



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXII • No. 1873 • May 19, 1975

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POST OFFICE PERMIT NO. 100
Superintendent of Documents

JUN 13 1975

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXII, No. 1873

May 19, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic \$42.50, foreign \$53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of April 29

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the Old Executive Office Building on April 29.

Press release 220 dated April 29

Mr. Nessen [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford]: The briefing was delayed until the evacuation was completed, and the last helicopters are now in the air.

I would like to read a statement by the President.

[At this point Mr. Nessen read a statement by President Ford, the text of which follows.]

"During the past week, I had ordered the reduction of American personnel in the U.S. Mission in Saigon to levels that could be quickly evacuated during an emergency, while enabling that mission to continue to fulfill its duties.

"During the day on Monday, Washington time, the airport at Saigon came under persistent rocket, as well as artillery, fire and was effectively closed. The military situation in the area deteriorated rapidly.

"I therefore ordered the evacuation of all American personnel remaining in South Viet-Nam.

"The evacuation has been completed. I commend the personnel of the Armed Forces who accomplished it, as well as Ambassador Graham Martin and the staff of his mission, who served so well under difficult conditions.

"This action closes a chapter in the American experience. I ask all Americans to close ranks, to avoid recrimination about the past, to look ahead to the many goals we share, and to work together on the great tasks that remain to be accomplished."

Copies of this statement will be available as you leave the briefing.

Now, to give you details of the events of the past few days and to answer your

questions, Secretary of State Kissinger.

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and Gentlemen, when the President spoke before the Congress [April 10], he stated as our objective the stabilization of the situation in Viet-Nam.

We made clear at that time, as well as before many congressional hearings, that our purpose was to bring about the most controlled and the most humane solution that was possible and that these objectives required the course which the President had set.

Our priorities were as follows: We sought to save the American lives still in Viet-Nam. We tried to rescue as many South Vietnamese that had worked with the United States for 15 years in reliance on our commitments as we possibly could. And we sought to bring about as humane an outcome as was achievable under the conditions that existed.

Over the past two weeks, the American personnel in Viet-Nam have been progressively reduced. Our objective was to reduce at a rate that was significant enough so that we would finally be able to evacuate rapidly but which would not produce a panic which might prevent anybody from getting out.

Our objective was also to fulfill the human obligation which we felt to the tens of thousands of South Vietnamese who had worked with us for over a decade.

Finally, we sought, through various intermediaries, to bring about as humane a political evolution as we could.

By Sunday evening [April 27], the personnel in our mission had been reduced to 950 and there were 8,000 South Vietnamese to be considered in a particularly high-risk category—between 5,000 and 8,000. We do not know the exact number.

On Monday evening, Washington time,

around 5 o'clock, which was Tuesday morning in Saigon, the airport in Tan Son Nhut was rocketed and received artillery fire.

The President called an NSC [National Security Council] meeting. He decided that if the shelling stopped by dawn Saigon time, we would attempt to operate with fixed-wing aircraft from Tan Son Nhut Airport for one more day to remove the high-risk South Vietnamese, together with all the Defense Attache's Office [DAO], which was located near the Tan Son Nhut Airport.

He also ordered a substantial reduction of the remaining American personnel in South Viet-Nam.

I may point out that the American personnel in Saigon was divided into two groups; one with the Defense Attache's Office, which was located near the Tan Son Nhut Airport; the second one, which was related to the Embassy and was with the U.S. Mission in downtown Saigon.

The shelling did stop early in the morning on Tuesday, Saigon time, or about 9 p.m. last night, Washington time. We then attempted to land C-130's but found that the population at the airport had got out of control and had flooded the runways. It proved impossible to land any more fixed-wing aircraft.

The President thereupon ordered that the DAO personnel, together with those civilians that had been made ready to be evacuated, be moved to the DAO compound, which is near Tan Son Nhut Airport; and at about 11:00 last night, he ordered the evacuation of all Americans from Tan Son Nhut and from the Embassy as well.

This operation has been going on all day, which of course is night in Saigon, and under difficult circumstances, and the total number of those evacuated numbers about 6,500—we will have the exact figures for you tomorrow—of which about 1,000 are Americans.

Our Ambassador has left, and the evacuation can be said to be completed.

In the period since the President spoke to the Congress, we have therefore succeeded in evacuating all of the Americans who were in South Viet-Nam, losing the two marines

last night to rocket fire and two pilots today on a helicopter.

We succeeded in evacuating something on the order of 55,000 South Vietnamese. And we hope we have contributed to a political evolution that may spare the South Vietnamese some of the more drastic consequences of a political change, but this remains to be seen. This last point remains to be seen.

As far as the Administration is concerned I can only underline the point made by the President. We do not believe that this is a time for recrimination. It is a time to heal wounds, to look at our international obligations, and to remember that peace and progress in the world has depended importantly on American commitment and American conviction and that the peace and progress of our own people is closely tied to that of the rest of the world.

I will be glad to answer questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you made some reference a few weeks back to those who believe in the domino theory, and while I don't remember exactly your words, the point was it is easy to laugh at it but there is some justification for subscribing to that theory. Now that this chapter is over, can you give us your estimate of the security of Thailand and other countries in the area, or the near area?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too early to make a final assessment.

There is no question that the outcome in Indochina will have consequences not only in Asia but in many other parts of the world. To deny these consequences is to miss the possibility of dealing with them.

So, I believe there will be consequences. But I am confident that we can deal with them, and we are determined to manage and to progress along the road toward a permanent peace that we have sought; but there is no question that there will be consequences.

Q. Now that it is over, could you tell us, or elaborate in more detail, what we did through various intermediaries to bring about, I think you said, as humane a political solution as possible, and why those efforts seem to have failed?

Secretary Kissinger: I would not agree with the proposition that these efforts have failed because at least some of the efforts, especially those related to evacuation, were carried out through intermediaries. I think it is premature for me to go into all of the details, but we did deal with Hanoi and with the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] through different intermediaries, and we were in a position to put our views and receive responses.

Q. May I follow on that by saying, why, then, was it necessary to stage a rescue operation in the final stages?

Secretary Kissinger: In the final stages, it was always foreseen that a helicopter lift for some contingents would be necessary. I believe that the dynamics of the situation in South Viet-Nam and the impatience of the North Vietnamese to seize power brought about an acceleration of events in the last day and a half.

But you will remember there was a period of about five days when both civilian and U.S. personnel were evacuated without any substantial opposition—in fact, more than five days, about a week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, do you now anticipate that the North Vietnamese intend to move in and forcefully seize Saigon? Do you anticipate there will be a bloody battle of Saigon, or is there still a chance for an orderly transition?

Secretary Kissinger: This is very difficult to judge at this moment. I think it is important to point out that the Communist demands have been escalating as the military situation has changed in their favor.

So, a week ago they were asking only for the removal of President [Nguyen Van] Thieu. When he resigned, they immediately asked for the removal of his successor, specifying that General [Duong Van] Minh would be acceptable. When President [Tran Van] Huong resigned in favor of General Minh, he was now described as a member of a clique which includes all of the members of his administration.

A week ago, the Communist demand was

for the removal of American military personnel. This quickly escalated into a removal of all American personnel.

Then a new demand was put forward for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese military apparatus. When that was agreed to, they added to it the demand for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese administrative apparatus. So, it is clear that what is being aimed at is a substantial political takeover.

Now, whether it is possible to avoid a battle for Saigon, it is too early to judge. I would hope—and we certainly have attempted to work in that direction—that such a battle can be avoided. And it is basically unnecessary because it seems to us that the South Vietnamese Government is prepared to draw the conclusions from the existing situation and, in fact, look forward to correspond to the demands of the Communist side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider the United States now owes any allegiance at all to the Paris pact? Are we now bound in any way by the Paris agreements?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as far as the United States is concerned, there are not many provisions of the Paris agreement that are still relevant. As far as the North Vietnamese are concerned, they have stated that they wish to carry out the Paris accords, though by what definition is not fully clear to me. We would certainly support this if it has any meaning.

Q. May I ask one follow-up? Do you now favor American aid in rebuilding North Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: North Viet-Nam?

Q. North Viet-Nam.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I do not favor American aid for rebuilding North Viet-Nam.

Q. South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to South Viet-Nam, we will have to see what kind of government emerges and indeed whether there is going to be a South Viet-Nam. We would certainly look at particular

specific humanitarian requests that can be carried out by humanitarian agencies, but we do believe that the primary responsibility should fall on those who supply the weapons for this political change.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question about the length of time that it took to complete this evacuation. First, the question of whether days went by after the end became obvious before ordering the evacuation; second, if after ordering it there was a one-hour delay in helicopter landings, apparently caused by military confusion; third, whether the evacuation was prolonged by picking up thousands of Vietnamese instead of concentrating on Americans; and fourth, whether this was delayed even further by Ambassador Martin's desire to be the last man to leave the sinking ship.

In other words, I tried to put the specifics in order to ask you, did it take too long to get out of there, to write this last chapter?

Secretary Kissinger: We got out, with all of the personnel that were there, without panic and without the substantial casualties that could have occurred if civil order had totally broken down. We also managed to save 56,000 people whose lives were in the most severe jeopardy.

We had to make a judgment every day how many people we thought we could safely remove without triggering a panic and at the same time still be able to carry out our principal function and the remaining functions.

I think these objectives were achieved and they were carried out successfully. Therefore I do not believe that there was an undue delay, because an evacuation has been going on for two weeks.

The difference between the last stage and the previous period was that the last stage was done by helicopter and the previous stage had been done by fixed-wing.

I think the ability to conduct a final evacuation by helicopter without casualties during the operation, at least casualties caused by hostile action, is closely related to the policies that were pursued in the preceding two weeks.

As for Ambassador Martin, he was in a very difficult position. He felt a moral obligation to the people with whom he had been associated, and he attempted to save as many of those as possible. That is not the worst fault a man can have.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been numerous reports of American appeals to the Soviets, to the Chinese. Can you say today in the evacuation effort were either the Soviets or the Chinese helpful or unhelpful in this diplomatic effort?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that we received some help from the Soviet Union in the evacuation effort. The degree of it we will have to assess when we study the exchanges.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what caused the breakdown of the intent which was spoken of earlier on the Hill to try to achieve a measure of self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam, and what is your total assessment now of the effectiveness or the noneffectiveness of the whole Paris accord operation, which you said at the outset was intended to achieve peace with honor for the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Until Sunday night we thought there was some considerable hope that the North Vietnamese would not seek a solution by purely military means, and when the transfer of power to General Minh took place—a person who had been designated by the other side as a counterpart worth talking to, they would be prepared to talk with—we thought a negotiated solution in the next few days was highly probable.

Sometime Sunday night the North Vietnamese obviously changed signals. Why that is, we do not yet know, nor do I exclude that now that the American presence is totally removed and very little military structure is left in South Viet-Nam, that there may not be a sort of a negotiation, but what produced this sudden shift to a military option or what would seem to us to be a sudden shift to a military option, I have not had sufficient opportunity to analyze.

As to the effectiveness of the Paris accords, I think it is important to remember

the mood in this country at the time that the Paris accords were being negotiated. I think it is worth remembering that the principal criticism that was then made was that the terms we insisted on were too tough, not that the terms were too generous.

We wanted what was considered peace with honor, was that the United States would not end a war by overthrowing a government with which it had been associated. That still seems an objective that was correct.

There were several other assumptions that were made at that time that were later falsified by events that were beyond the control of—that indeed were unforeseeable by—anybody who negotiated these agreements, including the disintegration of or the weakening of executive authority in the United States for reasons unconnected with foreign policy considerations.

So, the premises of the Paris accords, in terms of aid, of the possibility of aid, and in terms of other factors, tended to disintegrate. I see no purpose now in reviewing that particular history. Within the context of the time, it seemed the right thing to do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a follow-up question on that. What is the current relationship of the United States to the South Vietnamese political grouping, whatever you would call it?

Secretary Kissinger: We will have to see what grouping emerges out of whatever negotiations should now take place between the two South Vietnamese sides. After we have seen what grouping emerges and what degree of independence it has, then we can make a decision about what our political relationship to it is. We have not made a decision on that.

Q. Would you say diplomatic relations are in abeyance with the government in South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that is a fair statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, looking back on the war now, would you say that the war was in vain, and what do you feel it accomplished?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it will be a

long time before Americans will be able to talk or write about the war with some dispassion. It is clear that the war did not achieve the objectives of those who started the original involvement nor the objectives of those who sought to end that involvement, which they found on terms which seemed to them compatible with the sacrifices that had been made.

What lessons we should draw from it, I think we should reserve for another occasion. But I don't think that we can solve the problem of having entered the conflict too lightly by leaving it too lightly, either.

Q. Mr. Secretary, looking toward the future, has America been so stunned by the experience of Viet-Nam that it will never again come to the military or economic aid of an ally? I am talking specifically in the case of Israel.

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out in a speech a few weeks ago [April 17], one lesson we must learn from this experience is that we must be very careful in the commitments we make but that we should scrupulously honor those commitments that we make.

I believe that the experience in the war can make us more mature in the commitments we undertake and more determined to maintain those we have. I would therefore think that with relation to other countries, including Israel, that no lessons should be drawn by the enemies of our friends from the experiences in Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the developments in the last week or so, would you agree that there was never any hope of stabilizing the South Vietnamese military situation after the withdrawal from the northern region?

Secretary Kissinger: When the President met with General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army] in Palm Springs, the judgment was that there was a slim hope, but some hope. Somewhat less than 50-50, but still some hope.

