



# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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## The Global Challenge and International Cooperation

*Address by Secretary Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

Ten days ago our nation entered its 200th year. We begin our Bicentennial with justifiable pride in our past, a recognition of the challenges of the present, and great hope for the future.

The world in which we live is poised uneasily between an era of great enterprise and creativity or an age of chaos and despair. We have, on the one hand, developed weapons that could destroy us and our civilization; we have, on the other, created a world economy that could—for the first time in history—eradicate poverty, hunger, and human suffering.

This complex of unprecedented opportunity and unparalleled danger is at the heart of the great challenge that has faced the United States with increasing urgency since the close of World War II. And it is our generation that must make the choices which will determine success or failure. It is a burden that we can shoulder with fortitude or ignore with peril—but it is a burden we cannot shed.

Our nation has come to symbolize man's capacity to master his destiny. It is a proud legacy that has given hope and inspiration to the millions who have looked to us over the past two centuries as a beacon of liberty and justice.

Today's generation of Americans must be as true to its duty as earlier generations were to theirs. When weapons span continents in

minutes, our security is bound up with world peace. When our factories, farms, and financial strength are deeply affected by decisions taken in foreign lands, our prosperity is linked to world prosperity. The peace of the world and our own security, the world's progress and our own prosperity, are indivisible.

### **The Structure of Peace**

We have a proud foundation on which to build. We have maintained stability in the world, insured the security and independence of scores of nations, and expended blood and treasure in the defense of freedom. Our economic support helped our major allies regain their strength; we contributed to a global trading and monetary system which has sustained and spread prosperity throughout the world. With our encouragement, the new nations took their place in the international community and set out on the path of economic development. At our initiative many longstanding disputes were settled by peaceful means. Conflicts were contained and global war was avoided.

We have provided more economic assistance than any other nation in history. We have contributed more food, educated more people from other lands, and welcomed more immigrants and refugees. We have done so because we are a generous people—for which we need not apologize—and because we have understood that our self-interest is bound up with the fate of all mankind.

These successes have brought great change. The rigidities of the cold war period have

<sup>1</sup> Made before a dinner meeting sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Institute of World Affairs and other organizations at Milwaukee, Wis., on July 14 (text from press release 370).

fragmented. Power and wealth, ideology and purpose, have become diffused and have transformed the international scene. The reemergence of Europe and Japan, the rivalry among the Communist powers, the growth of military technologies, the rise and increasing diversity of the developing nations have produced a new global environment—a world of many centers of power, of persistent ideological differences, clouded by nuclear peril and struggling for economic security and advance. The central focus of U.S. foreign policy is to help shape from this environment a new international structure based on equilibrium rather than confrontation, linking nations to each other by practices of cooperation that reflect the reality of global interdependence.

Our task begins at home. To be strong and effective abroad, we must be strong and purposeful at home. To preserve peace, our military strength must be beyond challenge. To promote global prosperity, our domestic economy must prosper. To carry forward our international efforts, we must be a united people, sure in our purposes and determined to build on the great achievements of our national heritage.

Our first responsibility abroad is to the great industrial democracies with whom we share our history, our prosperity, and our political ideals. Our alliances across the Atlantic and with Japan are the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Today they are more than responses to military threat; they are instrumentalities of social and economic cooperation as well.

The ultimate objective of our alliances has always been to ease, not to freeze, the divisions of the world. In the past few years the United States has taken a number of steps to resolve concrete problems with the Soviet Union and lay the basis for more positive endeavors. We have also forged a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. There can be no lasting international stability unless the major powers learn habits of restraint and feel a stake in international peace; all our hopes for a better world require that they use their power for the benefit of mankind.

The scores of new nations that have become independent since the Second World War are now major actors on the world scene. In their quest for their own progress, they present a challenge to the rest of the world—to demonstrate that the international structure can give them a role, a fair share, dignity, and responsibility.

All of us—allies and adversaries, new nations and old, rich and poor—are part of a world community. Our interdependence on this planet is becoming the central fact of our diplomacy. Energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas—these are problems whose benefits and burdens transcend national boundaries. They carry the seeds of political conflict over the coming generation; they challenge the capacities of the international community with new requirements for vision and statesmanship.

Much of our current agenda is therefore global in nature and must be dealt with on a global basis. Within a few weeks there will be two major meetings of the most prominent international organization, the United Nations. A special session of the General Assembly will be devoted to economic issues, and the 30th regular session of the General Assembly will address the broad range of international problems.

Therefore I would like to use this occasion to place before you and our fellow members of the United Nations a candid assessment of how the U.S. Government views the contemporary United Nations—its capacities and its limitations, its promise and the trends which threaten future progress.

### **The Record of the United Nations**

Thirty years after the founding of the United Nations, its achievements have been substantial, and its promise is great. Most of the world is at peace. Beyond the absence of armed conflict, there has been a transition from a preoccupation with security to a new concern for the economic and social progress of all mankind. Yet, at the very time when interdependence impels international cooperation and when the membership of the

United Nations is most universal, the international organization is being tested by a new clash of ideologies and interests and by insistent tactics of confrontation. Such tendencies diminish the prospect for further achievement and threaten the very institution itself.

Let me place these tendencies in historical perspective.

The end of the Second World War brought on a period of idealism and hope. Victory in war against tyrannical regimes—by nations united for that purpose—seemed as much a triumph for liberty as for peace. The end of the colonial era was shortly to begin and was clearly in prospect. The awesome power of nuclear weapons, ironically, gave hope that the imperatives of collective security and peaceful settlement of disputes would at last impress themselves on mankind. The League of Nations had failed, but the cost of another failure now seemed so overwhelming that it was possible to hope that the nations of the world would be obliged to make the United Nations succeed.

No nation embraced this hope more genuinely than the United States. No country more seriously looked for the United Nations to replace force and domination with cooperation. No government more earnestly sought to create a world organization with a capacity to act. It is worth recalling that a year after the San Francisco Conference, when the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons, we offered to turn this entire technology over to the United Nations.

Even then American spokesmen were careful to insist that there were realistic limits to the scope of the new organization. Of these limits the most important, even if perhaps the easiest to overlook, is that the United Nations is not a world government; it is an organization of sovereign states. It is not an entity apart from its membership. It reflects the world context in which it operates—its diversity, its imperfections, its many centers of power and initiative, its competing values, its worldly compound of nobility and tragedy.

The founders' hope for peace rested not on

a naive belief in the perfectibility of man but on the hope that the major powers, given a dominant role in the Security Council, would be able to concert together to keep the peace. This hope, of course, proved stillborn when the United Nations became an arena for the confrontations of the cold war.

A generation later, its record in maintaining the peace shows both success and failure. There have been local wars; yet there has been no general war. More than once, small conflicts which could have led in the past to great ones have been contained through the efforts of the United Nations.

Time and again—in the eastern Mediterranean, in the Middle East, in the Congo, in Kashmir—the peacekeeping role of the United Nations has proved indispensable for settlement, guarantees, and prevention of major-power intervention. While a far cry from the concept of collective security originally envisioned, these operations have proven valuable and increasingly indispensable. They represent the most advanced manifestations of international cooperation for security yet achieved.

The United Nations has understood the principle that peace is not the same as the *status quo*, but must embrace procedures for peaceful change. Whether by special commissions or mediators or through the expanded role of the Secretary General within his broad responsibilities under article 99 of the charter, the United Nations has offered a flexible instrument of pacific settlement on a score of occasions since its founding.

The United Nations has provided a forum for debate and negotiation on regional or global problems and for multilateral efforts for arms control and disarmament. The talks provide a safety valve and a sounding board; in the corridors, quiet progress is often being made.

We found early on that there were limits to U.N. action on behalf of peace and security. Its writ can run no further than the agreement of its members. And on the sweeping issues of war and peace, it is the great powers, by virtue of their size, military strength, economic power, and political in-

fluence, who bear the principal responsibility for world stability and security. Of late, as the great powers are learning the practices of coexistence, there is hope that the United Nations can find renewed possibilities for effective action in accordance with the vision of its founders.

The United Nations, originally concerned primarily with issues of peace and security, has been the focus of increasing attention to economic and social issues. The U.N. Charter contains a commitment "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." Today, roughly nine-tenths of expenditures within the U.N. system relate to economic and social cooperation. We welcome this evolution and have contributed generously to it.

Indeed, it is in these fields that the work of the United Nations has been most successful and yet the most unheralded. Its specialized agencies have been effectively involved with countless areas of human and international concern—speeding decolonization; spreading education, science, and technology; organizing global cooperation to combat hunger and disease, to protect the environment, and to limit population growth; regulating international transport and communication and peaceful nuclear power; advancing human rights and expanding international law among nations and in outer space and on the seas; preserving the priceless cultural heritage of mankind. It is striking, and of great importance for the future, that the United Nations has been able to respond creatively to so many of the challenges of the modern age.

Thus the United Nations is of considerable importance for the world's future. It has accommodated our traditional security and political concerns to the new conditions of international diplomacy; it has extended its reach—even before most nations did—toward the new agenda that now confronts the world community. The United Nations is both a symbol of our interdependence and our most universal instrument for common progress.

In this connection, I want to pay tribute

to the outstanding leadership given to the United Nations by its Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim. He is tireless and totally dedicated to peace, fairness, and the future of the United Nations. The rapidity and efficiency with which he organized and dispatched peacekeeping forces to the Middle East in late 1973 was but one example of the many services he has rendered the organization and the international community.

#### **The United States and the United Nations**

Yet with all these achievements, the future of the United Nations is clouded. Much that has transpired at the United Nations in recent years gives us pause. At the very moment when great-power confrontations are waning, troubling trends have appeared in the General Assembly and some of its specialized agencies. Ideological confrontation, bloc voting, and new attempts to manipulate the charter to achieve unilateral ends threaten to turn the United Nations into a weapon of political warfare rather than a healer of political conflict and a promoter of human welfare.

The United Nations naturally mirrors the evolution of its composition. In its first phase it reflected the ideological struggle between the West and the East; during that period the United Nations generally followed the American lead. Time and again in those days there were some 50 votes in support of our position and only a handful of Communist-bloc members against.

Ten years later, when membership had grown to more than 80, our dominance in the General Assembly no longer was assured. Neither East nor West was able to prevail. In the Security Council the American position was still sustained, while the Soviet Union was required to cast veto after veto in order to protect what it considered to be its vital interests.

But with the quantum leap to the present membership of 138, the past tendencies of bloc politics have become more pronounced and more serious. The new nations, for understandable reasons, turned to the General

Assembly, in which they predominated, in a quest for power that simply does not reside there. The Assembly cannot take compulsory legal decisions. Yet numerical majorities have insisted on their will and objectives even when in population and financial contributions they were a small proportion of the membership.

In the process, a forum for accommodation has been transformed into a setting for confrontation. The moral influence which the General Assembly should exercise has been jeopardized and could be destroyed if governments—particularly those who are its main financial supporters—should lose confidence in the organization because of the imposition of a mechanical and increasingly arbitrary will.

It is an irony that at the moment the United States has accepted nonalignment and the value of diversity, those nations which originally chose this stance to preserve their sovereign independence from powerful military alliances are forming a rigid grouping of their own. The most solid bloc in the world today is, paradoxically, the alignment of the nonaligned. This divides the world into categories of North and South, developing and developed, imperial and colonial, at the very moment in history when such categories have become irrelevant and misleading.

Never before has the world been more in need of cooperative solutions. Never before have the industrial nations been more ready to deal with the problems of development in a constructive spirit. Yet lopsided, loaded voting, biased results, and arbitrary tactics threaten to destroy these possibilities. The utility of the General Assembly both as a safety valve and as an instrument of international cooperation is being undermined. Tragically, the principal victims will be the countries who seek to extort what substantially could be theirs if they proceeded cooperatively.

An equally deplorable development is the trend in the specialized agencies to focus on political issues and thereby deflect the significant work of these agencies. UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural

Organization], designed for cultural matters, and the International Labor Organization have been heavily politicized. An egregious recent case came in the World Food Council in Rome, where the very nations who desperately need, and would most benefit from, food assistance threatened to abort its work by disruptive tactics unworthy of an international organization. This Council grew out of the American initiatives at the World Food Conference last year. It reflects our deepest humanitarian concerns; it represents a serious effort on our part to eliminate hunger and malnutrition. Abuse by those whom we are trying to help, attacks on our motives by the beneficiaries of our efforts, threaten to undermine the very fabric of cooperation in a field of crucial long-range importance to mankind.

We realize that those of us who wish to surmount the current crisis must show some understanding of its origins. The major powers have hardly always set a consistent example of altruistic or benevolent behavior. The nations which would seek to coerce the industrialized countries have themselves been coerced in the past. History haunts us all. But it is precisely to transcend that history that the United Nations was founded. And it is precisely to arrest such trends that the United States is calling attention to them today.

The process is surely self-defeating. According to the rules of the General Assembly, the coerced are under no compulsion to submit. To the contrary, they are given all too many incentives simply to depart the scene, to have done with the pretense. Such incentives are ominously enhanced when the General Assembly and specialized agencies expel member nations which for one reason or another do not meet with their approval.

Our concern has nothing to do with our attitude toward the practices or policies of the particular governments against which action is being taken. Our position is constitutional. If the United Nations begins to depart from its charter, where suspension and expulsion are clearly specified prerogatives of the Security Council, we fear for

the integrity and the survival of the General Assembly itself, and no less for that of the specialized agencies. Those who seek to manipulate U.N. membership by procedural abuse may well inherit an empty shell.

We are determined to oppose tendencies which, in our view, will undermine irreparably the effectiveness of the United Nations. It is the smaller members of the organization who would lose the most. They are more in need of the United Nations than the larger powers such as the United States which can prosper within or outside the institution.

Ways must be found for power and responsibility in the Assembly and in the specialized agencies to be more accurately reflective of the realities of the world. The United States has been by far the largest financial supporter of the United Nations; but the support of the American people, which has been the lifeblood of the organization, will be profoundly alienated unless fair play predominates and the numerical majority respects the views of the minority. The American people are understandably tired of the inflammatory rhetoric against us, the all-or-nothing stance accompanied by demands for *our* sacrifice which too frequently dominate the meeting halls of the United Nations.

The United States, despite these trends, intends to do everything in our power to support and strengthen the United Nations in its positive endeavors. With all its limitations and imperfections the world body remains an urgent necessity. We are eager to cooperate, but we are also determined to insist on orderly procedures and adherence to the charter. The United Nations was never intended as an organization of like-minded states but, rather, an arena to accommodate and respect different policies and different interests. The world needs cooperative, not arbitrary, action; joint efforts, not imposed solutions. In this spirit the United States will do what it can to make the United Nations a vital hope for a better future.

## The Agenda Before Us

This, then, is the promise and the problem of the United Nations. We must insure that the promise prevails, because the agenda we face makes the institution more necessary than ever before.

The United Nations, first, faces continuing and increasing responsibilities in its mission, in the famous words of the U.N. Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

One of the central issues of our time is the Middle East conflict, and the U.N. Security Council continues to play a vital role in the quest for a solution. Resolution 338 of 1973 launched a negotiating process which has borne fruit and proved durable. Secretary General Waldheim convened and addressed the first session of the Geneva Conference. Resolution 242 of 1967 stated general principles for a comprehensive peace. The stationing of U.N. Forces was an indispensable element of the recent disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria in 1974.

