



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXII • No. 1861 • February 24, 1975

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic \$42.50, foreign \$53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Energy: The Necessity of Decision

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER¹

I appreciate this opportunity to speak to you on the question of energy.

The subject is timely, for this week marks an important moment in both our national and international response to the energy crisis.

On Wednesday, the Governing Board of the International Energy Agency (IEA) convenes in Paris for its monthly meeting. This organization, which grew out of the Washington Energy Conference, represents one of the major success stories of cooperation among the industrialized democracies in the past decade. In recent months it has begun to mobilize and coordinate the efforts of the industrial democracies in energy conservation, research, and development of new energy sources. The IEA already has put in place many of the building blocks of a coordinated energy policy. At the forthcoming meeting, the United States will advance comprehensive proposals for collective action, with special emphasis on the development of new energy sources and the preparation of a consumer position for the forthcoming dialogue with the producers.

Equally important, we are now engaged in a vital national debate on the purposes and requirements of our national energy program. Critical decisions will soon be made by the Congress, decisions that will vitally affect other nations as well as ourselves.

The international and national dimensions of the energy crisis are crucially linked. What happens with respect to international energy policy will have a fundamental effect

on the economic health of this nation. And the international economic and energy crisis cannot be solved without purposeful action and leadership by the United States. Domestic and international programs are inextricably linked.

The energy crisis burst upon our consciousness because of sudden, unsuspected events. But its elements have been developing gradually for the better part of two decades.

In 1950, the United States was virtually self-sufficient in oil. In 1960, our reliance on foreign oil had grown to 16 percent of our requirements. In 1973, it had reached 35 percent. If this trend is allowed to continue, the 1980's will see us dependent on imported oil for fully half of our needs. The impact on our lives will be revolutionary.

This slow but inexorable march toward dependency was suddenly intensified in 1973 by an oil embargo and price increases of 400 percent in less than a single year. These actions—largely the result of political decisions—created an immediate economic crisis, both in this country and around the world. A reduction of only 10 percent of the imported oil, and lasting less than half a year, cost Americans half a million jobs and over 1 percent of national output; it added at least 5 percentage points to the price index, contributing to our worst inflation since World War II; it set the stage for a serious recession; and it expanded the oil income of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations from \$23 billion in 1973 to a current annual rate of \$110 billion, thereby effecting one of the greatest and most sudden transfers of wealth in history.

The impact on other countries much more

¹ Made before the National Press Club at Washington on Feb. 3; as prepared for delivery (text from press release 42).

dependent on oil imports has been correspondingly greater. In all industrial countries, economic and political difficulties that had already reached the margin of the ability of governments to manage have threatened to get out of control.

Have we learned nothing from the past year? If we permit our oil consumption to grow without restraint, the vulnerability of our economy to external disruptions will be grossly magnified. And this vulnerability will increase with every passing year. Unless strong corrective steps are taken, a future embargo would have a devastating impact on American jobs and production. More than 10 percent of national employment and output, as well as a central element of the price structure of the American economy, would be subject to external decisions over which our national policy can have little influence.

As we learned grimly in the 1920's and 1930's, profound political consequences inevitably flow from massive economic dislocations. Economic distress fuels social and political turmoil; it erodes the confidence of the people in democratic government and the confidence of nations in international harmony. It is fertile ground for conflict, both domestic and international.

The situation is not yet so grave. But it threatens to become so. The entire industrialized world faces at the same time a major crisis of the economy, of the body politic, and of the moral fiber. We and our partners are being tested—not only to show our technical mastery of the problems of energy but, even more important, to show if we can act with foresight to regain control of our future.

For underlying all difficulties, and compounding them, is a crisis of the spirit—the despair of men and nations that they have lost control over their destiny. Forces seem loose beyond the power of government and society to manage.

In a sense we in America are fortunate that political decisions brought the energy problem to a head before economic trends had made our vulnerability irreversible. Had we continued to drift, we would eventually have found ourselves swept up by

forces much more awesome than those we face today.

As it is, the energy crisis is still soluble. Of all nations, the United States is most affected by the sudden shift from near self-sufficiency to severe dependence on imported energy. But it is also in the best position to meet the challenge. A major effort now—of conservation, of technological innovation, of international collaboration—can shape a different future for us and for the other countries of the world. A demonstration of American resolve now will have a decisive effect in leading other industrial nations to work together to reverse present trends toward dependency. Today's apparently pervasive crisis can in retrospect prove to have been the beginning of a new period of creativity and cooperation.

One of our highest national priorities must be to reduce our vulnerability to supply interruption and price manipulation. But no one country can solve the problem alone. Unless we pool our risks and fortify the international financial system, balance-of-payments crises will leave all economies exposed to financial disruption. Unless all consuming nations act in parallel to reduce energy consumption through conservation and to develop new sources of supply, the efforts of any one nation will prove futile, the price structure of oil will not be reformed, and the collective economic burden will grow. And unless consumers concert their views, the dialogue with the producers will not prove fruitful.

The actions which the United States takes now are central to any hope for a global solution. The volume of our consumption, and its potential growth, are so great that a determined national conservation program is essential. Without the application of American technology and American enterprise, the rapid development of significant new supplies and alternative sources of energy will be impossible.

There is no escape. The producers may find it in their interest to ease temporarily our burdens. But the price will be greater dependence and greater agony a few years from now. Either we tackle our challenge

immediately, or we will confront it again and again in increasingly unfavorable circumstances in the years to come. If it is not dealt with by this Administration, an even worse crisis will be faced by the next—and with even more anguishing choices.

History has given us a great opportunity disguised as a crisis. A determined energy policy will not only ease immediate difficulties, it will help restore the international economy, the vitality of all the major industrial democracies, and the hopes of mankind for a just and prosperous world.

The Strategy of Energy Cooperation

We and our partners in the International Energy Agency have been, for a year, pursuing strategy in three phases:

—The first phase is to protect against emergencies. We must be prepared to deter the use of oil or petrodollars as political weapons, and if that fails, we must have put ourselves in the best possible defensive position. To do this, we have established emergency sharing programs to cope with new embargoes and created new mechanisms to protect our financial institutions against disruption. This stage of our common strategy is well on the way to accomplishment.

—The second phase is to transform the market conditions for OPEC oil. If we act decisively to reduce our consumption of imported oil and develop alternative sources, pressure on prices will increase. Measures to achieve this objective are now before the International Energy Agency or national parliaments; we expect to reach important agreements on them before the end of March.

—Once the consumer nations have taken these essential steps to reduce their vulnerability, we will move to the third stage of our strategy: to meet with the producers to discuss an equitable price, market structure, and long-term economic relationship. Assuming the building blocks of consumer solidarity are in place, we look toward a preparatory meeting for a producer-consumer conference before the end of March.

Our actions in all these areas are inter-related. It is not possible to pick and choose; since they are mutually reinforcing, they are essential to each other. No emergency program can avail if each year the collective dependence on OPEC oil increases. New sources of energy, however vast the investment program, will be ineffective unless strict measures are taken to halt the runaway, wasteful growth in consumption. Unless the industrial nations demonstrate the political will to act effectively in *all* areas, the producers will be further tempted to take advantage of our vulnerability.

In recent months we and our partners have taken important steps to implement our overall strategy. Two safety nets against emergencies have been put in place. In November, the IEA established an unprecedented plan for mutual assistance in the event of a new embargo. Each participating nation is committed to build an emergency stock of oil. In case of embargo, each nation will cut its consumption by the same percentage, and available oil will be shared. An embargo against one will become an embargo against all.

And in January, the major industrial nations decided to create a \$25 billion solidarity fund for mutual support in financial crises—less than two months after it was first proposed by the United States. This mutual insurance fund will furnish loans and guarantees to those hardest hit by payments deficits, thus safeguarding the international economy against shifts, withdrawals, or cut-offs of funds by the producers.

The next steps should be to accelerate our efforts in the conservation and development of new energy sources. Action in these areas, taken collectively, will exert powerful pressures on the inflated price. No cartel is so insulated from economic conditions that its price structure is invulnerable to a transformation of the market. Because of the reduced consumption in the past year, OPEC has already shut down a fourth of its capacity, equaling 9 million barrels a day, in order to keep the price constant. New oil exploration, accelerated by the fivefold-higher price, is constantly discovering vast new reserves

outside of OPEC. The \$10 billion in new energy research in the United States—on the scale of the Manhattan project and the moon-landing program—is certain to produce new breakthroughs sooner or later.

