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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for NBC "Today" Show

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by Barbara Walters which was conducted at the Department of State on May 3 and broadcast on the NBC television "Today" show May 5–8.

Press release 231, parts I–IV, May 5–8

PORTION BROADCAST MAY 5

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, we are about to celebrate our Bicentennial. Is Viet-Nam our first defeat in 200 years?

Secretary Kissinger: When a nation is engaged in a major effort for 10 years and then doesn't achieve its basic objectives, you have to say it is a significant setback, yes.

Miss Walters: Is Viet-Nam our first defeat in 200 years?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it depends how you assess the War of 1812 and other events. It is a significant setback.

Miss Walters: You are responsible for the airlift of more than 100,000 Viet-Nam refugees. How do you answer the American people who are worried about further economic deprivation and are resisting the arrival of these refugees?

Secretary Kissinger: It has been the American tradition to take refugees throughout our history, even from countries to which we had no special obligation. We took 675,000 Cuban refugees. We took, I think, over 150,000 Hungarian refugees.

Here is a country in which for 15 years we were engaged in a major effort in which hundreds of thousands of people cooperated with us in the belief that the United States would see this effort through. The least we owe these people, those who were most seriously endangered, is that we make an effort to evacuate them.

I think when the American people reflect about our obligation they will recognize that we could not decently do anything else. The number is about 120,000. It is one of the things that we can be proud of having achieved. I think it is a national duty to help them. Moreover, I believe that the impact in any one locality is going to be absolutely minimal.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, right now at this point of our history how do you see the fundamentals of our foreign policy, and are they being redefined since the fall of Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: The fundamental goal of our foreign policy has to remain to preserve peace and to achieve progress—economically, humanly, and politically—in the world.

Now, there is a curious situation in which many people say there is no domino effect but we have to redo all our foreign policy. Both propositions cannot be true.

I believe that the major objectives which the United States has set itself are dictated by our history, by our values, by our geography. They are unaffected by what has happened in Viet-Nam. They are more difficult as a result of our setback, but we can master them, and we will master them.

While Americans have some reason to be unhappy for various reasons about the outcome of Viet-Nam, if we look at the whole postwar record, we have preserved the global peace. Almost every great initiative in the postwar period has either been initiated by America or has been carried out with our strong support. If we want to avoid a world of chaos, if we want to achieve a world of progress, the American role is absolutely imperative. I repeat, it is our goal to maintain it and, based on our recent experience, to strengthen it in a more mature way.

With respect to Indochina, it is important to remember that we found 550,000 Ameri-

cans in Indochina when we came into office. We didn't put them there. In fact, we withdrew them.

Our attempt has been to gear American commitments to American capabilities and necessities.

Miss Walters: I would like to divide our foreign policy questions now into different parts of the globe, starting with the Far East, to Viet-Nam. At the time of the Paris peace treaty many people felt, perhaps cynically, that it was only a matter of time before North Viet-Nam took over all of Viet-Nam and that the withdrawal of our troops was our way of getting out and saving face. These people wonder why you didn't know this and have some alternate plan should Viet-Nam push south.

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, if so many people knew it, they managed to keep it rather quiet. I don't remember any very vocal statements at the time that pointed out what you have just said.

Secondly, when you say why didn't we have an alternative plan, I would have to know what sort of a plan do people have in mind, what could we have done?

Miss Walters: Let me make a suggestion—not to run your foreign policy. But for example, one alternative is, after Congress had the arms cutoff, we might have gone to President Thieu and told him, "Look, it is a new world, and you had better negotiate unless you want defeat."

Secretary Kissinger: Let me first go back to where we were in January 1973 and where we wound up in April of '75. In January '73 we did not foresee that Watergate would sap the executive authority of the United States to such a degree that flexibility of executive action inherently would be circumscribed. We did not foresee that the Congress would pass a law which prohibited us from enforcing the Paris agreement; and while we probably might have done nothing anyway, it makes a lot of difference for Hanoi whether it thinks the United States probably will not or whether it thinks that we certainly can not.

I do not believe that Hanoi would have sent 19 of its 20 divisions south if these two things hadn't happened. Nor did we foresee that aid to Viet-Nam would be cut in successive years by 50 percent each year at a time when inflation quadrupled the oil prices and inflation increased the cost of everything—so that after May 1974 no new equipment of any kind was sent to Viet-Nam and not even spare parts in any substantial quantities reached Viet-Nam, so that ammunition had to be rationed for the Vietnamese forces. Maybe the South Vietnamese Army was not ever one of the better armies in the world, but even a good army would have been demoralized by these successive cuts.

None of this was predictable. After it became clearer that a gradual erosion of morale was occurring, we tried very hard to get negotiations started; and President Thieu, whatever you may think of him, on a number of occasions made proposals to get these talks started unconditionally.

But once the North Vietnamese realized what the trends were, they blocked all negotiations and went for a military solution.

Miss Walters: So that you feel there was no other possibility?

Secretary Kissinger: There was no other possibility.

Miss Walters: It is now known that President Nixon wrote a letter to President Thieu in January of 1973 promising that the United States would move "full force" to punish any violations of the Paris peace agreement. You obviously knew of the content of this letter.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course.

Miss Walters: Why didn't you reveal to Congress in the past months the content of that letter, especially when Senator [Henry M.] Jackson raised this question?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a very important question of the conduct of foreign policy. Presidents have been writing letters to foreign heads of state since the founding of the Republic. During the difficult months when we were trying to convince President Thieu to accept the Paris accords, many letters were written—just as every President, including

President Ford, is writing, has been writing letters to foreign heads of government.

If we begin revealing the contents of letters simply because a Senator—on top of it a Presidential candidate, but quite apart from this—a Senator alleges that there is something in these letters, then Presidential correspondence will lose its private character.

Moreover in this particular case, President Ford announced that the substance of these letters had been made public, not ascribed to correspondence, but in fact had been made public.

The reason President Ford decided to not release these letters was to maintain the principle of confidentiality of Presidential correspondence. We do have an obligation to tell the Congress about obligations which the country has undertaken. That was done in many public statements in 1973, and they were made moot by congressional actions and after that it was not an issue.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, this brings up one of the criticisms about you today. That is, people say Henry Kissinger deals in excessive secrecy. There are other letters and other deals perhaps being made at other conferences and other summits that perhaps the Congress doesn't know about. How does one resolve that, and how do you answer that criticism?

Secretary Kissinger: Once certain stereotypes develop, it is very difficult to deal with them. I am certain that if I read top secret documents in front of the Washington Monument to a public assembly I would still be accused of conducting foreign policy too secretly. One has to separate it into two parts.

The first is: Secrecy in negotiations is absolutely essential because it enables each side to state views and explanations which could be extremely embarrassing if they became public. It is absolutely required for the foreign leaders who deal with us to know that they can talk to us frankly. Therefore the secrecy of the negotiating process must be preserved. Charles Evans Hughes said in 1923 that open diplomacy can only refer to results, not to the process.

The second point is: Are there secret agreements that people don't know about and that have been kept from the public? Well, so far, with all the allegations that have been made, nobody has yet produced any secret agreement that has not been made public. At one time there was an allegation that we had made some secret agreement about 70 missiles. That turned out to be an absurdity, but it is so complicated to explain that I don't want to go into it now. At any rate, that was an absurdity.

The second argument that has been made is that we did not reveal a Gromyko letter about Jewish emigration. It is true that we did not reveal the letter, but the substance of that letter was fully disclosed to the Senate in the testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on December 3, 1974.

The third charge has to do with the war in Viet-Nam, with the end of the war in Viet-Nam. There, too, the substance was fully explained. There are no secret agreements. No one has as yet produced any secret agreements. All they have produced are limited statements that were fully revealed to the public.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, do you see our government recognizing the North Vietnamese Government?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we now have to see what the conduct of this Government is internationally and partially domestically. For example, we know that in Cambodia very tragic and inhuman and barbarous things are going on. We don't regret not having recognized Cambodia immediately.

We want to observe the conduct of the Vietnamese Government for a while before we make this decision.

Miss Walters: Can you tell us what part the Soviet Union played diplomatically, militarily, during the waning days of the South Viet-Nam collapse?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union played, in the last two weeks, a moderately constructive role in enabling us to understand the possibilities there were for evacuation, both of Americans and South Vietnamese, and for the possibilities that might exist for a political evolution.

On the other hand, I do not want to give the Soviet Union excessive credit for moderating the consequences that its arms brought about. Therefore we have to see it in perspective.

Miss Walters: Did the Soviet Union tell you that there would be no possibility of a negotiated settlement, that it was going to end in a takeover of the city?

Secretary Kissinger: That was not clear to me from the exchanges.

PORTION BROADCAST MAY 6

Miss Walters: We talk of détente with the Soviet Union, but how do we reconcile détente with the country that aids the collapse of an ally we are committed to defend?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to understand what détente represents. The Soviet Union is a country that we recognize as ideologically hostile. The Soviet Union is a great power that is in many parts of the world operating competitively with us. The Soviet Union is also a country that possesses an enormous nuclear arsenal and with which we have certain interests in common, such as the prevention of general nuclear war, such as limiting conflict in areas where both of us could get directly involved.

In those areas détente has worked reasonably well. What we cannot ask the Soviet Union to do is to keep itself from taking advantage of situations in which, for whatever reasons, we do not do what is required to maintain the balance.

It is true that Soviet arms made the conquest of South Viet-Nam possible. It is also true that the refusal of American arms made the conquest of South Viet-Nam inevitable.

Therefore, while the Soviet Union does have a heavy responsibility, we cannot expect the Soviet Union to police the world for us, and we have to be mature enough to recognize that we have to coexist, even in a competitive world, and perhaps hopefully be able to moderate over a period of years the competition in peripheral areas.

Now, eventually the Soviet Union must realize that it is responsible for the consequences of its actions even in peripheral areas. But as a basic relationship détente has never meant the absence of competition.

Miss Walters: Where does China stand now as a result of the fall of Saigon?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, China now has 40 million Vietnamese on its frontiers who do not exactly suffer from a lack of confidence in themselves. I think China will look at the international situation from the point of view of the overall balance of power, from the point of view of its own national interests. I think it will conclude that the policy that led it to undertake normalization of relations with the United States remains the best course for it, just as we believe that the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is an important objective of American policy which will be maintained.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, Thailand's Foreign Minister has said all American soldiers will be totally gone from that country within one year. What does that mean to us?

Secretary Kissinger: Basically, as we assess our policy around the world, it is important to understand that the United States does not do favors to other countries by being in an alliance with them nor do other countries do us favors by being our allies. If other countries want us to withdraw our troops, we will of course withdraw them.

Our security can be protected in many ways. What it means, however, is that for the Thai leaders the last few months have been a traumatic experience. Thailand supported our efforts in Viet-Nam and in Indochina because it believed its own security was intimately connected with it. And it is well known that we used Thai bases for many of the operations of the Indochina war. So naturally the Thai leaders are concerned about what this means, what our withdrawal from Cambodia and Viet-Nam means, about our general attitude in foreign policy. And I think they will find that we are going to stick by our commitments.

If they want us to reduce our forces, and they have indicated that they do, and if they

want us to withdraw them, we are prepared to discuss this with them, and of course we will accede by their wishes.

Miss Walters: Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield has said that we should withdraw our troops from South Korea, probably the next target of Communist pressure. Do you think we should? Has South Korea asked us to?

Secretary Kissinger: South Korea has not asked us to. In South Korea there can be no ambiguity about our commitment because we have a defense treaty ratified by the Congress. If we abandon this treaty, it would have drastic consequences in Japan and all over Asia because that would be interpreted as our final withdrawal from Asia and our final withdrawal from our whole postwar foreign policy.

Miss Walters: Is there a redefinition of the domino theory in light of the internal rebellions going on in such countries as Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia; and, as part of that, have we as a result of Viet-Nam stopped trying to persuade governments to resist communism?

Secretary Kissinger: There are two aspects to the domino theory. The first is: Is there a domino effect to foreign policy action? The second is: Can we, as a country, do something about every domino effect that may occur in the world?

Miss Walters: I like your questions much better than mine. They are more understandable. They are clearer.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to my first question, there is in almost every major event a domino effect that is produced either by the change in the balance of forces, or by the perception of other countries of the actions of the various participants, or by the general psychological climate that is created in the world as to who is advancing and who is withdrawing. That is inevitable.

What the United States can do about it is another matter. For example, with respect to Indochina we now receive cables from places as far away as Latin America and Africa, that have no geographic interest in Southeast Asia, simply questioning what this means about the American purpose.

Now, does it mean that the United States is no longer urging countries to resist internal subversion?

The first decision whether to resist internal subversion must come from the countries concerned. We probably made a mistake in Viet-Nam to turn Viet-Nam into a test case for our policy, and not for the Vietnamese policy, back in 1962 and 1963 when we first got ourselves involved there.

So our general attitude would be that the basic decision of how to react to internal subversion depends on the countries concerned.

Miss Walters: Let me go back to that. Does that mean we should have realized that the trend was toward communism and said we will stay out?

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we perhaps might have perceived it more in Vietnamese terms rather than as the outward thrust of a global conspiracy.

Miss Walters: Okay.