But despite these and other real achievements, the global perils of local conflict continue to loom large. The world has dealt with them as if it were possible to contain conflict perpetually. But such tolerance tempts conflagration. That is how the first two World Wars began. We must not have a third; with modern weapons there would not be a fourth. It is not enough to contain the crises that occur; we must eradicate their causes. President Ford is therefore determined to help bring about a negotiated solution in the Middle East, in Cyprus, and in other areas of dispute. And peacekeeping and peacemaking must be a top priority on the U.N. agenda.

Another problem of peace which the world community must urgently address is the spread of nuclear weapons. Their awesomeness has chained these weapons for almost three decades; their sophistication and expense have long helped limit the number of nations which could possess them. But now political inhibitions are crumbling. Nuclear

catastrophe—whether by plan or mistake, accident, theft, or blackmail—is no longer implausible.

It is imperative to contain—and reverse—the nuclear arms race among the major powers. We are now engaged in translating the principles agreed to in Vladivostok between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev into a new accord between the United States and the Soviet Union that will for the first time place a long-term ceiling on the strategic weapons of both sides.

As we strive to slow the spiral of nuclear arms, we must work as well to halt their spread. This requires both political and technical measures. In these areas the work of the United Nations has been important and could be crucial.

The Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970 was an important beginning. The recent conference held under U.N. auspices to review the treaty, and the adherence of additional countries to its provisions, have been valuable further steps.

The priority now is to strengthen the safeguards on the export of nuclear materials for peaceful uses. The oil crisis adds fresh urgency to this task because it has made the development of nuclear energy essential for an increasing number of nations. This means wider availability of materials, such as plutonium, and of equipment which might be used to develop nuclear explosives.

Future generations have a right to expect of us that commercial competition among the industrial exporting countries will not be so reckless and irresponsible that it accelerates the spread of nuclear weapons and thereby increases the risks of a nuclear holocaust.

Therefore the United States has begun confidential discussions with other nuclear-exporting countries to develop stronger and generally accepted safeguards. In this task, the role and work of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency is vital. As peaceful nuclear programs grow in size and complexity it is crucial that supplier and user

nations agree on firm and clear export standards and strengthened IAEA safeguards. An effective world safeguards system will minimize nuclear risks while fostering the development of peaceful nuclear energy. The control of nuclear weapons is one of the most critical tests of this generation. The United Nations can crucially help decide whether we will meet this test.

### **The Problem of Interdependence**

In the last few years the world economy has undergone a series of shocks and strains:

—Nations have suffered both severe inflation and deep recession on a worldwide scale.

—The price of the world's most essential commodity, petroleum, has been precipitously and arbitrarily increased, burdening the economies of all consuming nations and imposing the most serious hardships on the poorest countries.

—The world's food reserves have dwindled alarmingly in only a few short years. Unless massive efforts are mounted, the gap between population growth and food production could reach disastrous proportions.

—The pursuit of economic growth is complicated by the fact of interdependence; it can no longer be pursued by national efforts, but requires coordinated global actions.

This September's special session of the General Assembly will focus on the new global economic concerns. It will be an early and important test: Will the rich nations and poor nations identify common goals and solve problems together, or will they exacerbate their differences? Can we turn our energies from rhetorical battles to practical cooperation? Will nations strive for empty parliamentary victories or concrete progress?

The United States has made its choice. We believe strongly in a cooperative approach. We believe that the time has come to put the technological and economic genius of mankind into the service of progress for all. We will approach the special session with determination to make progress; we intend to

make concrete and constructive proposals for action across a broad spectrum of international economic activities such as trade and commodities, world food production, and international financial measures.

The session will also consider structural changes to improve the U.N.'s capabilities in the field of economic development. A group of experts appointed by Secretary General Waldheim has just completed a study of this subject. We will offer specific comments on these recommendations during the Assembly debate.

In this spirit, let me speak directly to the new nations who have pressed their claims with increasing fervor. We have heard and have begun to understand your concerns. We want to be responsive. We are prepared to undertake joint efforts to alleviate your economic problems. Clearly this requires a posture of cooperation. If nations deal with each other with respect and understanding, the two sessions this fall could mark the beginning of a new era in which the realities of an interdependent world economy generate a global effort to bring about peaceful and substantial change.

At the same time we are obliged to speak plainly to the question of what works and what does not. We believe that economic development is in the first instance an internal process. Either societies create the conditions for saving and investment, for innovation and ingenuity, and for enterprise and industry which ultimately lead to self-sustaining economic growth, or they do not. There is no magical shortcut and no rhetorical substitute. And to claim otherwise suggests a need for permanent dependence on others.

In this quest for development, experience must count for something and ideology is an unreliable guide. At a minimum, we know which economies have worked and which have failed; we have a record of what societies have progressed economically and which have stagnated. We know from our own experience that investment from abroad can be an important spur to development. We know also that it is now in short supply. In the future, as in the past, there will be

competition to attract capital; therefore those who do not wish investment from abroad can be confident that they will not receive it. By the same token those countries which are eager to industrialize must also be ready to create the conditions that will attract large-scale investment.

The voting records of the blocs in the General Assembly simply do not reflect economic reality. The family of less developed countries includes both producers and consumers of energy, importers and exporters of raw materials, and nations which can feed their populations as well as those which face the specter of famine. These divergent interests must be accommodated and reflected in practical measures; they cannot be resolved from the unreality of bloc positions.

At the same time, the industrial world must adapt its own attitudes to the new reality of scores of new nations. At bottom the challenge is political, not economic—whether the interests and weight of the less developed nations can be accommodated in the international order. Their political objectives often represent legitimate claims. Yet at the same time the new nations must not expect us to make *only* political decisions, with *no* thought for economic consequences. If they want truly to serve their peoples, there must be practical concern for effective results.

If the industrial world wants to overcome the attitude of confrontation between nations, it must offer equitable solutions for the problems of the less fortunate parts of the world. Just as we are rightly concerned about the economic impact of exorbitant oil prices, so we should show understanding for the concerns of producers of other raw materials whose incomes fluctuate radically.

As for the operation of our companies abroad, we consider it in our interest, as well as in the common interest, to promote an environment of mutual benefit in which our international businesses can continue to be both profitable and beneficial to the countries in which they operate. We will address this issue more fully at the special session.

Above all, the industrialized countries must recognize that many developing coun-

tries have had frustratingly slow rates of growth. Rather than a comfortable margin of progress, they face an abundance of obstacles and a surplus of despair. The future of international politics over the next generation—the kind of world our children will inherit—will be determined by what actions governments take now on this spectrum of economic issues.

### **The Central Role of the United Nations**

Dag Hammarskjöld once predicted that the day would come when people would see the United Nations for what it really is—not the abstract painting of some artist, but a drawing done by the peoples of the world. And so it is—not the perfect institution of the dreamers who saw it as the only true road to world harmony and not the evil instrument of world domination that the isolationists once made it out to be.

Rather it is, like so many human institutions before it, an imperfect instrument—but one of great hope nonetheless. The United States remains dedicated to the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. We continue to believe it can be a mighty and effective vehicle for preserving the peace and bridging the gap between the world's rich and poor. We will do all we can to make it so.

The past decade, and particularly the past several years, have been a difficult time for America. We have known the agony of internal dissension and political turmoil and the bitter costs of a lengthy war. But our nation has come through all this and its most difficult constitutional crisis since the Civil War with our institutions intact and our people resilient. And we have seen that the world still looks to us for leadership in preserving the peace and promoting economic advance for all mankind.

But the past decade has also surely shown that—strong and prosperous as we are—we cannot remake the world alone. Others must do their part and bear their responsibility for building the better world we all seek for the generations that will come after us.

In this endeavor, the United Nations plays a central role. It is there that each nation,

large or small, rich or poor, can—if it will—make its contribution to the betterment of all. It is there that nations must realize that restraint is the only principle that can save the world from chaos and that our destinies are truly intertwined on this small planet. It is there that we will see whether men and nations have the wisdom and courage to make a reality of the ideals of the charter and, in the end, to turn the Parliament of Man into a true expression of the conscience of humanity.

### **Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Milwaukee Address**

Press release 370B dated July 14

*Q. Has the United States recently shifted its position toward developing a first-strike nuclear capability?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Before I answer any questions, I wanted to make one remark about some of the people at the head table here.

For those of us in the executive branch, close relations between the executive and the legislative have always been crucially important, and I wanted to take the occasion to pay tribute to the senior ranking Democrat on the International Relations Committee after the chairman, your Congressman from Milwaukee, Clem Zablocki, who has been of enormous assistance in helping us put forward what we consider useful foreign policy initiatives, and who has not, I must point out, hesitated to harass us when he wrongly thought we were wrong. [Laughter and applause.]

And I would also like to say a word for one of that rare breed, the few Republicans that are left in the House of Representatives, Mr. Kasten, on my right, who—and when any member of the executive branch says anything friendly about a freshman these days, it is an accident. [Laughter.] But in his brief tenure in Washington, I have known him as a supporter of enlightened foreign policies who has not hesitated, I regret to say, to criticize us. But we will teach him. [Laughter

and applause.] You notice I did not say that about Zablocki. [Laughter.]

Now, with respect to your question: I do not believe that the United States has changed its basic policy with respect to first strike. It has always been the United States policy that in certain extreme circumstances, if the national survival was at stake or if the survival of our close allies, especially Europe, were at stake, and if no other means were available, that the United States might have to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons.

If you look at the statements of Presidents and Secretaries of Defense since the fifties, this has been a settled American doctrine. It has recently been stated more elegantly than in the past and therefore has attracted new attention. But it is not a new American policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what importance, other than ceremonial, do you attach to the coming July 30 East-West summit conference in Helsinki?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The European Security Conference has been in progress for several years. And in that period, it has attempted to establish a balance between the concerns of the East, which dealt primarily with the acceptance of frontiers, and the concerns of the West, which concerned primarily a recognition that peaceful change was not precluded by the existing circumstances and that an easing of human contacts with the East was in prospect.

I believe that the final document that has been negotiated achieves a balance between these two objectives. The meeting at the summit in Helsinki will symbolize this and will give an opportunity for the various heads of government to exchange ideas on many other problems going far beyond the Security Conference.

The Security Conference should not be overestimated as marking a decisive turn. It is one step in a progress toward the easing of tensions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will you explain the differences between your plan to disengage the Arabs and Israelis and the U.N. Resolution 242 signed by the big powers the war before*

*last, and do you believe the two sides prefer your plan to the U.N. 242?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, it is hard for me to imagine that anyone would not prefer my plan. [Laughter and applause.]

But the two approaches are not inconsistent with each other.

There are two general ways one can get at the solution of the Middle East problem. One is to attempt in one grand negotiation to settle all issues simultaneously—frontiers, Palestinians, guarantees, obligations of peace, and so forth. This would be the most desirable route, but it is also the most complicated, because the most extreme elements may dominate the debate and because outside powers may also bring pressure on the discussion.

The other approach is to try to isolate individual issues, deal with them one at a time until one has reached a point where this so-called step-by-step approach could no longer be feasible, and then attempt to have the overall negotiation.

We have believed that the distrust among the countries was so great, the issues so complicated, that to deal with them all simultaneously had an unacceptable risk to produce a stalemate and therefore an unacceptable risk of a Middle East war. And in a way, the complexity of even a single negotiation tends to support this.

On the other hand, if we should succeed in the negotiations now going on, it is highly probable that the next phase will deal with an overall settlement.

So what I have been doing up to now should be looked at as a preparatory phase to the overall settlement that was foreseen by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

*Q. Mr. Chairman, given the threat of the Soviet base in Somalia, do you believe this fact will give Congress added impetus to approve funds for a naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The visits by two congressional committees to Somalia seem to support the proposition that there is a Soviet facility in Somalia. And therefore it would be my impression that it would tend to strengthen the case for the base at Diego

Garcia that the Administration has proposed.

I would like to add, however, that the case for the base at Diego Garcia rests not only on the Soviet facility in Somalia, but it rests also on the general necessities of American strategy on a global basis and therefore has more justification than simply the base in Somalia, even though that is a contributing factor.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event of another Middle East war, would you support direct American military involvement to support Israel?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Israel has never asked for direct American military involvement and has always asked to be given sufficient arms to take care of itself. Therefore we do not believe that this issue will arise in another Middle East war. Nevertheless another Middle East war is something that we have every incentive to avoid, because it would create unacceptable pressures on our relations with Western Europe and Japan and high risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The United States has taken the position that we would resist outside intervention in the area. But we have also taken the position that the best way to avoid these contingencies is to make steady progress toward peace.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the minimum demands of President Sadat in order to renew the U.N. peacekeeping agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the Egyptian position has been to tie a renewal of the U.N. mandate to progress in the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. That decision will have to be made by July 24. And no one can survive who makes a prediction in the Middle East which can be proved right or wrong in such a short period.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, some of us in the United States feel that power and force is no longer the best means to solve world problems, even as the U.N.'s framers felt. What can the ordinary citizen do to assure that our government will begin to use the best minds and best hopes to solve these very complex problems? Could we not seek out a dozen of the*

*best minds in each state to pool their wisdom to aid in the support of peaceful means within the realm of the United Nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I agree with you that under contemporary conditions force is not an adequate means for settling international disputes. But I think it is also unfortunately true that as long as other countries maintain strong forces, the only way this can be achieved is by the United States maintaining its own strength.

Now, is it possible to avoid this threat by some comprehensive approach to the problem, either through government or by bringing in outside minds. As a former professor, I find it tempting to think that somewhere out there are 12 people in each country who, if they could only be consulted, would solve our problems. I frankly do not think that is the case. I do not doubt that there are outstanding people in the world who are not being sufficiently consulted. But I think the problem of war and peace and the elimination of war and the reduction of the reliance on force require a slow, patient, persevering effort. And I do not believe that it can be achieved in one grand solution written by a group of outsiders, however brilliant they are. I won't have that view, though, after I have left this position. [Laughter and applause.]

*Q. We just want to help you along a little bit.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Dr. Baumann [Carol Baumann, Director, Institute of World Affairs of the University of Wisconsin] says I will take one more question from the floor and then one from the head table. All right—please; whoever is next.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how long will it be until we reestablish diplomatic ties with Cuba?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* How long will it be? We have publicly stated that hostility to Cuba is not an organic aspect of our foreign policy and that we are prepared to have serious exchanges with Cuba on the basis of reciprocity. We have made some gestures. Recently Cuba has made some gestures in our direction. But they have so far mostly

concerned atmospherics. We are prepared to begin a dialogue with Cuba; and once that is in progress, we can judge better what the possibilities are for improving our relationships.

*Dr. Baumann: I'm sorry, but we are at the limit of our time. One of the prerogatives of the chair is to change the format. And there was a very good question that I would like to ask Dr. Kissinger which came from the head table.*

*Having responded to the many concerns over crisis areas this evening, could you perhaps close this informative session with an optimistic note reflecting the brighter areas and some of the accomplishments that influence the present U.S. position and our future?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I think it is important to understand that the world right now is in the process of transition from the post-war period, in which Western Europe and Japan were impotent as a result of the war, in which communism was monolithic, to a period in which Western Europe and Japan, largely as a result of our own efforts, of our own contribution—or to a considerable extent as a result of our own contribution—have recovered their strength and self-confidence to a considerable extent and in which the Communist world has fragmented itself into competing centers. And also that we are living in a world, as I said in my speech, that is growing ever more interdependent. So the commotion we are witnessing is the birth of a new international system, in which, on the whole, considerable progress is being made. America's relations*

with Western Europe and Japan have never been better—and not just on issues of common defense but also in relationship to the issues of energy, raw materials, and improvement of the human condition.