As the industrialized nations reduce consumption and increase their supply, it will become increasingly difficult for OPEC to allocate the further production cuts that will be required among its members. Even now, some OPEC members are shaving prices to keep up their revenue and their share of the market. Indeed, it is not too soon in this decade of energy shortages to plan for the possibility of energy surpluses in the 1980's.

The strategy we have been pursuing with our partners since the Washington Energy Conference has linked our domestic and international energy policies into a coherent whole. We have made remarkable progress, but much remains to be done. The question now is whether the industrialized countries have the will to sustain and reinforce these promising initiatives. Conservation and the development of new sources of energy are the next priorities on our common agenda.

Conservation

Unconstrained consumption of cheap oil is the principal cause of the present vulnerability of the industrial countries. Neither the United States nor other consumers can possibly reduce their dependence on imports until they reverse the normal—which is to say wasteful—growth of consumption.

There is simply no substitute for conservation. Alternative energy supplies will not be available for five or ten years. In the next few years conservation, and only conservation, will enable us both to absorb the present burden of high energy costs and to begin to restore the balance of consumer-producer relations.

Only a determined program of conservation can demonstrate that we and our partners have the will to resist pressures. If the industrialized nations are unwilling to make the relatively minor sacrifices involved in conservation, then the credibility of all our

other efforts and defensive measures is called into question.

Some say we face a choice between conservation and restoring economic growth. The contrary is true. Only by overcoming exorbitant international energy costs can we achieve reliable long-term growth. If we doom ourselves to 50 percent dependence on imported energy, with the supply and price of a central element of our economy subject to external manipulation, there is no way we can be sure of restoring and sustaining our jobs and growth. These decisions will depend on foreign countries for whom our prosperity is not necessarily a compelling objective.

To be sure, conservation—by any method—will have an economic cost. The restructuring away from production and consumption of energy-intensive goods which it entails incurs shortrun dislocations. At a time of recession, this must concern us. Yet these costs are small compared to what will be exacted from us if we do not act. Without conservation, we will perpetuate the vulnerability of our economy and our national policy. And we will perpetuate as well the excessive international energy prices which are at the heart of the problem.

At present, the United States—in the midst of recession—is importing 6.7 million barrels of oil a day. When our economy returns to full capacity that figure will rise; by 1977, it will be 8 or 9 million barrels a day in the absence of conservation. Imports will continue to grow thereafter. Even with new production in Alaska and the outer continental shelf, this import gap will remain if we do not reduce consumption significantly and rapidly.

With these prospects in mind, President Ford has set the goal of saving a million barrels a day of imports by the end of this year and 2 million by 1977. That amounts to the increase in dependence that would occur as the economy expands again, in the absence of a conservation program.

Our conservation efforts will be powerfully reinforced by the actions of our IEA partners and of other interested countries such

as France. Their collective oil consumption equals ours, and they are prepared to join with us in a concerted program of conservation; indeed, some of them have already instituted their own conservation measures. But any one country's efforts will be nullified unless they are complemented by other consumers. This is why the United States has proposed to its IEA partners that they match our respective conservation targets. Together we can save 2 million barrels a day this year and at least 4 million barrels in 1977.

If these goals are reached, under current economic conditions OPEC will have to reduce its production further; even when full employment returns, OPEC will have surplus capacity. More reductions will be hard to distribute on top of the existing cutbacks of 9 million barrels a day. As a result, pressures to increase production or to lower prices will build up as ambitious defense and development programs get underway. By 1977, some oil producers will have a payments deficit; competition between them for the available market will intensify. The cartel's power to impose an embargo and to use price as a weapon will be greatly diminished.

But if America—the least vulnerable and most profligate consumer—will not act, neither will anyone else. Just as our action will have a multiplier effect, so will our inaction stifle the efforts of others. Instead of reducing our collective imports, we will have increased them by 2–4 million barrels a day. OPEC's ability to raise prices, which is now in question, will be restored. In exchange for a brief respite of a year or two, we will have increased the industrialized world's vulnerability to a new and crippling blow from the producers. And when that vulnerability is exposed to public view through a new embargo or further price rises, the American people will be entitled to ask why their leaders failed to take the measures they could have when they should have.

One embargo—and one economic crisis—should be enough to underline the implications of dependency.

The Importance of New Supplies

Conservation measures alone, crucial as they are, cannot permanently reduce our dependence on imported oil. To eliminate dependence over the long term, we must accelerate the development of alternative sources of energy. This will involve a massive and complex task. But for the country which broke the secret of fission in five years and landed men on the moon in eight years, the challenge should be exciting. The Administration is prepared to invest in this enterprise on a scale commensurate with those previous pioneering efforts; we are ready as well to share the results with our IEA partners on an equitable basis.

Many of the industrialized countries are blessed with major energy reserves which have not yet been developed—North Sea oil, German coal, coal and oil deposits in the United States, and nuclear power in all countries. We have the technical skill and resources to create synthetic fuels from shale oil, tar sands, and coal gasification and liquefaction. And much work has already been done on such advanced energy sources as breeder reactors, fusion, and solar power.

The cumulative effort will of necessity be gigantic. The United States alone shall seek to generate capital investments in energy of \$500 billion over the next 10 years. The Federal Government will by itself invest \$10 billion in research into alternative energy sources over the next five years, a figure likely to be doubled when private investment in research is included.

But if this effort is to succeed, we must act now to deal with two major problems—the expense of new energy sources and the varying capacities of the industrialized countries.

New energy sources will cost considerably more than we paid for energy in 1973 and can never compete with the production costs of Middle Eastern oil.

This disparity in cost poses a dilemma. If the industrial countries succeed in developing alternative sources on a large scale, the demand for OPEC oil will fall, and inter-

national prices may be sharply reduced. Inexpensive imported oil could then jeopardize the investment made in the alternative sources; the lower oil prices would also restimulate demand, starting again the cycle of rising imports, increased dependence, and vulnerability.

Thus, paradoxically, in order to protect the major investments in the industrialized countries that are needed to bring the international oil prices down, we must insure that the price for oil on the domestic market does not fall below a certain level.

The United States will therefore make the following proposal to the International Energy Agency this Wednesday:

In order to bring about adequate investment in the development of conventional nuclear and fossil energy sources, the major oil-importing nations should agree that they will not allow imported oil to be sold domestically at prices which would make those new sources noncompetitive.

This objective could be achieved in either of two ways. The consumer nations could agree to establish a common floor price for imports, to be implemented by each country through methods of its own choosing such as import tariffs, variable levies, or quotas. Each country would thus be free to obtain balance-of-payments and tax benefits without restimulating consumption, if the international price falls below agreed levels. Alternatively, IEA nations could establish a common IEA tariff on oil imports. Such a tariff could be set at moderate levels and phased in gradually as the need arises.

President Ford is seeking legislation requiring the executive branch to use a floor price or other appropriate measures to achieve price levels necessary for our national self-sufficiency goals.

Intensive technical study would be needed to determine the appropriate level at which prices should be protected. We expect that they will be considerably below the current world oil prices. They must, however, be high enough to encourage the long-range development of alternative energy sources.

These protected prices would in turn be a point of reference for an eventual consumer-

producer agreement. To the extent that OPEC's current high prices are caused by fear of precipitate later declines, the consuming countries, in return for an assured supply, should be prepared to offer producers an assured price for some definite period so long as this price is substantially lower than the current price.

In short, the massive development of alternative sources by the industrial countries will confront OPEC with a choice: they can accept a significant price reduction now in return for stability over a longer period, or they can run the risk of a dramatic break in prices when the program of alternative sources begins to pay off. The longer OPEC waits, the stronger our bargaining position becomes.

The second problem is that the capacities of the industrialized countries to develop new energy sources vary widely. Some have rich untapped deposits of fossil fuels. Some have industrial skills and advanced technology. Some have capital. Few have all three.