Secretary Kissinger: Then if there is a decision to resist internal subversion, I would think that the introduction of American military forces is the worst way of dealing with it, because that introduces a foreign element. If we want to be helpful we would be much better off strengthening the government's ability to resist and giving it assistance rather than introducing American military forces.

But as a general rule, one would really have to look at that country by country. We don't have a blanket policy in this respect that applies to every country in the world.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, can we talk of the Middle East? President Ford and you are due to meet President Sadat in Austria next month and later with Prime Minister Rabin in Washington. What possible avenues for new negotiations do you see?

Secretary Kissinger: We do not have a plan that we want to present to these two governments now. But we do have the conviction that a prolonged stalemate in the Middle East involves a high risk of another Middle East

war with major consequences for the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union and with a major impact on the economies of all of the industrialized nations, including us. This is a danger that we are determined to avoid. We believe that it is also in the interest of all of the participants, all of the parties in the Middle East, including especially Israel.

So we will talk to President Sadat and, when we meet, Prime Minister Rabin and other leaders about their ideas of how the Middle East can be moved to a solution. And after that we will formulate a precise American policy.

Miss Walters: It has been widely noted that you and the President criticized Israel for not being more flexible. What was the purpose of this private criticism?

Secretary Kissinger: You know, Barbara, there are so many myths that go around. The President made a public criticism, not a private criticism, when he referred to inflexibility.

In terms of the long-term consequences, I have expressed the view that a strategy which on the whole had been agreed to with the Israeli Government did not succeed.

The purpose has been not of criticism, but the purpose of making clear the general American perception of the problem was to make clear that new decisions had to be taken by all of the parties and that the progress toward peace in the Middle East cannot be stopped.

Miss Walters: But when you publicly or privately criticized Israel, didn't this release President Sadat from reexamining his policy?

Secretary Kissinger: We have asked all parties to look at their policies, and the allegation of private criticism of Israel comes mostly from people who think they are helping Israel but who in my view are not helping Israel by making these allegations.

Our view is that all parties on both sides have an obligation to examine what they can do to produce peace. On the Israeli side this is a question of what territory they are prepared to give up. On the Arab side it is a question of what concrete commitments to peace they are prepared to make.

Miss Walters: Almost six weeks ago, President Ford asked for a reassessment of our policy in the Middle East. I know you have not finished the reassessment. They say it will take another week or so. But can you tell us anything of what has emerged?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, when President Ford announced this and set a tentative deadline, it was before events in Indochina took a great deal of our attention.

Secondly, it is a mistake to believe that there will be some clear terminal date at which one can say from now on the assessment is completed. But I believe that on the whole the decisions, the final decision, will not be made until President Ford has had an opportunity to meet with the leaders of the countries principally concerned.

But the conclusion to which we have come is certainly to continue a major American effort to produce progress toward peace in the Middle East and not to permit a long period of stagnation.

Miss Walters: What assurances do Israel and our other allies have that we will keep our commitments to them? As soon as Israelis hear "reassessment," and other allies, too, it seems to strike great fear that it could mean abandonment or great change. What assurances do they have?

Secretary Kissinger: The President has, on several occasions, made clear—and so have I —that we will stand by our existing commitments.

Miss Walters: Could Congress change this?

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly Congress can change our commitments, as it did in Viet-Nam—not our commitments, our implied obligations.

But the situation in Viet-Nam was quite different from the situation in other parts of the world. In Viet-Nam the situation was extremely controversial. It has not been that with respect to Israel or with respect to Western Europe and most of our other alliances. But Congress can certainly change any commitment we have.

Miss Walters: But do you feel that Israel and these other allies have good reason to be assured that the basic policy will not change?

Secretary Kissinger: Assurances are not achieved with words alone. It depends on our conduct as a people. In terms of the foreign policy of this Administration, our allies and friends have no reason to fear that we will abandon them.

In terms of our overall performance as a country, it is crucial that we restore a sense of unity between the executive and legislative branches and that we perform in such a manner that other countries know that we are dealing with them as a united people.

PORTION BROADCAST MAY 7

Miss Walters: If we turn now to Europe, our base in the Portuguese Azores was essential to the military airlift of aid to Israel in the October war. Portugal has said she may not allow this to happen again.

Secretary Kissinger: She said she will not allow it.

Miss Walters: Do we have alternate plans?

Secretary Kissinger: We have alternate possibilities, but they are much more complicated and involve a much longer route.

Miss Walters: Are you very concerned about this?

Secretary Kissinger: It is an additional problem in case there is a Middle East war.

Miss Walters: What are our relations now with Portugal? What do you see happening with this?

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in Portugal is in a state of evolution. There recently were elections which indicated gratifyingly that a majority of the Portuguese people favored the democratic parties. It is also a fact that the government has a very heavy Communist influence, out of proportion to the numerical strength that the party represents. So we have to assess what the foreign policy of Portugal will be before we can make any final decisions.

Miss Walters: You will be visiting and trying to reassess our relations with NATO, our participation in NATO. Do you expect Turkey and Greece to remain in NATO? Realistically, as things are now?

Secretary Kissinger: I hope very much that Greece and Turkey will stay in NATO. I think it is in their self-interest to stay in NATO, but the national passions are very great. They are now negotiating in Vienna—the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus are negotiating in Vienna. We hope that during the NATO summit the President and others will have an opportunity to exchange views with the Greek and Turkish leaders, and we hope that we can play a role in moving things toward a negotiated outcome.

Miss Walters: But you have expressed yourself as being very gloomy about what you see as the decline and erosion of the free world.

Secretary Kissinger: No, it has been alleged.

Miss Walters: It has been alleged. All right. Are you?

Secretary Kissinger: It is not always true.

Miss Walters: It has been alleged that you are gloomy about what you see as the decline and erosion of the free world. Is this true, that you feel this way?

Secretary Kissinger: As a matter of fact, it is; it is partly true. It is not so much erosion of the free world. I think if we look around the world today that in many countries Marxist ideologies and perceptions of the world which are contrary to our values are gaining in strength and that therefore we have in the world both a political problem and a philosophical problem; that is, a problem of the degree to which we appear relevant to other countries.

In Europe, in some European countries, the left is gaining in strength. I am stating this clinically, as a fact. I am not stating that necessarily the United States can do a great deal about it. It is something to be noted.

Miss Walters: If it happens, if it kept

growing little by little, will it reach us? Has it reached us?

Secretary Kissinger: Will it? The United States cannot be an island in this world any longer. We are tied to the rest of the world through the necessities of security, increasingly by the imperatives of economics, and inevitably by the modern means of communications.

So I would suppose that the intellectual and philosophical currents in the world will sooner or later affect the United States and then it is a question of what other currents exist here to deal with them.

Miss Walters: As a historian, do you see us going more to the left or more toward the right? How do you see the trends?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think we are becoming socialistic in this country. This is not at all a trend. But we have had a very sharp division in this country which formerly centered around Viet-Nam, but for which Viet-Nam was really a symbol between a more radical trend and a more conservative trend. And for one of the rare occasions in our history the contest was fought out in almost—it sometimes took extralegal forms on both sides.

Now, I think it is too early to tell in which direction it goes in this country because in this country the traditional element is very strong. It is a country that has very great faith in its existing values. So it could really go in either direction. But the major point that I would like to make is that we have the great advantage over many other countries that our divisions are not yet unbridgeable and that people on both sides of political dividing lines can still talk to each other.

I think we must preserve this and try to develop common positions rather than become, as so many other countries, divided into ideological blocs.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, is there any difference between the foreign policy of President Nixon and President Ford, and if so, how do they differ?

Secretary Kissinger: The foreign policy of a great country cannot be changed at the whim of individuals. And if it is perceived that every President starts an entirely new foreign policy, that in itself will create an element of instability in the world.

So if you look at the entire American postwar foreign policy, you will find that the changes in the major directions of the foreign policy haven't been all that significant.

What is different between various Presidents is the style, the method of doing business; and when new problems come up they must make their own decisions.

Miss Walters: Is there anything significantly different between these two men that you can see in the way that they handle foreign policy that influences you, that changes the direction?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would think that in the conduct of shaping, that in shaping a domestic consensus, President Ford would, on the whole, be more conciliatory.

Miss Walters: Well, it is considered in general that he is weaker in foreign policy than President Nixon. In his last speech there was a good deal of feeling that President Ford was going to put his own implant on foreign policy, but what he did was to put Henry Kissinger's impact. You read the papers, so you know what I am saying.

Secretary Kissinger: This is the sort of gossip that comes out of every White House. President Ford worked on this speech for many weeks. He spent days and nights on that speech, with many advisers.

Now, if advisers choose to put out that there were different points of view which were never apparent in the room and that one adviser prevailed, this makes a dramatic story; but it is not true. This speech reflected the convictions of President Ford.

Miss Walters: You did not go in the last few days and—

Secretary Kissinger: That is nonsense.

Miss Walters: —keep yourself in the White House and make the final impact and implant?

Secretary Kissinger: That is nonsense.

There was only one draft of the speech. I never heard any philosophical disagreements stated while I was in the room, nor did I change anything that already existed. It was predominantly a speech by President Ford which various of his advisers helped to draft.

Miss Walters: Is he as knowledgeable about foreign policy as President Nixon?

Secretary Kissinger: I think he would be the first to admit that when he came into office he was not as knowledgeable about foreign policy. On the other hand, he spends an enormous amount of his time on foreign policy. He moves with great deliberation, great care, and great thoroughness; and he masters the subjects of foreign policy with extraordinary attention and skill.

Miss Walters: I am going to be visiting Cuba as this interview is aired. I will be going with Senator [George] McGovern and some other reporters. This week the Organization of American States meets here in Washington, and high on their list is a reassessment of the economic blockade of Cuba. It is suspected if Latin America does this we will go along. What would you want Cuba to do to establish normalcy, and if I do see Premier Castro, is there anything that I can ask him for you, for us?

Secretary Kissinger: Castro is without any question a remarkable man. I think it is important for Americans to understand that individuals who go into the mountains to lead a revolution are not motivated by economic considerations. If they were, they would be bank presidents and not revolutionaries.

We have made clear to Cuba that we are prepared to improve our relations. We have made certain gestures to Cuba, so far not reciprocated. We are prepared to discuss with the other countries of the Organization of American States the question of blockade, the economic blockade, and to enable them to express their majority view on this subject.

But I think, Barbara, that Castro knows how to get in touch with us. I don't want to make it too tempting for him by using you as an intermediary.

PORTION BROADCAST MAY 8

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, let's talk about you and the criticism that is all around you at this point.

Secretary Kissinger: All unjustified. That is my position, and I will maintain it.

Miss Walters: Well, let's start. It has been said that by your holding two positions—Secretary of State and national security adviser—the President doesn't have the benefit of hearing diverse views on foreign policy. That is a legitimate point of view.

Secretary Kissinger: Leaving aside now the question of whether a man should hold two positions and addressing the question of does the President get diverse advice on foreign policy, the whole purpose of the national security system as it exists is to make sure that the President gets every significant point of view that exists in the bureaucracy. Typically when a major decision has to be made, there will be first a paper in which every agency expresses its view, after which there will be a meeting of the National Security Council at which every agency is represented. So the possibility of keeping anything from the President does not exist. And, moreover, any person who has been in a senior position for any length of time knows that it is essential for the President to make sure that the President has heard conflicting points of view because, if he doesn't and anything goes wrong for a reason which you didn't tell the President, his whole confidence in the policy will be undermined.

Miss Walters: All right. Now you have often said when we have talked in the past about how you present things, how you presented things to President Nixon, that you outlined all the possibilities but you also made recommendations. You are wearing two hats. Should you be? If you were standing out there somewhere looking at this one man holding two jobs, do you really think it is best that he hold both of them?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I want

to make clear that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and any other official who believes he has something relevant to say has very easy access to this President. It is not being blocked. Secondly, the decisions are made at meetings at which everybody is present. If the President wants to ask for my recommendations, he doesn't ask in what capacity he is asking it. Therefore the question cannot be answered in the abstract.

I agree with what the President said. If there is an individual who can handle both jobs and has the confidence of the President, the President should have the option of combining it. He should not be forced to either combine it or to separate it. He should have that option.

Miss Walters: Would you resign if either of these jobs were taken away from you?

Secretary Kissinger: I think this is not a time to talk about my resigning.

Miss Walters: I am going to have to because other people are, Mr. Secretary. Senator Frank Church, the leading Democrat in the Foreign Relations Committee, has called for your resignation as has the former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford. How do you react to men of this stature saying the country would be better off without you? I would like to know how you react as the Secretary of State and how you react as Henry Kissinger when you walk out of the room.

Secretary Kissinger: Senator Church, as I understand it, didn't ask for my resignation. He said we should change our policies or I should resign. I think that whether I resign or not depends on two factors: One, on the President's views as to my utility; and secondly, on my assessment of whether I am serving the country.

After one has been in Washington for six and a half years as I have, under extremely difficult and sometimes passionate circumstances, holding a job does not in itself hold any particular attraction. What I have to consider is the impact internationally if successively the President, Vice President, and the Secretary of State resign, and for what reason—what reasons are used to bring this about.

