diplomatic ef- 's to achieve international agreement at a es of U.N. conferences on the law of the I think it is broadly recognized that the ted States must persevere, no matter how d the task, in working out with other ntries fair, sound, and effective rules to ern this enormous sector of our planet. ld peace and security are at stake, as is future rational and peaceful exploitation he resources of the oceans and the sea- s. The third major session of the confer- e is now underway in New York, and we hopeful that a comprehensive oceans ty may soon be in sight.

he U.N. Fund for Population Activities is ther activity directly connected with the eral Assembly. Many members of the gress and public have been deeply con- ed with the difficult dilemma of trying to e meaningful gains through development stance when population growth outstrips omic growth. The U.N. Fund for Popu- n Activities is supporting important ects that help countries to slow down osive population growth rates. The d's connection with the General Assem- is very direct. Several years ago the eral Assembly debated and adopted a ld plan of action on this subject—a or step forward for the nations of the ld. This General Assembly action pro- s a fundamental framework and impetus all population control activities, includ- ing particularly those of the U.N. Fund.

The U.N. Environment Program is a crea- ture of the General Assembly, having been established by a resolution of the Assembly in 1972, and the budget of the United Na- tions contributes to its work. Since the U.N.'s Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the United States has at- tached great importance to the mounting of a major U.N. program to begin the work necessary to reverse worldwide deteriora- tion of the human environment. A concerted worldwide program can only be realized within the U.N. system, and the Assembly has taken the essential steps to launch and support this effort.

The General Assembly has also recently played a constructive role in planning world- wide cooperative efforts to cope with inter- national food problems. The Assembly de- cided, as a result of a U.S. initiative, to con- vene a World Food Conference. Held in November 1974, the conference was gener- ally successful. Among many other actions, the conference led to the formation of the World Food Council, which reports to the General Assembly. World food problems clearly are of central importance to the United States, both for humanitarian rea- sons and because they have direct impact on our own economic well-being.

The U.N. Disaster Relief Office, to which I earlier referred, is another activity guided and supported by the General Assembly. We believe that the worldwide coordination ef- forts of this organization can save the American Government, and thus the Ameri- can taxpayer, significant sums by helping to avoid overlapping or duplicative disaster relief efforts. The United States has always responded generously when other countries are struck by natural disaster, as recently occurred in Guatemala. I am sure that we will continue to do so. The functioning of the U.N.'s disaster relief coordination effort is of real practical value to the United States.

Finally, the General Assembly also serves as the only truly global forum for promoting disarmament agreements which are in our

interests and the broad interests of all other nations. Certain negotiations, like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, must of course be carried out by the nations most directly involved, the United States and the U.S.S.R. But there are other vital disarmament areas, like the current effort to control forms of warfare based upon manipulation of man's environment, which should merit wide international support and participation. The General Assembly has recently discussed a draft agreement proposed by the United States. The Assembly's activities are a necessary part of the process of achieving broad international support for a sound treaty.

There is another aspect of the General Assembly which I have not so far discussed. That is its role as a universal forum to debate basic viewpoints, to develop consensus when this is possible, and to register honest disagreement.

We must expect to encounter serious differences in point of view among the nearly 150 countries that comprise the United Nations. These differences do not derive primarily from hostility to the United States, though hostility is sometimes a factor. More often they reflect the diversity of interests among countries widely differing in geography, state of development, and historical background. Amid such diversity, the United States will not always have its way, and indeed it should not expect to. What is important is that countries pursue their differences in a spirit of mutual respect and that they still attempt, to the greatest extent possible, to agree on concrete measures from which there can be common gain.

Obviously, these precepts have not always been followed and there have been recent instances when countries have gone beyond the bounds of vigorous, constructive debate and have attempted to establish by "parliamentary victories" doctrines which a substantial part of the world cannot accept.

But even where there is sharp conflict, it is important that all of us keep in mind this fundamental aspect of the United Nations: It is not some abstract entity called the United Nations which is responsible for c agreements or irresponsible and confron tional acts; it is individual countries act through their representatives which ma decisions about what should be propos supported, or opposed at the United Natio In this sense the United Nations is bu mirror of the attitudes of governme throughout the world.

Certainly any parliamentary body can d tort the reflection of the real views of th represented. For example, there is no do that in many representational bodies, cluding the United Nations, the extent support for or opposition to a particular p posal is often affected by old-fashioned "l rolling" or by whether a particular rep sentative desires to build personal supp for an elected office in the body. In gene however, the opinions and concerns of g ernments are mirrored in the actions of th U.N. representatives.