Each of these elements will be in great demand, and ways must be found to pool them effectively. The consumers therefore have an interest in participating in each other's energy development programs.

Therefore the United States will propose to the IEA this Wednesday the creation of a synthetic fuel consortium within IEA. Such a body would enable countries willing to provide technology and capital to participate in each other's synthetic energy projects. The United States is committed to develop a national synthetic fuel capacity of 1 million barrels a day by 1985; other countries will establish their own programs. These programs should be coordinated and IEA members should have an opportunity to share in the results by participating in the investment. Qualifying participants would have access to the production of the synthetics program in proportion to their investment.

In addition, the United States will propose the creation of an energy research and development consortium within IEA. Its primary task will be to encourage, coordinate, and pool large-scale national research efforts in fields—like fusion and solar power—where

the costs in capital equipment and skilled manpower are very great, the lead times very long, but the ultimate payoff in low-cost energy potentially enormous.

The consortium also would intensify the comprehensive program of information exchange which—with respect to coal, nuclear technology, solar energy, and fusion—has already begun within the IEA. We are prepared to earmark a substantial proportion of our own research and development resources for cooperative efforts with other IEA countries which are willing to contribute. Pooling the intellectual effort of the great industrial democracies is bound to produce dramatic results.

When all these measures are implemented, what started as crisis will have been transformed into opportunity; the near-panic of a year ago will have been transformed into hope; vulnerability will have been transformed into strength.

Mutual Interests of Consumers and Producers

Consumer solidarity is not an end in itself. In an interdependent world, our hopes for prosperity and stability rest ultimately on a cooperative long-term relationship between consumers and producers.

This has always been our objective. It is precisely because we wish that dialogue to be substantive and constructive that we have insisted that consumers first put their own house in order. Collective actions to restore balance to the international economic structure, and the development in advance of common consumer views on the agenda, will contribute enormously to the likelihood of the success of the projected consumer-producer dialogue. Without these measures, discussions will only find us restating our divisions and tempt some to seek unilateral advantages at the expense of their partners. The result will be confusion, demoralization, and inequity, rather than a just reconciliation between the two sides.

A conciliatory solution with the producers is imperative, for there is no rational alternative. The destinies of all countries are linked to the health of the world economy.

The producers seek a better life for their peoples and a future free from dependence on a single depleting resource; the industrialized nations seek to preserve the hard-earned economic and social progress of centuries; the poorer nations seek desperately to resume their advance toward a more hopeful existence. The legitimate claims of producers and consumers, developed and developing countries, can and must be reconciled in a new equilibrium of interest and mutual benefit.

We must begin from the premise that we can neither return to past conditions nor tolerate present ones indefinitely. Before 1973, market conditions were often unfair to the producers. Today, they are unbearable for the consumers; they threaten the very fabric of the international economic system, on which, in the last analysis, the producers are as dependent for their well-being as the consumers.

As the consumers approach their preparatory meeting with the producers, what are the basic principles that should guide them?

The United States will propose the following approach to its partners in the IEA:

First, we should explore cooperative consumer-producer action to recycle the huge financial surpluses now accumulating. The oil producers understand that these new assets—which are far greater than they can absorb—may require new management mechanisms. At the same time, the industrial nations know that the stability of the global economic structure requires the constructive participation of the producers.

Second, and closely related to this, is the need to examine our internal investment policies. The oil producers need productive outlets for their revenues; the industrial democracies, while they should welcome new investment, will want to retain control of essential sectors of their economies. These needs can be reconciled through discussion and agreement between consumers and producers.

Third, we must help the producer nations find productive use for their wealth in their own development and in reducing their de-

pendence on a depleting resource. New industries can be established, combining the technology of the industrialized world with the energy and capital of the producers for their own benefit and that of the poorer nations. The creation of fertilizer and petrochemical plants is among the more promising possibilities.

Fourth, the oil-producing countries and the industrial consuming countries share a responsibility to ease the plight of the poorest nations, whose economies have been devastated by OPEC's price increases. Technology and capital must be combined in an international effort to assist those most seriously affected by the current economic crisis.

Fifth is the need to provide consumers with a secure source of supply. Another attempt to use oil as a weapon would gravely threaten the economies of the industrial nations and destroy the possibilities of consumer-producer cooperation. Oil-sharing arrangements by the consumers would blunt its impact at first, but over time an atmosphere of confrontation would be inevitable. Thus, if the producer-consumer dialogue is to be meaningful, understandings on long-term supplies are essential.

A central issue, of course, will be price. It is vital to agree on prices for the long run which will satisfy the needs of consumers and producers alike. The balance-of-payments crisis of the consumers must be eased; at the same time, the producers are entitled to know that they can count on a reasonable level of income over a period of time.

The United States is ready to begin consultations with the other major consuming nations on this agenda. We will be prepared to expand on these proposals and will welcome the suggestions of our friends so that we can fashion together a common and positive program.

In sum, consumers and producers are at a crossroads. We have the opportunity to forge new political and institutional relationships, or we can go our separate ways, each paying the price for our inability to take the long view. Mutual interest should bring us closer

together; only selfishness can keep us apart. The American approach will be conciliatory.

The implications for the structure of world politics are profound. If we act with statesmanship we can shape a new relationship between consumer and producer, between developed and developing nations, that will mark the last quarter of the 20th century as the beginning of the first truly global, truly cooperative international community.

The Need for United Action

The United States will soon celebrate the 200th anniversary of its independence. In those 200 years Americans have gloried in freedom, used the blessings of nature productively, and jealously guarded our right to determine our fate. In so doing, we have become the most powerful nation on earth and a symbol of hope to those who yearn for progress and value justice. Yet now we sometimes seem uncertain of our future, disturbed by our recent past, and confused as to our purpose. But we must persevere, for we have no other choice. Either we lead, or no one leads; either we succeed, or the world will pay for our failure.

The energy challenge is international; it can only be met by the cooperative actions of all the industrial democracies. We are far advanced with our partners toward turning a major challenge into bold creation and determined response.

But our hopes for the future rest heavily on the decisions we take on our own domestic energy program in the days and weeks ahead. Our example—for good or ill—will chart the course for more than ourselves alone. If we hesitate or delay, so will our partners. Undoing measures already instituted, without putting an alternative program in their place, will have implications far transcending the immediate debate.

The United States bears world responsibility not simply from a sense of altruism or abstract devotion to the common good, although those are attributes hardly deserving of apology. We bear it, as well, because we recognize that America's jobs and pros-

perity—and our hopes for a better future—decisively depend upon a national effort to fashion a unified effort with our partners abroad. Together we can retain control over our affairs and build a new international structure with the producers. Apart we are hostages to fate.

A domestic program that will protect our independence, a cooperative program with other consumers, and accommodation with producers—these are the indispensable and inseparable steps toward a new equilibrium of interest and justice. No one step can succeed in the absence of the other two.

It is the glory of our nation that when challenged, we have always stepped forward with spirit and a will to dare great things. It is now time to do so again and in so doing to reaffirm to ourselves and to the world that this generation of Americans has the integrity of character to carry on the noble experiment that began two centuries ago.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

The Chairman [William Broom, president, National Press Club]: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, in November you, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Arthur Burns, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, all made speeches emphasizing the imperative need to bring about a lowering of the OPEC prices of oil. Now the Administration is advocating an energy policy based upon a price even higher than the OPEC price. What happened between November and now?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think it is correct to say that the Administration's energy policy is based on an increase in price. The Administration's energy policy attempts to reduce consumption. The increase in price that is designed to reduce consumption will be rebated to the American public so that the inflationary impact will be severely minimized, if not eliminated. So we are not dealing here with an increase in price that produces a balance-of-payments drain. We are dealing with a technical measure designed

to reduce consumption for the reasons that I have explained, and the increase will then be rebated in various ways to the American people.

Q. Our audience has many questions for you today, Mr. Secretary. A second one here concerns what you anticipate from our allies. The first questioner asks, what result might you foresee if IEA nations do not all agree on some method of establishing floor prices; specifically, what results if only the U.S.A. does so? And secondly, someone wonders if you can identify or expect any European country or any consuming nation not to act in parallel in the consumer bloc.