Our relationship with the Soviet Union is still an adversary relationship. Nevertheless we have for the first time begun to limit strategic arms; and we hope by the end of this year, or certainly in the near future, we will conclude a comprehensive agreement which for the first time will put a ceiling on strategic weapons and therefore substantially reduce the possibilities of nuclear conflagration.

We have established relationships with the People's Republic of China.

With all the debates that are now going on, we think there is a great opportunity to work out together with the new nations a new approach to international development which will for the first time create a true world community. So I believe that our foreign policy is basically making progress and that we can look back to this period as one in which tensions were eased and a new international system was being created amidst much turmoil, with many frustrations, but on the whole one that will create a safer and better world for future generations. [Applause.]

*Dr. Baumann: Mr. Secretary, that enthusiastic applause is but a small indication of our appreciation for the candor with which you share your thoughts with us, the sparkle of your wit, and the time you so generously spent in answering our questions. On behalf of everyone here, our sincere thanks.*

## The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

I have long looked forward to coming to Minnesota because it is the home of a man I admire enormously, the one man who likes to talk almost as much as I do—Senator Humphrey. At the hearings on my nomination as Secretary of State, Senator Humphrey instructed me with much wisdom on the difficult job ahead. His advice was right on the mark and has been ever since. He is a good friend and a great statesman. Minnesotans can be proud that he represents them in the U.S. Senate, for he is an example of the spirit of our country—its decency, its humanity, and its strength.

America has now entered upon its 200th year as a free nation. In those two centuries our country has grown from a small agricultural nation with very few responsibilities beyond its borders to a world power with global responsibilities. Yet, while the range of interests has changed massively, our commitment to the values that gave birth to our nation has remained unaltered.

These are the aspects of our national experience I would like to address today: the pursuit of America's values as a humane and just example to others, and the furthering of America's interests in a world where power remains the ultimate arbiter. How do we reconcile and advance both aspects of our national purpose? What, in our time, is the significance of the age-old quandary of the relationship between principle and power?

Through the greater part of our history

we have been able to avoid the issue. A fortunate margin of safety and an unexplored continent produced the impression that principle and power automatically coalesced, that no choice was necessary, or that only one choice was possible.

But now for nearly a decade our nation has been weighed down by uncertainty and discord. We have found ourselves doubtful of our virtue and uncertain of our direction largely because we have suddenly realized that, like other nations before us, we must now reconcile our principles with our necessities. Amid frustration, many Americans questioned the validity of our involvement in the international arena; in the wake of our disappointments, some abroad now doubt our resolve.

We are, I believe, emerging from this period with a renewed sense of confidence. Recent events have brought home to us—and to the rest of the world—that a purposeful, strong, and involved America is essential to peace and progress. These same events have also reminded us of the contribution this country made in the 30 years since World War II and what is at stake in the next 30 years.

The United States can look back on an extraordinary generation of achievement. We have maintained a stable balance of power in the world. We have preserved peace and fostered the growth of the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. We helped shape the international trade and monetary system which has nourished global prosperity. We promoted decolonization and pioneered in

<sup>1</sup>Made at a luncheon meeting sponsored by the Upper Midwest Council and other organizations at Bloomington (Minneapolis), Minn., on July 15 (text from press release 372).

development assistance for the new nations. We have taken major initiatives to forge more reliable and positive relationships with the major Communist powers.

In a planet shrunk by communications and technology, in a world either devastated by war or struggling in the first steps of nationhood, in an international system not of empire but of scores of independent states, the global contribution of one nation—the United States—has been without precedent in human history. Only a nation of strong conviction and great idealism could have accomplished these efforts.

We shall not turn our backs on this legacy.

### **The Modern Agenda**

Today we face a new agenda. Our accomplishments over the past generation have changed the world and defined our tasks for the coming decades:

—Our allies, the major industrial democracies, have recovered their vigor and influence. We are transforming our alliances into more equal partnerships. We shall act in harmony with friends whose security and prosperity is indispensable to our own and whose cooperation is essential for progress and justice.

—The incredible destructiveness of modern weapons has transformed international politics. We must maintain our military strength. But we have an obligation, in our own interest as well as the world's, to work with other nations to control both the growth and the spread of nuclear weapons.

—In our relations with the Communist powers we must never lose sight of the fact that in the thermonuclear age general war would be disastrous to mankind. We have an obligation to seek a more productive and stable relationship despite the basic antagonism of our values.

—Thirty years of economic and political evolution have brought about a new diffusion of power and initiative. At the same time, interdependence imposes upon all nations the reality that they must prosper together or suffer together. The destinies of the world's

nations have become inevitably intertwined. Thus, the capacity of any one nation to shape events is more limited, and consequently our own choices are more difficult and complex.

### **The Legacy of Our Past**

To deal with this agenda we require strength of purpose and conviction. A nation unsure of its values cannot shape its future. A people confused about its direction will miss the opportunity to build a better and more peaceful world. This is why perhaps our deepest challenge is our willingness to face the increasing ambiguity of the problem of ends and means.

We start with strong assets. Throughout our history, we have sought to define and justify our foreign policy in terms of principle. We have never seen ourselves as just another nation-state pursuing selfish aims. We have always stood for something beyond ourselves—a beacon to the oppressed from other lands, from the first settlers to the recent refugees from Indochina. This conviction of our uniqueness contributed to our unity, gave focus to our priorities, and sustained our confidence in ourselves. It has been, and is, a powerful force.

But the emphasis on principle has also produced a characteristic American ambivalence. Relations with a world of nations falling short of our ideal has always presented us with dilemmas. As a people, we have oscillated between insistence on our uniqueness and the quest for broad acceptance of our values, between trying to influence international developments and seeking to isolate ourselves from them, between expecting too much of our power and being ashamed of it, between optimistic exuberance and frustration with the constraints practicality imposes.

Through most of our history, we have sought to shield our country and hemisphere from outside intrusion, to shun involvement in balance-of-power politics. Soldiers and diplomats—the practitioners of power—have always been looked upon with suspicion. We considered generosity in relief efforts, the encouragement of free international trade,

and the protection of our economic interests abroad as the only wholesome forms of international involvement.

Our Founding Fathers were sophisticated men who understood the European balance of power and knew how to profit from it. For the succeeding century and a half, our security was assured by favorable circumstances over which we had little influence. Shielded by two oceans and enriched by a bountiful nature, we proclaimed our special situation as universally valid to nations whose narrower margin of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own.

Indeed, the concern of other nations for security reinforced our sense of uniqueness. We were a haven for millions, a place where the injustices, inequities, privations, and abridgements of human dignity which the immigrants had suffered were absent or amenable to rapid redress.

As our strength and size expanded, we remained uncomfortable with the uses and responsibilities of power and involvement in day-to-day diplomacy. At the turn of the century, for example, there were soul-searching debates over the Spanish-American War and our first acquisition of noncontiguous territories. While many saw our policies as dictated by our interests, others considered them our entrance into a morally questionable world.

Our tradition of law encouraged repeated attempts to legislate solutions to international conflicts. Arbitration, conciliation, international legal arrangements, neutrality legislation, collective security systems—all these were invoked to banish the reality of power. And when our involvement in conflict became unavoidable in 1917, Woodrow Wilson translated our geopolitical interest in preventing any nation's hegemony in Europe into a universal moral objective; we fought to "make the world safe for democracy."

The inevitable disillusionment with an imperfect outcome led to a tide of isolationist sentiment. The Great Depression drew our energies further inward, as we sought to deal with the problems of our own society—

even as that same depression simultaneously generated real dangers abroad.

We were stirred from isolation only by external attack, and we sustained our effort because of the obvious totalitarian evil. We had opposed all-out war, and total victory further strengthened our sense of moral rectitude—and ill prepared us for the aftermath. Of all the nations involved, we alone emerged essentially unscathed from the ravages of conflict, our military power, economic strength, and political confidence intact. And in the postwar bipolar world of cold war confrontation, we believed we faced a reincarnation of the just-defeated foe—an apparently monolithic and hostile ideological empire whose ambitions and values were antithetical to our own.

Our success and the preeminent position it brought convinced us that we could shape the globe according to American design. Our preponderant power gave us a broad margin for error, so we believed that we could overwhelm problems through the sheer weight of resources. No other nation possessed so much insurance against so many contingencies; we could afford to be imprecise in the definition of our interests. Indeed, we often imagined that we had nothing so selfish as interests, only obligations and responsibilities. In a period of seemingly clear-cut black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our cause.

### **America's Role**

We no longer live in so simple a world. We remain the strongest nation and the largest single factor in international affairs. Our leadership is perhaps even more essential than before. But our strategic superiority has given way to nuclear balance. Our political and economic predominance has diminished as others have grown in strength, and our dependence on the world economy has increased. Our margin of safety has shrunk.

Today we find that—like most other nations in history—we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Today, we must

conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, maneuver, and imagination in the pursuit of our interests. We must be thoughtful in defining our interests. We must prepare against the worst contingency and not plan only for the best. We must pursue limited objectives and many objectives simultaneously. In this effort, the last decade has taught us:

—That our power will not always bring preferred solutions; but we are still strong enough to influence events, often decisively.

—That we cannot remedy all the world's ills; but we can help build an international structure that will foster the initiative and cooperation of others.

—That we can no longer expect that moral judgments expressed in absolute terms will command broad acceptance; but as the richest and most powerful nation, we still have a special responsibility to look beyond narrow definitions of our national interests and to serve as a sponsor of world order.

—That we cannot banish power politics from international affairs; but we can promote new and wider communities of interest among nations; we can mute the use and threat of force; we can help establish incentives for restraint and penalties for its absence; we can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation; and we can help construct a more equitable pattern of relations between developed and developing nations.

This new complexity has produced in some a rebellion against contemporary foreign policy. We are told that our foreign policy is excessively pragmatic, that it sacrifices virtue in the mechanical pursuit of stability. Once attacked as cold-war-oriented, we are now criticized by some as insensitive to moral values. Once regarded as naive in the use of power, we are now alleged to rely too much on the efficacy of force. Once viewed as the most generous of nations, we now stand accused by some of resisting a more equitable international economic system.

It is time to face the reality of our situation. Our choice is not between morality and pragmatism. We cannot escape either, nor are they incompatible. This nation must be

true to its own beliefs, or it will lose its bearings in the world. But at the same time it must survive in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills.

We need moral strength to select among often agonizing choices and a sense of purpose to navigate between the shoals of difficult decisions. But we need as well a mature sense of means lest we substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of survival.

Clearly we are in need of perspective. Let me state some basic principles:

—*Foreign policy must start with security.* A nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk. There can be no security for us or for others unless the strength of the free countries is in balance with that of potential adversaries, and no stability in power relationships is conceivable without America's active participation in world affairs.

The choices in foreign policy are often difficult and the margins are frequently narrow; imperfect solutions are sometimes unavoidable. In the Second World War, for example, we joined forces with countries whose values we did not share, in order to accomplish the morally worthy objective of defeating nazism. Today we cooperate with many nations for the purpose of regional stability and global security, even though we disapprove of some of their internal practices. These choices are made consciously and are based on our best assessment of what is necessary.

—*At the same time, security is a means, not an end.* The purpose of security is to safeguard the values of our free society. And our survival is not always at stake in international issues. Many of our decisions are not imposed on us by events. Where we have latitude, we must seize the moral opportunity for humanitarian purposes.

Our assistance to developing nations, for example, serves both foreign policy and humanitarian ends. It strengthens political ties to other nations. It contributes to expanded trade; close to 90 percent of our foreign assistance is eventually spent in this country. And our assistance reflects our

values as a people, because we cannot close our eyes to the suffering of others. Because of history and moral tradition, we cannot live with ourselves as an island of plenty in a world of deprivation.

In the whole field of foreign aid, and particularly in food aid, America's record is unsurpassed. We and the world owe much to leaders with vision and compassion like Senator Humphrey who drafted the Food for Peace legislation some 20 years ago.

—*Finally, our values link the American people and their government.* In a democracy, the conduct of foreign policy is possible only with public support. Therefore your government owes you an articulation of the purposes which its policies are designed to serve—to make clear our premises, to contribute to enlightened debate, and to explain how our policies serve the American people's objectives. And those principles—freedom, the dignity of the individual, the sanctity of law—are at the heart of our policy; they are also the foundation of our most basic and natural partnerships with the great industrial democracies, which are essential to our safety and well-being.

### Morality and Policy

The relation of morality to policy is thus not an abstract philosophical issue. It applies to many topics of the current debate. It applies to relations with the Communist powers, where we must manage a conflict of moral purposes and interests in the shadow of nuclear peril; and it applies in our political ties with nations whose domestic practices are inconsistent with our own.

Our relationship with the Communist powers has raised difficult questions for Americans since the Bolshevik Revolution. It was understood very early that the Communist system and ideology were in conflict with our own principles. Sixteen years passed before President Franklin Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Government. He did so in the belief, as he put it, that "through the resumption of normal relations the prospects of peace over all the world are greatly strengthened."

Today again courageous voices remind us of the nature of the Soviet system and of our duty to defend freedom. About this there is no disagreement.

There is, however, a clear conflict between two moral imperatives which is at the heart of the problem. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for a better future have both hinged on the relationship between the two superpowers. In an era of strategic nuclear balance—when both sides have the capacity to destroy civilized life—there is no alternative to coexistence.

In such conditions the necessity of peace is itself a moral imperative. As President Kennedy pointed out:<sup>2</sup>

... in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all moral.

It is said, correctly, that the Soviet perception of "peaceful coexistence" is not the same as ours, that Soviet policies aim at the furthering of Soviet objectives. In a world of nuclear weapons capable of destroying mankind, in a century which has seen resort to brutal force on an unprecedented scale and intensity, in an age of ideology which turns the domestic policies of nations into issues of international contention, the problem of peace takes on a profound moral and practical difficulty. But the issue, surely, is not whether peace and stability serve Soviet purposes, but whether they also serve our own. Constructive actions in Soviet policy are desirable whatever the Soviet motives.

This government has stated clearly and constantly the principles which we believe must guide U.S.-Soviet relations and international conduct and which are consistent with both our values and our interests:

—We will maintain a strong and flexible military posture to preserve our security. We will as a matter of principle and national interest oppose attempts by any country to achieve global or regional predominance.

<sup>2</sup> For President Kennedy's address at American University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, p. 459.

—We will judge the state of U.S.-Soviet relations not by atmospherics, but by whether concrete problems are successfully resolved.

—All negotiations will be a two-way street, based on reciprocity of benefit and reliable observance of agreements.

—We will insist, as we always have, that progress in U.S.-Soviet economic relations must reflect progress toward stable political relationships.

—We will never abandon our ideals or our friends. We will not negotiate over the heads of, or against the interests of, other nations.

—We will respond firmly to attempts to achieve unilateral advantage or to apply the relaxation of tensions selectively.

Beyond the necessities of coexistence there is the hope of a more positive relationship. The American people will never be satisfied with simply reducing tension and easing the danger of nuclear holocaust. Over the longer term, we hope that firmness in the face of pressure and the creation of incentives for cooperative action may bring about a more durable pattern of stability and responsible conduct.

Today's joint manned mission in space—an area in which 15 years ago we saw ourselves in almost mortal rivalry—is symbolic of the distance we have traveled. Practical progress has been made on a wide range of problems. Berlin has been removed as a source of conflict between East and West; crises have been dampened; the frequency of U.S.-Soviet consultation on bilateral and multilateral problems is unprecedented; the scope of bilateral exchanges and cooperation in many fields is in dramatic contrast to the state of affairs ten, even five, years ago. The agreements already achieved to limit strategic armament programs—the central weapons of our respective military arsenals—are unparalleled in the history of diplomacy. Your Senator Mondale is a strong and constructive advocate of such strategic arms control efforts.