Let us keep one point firmly in mind: T United States does not fear vigorous deb When widespread disagreement about an portant issue exists, it is in our interest t it be exposed and debated. The reality differing viewpoints, differing objectives, not go away simply because countries n find it expedient in one forum or anothe hold back in expressing their opinions. O discussion of differing viewpoints is an ess tial first step toward making progress understanding the full dimensions of a pr lem, the interests at stake, and in identify and enlarging on those areas where th may be common ground.

This does not mean that we welcome enjoy hostile or exaggerated attacks. W debate is carried on in an irresponsible fa ion, positions can harden and the prospe for accommodation diminish. We will the fore work in every way to encourage seric responsible debate, while forcefully reb ting unwarranted attacks on our good na But the United States is a strong enou country, and our overall record of past c structive achievements is impressive enou that we need not shrink timidly from e fray—even when the going gets pretty tou

here We Stand

I have already discussed where we stand th respect to some of the main substantive bjects within the U.N. system. As I have dicated, we believe the United Nations has ne, and is continuing to do, responsible rk in many areas relating to maintaining ternational peace and security. We also be- ve that the United Nations is doing essen- l work on many economic and social issues. hat I would like to focus on now is where v stand in our reinforced diplomatic efforts encourage a greater degree of responsi- ity and genuine cooperation among all untries in the United Nations.

The United States has for some time been tressed by what has seemed a growing nd toward confrontation within the U.N. stem. We witnessed an acute example of s confrontation nearly two years ago at e sixth special session of the General As- nbly. Many less developed and nonaligned untries seemed much more interested at t session in preserving an artificial bloc ity through which they could score "vic- ies" over the industrial world than in com- ; to grips with the real economic issues at ke. We were distressed not solely because the negative political ramifications of this itude but also because the practice of nming through "precooked," confronta- nal resolutions would destroy all possibil- of practical cooperation.

Our concern led us to begin a sustained ef- t to encourage a turning away from con- ntation toward cooperation. The Secretary State made a series of major statements ing 1975 in which he spelled out with ut- st clarity that countries cannot have it h ways: they cannot expect to challenge l confront us in some arenas and then omatically expect our full cooperation in ers. And we did much more. We attempted demonstrate, not only in conjunction with Secretary's statements, but in numerous lomatic representations, that through the ctice of cooperation and conciliation, ough the beginning of genuine dialogue, re were concrete gains to be realized by

Since confrontation seemed to have reached a peak at the sixth special session, we decided to focus special effort on our preparations for the seventh special session in September of last year. We viewed that session as a test case, to see whether countries would negotiate rather than confront in the General Assembly when we ourselves made major efforts to present concrete action proposals.

We believe this effort was a success, and I am pleased to say that this is not solely a view of the Administration but also one that has been expressed by the congressional group which participated in the special session. The congressional advisers reported that the session "marks a significant turning point in U.S. relations with the developing countries and sets the stage for a new era of economic partnership between rich and poor nations." They also said that the session "eases a decade of confrontation over how to narrow the widening gap in the distribution and control of global resources." And they referred to "the success of the Seventh Special Session, in creating a positive dialog and an atmosphere of negotiation on North/South issues."

Shortly after these encouraging developments were taking place, however, the General Assembly was also the scene of some actions based on confrontation and political antagonism. One such action stood out at the last General Assembly—the resolution equating Zionism and racism. It was a distressing and deplorable resolution which we know to be wholly unjustified. Nonetheless, it is our duty, no matter how strongly we feel about that resolution, to assess it objectively:

The *first* thing which needs to be said is that the resolution is not binding on us, or on any other member of the United Nations. Like most General Assembly resolutions, it is merely a recommendation. As Secretary Kissinger has said: "The United States will ignore this vote, pay no attention to it. . . ." [4]

[4] For questions and answers following Secretary Kissinger's address at Pittsburgh, Pa., on Nov. 12, 1975, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1, 1975, p. 765.

Second, we must recognize that, throughout this deplorable episode, some countries displayed objectivity and good sense. In other words, a substantial number of countries, including many from the Third World, refused to be bulldozed by the extremist leadership. This means that the extremists had no iron grip on all votes of the nonaligned. True, in the end the numerical vote went against us, but in the long run, it may be of more significance that bloc solidarity was fractured.

Third, we must ask ourselves: What are the practical consequences of the Zionism resolution? Is it likely to lead to the exclusion of Israel from the General Assembly? It should be recalled that some U.N. members did try last year to begin an effort to exclude Israel. Fortunately the effort was thwarted, largely because many African and nonaligned countries did not support it. Some of the countries which were against expulsion did, however, support the resolution equating Zionism and racism. They have said that they did so because they believed it represented a way to register a strong protest regarding the Palestinian problem. We will, in any event, continue as we have in the past to resist with the utmost seriousness any unconstitutional exclusion of a member of the United Nations from General Assembly activities. Such an abuse of the charter would pose the gravest threat to the viability of the organization as a whole and call fundamentally into question continuing U.S. support and participation.