The situation deteriorated with every passing day. Those of you whom I briefed

at that time will remember that I said that whatever—and I said it in public testimony on innumerable occasions—that whatever objective we may set ourselves and whatever assessment we make about the outcome, the Administration had no choice except to pursue the course that we did, which was designed to save the Americans still in Viet-Nam and the maximum number of Vietnamese lives, should the worst come to pass.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, are you now reassessing the amount of humanitarian aid which Congress should give to the South Vietnamese, and also, can you tell us the President's reaction and mood during the past 24 hours?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to humanitarian aid for South Viet-Nam, we spoke to the congressional leadership this morning, and we urged them to pass the humanitarian part of the aid request that we have submitted to the Congress.

The President pointed out that he would make a later decision as to what part of that humanitarian aid could be used in South Viet-Nam after the political evolution in South Viet-Nam becomes clearer.

The President's mood was somber and determined, and we all went through a somewhat anxious 24 hours, because until the last helicopter had left, we could not really know whether an attack on any of these compounds might start and whether missiles might be used against our evacuation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to clarify something that seems rather important at this point? You said here and in the past that a weakening of the American executive authority was a factor in this whole outcome. Now, there have been reports that former President Nixon, with your advice, had decided in April of 1973 to resume the bombing of North Viet-Nam but that Watergate intruded and he could not carry through on that. Is that a historic fact or not?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge, President Nixon had never ac-

tually decided on any particular action. The Washington Special Action Group at that period was considering a number of reactions that could be taken to the beginning flagrant violations of the agreements. This was done on an interdepartmental basis—including the Department of State, my office, the Department of Defense—and had reached certain options.

Then President Nixon, as it turned out, never made a final decision between these options. To what extent it was influenced by Watergate is a psychological assessment that one can only speculate about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a new Asia developing after the Indochina situation. What will the priorities of the United States be in recognizing its existing commitments and in making new ones?

Secretary Kissinger: We will have to assess the impact of Indochina on our allies and on other countries in that area and on their perceptions of the United States, and we will have to assess also what role the United States can responsibly play over an indefinite period of time, because surely another lesson we should draw from the Indochina experience is that foreign policy must be sustained over decades if it is to be effective, and if it cannot be, then it has to be tailored to what is sustainable.

The President has already reaffirmed our alliance with Japan, our defense treaty with Korea, and we, of course, also have treaty obligations and important bases in the Philippines. We will soon be in consultation with many other countries in that area, including Indonesia and Singapore and Australia and New Zealand, and we hope to crystallize an Asian policy that is suited to present circumstances with close consultation with our friends.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you confident that all the Americans that wanted to come out are out of Saigon, and do you have any idea of the number of Americans who remained behind?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no idea of the number of Americans that remained behind.

I am confident that every American who wanted to come out is out, but how many chose to stay behind we won't know until tomorrow sometime. The last contingent that left was the Ambassador and some of his immediate staff, and we won't know really until we get the report from them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is President Thieu welcome to seek asylum in this country, and is there any possibility that the United States would recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: If President Thieu should seek asylum in the United States, he would be, of course, received.

The United States will not recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what went wrong, what were the flaws in American foreign policy toward Indochina all these years? Why was it that so many Administrations repeatedly underestimated the power of the North Vietnamese and overestimated the capability on the part of the South Vietnamese?

Secretary Kissinger: As I said earlier, I think this is not the occasion, when the last American has barely left Saigon, to make an assessment of a decade and a half of American foreign policy, because it could equally well be argued that if five Administrations that were staffed, after all, by serious people dedicated to the welfare of their country came to certain conclusions, that maybe there was something in their assessment, even if for a variety of reasons the effort did not succeed.

As I have already pointed out, special factors have operated in recent years. But I would think that what we need now in this country, for some weeks at least, and hopefully for some months, is to heal the wounds and to put Viet-Nam behind us and to concentrate on the problems of the future. That certainly will be the Administration's attitude. There will be time enough for historic assessments.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly spoken of the potential consequences of what

has happened in Southeast Asia. I would like to ask if you feel that your personal prestige and therefore your personal ability to negotiate between other countries has been damaged by what has happened?

Secretary Kissinger: If I should ever come to the conclusion that I could not fulfill what the President has asked of me, then I would draw the consequences from this. Obviously, this has been a very painful experience, and it would be idle to deny this has been a painful experience for many who have been concerned with this problem for a decade and a half.

I think the problems in Viet-Nam went deeper than any one negotiation and that an analysis of the accords at the time will require an assessment of the public pressures, of what was sustainable, but I don't think, again, that we should go into this at this particular moment, nor am I probably the best judge of my prestige at any particular point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was it in particular that led you to believe until Sunday night that Hanoi might be willing to go for a non-military solution? Did you have some specific information from them to indicate that, because certainly the battlefield situation suggested otherwise?

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe to you, but the battlefield situation suggested that there was a standdown of significant military activity, and the public pronouncements were substantially in the direction that a negotiation would start with General Minh. There were also other reasons which led us to believe that the possibility of a negotiation remained open.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have blamed the Soviets and the Red Chinese for breaking faith with the letter and the spirit of the Paris peace accords. The Soviet Union has apparently, through its broadcasts, encouraged a Communist takeover in Portugal. The Chinese have signed a joint communique with North Korea encouraging North Korea to unify South Korea by force.

My question is, why, in view of these violations in both the letter and in the spirit of

détente, does the United States continue to believe in détente; secondly, are we ever going to take some obvious action showing American displeasure at the behavior of the two Communist superpowers?

Secretary Kissinger: First, I think it is important to keep in mind that our relationship with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China is based on ideological hostility but practical reasons for cooperation in certain limited spheres.

With respect to the Soviet Union, they and we possess the capability to destroy mankind. The question of how to prevent a general nuclear war is a problem that some Administration must solve before consequences that would be irremedial. Therefore there is always a common interest, and indeed a common obligation, to attempt to deal with this particular problem.

With respect to the various points you made, it is important for us to recognize that we cannot, in this situation, ask of the Soviet Union that it does our job for us. On the one hand, as I pointed out previously, of course the Soviet Union and the People's Republic must be responsible for the consequences of those actions that lead to an upset of the situation in Indochina, or maybe in the Middle East; that is, the introduction of massive armaments that will in all probability be used offensively is an event that we cannot ignore.

On the other hand, I think it would be a grave mistake to blame the Soviet Union for what happened in Portugal. It may have taken advantage of the situation in Portugal, but the fact that the Communist Party in Portugal has emerged despite the fact that it, in recent elections, had only 12 percent of the votes cannot be ascribed to Soviet machinations primarily, but due to causes that are much more complicated and also due to evolutions in Europe that have roots quite different from Soviet pressures.

So, we must not make the mistake of ascribing every reverse we have to our Communist opponents, because that makes them appear 10 feet tall. On the other hand, we must not make the mistake of lulling ourselves, with a period of détente, into believing

that all competition has disappeared.

Between these two extremes, we must navigate, seek to reduce tensions on the basis of reciprocity, and seek to promote a stabler world. When either of the Communist countries have attempted actively to bring foreign policy pressures, the United States has resisted strenuously, and again we have called their attention to the fact that the fostering of international conflict will certainly lead to a breakdown of détente. But the individual examples which you gave cannot be ascribed to Communist actions primarily.

Q. In ordering the evacuation, to what extent were you responding exclusively to the military situation and to what extent were you responding either to a request by "Big" Minh for all Americans to get out or to your own feeling that a total evacuation might facilitate a political settlement?

Secretary Kissinger: When the President ordered total evacuation, it was done on the basis that Tan Son Nhut Airport had already been closed and that therefore the American personnel in Saigon—and there were 45 in the province—might soon become hostage to the approaching Communist forces.

The order to evacuate was made before any request had been received from General Minh, and the principal, indeed the only, reason was to guarantee the safety of the remaining Americans.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was a report last night that the Communists were backing away from the airport, the rockets seemed to be moving back. Was that a direct result of negotiations and were they prepared to let us move refugees out or Americans out on fixed-wing aircraft?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know that particular report, but the shelling stopped about 9 p.m., last night. We could not operate fixed-wing aircraft, because the control at the airport broke down. And it was at this point that the President decided that with Communist forces approaching on all sides and with the airport being closed that we had to go to helicopter evacuation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a report in New York that last week you sent a further request for the good offices of the Council of Ministers of the Nine, the European Communities.

Secretary Kissinger: We did not approach the Nine last week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any possibility of a negotiated settlement, and also, with respect to that, what can and should the South Vietnamese Government do now?

Secretary Kissinger: I have already pointed out that the Communist demands have been escalating literally with every passing day, that as soon as one demand is met, an additional demand is put forward. So, we should have no illusions about what the Communist side is aiming for.

The South Vietnamese, as far as I can tell, have met every demand that has so far been put forward on the radio. There have not been any direct negotiations with which I am familiar.

What is attainable in the transfer of power that would preserve a vestige of other forces than the Communist forces, that remains to be seen.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger Commends Efforts of Armed Forces

Statement Issued April 29

Department of Defense press release 204-75 dated April 29

As the last withdrawal of Americans from Viet-Nam takes place, it is my special

responsibility to address to you, the men and women of our Armed Forces, a few words of appreciation on behalf of the American people.

For many of you, the tragedy of Southeast Asia is more than a distant and abstract event. You have fought there; you have lost comrades there; you have suffered there. In this hour of pain and reflection, you may feel that your efforts and sacrifices have gone for naught.

That is not the case. When the passions have muted and the history is written, Americans will recall that their Armed Forces served them well. Under circumstances more difficult than ever before faced by our military services, you accomplished the mission assigned to you by higher authority. In combat you were victorious, and you left the field with honor.

Though you have done all that was asked of you, it will be stated that the war itself was futile. In some sense, such may be said of any national effort that ultimately fails. Yet our involvement was not purposeless. It was intended to assist a small nation to preserve its independence in the face of external attack and to provide at least a reasonable chance to survive. That Viet-Nam succumbed to powerful external forces vitiates neither the explicit purpose behind our involvement nor the impulse of generosity toward those under attack that has long infused American policy.

Your record of duty performed under difficult conditions remains unmatched. I salute you for it. Beyond any question you are entitled to the nation's respect, admiration, and gratitude.

Adjusting to a Changing World Economy: Investment and Trade Policy

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll¹

We, as a nation, must not permit recent events in Indochina to detract from our vision of the future or cause us to turn away from the broader challenges of our time.

I want to talk to you this evening about the U.S. policy on international trade and investment, a topic of obvious relevance both to the nation, as we adjust to an era of economic interdependence, and to the work of this conference.

You, as businessmen and international traders, have a better appreciation than most Americans of the importance of our economic interaction with the rest of the world. You understand how the relatively unrestricted flow of capital and goods across international borders is vital not only to our economy but to general world stability and prosperity. In many respects, I am preaching to the converted, to an audience of experts deeply concerned about trade and investment among nations. I also understand the risks inherent in a long after-dinner speech and will therefore keep my remarks brief and to the point.

Let me turn first to U.S. policy on international investment, an issue of intense interest and debate in the nation today. Since the time of Alexander Hamilton, American policy has consistently been to welcome foreign investment and to support the generally free international movement of capital. We have, from time to time, turned protectionist in our trade policy, but not in our attitude toward investment.

Investment from abroad has historically

played an important role in building the economy and infrastructure of this nation; it was, as you are probably aware, an essential element in the construction of our trans-continental railway system during the last century. Foreign investment has never been a threat to our security or economic integrity. Today, in a recessionary period, it is an important source of capital, technology, management, and jobs.

Our longstanding commitment to the relatively nonrestrictive treatment of foreign investment is embodied in a wide-ranging bilateral network of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation with other nations. These treaties establish conditions favorable to private investment abroad, with many of them providing for a national-treatment standard to insure that foreign investment is not discriminated against in the recipient country.

You will have noticed that in describing our attitude toward the international flow of capital, I have consistently employed a qualifying word—"generally" free movement, "relatively" unrestricted. In discussing foreign investment, it is important to note that neither government policy nor our treaty system is intended to throw vital American industries open to uncontrolled investment from abroad. There are Federal restrictions effectively limiting the amount of foreign investment in areas such as atomic energy, communications, shipping and air transport, defense industries, and government-owned natural resources.

Let us be frank to admit the real cause of current public concern about foreign investment in this country; it is occasioned by the

¹ Made before the 38th Annual Chicago World Trade Conference at Chicago, Ill., on Apr. 30 (text from press release 221).

fact that in recent years certain oil-producing nations, many of them Arab, have accumulated vast foreign exchange holdings and, at least in theory, have the potential to invest heavily in American companies.

Response to New Investment Situation

The United States has long been accustomed to investing overseas; today we sense the shoe may be on the other foot, that we may become increasingly the target of investment. We read alarming reports about how, in a specified number of years, Saudi Arabia will have the resources to buy up all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

International investment, like any cooperative endeavor, involves a sense of give-and-take; it is a two-way street. We cannot expect to dot the major capitals of the world with the Golden Arches of McDonald's and American branch offices without being prepared to accept the same kinds of investment in this country.

Our experience to date strongly suggests that OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] investors do not desire to control large American companies and, indeed, lack the managerial capabilities to administer such establishments. These nations have shown themselves to be institutional investors, essentially conservative, with a legitimate objective: the best obtainable long-term return on their capital.