Our immediate focus is on the international actions of the Soviet Union not because it is our only moral concern, but

because it is the sphere of action that we can most directly and confidently affect. As a consequence of improved foreign policy relationships, we have successfully used our influence to promote human rights. But we have done so quietly, keeping in mind the delicacy of the problem and stressing results rather than public confrontation.

Therefore critics of détente must answer: What is the alternative that they propose? What precise policies do they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of the cold war? Does détente encourage repression—or is it détente that has generated the ferment and the demands for openness that we are now witnessing? Can we ask our people to support confrontation unless they know that every reasonable alternative has been explored?

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the United States will maintain its strength, defend its interests, and support its friends with determination and without illusion. We will speak up for our beliefs with vigor and without self-deception. We consider détente a means to regulate a competitive relationship—not a substitute for our own efforts in building the strength of the free world. We will continue on the course on which we are embarked, because it offers hope to our children of a more secure and a more just world.

These considerations raise a more general question: To what extent are we able to affect the internal policies of other governments and to what extent is it desirable?

There are some 150 nations in the world, and barely a score of them are democracies in any real sense. The rest are nations whose ideology or political practices are inconsistent with our own. Yet we have political relations and often alliances with some of these countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Europe.

Congressman Fraser has raised this issue with great integrity and concern, and I have profited from many discussions with him. We do not and will not condone repressive practices. This is not only dictated by our values

but is also a reflection of the reality that regimes which lack legitimacy or moral authority are inherently vulnerable. There will therefore be limits to the degree to which such regimes can be congenial partners. We have used, and we will use, our influence against repressive practices. Our traditions and our interests demand it.

But truth compels also a recognition of our limits. The question is whether we promote human rights more effectively by counsel and friendly relations where this serves our interest or by confrontational propaganda and discriminatory legislation. And we must also assess the domestic performance of foreign governments in relation to their history and to the threats they face. We must have some understanding for the dilemmas of countries adjoining powerful, hostile, and irreconcilable totalitarian regimes.

Our alliances and political relationships serve mutual ends; they contribute to regional and world security and thus support the broader welfare. They are not favors to other governments, but reflect a recognition of mutual interests. They should be withdrawn only when our interests change and not as a punishment for some act with which we do not agree.

In many countries, whatever the internal structure, the populations are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in many countries, especially in Asia, it is the process of American disengagement that has eroded the sense of security and created a perceived need for greater internal discipline—and at the same time diminished our ability to influence domestic practices.

The attempt to deal with those practices by restrictive American legislation raises a serious problem not because of the moral view it expresses—which we share—but because of the mistaken impression it creates that our security ties are acts of charity. And beyond that, such acts—because they are too public, too inflexible, and too much a stimulus to nationalistic resentment—are almost inevitably doomed to fail.

There are no simple answers. Painful experience should have taught us that we ought not exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in other societies. Therefore let me state the principles that will guide our action:

—Human rights are a legitimate international concern and have been so defined in international agreements for more than a generation.

—The United States will speak up for human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other governments.

—We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem and policies that bring positive results.

—We will not lose sight of either the requirements of global security or what we stand for as a nation.

#### The Domestic Dimension

For Americans, then, the question is not whether our values should affect our foreign policy, but how. The issue is whether we have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity, whether we will look behind easy slogans and recognize that our great goals can only be reached by patience and in imperfect stages.

The question is also whether we will use our moral convictions to escape reality or as a source of courage and self-confidence. We hear too often assertions that were a feature of our isolationist period: that a balance of power is a cynical game; that secret conspiratorial intentions lurk behind open public policies; that weapons are themselves the sources of conflict; that intelligence activities are wicked; that humanitarian assistance and participation in the economic order are an adequate substitute for political engagement.

These are the counsels of despair. I refuse to accept the premise that our moral values and policy objectives are irreconcilable. The ends we seek in our foreign policy must have

validity in the framework of our beliefs, or we have no meaningful foreign policy. The maintenance of peace is a moral as well as a practical objective; measures to limit armaments serve a moral as well as practical end; the cohesion of our alliances with the great industrial democracies makes our way of life and our principles more secure; cooperation to improve the world economic system enhances the well-being of peoples; policies to reconcile the rich nations and the poor, and to enhance the progress of both, serve a humane as well as a political end.

We live in a secular age which prides itself on its realism. Modern society is impersonal and bureaucratized. The young, who in every generation crave a sense of purpose, are too often offered cynicism and escapism instead of a faith that truly inspires. All modern democracies are beset by problems beyond the margin of government's ability to control. Debunking of authority further drains democratic government of the ability to address the problems that beset it. A world of turmoil and danger cries out for structure and leadership. The opportunities that we face as a nation to help shape a more just international order depend more than ever on a steady, resolute, and self-assured America.

This requires confidence—the leaders' confidence in their values, the public's confidence in its government, and the nation's collective confidence in the worth of its objectives.

Thus, for this nation to contribute truly to peace in the world it must make peace with itself. It is time to put aside the cynicism and distrust that have marked—and marred—our political life for the better part of the past decade. It is time to remind ourselves that, while we may disagree about means, as Americans we all have the same ultimate objective—the peace, prosperity, and tranquility of our country and of the world.

And most of all, it is time we recognized that as the greatest democracy the world has ever known, we are a living reminder that there is an alternative to tyranny and oppression. The revolution that we began 200 years ago goes on, for most of the world still lives without the freedom that has for so long been ours. To them we remain a

beacon of hope and an example to be emulated.

So let us come together for the tasks that our time demands. We have before us an opportunity to bring peace to a world that awaits our leadership.

## Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Minneapolis Address

Press release 372B dated July 17

*Donald R. Grangaard, president, Upper Midwest Council: Mr. Secretary, for the great Upper Midwest, a portion of this nation which has long been concerned with principles and ideals and their execution, you have brought a great message, and we again are deeply grateful. Thanks, most sincerely. [Applause.]*

*As was suggested earlier in the day, we will now spend a profitable period imposing on Secretary Kissinger to respond to questions which have been submitted by the audience. I am going to follow on the order of questioning which has been selected by our World Affairs Panel. With your permission, Mr. Secretary, I would like to read the question, and the name of the person who has authored it, and invite you to come to the podium to respond to it, please.*

*The first question is from Mr. Nathan Berman of Minneapolis. Do you feel that pressuring Israel to make concessions without equal pressure being applied to Egypt is morally defensible?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Let me answer this question, and then there were a few questions submitted orally earlier [laughter], which I would also like to deal with.*

First of all, it is not correct that we are pressuring Israel to make concessions or that the advice that we may give to one side is not matched by advice which we give to the other side.

It is worthwhile to remember that all our efforts in trying to promote peace in the Middle East have been carried out at the request of both parties. It is also worthwhile to remember that the consequences of

another war in the Middle East would be extremely grave for Israel, extremely grave for the industrial world, and raise a high risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Therefore we have an obligation to attempt to see whether it can be avoided.

But any settlement that may be reached between Israel and Egypt will be the result of American efforts which have been exerted equally on both parties. The difference is that when we make a proposal to Israel, it has to be discussed in its Cabinet, which speaks almost as much to the press as our Cabinet does, and therefore there is a slightly greater consciousness in the public press of what we say to Israel than what we say to Egypt.

If there should be an agreement, and when it is possible to compare the starting position of both sides with what is finally achieved, I am certain that everybody will agree that both sides will have made significant concessions, because without that, no meaningful agreement is possible.

Now, if I could perhaps address one or two of the questions that I heard earlier. One was, "Why do we not recognize Cambodia, or why do we not have diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Viet-Nam?"

With respect to Cambodia, we are dealing with a government that at this moment is engaged in one of the most barbaric practices that we have seen, in which 3 million people that lived in cities were told in a matter of minutes to go out into the countryside—a countryside that will not have a crop until November, and in which thousands, probably tens of thousands, are going to die from starvation and disease. It is a government, moreover, that has refused to establish diplomatic relations with all of the countries that have offered to have diplomatic relations with it. And therefore the question of diplomatic relations with Cambodia has never come up in any concrete way.

With respect to Viet-Nam, I have stated publicly, and I repeat here, that the United States is willing to look to the future and to gear its policies toward Viet-Nam to the policies which it pursues toward us and toward its neighbors.

With respect to the economic and military aid and its relationship—and the relationship between them, the question of military aid depends on whether it is given to countries whose security is in our interests and whether we share their conception of their security needs. It goes through detailed congressional scrutiny in each year and has substantially declined in each year and is substantially below the level of our foreign economic aid.

The foreign economic aid is not all we would like it to be. But we owe a great debt of gratitude to Senator Humphrey for his enlightened management of our foreign aid legislation, which relates us to other countries in the world and which contributes to establishing an economic and political structure that reflects the interdependence of mankind, and therefore we consider that both economic aid and declining military aid are in the national interests.

*Mr. Grangard: The next question submitted in the usual way is from Mr. Gelatis of Red Wing. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your thoughts on the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation and on the prospects for limitation and control?*

*Secretary Kissinger: The problem of weapons proliferation has two aspects—one, the development of nuclear weapons by countries that have industrial capacity to do so today, such as, for example, a country with the industrial capacity of Japan; and secondly, the danger of nuclear proliferation that derives from the spread of nuclear technology.*

With respect to the first problem, the United States and a number of other countries in 1970 signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, which was designed to put a limit—actually the Nonproliferation Treaty was signed before 1970 and ratified then—which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by putting safeguards on certain types of explosives and on the spread of nuclear technology. However, not all countries in the world have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty.

We face today, as a result of the energy

crisis, a much greater incentive for the spread of nuclear technology because nuclear energy has now become commercially profitable and in fact, in many countries, economically necessary. We are deeply concerned about the impact of the spread of nuclear technology because it will give an increasing number of countries the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

There is the danger that in the pursuit of commercial interests, the countries exporting nuclear technology may begin to compete in easing safeguards. Therefore the United States is at this moment engaged in negotiations with exporters of nuclear technology to see whether we could all agree to strengthening the existing safeguards under preferably United Nations IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency—safeguards in order to avoid the tragedy that commercial competition and the pressures of the energy crisis produce a situation where 10 to 15 years from now people will ask themselves: "What did the leaders in the 1970's think of when they permitted this nuclear technology to spread unchained?"

These decisions will have to be made within the next year or the proliferation of nuclear technology may really raise grave difficulties in other decades.

*Mr. Grangaard: Mr. Secretary, this question is from Mr. Dietz of St. Paul. What is State Department policy with respect to whether American overseas business should conform to local custom or follow on U.S. standards of business morality in the host country? [Laughter.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't know which of the two criteria are more painful. [Laughter.]

I think that the relationship of American corporations, or of multinational corporations, to the host country is one of the problems that requires a great deal of attention. On the one hand, private capital is more readily available right now for development than much of government capital. Therefore

it is in our interests to encourage the investment abroad of American capital.

On the other hand, these American enterprises must conform to local conditions, and we must see whether the local requirements can be put into some international framework so that there is some pattern that gives assurances to the host government against undue interference and to American business some guarantee of stability.

We are inviting to the State Department in the next few weeks a number of executives from our leading corporations to see whether they could think up, or work with us in developing some criteria that they could live with and at the same time could be internationally acceptable that would deal with the problem that is raised by this question, which we could then take up with potential host countries to see whether one can get some international framework of acceptable conduct by both host governments and foreign corporations.

*Mr. Grangaard: Mr. Secretary, this question from Mr. Cameron of Pryor Lake. How strong do you feel the trend in the United States is toward returning to a policy of isolationism?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the curious thing that is happening in America right now is that the trend toward isolationism is strongest in those parts of the country which used to carry the international policies—in many parts of the East, among many intellectuals. The support for foreign policy is most active in those parts of the country that used to be isolationist, like the Middle West and many parts of the country away from the eastern seacoast—which is an interesting phenomenon of the contemporary period.

I believe, however, that with the end of the war in Indochina, America is coming together again and that there is an increasing recognition of our importance to peace and progress in the world and also a greater understanding that we cannot do everything and that we must work more cooperatively. So I think our most difficult period in

this sense is behind us and that we can work together on a nonpartisan basis in the pursuit of our foreign policy.

*Mr. Grangaard: This from Mr. Stewart Hunter of Northfield. What are the prospects and the means for an effective international peacekeeping body such as a good, effective United Nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, yesterday in Milwaukee, I pointed out the concerns the United States has with the present procedures, the conduct of some countries in the United Nations.

The United States continues to believe that many problems, including the problem of peacekeeping, can only be settled—solved—on a global basis. The nature of nuclear technology, the nature of the energy and food and raw materials problems, all require global solutions. But also we must face the fact that many nations have organized themselves into blocs and are pursuing bloc tactics of confrontation.

What I intended yesterday with my speech in Milwaukee—if I may mention that city here [laughter]—is to point out that we have a great opportunity for international cooperation, in fact, an unprecedented opportunity, but that requires a sense of responsibility by all of the countries and that it requires an attitude of cooperation which has not always been reflected in the recent sessions of the General Assembly or its specialized agencies.

*Mr. Grangaard: And this question from Mr. Brown, Mr. Rich Brown, of St. Paul. What is your reaction to the concept that détente with the Russians helps the U.S.S.R. more than the United States?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I reject this concept. Détente is in the mutual interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Both countries have a great interest in preserving the peace. Both countries sooner or later, if not in this decade then in the next decade, must solve the problem that the globe is now too small for the kind of confrontation that was natural in the relationship among na-

tions even a generation ago.

If we look at what has actually been negotiated between the two countries, every settlement has been in the mutual interest. A limitation of strategic arms is in our mutual interest. A settlement of the Berlin crisis is in the mutual interest. The easing of tensions is in our mutual interest.

We, however, must not use détente as a cure-all for everything. Détente is not a substitute for our own efforts. Détente must not be used as an alibi when things go wrong anywhere in the world of blaming it on somebody else, because very often it is to our own actions. And those who raise this question should ask themselves this: "What exactly is it they want us to do as an alternative to this policy? Do they want us to create tension? Do they want us to raise the level of international conflict?" Can we really ask the American people to face the risks of war unless we can demonstrate to them that their government has explored every reasonable alternative?

I believe that any Administration, of whatever party, whatever may be said in the abstract, will be driven to the realization that the problem of peace is the dominant problem of our time, and that it cannot be conceived as a unilateral benefit to anybody.

*Mr. Grangaard: Mr. Secretary, this question from Mr. Robert Provost of Minneapolis. How do you see the Korean problem being resolved?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I frankly do not see that the Korean problem has a permanent solution in the foreseeable future.

What we have on the Korean Peninsula is two governments, the South Korean Government and the North Korean Government, which have irreconcilable objectives. What we must attempt to do for this period is to prevent the outbreak of war, to create conditions in which these two governments can resume the process of negotiation which they started some years ago, and to look toward a general easing of world tensions within which the Korean problem can also in time be solved. But it has no short-term solution.

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Minneapolis July 15

*Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the Radisson South Hotel in Bloomington (Minneapolis), Minn., on July 15.*

Press release 374 dated July 17

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could tell us what progress, if any, the State Department is making on negotiating with the Canadian Government on maintaining the flow of oil to this country. It gets kind of cold here in the wintertime.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was asked this question this morning in an off-the-record meeting, and I did not know the answer then. I really do not have the answer to that question.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you know, where I live in Minnesota the farmers don't care very much for the idea of a lot of government-held grain reserves hanging over the market price. Are you going to be coming along one of these days and telling them that is a sacrifice they should accept in the national interest?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the farmers have no objection to the purchases that are involved in building up the grain reserves. They are concerned that the grain reserves will be used to depress prices in inflationary periods and that the government will use grain reserves to depress prices. And secondly, they are not very much for government storage of grain reserves.