Secretary Kissinger: The proposal about a floor price will of course only be formally submitted to our allies on Wednesday. But we have had some exploratory conversations which lead us to believe that the proposal will receive a sympathetic reception. The United States is of course in a position to establish such a price for itself, and given the scale of its investment, it could carry out a very massive program for the development of alternative energy sources. But in order to achieve the objectives which I have described, the cooperation of all the consumers would be extremely important.

I would not want to identify—indeed, I do not know any consumers that are likely to disagree. I believe that the cooperation of the nations in IEA, as I pointed out in my speech, has been one of the great success stories of the last decade and a half. Within the space of less than a year, very major steps have been taken in the field of conservation, in the field of emergency sharing, and in the field of financial solidarity. And I have every confidence that the spirit of cooperation that has brought us to this point will hold in the months ahead.

Q. A number of questions on price. What do you estimate the protected price of oil will be? For how long will it be protected? How will the long-term protected price be affected by inflation? And based on your remarks, what do you believe is the minimum price per barrel for domestic oil that will be required to keep U.S. investments competitive?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the precise price would have to be established first by more detailed technical studies and then in consultation with our partners that also have an interest in the problem. However, it can be stated now that the protected price would be substantially below the existing world price. It would have to be protected for a period of time sufficient to justify the massive investment in the alternative sources that are called for.

With respect to the impact of inflation on the protected price, if a long-term price arrangement were made with the producers and if the price were pegged at a level considerably below current world prices, the United States would not exclude discussing indexing in relation to it.

Q. If the cost of oil in the United States and in the major industrial nations remains above the level of exported oil or Communist country prices, how are U.S. or European exporters of petrochemicals going to cope with competition from Eastern European or other nations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this assumes that there is an unlimited capacity by the Soviet Union to expand its oil exports at lower prices, and we doubt seriously that this capacity exists.

Q. Have you had any reaction as yet from the oil-producing countries' leaders regarding President Ford's plan to impose the import levy on oil in this country? What is the possibility that the oil-producing countries will use that as a reason for a further price increase?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not had any reaction from the oil-producing countries with respect to the President's import tax. I believe also that the oil producers very clearly understand the difference between a price increase that compounds a balance-of-payments deficit and a price increase that is rebated to the consumers.

Q. Do you agree, Mr. Secretary, with Senator Church's proposal that the United States set up an oil purchasing agency as one way

of eliminating unnecessary competition for profits and supplies?

Secretary Kissinger: I have frankly not had an opportunity to study this proposal in great detail, and I therefore would rather withhold judgment.

Q. An enterprising member of the audience asks, can we trade U.S. wheat for Russian oil?

Secretary Kissinger: That, too, is something I would like to examine a little bit. [Laughter and applause.]

Q. We have a number of questions on other countries, particularly the Middle East, where you will be going within a very short space of time. Will it be possible to arrange a further military disengagement on the Sinai with Egypt without further progress with Syria on the Golan Heights? And secondly, will the time come when the United States will have to deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)?

Secretary Kissinger: If I didn't believe that there was some possibility of progress in further negotiations I would not, obviously, go to the Middle East. Of course any step that is taken should only be considered as an interim step toward a final peace. And all other of the nations in the Middle East will have to participate in that next step—or will have to participate, not in the forthcoming step, but will have to participate in a negotiation for a final peace.

With respect to the PLO, we have stated our position repeatedly, that there is no possibility of a negotiation as long as the PLO does not recognize the existence of Israel.

Q. How do you explain shipments of American airplanes to the Middle East and to the Arab countries in view of the possibility of the renewal of an Arab embargo on oil?

Secretary Kissinger: In my press conference last week, I explained the American policy with respect to arms shipments to other countries as follows: The questions

that have to be answered are whether a threat to the security of these countries exists in the minds of these countries; whether the United States considers this a realistic appraisal; whether the United States has an interest in the stability and security of the countries concerned; and finally, whether, if the United States does not supply these weapons, these countries would remain without weapons.

In the case of the arms shipments to which the United States has agreed, we believe that the answer to each question can be affirmative—and in view of the various balance-of-payments considerations that I have earlier outlined, also in our interest. But the controlling decision is not a commercial one. The controlling decision is the political one that I explained.

Q. Four or five questions on Cuba. The first one asks whether you have any comment on Senator Sparkman's recent remarks about resuming U.S. relations with Cuba and what are the chances that U.S. policy toward Cuba will change this year.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm brave but not reckless. [Laughter.]

In the spirit of partnership between the Congress and the executive that I called for recently, I would like to say that we are examining our policy toward Cuba—that we are prepared to look at various of the measures that have been taken in the inter-American system with a view toward seeing what can be done in our Cuban relationship.

Q. Do you see any possibility, Mr. Secretary, of an opportunity for the United States to sell some goods to Cuba in the near future to help us with our balance of payments?

Secretary Kissinger: Whatever decision will be made on Cuba is not going to be dictated by economic considerations. It will grow out of our assessment in the international context, as well as our overall relationships with the Western Hemisphere.

Q. Let's switch to the Eastern Hemisphere for a moment. A member of the audience notes that Chinese leaders are reportedly dis-

satisfied at the pace of Sino-American rapprochement. When will the United States recognize mainland China? Will it be during President Ford's visit to China this year? And, presuming, when will we withdraw U.S. troops from Taiwan?

Secretary Kissinger: I read these accounts with great interest, but of course we can only deal with the expressions that the Chinese leaders make to American officials. And we do not have the impression that the Chinese leaders are dissatisfied with the state of Chinese-American relations. We are committed in the Shanghai communique to proceed toward the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China. We are determined to carry out not only the letter but the spirit of the Shanghai communique, and we will base our improving relations with the People's Republic of China on these principles.

Q. Within a few days, the Prime Minister of Pakistan will be paying a visit to Washington. Is the United States ready to lift the embargo on arms to Pakistan when Prime Minister Bhutto is here this week?

Secretary Kissinger: The question about Pakistan, an ally which is in the curious position of being subject to American embargo, is always before us—especially at a time when the Prime Minister of Pakistan visits the United States. No decisions have yet been made, and I doubt that any final decision will be made while Prime Minister Bhutto is here. But of course it is always a subject that is seriously examined in preparation for his visit and of course will be discussed.

Q. A pair of questions on Viet-Nam. Is the division of South Viet-Nam into Government and Viet Cong regions a feasible way to stop the fighting? Or—to put it another way—another questioner asks, despite any agreements that have been made or will be made, do you feel there can be peace in Viet-Nam as long as North Vietnamese troops occupy any part of South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States

has always been prepared, together with the Government in Saigon, to see to it that peace is maintained in South Viet-Nam along the demarcation lines that existed when the armistice agreement was signed. It is the Communist side which has consistently refused to agree to a demarcation and to deploy the international control teams by which such a demarcation would be insured.

Under the agreement in January 1973, there was no requirement for the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese troops which were then in South Viet-Nam. But there was a flat prohibition against any further increase in their numbers—or, indeed, a flat prohibition against sending any new personnel. This prohibition has been consistently violated from the very first day of the agreement. And the only security problem in South Viet-Nam is the presence of North Vietnamese military forces.

Q. Back to the Western Hemisphere. Today's Washington Post reported some conclusions by former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier, who alleged that he had been deceived about CIA involvement with the opposition to the Allende government. In retrospect, should any of the CIA's activities have been different—do you regret the outcome?

Secretary Kissinger: I found it amazing that the front page of a leading newspaper would report a totally unsupported story by an individual who, after all, was not exactly disinterested and who told a rather amazing tale that he had been invited to the house of a Washington columnist to receive a special message from me.

Now, it would be an interesting question—who exactly passed that message to him that he should come to the house of that columnist. That columnist does not remember such an incident; I do not remember such an incident. And while our denial was duly reported in the last paragraph of the story, one would not be able to determine that from the front page of an article that can only be designed to prove that I was telling a lie for purposes that are totally

unclear by a man who has a profound interest in the problem. And I might say I find it particularly painful because I have not been uninvolved in his release from prison in Chile. [Applause.]

Q. A pair of questions here about food as it relates to the present energy crisis. One questioner wants to know if there is a plan to use food as a weapon in the strategy of the consuming nations against the oil-producing countries.