Fourth, will there be other consequences of the Zionism resolution affecting the work of the United Nations? Yes, there will be. Of most immediate significance, the Zionism resolution applies to other recently adopted resolutions relating to the Decade for Action To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, which was launched in 1973. We therefore decided not to participate in this activity. Recently we took concrete steps to implement this policy. We instructed our representative at UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] to inform the Director General that we would not participate in a meeting of experts to draft UNESCO declaration on racism. The meeti was postponed.

U.S. Policy in the Future

I would like now to discuss, in light of th review, what we in the Administration b lieve should be the American approach participation in the United Nations. I sh do so first in terms of the direct positi steps we think should be pursued in order advance American interests, and then I wou like to outline some of the policies which w believe it would be contrary or harmful American interests to adopt.

First, the steps we intend to pursue:

—The Administration intends to contin to support in an effective, vigorous, a tough-minded way all of those programs the United Nations which offer benefits the American people. As I think I have de onstrated, there are programs and activiti of benefit throughout the entire system: the Security Council, in specialized agenci in many technical and ad hoc committees, a in the General Assembly itself.

—We will continue selectively to refuse participate in U.N. activities which we l lieve are fundamentally unsound or gros irresponsible. An immediate consequence this approach is our decision, caused by t resolution equating Zionism and racism, t to participate in the Decade To Combat R ism. We hope that our firm stand will gi many countries serious second thoug about the wisdom of letting a situation d velop in which over the longer term th lose more than they gain.

—On the diplomatic front, we have inten fied our efforts to impress on other gover ments that standards of cooperation a restraint largely prevalent in the conduct bilateral relations should also prevail multilateral relations. We are doing ever thing possible to counter the belief that a tacks on the motivation and the basic go faith of the United States can be safely a

expensively delivered in international rums. While we welcome honest and vigor- s debate over issues, countries should not lieve, without any concern for the conse- ences, that they can attack the vital inter- ts of the United States in behalf of some stract concept of group solidarity, particu- ly when their own national interests are t involved. When we see a consistent pat- n of hostility toward the United States, justified by any reasonable and honest ferences of policy, we will consider whether ere are appropriate direct bilateral re- onses that we should carry out. It will of rse continue to be our duty in any such es to keep in mind the practical balance American national interests.

—In meetings of international organiza- ns, and particularly in the General Assem- , we will continue to speak out firmly and cefully in behalf of American interests. ere may be differences of judgment from e to time on precisely how this may best done, but basically an approach of vigor l candor on our part strengthens our par- pation in the United Nations. Others will w that we care more about the work of United Nations and about their opinions en we take the time and the trouble to gage ourselves in vigorous give-and-take. reover, it seems clear that such an ap- ach will be strongly supported by the erican people and will be important for intaining the public's confidence in our rk.

—To strengthen our capacity to interrelate ectively our multilateral and bilateral lomacy, the Department of State has en important new organizational steps. e have established within the Bureau of ernational Organization Affairs a new ce of Multilateral Affairs, under the su- vision of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of te. The basic responsibility of this office o work even more intensively than in the t with our regional bureaus and our em- sies in order to achieve maximum possible port from other countries in pursuing ues of greatest concern to the United States. The overall thrust of this effort will be to increase our effectiveness in persuading others on the merits of the issues. There is a tremendous job to be done here. We need to approach governments early. We need to build up serious and frank dialogues with many countries which continue throughout the year. We need to frame our arguments in ways which are most meaningful to countries with dissimilar backgrounds. In short, we need to use all opportunities, both in our bilateral and multilateral contacts, to *persuade*—to build a climate of greater understanding.

—In addition to these specific immediate actions, we are taking broader long-range actions to build up the capability of the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service to perform more effectively in advancing American interests in international organizations. We are building up work on multilateral affairs as a specialty. To be sure that the best officers are attracted to assignments in multilateral diplomacy, we are establishing new training programs and designating positions in our embassies to concentrate on multilateral affairs problems on a year-round basis. The success of all of our efforts in multilateral affairs ultimately will depend to a large measure on the talents, skills, and training of our personnel.

Let me discuss now certain courses of action which we do *not* think are in the American interest:

First, withdrawal from the United Nations as a whole. The President has made clear that the United States continues to support the United Nations. We believe that the organization as a whole serves many important American interests. This option would hurt, not help, the United States.