Now, the grain reserve program that we have put forward first of all calls for privately held grain reserves. Secondly, the basic reason for our position on grain reserves is that, if there are catastrophes that could have been foreseen by governments that were not dealt with, it shakes confidence in governments all over the world. The margin by which food is now being produced

in relation to needs is very narrow indeed. And at that point, if there is a major shortfall, the demand on the American supplies will be so enormous that things could get completely out of control.

So we are looking for the grain reserves not in order to affect domestic prices, but so that we have a cushion in case of emergencies and so that we can get other governments also to hold reserves, many of which would be purchased from the United States.

But we believe that when the agricultural community understands the nature of our grain reserve proposal they will substantially support it. They are seeing it in terms of some of the older schemes that have existed. Basically our idea is that the American reserves should be privately held, and secondly, that the international reserves would be up to each country to create, which would enable us to establish some priority among claimants on our own food. And it is not relevant to an attempt to reduce the prices in this country.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you comment on the FBI's report that foreign embassies have been broken into over the course of the past several years?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have not seen this report yet. I have just seen some fragmentary press accounts. And therefore I cannot really comment on it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Egyptians say that they are not going to renew the U.N. mandate in the Sinai next week. What does this do to your Middle East peace efforts?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, it underlines the problem to which we have been calling attention. Has it been officially stated?

*Q. A letter from the Egyptian Government to Waldheim [Kurt Waldheim, U.N. Secretary General].*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it calls attention to the urgency of the problem and to the need of working out some new interim solutions. We will have to study the implications—whether they will in fact ask for the removal of these forces, which I doubt. I think they may simply not renew the mandate. But I will have to study precisely what it means.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I realize that you are not looking for apple pie answers and questions. And I'm from the Heartline KDHL Radio in upper Minnesota. And I have a resolution here from the American Legion, the whole State of California, that states that the Council on Foreign Relations, 68th Street, New York City, is a subversive organization. And it has already been passed in a resolution. Now, these are a thousand of Legionnaires; and I am speaking as a Legionnaire myself, as well as a reporter. Now, I understand that you are a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. And if the American Legion considers this subversive, then why are you a part of it, sir?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, first of all, with all due respect for the American Legion, I think that its judgment of whether the Council on Foreign Relations is subversive may be based on insufficient information. After all, the Council on Foreign Relations has in its membership almost every—in fact, every Cabinet member who has dealt with foreign policy or defense policy, or every senior official—

*Q. Well, sir, don't you believe that the American Legion, who has fought for our country—and there are many laying out in foreign lands—are capable enough of investigating and their investigating should be just as positive as this jerky Congress we have now?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I must say I—

*Q. I mean, you are talking about the American Legion now. And I want you to answer in that vein; if they are stupid enough not to know what the CFR is—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You are talking about one American Legion post.

*Q. This is thousands of—this is the whole chapter of California, sir. I don't believe they are stupid, and I don't believe they like to be called stupid.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not saying they are stupid. But I must say, with all due respect to the American Legion in California, if you look at the membership of the Council on Foreign Relations and consider it subversive, then the country is really in bad shape, because it contains every major—

*Q. You don't suppose it is in good shape, do you, Mr. Secretary, with the unemployment and all this junk, and the educational system? You don't believe that we are not having a little problem?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not think that the subversion in this country will be led by the Council on Foreign Relations.

*Q. Well, I hope that the news media here this evening, if they have got any guts at all, can bring this out to the American Legion as to your answer to this. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to be more specific about your speech last night about the United Nations and your reference again today. Specifically, if the General Assembly should vote to exclude Israel in the coming General Assembly session, is this the sort of thing that might cause the United States to withdraw from the General Assembly?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we have not said exactly what we will do if the Charter of the United Nations is violated, in our view. We believe that the expulsion of member states by the General Assembly, which is a responsibility under the charter of the Security Council, would be an act which would affect American participation in the activities of that body. To what degree and in what manner remains to be determined. But we believe that the charter should be strictly observed and should not be used for punitive purposes that are incompatible with it.

*Q. If I could just follow that up. You say*

*it would affect American participation. Are you referring to the reaction that probably would occur in Congress or are you talking about action by the executive branch?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The executive branch would undoubtedly take some actions. But what these actions would be I am not now prepared to say. But above all we are trying to prevent that situation from arising.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned in response to an earlier question today that what the United States says to Israel is in the press more than what the United States says to Egypt. Is there anything that the United States has said to Egypt that hasn't made the news as of yet?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The individual steps by which the negotiation proceeds are, in the nature of the governmental system in Israel, likely to be more public. The basic point that I made was that the United States attempts to advance the negotiating process and it makes its best judgment to each side as to what is needed to make progress. And we have done this with Egypt. As the negotiations come to a conclusion, if they come to a conclusion, then it will be apparent what each side has conceded.

But the United States cannot, as an intermediary, announce on its part what each side is going to say or what it says to each side at each stage along the way.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, along those lines, the conduct of foreign policy in a democracy has been compared to playing stud poker with the hole card turned up. Leaving abuses in the past aside, should security leaks—breaches of whatever nature—occur again, would you participate in wiretapping or other surveillance methods similarly covert?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, you know, the subject of wiretapping has been discussed at inordinate length in recent years, however confined usually only to one administration.

The problem of security in a democracy, the problem of what things should be made public and what things threaten national security, is a very serious one. There are

certain secrets that anybody concerned with the conduct of foreign policy must want to safeguard because if they are jeopardized they will threaten the national security of the United States.

Your question is very hard to answer in the abstract. But any government, any administration, has to protect some of its secrets. Now, whether that is carried too far, whether the effort to protect it is carried too far, that is a question of legitimate inquiry.

And I would also say that, of course, the legal position—the Supreme Court has taken a position on wiretapping that every administration should—must—observe and will observe.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Agriculture Secretary Butz said yesterday that he thought that President Ford was unbeatable in 1976. Do you concur with that assessment?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am responsible for foreign policy. I think foreign policy is a nonpartisan effort. And I will not get into partisan activities or make any political prediction.

*Q. How do you view today's space flight, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it is a positive indication of the relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is the sort of cooperative effort which brings home to both peoples, on both sides, that we are living on a small planet, that we can do constructive things together, and that we must try to coexist. I therefore view it as a very positive thing.

*Q. Could you please advise on foreign countries' current needs for American agricultural products and what importance they play in your negotiations with: one, the OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and two, Russia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The agricultural productivity of the United States is one of the most important factors in the world economy today, and it is one of our great assets. The United States produces the largest surpluses.

It contributes more food aid than all of the rest of the world combined. Its technological skill can contribute enormously to closing the gap between production and need, in which the ultimate solution of the food problem resides.

Now, the way we can use this in concrete negotiations is affected by two things: first, by the negotiation itself; and secondly, by the kind of world that we want to create. Because after all, it is in our interests and in the interests of the world to show that a commodity in which we have a special advantage, used responsibly, can set a pattern for how commodities in which other countries have a special advantage can also be used responsibly.

So in negotiations with the Soviet Union, we have the problem that our sales are conducted by private companies, and of course our foreign policy is not yet conducted by private companies. So we have to gear some of the actions of these private companies, maybe, to our requirements in foreign policy; and that does not mesh with great precision.

We are trying to keep in mind that we should not sell so much that it will later bring enormous pressures on our own economy or deprive us of the food for our other international needs and yet sell enough so that the American farmer can get rid of his production.

We have worked out an informal system which has worked rather well and which we will apply in this present situation on sales.

*Q. The other half of that was the OPEC countries.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes. With respect to the OPEC countries, a great deal depends on what actions they will take and what general framework can be created for all kinds of commodities; and this we will know a little better at the end of this year.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your speech you apparently said that no stability in power relationships is conceivable without America's active participation in world affairs. And my question is how actively do you feel*

*the United States must participate in world affairs in order to achieve stability in power relationships, for instance, in Korea or in the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is a difficult question to answer in the abstract. In many parts of the world no stability is possible without an American effort. On the other hand, the situation of the United States has changed as compared to the immediate post-war period, in which all the efforts had to be carried out almost exclusively by the United States. Other parts of the world have now developed some strength and self-confidence and can assume larger responsibilities.

As a general rule, the United States is reluctant to undertake new commitments for the long-term stationing of military forces abroad and looks rather for the local capacity to defend itself if necessary and, if we think it is in our own interests, with our support.

In the Middle East we are in the position that we are the only country that both parties can talk to or have been willing to talk to. And also we are the country that has been the major source of support for Israel. Therefore we have an obligation to see what we can do to bring the parties closer together and to see whether some momentum can be created for peace.

In Korea we have a mutual security treaty which obliges us to the common defense, which is also in our interest because of the importance Japan and other countries attach to it.

So I would say our role is changing. It is less direct than it was in the past, and it is less military than it has been in the past. But it still has to be significant.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of your outstanding diplomatic contributions, I was wondering: first of all, why it seems to be that you pour so much into your work and work so rigorously; and secondly, what you do to relax and get away from things of the Department of State?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What I do to get away from the Department of State? Travel.

*Q. First of all, why do you work so rigorously in diplomatic relations and what you do to relax and just unwind?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the first question requires, I suppose, a psychological analysis which I may not be in the best position to make. But I think for somebody who has seen in his life the consequences of what can happen if societies collapse and the consequences of war, there is an interest and an incentive to do what one can for domestic tranquillity and above all for international peace. And perhaps for somebody who has come to this country as an immigrant, one can understand better how important this country is to the rest of the world than people who have perhaps not exactly the standard of comparison.

As far as relaxing is concerned, this job does not lend itself to too many free periods. But I have been given a dog for my birthday, and I have to walk him now. [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, three of the recommendations of the Murphy Commission were that the CIA be reorganized into a new agency, the Foreign Intelligence Agency; that the paramilitary operations of the CIA be shifted to the Department of Defense (DOD); and that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should not ordinarily hold a Cabinet position, as you currently do. What plans are there to implement these recommendations, and if there are no such plans, why not?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the Murphy Commission recommendations are now being studied by the executive branch, and therefore I cannot tell you which of them are going to be implemented and which of them are not going to be implemented.

The proposition that the Assistant to the President should not ordinarily be a Cabinet member is one with which it is hard to disagree. I would agree with those who hold the view that the President should have the right to make that decision himself. All the more so as the influence of any person with the President does not depend on the hierarchical position that he may have. The fact that I hold two positions does not give me

any additional influence with the President. And therefore I think it depends on the judgment that the President makes in each case. Some other recommendations of the Murphy Commission will no doubt be implemented. Maybe this one will be implemented, too. It is a little early to say.

*Q. Specifically, do you see any advantages to shifting the paramilitary operations of the CIA to Defense Intelligence Agency in the DOD?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, frankly, not particularly, because you can make a case for the proposition that we should not engage in paramilitary operations. But there is no way that the Defense Department can conduct paramilitary operations in the same way. The reason for having them in the Intelligence Agency was to permit a degree of dissociation from overt military operations and to prevent there being a direct engagement of American military power.

So I think one could have the argument one should not have paramilitary operations. But this is one that I have some question about.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you confirm for us absolutely rumors that there is going to be a major Soviet-U.S. grain deal this year; and if so, tell us how large it is going to be.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, there is no U.S.-Soviet grain deal of the kind of 1972, in which there were some governmental credits involved. We have had reports that the Soviet Union is interested in substantial purchases of American grain. And there have been some informal discussions in which they have tried to determine the amount that could be purchased without disrupting our market so completely that it might lead to a reaction such as occurred last year when an informal limit had to be put on. These informal discussions have taken place. But what the exact limit is has not yet been finally established. But I have the impression there will be Soviet grain purchases.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what area, in your estimation, poses the greatest threat to our U.S. security today?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, without answering the question of what is a threat to U.S. security, obviously the greatest immediate threat of war is in the Middle East.

The action to which my attention was called, which I have not officially heard yet, of the nonrenewal of the UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] mandate in the Sinai is just one example of the precariousness of the situation in the Middle East if no progress is made toward a peace settlement. If there is a war in the Middle East, it is bound to have consequences outside of the Middle East. I think that is the area that is most complicated.

Of course, the nature of modern weapons is such that there are always dangers of technological breakthroughs and of one side getting ahead of the other, which is one reason why we attach so much importance to the strategic arms negotiations.

But the single most complicated area in the world and the single area most likely to produce a conflict, if no progress is made, is the Middle East.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, your talk today in a sense was a basic review of American foreign policy over 200 years. The question is, did the time and place of the talk have anything to do with the choice of the subject?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have felt for a long time that I should talk about the relationship of principles to practice in foreign policy. And I generally do not try to invent talks for particular audiences. That is to say, I thought this was an important subject on which to talk. I do believe, however, that particularly in Minnesota, with its idealistic tradition, with its Senators and Congressmen who have paid such particular attention to the range of problems that I discussed today, that this was an appropriate subject for this area.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if U.S. troops are committed as a buffer in the Sinai, need we be afraid that that might be a military foot in the door that will be hard to extract, as the foot in Viet-Nam was hard to extract many years ago?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There is no possi-

bility of committing American forces as a buffer. And whatever may be done in the Sinai will not be to involve the United States in any possible military operation.

Now, I have seen some of the newspaper speculation on what might or might not be done. But I want to make clear that nothing that is being considered or even generally talked about involves a possibility of an American military involvement in any military conflict in the Middle East.

We are now conducting reconnaissance flights for both of the parties.

The issue that has been informally raised is whether some of these functions that are performed occasionally by reconnaissance flights could be done on a more permanent basis; that is to say, warning and so forth. But that would be done for both sides. It would not be done for the United States, and it would not involve any possibility of military combat.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, please, sir, in light of the recent and ever-continuing terrorist acts in Israel, is it a vital step still that Israel must negotiate with the Palestinians en route to the Geneva Conference?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has never recommended that Israel negotiate with the Palestinians. The U.S. position is that the question of any negotiation between Palestinians and Israel presupposes the acceptance by the Palestinians of the State of Israel and of the relevant Security Council resolutions, neither of which has yet been done by the Palestinians. So we have never taken the position which you have described.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, first, we are very happy that you are here. Second, why do you insist on Israel to pull back; and if they do not, you say that you will not sell them any armaments?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, both of these propositions are incorrect.

We believe that progress toward peace in the Middle East is essential. It is essential in the interests of Israel; it is in the interests of the other countries; it is in the interests of the United States.

As long as the United States is in the

position in which it finds itself in the Middle East, we cannot escape the consequences of either a stalemate or of an explosion. And therefore we, having been first invited by both of the parties to participate in the negotiations, have given our own judgment as to what is required to make progress.

There has never been any question of embargoing arms to Israel. The questions have been the normal discussion of the scale of the support and some items of a particular kind of technology which are rather long-lead-time items.

So the two basic assumptions in your question are not correct.

But the United States believes—the President has repeatedly said it, and I have repeatedly said it—that a stalemate in the Middle East will in time have consequences that will be extremely unfortunate for all of the parties.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like you to comment on the negotiations for a Panama Canal treaty.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States signed about 18 months ago a declaration of principles with the Government of Panama in which we committed ourselves to continue in good faith the negotiations that were started in 1964, looking toward a new arrangement for the Panama Canal. The importance of this negotiation resides in the fact that Panama could become, in certain circumstances, a focal point for the kind of nationalistic guerrilla type of operation that we have not yet seen in the Western Hemisphere directed against the United States and might unify all of Latin America against the United States. Therefore the United States has negotiated in good faith to see what can be achieved that would give the United States a guarantee with respect to the defense of the canal and a substantial period of operation of the canal, but which would remove some of the particularly grating aspects of the present situation in Panama.