Miss Walters: This interview is going to run over a several-day period. I don't want to miss anything. Can I be assured that you will not resign between now and the end of the airing of this interview? Would you like to say something about it?

Secretary Kissinger: I save my resignations for visits to Salzburg.

Miss Walters: You only resign in Austria, is that it?

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, let's talk a little bit about you on a personal level now. You have been married now, it is over a year, isn't it?

Secretary Kissinger: Over a year, yes.

Miss Walters: What has marriage brought you besides a very lovely wife?

Secretary Kissinger: I am very close to my wife. I think it has enormously contributed to my peace of mind and to my ability to deal with temporary adversity.

Miss Walters: Is there any particular criticism that you feel is particularly unfair and that is prevalent and that you would like to answer?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't—I haven't really thought about this.

Miss Walters: Perhaps the major one is that it has been personal diplomacy, that it is Henry Kissinger's personal one-to-one diplomacy and that hasn't worked.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, to say it has not worked is probably—

Miss Walters: That is what your critics say.

Secretary Kissinger: That is probably an overstatement. If you look at what has been done over the last six and one half years with China, with the Soviet Union, in energy, in food, in getting our troops out of Viet-Nam and our prisoners back, and in starting the process toward peace in the Middle East, I don't think it is correct to say that our

foreign policy hasn't worked. I don't want to identify our foreign policy with me personally.

Miss Walters: Everyone does.

Secretary Kissinger: But I do not think Americans should accept the proposition that their foreign policy hasn't worked, because it has worked. We have had some setbacks, but nobody is batting 1.000. Most of our setbacks, many of our setbacks, have been caused by domestic problems. But on personal diplomacy, all diplomacy is to some extent personal.

Finally, the thing that probably will last longest, one of the aspects that will last longest is to get into the key positions of the Department of State the ablest younger people in the Department, so that I think now the Department of State has the most tough-minded and most forward-looking group it has had in 20 years. I am not working alone. I am working very closely with my associates.

Miss Walters: How is your staff going to feel when they hear you complimenting them? Aren't they going to get the bends just from the change?

Secretary Kissinger: I will make it up in private meetings.

Miss Walters: In days past—

Secretary Kissinger: One of my associates has said the highest praise they can get from me is the absence of abuse.

Miss Walters: Are you really that tough?

Secretary Kissinger: I am a perfectionist. I like to try to make people do things that they didn't think they could do. But most of my close associates also become close personal friends.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, in days past you used to say—when we had conversations sometimes as well—that you wanted to leave office in a sense while you were ahead to avoid the kind of controversy and pain, for example, that a man like Dean Rusk went through. Having said that in the past, do you feel sometimes, do you wish, you could have left sooner?

Secretary Kissinger: For me selfishly it would have been better if I had left sooner. But I think, if I may say so, that was at a perhaps more immature period of my life because I should look at this not from the point of view of what may be better for me but for what is better for the country. Right now in these circumstances to leave in a period of turmoil, when people are looking for a sense of direction and when foreign nations are watching us, I think it would not be a service to the country if I left as long as the President has confidence in me and asks for me to stay.

If I ever questioned that, I would leave very quickly and without any difficulty.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, you are a historian as well as a statesman. If you were writing the text, what was Henry Kissinger's greatest contribution and what was his greatest failure?

Secretary Kissinger: I am sure there are several things that I wish I had done differently, but when you are in the middle of it I think it is dangerous to claim successes and premature to insist on failures. But there are, I suppose, several things I might have done differently. But the main lines of the policy—this I want to repeat—the main lines of the policy, if I had to do it over again, I would do again, substantially the same way, which may make me unreconstructed and may be one reason why I am at peace with myself.

President Ford's News Conference of May 6

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the Old Executive Office Building on May 6.[1]

Q. Mr. President, what are the lessons of Viet-Nam in terms of the Presidency, the Congress, and the American people, in terms of secret diplomacy and fighting a land war in Asia? And also, would you welcome a congressional inquiry into how we got in and how we got out of Viet-Nam?

President Ford: Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International], the war in Viet-Nam is over. It was sad and tragic in many respects. I think it would be unfortunate for us to rehash allegations as to individuals that might be to blame or Administrations that might be at fault.

It seems to me that it is over. We ought to look ahead, and I think a congressional inquiry at this time would only be divisive, not helpful.

Q. Mr. President, may I ask you, then, don't you think we can learn from the past?

President Ford: Miss Thomas, I think the lessons of the past in Viet-Nam have already been learned—learned by Presidents, learned by Congress, learned by the American people—and we should have our focus on the future. As far as I am concerned, that is where we will concentrate.

Miss Lewine [Frances L. Lewine, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. President, your forthcoming meetings with Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, do they represent the beginning of a new American-led negotiation in the Middle East toward a peace settlement?

President Ford: They do not represent a new negotiating process. I am meeting with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin for the purpose of getting from them any recommendations they might have as to how we can maintain the peace in the Middle East, how we can come to some final settlement that will be beneficial to all of the parties.

We are in the process of reassessing our Middle East policy, and they can make a very, very valuable contribution with their on-the-spot recommendations.

Q. Mr. President, do you now see any hopeful signs that there is any movement there off dead center?

President Ford: I am always optimistic. I believe that the leaders of all of the countries, both Arab and Israeli, as well as others, recognize the seriousness of any new military engagement in the Middle East and the ramifications that might come from it.

So, I am optimistic that as we try to move ahead—aimed at avoiding a stalemate, avoiding stagnation—that we can work with other countries in order to insure the peace and a settlement that will be satisfactory to all parties.

Q. Mr. President, you have been reported as being "damned mad" about the adverse reaction of the American people to the Vietnamese refugees. I would like to ask you, how do you explain that reaction? What in your judgment is the cause of that?

President Ford: Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], I am primarily very upset because the United States has had a long tradition of opening its doors to

[1] For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 12.

immigrants from all countries. We are a country built by immigrants from all areas of the world, and we have always been a humanitarian nation. And when I read or heard some of the comments made a few days ago, I was disappointed and very upset.

I was encouraged this afternoon, however. I understand that the Executive Committee of the AFL–CIO passed a resolution urging that the United States open its doors and make opportunities available for the South Vietnamese who have been driven or escaped from their country.

I understand that the American Jewish Committee has likewise passed a resolution this afternoon endorsing the policy of making opportunities available in the United States for South Vietnamese. And I am very proud of those Governors, like Governor Pryor of Arkansas, Governor Askew of Florida, Governor Longley of Maine, Governor Evans of Washington, Governor Ariyoshi of Hawaii, as well as Mayor Alioto [of San Francisco], who have communicated with me and indicated their support for a policy of giving the opportunity of South Vietnamese to come from this country to escape the possibility of death in their country under the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, and individuals who wanted an opportunity for freedom.

I think this is the right attitude for Americans to take, and I am delighted for the support that I have gotten.

Q. May I follow that and ask you, why in your judgment is there such a widespread adverse reaction to this?

President Ford: I understand the attitude of some. We have serious economic problems. But out of the 120,000 refugees who are either here or on their way, 60 percent of those are children. They ought to be given an opportunity. Only 35,000 heads of families will be moved into our total society.

Now, I understand people who are concerned with our economic problems. But we have assimilated between 50,000 and 100,000 Hungarians in the midfifties, we have brought into this country some 500,000 to 600,000 Cubans; they have been good citizens. And we ought to welcome these people in the same way. And despite our economic problems, I am convinced that the vast majority of Americans today want these people to have another opportunity to escape the probability of death; and therefore I applaud those who feel that way.

. . . . .

Q. Even though the war is over, sir, there are many Americans who must still live with the agonies that it caused them. I speak primarily of those wounded and crippled and the families of those who died. In very human and personal terms, how would you speak to them about the sacrifices that were made?

President Ford: Well first, let me say very emphatically, they made a great sacrifice. The 56,000 that died and the countless thousands who were wounded, I honor and respect them, and their contribution was most significant. I think their contribution was not in vain.

Five Presidents carried out a national policy. Six Congresses enforced that policy, which was a policy of our country. And they carried out that responsibility as a member of our Armed Forces.

I think we should praise them, congratulate them, and we have an unbelievable commitment to them in the future. All we can say is, thank you very much for what they have done for freedom.

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned that you spoke to some Virginia Republicans the week before last and at that time you said that in 1976 we will have some excellent results in foreign policy. After the past few weeks, we can all use a little good news. Can you tell us just what you do expect in 1976?

President Ford: Yes, I think between now and the end of 1976 we are going to make progress in the negotiations for a SALT Two agreement. It hasn't been finalized, but the atmosphere is good.

There's going to be some hard negotiating, but I will approach that important meeting with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] aimed at achieving re-

sults, and I think his attitude will reflect the same.

I think you are going to find a greater solidarity in Europe. I am going to Europe the latter part of this month to strengthen that solidarity and to work on a more unified position in solving our joint economic problems, in trying to solve the energy problems that are serious for all of us.

It is my judgment that we can move ahead even in the Pacific. We will have to not reassess, but assess, how we can proceed; but it is my aim to tie more closely together South Korea with the United States, to reaffirm our commitments to Taiwan, to work more closely with Indonesia, with the Philippines and with other Pacific nations.

These are the kind of, I believe, forward movements in foreign policy that will be beneficial in the maintenance of peace.

Q. Mr. President, I would very much like to follow that up one second. Is your job going to be complicated by what happened in Southeast Asia? You have gone out of your way in the past week or two to say the United States will honor its foreign commitments. What sort of private feedback are you getting from foreign capitals? Is there a lack of confidence now? A loss of confidence in the United States?

President Ford: We do get reactions from foreign governments wondering what our position will be, asking where we will go and what our policy will be. We have indicated to our friends that we will maintain our commitments. We understand the perception that some countries may have as a result of the setback in South Viet-Nam.

But that perception is not a reality, because the United States is strong militarily; the United States is strong economically, despite our current problems. And we are going to maintain our leadership on a worldwide basis, and we want our friends to know that we will stand by them, and we want any potential adversaries to know that we will stand up to them.

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. President, events in Indochina outran the deliberative process of the Congress, and you weren't given the clearly defined authority to use U.S. forces to evacuate there because of Cambodia and Viet-Nam. My question goes to the matter of whether it was a personal dilemma for you as Commander in Chief to use U.S. forces without the expressed concurrence of the Congress.

President Ford: Our prime objective, of course, both in the evacuation from Phnom Penh in Cambodia and in Saigon was to bring all Americans out of both locations. Now, in the process, it did appear to be wise, particularly in Saigon, to take out a number of South Vietnamese. We did that because, number one, we felt that a number of these South Vietnamese had been very loyal to the United States and deserved an opportunity to live in freedom, and secondly, the possibility existed if we had not brought out some South Vietnamese that there could have been anti-American attitudes developed that would have complicated the evacuation of our American personnel.

So, I felt that what we did could be fully justified in not only evacuating Americans but evacuating some of the South Vietnamese who wanted to come to the United States.

Q. Mr. President, Secretary Kissinger said that all of the Americans who wanted to leave South Viet-Nam were evacuated, but there may be some reason to believe not all were evacuated. Some organizations, for example, report at least eight missionaries captured in the northern part of South Viet-Nam. So, I am wondering if there is some process to check this sort of thing out and what could be done about it.

President Ford: We certainly made a maximum effort to get every American out. We found in the last week that on a certain day they could tell us that there were 1,000 Americans that were ready to come out, and we would take 300 or 400 out, and then the next day we would find that a number of other Americans had come into Saigon and wanted to get out.

So, we certainly made a tremendous effort to get all Americans out. I am sure there are

some who are left. At this time, I can't give you the specifics as to how we will seek to get any Americans who are still there, but we will do all we can to achieve that result.

Q. Mr. President, you have praised Ambassador Graham Martin's record in Viet-Nam, and you have also defended the evacuation of Vietnamese civilians. Yet, there is some evidence that Mr. Martin's actions made it impossible for some Vietnamese to escape who were longstanding employees of the U.S. Government and others were evacuated on the basis of their ability to pay.

Have you investigated any of these charges, and do you still believe that Ambassador Martin's record is one of effectiveness?

President Ford: Because of the ability of Ambassador Martin to handle a tough situation—and it was very difficult—we got all Americans out and we got roughly 120,000-plus South Vietnamese.

Now, I am familiar with some individuals who are critical of the way in which Ambassador Martin handled it. I never had much faith in Monday-morning quarterbacks or grandstand quarterbacks. I would rather put faith in the man who carried out a very successful evacuation of Americans and a tremendous number of South Vietnamese.

Rather than be critical of somebody who I think did a good job, I think we ought to praise him. If some of these people want to in hindsight—who didn't have the responsibility—criticize him, I think we will accept it for what it is worth.

. . . . .

Q. You apparently had some intelligence reports about a bloodbath in Cambodia. I am wondering if you can bring us up to date on anything in this area in Cambodia and whether or not there is any report of a bloodbath in South Viet-Nam?

President Ford: We do have some intelligence reports to the effect that in Cambodia some 80 or 90 former Cambodian officials were executed, and in addition, their wives were executed.

This is very hard intelligence. That is, I think, very factual evidence of the bloodbath that has taken place or is in the process of taking place in Cambodia.