Secretary Kissinger: In my first public statement as Secretary of State, two days after I was sworn in, I proposed the convening of a World Food Conference. I did so because it seemed to me that if we were serious about our assertions that the world was interdependent and that a new world order had to be instituted based on this principle, then we had a moral and political obligation to use the resource which we have in surplus for the benefit of all of mankind. We made proposals at the World Food Conference which were designed to alleviate the chronic food shortage that exists all over the world; and we emphasized that whatever the level of American food aid, we would not be able to deal with the chronic problem by American food alone—that it was necessary to increase the productivity, especially in less developed countries, to improve the distribution, and to take other fundamental measures of agricultural reform, to which the United States will contribute.

With respect to American food aid, which is a separate problem, a very large percentage of this food aid is given for primarily humanitarian purposes. There are, of course, countries where we are conscious that this food aid also helps us politically, and we have no reason to apologize for this. But even in those countries there is a profound need for food.

We have worked closely with Senator Humphrey, with Senator Hatfield—first, to produce the maximum level of food aid that was possible and, secondly, to allocate it in a manner that met both the humanitarian and other needs of this country.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, in the final moments of drafting the budget, \$178 million was apparently added to the total available for the P.L. 480 Food for Peace program. Some people are crediting you with arguing for the addition of that \$178 million. Who is going to receive it? How much of the total food aid available will go to most seriously affected (MSA) countries? Have Cambodia and South Viet-Nam been added to the MSA list?

Secretary Kissinger: I can hardly keep up with the newspaper reports printing the breakdown of various working papers with respect to food aid, none more recent, incidentally, than two months. I, frankly, don't know the exact figure that was added in recent weeks to the budget. But, again, if you remember—I don't know why I assume that each of you remember every detail of every speech I gave; I look at my staff here and they have to open staff meetings by rehearsing them, in spite of their prayers. [Laughter.]

But in that speech I indicated that the United States would support the highest possible level of food aid. The only reason we did not announce the level then was because of the impact on American domestic prices and because we were afraid that if the result of announcing a high level of food aid would be to push up the American domestic food prices, that then congressional support for the food aid program might evaporate altogether. Therefore we have consistently been at the highest level that was compatible with our domestic price structure.

Now that the recent crop reports have indicated that we have adequate food supplies, we have, as a matter of course, gone to the high levels. And it is not the case that this was suddenly jury-rigged in order to produce a particular effect. With respect to the allocations required by the Congress between the humanitarian and other purposes, we have worked out this arrangement with all the Senators and Congressmen who have shown a particular interest in the problem.

To answer your specific question, Viet-

Nam and Cambodia have not been added to the MSA list, even though, in fairness, the only reason they are not on the MSA list of the United Nations is because Viet-Nam is not in the United Nations.

British Prime Minister Wilson Visits Washington

Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, made an official visit to Washington January 29-February 1. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and Prime Minister Wilson at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on January 30 and their exchange of toasts at a White House dinner that evening.

REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 3

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen: It gives me a very great deal of pleasure to welcome you again to the United States. You are no stranger, of course, to this city and to this house. Your visits here over the years as a staunch ally and a steadfast friend are continuing evidence of the excellence of the ties between our countries and our people.

You, Mr. Prime Minister, are the honored leader of one of America's truest allies and oldest friends. Any student of American history and American culture knows how significant is our common heritage. We have actually continued to share a wonderful common history.

Americans can never forget how the very roots of our democratic political system and of our concepts of liberty and government are to be found in Britain.

Over the years, Britain and the United States have stood together as trusting friends and allies to defend the cause of freedom on

a worldwide basis. Today, the North Atlantic alliance remains the cornerstone of our common defense.

However, we and other members of the Atlantic community face a new dimension of challenges. That these challenges today are different from those that we have confronted in the past does not mean that they are any less perilous.

What is at stake is the future of industrialized democracies which have perceived and sustained their destiny in common for 30 years. The problems of recession, inflation, and of assuring equitable access to fairly priced resources threaten the stability of every economy and the welfare of people in developed as well as developing nations alike. These problems defy solution by national means alone.

Mr. Prime Minister, as I recently said in my state of the Union address, if we act imaginatively and boldly to deal with our present problems, as we acted after World War II, then this period will, in retrospect, be seen as one of the great creative moments in our history.

Britain's role then, as now, was crucial. Only by working together can the industrialized democracies and the nations of the world overcome these great challenges. Only in this manner can we insure a better life and a better world for all peoples.

The United States, for its part, is fully prepared to give our closest cooperation to this joint enterprise. A start has already been made—an international energy program, an International Energy Agency, and an international financial facility have been created.

Consultations such as you and I will have today and tomorrow are setting the stage for further cooperation. Your government plays a very essential part. We recognize and we applaud the support that Britain has shown for strengthened international cooperation and your contribution to dealing with the global problems of inflation, food, and energy.

Mr. Prime Minister, I look forward with pleasure to the discussions that we will have on the major security, political, and economic

issues before our two countries. As befitting talks between close friends, I know that they will be wide-ranging and candid. They will confirm our mutual trust and serve our common goals.

Mr. Prime Minister, you and your party are most welcome in our country.

Prime Minister Wilson

Mr. President: First, may I thank you for your very warm welcome, symbolic in every way of the close friendship and the very real ties which, as you have said, have always existed between our countries over the generations.

It is today a privilege that the Foreign Secretary and I should have the opportunity to join with you and the Secretary of State in what I am sure will be wide-ranging and deep discussions about the problems we face together as friends, as partners, and as allies.

We could not be meeting at a time of greater moment for the causes for which our two countries have worked and fought over the years—the continuing strength to protect and fortify peace and to bring security to all peoples, and especially at this time, our declared pledges to our own peoples and to the wider world of our determination to meet this new and menacing world economic crisis.

For we know that the urgency of meeting this challenge is not simply a question of economic mechanisms and economic institutions; it is vital for the economic security, the jobs, and the living standards of the millions of families whose interests we are here to protect and to serve.

Mr. President, I thank you.

TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 3

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson, our distinguished guests: We are very deeply honored, and we are greatly pleased to have both of you and your party here with us this

vening. You have been guests in this house before, and I hope you have enjoyed it tonight as well as you have enjoyed your previous occasions. My wife and I consider ourselves very fortunate to have this opportunity to extend our hospitality to both of you, both officially as well as personally.

The great heritage that we have, that we share, draws our two countries together. George Bernard Shaw once remarked that we are two nations separated by the same language. Nevertheless I believe you will agree that what unites us is vastly more significant than our differences.

As you put it so well on a previous visit, Mr. Prime Minister, Britons and Americans communicate effectively because we share a common background of understanding. And each of us is aware that behind these few words lie volumes of thought and experience which do not need to be articulated, and of course this is a priceless asset to both our nations and our enduring friendship.

Mr. Prime Minister, another aspect of our common heritage is our devotion to democracy, our faith in the wisdom of people—and you and I have spent most of our adult life in government in one capacity or another.

This year marks the 30th anniversary of your election as a Member of the Parliament, where you have built an extraordinary record of achievement, leadership, and service to your country.

My own election to the House of Representatives was in 1948, when one of our guests, Hubert Humphrey, and I were both elected, he to a more prestigious office in the minds of some Members of the Congress [laughter]; but none of us in those days could have foreseen what would happen in the 1970's.

Today, the task is not to rebuild and to reorder a world torn by war but to face the challenges of peace and to face the problems of recession, inflation, balance-of-payments deficit, the shortages of energy and fuel as well as food, and the safeguarding of our security while trying to reduce the international tensions that are difficult as we try to strengthen our international relationships.

The problems underlying our interdepend-

ence of nations and the need for communication are vastly important, and our two nations, I think, can set an example for the problems that we face in this regard.

Recently, the world honored the 100th anniversary of Sir Winston Churchill's birthday, and it is almost unbelievable that today marks the 10th anniversary of Sir Winston Churchill's death. So, we think of him and of our difficulties and challenges. We are reminded of his courage and optimism in the face of great peril.

He told the world in December of 1941—and I think this is appropriate to mention now:

We have not journeyed all this way across the centuries, across the oceans, across the mountains, across the prairies because we are made of sugar candy.