The United States will continue these negotiations. We do not yet know whether they can be concluded. We will stay in the

closest contact with the Congress on this at each stage and consult intimately with the Congress about the negotiations. But we are continuing the negotiations.

## United States and Canada Discuss Possible Oil Exchanges

Press release 345 dated June 25

Following a meeting in Ottawa on June 18, U.S. and Canadian officials have concluded that oil exchanges between U.S. and Canadian refineries could contribute to reducing supply and transportation costs, helping consumers in both countries.

Officials at the meeting discussed several alternatives for oil exchanges between U.S. and Canadian refiners, including possible longer term arrangements for the exchange of Alaskan oil.

U.S. and Canadian officials agreed to consider adjusting or removing legal, fiscal, and administrative impediments to commercially workable and mutually beneficial oil exchanges consistent with their respective national policies.

The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) will shortly contact U.S. refineries historically dependent on Canadian oil imports to advise them of the results of the discussions.

An exchange involves the supply by one company of oil to another company's refinery offset by the second company's returning oil to the first company's refinery at another location. The exchange results in transportation and other savings for both companies.

The Ottawa meeting was held between officials of the Department of State and the Federal Energy Administration and the Canadian Ministries of External Affairs and Energy, Mines and Resources.

In a related activity, the FEA is considering establishing a system for allocation of Canadian crude oil imports. However, such action, if implemented, cannot be expected to provide more than short-term relief to U.S. refiners dependent on Canadian oil.

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Milwaukee July 16

Press release 375 dated July 17

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does the Egyptian threat to terminate the U.N. peacekeeping-force mandate signal a snag in the Middle East negotiations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are not yet fully clear about what is intended with the Egyptian letter to the Security Council. There is some implication in that letter, which we are attempting to clarify, that the UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] can be extended by the Security Council and that they were primarily concerned with the surrounding circumstances. We believe that the timing of this letter, at this delicate moment, is extremely unfortunate and complicates things.

Of course, the United States has an interest in progress in the negotiations in the Middle East, and the United States is making every effort it can to promote progress in the Middle East. But ultimately, progress depends on the willingness of all parties to be conciliatory and to make the moves that are necessary. The U.S. effort cannot substitute for the effort of the parties concerned.

*Q. When you say, Mr. Secretary, "the surrounding circumstances," what are you referring to?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not want to speculate on something that we are attempting to clarify. But the possibility exists that the letter is intended to stimulate a general negotiating process and to call attention to—the objection was to the stalemate in the negotiations more than to the existence of the Force.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, also on the Mideast, there is a report that 40 Arab-bloc Foreign Ministers are meeting in Jidda today and voted to exclude Israel from the U.N. General Assembly this autumn. Is this the sort*

*of thing that you have in mind that could trigger an American reaction?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The U.S. position was stated by me in Milwaukee here two evenings ago. The United States strongly objects to the use of exclusion from the General Assembly as a method of conducting the diplomacy of any area. Exclusions from the United Nations or any of its organs have been by the charter assigned to the Security Council. And the United States cannot be indifferent to the abuse of the charter if that should be attempted.

I have not seen an official report of the action to which you have referred. But if this should be a proposition, the United States would resist it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the Egyptian letter, there have been demonstrations in Israel by people who oppose what they suspect is an agreement, coming agreement, by the government there. What do you see in view of these are the prospects now for an interim—another interim Israeli-Egyptian agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I can only repeat what I have said previously. The progress toward peace in the Middle East is going to be difficult, and it is going to require sacrifices by all parties concerned. And inevitably, therefore, it is going to have painful elements for any of the parties.

The United States cannot substitute its efforts for the good will, for the willingness to cooperate, for the readiness to relate the immediate to the long-term interests of the parties involved. Therefore what I have said earlier is addressed to all of the parties: that the United States can help the parties; it cannot substitute for them.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Israelis seem to feel that they are the ones—the only ones being*

asked to make sacrifices for a peace which would benefit both sides. What sacrifices are the Egyptians and the Arab side being asked to make?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not believe that it is helpful for the United States, which is trying to act as an intermediary at the request of the parties, to list the concessions that either side is willing to make. None of the stories of what either side has been willing to do or has been asked to do has come from the United States.

I am confident that if an agreement is reached, that when any fair-minded person compares the publicly stated starting position of the two sides with the final agreement, it will be self-evident that both sides have made concessions.

With respect to the question earlier that I have not fully answered, I believe that there are possibilities for achieving agreement. I stated last weekend that progress had been made. I still maintain this. I believe there is a possibility for making an agreement if everybody keeps in mind that the consequences of a breakdown of negotiations will transcend in significance any of the difficulties that will be produced by the negotiation itself. And under those conditions, I think the progress that has already been made can be consolidated and extended.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you see the role of the United States being vis-a-vis struggles for majority rule in southern Africa during the 1970's, especially in light of the heavy U.S. business interests in that area?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has made clear its position that it favors respect for human rights and respect for the rights of all the populations in southern Africa. The United States has expressed also the strong hope, in the interests of all of the peoples concerned, that this process take place by peaceful means and through negotiation. And there have been some encouraging developments in this direction. So the United States will support an evolution in the direction of an extension of humane values, and it will support this evolution by peaceful means.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think the consequences would be of the withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Desert?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the consequences of the withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Desert would be to complicate enormously the negotiating possibilities and to raise serious doubts about the possibilities of such negotiating efforts. It would undoubtedly contribute to an increased state of tension. It would not necessarily mean an end of all the agreements that have been reached, but it would certainly compound an already difficult situation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, former Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia has criticized your policy position as being neglectful of the smaller developing countries. Do you plan at any time soon to make a visit to Africa to assure these countries that they are not being neglected?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, first, I understand the problems that Governor Carter has, and I do not want to be uncooperative. But if you read the public statements of the U.S. Government and the many speeches that I have given on the subject in recent months, the whole thrust of our approach is to insist that some arrangements must be negotiated.

Keep in mind the concerns of these developing countries. Our dispute with the developing countries is not about their aspirations, but about their methods. What I attempted to say here the other evening, what I said at the OECD [Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development] meeting in Paris, what I have said in Kansas City, is that the United States is prepared to have a dialogue on development with the new countries and to discuss with them their concerns with respect to raw materials, with respect to development, with respect to transnational corporations and other issues. And I have stated that we will put before this special session of the General Assembly our program of how to deal with it.

With all due respect to Governor Carter, I do not agree with him about the lack of concern. It is one of the big themes in our foreign policy.

Now, on the specific question, whether I plan to go to Africa. I have had the intention of going to Africa and have not been able to set a date because there were always some immediate crises that kept me here. But I would say my physical presence in Africa should not be confused with the basic direction of our policy, because the basic direction of our policy will be along the lines that I have described here.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider the recent statements in this country by Alexander Solzhenitsyn a threat to détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and also, do you think that this Administration should minimize its contact with Mr. Solzhenitsyn?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I consider Solzhenitsyn one of the greatest writers of this period. In my present position, I seem to read only classified papers. Solzhenitsyn is one of the few unclassified documents that I have been reading. So I have enormous respect and admiration for Solzhenitsyn as a writer.

Secondly, I think this country can well afford to listen to a man of his distinction without worrying about what effect it will have on the foreign policy interests of the United States.

As for seeing senior officials, this can be considered from the foreign policy aspect. From the point of view of foreign policy the symbolic effect of that can be disadvantageous—which has nothing to do with a respect either for the man or for his message.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you advise President Ford not to see Solzhenitsyn, and if you did, doesn't this kind of weakness convey to the world perhaps that the United States is not willing to stand up for its ideals?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it is a very bad idea for White House advisers to engage in this constant series of leaks on who advised or who did not advise the President on what should be done.

In issues of this kind, the President solicits the opinion of many advisers, including foreign policy advisers. I myself happened to be out of the city when that

particular decision came up, but my office was asked, and I gave my opinion, and my opinion is the one that I have stated here, which is to distinguish between the man and the foreign policy implications of such a symbolic gesture.

I stand behind that view, which I do not consider a view of weakness, and which would have to be considered also in terms of other actions. But the President makes up his own mind, and I do not go into debates of who specifically recommends what at any moment, and I do not consider these—

*Q. If I could follow up for a moment. In what kind of light do you take his warnings that détente is a trap?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I take his warnings—if I understand the message of Solzhenitsyn, it is not only that détente is a threat but that the United States should pursue an aggressive policy to overthrow the Soviet system.

I believe that Solzhenitsyn is a man whose suffering entitles him to be heard and who has stood with great anguish for his views. But I do believe that if his views became the national policy of the United States, we would be confronting a considerable threat of military conflict. Therefore, for those who are responsible for the foreign policy of the United States, his views can be listened to with respect, but they cannot guide our actions, much as we admire his writings.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports at the White House that the President may now see Solzhenitsyn.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The schedule of the President is not made in the State Department. As I said, when I am asked for the foreign policy implications, I will give them. As to the composition of the President's schedule, I think that should be asked by White House correspondents. That is not my responsibility.

*Q. You said that Solzhenitsyn, as you understand it, would pursue an aggressive policy to overthrow—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My understanding of the message of Solzhenitsyn is that the

United States should seek to overthrow the Soviet system. And I believe that under modern conditions, with modern weapons, this has consequences that will not be acceptable to the American people or to the world. But this is no reflection on the literary greatness of Solzhenitsyn or on the importance of some of his messages.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on a related topic, what will the U.S. position be on the status of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The U.S. position on these subjects is unchanged by recent events, and we have no need to take a new position.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Egyptian move not to renew the U.N. mandate come as a surprise to the American Government, or was it predicted as part of the stalemate that—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have warned for months that a continuation of the stalemate would lead to serious consequences. We did not expect the move on the day on which it occurred. But we have predicted a move like that as the inevitable consequence of a continued stalemate. Therefore, in a strategic sense, we are not surprised. As far as the particular timing is concerned and the day on which it occurred, I have expressed my views.

*Q. To clarify, Mr. Secretary—is it your view that the withdrawal of the U.N. Force would lead to a breakdown of the negotiations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not want to say that. I would say without any question the withdrawal of the U.N. Force would complicate the negotiations.

*Q. Is it possible, sir, for the U.N. Force to stay on without a mandate?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This is the sort of question that will have to be explored over the next few days. And of course one has to consult the views of the Secretary General of the United Nations and of legal authorities on this subject. Whether this is a possibility or whether it is possible for the Security Council to extend the mandate in

the absence of a direct request—these are questions that will have to be looked into.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is the solution to the Middle East a two-way one, a separate one for Jerusalem and a separate one for the other areas? And secondly, do you think the Pope could have any role in the solution?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There have been two general approaches to the Middle East negotiation, and these approaches are not incompatible but would inevitably merge at some point. One is whether all issues should be negotiated simultaneously between all of the parties on all of the topics—whether all of the countries and parties that have an interest should be participating from the very beginning and whether frontiers, Arab peace obligations, guarantees, Palestinian rights or interests, Jerusalem, and all the surrounding circumstances—whether all of these should be negotiated simultaneously or whether one should go as far as possible by taking individual steps between two of the parties concerned and go on from there to the final settlement.

Up to now, the United States has had the view that if the parties agree, it would be better to take the individual steps first, to create a climate of confidence and to make the general negotiation take place under conditions in which there is less of a danger of explosion because there would be less of an immediate urgency. If, however, that is not possible, the President has stated repeatedly that we, under those circumstances, would have to pursue, with some energy, an overall approach and try to bring about an overall solution.

In any event, it is our view that the interim process or the step-by-step process cannot be carried on for an indefinite period of time and that somewhere along the road, and in our judgment very soon along the road, a return to an overall approach would be inevitable.

So I do not think that the problem is to be segmented into so many individual parts.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the last time you visited this particular region of the country, there was somewhat of a diversion, the Cambodian*

*crisis involving the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez. How do you gauge the response to your particular ideas—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was trying to figure out what you meant by this region of the country. When I was in St. Louis, yes.

*Q. When you were in St. Louis and Kansas City. How do you gauge the response in this particular area, now that you have had a chance to travel about, to the Administration's foreign policy views, and how do you see the politics of that situation affecting the Administration?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, let me take the second question first. I have believed strongly that the foreign policy of the United States is a nonpartisan effort. It has been carried out with the support of both parties. And I do not consider it my obligation—and I do not have the slightest intention of participating in any partisan effort.

The major progress that has been made in American foreign policy has had the support of both parties, and it has had the support of Democrats and Republicans, including the elected representatives from this state. So I am not taking these trips in order to have any impact on the political situation.

With respect to the first question, I think it is an interesting phenomenon that the formerly isolationist part of the United States is now the part of the country that most strongly supports an active and responsible involvement of the United States in international affairs. I consider that one of the most heartening developments of the last generation and one of the sources of strength for our foreign policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke a great deal about interdependence in your speech.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

*Q. Is it your view and position that the U.N. Charter should be implemented in all of the nations who are member nations of the United Nations, superseding the constitutions of the individual nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The U.N. Charter is based on the proposition that the United Nations is composed of a group of sovereign

states, and therefore the United Nations has never been intended as a world government superseding the sovereign governments.

When I speak of interdependence, I do not speak of world government. I speak of cooperation among sovereign nations based on their recognition that they are now living on a small planet under conditions in which they cannot maintain the peace or achieve economic progress except by cooperative efforts. The difficulty is that for sovereign nations it is inherently more difficult to cooperate.

This is the problem that our period must solve, and it cannot be solved by world government.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give your assessment of the situation in Portugal following the decision of the Socialist Party to pull out of the government?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the evolution in Portugal has been increasingly in the direction of a state in which political parties play a less and less significant role; in which the final decisions are made by the Armed Forces Movement, as it is called, which has its own definitions of democracy, which are different from the definitions that have been historically accepted.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, during these trips you have been having private sessions with community leaders. Do you find in talking to them that they have any urgent considerations or any insights? In other words, educationally, what are you learning in talks with them out here? Do you find anything, any insights that you don't get back in Washington?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* For the benefit of the local press, the Washington contingent that is here is trying to get me to say something that will make great news in Washington—namely, an admission by me that I can learn something from anybody [laughter], which would be a historic event. [Laughter.]

But to answer your question seriously, I find these meetings with the leadership groups in the various cities extremely helpful. They give me an opportunity to respond to their concerns. They also give me an op-

portunity to find out what serious and interested people are thinking about the direction of their country in foreign policy in various parts of the United States. And since these are the leaders that can and will influence opinion in their communities, it is important for me and for the President to know what issues are of greatest concern to them. So I have been very grateful for the opportunity to exchange ideas.

I do not make any presentation at these meetings. It is a very free give-and-take. I have found them extremely helpful, and I am very grateful to the local sponsors who have arranged them.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the South Koreans appear to be somewhat paranoid about a possible invasion from the North. Do you share their fears, and if so, would you anticipate that the United States would get involved again in Korea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The concern about Korea developed most strongly in the aftermath of Indochina. There was a justifiable concern that a government which has in a way excluded itself from contacts at least with the Western world might suffer the misapprehension that events in Indochina would be permitted to repeat themselves in Korea. Therefore it was judged important for the United States to make clear its position before any such impression developed.