Second, cessation of our active participation in the General Assembly. We do not believe this is either a desirable or a practical course of action. There are many Assembly activities which are beneficial to us and many which are intertwined with vital activities in other forums like the Security Coun-

cil. For us to cease our active participation in the Assembly's work would deprive us of an influential voice on such issues as: the funding and administration of peacekeeping operations; the planning and shaping of important international conferences, like the World Food Conference and the Law of the Sea Conference; the development of new international institutions like the International Fund for Agricultural Development; the formulation and approval of the U.N. budget, which supports such activities as international drug control and worldwide efforts to improve the environment.

Third, reduction in the U.S. contribution to the U.N.'s budget. This also would be a self-defeating course. We have a treaty obligation to pay our assessed contribution to a U.N. budget properly adopted by its members. The Administration does not intend to disregard the treaty obligations of the United States, and we are certain the Congress would agree. But even if this fundamental consideration were not present, it would still serve no practical purpose to reduce unilaterally our contribution. There is no realistic way to prevent activities which we do not like as a result of such a reduction. The Soviet Union tried this course when it refused to pay its assessments for U.N. bonds required to relieve financial strains arising out of U.N. peacekeeping operations. The net result was not to stop the peacekeeping operations, but to place additional burdens on the funding of all activities covered by the U.N. budget. We should not ourselves consider reductions which would only have the impact of making it harder to support the many activities which we feel are beneficial. I would note in passing that under the present assessment rates the United States is treated specially—and favorably. If the formula used for calculating the dues of others—for example, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union—were applied strictly to the United States, we would pay more than the 25 percent we do now. A great many countries now contribute a larger share of their gross national product to the United Nations than does t United States.

Fourth, cutting off U.S. bilateral assista to all countries which supported the Zioni resolution or other resolutions which w egregiously irresponsible or hostile. We lieve that this type of shotgun appro would harm American interests. It would playing into the hands of extremist adv saries for us to lash out equally at all w voted for the Zionism resolution, with recognizing important differences in und lying situations and even some possible d ferences in motives. In short, our bilate programs serve a great many American terests and are carried out for a wide a complex variety of reasons. We should subordinate all of these American intere to a single vote, no matter how offensive, a recommendatory resolution which we a many other members intend to disrega

Fifth, reduction of U.S. support for mu lateral development assistance, especi through the U.N. Development Progr This also would be contrary to Ameri interests. By cutting back on our own c tributions, we would be lessening sign cantly the money available for many cl friends who benefit from UNDP progra In addition, we would be lessening the ass ance available to many of the poorest co tries, like the drought-stricken nations Africa. This dimension—that some aid is an essentially humanitarian character—a argues against proposals to cut back on bilateral economic assistance. But there an even more fundamental point involv the calculation of U.S. interests. We do support UNDP as a favor to other natio We do so because we believe it is in interest. We believe that the developm efforts fostered by the UNDP and ot multilateral programs will over time cont ute to creating a healthier, expanding wo economy—one in which there will be m opportunities for American business, growing and profitable trade, all of wh can have the consequence of greater Am can prosperity.

clusion

Ir. Chairman, this hearing provides a valu- occasion for the Congress and the Admin- ation to consider together issues of fun- ental importance to the American people. breadth of our interests involved com- ends our physical security, our economic -being, and even our ability to pursue the of way of life which we cherish.

is clear that it would be wrong, even ic, to take only a short-range view of vidual activities within the U.N. system. the Secretary of State commented last in Pittsburgh, "we also will keep in l that we have long-term obligations and we will not be driven by the emotions ie day." [5] All of us, I submit, must make y conceivable effort to keep our sights on our larger long-range goals.

e will not, Mr. Chairman, ever experience ny continuing body, domestic or inter- onal, a steady and straight graph of esses or failures. There will be ups and is. We have recently experienced a seri- ow point. But we have also experienced points that are very high indeed. Fore- among these is the outstanding Ameri- success at the seventh special session nternational economic cooperation. We ot exclude that other high points, other esses, are possible. In fact, we believe they are. But we can achieve them not withdrawing but by participating—by ng and fighting for what we know to be .

e will not ignore our difficulties. We will retend that we have not had setbacks—ise indeed we have. But equally, we in Administration, and we hope and trust this is true of Americans generally, will give up in a fight where there are im- nt and fundamental gains to be made ur country.

d we must maintain historical perspec- Since the United Nations was founded 30 years ago at San Francisco, the l has witnessed fundamental changes which no one could have predicted.