Mr. Prime Minister, the challenges we face are serious, they are different and, in many ways, much more complex than those confronted in the Second World War; yet I am confident by working together the free and democratic nations can again triumph. We are still made not of sugar candy.

I look forward, Mr. Prime Minister, to continuing our constructive discussions tomorrow that we initiated today. It was most enjoyable to have an opportunity to be in the company of our British friends.

Mr. Prime Minister, you and I talked before dinner of a sport that apparently we both enjoy, but we don't do too competently. It is a sport better known among the Scottish, but loved by Americans as well as the British.

You know, I especially like to play golf with our Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who is with us tonight. Henry is undoubtedly one of the greatest diplomats this world has ever known. Let me tell you why I can make that categorical statement. The last time we played, I found myself in a sand trap. There was a water hazard beyond that, and then 95 feet before we found the first hole. Henry conceded the putt. [Laughter.]

Mr. Prime Minister, with profound appreciation for your presence with us today and tonight, I offer a toast to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth and to you and Mrs. Wilson. To the Queen.

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Rockefeller, Your Excellencies, distinguished fellow parliamentarians of both Houses of Congress, ladies and gentlemen: On behalf, Mr. President, of all those who have traveled with me for this meeting this week I should like to express our sincere thanks for your warm hospitality and for your kindness in inviting tonight so great and distinguished a company of your fellow countrymen, many of them old friends of mine, very many of whom to my personal knowledge have contributed to the full in maintaining and strengthening our transatlantic friendship.

The tradition of meetings between the governments of our two countries is rooted deep in our history. The very informality and friendship of these meetings, as we have found again today, so far from being a bar to the deep and wide-ranging probing of world problems, these things are themselves a guarantee that these problems fearlessly faced will be resolutely handled.

In my experience, the value of these Anglo-American intergovernmental and equally, may I say, interparliamentary associations that strengthen our relationship—the value of them rests in the fact that when we meet, there is so much that just does not need to be said between us.

It is all taken for granted, whether it be the assertion of the principles which we jointly hold or whether it be the obligations upon us to work together toward the solution of our own problems and those of the world, and it saves a great deal of time because we don't even have to go back to first base and repeat these things one to another.

From my experience of intergovernmental meetings in this city and in London, now going back more than a quarter of a century, I repeat tonight what I said to my hosts on Capitol Hill this afternoon. I repeat that I cannot recall a time when our relationship was so close or our understanding so deep as it is at this time as we meet, Mr. President, this week.

In the past years and for more than a generation—many would say for many generations—our peoples have worked together and indeed fought together to secure and strengthen the peace of the world and to show the role that democracy can play and must play within that world.

Last year 15 North American and European nations celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Atlantic alliance. As a survivor member of the Attlee Cabinet in Britain, which jointly with President Truman's Administration played so large a part in creating that alliance, I asked last year at the celebrations how many of us in 1949 could have foreseen the enduring strength of the alliance, still less foresee the contribution it would make and is making for peace and for the defense of democracy in some of those dangerous years which have lain between.

But whenever peace was in danger, whenever democracy was threatened, there were always leaders in our two countries ready to work together in joint action and in a wider setting to meet whatever challenges faced us, nor at any time did those leaders lack the unstinted support of their peoples.

But always we set before us the objective not just of building strength for its own sake or even building strength just for our own defense; always we have looked on strength as a means to peace and to reconciliation and to détente.

It is these aims that we are together again this week pursuing with world leaders. It is these aims that Her Majesty's Government will continue to assert when the Foreign Secretary and I visit Moscow in two weeks' time.

But, Mr. President, in a wider sense, our talks this week are being directed to still greater, still wider, still newer problems which have arisen to threaten the economic life of our own nations and of so many other nations of the world, rich and poor. It is out of the very nature of the challenges we have faced together—challenges which now are to the economic advance, challenges to the well-being for all the peoples of the world—

is out of the nature of the very challenge, is also out of the understandings developed between us in the past that we must now in his new situation forge still newer instruments for meeting the economic problems, these problems the gravity of which—and they are grave—serve only to strengthen the joint resolution which we shall put forward together.

In this spirit, Mr. President, thanking you again for your wonderful hospitality today and this evening, it is in this spirit that we undertake together the discussions of this week, and it is in this spirit, too, that we shall go forward together.

In that spirit, Mr. President, may I now have the honor, on behalf of your visitors here this week and of this great company, of proposing the health and prosperity of the President of the United States and of Mrs. Ford.

President Ford's News Conference at Atlanta February 4

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford at Atlanta, Ga., on February 4.¹

Q. In the last 24 hours you have spoken at length about domestic concerns. I would like to ask you what options you will have to help maintain a non-Communist government in Viet-Nam if the Congress does not go along with your supplemental appropriation request as well as this fiscal year '76 request for Viet-Nam?

President Ford: If the Congress does not respond to the requested additional military assistance for the current fiscal year, an amount which the Congress last year previously authorized, it will certainly complicate the military situation from the point of view of the South Vietnamese.

The South Vietnamese on their own, with our financial assistance, our military aid, have done very well; but the Congress did not fully fund the requested military assistance that was requested. I believe that if the Congress funds the additional money that I have proposed for this fiscal year and continues the money that I have recommended for next fiscal year, the South Vietnamese can and will be able to defend themselves against the aggressors from the North.

Q. The question is, if the Congress fails to do that, what options will you have then?

President Ford: I do not think that the time for me to answer that question is at the present. I, in the first place, believe Congress will fund the money that I have requested; and if they do, then I have no need to look at any other options, because they will be capable of defending themselves. The good judgment of the Congress will fund, the South Vietnamese will defend themselves, and I do not think there will be any other needed options.

Q. Mr. President, when you left Vladivostok in November, we were led to understand that General Secretary Brezhnev would be in Washington in May or June. The time is running short, a lot has happened in American-Soviet relations since then. Do you still look forward to welcoming Mr. Brezhnev just three or four months from now?

President Ford: Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press], I look forward to having the General Secretary in the United States in the summer of 1975. The negotiations which we concluded in Vladivostok are moving along in the negotiations that are necessary to put the final draft. These negotiations are taking place in Geneva.

I see no reason why we cannot reconcile any of the relatively minor differences. The basic agreement is still in effect, and I am confident that we can welcome the General Secretary to the United States in the summer of 1975, and I look forward to it.

¹ For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Feb. 10, 1974.

President Ford Warns of Effects of Military Aid Cutoff to Turkey

*Statement by President Ford*¹

Legislation enacted by Congress requires that arms deliveries to Turkey must be suspended February 5. The Administration will comply fully with the law. However, it should be made clear that military aid to Turkey is not given in the context of the Cyprus issue, nor has it been granted as a favor to Turkey. Rather, it is based on our common conclusions that the security of Turkey is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean and to the security of the United States and its allies.

A suspension of military aid to Turkey is likely to impede the negotiation of a just Cyprus settlement. Furthermore, it could have far-reaching and damaging effects on the security and hence the political stability of all the countries in the region. It will affect adversely not only Western security but the strategic situation in the Middle East. It cannot be in the interest of the United States to take action that will jeopardize the system on which our relations in the eastern Mediterranean have been based for 28 years.

When it is seen that the United States is taking action which is clearly incompatible with its own interests, this will raise grave doubts about the conduct of American foreign relations even among countries that are not directly involved in that area.

¹ Issued on Feb. 5 (text from White House press release).

The Administration judges these adverse effects of a suspension of aid to Turkey to be so serious that it urges the Congress to reconsider its action and authorize the resumption of our assistance relationship with Turkey.

Letters of Credence

Bolivia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Bolivia, Roberto Capriles, presented his credentials to President Ford on January 29.¹

Dominican Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, Dr. Horacio Vicioso Soto, presented his credentials to President Ford on January 29.¹

Ecuador

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Ecuador, Jose Corsino Cardenas presented his credentials to President Ford on January 29.¹

Sudan

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Dr. Francis Mading Deng, presented his credentials to President Ford on January 29.¹

¹ For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Jan. 29.