Contrary to popular impression, the United States is not being inundated with investment capital from abroad. Under the terms of the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, we are undertaking a comprehensive survey of foreign investment in this country. The survey has not yet been completed, but figures from other sources show that at the end of 1973, direct long-term foreign investment in our private sector had a book value of \$18 billion, a 25 percent increase over the previous year. About \$12 billion of this investment comes from Europe; an additional \$4 billion from Canada. By contrast, U.S. direct investment abroad in 1974 had a book value of \$107 billion.

These figures and observations are not intended to suggest that the United States can simply forget about foreign investment and let events take their course. Our traditional support for freedom of investment flows must obviously be responsive to the new situation created by unprecedented capital accumulations by a relatively small number of foreign governments.

Earlier this year the Administration undertook an extensive review of government policy on foreign investment. The conclusions of the study basically reaffirm our longstanding belief that the operation of free market forces will direct worldwide investment flows in the most productive way. But our review also calls for prompt and effective action in three areas:

—We need an improved system for collecting and analyzing data on foreign investment coming into this country.

—We must confirm that existing authority to deal with abuses by foreign investors is adequate and is being enforced where necessary.

—We should reach understandings with foreign governments, particularly those with a substantial capacity to invest, to consult with us prior to making major official investments in U.S. firms.

To meet these requirements, the Administration is moving to establish an Inter-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The Committee will have primary responsibility for analyzing the impact on the U.S. economy of foreign investment and for coordinating U.S. policy on such investment. It will also review foreign investments that could be of major significance to our national interests and provide guidance on arrangements for advance consultation with foreign governments on major official investments.

An Office of Foreign Investment will also be established to assist the Committee in its work, particularly by improving the gathering and dissemination of information on foreign investment.

The Administration believes it now has the tools to deal with any potential problems

or abuses in the field of foreign investment. We are generally opposed to legislative initiatives that would make it more difficult for other nations to invest responsibly in this country.

Our task is to utilize existing safeguards more effectively, not to impede the flow of foreign investment or block it from job-creating industries in a time of recession.

Finally, while on the subject of investment, let me emphasize a point made clearly by the President: In determining whether or not to invest their assets in this country, foreign investors should be aware that discrimination is totally contrary to American tradition and repugnant to our principles. The basic concern of our investment policy is not whether a potential investor is foreign, but whether he is prepared to abide by our laws and regulations.

Private Sector Role in Trade Policy

Investment is but one aspect, and a risky one at that, of increasing world economic interdependence. All of us have at one time or another been burned on our investments, but the respectability and evident prosperity of this gathering strongly suggests that a person of talent can operate with fairly consistent success in the field of international trade.

If I may be permitted a quote from a former British Chancellor of the Exchequer, R. A. Butler: "It takes two to make love and two to make trade agreements work. Unrequited trade or exports pay no better than unrequited love." The freer flow of trade throughout the world is a cardinal point of American foreign policy, one soundly based on our national interest and the furtherance of our policy objectives.

The Trade Act of 1974 and the multilateral trade negotiations now taking place in Geneva are significant benchmarks in this country's longstanding commitment to help shape a more just and open international trading system. The Trade Act gives us the authority to do the job, consistent with our national interests. Geneva is the forum at which we and our trading partners will seek

to reconcile national differences and mutual concerns in the interest of expanded world trade and prosperity.

Many of you are aware that the Trade Act specifically calls upon the President to obtain the advice of the private sector regarding our negotiating objectives and bargaining positions at Geneva. An overall, 45-member advisory committee for trade negotiations is being established. It will include private sector representatives from all segments of the American economy—industry, agriculture, small business, consumers, retailers, and labor—and will play a central role in the consultative program.

Twenty-six industry sector advisory committees and eight agricultural technical advisory committees are also being formed to act as a liaison with representatives of the private sector as we attempt to remove obstacles to international trade. The initial round of consultations with business and agricultural interests is well underway. When public hearings on trade policy are concluded this summer, the Administration will have an unprecedented stock of information and advice from the private sector to use in determining our negotiating goals and strategy, both overall and with regard to specific products.

These committees include many members of the Chicago business community. They insure that your voices will be heard as our policy on international trade develops. As businessmen concerned with international commerce, you have a responsibility to make effective use of these avenues of communication with the government and then to take maximum advantage of export opportunities. And I want to emphasize the latter as well as the former. Taking maximum advantage of export opportunities requires good old-fashioned work, work that is essential to our survival as a great trading nation in a new world order.

During my business and diplomatic career in Asia and through frequent contact with American businessmen overseas, I have noticed a real concern about delivery schedules. American representatives abroad can frequently get the orders but have difficulty

in delivering the goods. If we are going to take advantage of freer trade and compete successfully in the international marketplace, our exporters must recognize the importance of foreign markets and treat overseas orders with the same priority as domestic demand. Production capacity must be adequate to meet both domestic and overseas markets.

Here at home, we also need the support and involvement of the American business community to obtain congressional support for repeal of restrictive domestic trade legislation. One example is the recent initiative by Congress to exclude all OPEC nations—including some which did not participate in the 1973 oil embargo such as Venezuela, Iran, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Indonesia—from the benefit of our generalized tariff preferences. Legislation of this nature calls into question our commitment to freer trade, creates needless irritants in our bilateral relations, and makes our task at Geneva all the more difficult.

Geneva Trade Negotiations

Let us take a look at some of the specific issues at Geneva, the problems and accomplishments to date.

The agreements reached by the 89 nations currently negotiating at Geneva will set the trade policies of much of the world for the coming decade. The success of these negotiations is of critical concern not only to the prosperity of this nation—which exported almost \$100 billion worth of goods in 1974—but to economic growth and stability around the world.

During the Kennedy round of trade negotiations in the sixties the international community made very substantial progress in reducing tariff barriers to trade. We were less successful in dealing with the question of nontariff barriers and with the liberalization of agricultural trade—an issue of obvious concern to Illinois, which leads the United States in agricultural exports. We expect to do better this time.

Given the significance of agriculture on our overall trade position, it is of the utmost importance that we be able to expand our

access to overseas markets. For their part, other nations understandably require of us assured access to our agricultural supplies. We can anticipate that the agricultural negotiations will continue to be difficult since there are basic differences between major agricultural producers such as the United States and the European Community over the relationship between domestic and international agricultural policy. The European Community, for example, is far more protective of its domestic agriculture than is the United States.

Resolving these differences on a basis leading to expanded international trade is important not only to the United States but to the future of the negotiations. Failure to reach accommodation on the important issue of agriculture could spill over into other areas at Geneva, crippling the negotiations before they are fully underway.

At the February 1975 multilateral trade negotiation meeting in Geneva, working groups were established to deal separately with the principal problems of negotiations: tariff and nontariff barriers, agriculture, and safeguards for affected domestic industries. A separate group was set up to work on tropical agricultural products, such as cocoa, bananas, and coffee, items on which there is opportunity for rapid progress in the negotiations.

Another group will examine the concept of a sector approach to trade negotiations by looking at the barriers to trade affecting a broad industry rather than specific products. We have under study at Geneva, for example, all restrictions relating to the metal industry—steel, copper, zinc, and lead—in an effort to evaluate the prospects for removing them on a sectoral basis. Where we anticipate that our interests are better served and our commitment to trade liberalization furthered, the United States is prepared to proceed on this integrated sector approach.

With the exception of those dealing with agriculture, all the working groups at Geneva are now engaged in the substantive stage of negotiations. Upon the conclusion of our domestic procedures for consultation with the private sector, we will begin the

process of tabling specific proposals in the various negotiations.

Nontariff Barriers and Commodities

We have unprecedented authority to reduce tariffs in return for mutual concessions by other nations. We also, for the first time, have explicit authority to attack the problem of nontariff barriers, which, with the success of the Kennedy round, have become increasingly important impediments to trade. We hope to reduce or eliminate some of the more onerous nontariff barriers by agreement on codes of conduct governing what is and is not acceptable internationally.

Export subsidies constitute an important nontariff obstacle to trade, and we recently achieved an important breakthrough on this issue when the United States and the European Community, through a process of negotiation and compromise, reached accord on the difficult problem of the European Community's policy of subsidizing cheese exports to the United States.

Other examples of our concern in the area of nontariff barriers are import quotas, discriminatory national standards in packaging or labeling, and government procurement practices favoring domestic industries.

Section 108 of the Trade Act gives us the authority to tackle a new dimension in trade negotiations: access to raw materials. Section 108 permits U.S. negotiators to seek agreements assuring that we and other countries enjoy continued access to raw material supplies at prices fair to both consumer and producer.

All nations stand to benefit from smoothing out the wide fluctuations in price that have recently characterized the commodities market. We can anticipate, however, that in return for concessions on commodities, producer states will press for modification in our tariff schedules which currently inhibit the processing of raw materials in the country of origin.

We recognize that the international com-

munity has a long way to go on the sensitive issue of commodity trade, an issue with serious potential for confrontation between developed and less developed nations.

We can expect that the developing nations will play an active role at Geneva; their concerns are by no means limited to commodities. They will seek recognition of the special requirements attributable to their relative underdevelopment, and we are prepared to respond to these needs. We and other industrialized nations, for example, have adopted a generalized system of tariff preferences giving developing nations substantially freer access to our domestic markets.

The latest round of the multilateral trade negotiations at Geneva has been a long time in coming. As you can see, progress on all fronts has not always been as rapid as we would like. Despite the existence of inevitable differences, there is an inherent importance to the fact that the nations of the world are engaged in active negotiations on the issues of interdependence, the issues of the future.

In a period of worldwide economic malaise, the Geneva trade negotiations hold out the prospect of resolving outstanding trade issues and help to forestall the possibility of unilateral initiatives to restrict imports or stimulate exports. Many nations are under substantial pressure to take precisely such measures, to return to an era of beggar-thy-neighbor economic practices which could quickly undermine the basis of the world trading system.

There has already been regrettable movement in the direction of unilateral action. Finland, for example, has recently adopted an import deposit scheme requiring a potential importer to place a deposit in the Bank of Finland, where it is held for six months and then returned without interest. The Australians have placed import quotas on cars and a ban on meat from abroad, while the British have begun to subsidize exports through a system of "inflation insurance."

Unilateral action must not be permitted to become the pattern of the future in international trade relations. The Geneva talks are a key element in the efforts of the world community to resolve problems in a manner that lays the foundation for an expanding world prosperity.

It is to our, and to the world's, credit that we are responding to economic challenge and adversity, adjusting to a changing world economy, by looking outward, by seeking ways to expand the opportunities for trade and investment. Our government can only increase the potential for world trade. Government and the private sector have a shared obligation to design a coherent national trade policy. But the responsibility to get out and compete wholeheartedly for world markets is mainly yours.

An effective American international economic policy, backed by a dynamic and creative business community, is essential to our continued prosperity. Such a policy demands your ideas, your understanding, your involvement, and your support.

King Hussein of Jordan Visits Washington

During a private visit to the United States, King Hussein of Jordan met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington. Following is an exchange of toasts at a dinner given by President Ford on April 29.

White House press release dated April 29

PRESIDENT FORD

Your Highness: I want again to extend to you my personal feeling, my strong conviction, that you and your country represent in this situation the finest in what we have to do in the area of peace in the Middle East.

You have been here many, many times

over the years; and on each and every occasion, your contribution to a solution has been all to the good from the point of view of all parties concerned. We are deeply grateful now, as well as in the past, for this contribution.

We had a very, I think, constructive meeting this morning, and I know you are going to be meeting with the Secretary of State tomorrow. Your personal contribution to this very difficult problem that the world faces in the Middle East is a very significant one.

We have had some disappointments with the efforts that the Secretary of State, and that I, made in the Middle East. But I for one do not believe that we can tolerate stagnation or stalemate, and we do not intend to do so.

The precise key, the precise answer, is still being analyzed here in our country, and I am sure in other parts of the world. But momentum for progress has to be continued. And one of the benefits of my meeting with you this morning was that we discussed the need and necessity not to look back and condemn one party or another, or to have any adverse comments about one party or another.

The important point is that we have to look forward. We have to be optimistic about what is good in the Middle East, but what, more importantly, is good for the world as a whole.

The situation in the Middle East is totally related to the improvement of world conditions on a global basis. We are thankful and very appreciative of your continuous statesmanship.

It has been evident to everybody over a long period of time, but I have personally had the opportunity to observe it, and I thank you.

We are most grateful, and in the months ahead we will be very mindful of your observations, your recommendations, as we try to find an answer to the problems, not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere.

So, it is my great honor and privilege,

Your Majesty, to offer a toast to you for all that you have done and all that you will do for the benefit of all of the people in the Middle East and the people in the world: Your Majesty.

KING HUSSEIN

This is indeed an honor and a very great pleasure for me, sir, to have had this opportunity to meet with you again, sir, and to be among friends.

We have indeed over the years been ever proud of the fact that those years that passed brought us closer together in many fields, and in many areas. We are proud of the friendship that has always existed between our two countries, the friendship that now we feel exists between the Arab nation and the United States, its government and its people.

We have a commonality of interests. On the one hand, we share the same principles, uphold the same ideals, have the same hopes and aspirations for a better world, for a world where people can live in peace and in dignity and divert their energies and resources to further build for the generations to come.

Our area is a troubled area, and trouble in our area is dangerous, not only to all those who live in it but to the future of mankind.

I am proud of the fact that I don't speak only for myself, but for many of the area's leaders, many of our present Arab world, and to say that we wish for nothing more than a just and durable peace.