Secondly, the United States has a treaty of mutual assistance with South Korea, which has been ratified by the Congress and which spells out the legal obligations of the United States in case of aggression. And the President, the Secretary of Defense, and I have all pointed out that we would maintain our obligations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the previous question, do you see these trips as a means, perhaps, to get around Congress and to get your views across without being filtered through the Washington press?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Absolutely not. I believe that foreign policy must be carried out in the closest consultation between the

Congress and the executive. These trips are not designed to get around the Congress, because on every concrete issue the Congress will still have to support us. There has been no reduction in the intensity of briefings of Congressmen and Senators. In fact, it has been increased with the fragmentation of authority within the Congress and with the many new centers of power that have developed within the Congress.

But we think we have an obligation, in a democratic government, to put the issues to the Congress as well as to the people. And I think anybody who has attended any of my meetings in addition to, of course, the public record, will look in vain for any attempt to urge anybody to use any particular influence with the Congress. In fact, most of the issues that are being discussed are not controversial between the Congress and the executive.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the leaders yesterday whom you conferred with before your speech indicated that at a private meeting you sounded them out on the use of U.S. civilian technicians operating some sort of electronic buffer zone between the Egyptians and the Israelis in the Sinai. Why did you sound them out on that, and what reaction do you have to that sort of idea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I did not initiate the discussion. The discussion arose out of questions that were asked me, which were generated in turn by press reports, and therefore I [asked] them that if these press reports ever became a reality—which they have not at this point—what their reaction would be to such propositions. And this is one of the functions that I believe these meetings serve in giving us an insight into what people think on these issues.

In any event, if such an issue arose, that is to say if the parties ever asked us to do this, we would certainly submit it to the Congress for the Congress' view before we got American technicians, whether military or civilian, involved in the Middle East.

*The press: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.*

## Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and With Israeli Prime Minister Rabin During European Trip

*Secretary Kissinger left Washington July 9 for a visit to Paris (July 9-10), Geneva July (10-11), Bonn (July 11-12), and London (July 12). He met with French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues at Paris; with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at Geneva; with Federal German President Walter Scheel, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at Bonn; and with British Foreign Secretary James A. Callaghan at London. Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger, Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues, and Prime Minister Rabin, together with the text of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement issued at Geneva July 11.*

### DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AFB, JULY 9

Press release 360 dated July 9

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am leaving for consultations with our European allies and also to meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister to review Soviet-American relations, and particularly to discuss the situation in the Middle East. And of course we attach great importance to the meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, all of which is part of our effort to encourage the process of peace in the Middle East.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there's been some talk of additional U.S. assurances, commitments, guarantees for Israel. Are there any additional assurances?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Any progress toward peace in the Middle East has two elements—the negotiations between the parties in the Middle East and what the United States can

contribute in the way of any assurances, or acting as a transmitter of assurances of the two sides to each other. And whatever it is humanly possible to do, the United States will do to promote progress.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that an agreement is already wrapped up between Israel and Egypt.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Totally wrong.

*Q. But is it approaching the point?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. We are not anywhere near that point. But all sides, Israel and Egypt, are working seriously. And of course the United States has repeatedly expressed its interest in promoting peace on a basis just to all.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there's been a report that the President and some leaders in the House have worked out a tentative compromise on resuming aid to Turkey.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, they discussed this morning possible ways by which aid to Turkey can be resumed. Hearings will be held in the Foreign Affairs Committee—or the International Relations Committee—tomorrow, and we are hopeful that something can be done.

### REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES, JULY 10

#### Remarks to the Press Following Meeting With President Valery Giscard d'Estaing

Press release 363 dated July 10

*Q. Who took the initiative for this meeting?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* We are in constant contact with the Secretary of

State, and it had at first been agreed that I would meet with him in Washington. But the Secretary of State's schedule and the meetings he is to have in Bonn led him to modify his plans and to come to Paris. I thank him for this while nevertheless hoping to see him again, probably in Washington on the occasion of the U.N. meeting. The Secretary of State is going to tell you personally that we had a long private conversation this morning and that we decided to go together and report it to the President of the Republic.

*Q. On what subjects, Mr. Foreign Minister?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* We spoke of the resumption of the dialogue; we spoke of Cyprus; we spoke of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and we discussed in a general way— The Secretary of State referred to the Middle East problem— This was a very thorough exchange of views and, I believe, a very constructive one.

*Q.—the European cooperation conference?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First, let me say that I agree completely with what my colleague has said. We've had very constructive talks, and we reviewed most of the outstanding issues in the spirit of friendship and cooperation which characterizes our relationship. We discussed the resumption of the dialogue between consumers and producers, and I believe we have made very good progress toward establishing a framework for the resumption of this dialogue. And we had fruitful exchanges on a range of other subjects.

With respect to the European Security Conference, I believe that both our countries are of the view that it should be brought to a conclusion as rapidly as possible and that both our delegations are working in that sense at Geneva.

*Q. What did you tell the President about the prospects for another settlement in the Middle East, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We had a full discussion of the situation in the Middle East,

and I told him we cannot really judge until I have had a chance to talk with the Israeli Prime Minister and until the views of the Israeli Government will then have been formally communicated to the Egyptian Government for their reaction.

*Q. About President Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for a monetary conference next autumn?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we have not had a formal suggestion to that effect, but we take the views of the French Government on the monetary situation seriously, and we recognize that this is one of the big outstanding issues about which we will remain in very close contact.

*Q. Have you agreed on a tentative date for the resumption of the oil dialogue?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We haven't agreed on a date, but I think we are making progress toward establishing a framework which should enable us to propose dates within a reasonable future.

*Q. About the renewal of the dialogue before the special session of the United Nations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are working in that direction.

#### **Remarks to the Press Following Meeting at the French Foreign Ministry**

Press release 366 dated July 11

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you envisage anything to end the deadlock between producers and consumers?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We talked at some length about the producer-consumer dialogue and how to resume it. And I think that we have made good progress which gives us hope that the dialogue can be resumed in the relatively near future.

*Q. Have you discussed the situation in the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We had a discussion about the situation in the Middle East also, yes.

*Q. What are the main obstacles, according to you?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as you know, some rather delicate negotiations are now going on, and I will be meeting the Israeli Prime Minister in Bonn, and we are in close touch with the Egyptian Government as well as with other Arab governments. So I don't think it would be proper for me to characterize the state of the negotiations while they are in progress.

*Q. About the reaction of the developing countries to the resumption of the dialogue between oil producers and oil consumers?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My impression is that the ideas that were discussed this morning by the Foreign Minister, the President, and myself offer a basis on which the developing countries will also agree to resume the dialogue.

*Q. On the basis proposed by the Energy Agency?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't want to go into the details. But the ideas that have been commonly discussed will undoubtedly be incorporated.

*Q. A comment about the lifting of the arms embargo to Turkey?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As you know, the Administration strongly favors the lifting of the arms embargo and has made specific proposals to the Congress to that effect. The Senate has already approved it. The President and I met with the leaders of the House of Representatives yesterday, who promised us they would take urgent action, and they are now considering our proposals.

*Q. And what about negotiating the bases in Turkey?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we are assuming that on the basis of the action that we have proposed to the House of Representatives that the climate for the discussion with respect to our bases in Turkey will be greatly improved.

*Q. On which international question have*

*you and Mr. Kissinger made the best progress?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* Well, we have found to have a fairly broad convergence of views on most of the major international problems. Since we have really covered all the major problems that currently confront the world, I don't think I can point out any single problem. Lastly, I think that we have reached a solid base for progress in those areas which call for the joint action of the United States and of France.

*Q. Which problems?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* Especially on the dialogue, especially on the international monetary problems that have to be approached. And there is a whole series of things on which general opinions were exchanged.

*Q. And on the Conference of European Security?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* On the European Security Conference, the United States and France are of the opinion that this conference, which is now in its final stage, should be brought to its conclusion as fast as possible. And we hope that the final stage in Helsinki can take place either by the end of July or, at the latest, by the end of August.

*Q. Mr. Minister, did you discuss Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for a monetary conference?*

*Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues:* Mr. Giscard d'Estaing did in fact speak of it. There is no proposal as yet. Only the ideas were exchanged.

Coming out of the Elysée we have already told you the essentials about what we discussed this morning. We do not have to repeat it. I believe one may say that the exchanges of views that we have had with the American Secretary of State and the conversation we have had with the President of the Republic were entirely useful and have reflected, as one could expect, the excellent climate of relations between the United States and France.

## ARRIVAL, GENEVA, JULY 10

Press release 367 dated July 11

I am glad to be back in Geneva for an opportunity to continue an exchange of views with Foreign Minister Gromyko. As you know, we believe that the United States and the Soviet Union have a particular responsibility to do all they can to lessen international tension and contribute to the solution of outstanding problems. It is in this spirit that we will review a number of bilateral issues and a number of issues of world peace with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and I hope we will make some contribution toward the solution of these issues.

I would like to express my appreciation to the Swiss Government for making this meeting possible and for the hospitality they have extended.

Thank you.

## REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER TO THE PRESS, GENEVA, JULY 10<sup>1</sup>

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we had very extensive talks, very constructive, and conducted in a cordial atmosphere. We concentrated on the European Security Conference and mostly on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. With respect to the European Security Conference, the United States supports the consensus that has developed that the last stage of the conference should take place on July 30 as proposed by Canada, and we are prepared to bring this to as rapid a conclusion as possible in order to permit the Finnish hosts to make their preparations. With respect to SALT we had extensive discussions, which will be continued tomorrow, and progress was made.

Thank you.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you heard anything from Malta? Since the meeting is still on, they are still waiting down there.*

<sup>1</sup> Made following a meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the Soviet Mission (text from press release 368).

*Secretary Kissinger:* I understand that the only country that has not yet joined the consensus is Malta and that they are waiting to hear from them either tonight or tomorrow morning.

*Q. Did Mr. Gromyko give you anything resembling a new proposal on verification that would help reach agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I cannot go into the details of a discussion that is still going on, but as I pointed out progress has been made.

*Q. The Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Middle East will be discussed tomorrow. We have not yet discussed the Middle East. Tomorrow we will continue our discussions on SALT, and then we will turn to the Middle East. We will meet here at 10:30. We have been meeting off and on with the Ambassadors to the European Security Conference.

## U.S.-U.S.S.R. JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT GENEVA JULY 11

Press release 369 dated July 11

In accordance with an earlier agreement, a meeting was held on July 10-11 in Geneva between the Secretary of State of the United States and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Andrei A. Gromyko.

In furtherance of the conversations held previously, they continued their exchange of views on matters of bilateral US-Soviet relations. Particular attention was given to issues related to working out a new long-term agreement on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms on the basis of the understanding reached between President Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, at their meeting in Vladivostok in November, 1974.

In reviewing the international issues of interest to both sides, they held a thorough

discussion, in particular, on questions concerning the holding of the final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at the summit level in Helsinki. They also continued their exchange of views on matters of achieving a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, including the question of resuming the Geneva Peace Conference.

The talks were conducted in a friendly atmosphere and both sides believe that the exchange of views was constructive and useful from the standpoint of further developing US-Soviet relations in conformity with the course they have embarked on together and the concrete agreements reached during the US-Soviet summit meetings.

#### REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER RABIN, BONN, JULY 12 <sup>2</sup>

*Prime Minister Rabin:* Well, Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen, I am very thankful to the Federal Republic of Germany for making it possible to use my visit for another purpose, not just visiting the Federal Republic. I thank the Secretary, who found the time to have this meeting with me. In the meeting we have discussed in the way that normally we discuss between Israel and the United States—in a friendly atmosphere—the problems we face today.

We discussed various elements and aspects of the interim agreement with Egypt. We received—the Israeli part has received—certain clarifications. With these clarifications I am going tonight to Israel. We will have to discuss it there, and the Ambassador of Israel to the United States will bring our reaction to what we have heard and we have discussed in this meeting.

I am still hopeful that an interim agreement will be reached, but we have to overcome certain difficulties in the road to its achievement. Thank you very much.

<sup>2</sup> Made to the press at the conclusion of talks at Schloss Gymnich (text from press release 373 dated July 15).

*Secretary Kissinger:* I also would like to express the appreciation of the U.S. Government to the Federal Republic for making this meeting possible. The Prime Minister and I had a very friendly and very constructive talk. We reviewed all the elements of a possible interim agreement, and we attempted to answer the questions that Israel had put to us earlier in the week and additional questions that the Prime Minister raised this morning.

I believe that we have made progress in achieving understanding of the elements that are needed, and the Prime Minister will now return to Israel and communicate with us through his Ambassador later in the week. But from our point of view, I consider the talks constructive, and the atmosphere was friendly and warm as befits the relationship between our two countries.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what are the major difficulties you referred to?*

*Prime Minister Rabin:* I am not going to elaborate about details. I believe for the time being the statements that have been made are enough. You are going on the plane; you'll get an opportunity to— [Laughter.]

*Secretary Kissinger:* It may produce a senior official familiar with the Middle East. [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think an interim agreement is closer now than it was prior to your meeting with the Prime Minister?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I always believe that some progress in clarifying issues was made, and this can only be helpful. But, of course, it depends on all of the parties, and we will have to see later on in the week.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, [inaudible] do you plan a trip to the Middle East now?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I said the next event will be the return of the Israeli Ambassador to Washington, and after that, we will make the decisions of how to carry the process forward.

## President Ford's News Conference at Chicago July 12

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford at Chicago on July 12.<sup>1</sup>*

*President Ford:* Good morning. Won't you all please sit down.

I have one short announcement, a very important announcement.

I am deeply relieved at the report of the safe release of Colonel [Ernest R.] Morgan. Since his abduction on the 29th of June, the U.S. Government, with the close cooperation of the Government of Lebanon, has been trying to secure Colonel Morgan's return, and we are extremely glad to report that that has occurred.

At the same time, the United States is greatly appreciative of the extraordinary efforts of the Government of Lebanon in obtaining Colonel Morgan's release and for the assistance of others who have worked toward this end.

*Q. Mr. President, can you tell us what was negotiated in order to obtain the release of Colonel Morgan?*

*President Ford:* Our representatives in Lebanon worked very closely with the Government of Lebanon and with other elements in order to make sure that Colonel Morgan was returned. We have a policy—and I think it is the right policy—that we will not as a government pay ransom, and as far as I know it was not done in this case by our government. But by working closely and firmly with all parties, we were, thank goodness, able to return Colonel Morgan safely.

*Q. Mr. President, the United States is apparently prepared to approve negotiations of a multiterm wheat and grain sale with the Soviet Union. Other countries are facing drought and may ask for sales, too.*

*My questions are: How much can we sell*

<sup>1</sup>For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 21.

*without dipping in too much into our harvest this year; and won't this increase costs of bread and food later this year to our consumers?*

*President Ford:* First, we should thank the farmers of this country for their tremendous productivity. We are fortunate in America to be the breadbasket of the world. Our farmers do a tremendous job in the production of food for us and for the world as a whole.

We are anticipating the largest corn crop, the largest wheat crop in the history of the United States, but there are some uncertainties.

We hope that there will be a sale to the Soviet Union. It will be helpful to the American farmer and will be a reward for his productivity. We hope that there will be ample supplies of corn and wheat and feed grains so that we can help other nations around the world through our Food for Peace program.

And if there is this sizable crop in the variety of areas, it will mean that we can expand our Food for Peace program and act in a humanitarian way to the less fortunate.

I have no idea at this point what the amount will be of the sale to the Soviet Union, if it does materialize.

But I think the fact that we can make one is a blessing, and I hope we do make one. But I want to assure you, as I do the American consumer, that we are alert to the danger of too big a sale or too much shipment overseas because the American consumer has a stake in this problem as well.