Department Discusses Request for Supplemental Appropriation for Military Assistance to Cambodia

Statement by Philip C. Habib

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs¹

In both Viet-Nam and Cambodia there has been a recent significant escalation of military action by Communist forces. This has placed new and severe strains on the resources of the governments of those countries and has rendered the assistance we provide to them inadequate to meet its intended objectives. The President has therefore asked Congress to make available additional funds for military aid to Viet-Nam and Cambodia and to remove impediments to the use of funds already appropriated to provide essential food aid to Cambodia.

The Viet-Nam supplemental, a Defense appropriation, will be formally considered on another occasion. The authority to increase food aid for Cambodia does not require any additional appropriation. My testimony today therefore is primarily in support of our request for appropriations for military aid for Cambodia. But in my remarks this afternoon I will attempt to address the problem of Cambodia in the broader context of our overall Indochina policy.

Two years ago we concluded an agreement in Paris which we hoped would end the war in Viet-Nam and pave the way for settlements in Laos and Cambodia. The Paris

agreement was the end result of a long and tortuous negotiating process. In its final form, the agreement was one which we felt honored the sacrifices and respected the sense of justice of both sides. It implied a rejection of absolutes, an acceptance of restraint, an acknowledgment of limitations—as must any accord. From the standpoint of the United States, the agreement in large measure met what had been our purpose throughout the long history of our efforts in Viet-Nam: it ended our direct military involvement there and established a formula through which the people of South Viet-Nam could determine their political future without outside interference.

Things have not worked out as we had hoped. Only in Laos have the contending parties moved from military confrontation to political competition. In Viet-Nam, after a period of relative quiescence, warfare again rages and the structure created by the agreement for working toward a political settlement is endangered. In Cambodia, there has been no amelioration of the conflict, and the military balance in that country is gravely threatened.

I cannot profess surprise at these developments. The Paris agreement contained no self-enforcing mechanisms. For that agreement to be effective and to achieve its purpose, both sides were required to act in accordance with the principles of restraint, compromise, and minimal good faith which must underlie the resolution of any indeci-

¹Made before the Subcommittee on Government Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations on Feb. 3. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

sive conflict. Those qualities have been conspicuously absent from Hanoi's approach. In Cambodia, also, a negotiated settlement demands that both sides accept the imperatives of compromise. The Cambodian Communists have instead sought military victory.

While its focus was on Viet-Nam, the Paris agreement also contained provisions relating to Laos and Cambodia. The signatories were enjoined to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those countries, and all foreign troops were to have been withdrawn. South Viet-Nam and the United States have abided by those strictures. Hanoi has not. North Viet-Nam continues to use the territory of Laos to send forces and war materiel to South Viet-Nam and continues to station troops in remote areas of that country. North Viet-Nam uses the territory of Cambodia to support its military operations in South Viet-Nam. In addition, Hanoi gives material assistance and battlefield advice to Communist forces operating against the Cambodian Government.

Let me now turn specifically to the situation in Cambodia. The conflict in Cambodia is complex, and its origins are widely misunderstood. Sihanouk was deposed in 1970 by a government which he himself had formed less than a year before. That action was ratified by a National Assembly whose members Sihanouk had personally selected. The United States played no role in the matter. (Our total presence in Cambodia at that time consisted of two diplomatic officers and three military attaches.) Several days after those events, North Vietnamese forces attacked Cambodian Government outposts in the eastern region of the country. Armed hostilities in Cambodia date from those attacks. Under North Vietnamese auspices, insurgent forces were formed and joined the fray.

Warfare has since been unremitting and often intense. The human and material cost has been high. The economic life of Cambodia has been shattered. What was once a rich agricultural country producing con-

sistent rice surpluses is now heavily dependent on outside assistance for even the most basic necessities. Perhaps as many as 1.5 million people, over a fifth of the total population, have become refugees. Thousands of Cambodians—soldiers and civilians—have lost their lives.

Cambodia's battle against an externally supported insurgent movement has been intensified still further in recent weeks. On January 1, Communist forces launched a new offensive, stepping up attacks in the area near Phnom Penh and against several provincial capitals and making strong efforts to cut the vital Mekong supply corridor. Total casualties for both sides are running at least 1,000 a day—killed, wounded, or missing—and more than 60,000 new refugees have been created. The already stricken economic life of the country is further ravaged.

Cambodian Government forces have fought remarkably well in the face of difficult odds. In little more than four years, a small and largely ceremonial army has grown into a sizable and increasingly effective fighting force. In this connection, I have seen a number of recent press articles alleging waste of ammunition by Cambodian forces. They require comment. While this was partly true a year ago, as noted by the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance in a recent report, that report also notes that steps have been taken to improve ammunition conservation. Because of those efforts, Cambodian forces are undoubtedly making better use of their ammunition this year than last. But combat intensity remains the primary determinant of ammunition expenditure—and the Communists have raised the intensity markedly since January 1.

I would also add that it is misleading to compare the ammunition expenditures of defending forces with those of insurgents. As in Viet-Nam, Communist forces—having no population centers or fixed positions to defend—are able to mass forces at times and places of their choosing; this allows them economies unavailable to widely dispersed defenders.

In Cambodia, even more than in Viet-Nam, the material resources the nation must have for its defense are strained to the limit. If South Viet-Nam faces a harsh choice in allocating diminishing defense resources, it is not inaccurate to say that Cambodia has no choice. If it is to avoid collapse and chaos, and if there is to be any prospect for a compromise solution, additional aid must be provided without delay.

Our objective in Cambodia is to restore peace and to allow the Cambodian people an opportunity to decide freely the political future of their country. It has never been our belief, or a premise of our policy toward Cambodia, that the conflict would end in conclusive military victory by Cambodian Government forces. Nor, however, should it end in military victory by the Communists. We believe the only logical and fair solution is one involving negotiations and a compromise settlement. The Cambodian Government has repeatedly called for talks with the opposing side, without preconditions. We have fully supported these proposals as well as the resolution, sponsored by Cambodia's Southeast Asian neighbors and adopted in the last session of the U.N. General Assembly, calling for early negotiations. The Communists, however, have been adamantly opposed to a negotiated settlement. Their attitude is unlikely to change unless and until they conclude that military victory is not possible. The first imperative, therefore, and the aim of our military assistance to the Cambodian Government, is to preserve a military balance and thereby to promote negotiations.

Present restrictions on our military and economic assistance to Cambodia, contained in the 1974 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, make it impossible to accomplish that goal. The Administration originally requested \$390 million in military aid for this fiscal year. The \$200 million in military aid authorized for this fiscal year was expended during the past six months, on the basis of continuing-resolution authority, in response to significantly intensified Communist offensive actions. Since the be-

ginning of the latest Communist offensive on January 1, ammunition expenditures have gone higher, of necessity, and even the \$75 million drawdown of Defense Department stocks authorized for this emergency situation will not meet the needs. In addition to this stringent situation with respect to military supplies, Cambodia also faces an impending severe rice shortage.

Therefore, to meet minimum requirements for the survival of the Khmer Republic, President Ford has asked the Congress to do three things:

—First, to eliminate the existing \$200 million ceiling on military assistance for Cambodia.

—Second, to authorize and appropriate \$222 million in military aid, in addition to appropriating the \$200 million currently authorized. Our original request to the Congress for military assistance to Cambodia during the current fiscal year, \$390 million, was an amount we regarded then as the minimum needed. With unexpectedly increased Communist pressures, and in view of the sharp rise in the cost of ammunition—the largest single item in the program—\$222 million in additional funds is now clearly required. That amount, plus the \$200 million in aid funds and the \$75 million in Department of Defense drawdown already authorized, will bring total military assistance for the year to a level generally comparable to our original estimates of the need and our original request to the Congress.

—Third, to eliminate the \$377 million ceiling on our overall aid to Cambodia, or at least to exempt Public Law 480 food from that ceiling. This is necessary to enable us to provide vital commodities, mostly food, as soon as possible. The inability to use funds already included in the Department of Agriculture appropriation will cause a break in the food supply pipeline beginning in June unless procurement action is begun by late March. New authority therefore is needed urgently. We anticipate, as we have throughout the year in appearances before you, that between \$73 million and \$100 million in

additional rice and wheat will have to be provided to Cambodia this fiscal year. Economic collapse, and even starvation, may otherwise result.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, we wish, as do you, to see an early end to the suffering of the Cambodian people and to the destruction of their country. The only equitable way in which this can be accomplished is to strengthen conditions which will permit a negotiated solution to take place. It is for this purpose that additional military assistance and economic assistance authority for Cambodia is an urgent necessity.