We are proud of the fact that we have contributed our utmost toward that end, and we have determined to do our utmost for that end.

We know very well that the United States

will continue to look at our problems with interest and with determination to play the major role which only the United States can play for the attainment of the goal of peace.

We have watched with admiration and respect the many efforts made under your wise auspices and leadership; the efforts and initiatives of our great friend, Dr. Kissinger; the patience, the perseverance, and the dedication.

Regardless of the outcome to date, we admire the spirit and we appreciate the tremendous efforts, and we will always do so.

We look into the future with hope at the chance that is ahead of us—which may be the final chance—and a tragic history of lost opportunities may be taken by all concerned for the establishment of a just and durable peace.

We saw difficulties. We feel they are both in our area and in the world as a whole.

I thank you for the time and the patience, and I look forward to my days in Washington and the opportunity to meet and talk very frankly with all our friends on all issues of mutual interest.

I thank you for giving me this time, and I can assure you that we will continue to do our utmost to work together for a better future in our area and in the world, ever proud of the friendship that exists between us, ever determined to see that we strengthen the ties that happily exist and have existed for so long between our nations and our peoples.

Gentlemen, I would wish you to join me in drinking a toast to the President of the United States, his continued good health, success, and to the United States, and to the friendship that we hope will always grow between the Arab people and the people of the United States.

The Second Nuclear Era

Address by Fred C. Iklé

*Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*¹

Mankind's first nuclear era began 30 years ago. Three-fifths of the people alive today had not yet been born. For those who remember that beginning, it offers mixed memories. People were stunned by the destructiveness of this new power. At the same time, they looked upon the bomb as bringing an end to a war that threatened to grow bloodier and go on for endless days.

And there was a widespread feeling that the world now had a singular opportunity to rebuild itself in a better way. Almost everyone recognized the world could never be the same—atomic power had revolutionized the nature of peace and war.

Americans were confident that their country would show the way. Our self-confidence found concrete expression in a proposal to the United Nations—a proposal that combined our hopefulness of that time with acceptance of our responsibility as sole possessor of the atom bomb. This proposal, known as the Baruch plan, envisaged placing all nuclear resources throughout the world under the ownership and control of an independent international authority. Its purpose was to assure that this new force served only peaceful ends.

Some debate has arisen about the realism of the Baruch plan and even about the sincerity with which it was offered. Let me lay a myth to rest.

Was it realistic? No, because its optimism demanded too great a change in the politics

of power. Yes, because its boldness matched the magnitude of the problem.

Was it sincere? While preparing and pressing this proposal, did we exploit our nuclear monopoly to the hilt, or did we exercise self-restraint?

What we did was this: First, the United States diminished its nuclear research and development from \$940 million in 1944 to \$280 million in 1946. Second, in 1946 and early 1947, the United States exploited its nuclear monopoly by having on hand a total stockpile of battle-ready weapons that numbered—I will give you the exact figure—zero. As late as April 1947, President Truman noted that we still had only few components of bombs and that our bombs were not assembled. Evidently, Harry Truman—that alleged cold warrior—had not ordered a crash program.

These facts are available to any historian. Yet they have been conveniently overlooked in recent attempts to rewrite the history of how the cold war began. We do not have to assert that we were without flaw during that period. But we should not forget the truth—the self-restraint and generosity in American foreign policy during that period, a period when the United States had a world monopoly on power without parallel in history.

The United States, during the critical years of 1946 and 1947, continued to press for an effective international system of control and ownership of the atom. It did not launch a massive research and development program to assure that its nuclear superior-

¹ Made before the 15th Annual Foreign Affairs Conference, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., on Apr. 23 (text from ACDA press release).

ity would remain unchallengeable. It did not rush to amass a stockpile of nuclear weapons. Thus it did not exploit its monopoly to impose its own interpretation of the World War II settlements. But at the end of 1947, it seemed clear that the Baruch plan—or any comparable, effective constraint on nuclear arms—would not be accepted. In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb. Over the next 15 years, the nuclear arsenals grew competitively on both sides to incomprehensible levels of destructiveness.

The United States maintained its lead in this deadly competition. Nevertheless, in the mid-1960's it took the initiative of restraining the expansion of its strategic offensive and defensive forces, seeking stability by a renewed effort for agreed controls. This American self-restraint found formal expression in the 1969 decision to discard "strategic superiority" as official U.S. policy. The Soviet Union would thus be allowed to achieve equality where the United States had held an advantage for 25 years.

This decision was based on recognition that a stable world order cannot be achieved if either superpower engages in the futile and dangerous pursuit of unilateral advantages. We have pursued this principle of equality and mutual self-restraint through six years of difficult strategic arms talks, and we continue to pursue it in other East-West arms control negotiations.

Given the historic development of the American and Soviet positions in the world, parity between our strategic forces is a relationship that can add to stability. And strategic parity is to be anchored even more securely in the agreement on offensive arms based on the accord reached at Vladivostok. The agreement will complement the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and its 1974 protocol. By that groundbreaking set of agreements, we and the Russians effectively renounced major weapons systems in the interests of world stability.

Now, these are substantial achievements. The world's two most powerful nations, to enhance their own security, have begun to rely on controlling their armaments. It might thus seem as if the road ahead were clear.

Successive limitations and reductions to be negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union might seem all that is needed to avoid nuclear war.

But something more is needed.

Complex New Problems

For we are now moving into a new era that will differ fundamentally from the world to which we have, in part, adjusted. The revolutionary agent is the inexorable diffusion of nuclear technology throughout the world. We can slow down the spread of the means to make the bomb; but we—the United States—cannot stop it. As if to saddle mankind with a double curse, the nuclear technology now of greatest interest throughout the world—reactors to produce energy—is also a technology that yields the material necessary to build nuclear bombs. From a powerful mixture of economic and nationalistic motives, nation after nation will want this technology. The most dangerous material man has ever fashioned will gradually spread all over the world.

In the coming era, we will no longer be able to prevent use of the nuclear bomb solely by deterring one or two potential adversaries. Further, we will no longer be able to curb nuclear arms competition through bilateral agreements alone.

Realism forces us to recognize that most nations which acquire nuclear arms will insist on retaining sovereign control over them for decades to come. For this and other reasons, "general and complete disarmament" is not a guideline for policies to shape the foreseeable future. Yet realism also forces us to recognize that the continuing spread of nuclear materials cannot coexist for decades with the present structure of nuclear deterrence on the one hand and the present fragile controls over nuclear explosive technology on the other.

Political philosophers, to be sure, may wish to explore the possibility of a world in which nation-states as we know them will have disappeared in a dispensation of general and complete disarmament. Similarly, military strategists may wish to speculate

on how nuclear deterrence as we now understand it could survive in a world with several dozens of nuclear powers and where even criminal groups might obtain nuclear bombs. But I believe neither of these worlds is realistic. Something will have to give.

The coming era calls for realism and for vision, for an effort that will mobilize the support of other nations and draw on our own vast intellectual, scientific, and moral strength. The second nuclear age calls for a U.S. arms control program that reaches so far ahead that we can shape our future.

Tasks for the Coming Era

As I see such a program taking shape, three important tasks stand out.

First, for many nonnuclear powers, protection against nuclear threat or attack rests on American commitments. America's self-interest dictates that we sustain our alliances. If we withdrew our protection, or if confidence in it were shaken, strong internal pressures would arise in many countries to acquire nuclear armaments for their self-protection. Then their neighbors would feel threatened and follow suit.

To the degree that we appear to turn inward, we encourage nonnuclear nations—from Asia to Europe and the Middle East—to create their own nuclear forces. We will thus make the future less manageable and eventually bring arms control efforts to a dead end. How could arms control and disarmament make progress in a world where nations increasingly depend for security on a tangled web of nuclear threats and counter-threats among dozens of nuclear-armed countries? Our alliances help protect both other nations and ourselves from the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

A second task is to make safer our reliance on nuclear deterrence—to be very clear about its shortcomings and to find ways to correct them.

Never in man's history has the technology of warfare changed so sweepingly and so rapidly—and never without being tested in real battles. We can only be thankful, of course, that the generation which has grown

up since the Second World War has never been witness to the cruel impact of nuclear destruction. But to be spared such experience has also insulated this generation from the grim reality of nuclear arsenals. Today, nuclear strategists of all countries analyze a shadow world of abstract calculations. We are not moved by compassion or revulsion, and the corrective mechanism of learning from experience cannot work.

In past centuries, every advance in technology was eventually used for war. Then, however, the scope and suddenness of destruction were never so immense. Weaponry was never rigged in such a way that one single failure could mean the last chance had passed.

But we have made mutual deterrence hinge on cataclysmic speed. There would be no time for learning, no time for human compassion and mercy to call a halt, no pause in the battle long enough for governments to reflect and gain a sense of proportion. Over the long term, this emphasis on speed imposes a risk that is intolerable and unnecessary.

Major changes in deterrence will be needed in the second nuclear era, when the danger of nuclear war from deliberate attack may be overshadowed by the chances of war from accident or miscalculation.

We have already taken promising steps, both unilaterally and through agreement, to escape from the interlock of "hair-triggered" nuclear armaments where one tragic episode could lead to mutual genocide. We have reached agreements with the Soviet Union on measures against the risk of accidents and on improvements in the Washington-Moscow hotline. We must take further steps along this important road. Unilaterally, we continue to improve the controls and safety of our nuclear armaments.

We are also adjusting our strategic doctrine to changing conditions. Here we must carefully strike a balance. On the one hand, we must not stake our survival on one single gamble, the gamble that deterrence will never be seriously tested and that we will never require room for choice—after some nuclear weapons have been used—to avoid mutual genocide. On the other hand, we must not

slide back into errors of the past by permitting nuclear weapons to be regarded as a substitute for conventional defenses. We must not mistake nuclear war or the threat of it for an acceptable instrument of foreign policy.

A great deal more needs to be done to make deterrence safer. We must search for improvements with a distrust of anyone who pretends all is well. Year in, year out, the avoidance of nuclear war now depends on the proper working of farflung armaments, on the safety of alert missile forces halfway around the globe, on the integrity of military command chains stretched thousands of miles. We have to rely on the absolute control of these engines of destruction, all in a state of readiness day and night, month after month, all managed by people, large communities of people, with the usual admixture of heroes and villains, wise men and fools.

It would be an insult to the ingenuity of our strategic experts and our engineers to argue that for decades to come such an unbelievably explosive contraption is the best we can build.

International Guardianship

A third task is to create an international guardianship of peaceful nuclear technology.

To keep nuclear technology peaceful was a need manifest from the very beginning, but it will be far more compelling in the second nuclear era. Its urgency will increase as technology spreads and nuclear materials increasingly supply the world's energy needs. Hence, the effort to assure that these resources serve only peaceful ends must expand and intensify year by year.

Inevitably, the international guardianship of dangerous nuclear materials will become steadily more important. Its work will involve an increasing number of people and a broadening array of tools to coordinate or manage directly the flow of nuclear materials among a steadily growing number of countries. The timely supply of these fuels will be crucial to the economy of many; their per-

petual and total safety will be crucial to the safety of all people.

The activities of this guardianship will be a matter of daily concern rather than a matter of sporadic intervention in emergencies. It will have to deal chiefly with persistent problems, such as the growing worldwide need for nuclear-waste disposal and the ever-present danger of theft of nuclear materials.

Unlike mutual deterrence and the strategic analysis that supports it, it will not be condemned to live in a world of theory and abstraction. Its workings will be tested every day. Hence, it can learn from trial and error. Because failures will not inevitably be fatal, experience can teach.

Again unlike deterrence, the guardianship of the world's peaceful nuclear resources does not fix nations in a posture of deadly antagonism. The dangers which must be controlled—some manmade, some essentially natural forces—are the byproducts of peaceful activities, not the result of a hostile arms competition.

Can the nations of the world ever reach the kind of agreement that produces an effective and reliable guardianship? Over the last 20 years—when the risks were not yet so compelling—over 100 countries have learned to work harmoniously together in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The fruitfulness of that collective effort—based on an American initiative—should give solid encouragement.

I do not mean to project some instant utopia. There will be pitfalls of many kinds. The effort to build an international guardianship might become entangled in the short-term politics of the struggle for resources. Or it could fail because of ideological schisms. There may be breakaway or outcast nations whose obsolete view of the world blinds them to the realities of their own interests. But we have the promise of the International Atomic Energy Agency. And over 80 nations support the Nonproliferation Treaty. These examples point the way to the political consensus we must create.

A decade hence, the performance of this

international guardianship will vitally engage the attention of governments throughout the world. It will affect the most elementary interests of the general public and political leaders alike: their welfare and their physical survival. By the nature of its task and the way it must work, it can forge a common bond among nations that may prove more fruitful and sturdy than any we have tried to create and teach a more meaningful collaboration than any we have known. Given America's position as the leader in nuclear technology and our skill in designing international institutions, we can play a particularly creative role.

U.S. and Greece Hold Second Round of Talks on Defense Matters

*Joint Statement*¹

Delegations representing the Governments of Greece and the United States met in Athens April 7-29 for a second round of negotiations concerning mutual defense matters.² The talks proceeded in a spirit of mutual understanding. The Greek and United States delegations, led respectively by Ambassador Petros Calogeras [of the Greek Foreign Ministry] and Minister Monteagle Stearns [Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Athens], having discussed all aspects of Greek-United States military cooperation, concluded the second round as follows:

1. At Greek request:

A. The United States agreed to terminate homeporting at Elefsis.

B. The United States base at Hellenikon will be closed. Certain United States facilities which contribute to Greek defense needs will continue to operate on the Greek Air Force Base at Hellenikon.