So we have to find a careful line to tread, of selling all we can, but protecting the rights of the American consumer and utilizing the productivity of the American farmer to help our balance of payments, to improve our humanitarian efforts overseas, and to indirectly help us in our relations with other countries.

*Q. But a sale of any substantial size would mean some increase in a loaf of bread here, wouldn't it?*

*President Ford:* I don't think I am in a

position—or anyone else is in a position—to define what a substantial sale is. A big sale with big wheat and feed grain and corn production would have a minimal effect on consumer prices in the United States.

I can only assure you and the American people that we are watching all aspects of this problem, and we will keep alert to any pitfalls or dangers that might result.

## **Security Assistance Program Discussed by Department**

*Statement by Carlyle E. Maw  
Under Secretary for Security Assistance*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee today and to testify with respect to the status of our security assistance program.

Security assistance has been an important instrument of our foreign policy for more than a quarter of a century. It began with special programs of military aid to the Philippines in 1946 and Greece and Turkey in 1947 and was expanded in the 1950's and 1960's to include nations in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Security assistance is provided for several basic reasons: to assist allies and other states with the means to defend themselves, to obtain bases and other military access rights, and to support political objectives that are deemed essential to the U.S. Government. In pursuit of these objectives, we have over the years provided military assistance to more than 75 countries, made military instruction available to almost 500,000 foreign military personnel, and recently provided on a non-reimbursable basis an annual average of \$4 billion in military equipment and related sup-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 10. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

port to countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

Today the situation is different. As the subcommittee is aware, recent events in Southeast Asia have necessitated an extensive review of our policies in Asia. At the same time, we are engaged in a major effort to bring peace to the Middle East through a negotiated settlement of Arab-Israeli differences. Concomitantly, we have underway a reassessment of our Middle Eastern policies as well as a study of the types of programs needed to achieve our objectives in this region.

In early February 1975, the President transmitted to Congress his recommended foreign assistance legislation for fiscal year 1976. He made it clear that the sums he had recommended for security assistance—\$790 million for grant military assistance, and \$560 million for foreign military sales credits to finance a \$1.021 billion program—were contingent in nature. He pointed out at the time that:

Due to the largely fluid situations in Indochina and the current reassessments of our Middle East policy, the military assistance programs are now under review.

I wish to stress at this juncture that what is at stake in this policy review is not the arithmetic of appropriations, but the nature of future American relations with nations in the Middle East and Asia. Until the Middle East review is completed, we will not be in a position to provide Congress with a complete presentation of our security assistance funding requirements for FY76. The countries that will be omitted include Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. On the other hand, our Asian policy assessment is fully underway, and we should be in a position to provide to the subcommittee the Administration's proposed security assistance program for countries in this region within the next few weeks.

At the same time, we will be in a position to report to the Congress on security assistance and human rights as required under section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (amended) [Public Law 93-559, approved Dec. 30, 1974].

The U.S. Government is genuinely and

deeply concerned about human rights matters. This concern reflects both our own traditions as well as a realization that human rights, and respect for them, are valid foreign policy objectives in their own right. Moreover, we recognize the importance of human rights in the conduct of our foreign policy as well as the clear intent of the Congress that human rights questions be addressed in the formulation of our policies.

At the same time, we must recognize that we are dealing with sovereign countries with differing political systems. There is also a very finite limit to the proper role of an outside government in internal developments and affairs. We can neither determine the course of internal change nor be certain as to what the outcome will be in situations where there are internal tensions.

Further, our policies toward individual countries represent a mix of interests, objectives, and relationships different in almost every case. We know that neglect of human rights may well adversely affect the achievement of other important objectives. We also know that internal popular support is essential to long-term political stability. As the Secretary of State said in his address to the Japan Society on June 18:

... there is no question that popular will and social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential underpinnings of resistance to subversion and external challenge.

In the State Department, we have strengthened our capacity to deal with human rights matters. We have within the last year directed each of our Embassies to report in detail on the status of human rights in its country. Over the past three months, we have directed a comprehensive review of the human rights situation preparatory to transmittal of a report to the Congress as required under section 502B.

The Administration has been active in complying with other congressional requirements. For example, section 51 of the Foreign Assistance Act urges new initiatives in the area of international controls over the transfer of arms and calls for a report to the Congress by the President "setting forth the steps he has taken to carry out" the provi-

sions of section 51. This report is in preparation and should be received by the Congress within the next few days.

Over the past several months, we have also embarked on a serious effort to meet the provisions of section 17(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which directs the President to submit to the first session of the 94th Congress a "detailed plan for the reduction and eventual elimination of the present military assistance program." We expect that we will be in a position to submit a report on this subject by the third quarter of 1975.

At the same time, we are attempting to deal with a number of other equally important questions as we develop a revised FY76 security assistance program for presentation to the Congress. Our future relations with Turkey is one such question. The total U.S. embargo on grant assistance, credit, and commercial sales of military equipment to Turkey, so sweeping that members of the Warsaw Pact can purchase items now forbidden to Turkey, is subjecting our security relationship with this important NATO ally to an intolerable burden. A relationship of trust and confidence built up over many years has already been seriously and adversely affected. Continuation of the embargo risks further deterioration that could jeopardize our security interests throughout the eastern Mediterranean area.

While the Administration strongly believes that the embargo should be rescinded, it is for Congress itself to decide what form the legislation should take. The Senate has already adopted the Scott-Mansfield bill, which would restore grant assistance as well as cash and credit sales. In any case, it is important that the Congress act as expeditiously as possible. As a result of the February 5 embargo, Turkey has recently informed us it wishes to begin negotiations in mid-July on the future of U.S. facilities. The Government of Turkey has not linked the facilities negotiations to progress toward lifting the embargo, but it is clear that the scope of the negotiations will be affected by congressional action.

The downward spiral in U.S.-Turkish relations that would result from a prolongation

of the embargo is contrary to U.S. and Turkish interests. It would also deal a heavy blow to the NATO alliance at a time when other major unresolved problems exist in the Mediterranean region. Diminution of the Western position in Turkey is also likely to have adverse implications for our standing in the Middle East.

As the subcommittee is aware, we are engaged in base rights negotiations with the Government of Spain, and we are also about to embark on discussions with the Government of the Philippines on our bases in that country. The outcome of these negotiations could have a significant impact on our security assistance funding needs.

Gentlemen, we continue to believe that political and economic development can only take place in a more secure world. Thus security assistance is a necessary complement to our efforts to assist development.

As you know, we have greatly modified our security assistance programs in the past five years to encourage nations to bear the primary burden for their own defense. In specific situations, grant assistance must continue to play a major role; where we decrease grant assistance we should provide adequate credit to our friends and allies to enable them to purchase the arms they require. The foreign military sales program promotes the self-sufficiency we seek and our partners are pursuing.

Whatever the outcome of the Middle East and Asia reviews now in progress, the program that is presented to the Congress will substantially contribute to the following goals:

—Creating a lasting peace in the Middle East.

—Building the capacity of the nations of East Asia to determine their own destiny.

—Establishing the foundations for countries in Latin America and elsewhere to meet pressing internal security and self-defense problems.

—Lowering the burden on the United States to play a dominant security role with our own armed forces.

We in the United States cannot alone un-

derwrite the success of the quest to resolve old issues or alone persevere in the face of continuing obstacles to peace. Nor can we assure that the imperative to cooperation will overcome the temptation of nations to pursue short-term advantage. But it is equally clear that hopes for a peaceful, cooperative, and just international order can only be realized with the strong participation of this nation. Our security assistance program is a crucial vehicle for that participation.

I believe that this is a time of transition and of testing in our relations with other nations. It is also a time when we must move prudently and patiently in fashioning new policies and constructing programs to aid other nations. I hope that the subcommittee will appreciate what we are attempting to accomplish and will bear with us as we develop a coherent and effective security assistance program for FY76.

## U.S. Interpretive Statement on NPT Review Conference Declaration

*The final declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by consensus on May 30 at Geneva.<sup>1</sup> Following is the U.S. interpretive statement on the declaration, which was made before the conference that day by David Klein, U.S. Alternate Representative to the conference.*

My delegation is pleased to have joined in the adoption of the final declaration of this, the first NPT Review Conference. We believe that by reaching agreement on the conference declaration, which is the culmination of our efforts over the last four weeks, we have taken an important step forward.

The declaration is a realistic document, containing recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the treaty's operation and, most important, of the nonproliferation

<sup>1</sup> For a statement by U.S. Representative Fred C. Iklé made before the conference on May 6 and the text of the final declaration, see BULLETIN of June 30, 1975, p. 921.

regime generally. Some ideas—including those relating to international cooperation on physical security, to improvements of safeguards on exports, and to regional solutions to fuel-cycle needs—are innovative and are receiving broad international endorsement for the first time. In addition, the conference declaration strongly underlines the need for determined and timely efforts to achieve widely shared objectives. Taken as a whole, the final declaration establishes a practical and comprehensive course of action for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. It shows clearly that we all have a shared and overriding interest in the success of efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, which is a continuing and complicated process.

We recognize that no delegation can give unqualified support to each of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the declaration. Some may have reservations about particular ideas expressed in the document; others may regret that some of their suggestions were not included or were given less emphasis than they would have preferred. This is as true of our delegation as it is of others.

I would like to take this opportunity to briefly state for the record our views on some of the issues covered in the final declaration.

First, I would like to reiterate that we look forward, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the agreement outlined at Vladivostok, to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations and reductions in the level of strategic arms.

Second, with respect to the question of restraints on nuclear testing, my government joins in affirming the determination of participants of this conference to achieve the discontinuance of all explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The final declaration notes that a number of delegations at the conference expressed the desire that the nuclear-weapon states parties enter as soon as possible into an agreement to halt all nuclear-weapon tests for a specified period of time. Our view is that any treaty or agree-

ment on nuclear-weapons testing must contain provisions for adequate verification and must solve the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. It would not be realistic to assume that an agreement banning all nuclear-weapons testing, whether by nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT or by all testing powers, could be concluded before solutions to these problems are found.

With reference to nuclear-free zones, we believe that the creation of such zones could effectively complement the NPT as a means of preventing the spread of nuclear-explosive capabilities. We have emphasized that, to be effective, regional arrangements should meet the following criteria:

The initiative should be taken by the states in the region concerned. The zone should preferably include all states in the area whose participation is deemed important. The creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements, and provision must be made for adequate verification. Finally, we do not believe that the objective of nonproliferation would be served if a nuclear-free-zone arrangement permitted the indigenous development of nuclear explosives for any purpose; no effort to achieve nonproliferation could succeed if it permitted such indigenous development of nuclear explosives by non-nuclear-weapon states or failed to safeguard against diversion of nuclear materials to such use.

A number of delegations at the conference urged that nuclear-weapon states provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those states which became fully bound by the provisions of a regional arrangement. My government adhered to protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty, which contains such a binding security assurance, after determining that that treaty met the criteria noted above. However, we believe that each nuclear-free-zone proposal must be judged on its own merits to determine whether the provision of specific security assurances would be likely to have a favorable effect. Moreover, we do not believe it would be realistic to expect nuclear-weapon states to

make implied commitments to provide such assurances before the scope and content of any nuclear-free-zone arrangement are worked out.

I ask that this written statement be incorporated in annex II of the final document.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement, 1968. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973. TIAS 7809.

*Accession deposited:* Ireland, July 8, 1975.

##### Health

Amendments to articles 35 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, July 9, 1975; Malaysia, July 3, 1975.

##### Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

*Acceptance deposited:* Ethiopia, July 3, 1975.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948 on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Barbados, June 30, 1975; Bulgaria, April 16, 1975; People's Republic of China, April 28, 1975; France, March 24, 1975; Iran, July 8, 1975; Norway, April 28, 1975; Panama, May 23, 1975; Spain, March 24, 1975; Sweden, May 5, 1975; Trinidad and Tobago, May 16, 1975; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 28, 1975; United Kingdom, June 26, 1975.

Inter-American convention on facilitation of international waterborne transportation, with annex. Done at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Applicable to Berlin (West).

*Ratification deposited:* Chile (with reservation and statement), June 16, 1975.

##### Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, May 20, 1975.<sup>3</sup>

##### Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* Belgium (with a declaration), July 4, 1975.

##### Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* Monaco, July 4, 1975.

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force March 18, 1970; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* Monaco, July 4, 1975.

Trademark registration treaty, with regulations. Done at Vienna June 12, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Upper Volta, May 23, 1975.

#### BILATERAL

##### Egypt

Agreement extending the term of the task force assisting Egypt in the clearance of the Suez Canal. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 16 and 29, 1975. Entered into force June 29, 1975.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975.

##### Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul May 27, 1975. Entered into force May 27, 1975.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul July 1, 1975. Entered into force July 1, 1975.

## Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of December 11, 1974, as amended, relating to cooperative arrangements to support Mexican efforts to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico March 20, 1975. Entered into force March 20, 1975.

Agreement relating to the provision of equipment and training by the United States to support U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb illegal narcotics traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico May 29, 1975. Entered into force May 29, 1975.

Agreement relating to the provision of equipment and training by the United States to support U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb illegal narcotics traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico June 25, 1975. Entered into force June 25, 1975.

## Peru

Understanding relating to the air transport agreement of December 27, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1587, 4050, 6080), with related notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima July 7, 1975. Entered into force July 7, 1975.

## Portugal

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense articles by Portugal. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon May 30, 1974 and June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975; effective July 1, 1974.

## United Arab Emirates

Agreement relating to the sale of defense articles and services to the United Arab Emirates. Effected by exchange of notes at Abu Dhabi June 15 and 21, 1975. Entered into force June 21, 1975.

## United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of March 30, 1973, as amended and extended, relating to implementation and enforcement of civil aviation advance charter rules, and the related letter of March 29, 1974 (TIAS 7594, 7832, 8047). Effected by exchange of notes at London June 4, 1975. Entered into force June 4, 1975.

Agreement concerning an exchange program of Bicentennial fellowships in the creative and performed arts. Effected by exchange of notes at London July 2, 1975. Entered into force July 2, 1975.

## United Nations

Agreement amending the grant agreement of November 7, 1973, as amended, concerning assistance

to economic and social development programs in Africa. Signed at New York June 3, 1975. Entered into force June 3, 1975.

## Check List of Department of State

### Press Releases: July 14-20

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
370	7/14	Kissinger: Institute of World Affairs, Milwaukee, Wis.
*370A	7/14	Governor Lucey of Wisconsin: introductory remarks.
370B	7/14	Kissinger: questions and answers following address.
*371	7/14	Holdridge sworn in as Ambassador to Singapore (biographic data).
372	7/15	Kissinger: Upper Midwest Council, Bloomington (Minneapolis), Minn.
*372A	7/15	Donald Grangaard, Senator Humphrey, Governor Anderson of Minnesota: introductory remarks.
372B	7/15	Kissinger: question and answers following address.
373	7/15	Kissinger, Rabin: remarks at Bonn, July 12.
374	7/17	Kissinger: news conference, Bloomington (Minneapolis), Minn., July 15.
375	7/17	Kissinger: news conference, Milwaukee, Wis., July 16.
*376	7/17	Study Group 2 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCITT, Sept. 11.
*377	7/17	Study Group 8 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Aug. 27.
*378	7/18	Advisory Committee on the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements, July 31.
*379	7/18	Study Group 5 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCITT, Aug. 8.
*380	7/18	Andrew Wyeth to visit U.S.S.R.
†381	7/18	U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign North Pacific fisheries agreement.
†382	7/18	U.S. rejects ICNAF Northwest Atlantic fisheries regulations.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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