Now, a turn to Viet-Nam. As you know, there is a very tight censorship in South Viet-Nam. The news that gets out is pretty heavily controlled by the North Vietnamese and by the Viet Cong. So, we really don't have the same kind of hard evidence there that we have had in Cambodia in the instance that I have indicated.

But I think probably the best evidence of the probability is that 120,000-plus South Vietnamese fled because they knew that the probability existed that if they stayed, their life would be in jeopardy. That is the best evidence of what probably will take place.

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on that, you say you don't have any hard evidence. Do you have any report, any intelligence reports that indicate this is going on?

President Ford: As of the moment, we have not.

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The Contributions of the Statesman and the University in Today's World

Address by Joseph J. Sisco
Under Secretary for Political Affairs [1]

My theme is drawn from the familiar opening line of Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities*: "It was the best of times; it was the worst of times."

It seems to me this aptly describes the environment, domestic and international, in which we live and into which this graduating class enters. Never have we seen a decade of such affluence and material and technological progress as the past decade. Yet we seem to be going through a period which is painful, confusing, frustrating, and downright irritating.

[1] Made at commencement exercises of the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., on May 4 (text from press release 228 dated May 2; introductory paragraphs omitted).

It brings to mind the schoolteacher who asked the class, "What shape is the earth?" A small boy quickly replied, "My father says it's in the worst shape it ever was." I daresay that each of us has probably said something like this in recent days.

This feeling is entirely understandable. After years of relative well-being, most of us regard any intrusion upon our way of life as an indignity not to be borne lightly.

At home, we have painfully experienced a decade of social turmoil and political assassinations. We witnessed the ignominy of Watergate and weathered the constitutional crisis that followed. Even now we face severe economic difficulties accompanied by pockets of misery, unemployment, and injustice.

On the international scene, the trauma and anguish of events in Indochina linger though the war is finished as far as America is concerned. The trouble spots in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East pose continuing grave risks; the attempt to stabilize our relations with our adversaries remains incomplete and uncertain; the imperatives of global economic interdependence are only partially met; and above all, the survival of man is no longer a figure of speech, but an operational problem before governments and peoples of the world.

For America—for a self-confident, buoyant, can-do America—this has been hard to take. As understandable as these feelings are, we cannot—we dare not—shirk our responsibilities at home or overseas. If in a time past the only thing we had to fear was fear itself, then today we must fear the temptation to submit to resignation, apathy, and cynicism.

Yes, it is "the worst of times" in a sense, but it is "the best of times" as well. I prefer to believe that we are entering a period of creative opportunity which will test our fiber, ingenuity, and fortitude and that we are equal to the test.

It is not in the American character to shrug and declare problems insoluble or take the attitude that it is for someone else to tackle. I have a favorite philosopher. His name is Charlie Brown. He has put it this way: "There is no heavier burden than a great potential." I happen to believe that America and Americans still have the world's greatest potential. We have material strength, technological leadership, a strong defense, and political and social ideals rooted in our history. And I believe that the American people, despite all the alarm, are responsive to effective leadership.

What are the tasks ahead?

First, at home: Our priority requirement is to regain our sense of purpose and find ways to restore confidence in our leaders and institutions. As Macaulay put it so well, people need to "learn that it is the spirit we are of, not the machinery we employ, that binds us together."

A good beginning is to apply the lessons of Watergate. If we have learned anything from this horrendous development, it is that there must be greater probity and accountability in the exercise of governmental leadership by all of us who are in responsible positions. We must be pragmatic but at the same time be practitioners and shapers of values. I hope we at least learn from Watergate the political relevance of moral principle. The quality of our moral response to national and international problems has become a decisive issue in politics. This is due to the simple fact that many of today's problems present themselves in moral terms. Those who seek office in our next election will need to heed this reality more than ever if they are to gain and maintain the support of an informed electorate.

If this is the political challenge, we confront an equally important one on the economic front. With substantial unemployment and the country still in the throes of the recession-inflation syndrome, we are facing a serious period of adjustment. I am a product of the depression, and I hope I have not forgotten what recession means in human terms, despite years of living in the comfort and the protective cloister of suburbia. None of our experts have found an answer, including our economists. But I remain hopeful. America in 1975 is not the America of 1929. The world of the seventies is not the world of the thirties. We are not dealing with an economic crisis like that in 1929. We have

learned something from the past and have set about using what we have learned. We are more skilled in checking economic decline and more resourceful in mitigating the hardships that flow from it. The country has the talent and the will to do it. And we are beginning to take the hard measures necessary to overcome recession and cool inflation.

Our task overseas is equally demanding, and it presents itself in a context of rapid change. We are living in an interdependent world, living literally in each other's backyards. We have moved from the period of atomic supremacy through the cold war and now deal with problems in a world more complex as well as more perplexing. No longer can we make the distinction between domestic and international policies. America has faced great and seemingly overwhelming challenges before in its history and has shown its inherent capacity to overcome them and indeed create something new from the old. This is the critical task before us in our foreign policy as we strive to seize the historic opportunity to create a more stable and equitable world order.

While we are no longer directly engaged in war, we know that peace cannot be taken for granted. The nuclear equation makes restraint imperative; for the alternative is nuclear holocaust. We have come to realize that in the nuclear age the relationship between military strength and politically usable power is more complicated than ever before.

We have also learned, I believe, that our resources are not unlimited, that there cannot be a Washington blueprint or panacea for every international problem. We have learned, I hope, of both the potential and the limits of power, and we are aware that we are not omniscient nor can we be omnipresent.

It is clear that the United States no longer can play the role of world policeman. But the alternative is not to turn inward and withdraw to a new isolationism. It is essential that our policy be one of selective engagement, of establishing priorities based on their relevance to our interests and geared to our capacities.

For example, in the multipolar world of the seventies:

—We must continue to strengthen our alliances with Europe, Canada, and Japan.

—Our efforts to strengthen relations reciprocally between the United States and the Soviet Union must continue; for this relationship will probably determine more than any other single factor whether our hopes for peace and stability in the world are eventually realized.

—The dialogue and mutual understanding between the United States and the People's Republic of China should be strengthened.

—There can be no diminution of the U.S. effort to achieve practical progress toward peace in the Middle East and the Cyprus issue despite the recent setbacks, because vital stakes are involved.

—On the economic front, including questions of energy, food, population, and environment, there is no rational alternative to attacking problems globally and in a collaborative way. No individual nation has the capacity to solve these problems singlehandedly; for the imbalance between limited resources and unlimited demand can only be met by the cooperation of all.

And our foreign policy, to be effective, must rest on a broad national base and reflect a shared community of values. This does not mean rubberstamping, and we cannot expect unanimity. But we must recapture the habit of concentrating on what binds us together to shape a broad consensus, a new unity, a renewed trust, and a fresh confidence.

Our ability as a nation to cope with critical issues at home and abroad is partly a function of the quality of our leadership and partly a function of education. The statesman and the educator have a common commitment to the development of an informed public opinion. The statesman seeks to inform and persuade so as to elicit its support; the educator to equip it with knowledge and discernment. And the students and alumni of a university—including the members of the class of 1975—have a responsibility to

carry forward into adult life the capacity for informed and critical opinion which your education has given you. You can have no more important purpose than to enrich, by your individual efforts and contributions, the tone and substance of our nation's public discourse. For if the strength of our institutions resides ultimately in the consent of the people, then it resides literally in you—in your strength and wisdom as individuals and as citizens. You are the future shapers and custodians of values.

Democracy is founded on the premise that, in order to judge their leaders, the people will be able to understand the issues the leaders face. Our problems threaten our well-being and security because they first threaten our understanding.

Your generation is faced with the prospect of continuing political turmoil, economic uncertainty, and threats to the peace. These dangers have raised doubts as to the ability of our society not only to overcome these challenges but also to satisfy the most basic needs of our people—the need to provide a sense of welfare, of equal justice, and of achievement and participation for all our citizens. Any organized society is, in the last analysis, judged by how it serves these basic human needs—and we can only measure our success against our own expectations of ourselves as a people.

In this respect, university students need both the breadth of the liberal arts and the specialization of scientific and technical studies. But beyond this, our primary need is not for information, which we have in abundance; it is for new ways of understanding and organizing this information. By so doing, we will enhance the capacity of Americans to adjust to a world in which power is diffused and centers of decisions are plural. The nature of our education and the quality of our leadership are essential factors in determining whether or not we succeed. In the last analysis, our government can be no stronger than the men and women who lead it and the citizens who support it. I believe that both academia and the government can work together again in a shared endeavor, with government leaders creating the climate for the receptivity of ideas and the university making an input beyond criticism and dissent.

The task in meeting domestic and global issues before us is to draw on the best in our own historical experience and to formulate relevant policies. Amidst reverses and difficulties at home and abroad, our sense of disarray admittedly is still great. But if we view the scene with some discernment, the basis for a new assurance can emerge.

As a mature people with a historical perspective, we should no longer feel dismayed or feel betrayed if there is no perfect harmony in our domestic or foreign affairs. Despite the profound changes we have experienced at home, our democratic institutions have survived unprecedented trials. Abroad, common sense should teach us that history is complex and cannot be controlled or determined by any one nation. But America, because of its position and strength, will and must continue to influence world history in a major and decisive way.

In our effort to meet the emerging complex challenges at home and abroad, we as a people must display the same patient, practical wisdom and persistence that has served us so well in the past in our effort to secure the blessings of liberty, justice, and peace.

This great task is now rapidly becoming the responsibility of your generation. I am confident that you will grasp this historic opportunity to help make "the worst of times the best of times."

Prime Minister Nouira of Tunisia Visits the United States

Prime Minister Hedi Nouira of Tunisia made an official visit to the United States April 29–May 6. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington May 1–3. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister Nouira at a dinner at the White House on May 1.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 5

PRESIDENT FORD

Mr. Prime Minister: First let me welcome you and your party to the White House this evening. And may I express the warmth of the American people for you, and the people that you represent, and particularly President Bourguiba.

I thought the meeting that we had this morning discussing some of the very important matters involving the Mediterranean, Middle East were very helpful. We look forward to working with you and others in trying to make progress in that vital area of the world.

I couldn't help, as I looked at some of the material that came to me concerning your visit, to note the long, long relationship that your country and our country have had, going back to the latter part of the 18th century. We are proud of that longstanding as well as currently warm relationship. We trust that as we move into the days ahead there can be a broadening and expansion, deepening of that relationship.

As we look at the progress in your country, which includes great educational advancements for your people, social progress for the people of Tunisia, an increase in the per capita income of the people of Tunisia, you should be very proud of the progress that has been achieved. But, I know that the efforts of your President, of you, and others are aimed toward greater progress in the days ahead.

We compliment you and congratulate you on what has been done, and let me assure you we will try to work with you in the mutual efforts that can be helpful to ourselves as well as to others.

I trust that the President can come here sometime in the future. We are very proud of our relationship with him and very anxious that he come and visit us.

May I extend to you, Mr. Prime Minister, on behalf of the American people, the warmest welcome and the very best wishes. And to you and your party, and particularly to your President, a toast at this time: To the people of Tunisia and to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and to the President.

PRIME MINISTER NOUIRA [1]

Mr. President: I am deeply touched by the very flattering remarks that you have just addressed to me, remarks which beyond myself, I know, are directed to President Bourguiba, founder of new Tunisia, and to the Tunisian people.

I thank you most kindly and I want to express how deep is my joy to be in this great, generous, and hospitable land. The honor and the pleasure that I feel today are shared equally by the members of my delegation. I should like to express our gratitude for your kind invitation as well as for the very warm welcome extended to us.

The century-long relations between our two countries, interrupted by the colonial interlude, have known, since Tunisia became independent, a new impulse in the very

[1] Prime Minister Nouira spoke in French.

harmonious development. My visit, Mr. President, is not only to be viewed within the framework of the very strong and traditional friendship which is the mark of our relationship, but it reflects also the very high degree of respect and mutual esteem between our two governments and our two people.

It is that our two countries have had in common from the very beginning a deep attachment to the ideals of peace, liberty, and justice. And so it was that, from the very first years of independence of Tunisia, we found together, in a disinterested and fruitful cooperation, a very fertile ground to go together toward the concrete achievement of our special vision of man and society.

Tunisia, along these lines, is pledged to build its future, relying first and foremost upon her own resources, fully aware of the fact that development is first and foremost a national matter. Tunisians are investing considerable efforts to bring their own country out of its stage of undevelopment and to catch up the lag between our country and industrialized nations. The proportion of our national product which is devoted to investments, the level of saving in the country, cutting down national consumption—all those have reached very high degrees.

Under the impetus of President Bourguiba, Tunisia is at work. Stability, union, and progress have never been as evident as they are today, nor have they been as reassuring as they are today.

Haven of peace and land of action, Tunisia, over the span of very few years, carried out substantial progress in a number of different areas. We feel that economic and social problems cannot be separated from national security considerations. The solution to be found to these problems is therefore the first line of defense. That is why employment, overall development and speeded-up development, and improving the standard of living are our priority objectives.

In the fulfillment of this enthusiastic task which aims at giving man the potential to fulfill his own self fully, Tunisia, while it calls on its own resources, requests the aid of its friendly nations.