¹ Issued at Athens and Washington on Apr. 29 (text from press release 219).

² The first round of talks was held at Athens Feb. 10-14.

2. Agreement is also expected on the elimination, reduction and consolidation of other United States facilities in Greece.

3. The privileges, immunities and exemptions of American personnel in Greece were reviewed and satisfactory progress has been made.

The installations where United States facilities remain will be placed under Greek commanders. The scope and conditions of operations of remaining facilities will be discussed in detail in the third round.

ANZUS Council Meeting Held at Washington

Following is the text of a communique issued on April 25 at the conclusion of the 24th meeting of the ANZUS Council.

The ANZUS Council held its twenty-fourth meeting in Washington on April 24 and 25, 1975. Senator the Honorable Donald R. Willesee, Minister for Foreign Affairs, represented Australia; the Honorable Arthur J. Faulkner, Minister of Labor, represented New Zealand; and the Honorable Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, represented the U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger also participated in the meeting.

The Ministers exchanged views on a wide range of strategic, political, and economic issues of concern to the ANZUS partners. They reaffirmed the enduring nature of the relationship among the three countries, based as it is on a substantial community of interests and a shared heritage of representative democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law. The ANZUS treaty [Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty] and the regular consultations for which it provides are a natural expression of this close relationship.

The Ministers welcomed the continuing process of détente among the major powers, and efforts to work toward a more stable and cooperative relationship among states. They expressed hope that renewed efforts might bring about peace in areas of continuing conflict such as Indochina, and more peaceful and stable relationships in areas of recent or potential conflict such as the Near East.

The Ministers reviewed the situation in Indochina. The Ministers noted the plight of refugees in

South Viet-Nam and regretted the continuing loss of life and the widespread human misery caused by the fighting. They recognized that an early end to the fighting, an adherence to the Paris Agreements, and a spirit of national reconciliation were prerequisites to an end to the suffering. The Council expressed the hope that the wounds of war in Cambodia would be speedily healed, and noted with satisfaction the continued peaceful evolution in Laos.

The Council welcomed the emergence of a new spirit of regional consciousness and self reliance in Southeast Asia and the practical measures being taken to develop the habit of regional cooperation. The Ministers applauded the progress made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and indicated the desire of their countries to assist this cooperation.

The Ministers agreed that the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Five Power Defense Arrangements contributed to the climate of confidence in the area and provided a useful framework for practical cooperation.

The Council reviewed the world economic situation with special attention to its effects within the Asia/Pacific region. They discussed the difficulties caused by the present downturn in the world economic situation and also the collective international effort which has begun to evolve a more soundly-based world economic order. The Ministers agreed on the importance of close cooperation among themselves and with other nations on problems of international finance and trade. In particular, they agreed that in matters relating to trade in raw materials and primary products the interests of both producers and consumers should be taken into account. The Ministers expressed the hope that oil exporting and oil importing countries would seek to reconcile differences between them through dialogue. They affirmed the need for continued efforts aimed at liberalisation of international trade. The Ministers noted the special economic problems faced by the

less developed countries of Asia and the Pacific and agreed on the need for efforts to see that the net flow of resources to those countries is not diminished.

The Council reviewed progress toward arms limitations and the limiting of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Ministers agreed that further measures of arms control are a necessary concomitant of the continuing trend toward détente and the establishment of a just and stable world order. Noting the need for progress toward reduction in nuclear weapons, the Council expressed the hope that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the USSR will make further progress. The Council supported the continuing negotiations to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe as an important stage in the effort to bring about the limitation of conventional arms. The Ministers noted that a conference of the Parties will review the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and expressed their hope for a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The Council noted the conclusion of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty and reaffirmed its support for the early achievement of an effective Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The Ministers welcomed the continued development of a community of independent and self-governing states in the South Pacific, including the forthcoming independence of Papua New Guinea. They noted with satisfaction the constructive role Australia has played in assisting the emergence of this new state.

In conclusion, the ANZUS partners reaffirmed the great value each placed on the Alliance. They agreed that the continuity symbolized by the ANZUS treaty was important in a period of significant change, and that the Alliance continued to play an important role in the evolution of stability and normal relationships among states in the Asia and Pacific area. The three partners agreed to continue to consult closely on all matters of common concern.

Department Discusses Implementation of Recommendations of World Food Conference

*Statement by Thomas O. Enders
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs¹*

This review of actions to follow up the recommendations of the World Food Conference seems to me to be especially timely, and I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today.

The World Food Conference succeeded in focusing attention on one of mankind's most basic and persistent problems—that of hunger. It laid a basis for the sustained global action needed to overcome this problem. In the intervening five months, the new institutional structures called for by the conference have begun to take shape. We are now passing to the implementation phase.

Our own program of action rests upon our analysis of the world food problem. The world's potential agricultural capacity is great enough, given present technology, to support the global population projected for the end of this century and beyond. The food problem therefore is one of meeting the needs of areas with rapidly growing populations and existing food deficits, particularly South Asia and parts of Africa. Overall, developing countries now import about 25 million tons of grain annually. This could rise to as much as 85 million tons by 1985, an amount which exporters, mainly North America, could pro-

vide but which would be virtually impossible to transport and finance on a sustained basis.

This import requirement of developing countries is the "food gap." It can be met in the short run by increasing production among traditional exporters and transferring increased amounts of food on concessional terms. For the longer run the only solution is to accelerate production in the food deficit areas.

A coordinate problem is the shrinking margin of safety between annual grain production and the consumption needs of a growing population, made acute by the present near-exhaustion of world grain reserves. To provide a dependable degree of security of supply and to avoid the extreme international price fluctuations, sharp domestic economic adjustments, and foreign political pressures of the past three years, it is desirable to establish an internationally coordinated system of national grain reserves.

Other spokesmen here today are best able to discuss the programs of the Agency for International Development in food aid, agricultural development assistance, and nutrition improvement, and the outlook of the Department of Agriculture on food production. My comments will focus on the institutional framework which has developed out of the Food Conference and on what I understand to be the subcommittee's particular interest in actions to improve world food security and on trade-related issues considered by the Food Conference.

¹Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on May 1. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Institutional Framework

The Food Conference proposed specific new institutional devices in the areas of food aid, agricultural development and finance, food security, and overall coordination. Arrangements for each of these are underway.

The prerequisite to institutional followup was acceptance of Food Conference resolutions by ECOSOC [U.N. Economic and Social Council] and the General Assembly. This was accomplished before adjournment of these bodies last December.

In the area of food aid, the Food Conference recommended that the Governing Body of the U.N.'s World Food Program be reconstituted as the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs. This was done in March when the former intergovernmental committee enlarged and reformed itself to discharge new responsibilities to review and recommend improved coordination between bilateral and multilateral food aid programs, in addition to continuing to guide operations of the World Food Program.

Work has gone forward under the joint auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and U.N. Development Program (UNDP) on formation of a Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment to develop means for increasing food production in developing countries. The Group is to include representation from both donors and recipients. Donors are to be self-selected, with representation from recipients distributed regionally. The Group will not control distribution of development resources but is to address policy issues important to optimum benefit from agricultural investment, such as development objectives and the adequacy of resource flows; means for increasing resource transfers; investment strategies and food production policies. The initial response of both traditional donors and potential new donors among the oil-exporting countries has been positive. The recipient developing countries are in the process of selecting their representation, and a first meeting is being planned for July.

Food Conference staff analysts concluded that agricultural investment in developing countries should be increased from about \$1.5 billion currently to \$5 billion by 1985 to meet their growing needs. The conference grappled at length with the need for new institutions to finance this investment and concluded that new arrangements were justified only to the extent that they were required to generate additional capital. A resolution calling for establishment of a new international fund for agricultural development was proposed by a number of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and other developing countries and was adopted. However, the proposed fund must meet two criteria established by the conference; there must be both the promise of substantial additional resources and of continued operation. U.N. Secretary General [Kurt] Waldheim will open a consultation in Geneva next week to explore establishing the fund. The United States will participate in this consultation confident of its unmatched record of financial support for agricultural development. The United States is receptive to the ideas of others and wishes to hear them before concluding whether a new institution is needed and how it should be structured.

To maintain high-level attention to the world food problem and to provide for continuing review of all food-related programs operated by U.N. agencies, the conference called for a World Food Council to meet at ministerial level. The United States is a member of this Council, which will have its inaugural session in late June. As these programs multiply and expand their operations, the Council's coordinating role will become increasingly important.

World Food Security

In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly last fall, President Ford expressed U.S. willingness to join in a worldwide effort to negotiate, establish, and maintain an international system of nationally held grain reserves.

At the World Food Conference in Rome in November, Secretary Kissinger proposed negotiation of an agreement on a reserves

system to include the following elements:

—Exchange of information on levels of reserve and working stocks, on crop prospects, and on intentions regarding imports or exports.

—Agreement on the size of global reserves required to protect against famine and extreme price fluctuations.

—Sharing of the responsibility for holding reserves.

—Guidelines on the management of national reserves, defining the conditions for adding to reserves and for releasing from them.

—Preference for cooperating countries in the distribution of reserves.

—Procedures for adjustment of targets and settlement of disputes and measures for dealing with noncompliance.

The World Food Conference adopted a resolution on food security, in accordance with which the United States convened an ad hoc meeting of 10 other governments in London in February to explore the elements of a possible reserves agreement. While no formal consensus was reached, the discussion concerned the following: commodity coverage; size of total reserve; criteria for distribution of stockholding responsibility among participants; rights and obligations of participants.

It is natural that the United States should take the initiative in discussing a grain reserves agreement. Our role in the world food economy is predominant. Since 1972, the United States has provided about 40 percent of world exports of food grains and about 60 percent of feed grains and oilseeds.

Having assumed this leadership role, we believe it essential to exercise it responsibly, both in support of our own interests and those of others. This does not mean subordinating our farm policy to our foreign policy; it means using it constructively in our dealings with other countries.

A reserves agreement, we believe, offers an opportunity to do just this. We share a general interest in preventing world food shortages and famine. The establishment of adequate grain reserves can play an impor-

tant role by assuring supplies of grain to offset production shortfalls. Other programs apart from reserves are being developed to assist countries to increase the general level of their production, to improve the means of food distribution and financing, and to provide food aid where needed. These are not, however, among the purposes of reserves. A reserves agreement should, in our view, aim only at assuring the availability of supply.

We believe that a reserves agreement would serve our own interests.

First, it would spread the responsibility for holding stocks among all participants.

Second, rules or guidelines providing for the accumulation of stocks would help to remove excess supplies from the market in those years when production exceeds normal requirements, thereby preventing uneconomic price drops.

Third, rules for the drawdown of reserves would reduce the threat of stocks being dumped on the market. This is a point of particular interest to U.S. producers, who have been concerned that the existence in the past of large government-held stocks not subject to such rules has depressed market prices. Whatever its validity in the past, this objection can be substantially overcome by making the release of reserves subject to internationally as well as nationally accepted rules which would clearly define the conditions which require additional supplies of grain. Taken together, these rules for the accumulation and release of stocks would work to moderate extreme fluctuations in prices, which in general benefit neither producers nor consumers, but need not interfere with normal market operations.

Fourth, by encouraging all major consumers to hold reserves, the agreement should work to avoid situations like 1972, when the U.S.S.R. preempted a major share of our grain crop at bargain prices, thereby shifting the burden of adjustment to their shortfall from the Soviet Union to the United States.

Finally, the establishment of a system of reserves subject to known rules governing their release would represent an important

assurance to importers of the reliability of the United States as a supplier of the grains they need and would reduce the threat of the abrupt imposition of export controls on these products.

These are the benefits which we believe an effective reserves system could offer to U.S. producers and consumers. Others may not fully agree, but major differences seem to concern not the benefits themselves but instead how these promises would be most effectively fulfilled and at what cost.

Subsequent to the ad hoc meeting of last February, work on technical aspects of a possible reserves agreement—such as development of quantitative, rather than price, indicators for signaling acquisition and release of stocks—began under the auspices of the International Wheat Council in a special preparatory group established to explore possible bases for a successor to the present International Wheat Agreement. The group is to report its progress to the next regular session of the Wheat Council in late June.

One important problem that has yet to be solved is the relationship of grain reserves negotiations to the Tokyo round of trade negotiations. Clearly there are major commercial implications in a reserves negotiation. Clearly also, the problem of food security transcends the commercial sector only. We are seeking now agreement with the other main grain producing and consuming countries on a formula permitting urgent negotiation of a reserves agreement but allowing the commercial aspects of grains to be fully taken into account in the Tokyo round.

Meanwhile, the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization has completed and referred to member governments for their acceptance the International Undertaking on World Food Security, endorsed by the Food Conference. The undertaking outlines a set of nonbinding principles to guide national stock policies as a basis for international coordination. FAO members were

requested by the organization's Director General to notify him of their acceptance of the undertaking well before the meeting of the FAO Committee on World Food Security, whose establishment was recommended by the Food Conference. The United States informed the Director General of its acceptance of the undertaking last March.

The FAO has convened a special consultation on world food security for later this month, pending creation of the standing committee by the FAO Council when it meets this fall. We believe that FAO could usefully contribute to improving information about world supply, demand, and stock situation for major food grains through such a committee.