This request—and the one we are submitting separately for Viet-Nam—does not represent the beginning of a new and open-ended commitment for the United States. Nor does it reflect any change in policy on the part of the United States. The additional funds and authorities which we are asking the Congress to make available for Cambodia are vitally needed, for the reasons I have set forth, in support of a policy which has in large measure proven appropriate to the difficult circumstances of Indochina. That policy, borne out in the record of our actions, is one of steady disengagement—in a manner designed to prevent new upheavals in Indochina, new instability in the East Asia region, and renewed contention among the major powers.

Cambodia cannot be considered separately from Viet-Nam and Laos, and the whole of Indochina cannot be isolated from larger world issues. The consequences of a decision to withhold vitally needed assistance to Cambodia would extend beyond the confines of Indochina—and they would be inimical to the broad sweep of our interests in this small and interdependent world. Such a decision would amount to a conscious act to abandon a small country to a forcible Communist takeover, an action without precedent in our history. The amounts we are requesting for Cambodia are not large when measured against the sacrifices we and the people of Indochina have already made. They are, however, vital to the restoration of conditions which can lead to peace in Cambodia.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

- Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949–50. Historical Series. Hearings held in executive session before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (1949 and 1950). Made public January 1974. 280 pp.
- Reviews of the World Situation: 1949–50. Historical Series. Hearings held in executive session before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (1949 and 1950). Made public June 1974. 447 pp.
- The Energy Crisis: Impact on Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 27, 1974. 41 pp.
- International Terrorism. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. June 11–24, 1974. 219 pp.
- Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the House Committee on Armed Services. May 8–July 2, 1974. 71 pp.
- Resolutions of Inquiry Into Proposed Nuclear Agreements With Egypt and Israel. Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July 9, 1974. 6 pp.
- Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations. Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Relations on H. Con. Res. 507 and identical and similar resolutions relating to the resumption of opium production by and the termination of foreign assistance to Turkey. July 16, 1974. 79 pp.
- World Population and Food Supply and Demand Situation. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Department Operations of the House Committee on Agriculture. July 23–25, 1974. 188 pp.
- Cyprus—1974. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on Europe. August 19–20, 1974. 85 pp.
- Report on Nutrition and the International Situation. Prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs. September 1974. 57 pp.
- U.S. Policy and World Food Needs. Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Movements and on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. September 10–12, 1974. 163 pp.
- U.S. Foreign Policy and the Export of Nuclear Technology to the Middle East. Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Movements and on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. June 25–September 16, 1974. 333 pp.
- Briefings on Diego Garcia and Patrol Frigate. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations. Executive hearings held on April 11, 1974; made public November 22, 1974. 47 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973.¹

Signatures: Bolivia, December 23, 1974; Ecuador, December 12, 1974; Ghana, December 16, 1974; Ireland, November 1, 1974; Netherlands, December 30, 1974; Norway, December 23, 1974; Peru, December 30, 1974; Portugal, December 6, 1974.

Ratification deposited: Cyprus, October 18, 1974.
Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates, November 21, 1974.

Copyright

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Ratification deposited: Spain (with reservation), October 16, 1974.

Cotton

Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute, as amended (TIAS 6184). Done at Washington January 17, 1966. Entered into force February 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.

Accession deposited: Nigeria, February 4, 1975.

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.

Accession deposited: Liberia, January 7, 1975.
Customs convention on containers, with annexes and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva May 18, 1956. Entered into force August 4, 1959; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6634.
Extended to: Hong Kong, effective March 12, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: France, January 28, 1975.
Accessions deposited: Barbados, January 28, 1975; Saudi Arabia, January 29, 1975.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at

Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.

Notifications from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratifications deposited: Algeria (with a declaration and a reservation), Cameroon, January 20, 1975; Cuba (with a declaration and a reservation), January 8, 1975; Holy See, Japan (articles 1 to 12 excepted), January 24, 1975.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, January 16, 1975; Holy See, Japan, January 20, 1975.

Accessions deposited: Cuba (with a declaration), December 27, 1974; Egypt, January 21, 1975.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Ratification deposited: Iceland, February 7, 1975.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.²

Accession deposited: Australia (with a reservation), December 10, 1974.³

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.¹

Ratifications deposited: Nigeria, October 23, 1974; Zaïre, September 23, 1974.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement modifying the agreement of March 31 and June 12, 1967, as amended (TIAS 6268, 6626), relating to pre-sunrise operations of certain standard (AM) radio broadcasting stations. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa November 12, 1974, and January 22, 1975. Entered into force January 22, 1975.

Japan

Agreement relating to the establishment of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo December 27, 1974. Entered into force December 27, 1974.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ Not applicable to Papua New Guinea.

Paraguay

Agreement relating to the deposit by Paraguay of 10 percent of the value of grant military assistance and excess defense articles furnished by the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción May 12, 1972. Entered into force May 12, 1972; effective February 7, 1972. TIAS 7461. *Terminated*: January 27, 1975.

Spain

Supplementary treaty on extradition. Signed at Madrid January 25, 1975. Enters into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

U.S. Relations With Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf Countries. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series is a statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the House Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Pub. 8777. Near East and South Asian Series 83. 8 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S1.86:83).

Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7867. 9 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7867).

Copyright. Universal Copyright Convention, as amended. TIAS 7868. 81 pp. \$1.15. (Cat. No. S9.10:7868).

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Egypt relating to the agreement of June 29, 1963. TIAS 7870. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7870).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Paraguay. TIAS 7873. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7873).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Nicaragua. TIAS 7876. 4 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7876).

Economic, Technical, and Related Assistance. Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 7877. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7877).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Hungarian People's Republic amending the agreement of August 13, 1970, as amended. TIAS 7878. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7878).

Control and Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Agreement with Colombia amending the agreement of November 27 and December 3, 14, and 17, 1973. TIAS 7879. 3 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7879).

Refugee Relief in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos and the Khmer Republic. Agreements with the International Committee of the Red Cross amending the agreement of November 1, 1973. TIAS 7880. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7880).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic amending and extending the agreement of February 28, 1969, as amended and extended. TIAS 7881. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7881).

Suez Canal—Clearance of Mines and Unexploded Ordnance. Arrangement with Egypt. TIAS 7882. 5 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7882).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Haiti modifying the agreement of October 19 and November 3, 1971, as amended. TIAS 7883. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7883).

Meteorology—Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP) Atlantic Tropical Experiment (GATE). Agreement with the World Meteorological Organization. TIAS 7884. 29 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7884).

Relations. Joint statement with Jordan. TIAS 7885. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7885).

Air Transport Services. Agreements with Mexico extending the agreement of August 15, 1960, as amended and extended. TIAS 7886. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7886).

Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Helicopters and Related Assistance. Agreement with Burma. TIAS 7887. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7887).

Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Rinderpest. Agreement with Panama amending the agreement of June 21 and October 5, 1972. TIAS 7888. 16 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7888).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Thailand amending the agreement of March 17, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7889. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7889).

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**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 3-9**

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*41	2/3	Saxbe sworn in as Ambassador to India (biographic data).
42	2/3	Kissinger: address and question and answer period, National Press Club.
*43	2/3	U.S.-Singapore textile agreement extended.
*44	2/3	Program for the official visit of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Feb. 4-7.
†45	2/4	"Foreign Relations," 1948, volume III, Western Europe (for release Feb. 11).
*46	2/4	U.S.-Nicaragua textile agreement extended.
*47	2/4	Program for official visit of the Prime Minister of Pakistan: correction.
*48	2/4	U.S.-U.S.S.R. fisheries discussions convened.
*49	2/5	Kissinger, Rusk, Reston: interviews by Reg Murphy, Atlanta Constitution, for Public Broadcasting System program "Great Decisions '75."
†50	2/5	Department releases 1975 edition of "Treaties in Force."
*51	2/7	Study Group 2 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Mar. 6.
*52	2/8	Meeting on international grain reserves, London, Feb. 10-11.
†53	2/7	Kissinger: interview for Netherlands television.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.