I must stress here that the United States has been of those who were first to respond to our appeal. The assistance that the great American people has given us has been a substantial aid. It has adapted and it has evolved constantly to fit very closely with the various stages of our development, to the national character of Tunisia, and to the psychological and human environment of our country. Faithful to an ideal and to a long tradition of support and assistance, yesterday vis-a-vis Europe and today for the countries of the Third World, the successive Administrations and Congresses of the United States who have led your great nation have always advocated and implemented a consistent policy of very close cooperation with Tunisia.

There remains much to be done to fully attain the objectives of creation of wealth and dissemination of well-being that Tunisia has set for itself. The contribution of our friends remains indispensable to the extent that they are the necessary complement to our own efforts and to the extent that, through technology and science transfer, they contribute to giving our development a new dimension and a determinant impulse.

Mr. President, whether we talk about our own problems or international matters, to which the Tunisian people pay particular attention, our political action has always been clear and consistent. Our calling is that of an Arab nation, of a Mediterranean nation, of an African nation. It is based upon the principles of law, justice, and freedom. Those are the very principles which guided us yesterday in our struggle for liberation, which guide us today in our will to develop our country.

The world in which we live will not lead you to all-out optimism. If détente appears to place itself within a historical context as a growing reality and if contacts among the great powers concerning disarmament are pursued, still many problems await to be solved.

In our part of the world, and more particularly in the eastern part of the Mediterranean area, peace remains precarious. We

have followed with sustained attention the very laudable efforts of Dr. Kissinger. Even though they have not succeeded to attaining tangible and immediate results, we believe that the mission of the Secretary of State has the great merit of bringing forth very clearly the responsibilities of each party. Now international opinion knows clearly that if it was not possible to bring about the initiation of the peace process, the fault lies primarily upon the intransigence of the Israeli leaders.

We must observe that today most international organizations, most nations, have finally recognized the legitimacy of the struggle waged by the Palestinian people, a people who derives its strength from its right to live in a sovereign manner upon the land of its ancestors in freedom and dignity. It is an illusion to attempt to build a just and durable peace in the Middle East without the participation of the representatives of the Palestinian people. That is why we have always advocated a return to international legality. The organization of the United Nations at the same time as in 1947 it was drawing up the document giving birth to the State of Israel was also simultaneously defining its boundaries.

Upon our African Continent, colonialism has not entirely laid down its arms. Millions of African nationals continue to suffer the injustices of discrimination and oppression. There also, we hope that reason will prevail, and we feel that the international community must strive to spare these innocents the unfortunate events which usually accompany violent reactions.

We must also observe sadly that the sufferings of the civilian populations of the Southeast Asian area do not appear to have reached their final point. We hope that the voice of reason and of the heart will prevail over any other consideration and that very soon a tragedy which has cost much and lasted long will come to an end.

Tunisia has consistently felt and stated that it is detrimental to resolve problems in an atmosphere of resentment and violence. We remain convinced that, throughout the world, dialogue must prevail over the recourse to blind force and the judgment of arms.

Those are the lines along which we feel that the solution of the major issue preoccupying today the governments must be found, and I refer of course to the economic crisis which has broken out worldwide and which gives a more precarious character to international balance which already, by its very nature, is an unstable balance. We feel that it is urgent to reexamine the rules and principles which have, up to now, ruled international relationships in the economic and financial fields.

In this connection, Tunisia feels that the new economic order is a vital need in order to raise the standard of living of hundreds of millions of men and women, and in order to exorcise the scourges of poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance which weigh so heavily upon nearly half of mankind. Tunisia is convinced, not only for ethical and ideological reasons but because it feels deeply that this is the essential, the essential token for international security and that this is indispensable for the development and the harmonious fulfillment of the individual human being. Tunisia is also convinced that mankind as a whole must and can make progress toward setting up this new economic order in a serene and concerted manner, not in a fruitless confrontation.

Developed nations, particularly the United States, are facing historic responsibility to contribute to the setting up of this economic order which should be worldwide and more equitable, because it is very true that the economies of the rich nations and of the poor nations are interdependent and complementary. This has been demonstrated clearly.

There is wide opportunity for fruitful and promising cooperation in the interest of all, and consultation and dialogue should replace the passionate behavior or the sectarian attitudes and intransigent selfishness. The world is evolving in such a manner that a reconsideration of the relationship between industrialized nations and developing nations is a must. The laws of market alone may not rule these relationships, because if there is a certain legitimacy there, still it is not the

sole justification and it is not admitted without any restrictions by the Third World nations.

The main international bodies which arose out of World War II claimed—probably and this was the generous intent of their founders—claimed to take into account the interests of their members. But experience has proved that if they did indeed contribute substantially to those who were less well endowed, they were still not in a position to foresee the pace of evolution of our societies, and they were in a certain sense called upon to manage the interests of the stronger among nations. This has produced an accumulation of tensions in every area—even in every part of the world—which has been detrimental to some and which has been a catastrophe for the large number.

Because of its size, prestige, the genius of its people, and the wisdom of its leaders, the United States must play a decisive role in order to bring about a period of peace and prosperity throughout the world. When he came to Tunisia, Secretary Tabor [John K. Tabor, Under Secretary of Commerce] compared the world situation to a vessel which carries a large number of passengers but which also carries a very big and bulky elephant. Now, this is a very dramatic picture, and I believe that the passengers on this vessel want as much as the elephant to come together, to come to an understanding, so that they will not all together tumble overboard and find themselves at the bottom of the sea.

Mr. President, I am convinced that the meetings that we shall have with the high leaders of your Administration, as well as with some of the honorable Members of the Congress, will bring about very positive results and will strengthen the free and fruitful cooperation that has existed between our two countries within the framework of our common pragmatic approach, and the spirit of support and solidarity which has always motivated the Government and the people of the United States with respect to Tunisia.

When we think of the celebration next year of the Bicentennial of the United States, Mr. President, I cannot keep myself from thinking back upon the faith of those proud founders, their vision, who, two centuries ago, united the American people to free their people and build here the greatest democracy the world has ever seen. As directed by President Bourguiba, Tunisia will be happy to participate in this manifestation, and it will offer as a contribution to the celebration an exhibition of some of the most beautiful mosaics, which retrace life in Tunisia under the Roman empire.

Throughout the ages and over time, from the very first steps of the Pilgrims who landed upon an unfriendly shore all the way to the first steps of your astronauts over the Moon, your history is a succession of stunning victories over nature, to wrest from nature its secrets and put them at the service of man. This has been made possible through the genius, the perseverance, and the courage of your research workers and your scientists.

I want to raise my glass, Mr. President, to peace and free cooperation among nations. And let us raise our glass to the prosperity of the American people and friendship between Tunisia and the United States.

U.S. Concerned at Price Increase for Canadian Natural Gas Exports

Department Statement [1]

We are disappointed at the decision announced yesterday by the Canadian Government to increase the export price of natural gas from the present $1.00 to $1.40 per MCF [thousand cubic feet] on August 1 and to $1.60 per MCF on November 1, 1975. This price increase will cost U.S. consumers of Canadian natural gas an additional $583 million a year.

These latest increases follow substantial export price rises imposed by the Canadian Government on January 1 of this year and

[1] Issued on May 6 (text from press release 237).

earlier increases which have raised the prices paid by American consumers for Canadian natural gas under long-term, firm contracts more than 500 percent since 1973.

U.S. officials met with Canadian officials in Ottawa on April 22 to explain our concern over the serious impact another large price increase would have on regions in the United States which are substantially dependent on Canadian gas imports.

At that meeting, we emphasized our view that such an increase constitutes a further breach of the long-term contracts covering these exports. We expressed our understanding of the need to increase natural gas prices over a reasonable period of time to commodity value, which is also a U.S. policy objective.

It was noted, however, that the increase proposed by Canada, as in January, will be applied only to U.S. consumers—Canada's sole export customers—not to Canadian users. This price increase will further widen the gap between the export price and the price to Canadian consumers, thus increasing the discrimination against the United States.

At the April 22 meeting, as in previous discussions with Canadian officials, we dwelt on the importance we attach to a continuing supply of gas under these long-term contracts. The question of supply continues to be of great concern to us, and we expect to have further consultations with Canada to discuss this issue.

This decision by the Canadian Government and Canada's stated intention to impose further increases in the export price for natural gas demonstrate the urgency for a clear U.S. energy policy to stimulate rapid development of our own resources and permit us to reduce dependence on foreign energy suppliers.

World Trade Week, 1975

A PROCLAMATION[1]

America approaches the 200th anniversary of national independence at a time when events at home and abroad demonstrate the interdependence of the community of nations.

Interdependence and its impact on all Americans is particularly apparent in world trade.

Through world trade, Americans expand with others the flow of goods and services to all peoples and enhance the economic well-being of all countries. In so doing, we recommit the United States to an open world economic order and reconfirm our pledge to international peace and understanding.

The Congress of the United States underscored America's dedication to more free and fair international commerce with passage of the Trade Act of 1974. That act enables us to move toward multilateral negotiations that will open the way to improved access to foreign markets for American goods and to vital raw materials.

In the face of economic stress at home, more exports mean more jobs for Americans, more purchasing power for America's consumers and more business for our manufacturers. Exports help us meet the swiftly rising cost of the energy we consume. They are the source of equilibrium in our balance of payments.

World trade joins nations in peaceful and creative partnership. It has greater significance today than ever before.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 18, 1975, as World Trade Week, and I call upon all Americans to cooperate in observing that week by participating with the business community and all levels of government in activities that emphasize the importance of world trade to the United States economy and to our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fifth day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.

GERALD R. FORD.

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[1] No. 4362; 40 *Fed. Reg.* 15861.

Department Discusses Preparatory Meeting of Oil Producing and Consuming Nations

Statement by Charles W. Robinson
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs [1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to provide testimony on the recently concluded preparatory meeting between oil producing and consuming nations and to discuss in broad terms the relationship of this meeting with our overall energy policy.

At the Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, the United States and 12 other industrialized nations agreed that, at the appropriate time, they should meet with developing consumer states and producing countries to explore possibilities for mutually acceptable solutions to the energy problem. The International Energy Agency (IEA), created nine months later, has as one of its goals the institution of contacts and dialogue with the producing nations.

We realized, however, that meaningful discussions could take place only after consuming nations had proved that they would not remain helpless over time to the arbitrary manipulation of the world oil market by the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] states. Before we could negotiate effectively, or even gain the necessary respect for serious discussions, we had to undertake unified actions in the energy field that would demonstrate strength and consistency of purpose.

Consequently, our international energy efforts since the Washington Energy Conference have concentrated on the creation of a framework of close consumer-country cooperation. Through this effort, we seek to reduce, and eventually eliminate, our vulnerability to manipulation of our oil supply and oil prices.

Substantial progress has been made in building consumer solidarity over the past 14 months. In the IEA, we have agreed on emergency provisions that will enable a unified and coordinated response to any future embargo. Along with other OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, we have agreed to create within the OECD a $25 billion support fund to act as a lender of last resort to industrialized countries suffering severe balance-of-payments costs because of high oil prices.

These efforts, basically short-term insurance policies, are complemented by essential longer term programs to reduce IEA members' collective dependence on imported oil. We have established as a conservation target the reduction of IEA oil imports by 2 million barrels a day by the end of 1975, and similar objectives will be established for later years. We have agreement in principle on a series of interrelated measures to accelerate the development of indigenous energy supplies; it is anticipated that implementation programs will be developed and approved by July 1.

The Paris preparatory meeting of April

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on May 1. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

7–15, or "Prepcon," took place as a result of a French initiative. Last fall the French President proposed a meeting of a small number of industrialized, developing, and producing countries in Paris to plan a multilateral conference on energy; invitations to such a meeting were issued in March. The French proposal was similar to one made earlier by Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister [Ahmad Zaki] Yamani, and the French invited the same countries to the Prepcon that Minister Yamani had originally proposed. The Shah of Iran had also shown interest in a producer-consumer conference.

In December at Martinique, President Ford conditioned the participation of the United States in a producer-consumer conference on a sequential four-stage approach, which the IEA subsequently endorsed. In the first stage, consumer cooperation would be strengthened in the areas of finance, conservation, and accelerated development of energy; as I mentioned earlier, concrete programs in these areas have been agreed to. The second stage was to be the Prepcon. Stage 3 would involve intensified consumer cooperation and the development of common consumer positions. Stage 4 would be the holding of the conference. In the light of progress made toward consumer solidarity, we agreed in late March to proceed with the preparatory meeting.

Issues Discussed at Preparatory Meeting

The task of the Prepcon was to agree on the procedures and participants for the energy conference to be held later this year. The 10 participants included representatives from the industrialized countries (the United States, Japan, and the nine members of the European Community represented through a single spokesman), the developing consumer countries (Brazil, India, and Zaïre), and the OPEC nations (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria). As host, France, which has declined to join the IEA, provided the "technical chairman"; the French were also represented in the European Community delegation.

We went to Paris determined to be cooperative and constructive. We believed that the conference should be one in which rhetoric was minimized and real work toward concrete solutions was maximized. Therefore it was essential, in our view, to have an agenda for the conference that was manageable in size and which offered the promise of real progress.