Trade-Related Issues

The World Food Conference adopted an elaborate resolution on trade, stabilization, and agricultural adjustment. It reflects both the concepts of preferential treatment and resource transfers via trade that developing countries put forward in advocating a new economic order, and of market liberalization included in the Tokyo Declaration that is the backdrop to the present multilateral trade negotiations (MTN). The conflicting objectives and issues are being joined in the framework of the MTN.

Meanwhile, work is going forward on particular elements of the resolution on trade. The Trade Act of 1974 has provided a basis for the United States to join with 18 other developed countries in extending a generalized system of preferences to developing countries. So far, 89 developing countries and 43 dependent territories have been designated for beneficial status under the act, with 24 other developing countries under consideration. Meanwhile, the U.S. International Trade Commission is proceeding with its study of the impact on U.S. producers and consumers of extending preferences to a list of products recommended by an inter-agency task force, as required by the act.

Other specific action has been taken by the FAO in response to this resolution. FAO is convening shortly a conference to discuss international agricultural adjustment in light of discussions at the Food Conference.

Mr. Chairman, the world has passed through three years of food shortages and food insecurity; this year, in considerable part thanks to freeing the productive capacity of the American farmer, we expect to have a better balance in food supplies. We must not allow this improvement to lull us into thinking the world food problem is solved. It is not. Rather we must use the improving market situation to rebuild a world food reserve on an agreed rational basis and to lay the basis for a long-term attack on what remains one of the great threats to the future of humanity.

Department Supports Legislation on National Emergency Authorities

*Statement by Mark B. Feldman
Deputy Legal Adviser¹*

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to testify on H.R. 3884, a bill "to terminate certain authorities with respect to national emergencies still in effect, and to provide for orderly implementation and termination of future national emergencies." This bill is very much the same as S. 3957 passed by the Senate last session.

The Department of State believes that it is appropriate to reexamine the national emergency authorities at this time, to repeal obsolete authorities, and to set criteria for national emergencies which may be declared

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Apr. 9. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

in the future. H.R. 3884 does this and at the same time preserves major emergency authorities that are essential to the conduct of foreign relations. The Department wishes to speak particularly in support of section 602 of H.R. 3884, which preserves essential authorities.

The Department of State is primarily concerned with section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, which provides the basic legal authority for a number of programs of major foreign policy importance. These include:

- Foreign Assets Control Regulations
- Cuban Asset Control Regulations
- Foreign Funds Control Regulations

Under these programs, transactions are prohibited which involve persons or property subject to U.S. jurisdiction and which take place with Cuba, North Viet-Nam, North Korea, and designated nationals of those countries, unless specifically or generally licensed. In addition, property in which those countries or their nationals have an interest has been blocked and is under U.S. Government control. We also are holding assets of the People's Republic of China blocked before May 1971 and assets of certain Eastern European countries. While the amounts of the blocked assets vary, in some cases it is substantial; for example, possibly in excess of \$80 million in the case of the People's Republic of China.

Mr. Chairman, an interruption of these programs would seriously prejudice the foreign relations interests of the United States and the interests of thousands of American nationals with outstanding claims against Cuba and the People's Republic of China. One effect of such interruption would be to release the blocked assets. Another would be to authorize transactions now prohibited without regard for the state of U.S. relations with countries concerned or the underlying U.S. interests served by these programs. Thus, for example, Cuban imports could come into the United States without

regard to other economic issues, and the relaxation of transaction controls with respect to North Viet-Nam would be without regard to any context of improved bilateral relations. As a result it would become very difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate satisfactory claim settlements, or to realize other U.S. objectives.

The Department wishes to stress that these are merely the current programs under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act and the 1950 proclamation of national emergency. This authority has been utilized in the past for programs which have served their purposes and been terminated, and it may be necessary again. The present international situation has the potential for serious difficulties in international fiscal and economic matters, particularly in the energy area, which may call for measures requiring recourse to this authority. Therefore the Department believes it is essential that section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act be specifically exempted as section 602 now provides.

The Department has not opposed, and does not oppose, the replacement of section 5(b) by other permanent legislation. We do believe, however, that there are a number of serious legal and policy questions in connection with any such legislation that will require protracted congressional consideration, and we are convinced that it would be highly imprudent to cast away the authority of section 5(b) without any assurance of such a replacement.

Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to make a comment on another authority which is of concern to the Department of State. Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the existing proclamation of emergency, are the only current authority for requiring American citizens to have a valid passport for leaving and entering the United States. I am advised that in the absence of this authority the Immigration and Naturalization Service would have a substantial additional administrative bur-

den of screening persons who claim to be American citizens but have no passport.

We would ask the committee to consider whether this additional authority, section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, should not also be exempted for the reasons that I have given.

To sum up, the Department of State believes that H.R. 3884 preserves essential emergency authorities and eliminates obsolete ones, so the Department has no objection to its enactment.

International Economic Report Transmitted to the Congress

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

America must adjust to turbulent global economic events. The world has moved from a period of slow economic growth in 1971 through a two-year expansionary boom to a sudden and pervasive recession. Recent events have caused the United States, as well as other countries, to reappraise international economic policies.

This, the third annual International Economic Report, describes the very difficult situation confronting us. It also reflects the progress made toward achieving our goal of an open world economy to serve the interdependent needs of all countries.

In 1974, most of the world's economies were beset by problems flowing from the unprecedented combination of recession and inflation. Additional pressures, including precipitous increases in energy costs and disappointing food harvests further strained the

¹ Transmitted on Mar. 20. The President's message, together with the Annual Report of the Council on International Economic Policy, is printed in "International Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress March 1975"; for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (166 pp., \$3.60; stock no. 4115-00072).

world economy, particularly in the areas of trade and monetary flows and adjustments. Moreover, these factors contributed to the trend towards increasing economic nationalism which could frustrate our desire for an open world economy.

In recent years, many governments have elected more direct involvement in economic activities, notably through restrictive supply and pricing practices and, sometimes, by the expropriation of foreign investment. When governments manipulate international markets to maximize short-term benefits, they often do so at the expense of others and, ultimately, of themselves. Improved living standards and a more peaceful world are the rewards of an open world economy based on international cooperation. Such rewards are too great to allow short-sighted distractions to alter our course.

Building effective economic institutions and policies in today's economic environment is more difficult, but also more necessary, than ever. Unless we act constructively, energy and food problems, growing economic nationalism, the possibility of increased protection for trade, and the prospects of world recession and unemployment will jeopardize the world cooperation developed after World War II.

The United States does not and cannot govern the world economy. But it should fulfill its responsibility as an economic leader among nations. The Administration recognizes this responsibility. We have taken steps to turn the difficult food, energy, trade and investment issues into positive opportunities for achieving cooperation with trading partners and coordination between the Nation's domestic and international economic policies. Specifically, the Trade Act of 1974—which exemplified constructive cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches—reflects the U.S. commitment to an open and equitable world trading system.

The World Food Conference, proposed by the United States, set in motion international activities to improve world food reserves,

agricultural assistance, crop information systems and increased food production. At the time I signed the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 which authorized the collection and analysis of data on foreign investment in the United States, I reaffirmed American support for the operation of free market forces to direct worldwide investment flows in the most productive way. Therefore, we will oppose any new restriction on foreign investment in the United States except where absolutely necessary on national security grounds or to protect an essential national interest.

The goal of normalization of economic relations with the Communist countries has been reaffirmed. America also has continued its commitment to help the less developed countries. Moreover, we have proposed that an International Monetary Fund trust be established to provide special assistance to the least developed countries. We will shortly implement a generalized system of preferences in trading with less developed countries. We are also continuing our cooperative efforts to achieve equitable treatment for U.S. investment abroad.

Recently, I sent to the Congress a comprehensive energy and economic program. It is designed to reduce our dependence on imported oil. The plan provides incentives to increase domestic energy production and conserve energy use. The United States is meanwhile developing joint policies with other major oil-consuming countries aiming at increased resource development and more efficient use of energy. The major consuming countries must act jointly to build a constructive relationship with the oil producing nations. Such actions are essential to restore the international confidence in adequate and reliable energy sources.

These interrelated economic activities are aimed at achieving an improved international economic system. They are part of a balanced policy. They also accentuate the positive initiatives being taken to cope with the specialized problems of food, assistance

to less developed countries and East-West economic relations.

The United States firmly believes that our own problems, and those of the rest of the world, can be dealt with most effectively through international cooperation. We lead in the pursuit of peace. Therefore, our motivating principles, our standards of conduct and the guidelines we set for the conduct of international economic development are ever more crucial to our national well-being, and that of the world.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 20, 1975.*

Senate Asked To Approve Protocol Extending Coffee Agreement

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to acceptance, the Protocol for the Continuation in Force of the International Coffee Agreement of 1968, as Extended. This Protocol, which was adopted by the International Coffee Council in its Resolution Number 273 of September 26, 1974, contains no operative economic provisions, but preserves the structure of the International Coffee Organization through September 30, 1976, or up to 12 months beyond that date if the conclusion of a new Coffee Agreement has progressed to the degree specified in the Protocol. Without this Protocol, the Coffee Organization would expire on September 30, 1975. The United States signed the Protocol at the United Nations Headquarters on January 15, 1975.

The purpose of this extension is to continue the International Coffee Organization as a source of statistical information and technical studies on developments in world

coffee markets and as a forum for discussion and eventual negotiation of a new coffee agreement whenever producing and consuming countries determine such action would best serve their common interests. This Protocol will preserve twelve years of institutional cooperation between seventeen major consuming countries (of which the U.S. is the largest) and forty-two producing nations of the developing world who rely on coffee exports for a significant portion of their foreign exchange earnings. In 1973, for example, coffee exports from ten major Latin American producers earned over \$2.5 billion and six Latin American countries obtained more than 20 percent of their foreign exchange from coffee. In that same year, the United States imported 37.3 percent of all coffee in world trade and 39.1 percent of Latin American coffee exports.

I believe that continued United States participation in the Coffee Agreement will serve both our foreign policy and our consumer interests. It will reaffirm our commitment to cooperate with the developing countries on this matter of vital interest to them. As the largest consuming nation, it will guarantee us a substantial voice in discussions and negotiations for a new coffee agreement. Preliminary work for such negotiations started in early January 1975. I am hopeful that the constructive spirit which has characterized the International Coffee Organization in the past will enable producing and consuming countries to again harmonize their interests in a mutually beneficial accord.

I am also transmitting, for the information of the Senate, the report submitted to me by the Department of State explaining the provisions of the Protocol extending the International Coffee Agreement of 1968, as Extended, and providing background on the current state of the world coffee economy.

I, therefore, recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this Protocol and give its advice and consent to acceptance.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 16, 1975.*

¹ Transmitted on Apr. 16 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. B., 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the protocol and the report of the Department of State.

United States and Romania Sign Agreement on Trade Relations

The United States and the Socialist Republic of Romania signed a trade agreement on April 2. Following is a Department announcement issued April 3 and the texts of the agreement and annexes, together with the texts, dated April 24, of a letter from President Ford to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, a proclamation, a message from President Ford to the Congress, and an Executive order.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 182 dated April 3

The United States and the Socialist Republic of Romania signed a trade agreement on April 2 at Bucharest. The agreement was signed on behalf of the United States by Ambassador to Romania Harry G. Barnes, Jr., and on behalf of Romania by Ion Patan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade. It is the first such agreement to be negotiated under the provisions of the Trade Act of 1974. In accordance with the provisions required under that act, it includes most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment for Romanian goods exported to the United States.

Negotiations leading up to the agreement began on January 14, 1975, in Bucharest. The agreement is designed to give further impetus to improved U.S.-Romanian political and economic relations. It will foster additional American exports to the growing markets of Romania and will remove the non-MFN discriminatory treatment of Romanian products in the U.S. market. MFN for Romania is a goal which the Administration has pursued for several years and rep-

resents a key to full normalization of U.S.-Romanian economic relations.

This agreement will now be submitted to both Houses of Congress for approval.

TEXTS OF AGREEMENT AND ANNEXES

Text of Agreement

AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania;

Conscious of the long-standing friendship between their countries and the American and Romanian peoples;

Desiring to develop their relations on the basis of the principles set forth in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the two States at Washington on December 5, 1973, and reaffirming the continuing importance of the Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation issued at Washington on December 5, 1973;

Having agreed that commercial and economic ties are an important element in the general strengthening of their bilateral relations;

Believing that an agreement embodying undertakings and arrangements for the conduct of trade between their countries will serve the interests of both peoples;

Acknowledging that favorable conditions exist for the further expansion of trade between their countries;

Recognizing that it is to their mutual advantage to continue to develop their commercial relations,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Most Favored Nation Treatment

1. Both Parties reaffirm the importance of their participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the importance of the provisions and

principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for their respective economic policies. Accordingly, the Parties shall apply between themselves the provisions of the General Agreement, the Protocol for the Accession of Romania of October 15, 1971 to that Agreement, and Annexes to that Protocol including Annex B.

2. As provided in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Parties agree to grant each other's products most-favored-nation treatment immediately and unconditionally with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and as otherwise provided in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, provided that to the extent that this or any other provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is inconsistent with any subsequent provision of this Agreement, the latter shall apply.

3. The Parties agree to maintain a satisfactory balance of concessions in trade and services during the period of this Agreement, and in particular to reciprocate satisfactorily reductions by the other Party in tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade that result from multilateral negotiations. In this respect, it is noted that Romania, as a developing country, could be eligible for treatment accorded to developing countries.