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, on the occasion of the U.N.'s 20th anniversary, shortly before his death, described the situation this way: [6]

> In the bright glow of 1945 too many looked to the United Nations for the full and final answer to world peace. And in retrospect that day may seem to have opened with the hint of a false dawn.
>
> Certainly we have learned the hard way how elusive is peace, how durable is man's destructive drive, how various are the forms of his aggressions.
>
> We have learned, too, how distant is the dream of those better standards of life in larger freedom, how qualified our capacity to practice tolerance, how conditional our claims to the dignity and worth of the human person, how reserved our respect for the obligations of law.

He then described the changes taking place in the world:

> Already science and technology are integrating our world into an open workshop where each new invention defines a new task, and reveals a shared interest, and invites yet another common venture.
>
> In our sprawling workshop of the world community, nations are joined in cooperative endeavor: improving soils, purifying water, harnessing rivers, eradicating disease, feeding children, diffusing knowledge, spreading technology, surveying resources, lending capital, probing the seas, forecasting the weather, setting standards, developing law, and working away at a near infinitude of down-to-earth tasks—tasks for which science has given us the knowledge, and technology has given us the tools, and common sense has given us the wit to perceive that common interest impels us to common enterprise.
>
> Common enterprise is the pulse of world community, the heartbeat of a working peace . . . .

Mr. Chairman, I can find no words that better express my own view of the United Nations than those spoken by this great American on that occasion:

> . . . we support the United Nations; and we shall work in the future, as we have worked in the past, to add strength, and influence, and permanence to all that the organization stands for in this, our tempestuous, tormented, talented world of diversity in which all men are brothers and all brothers are somehow, wondrously, different—save in their need for peace.

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[5] or Secretary Kissinger's news conference at urgh on Nov. 12, 1975, see *ibid.*, p. 770.

[6] For an address made by Ambassador Stevenson at the U.N. 20th anniversary commemorative session at San Francisco, Calif., on June 25, 1965, see BULLETIN of July 19, 1965, p. 101.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[1]
Acceptance deposited: People's Republic of China, March 5, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Algeria, March 8, 1976.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.[1]
Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, March 8, 1976.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Open for signature at U.N. Headquarters from July 1, 1975, to April 30, 1976, inclusive.[1]
Signature: United States, March 11, 1976.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization. Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered into force January 2, 1975; for the United States December 12, 1975.
Declarations of adoption deposited: Austria, December 22, 1975; Bulgaria, January 21, 1976; Cuba, December 11, 1975; France, December 31, 1975; Federal Republic of Germany, January 29, 1976; Poland, February 10, 1976; Switzerland, January 12, 1976; Union of Soviet Socialis publics, December 29, 1975; United States cember 16, 1975.

[1] Not in force.

BILATERAL

Iran

Agreement relating to interim understandings cerning air transport services. Effected by change of notes at Washington December 29, and January 19, 1976. Entered into force Ja 19, 1976.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of May 12, (TIAS 8079), relating to trade in cotton, and man-made fiber textiles. Effected by exc of notes at Washington March 11 and 16, Entered into force March 16, 1976.

Portugal

Agreement for sales of agricultural commo Signed at Washington March 18, 1976. E into force March 18, 1976.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or number from the Superintendent of Document Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for more copies of any one publication mailed same address. Remittances, payable to the Su tendent of Documents, must accompany Prices shown below, which include domestic p are subject to change.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with t public of Korea amending the agreement of A 1973, as amended. TIAS 8142. 7 pp. 50¢. (Ca S9.10:8142).

Desalting Plant. Agreement with Israel. TIA 31 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8144).

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: March 15–21

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†127	3/16	Kissinger: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
128	3/16	U.S. increases program of economic assistance to Portugal.
*129	3/18	Secretary's Advisory Committee of Private International Law, Study Group on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Cambridge, Mass., Apr. 24.
*130	3/18	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC) Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on ship design and equipment, Apr. 13.
*131	3/18	Advisory Committee on International Intellectual Property, International Industrial Property Panel, Apr. 28.
*132	3/18	U.S. and Mexico amend textile agreement, Mar. 16.
*133	3/18	U.S. and Yugoslavia terminate textile agreement, Feb. 14.
134	3/18	Lewis: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
*135	3/18	International investment experts of nine nations meet in 30-day seminar and tour project.
*136	3/18	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Apr. 22.
*137	3/18	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Boston, Mass., Apr. 18.
*138	3/18	SCC, U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, Working Group on segregated ballast in existing tankers, Apr. 8.
*139	3/19	Edward W. Mulcahy sworn in as Ambassador to Tunisia (biographic data).

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.