Despite nine days of intense and grueling negotiations, the 10 delegations at the Prepcon could not reach agreement on the procedural issues for the conference. The talks failed to resolve the fundamental question of what type of conference it would be. The United States, the European Community, and Japan, unanimously supported by other members of the IEA, maintained that the conference should focus on energy and energy-related matters as proposed in the French invitation. The OPEC and LDC [less developed countries] representatives were willing for the conference to discuss energy but only if equal status were given to a wide range of problems relating to the economic relations between developing countries and the rest of the world. Specifically, they insisted that the conference treat raw materials, monetary reform, and assistance to most seriously affected countries on the same basis as energy.

The industrialized countries demonstrated considerable flexibility in the negotiations, offering to interpret quite broadly the topics that could be considered under the general energy rubric. We offered in addition to treat all non-energy-related subjects in other appropriate fora where work on them was already underway. We were not willing, however, to agree, as the OPEC and LDC representatives seemed to want, to create another unproductive forum to discuss the "new international economic order."

Even though the talks adjourned because of disagreement over this basic issue, several other issues were left undecided. The OPEC and LDC representatives sought specific agenda references to maintaining the purchasing power of export earnings and the real value of investments; i.e., indexation of prices and investments. We argued that we could not accept such references since they

prejudged the outcome of the conference. We said, however, that we were prepared for them to raise these subjects for discussion at the conference under an agenda formulation that was neutrally cast. Since the Prepcon's mandate was only procedural, we did not attempt to engage in substantive debate over indexation.

Spearheaded by Algeria, the OPEC and LDC states also opposed IEA attendance as an observer at the full conference. They maintained that IEA is a confrontational organization whose existence is not recognized by the OPEC nations. They argued that the presence of the IEA would give the conference too much of an energy orientation and that OECD presence at the conference should suffice for IEA representation. With unanimous support from other IEA members, the United States, the European Community, and Japan were prepared to condition their attendance at the conference, and acceptance of any agreed agenda, on IEA presence as an observer with the right to speak. We believed that to agree on IEA exclusion would be to accept implicitly the confrontational charge. Furthermore, IEA exclusion would prevent representation at the conference (via IEA) of many important consuming countries. This issue was not settled before the conference adjourned.

Let me note parenthetically that it was clear early in the first week that compromise on these fundamental differences was unlikely. Nevertheless the participants continued their negotiations for several extra days and nights in order to explore all possibilities for accommodation. The adjournment of the Prepcon was not accompanied by recrimination among the participants.

Major Conclusions Drawn From Meeting

Mr. Chairman, it is not correct, I think, simply to characterize the Prepcon as a failure. It is true that the main purpose of the meeting was not achieved. On the other hand, all participants gained a much greater appreciation of the others' views which may have a salutary effect on future bilateral and multilateral relations.

What are the major conclusions we have drawn from the Prepcon?

First, the OPEC states have succeeded in linking their interests with those of the LDC's even though high oil prices are seriously damaging the economies of many developing nations. Some LDC nations unfortunately find attractive the idea that they can help solve their economic problems by following the OPEC example; i.e., cartelizing and demanding higher prices for all raw materials. We expect the OPEC–LDC bloc under OPEC leadership to be a strong and vocal force in future international fora, at least until developing countries come to recognize that widespread cartelization will be neither practical nor productive.

Second, the industrialized nations demonstrated strong consumer solidarity, proving the tremendous progress that has been made in the IEA over the past 14 months. During the Prepcon, we coordinated our positions closely with other IEA members. The decision to hold firm in insisting on an energy conference and on IEA participation received unanimous endorsement from the IEA Governing Board, which is composed of representatives from the 18 member countries.

Finally, it appears that the timing is not yet right for a multilateral dialogue on key energy issues. The producers at the Prepcon showed little willingness to engage in serious discussion on energy unless the industrialized nations would consider at the same time the broader issues of LDC relations.

Effect of Meeting on U.S. Energy Policy

We regret that the Prepcon did not succeed. We remain willing to participate in a multilateral conference if one can be arranged that concentrates on energy. But we do not expect our own energy policies to be affected in a major way by the suspension of the Prepcon talks.

Our overall energy policy, pursued both in the United States and in coordination with other IEA countries, will continue to be to bring about a basic shift in the supply-demand balance in the world oil market. This will reduce our vulnerability to foreign

supply disruptions, reduce the ability of a small group of countries to manipulate world oil prices arbitrarily, and enable prices to approach their long-term equilibrium level.

The focus of our international efforts will remain in the IEA. We intend to insure that momentum is maintained as we press ahead to implement the conservation and accelerated-development programs.

The Prepcon proved that other IEA members share our belief in the necessity of consumer solidarity. They, too, believe the IEA has a key role to play in dealing with the energy problem. They will, we think, work with us to insure that the IEA's importance and influence will increase in the future.

Given the leading role which the United States has played in the development of the International Energy Agency, it is most important that the United States accede to the Agreement on the International Energy Program without reservation. The United States is now applying the agreement provisionally pending adoption of the requisite implementing legislation by Congress. Unfortunately, the legislation currently under consideration in the House of Representatives would not permit us to adhere to the International Energy Program without reservation. Specifically, this legislation does not fully meet vital IEA requirements relating to demand restraint; that is, conservation, the allocation of petroleum in case of another embargo, and the establishment of a petroleum reserve. The antitrust provisions of the legislation under consideration are also deficient. While this subcommittee is not immediately concerned with this legislation, may I take this opportunity to urge you and your colleagues in the House to make every effort to promptly approve legislation which will permit the United States to accede to the Agreement on the International Energy Program.

In the months ahead, we will also seek to intensify our cooperative bilateral relations with producing governments. We have many common interests which provide important opportunities to work together. For instance, our joint commissions with Saudi Arabia and Iran are making significant progress in identifying key areas for cooperation. As we build on and broaden the scope of our activities with these two producers and with other OPEC states, we will create in time a set of economic and political relationships that should enable us to help them achieve important national goals and to appreciate more fully their responsibility for pursuing oil policies that lend stability to the international economy.

We are convinced, Mr. Chairman, that the oil crisis will not simply go away. Our policies are designed to meet the challenge of that crisis. They will, if properly and vigorously pursued, permit us to achieve our two fundamental objectives: an international price of oil set by free market forces and substantial U.S. self-sufficiency in energy.

President Ford Urges Legislation To Assist Viet-Nam Refugees

Following are texts of a letter from President Ford to the Speaker of the House dated April 30 and a statement by President Ford issued on May 1.

LETTER TO SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, APRIL 30

White House press release dated May 1

April 30, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: In view of the urgent need for funds to pay for humanitarian assistance and transportation of refugees from South Vietnam, I request that the House of Representatives act quickly to approve the Conference Report on H.R. 6096, the Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975. In making this request, I am aware that sections 4 through 9 of H.R. 6096 have been overtaken by events and have no further utility. Nevertheless, the enactment of the bill as recommended by the Conference Report is the most expeditious method of obtaining funds which are now desperately needed for the care and transportation of homeless refugees.

As I stated yesterday, the evacuation has

been completed. The Congress may be assured that I do not intend to send the armed forces of the United States back into Vietnamese territory.

Approximately 70,000 evacuees are now located on various safe haven islands, on U.S. Navy vessels and on civilian vessels. These individuals are being cared for by agencies of the United States Government while being processed through a system established to relocate them in the United States and in other countries.

Although the specific cost of activities related to the evacuation cannot be fixed at this point, it is estimated that direct U.S. expenditures to care for and process these evacuees, and contributions to international organizations and private voluntary agencies to assist in this effort, will exceed $400,000,000. Available funds already appropriated to provide aid to Vietnam will be reprogrammed and utilized to the maximum extent possible. But the additional authority of $327,000,000 will be required to fully meet immediate needs.

The authority of this legislation, followed by appropriations as soon as possible, is necessary to continue this operation, to integrate the evacuees into the United States and other countries and to permit consideration of further humanitarian assistance which may be consistent with the provisions of H.R. 6096 and American policy objectives.

I urge the immediate enactment of H.R. 6096.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD, MAY 1

White House press release dated May 1

I am saddened and disappointed by the action of the House of Representatives today in rejecting assistance to the refugees from South Viet-Nam.

This action does not reflect the values we cherish as a nation of immigrants. It is not worthy of a people which has lived by the philosophy symbolized in the Statue of Liberty. It reflects fear and misunderstanding, rather than charity and compassion.

Despite the House vote, I believe that in this tragic situation the American people want their country to be guided by the inscription on the Statue of Liberty:

> Give me your tired, your poor,
> Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
> The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
> Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:
> I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

After World War II, the United States offered a new life to 1,400,000 displaced persons. The generosity of the American people showed again following the Hungarian uprising of 1956 when more than 50,000 Hungarian refugees fled here for sanctuary. And we welcomed more than a half million Cubans fleeing tyranny in their country.

Now, other refugees have fled from the Communist takeover in Viet-Nam. These refugees chose freedom. They do not ask that we be their keepers but only, for a time, that we be their helpers.

Some members of the House of Representatives apparently voted against the legislation to assist the refugees because of a section relating to evacuation from South Viet-Nam. The evacuation is complete.

I urge the members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate to approve quickly new legislation providing humanitarian assistance to the South Vietnamese refugees. To do otherwise would be a repudiation of the finest principles and traditions of America.

President's Letter to Congress on Oil Price Controls and Import Fees

Following is the text of identical letters dated April 30 from President Ford to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.

White House press release dated April 30

APRIL 30, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) Three and one-half months have passed since I presented the Nation and the Congress with a comprehensive program to

achieve energy independence by 1985. Although the policy I put forth was not an easy solution, it was, and remains today, the only comprehensive and workable national energy program. Because of the seriousness of the problem, I also moved to cut energy demand and increase supply to the maximum extent within my administrative discretion by announcing a three step increase in the fees on imported petroleum starting last February 1 and complete decontrol of old oil prices by April 1.

After imposition of the first dollar of the additional import fees, the majority leadership in the Congress requested that I delay further actions to provide time to evaluate my proposals, to formulate an alternative comprehensive energy plan and to enact legislation. I granted a 60 day delay in the spirit of compromise, in spite of the fact that we had already waited much too long to make the hard decisions our country needs.

In the 60 days that followed, a number of Congressional energy programs were introduced and considered. Little progress has been made though. Thus, I am forced to again make a difficult administrative decision.

Since my State of the Union Message last January, there has been no improvement in the situation in the Middle East. The existing tensions only heighten my belief that we must do everything possible to avoid increasing our dependence on imported oil in the months ahead.

The recession is coming to an end. But the pending upturn will result in greater demand for imported oil. At the same time, however, it will put us in a better position to absorb the adjustments that greater energy conservation will require.

There are some encouraging signs in the Congress. Chairmen [Al] Ullman and [John D.] Dingell and ranking minority members [Herman T.] Schneebeli and [Clarence J.] Brown have been working diligently in their respective committees to formulate a comprehensive energy program. After extensive hearings and discussions, their efforts to date embody some elements of the energy proposals which I sent to the Congress as well as several which could be potentially disastrous.

The Senate has also conducted many hearings. Yet the only legislation which has passed is a bill that would impose mandatory restrictions within 60 days on recreational and leisure travel, hours of business operation, and commercial lighting. This bill is ineffective and unrealistic. It would result in unwarranted government control of personal freedoms, and would cause unforeseen economic consequences.

I am hopeful that the weeks ahead can result in agreement between the Congress and the Administration. I believe it can if we are willing to work diligently, honestly, and more rapidly. But I am concerned about the possibility of the Congress passing politically popular legislation which will not only fail to meet our energy needs but which could create serious economic problems for the Nation. From my many years in the Congress, I know how easy it is to become embroiled in endless debate over tough decisions. I also know how easy it is for the Congress to enact legislation full of rhetoric and high sounding purpose, but short of substance. That must *not* happen in this case.

Neither the House nor the Senate has passed one significant energy measure acceptable to the Administration in these past few months. Hence, I must be a realist—since the time before final legislation will be on my desk is very long. I understand that in many ways the timing and substance is beyond the control of the individual committee chairmen. Yet, postponement of action on my part is not the answer. I am, therefore, taking these administration actions at this time:

—First, I have directed the Federal Energy Administrator to implement a program to steadily phase out price controls on old oil over two years, starting June 1, 1975. This program will not proceed until public hearings are completed and a plan is submitted for Congressional review, as required by statute. While I intend to work with the Congress, and have compromised on my

original decision to proceed with immediate decontrol, the nation cannot afford to wait indefinitely for this much needed action. I intend to accompany this action with a redoubling of my efforts to achieve an appropriate windfall profits tax on crude oil production with strong incentives to encourage maximum domestic exploration and production.

—Second, I will again defer the second dollar import fee on crude oil and the $.60 per barrel fee on imported petroleum products in order to continue the spirit of compromise with the Congress. However, I will be forced to impose the higher fees in 30 days, or sooner, if the House and Senate fail to move rapidly on the type of comprehensive legislation which is necessary to resolve our critical energy situation. Such legislation must not embody punitive tax measures or mandated, artificial shortages, which could have significant economic impact and be an unwarranted intrusion on individual freedom of choice.