ARTICLE II

Expansion of Trade

1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, to encourage and facilitate the exchange of goods and services between the two countries on the basis of mutual advantage in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. In expectation of such joint efforts, both Governments envision that total bilateral trade in comparison with the period 1972-1974 will at least triple over the initial three-year period of this Agreement. In this respect, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania expects that during the period of this Agreement Romanian firms, companies and economic organizations will place substantial orders in the United States of America for machinery and equipment, agricultural and industrial materials, and consumer goods produced in the United States of America, while the Government of the United States anticipates that the effect of this Agreement will be to encourage increasing purchases by firms, companies, economic organizations and consumers in the United States of such products from the Socialist Republic of Romania.

2. Commercial transactions will be effected on the basis of contracts to be concluded between firms,

companies and economic organizations of the United States of America and those of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Such contracts will generally be concluded on terms customary in international commercial practice.

ARTICLE III

Safeguards

1. The Parties agree to consult promptly at the request of either Party should it determine that actual or prospective imports of products originating in the territory of the other Party are causing or threaten to cause, or are significantly contributing to, market disruption within a domestic industry of the requesting Party.

2. Either Party may impose such restrictions as it deems appropriate on imports originating in the territory of the other Party to prevent or remedy such actual or threatened market disruption.

3. The procedures under which the Parties will cooperate in applying this Article are set forth in Annex 1.

ARTICLE IV

Business Facilitation

1. In accordance with applicable laws and regulations, firms, companies and economic organizations of one Party may open, establish and operate representations (as these terms are defined in Annex 3) in the territory of the other Party. Information concerning rules and regulations pertaining to such representations and related facilities shall be provided by each Party upon the request of the other.

2. Nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of either Party shall be afforded access to all courts and, when applicable, to administrative bodies as plaintiffs or defendants, or otherwise, in accordance with the laws in force in the territory of such other Party. They shall not claim or enjoy immunities from suit or execution of judgment or other liability in the territory of the other Party with respect to commercial or financial transactions; they also shall not claim or enjoy immunities from taxation with respect to commercial or financial transactions, except as may be provided in other bilateral agreements.

3. Firms, companies and economic organizations of one of the Parties shall be permitted to engage in the territory of the other Party in any commercial activity which is not contrary to the laws of such other Party.

4. Firms, companies and economic organizations of either Party that desire to establish representations or already operate representations in the territory of the other Party shall receive treatment no less favorable than that accorded to firms, companies and economic organizations of any third country in all matters relating thereto. The rights

and facilities set out in Annex 2 shall be among those that will be accorded such firms, companies and economic organizations which establish representations.

5. For the purpose of carrying on trade between the territories of the two Parties and engaging in related commercial activities, nationals of each Party and employees of its firms, companies and economic organizations and their families shall be permitted to enter, to reside and to obtain appropriate housing in the territory of the other Party, and to travel therein freely, in accordance with the laws relating to entry, stay and travel of aliens.

6. The Parties affirm that no restrictions shall exist in principle on contacts between representatives of American and Romanian firms, companies and economic organizations. To this end, representatives of firms, companies and economic organizations of either Party shall be permitted within the territory of the other Party to deal directly with buyers and users of their products, for purposes of sales promotion and servicing their products, in accordance with the procedures and regulations applicable in each country.

7. The Parties shall as appropriate permit and facilitate access within their territories by representatives of firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party to information concerning markets for goods and services in accordance with the procedures and regulations applicable in each country.

8. Firms, companies and economic organizations of either Party shall be permitted in accordance with procedures and regulations applicable within the territory of the other Party to advertise, conclude contracts, and provide technical services to the same extent that firms, companies and economic organizations of the latter Party may do so. Duty-free treatment will be accorded to samples without commercial value and advertising materials, as provided in the Geneva Convention of November 7, 1952, relating to the importation of commercial samples and advertising material.

9. Each Party agrees to provide its good offices to assist in the solution of business facilitation problems and in gaining access to appropriate government officials in each country.

10. Each Party agrees to encourage the development on its territory of appropriate services and facilities and adequate access thereto and also to promote the activities of firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party, which do not have representations, and their employees and representatives.

11. Each Party agrees to facilitate in its territory, to the fullest extent practicable, the activities of firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party acting through employees, technicians,

experts, specialists and other representatives in carrying out contracts concluded between the firms, companies and economic organizations of the two Parties.

12. Each Party undertakes to facilitate travel by tourists and other visitors and the distribution of information for tourists.

13. The Parties confirm their commitment, as expressed in the Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial, and Technological Cooperation of December 5, 1973, to facilitate participation of their nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations in fairs and exhibitions organized in the other country. Each Party further undertakes to encourage and facilitate participation by nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other country in trade fairs and exhibits in its territory, as well as to facilitate trade missions organized in the other country and sent by mutual agreement of the Parties. Subject to the laws in force within their territories, the Parties agree to allow the import and re-export on a duty-free basis of all articles for use by firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party in fairs and exhibitions, providing that such articles are not transferred.

ARTICLE V

Industrial Property, Industrial Rights and Processes, and Copyrights

1. Each Party shall continue to provide nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party with the rights with respect to industrial property provided in the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967).

2. With respect to industrial rights and processes other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, each Party shall provide the same legal protection to nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party that is provided within its territory to its own nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations.

3. Each Party agrees to provide nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party the rights with respect to copyrights set forth in the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971.

ARTICLE VI

Financial Provisions

1. Nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of each Party shall be accorded by the other Party most-favored-nation treatment with respect to payments, remittances and transfers of funds or financial instruments between the territories of the two Parties, as well as between the territory of such other Party and that of any third

country. For this purpose, the Parties agree to grant those authorizations which are necessary.

2. Financial transactions between nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the United States of America and those of the Socialist Republic of Romania shall be made according to applicable laws and regulations. All financial transactions shall be made in United States dollars or any other freely convertible currency mutually agreed upon by such nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations, unless they otherwise agree. However, expenditures in the territory of a Party by nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party may be made in local currency received in an authorized manner in accordance with the regulations applicable to such expenditures. No restrictions shall be placed by either Party upon the export from its territory of freely convertible currencies or deposits, or instruments representative thereof, by the nationals, firms, companies, economic organizations or government of the other Party, provided such currencies, deposits, or instruments were received in an authorized manner. If either Party maintains more than one rate of exchange, it shall accord to nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party treatment no less favorable in matters relating to rates of exchange than it accords to nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of any third country.

3. Nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of each Party shall be accorded most-favored-nation treatment by the other Party with respect to the opening and maintaining of accounts in local and any convertible currency in financial institutions and with respect to use of such currencies.

ARTICLE VII

Navigation

1. Vessels under the flag of either Party, and carrying the documents required by its law in proof of nationality, shall be deemed to be vessels of that Party both on the high seas and within the ports, places, and waters of the other Party.

2. The documents of a vessel, as well as the documents referring to crews, issued according to the laws and regulations of the Party under whose flag the vessel is navigating, will be recognized by the authorities of the other party.

3. Vessels of either Party (other than warships, as defined in the Geneva Convention on the high seas of April 29, 1958) shall have liberty on equal terms with vessels of any third country, to come with their cargoes to ports, places, and waters of the other Party open to foreign commerce and navigation, except insofar as requirements of national security limit such access; such vessels and cargoes shall then in all respects be accorded most-favored-nation treatment within the ports, places

and waters of the other Party except insofar as modified by port security requirements.

4. The provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article shall not apply to fishing vessels, fishery research vessels, or fishery support vessels. The Parties reaffirm the importance of their Agreement Regarding Fisheries in the Western Region of the Middle Atlantic Ocean, concluded at Washington on December 3, 1973, which shall continue to apply in accordance with its terms.

ARTICLE VIII

Disputes Settlement

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment, as expressed in the Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial, and Technological Cooperation of December 5, 1973, to prompt and equitable settlement on an amicable basis of commercial disputes which may arise.

2. The Parties encourage the adoption of arbitration for the settlement of disputes arising out of international commercial transactions concluded between firms, companies and economic organizations of the United States of America and those of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Such arbitration should be provided for by provisions in contracts between such firms, companies and economic organizations, or in separate agreements between them in writing executed in the form required for such contracts. Such agreements (a) should provide for arbitration under the rules of arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris; and (b) should specify as the place of arbitration a place in a country other than the United States of America or the Socialist Republic of Romania that is a party to the Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of New York on June 10, 1958; however, firms, companies and economic organizations party to a contract may agree upon any other form or place of arbitration.

ARTICLE IX

Governmental Commercial Offices

1. In order to promote the development of trade and economic relations between the Parties, and to provide assistance to their firms, companies and economic organizations, and to nationals who are engaged in commercial activities, each Party agrees to permit and facilitate the establishment and operation of governmental commercial offices of the other Party on a reciprocal basis. The establishment and operation of such offices shall be in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, and subject to such terms, conditions, privileges, and immunities as may be agreed upon by the Parties. The Parties agree that access, for commercial purposes, to such offices by nationals of either Party who are engaged in commercial activities will be unrestricted.

2. Governmental commercial offices, and their

respective officers and staff members, to the extent that they enjoy diplomatic immunity, shall not participate directly in the negotiation, execution, or fulfillment of trade transactions or otherwise carry on trade.

ARTICLE X *National Security*

The provisions of this agreement shall not limit the right of either Party to take any action for the protection of its security interests.

ARTICLE XI *Review of Operation of Agreement*

The joint American-Romanian Economic Commission, established in accordance with the Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation of December 5, 1973, shall review the operation of this Agreement and as necessary prepare recommendations which shall be presented to the Governments of both countries for the further improvement of trade relations between the two countries.

ARTICLE XII *Duration and Entry Into Force*

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of exchange of written notices of acceptance by the two Governments, and shall remain in force as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. (a) The initial term of this Agreement shall be three years, subject to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(b) If either Party encounters or foresees a problem with respect to the application of this Agreement, including a problem concerning its domestic legal authority to carry out any of its obligations under this Agreement, such Party shall request immediate consultations with the other Party. Once consultations have been requested, the other Party shall enter into such consultations as soon as possible concerning the circumstances that have arisen, with a view to finding a solution which would make action under subparagraph (c) unnecessary.

(c) If either Party is unable to carry out any of its obligations under this Agreement either Party may suspend or terminate the applicability of this Agreement or, with the agreement of the other Party, any part of this Agreement. If either Party takes action under this subparagraph, that Party will, to the fullest extent practicable and consistent with domestic law, seek to minimize disruption to existing trade relations between the two countries.

(d) This Agreement shall be extended for successive periods of three years each unless either Party has notified, in writing, the other Party of the termination of this Agreement at least 30 days prior to its expiration.

3. Annexes 1, 2 and 3 shall constitute an integral part of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the authorized representatives of the Parties have signed this Agreement.

DONE in two original copies at Bucharest this second day of April 1975, in English and Romanian, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America

HARRY G. BARNES, JR.

For the Socialist Republic of Romania

ION PATAN.

Texts of Annexes

ANNEX 1

PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III

1. (a) The consultations provided for under Article III shall have the objectives of presenting and examining together the factors relating to those imports that may be causing or threatening to cause or significantly contributing to market disruption, and finding means of preventing or remedying such market disruption. Such consultations shall provide for a review of the production, market, and trade situation of the product involved (and may include such factors as trends in domestic production, profits of firms within the industry, the employment situation, sales, inventories, rates of increase of imports, market share, level of imports, sources of supply, the situation of the exporter and any other aspect which may contribute to the examination of the situation).

Both Parties in carrying out these consultations shall take due account of any contracts between firms, companies and economic organizations of the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania concluded prior to the request for consultations.

Such consultations shall be concluded within ninety days of the request, unless otherwise agreed during the course of such consultations.

(b) Unless a different solution is agreed upon during the consultations, the quantitative import limitations or other restrictions stated by the importing Party to be necessary to prevent or remedy the market disruption in question shall be implemented.

(c) At the request of the importing Party, if it determines that an emergency situation exists, the limitations or other restrictions referred to in its request for consultations shall be put into effect prior to the conclusion of such consultations.

(d) The rights of the exporting Party referred to in paragraph 4(D) of the Protocol for the accession of Romania to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of October 15, 1971 shall apply in the event that action contemplated in this Annex is taken.

2. (a) In accordance with applicable laws and regulations, each Party shall take appropriate measures to ensure that exports from its country of the products concerned do not exceed the quantities or vary from the restrictions established for imports of such products into the other country pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Annex.

(b) Each Party may take appropriate measures with respect to imports into its country to ensure that imports of products originating in the other country comply with such quantitative limitations or other restrictions.

ANNEX 2 BUSINESS FACILITATION

1. The firms, companies and economic organizations of one Party, in connection with the establishment and operation of their representations in the territory of the other Party, as well as the employees of such representations, shall enjoy rights and facilities as provided below.

1. Applications to establish representations and to obtain any necessary authorization shall be processed and acted upon expeditiously in accordance with procedures and standards no less favorable than those accorded to the firms, companies and economic organizations of any third countries.

2. Revocation or refusal to renew authorization to operate such representations shall require notice in writing at least three months prior to termination of authorization to such representation.

3. Such representation shall consist of natural or legal persons and shall be established and operated in accordance with procedures and regulations in the host country. Termination of the activities of a representation shall not be subject to any penalties when it does not contravene the provisions of any contract existing between the representation and the firms, companies and economic organizations of the host country.

4. The Parties recognize that reasonable levels and application of fees, taxes, rents and other charges, and adequate notice of changes therein to the concerned representations and their employees, are beneficial to commerce and cooperation between the two countries.

5. Representations shall be permitted to rent office space for their needs and housing for the use of their employees. The Parties, upon request, will use the good offices at their disposal to facilitate and expedite the obtaining and occupying of such office space and housing.

6. Representations shall be permitted to import, as promptly as desired, office machines, automobiles, and other equipment for the purpose of efficient and business-like operation of the representation, subject to applicable customs regulations.

7. The employees of the representations shall be permitted to import personal effects including furniture and appliances. Such personal effects shall

be entered duty-free in accordance with applicable customs regulations. Automobiles and similar means of transportation imported for the use of such employees will be permitted to enter in accordance with the applicable customs regulations. Such employees shall also be permitted to export their imported personal effects and automobiles, free of export duties.

8. Representations may acquire communications facilities, such as office or home telephones for their employees, extensions, and telex equipment, which will be made available as promptly as possible upon application therefor, in accordance with applicable law.

9. The term "employees" used in paragraphs 4, 5, 7 and 8 of this Annex refers to persons sent by firms, companies and economic organizations of one Party to perform services for their representations which are functioning in the territory of the other Party.

10. Representations may, subject to the applicable laws and procedures, select and employ any person, regardless of citizenship, lawfully residing in or admitted to the territory of such other Party. Neither Party shall impose restrictions on the termination of employees, other than the contractual provisions requiring notice and compensation. Neither Party shall restrict the total number of persons to be employed as long as they are reasonably needed for the conduct of business. Representations shall hire, compensate, and terminate the employment of employees in accordance with the provisions of contracts governing their employment. Each Party agrees to encourage the negotiation of contracts in such a way that the representations of the other Party shall have the broadest possible flexibility in selecting, hiring and compensating employees and in terminating their employment.

11. Each Party agrees to facilitate to the maximum extent possible the travel of persons employed by representations of the other Party desiring to enter its territory in furtherance of the purposes of this agreement and members of their immediate families. Each Party agrees to make available multiple entry visas of duration of 6 months or longer to such persons and to members of their immediate families. Persons who are employees of representations of the other Party shall be permitted to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with applicable regulations, to travel abroad for purposes related to the business of the representations by which they are employed.

II. For the purpose of applying paragraph 10 of Article IV, the Parties recognize that reasonable levels and application of fees, rents, and other charges and adequate notice of changes therein to the concerned employees and representatives are beneficial to commerce and cooperation between the two Parties.

III. For the purpose of applying paragraph 11 of Article IV, the Parties agree that the persons re-

ferred to therein should have access to adequate housing and office space and communication facilities, and the ability to utilize, in accordance with applicable procedures, local personnel necessary for the carrying out of their normal activities. In addition, in accordance with applicable customs regulations, the Parties will permit the import of tools, equipment and automobiles required for carrying out contracts, as well as, on a duty-free basis, imports of personal effects. The Parties will permit duty-free export of imported personal effects and automobiles. Each Party agrees to facilitate to the maximum extent possible travel of such persons and the members of their immediate families desiring to enter and leave its territory.

ANNEX 3 DEFINITIONS

1. In this Agreement "firms, companies and economic organizations" of the United States of America shall include corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships, companies and other economic associations constituted under the laws and regulations applicable in the United States of America, and "firms, companies and economic organizations" of the Socialist Republic of Romania shall include state enterprises, industrial centrals, enterprises with the status of centrals and other enterprises which carry out foreign trade activities in accordance with laws and regulations applicable in the Socialist Republic of Romania.

2. In this Agreement "representation," in the case of the representations established in the United States of America, shall include subsidiaries or unincorporated branches or other forms of business organizations legally constituted under the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the United States of America by firms, companies, or economic organizations of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and in the case of the representations established in the Socialist Republic of Romania, shall include the agencies referred to in Article 1 of Decree No. 15 of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania of January 25, 1971, established by a firm, company or economic organization of the United States of America.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD, APRIL 24¹

White House press release dated April 24

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) In accordance with Section 407 of the Trade Act of 1974, I am transmitting herewith a copy of a Proclamation extending nondiscriminatory treatment to

¹Identical letters were sent to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.

the products of the Socialist Republic of Romania. I am also enclosing the text of the Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania, which was signed on April 2, 1975, and which is included as an Annex to the Proclamation.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the report which was transmitted to the Congress this date as required by Section 402(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, and I shall issue today an Executive Order waiving the application of subsections (a) and (b) of Section 402.

This agreement caps a decade of improvements in all areas of US-Romanian relations. It will place our trade with Romania on a nondiscriminatory basis that will promote continued development of mutually beneficial economic ties. It will thereby bring the structure of our economic relations into accord with the very satisfactory state of our political relations.

This agreement is consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Trade Act of 1974. In addition to providing for mutual extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment, it meets the requirements of Title IV that are designed to ensure overall reciprocity of economic benefits. Its special safeguard arrangements provide the strongest possible assurance that our trade with Romania will continue to grow without injury to domestic firms or loss of jobs for American workers. American businessmen are assured of basic rights and facilities in establishing operations in Romania and doing business with Romanian enterprises. Other provisions include protection for industrial property rights, industrial processes, and copyrights; and encouragement of third-country arbitration of commercial disputes under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.

I urge that Congress act as soon as possible to approve the agreement under the provisions of Section 407.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

TEXT OF PROCLAMATION 4369, APRIL 24²

AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the United States Constitution, I, as President of the United States of America, acting through duly empowered representatives, entered into negotiation with duly empowered representatives of the Socialist Republic of Romania looking toward the conclusion

²40 Fed. Reg. 18369.

of an agreement governing trade relations between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania;

The aforesaid negotiations were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978);

An "Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania," including the annexes thereto, in the English and Romanian languages, was signed on April 2, 1975, by duly empowered representatives of the Governments of the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania, respectively, and is hereto annexed;

The said Agreement is in conformity with the requirements relating to bilateral commercial agreements as specified in section 405(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1978, 2061);

It is provided in Article XII of the said Agreement that it shall enter into force on the date of exchange of written notices of acceptance by the Governments of the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania; and

It is provided in section 405(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1978, 2061) that a bilateral commercial agreement providing nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of countries heretofore denied such treatment, and a proclamation implementing such agreement, shall take effect only if approved by the Congress by the adoption of a concurrent resolution of approval, referred to in section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1978, 2001), of the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of the country concerned;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 404(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, do hereby proclaim as follows:

(1) This Proclamation shall become effective and said agreement shall enter into force according to its terms, and nondiscriminatory treatment shall be extended to the products of the Socialist Republic of Romania in accordance with the terms of the said Agreement, on the date of exchange of written notices of acceptance in accordance with Article XII of the said Agreement, all of the foregoing to follow the adoption by the House of Representatives and the Senate, in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 151 of the said Act, of a concurrent resolution of approval of the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of the Socialist Republic of Romania, to the end that the same and every part of the said Agreement may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States of America and the citizens thereof and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof as of the date of its entry into force; and

(2) General Headnote 3(e) of the Tariff Sched-

ules of the United States is amended by deleting therefrom "Rumania" as of the effective date of this proclamation and a notice thereof shall be published in the Federal Register promptly thereafter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-fourth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred seventy-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.

GERALD R. FORD.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, APRIL 24

White House press release dated April 24

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to Section 402(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, I shall issue today an Executive Order waiving the application of subsections (a) and (b) of Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the Socialist Republic of Romania, and I am hereby making the report contemplated by Section 402(c)(1) of the Act.

I refer to the Declaration of the Presidents of the United States and of the Socialist Republic of Romania signed in Washington in 1973 wherein it was stated that "they will contribute to the solution of humanitarian problems on the basis of mutual confidence and good will." I have been assured that if and when such problems arise they will be solved, on a reciprocal basis, in the spirit of that Declaration. Accordingly, I am convinced that the emigration practices of Romania will lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of Section 402 of the Act. I have therefore determined that the waiver contained in said Executive Order will substantially promote the objectives of Section 402 of the Act.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 24, 1975.

TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11854, APRIL 24³

WAIVER UNDER THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 WITH RESPECT TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 402(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-618, January 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 1978, 2057), and having made the report to the Congress re-

³ 40 Fed. Reg. 18391.

quired by that provision, I hereby waive the application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of said Act with respect to the Socialist Republic of Romania.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 24, 1975.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Protocol suspending the agreement of March 1, 1972 (TIAS 7295), between the International Atomic Energy Agency, Sweden, and the United States for the application of safeguards pursuant to the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839). Signed at Vienna April 14, 1975. Enters into force on the date on which the Agency receives written notification from Sweden that its constitutional requirements for entry into force of the treaty safeguards agreement and of this protocol have been met.

Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, Sweden, and the United States.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.

Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, March 26, 1975; Dahomey, April 25, 1975.

Exhibitions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, as amended (TIAS 6548, 6549), relating to international exhibitions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Denmark, March 20, 1975.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany,^{2,3} Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, May 2, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: New Zealand (not applicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, or the Tokelau Islands), April 30, 1975.

Publications

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Done at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force November 23, 1961; for the United States June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438.

Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Republic (with declaration), February 19, 1975.

Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between states. Done at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 1961; for the United States June 9, 1968. TIAS 6439.

Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Republic (with declaration), February 19, 1975.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

Ratification deposited: Dahomey, April 25, 1975.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973. TIAS 7435.

Notification of approval: Greece, February 11, 1975.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.⁴

Notification of approval: Federal Republic of Germany,³ February 24, 1975.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.⁴

Notification of approval: Federal Republic of Germany,³ February 24, 1975.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.¹

Accession deposited: Ghana, April 25, 1975.

BILATERAL

Bulgaria

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15, 1974.

Ratifications exchanged: April 28, 1975.

Enters into force: May 29, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² With statements.

³ Applicable to Berlin (West).

⁴ Not in force for the United States.

Canada

Agreement extending the agreement of June 15, 1973, as extended (TIAS 7676, 7818), on reciprocal fishing privileges in certain areas off the coasts of the United States and Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa April 24, 1975. Entered into force April 24, 1975.

Colombia

Agreement concerning an army mission, a naval mission, and an air force mission of the United States of America armed forces in Colombia. Signed at Bogotá October 7, 1974.

Entered into force: April 16, 1975.

Naval mission agreement, as amended. Signed at Washington October 14, 1946. Entered into force October 14, 1946. TIAS 1563, 3146, 4210.

Air force mission agreement, as amended. Signed at Washington February 21, 1949. Entered into force February 21, 1949. TIAS 1893, 3146, 4210.

Army mission agreement, as amended. Signed at Washington February 21, 1949. Entered into force February 21, 1949. TIAS 1892, 3146, 4210.

Terminated: April 16, 1975.

International Telecommunication Union

Agreement relating to a procedure to reimburse the International Telecommunication Union for reimbursement of personnel subject to payment of United States income tax. Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva April 2 and 7, 1975. Entered into force April 7, 1975; effective January 1, 1974.

Japan

Agreement relating to the use of interest accrued in connection with payments made under agreement of April 18, 1969 (TIAS 6724), concerning the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 18, 1975. Entered into force April 18, 1975.

Agreement extending the period for provision of products and services by Japan under the agreement of April 18, 1969 (TIAS 6724), concerning the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 18, 1975. Entered into force April 18, 1975.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement of March 16, 1972, concerning trade in cotton textiles, with related letters. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok April 21, 1975. Entered into force April 21, 1975; effective April 1, 1974.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

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| Germany, Federal | Cat. No. S1.123:G31 | 8 pp. |
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| Pakistan | Cat. No. S1.123:P17 | 8 pp. |
| | Pub. 7748 | 8 pp. |
| Panama | Cat. No. S1.123:P19 | 5 pp. |
| | Pub. 7903 | 5 pp. |
| Senegal | Cat. No. S1.123:SE5 | 4 pp. |
| | Pub. 7820 | 4 pp. |
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| | Pub. 8168 | 8 pp. |
| Tanzania | Cat. No. S1.123:T15 | 8 pp. |
| | Pub. 8097 | 8 pp. |

Narcotic Drugs—Training Program for Helicopter Pilots and Mechanics. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 7982. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7982).

Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Assistance in Enforcement Training Activities. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 7984. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7984).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Uruguay. TIAS 7985. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7985).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 7971. 20 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7971).

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**Check List of Department of State
 Press Releases: April 28-May 4**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to April 28 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 182 of April 3.

| No. | Date | Subject |
|------|------|--|
| *218 | 4/29 | Program for official visit of Prime Minister Hedi Nourra of Tunisia. |
| 219 | 4/29 | U.S.-Greek base negotiations: joint statement. |
| 220 | 4/29 | Kissinger: news conference. |
| 221 | 4/30 | Ingersoll: World Trade Conference, Chicago. |
| *222 | 4/30 | Delegation of U.S. veterans to participate in Soviet observance of 30th anniversary of Allied victory in Europe. |
| *223 | 5/1 | U.S.-Macau cotton textile agreement extended. |
| *224 | 5/1 | Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Birmingham, Ala., May 5. |
| *225 | 5/1 | Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, May 28. |
| *226 | 5/1 | Study Group 7 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, May 30. |
| *227 | 5/1 | U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Mexico City, May 29-31. |
| †228 | 5/2 | Sisco: George Washington University, May 4. |
| *229 | 5/2 | Kissinger to visit St. Louis and Kansas City, Mo., May 12-13. |
| †232 | 5/2 | Deposit of ratifications of Non-proliferation Treaty by five EURATOM countries. |

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.