The administrative action that I have set in motion will help achieve energy self-sufficiency by 1985, stem increasing vulnerability during the next few critical years, and accomplish this without significant economic impact. Nevertheless, my actions alone are not enough. The Congress must move rapidly on a more comprehensive energy program which includes broader energy conservation and actions to expand supply. Action now is essential to develop domestic supplies and protect American jobs. It is my utmost desire in announcing these executive initiatives to balance our overwhelming need to move ahead with an equally important need not to force outright confrontation between the Administration and the Congress.

I pledge to work with the Congress in this endeavor. To the extent comprehensive and effective legislation is passed by the Congress, I stand ready to approve it. What I cannot do is stand by as more time passes and our import vulnerability grows. If this happens, I will not hesitate to impose the higher import fees. Meantime, my administrative actions must fill the gap in this endeavor. The country can afford no less.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

Constituent Assembly Election in Portugal Discussed

Following is a statement by L. Bruce Laingen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on May 1.[1]

Two months ago I had the pleasure of appearing before you for a detailed discussion of the political and economic situation in Portugal. Much has happened there since that time, and my colleagues and I are glad to have this further opportunity to exchange views with the committee.

The culmination of many of these events, of course, was in the constituent assembly elections held on April 25, the first anniversary of the revolution in Portugal. An impressive 92 percent of Portugal's registered voters cast their ballots in what appears to have been an orderly and genuinely free balloting process.

The newly elected assembly, which consists of 247 delegates, is charged with the responsibility of drafting a new constitution, but within the strict guidelines set down by the Armed Forces Movement and recently agreed to by the principal political parties. The assembly will have 90 days to complete its work, with provision for an extension of another 90 days should that be necessary.

Of the 12 political parties participating in the elections, the Socialists recorded the greatest degree of popular support, with 38 percent of the ballot. The center left Popular Democratic Party received 26.4 percent, the

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Communists 12.5 percent, and the Social Democratic Center 7.6 percent. The Communist-front Portuguese Democratic Movement recorded 4 percent, and 4 percent was divided among a range of smaller parties. Only 7 percent cast blank ballots.

While it would be inappropriate for me to comment in any detail on the outcome of the elections, I have no doubt that all Americans welcome them as demonstrating the democratic sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese people. The electoral results are of special importance in recording, for the first time, the range and strength of political opinion among the people of Portugal. However, the relationship between the expression of democratic views and governmental action remains to be established. Their practical impact in the short term has been limited by the prior action of the Armed Forces Movement in laying down the essential outlines of the constitution which the elected members of the constituent assembly are now to develop in detail.

The elections are thus one further stage in a continuing process of change in Portugal, a process that is obviously not yet complete. As a friend and ally of long standing with Portugal, the United States will remain an interested and sympathetic observer. It is in that sense in particular that we welcome this renewed opportunity to share impressions with you and your committee.

Annual Report on Trade Agreements Program Transmitted to the Congress

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit herewith to the Congress the Nineteenth Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program. This report covers calendar year 1974.

The world economy in 1974 was characterized by deepening stresses and strains caused by persistent inflation, a downturn in economic activity, structural dislocations in the wake of the oil crises, high rates of unemployment, and widespread uncertainty as to the future. In such circumstances, most governments faced strong pressures to adopt unilateral restrictions on imports, to promote their export earnings and to secure access to essential supplies.

Fortunately, most governments have not forgotten the costly lessons of the nationalistic, go-it-alone policies and ensuing trade wars of the 1930s. With economic wisdom and political courage, the world's industrialized countries have in large part held the line against the proponents of short-sighted solutions involving unilateral measures restricting and distorting trade and competitive currency devaluations. Moreover, recognizing the need for positive cooperative approaches, most of the world's trading nations joined in technical preparatory work for far-reaching multilateral negotiations to reduce trade barriers, as had been agreed to by over 100 countries in September, 1973. By the end of 1974, this preparatory groundwork was largely completed.

Passage of the Trade Act of 1974 last December opened the way for the multilateral trade talks to move into the negotiating stage in February, 1975. Countries accounting for most of the world's trade are participating in negotiations which will include all types of tariff and nontariff barriers that affect agricultural as well as industrial trade. Both developed and developing countries expect major benefits from the results.

When these negotiations were launched in 1973 at a Ministerial-level meeting in Tokyo, the objective was to achieve the "expansion and even greater liberalization of world trade and improvement in the standard of living and welfare of the people of the world." This commitment has been reaffirmed in recent meetings of the Trade Negotiations Committee in Geneva. The

[1] Transmitted on May 1 (text from White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 94–123, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of the report.

spirit of cooperation offers hope for broad and significant results.

The mandate given the President in the new trade legislation will enable the United States to play a leading role in these multilateral negotiations. Our position will be strengthened, moreover, by the close working arrangements which have been established between the Executive Branch and the Congress. Under these arrangements, representatives of the Congress have an important voice in U.S. policies and are participating fully in the negotiating sessions.

U.S. negotiators will also have the benefit of far more extensive advice from the public sector than in the past. Public hearings by the International Trade Commission are in progress. Hearings by the Executive Branch will open soon. Advisory committees, made up of a cross-section of the public interest and agriculture, industry, labor and consumer groups involved, will provide input for the U.S. negotiating effort at both the policy and technical levels.

The Trade Act, like the earlier Declaration of Tokyo, recognizes the importance of providing fair and reasonable market access to products exported by developing countries. As one step toward this objective, the Act provides for the granting of temporary generalized tariff preferences to such countries. The mandatory procedural steps for establishing the preference system have been initiated. When the system is in operation later this year, it will offer substantial benefits to many developing countries.

I am hopeful that, as implementation moves forward, the Congress will provide the necessary authority to include other developing countries through waiver of those restrictions of the Trade Act that are incompatible with our national interest and to which a number of countries have voiced strong objections.

At the same time, in signing the Trade Act on January 3, 1975, I expressed reservations about the wisdom of one of its provisions relating to restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union which led the U.S.S.R. to repudiate its 1972 trade agreement with the United States. This action by the Soviet Union constitutes an unfortunate setback to normalization of our economic relations with that country. In a spirit of cooperation with the Congress, I am hopeful that a solution to this problem can be found.

In light of the serious economic problems in the United States and elsewhere in the world today, efforts to preserve and build upon past gains in the trade field are now more urgent and imperative than ever. A more open, fair, and nondiscriminatory system, providing access to both markets and supplies, can give a vital stimulus to economic recovery, increased employment, and sound growth both in the United States and in the world economy. Congress has provided the mandate for the United States to move forward toward these objectives in cooperation with other nations. It is my intention to carry out this mandate fully and expeditiously, in the interests of the health of the American economy and the strengthening of harmonious and mutually beneficial economic relations among all countries of the world.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 1, 1975.*

President Reports on Export Laws and Safeguards on Nuclear Materials

Message to the Congress [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with Section 14 of Public Law 93–500, the "Export Administration Amendments of 1974", I am forwarding to the Congress a report on U.S. laws and regulations governing nuclear exports and on domestic and international safeguards. This

[1] Transmitted on May 6 (text from White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 94–131, which includes the text of the report.

report considers the effectiveness of such laws and safeguards in preventing the diversion of nuclear capabilities to nonpeaceful purposes.

I have concluded that current laws provide ample authority to control the export and reexport of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology. Nevertheless, existing policies and regulations are constantly being reexamined and changed as appropriate. Domestic safeguards are under continuing review for the purpose of making them even more effective. The international safeguard system will detect and thus help to deter efforts to divert such materials by other nations.

As the volume of material and the nature of facilities grow in the world, commensurate increases and improvements in the international safeguarding system will be needed. The United States is encouraging the strengthening of international safeguards by aiding and supporting IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguard development efforts. It is also seeking to enhance physical security through the adoption of an international convention. The U.S. is taking the lead in advocating in-depth physical protection measures necessary to preclude terrorist groups from capturing such material or conducting sabotage activities.

I wish to assure Congress that the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of nuclear explosive materials for possible nonpeaceful uses is a priority concern in my Administration. Whatever efforts are needed to allow the U.S. and other countries to enjoy the benefits of nuclear power, without fear, will be taken by the Government of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 6, 1975.*

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

1974 Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission. Fiscal year ended June 30. H. Doc. 94–26. 26 pp.

Supplemental Assistance for Cambodia. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, together with minority views, to accompany S. 663. S. Rept. 94–54. March 21, 1975. 26 pp.

Making Appropriations, Foreign Assistance for Fiscal Year 1975. Conference report to accompany H.R. 4592. H. Rept. 94–108. March 21, 1975. 8 pp.

Proposed legislation to authorize additional military and economic assistance for South Vietnam, and to clarify the availability of funds for the use of United States armed forces for humanitarian evacuation in Indochina. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting drafts of proposed legislation. H. Doc. 94–103. April 14, 1975. 2 pp.

Requests for supplemental appropriations for refugee assistance and relief and for military assistance in South Vietnam. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting proposed appropriations. H. Doc. 94–104. April 14, 1975. 2 pp.

U.S. Suggests Consideration of Restraints on Conventional Arms

Statement by Joseph Martin, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [1]

Conventional arms have a central place in the military planning of virtually every country of the world, a daily and almost commonplace role in national and international affairs, and a profound long-term impact on the security of us all. Despite—or perhaps more realistically, because of—these factors, the subject of conventional arms control has occupied the efforts of the CCD only rarely in recent years.

My government has long stressed the importance of giving serious and detailed consideration to the question of possible restraints on conventional weapons. In this committee we have often stated our belief that suitable restraints in the conventional arms field could make a major contribution to the security and well-being of all states. In interventions over the last several years, we have emphasized the U.S. willingness to explore all practical approaches to the problem and have urged other delegations to express their views.

One of the approaches the U.S. delegation has discussed in the committee is that of regional arms control. In 1966 we presented six principles which could be used as a basis for regional agreements in the conventional arms field; in 1970 we recommended three additional steps that states could take unilaterally—steps "which in their cumulative effect, even without formal binding agreements, could constitute reliable arms limitations on a regional basis." [2]

There are several reasons why my delegation believes it may be useful to consider restraints on conventional arms in a regional context. First, in most cases the relationship of the size and character of a country's armed forces to the armed forces of other states within its region is much more relevant to its security than the relationship between its forces and those of more distant powers. Second, states near one another have generally tended to acquire similar and comparable military capabilities. Third, in several areas of the world there already exist regional cooperative arrangements which could serve as useful precedents for arms control initiatives, as well as regional institutions which could most conveniently take action on such initiatives.

Although these factors suggest in general terms why the regional or subregional approach to conventional arms control might be practicable and effective, prospects for actual arms control arrangements obviously vary widely from one region to another. In several areas of the world the prevailing political climate may not permit the successful negotiation of such arrangements for some time to come.

Nevertheless we should be encouraged that in two regions of the world significant efforts in the area of conventional arms control have recently taken place. In Europe, members of

[1] Made before the concluding meeting of the spring session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva on Apr. 10 (introductory paragraphs omitted).

[2] For a U.S. statement made before the CCD on Aug. 13, 1970, together with the text of a U.S. working paper incorporating the six principles presented in 1966, see BULLETIN of Sept. 14, 1970, p. 310.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been actively seeking a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in the central region of the continent. In Latin America, eight governments of that region agreed, in the Declaration of Ayacucho of December 9, 1974, to create conditions which permit effective limitation of armaments, to put an end to the acquisition of arms for offensive warlike purposes, and to dedicate all possible resources to the social and economic development of Latin American countries. Representatives from several Latin American governments subsequently met in Lima, Peru, to discuss possible means of achieving arms limitations. The United States supports the efforts of these Latin American countries and hopes they will be successful in reaching solutions that further the worthy goals outlined at Ayacucho.

My government continues to regard the regional approach to conventional arms control as a particularly promising one. In addition to the direct value of regional arrangements, the development of workable measures in one region may provide useful insights for solving arms control problems elsewhere. A sound principle for the development of regional arrangements—one which we have endorsed on several previous occasions—is that the initiative should come from within the region concerned. This principle reflects the view that in order that a regional arrangement may be effective and durable it must be firmly grounded in the desires and concerns of the local parties, who are obviously the most directly affected.

At the same time, we have also pointed out that states outside the region concerned can play an important, perhaps essential, supportive role in the success of a regional arms control arrangement. The willingness of outside powers—particularly potential arms suppliers—to respect regional arrangements can operate as a strong inducement to develop local initiatives. Such willingness can provide assurance both to local parties and to other outside powers that their efforts will not be undermined.

Outside powers might respect a regional arrangement in a variety of ways. They would presumably be expected to agree not to take action inconsistent with the restrictions worked out by the local states. This would reinforce the obligations assumed by regional parties and create a double guarantee of compliance. Another way of respecting the arrangement might be to provide local parties with military equipment not proscribed and to render other types of support and assistance that might be important in satisfying those parties that their interests are adequately protected by the arrangement.

The United States stands ready to assist and cooperate in the development of regional and subregional arrangements in ways desired by the local participants. We are prepared to respect such arrangements in an appropriate manner provided, of course, that the measures do not impinge upon the legitimate security needs of the participants or undermine existing security arrangements contrary to their wishes and also provided that other outside powers respect the arrangements.

While pursuing the possibilities of regional arrangements, we believe it is important to explore ways of making progress in the conventional arms field in a broader context as well. We are convinced that this committee—in which countries from all regions of the world are represented—can make an important contribution by examining approaches to conventional arms control that are not limited in geographical scope and that could complement regional arrangements.

Views of Security Requirements

Today I would like to suggest one such approach. My delegation believes it would be useful for the CCD to identify and discuss principles of conduct that could be applicable on a worldwide basis to the acquisition or transfer of conventional arms. Before outlining some ideas about the content of such principles, I would like to discuss a number of factors which in our view should underlie conventional arms principles of this type.

Any practical attempt to deal with the question of restraints on conventional arms must be based on the assumption that, in

today's world, states will be determined to acquire the means necessary to safeguard their national independence and territorial integrity. Indeed, the acquisition of conventional arms may reinforce the stability of a local military balance and therefore reduce the likelihood of tensions and conflict.

All of us recognize, however, that there is another side to the impact of conventional arms. We live in an interdependent world with a panoply of modern weapon systems, an increasing ability of most states to manufacture or otherwise acquire virtually all the arms they desire, and a system of rapid communications media which often alert states to the conventional arms activities of others. In such a world, the continuing accumulation of conventional arms does not necessarily guarantee increased security. Efforts to provide for one's own defense needs may often affect the security of others. Moreover, the acquisition of arms by one state may lead to competitive reactions, or overreactions, by others. This process can result in a decreased sense of security for all concerned.

Any principles of conduct must take into account both of these sides of the conventional arms issue. In the light of the legitimate and often pressing security requirements of states, it would hardly be realistic to develop guidelines that would prevent the acquisition of arms altogether or would impose limits making it impossible for states to meet those requirements. Instead, the primary objective of such principles should be to encourage states to limit arms acquisitions to essential security requirements and thereby reduce the likelihood that those acquisitions of arms will appear threatening to others and increase tensions among states.

Reliance on Self-Restraint of States

Another important consideration relates to the nature of the restraints that would be called for in principles of conduct. Formal and legally binding restraints are often desirable in the arms control field and may be particularly appropriate in the case of regional conventional arms arrangements. However, considering the very early stage of international efforts in the conventional arms area and the vastly differing perspectives on the problem held by countries throughout the world, it would be premature to expect states to accept firm obligations that would be applicable on a worldwide basis. At least initially, therefore, any universally applicable principles of conduct should rely largely on the self-restraint of states. Such principles should encourage governments to be fully aware that their actions affect the security concerns of others. They should also encourage them to exercise appropriate restraints in order that such actions will not have adverse consequences, not only for other states but for their own security as well.

My delegation believes that such an approach could have a significant damping effect on the competition in conventional arms. Self-restraint by one would create incentives for self-restraint by others. However, I wish to emphasize that such a voluntary guidelines approach could not succeed if the willingness of some states to abide by the guidelines were not matched by the self-restraint of others whose cooperation is deemed important. Thus it would be unrealistic to expect one arms supplier to continue to restrain his shipments if other suppliers were determined to take up the slack. Likewise, we could not expect continued self-restraint in the acquisition of arms if such restraint were not reciprocated.

Diversity of Local Circumstances

A third consideration is the wide variation not only in the types and military missions of the weapons systems currently in existence but also in the effects they are likely to have in differing regions of the world. The political and military implications for regional stability of a particular arms acquisition depend on many factors. Among these are the quantities involved; the extent to which the acquisition provides the acquiring state with a new military capability; the relationship of the acquiring state's armed forces to those of other states whose security calculations might be affected; the perceptions by leaders of these other states of how the acquisition affects the balance of forces; and the compatibilities of

the new weapon systems with the acquiring state's technical and support capabilities, climatic and terrain conditions, and other weapon systems already in its inventory.

These are, of course, only a few of the many factors that determine the effects of arms acquisitions internationally. They demonstrate, however, that the impact of arms acquisitions on stability depends as much on the political and military context in which arms are acquired as on the characteristics of the weapons themselves. It would rarely be possible to single out specific weapons or categories of weapons that would be likely to have the same impact on stability in all situations throughout the world. In some regions the acquisition of small arms and ammunition might contribute more to insecurity than the acquisition of advanced jet aircraft. In other areas, of course, the reverse could be true.

Because of the diversity of local circumstances, we think that conventional arms guidelines applicable on a worldwide basis should encourage individual states to exercise judgment in making the determination whether, in a certain political and military context, the acquisition of weapons in certain types or quantities would be likely to have an adverse impact on regional or international security. Since such a determination inevitably has a subjective component, the guidelines would have to provide governments with flexibility in making arms acquisition decisions.

A final consideration in developing practical guidelines concerns the relationship between conventional arms acquisitions and economic and social development. In my delegation's view, such guidelines should call on governments to think of security as more than a strictly military concept, in particular, to recognize that real security lies not only in adequate defense capabilities but also in economic and social progress.

Illustrative Principles

The foregoing considerations suggest the types of restraints that might appropriately be embodied in principles of conduct in the conventional arms field.

One principle might call on states to assume responsibility for making the judgment that the arms they acquire or transfer will not have adverse effects on regional or international security. As I mentioned earlier, the requirements for stability may differ markedly from one situation to another. Accordingly, this principle would involve a careful determination by states as to whether certain types or quantities of weapons would be destabilizing in a particular context.

Another principle might be based on the assumption that the acquisition of arms by one state may be a legitimate concern of those other states whose security is affected. Such a principle might indicate that consultations among interested states on possible effects of arms acquisitions could be useful in preventing or alleviating regional or international tensions. "Interested" states might include neighboring countries as well as others outside the region. The consultations could be held in the event of a potential or officially acknowledged arms acquisition of particular concern to others; and they might also be arranged from time to time without reference to a particular acquisition. The result could be to allay fears that might otherwise lead to competitive and possibly destabilizing actions by other states.

Another principle could be formulated to reflect the view that the concept of security cannot, and should not, be based solely on political-military criteria but must also encompass progress in the social, economic, and cultural fields. Such a principle might, for example, encourage states to limit their acquisition of arms to those deemed indispensable for their security so that resources would not be unnecessarily diverted from economic and social development. States themselves must be the judge of their national priorities and of what is indispensable for their security. However, acceptance of a principle along these lines by a significant number of states, and real efforts to abide by it, could increase the incentives for others to act in accordance with it.

Another principle could apply to the transfer of arms production capabilities rather than to the transfer of arms themselves. It

might recommend that the export of technical data and equipment used for the manufacture of arms should be subject to the same effective governmental review and authorization procedures as arms exports themselves. All arms-exporting countries require licenses or their equivalent for the export of weapons. Not all of them, however, require government authorization for the export of technical know-how and equipment for the manufacture of arms.

In some cases, therefore, there are fewer legal barriers against the transfer of an arms production capability than against the provision of the arms themselves. Observance would not restrict the ability of suppliers and recipient governments to engage in transfers of technology. It would, however, reduce the risk of unauthorized transfers that could lead to the creation of arms production capabilities in areas of potential conflict, thus heightening tensions.

We believe that if a wide number of states supported principles such as the ones I have just suggested and acted in accordance with them, this would have a marked favorable impact on the worldwide competition in conventional arms. Broad acceptance of the view that international security can be enhanced by practicing appropriate restraints could favorably affect the way governments approach decisions on arms procurement. Implementation of such principles by a significant number of states would constitute an important first step leading to more favorable conditions for arms control arrangements on a regional basis and for more binding restraints on a broader geographical basis.

The illustrative principles I have described this morning are of course not meant to be an exhaustive set of policy guidelines in the conventional arms area, nor should they be regarded as proposals in any formal sense. They are intended to provide a basis for further discussion, to focus attention and, hopefully, constructive efforts on an area of arms control that has so far not been amenable to effective solutions.

We hope that other delegations will comment on the approach suggested today and possibly recommend principles of their own. We would also be interested in any alternative approaches for developing restraints on conventional arms that delegations may propose. Because the subject of conventional arms control is one which touches upon the vital interests of us all, it is essential that the needs and desires of all states be fully expressed and taken into account in our effort to find effective solutions.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.

General Assembly

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Report on the needs of developing countries for assistance in the practical applications of space technology. Report prepared by the Secretariat. A/AC.105/143. February 26, 1975. 78 pp.
Report of the United Nations expert on space applications to the scientific and technical subcommittee. A/AC.105/144. March 4, 1975. 13 pp.
Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its fourteenth session (February 10–March 7, 1975). A/AV.105/147. March 11, 1975. 25 pp.
Progress report (1974/1975) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on its tropical cyclone project. A/AC.105/148. March 11, 1975. 8 pp.

Economic implications of sea-bed mining in the international area: report of the Secretary General. A/CONF.62/37. February 18, 1975. 17 pp.

Letter dated March 6, 1975, from the Permanent Representative of Portugal addressed to the Secretary General transmitting the text of the agreement between Portugal and the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), aiming at the establishment of the self-determination and independence of Cape Verde. A/10054. March 11, 1975. 5 pp.

Letter dated March 21, 1975, from the Permanent Representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom transmitting the text of the Joint U.K.-Soviet declaration on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. A/10060. March 21, 1975. 3 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Commission on Human Rights. Periodic reports on human rights. Analytical summary of reports and other material on economic, social, and cultural rights for the period July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1973, received under Economic and Social Council resolution 1074 C (XXXIX). E/CN.4/1164. December 12, 1974. 51 pp.

Population questions. World Population Year, 1974. Report of the Secretary General. E/5602. December 23, 1974. 6 pp.

Commission for Social Development:

Social Indicators. Current national and international activities in the field of social indicators and social reporting. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.5/518. January 2, 1975. 24 pp.

Migrant Workers. ILO action on behalf of foreign and migrant workers and their families. Note by the Secretary General. E/CN.5/523. January 6, 1975. 25 pp.

Population Commission. Biennial program of work for 1976–1977, medium-term plan for 1976–1979 and long-term perspectives with specific reference to the implications of the World Population Conference and the World Population Plan of Action. Note by the Secretary General. E/CN.9/317. January 22, 1975. 38 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.

Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, March 26, 1975.

Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928; for the United States April 10, 1975.

Proclaimed by the President: April 29, 1975, with reservation.

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.[1]

Acceptance deposited: Spain, April 14, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Accession deposited: Bangladesh, April 25, 1975.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.[1]

Acceptances deposited: Malta, April 10, 1975; Monaco, March 18, 1975.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.[1]

Acceptance deposited: Malta, April 10, 1975.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.[1]

Acceptance deposited: Malta, April 10, 1975.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970.[1]

Ratification deposited: Togo, January 28, 1975.

Accession deposited: Gabon, January 28, 1975.

Postal Matters

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Enters into force January 1, 1976.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Enters into force January 1, 1976.

Property—Industrial

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force March 18, 1970; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Netherlands, December 6, 1974.

Trademark registration treaty, with regulations. Done at Vienna June 12, 1973.[1]

Accessions deposited: Gabon, March 6, 1975; Togo, January 28, 1975.

[1] Not in force.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Ratifications deposited: Gabon, March 6, 1975; Ivory Coast, February 1, 1974; Mexico, March 14, 1975; Niger, February 18, 1975; Portugal, January 27, 1975.

Accessions deposited: Chile, March 25, 1975; India, January 31, 1975; Togo, January 28, 1975; Republic of Viet-Nam, January 30, 1975.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.[1]

Ratification deposited: Iceland, April 21, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: South Africa, May 7, 1975.

Declaration of provisional application deposited: Spain, April 15, 1975.

Accession deposited: Malta, April 29, 1975.

Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with statement), May 6, 1975.

BILATERAL

Honduras

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of March 5, 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa April 18, 1975. Entered into force April 18, 1975.

India

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington May 2, 1975. Enters into force when the United States notifies India in writing that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling have been complied with.

[1] Not in force.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 5–11

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to May 5 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 228 of May 2.

No.	Date	Subject
*230	5/5	Assistance to Viet-Nam refugees: toll-free telephone number established.
231	5/5–5/8	Kissinger: "Today" show interview, parts I–IV.
*233	5/5	U.S. and Thailand amend textile agreement.
*234	5/5	Kissinger: statement on death of Ambassador Keating.
*235	5/5	Shipping Coordinating Committee, June 17.
*236	5/6	U.S.-Netherlands civil aviation discussions.
237	5/6	Price increase on Canadian natural gas exported to U.S.
*238	5/6	Study Group CMTT of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, June 3.
*239	5/6	Study Group 1 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIT, May 21–22.
†240	5/8	U.S. and Canada renew North American Air Defense Agreement.
*241	5/9	Study Group 6 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, July 7–9.
*242	5/9	Study Group 4 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, June 24.
*243	5/9	U.S. and Pakistan extend textile agreement.
†244	5/9	Sisco: National Association of Arab Americans.
†245	5/9	Kissinger: toast at luncheon for Latin American Foreign Ministers.
*246	5/9	Whitehouse sworn in as Ambassador to Thailand (biographic data).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Name Index