



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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AND THE SOVIET UNION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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President Ford's News Conference of December 2

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the auditorium of the Executive Office Building on December 2.¹

President Ford: Good evening. Perhaps I can anticipate some of your questions by summarizing my recent visits to Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union.

In Japan, we succeeded in establishing a new era of relations between our two countries. We demonstrated our continuing commitment to the independence and to the security of South Korea. At Vladivostok we put a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race, which heretofore has eluded us since the nuclear age began. I believe this is something for which future generations will thank us.

Finally, Secretary Kissinger's mission maintained the momentum in China with the People's Republic of China.

My meetings at Vladivostok with General Secretary Brezhnev were a valuable opportunity to review Soviet-American relations and chart their future course. Although this was our original purpose, Secretary Brezhnev and I found it possible to go beyond this get-acquainted stage.

Building on the achievements of the past three years, we agreed that the prospects were favorable for more substantial and, may I say, very intensive negotiations on the primary issue of a limitation of strategic arms.

In the end, we agreed on the general framework for a new agreement that will last

through 1985. We agreed it is realistic to aim at completing this agreement next year. This is possible because we made major breakthroughs on two critical issues:

—Number one, we agreed to put a ceiling of 2,400 each on the total number of inter-continental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and heavy bombers.

—Two, we agreed to limit the number of missiles that can be armed with multiple warheads, MIRV's. Of each side's total of 2,400, 1,320 can be so armed.

These ceilings are well below the force levels which would otherwise have been expected over the next 10 years and very substantially below the forces which would result from an all-out arms race over that same period.

What we have done is to set firm and equal limits on the strategic forces of each side, thus preventing an arms race with all its terror, instability, war-breeding tension, and economic waste.

We have, in addition, created the solid basis from which future arms reductions can be made and, hopefully, will be negotiated.

It will take more detailed negotiations to convert this agreed framework into a comprehensive accord, but we have made a long step toward peace on a basis of equality, the only basis on which an agreement was possible.

Beyond this, our improved relations with the other nations of Asia developed on this journey will continue to serve the interests of the United States and the cause of peace for months to come. Economy, energy, security, and trade relations were discussed, which will be of mutual benefit to us all.

¹ For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 9, 1974.

I would like to repeat publicly my thanks and gratitude for the hospitality extended to me by all of my hosts and, through me, to the American people.

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International], I am glad to respond to your question.

Q. Mr. President, this pact permits the nuclear buildup to go ahead. Since you want to cut government spending, how many billions of dollars will this cost the American people over the years, and also, do you think that the Russians stalled last July because they knew that Mr. Nixon was doomed in the Presidency and preferred to deal with his successor?

President Ford: I would like to correct, if I might, one impression. This does not permit an agreed buildup. It puts a cap on future buildups, and it actually reduces a part of the buildup at the present time.

It is important, I should say, however, in order for us to maintain equality, which is a keystone of this program, to have an adequate amount of military expenditures. But I can say this without hesitation or qualification: If we had not had this agreement, it would have required the United States to substantially increase its military expenditures in the strategic areas.

So, we put a cap on the arms race. We actually made some reductions below present programs. It is a good agreement, and I think that the American people will buy it, because it provides for equality and it provides for a negotiated reduction in several years ahead.

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. President, there are reports that you and Mr. Brezhnev made some progress in maybe fashioning a complementary approach to negotiations in the Middle East. More specifically, perhaps the Soviets would agree to try to persuade the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] to acknowledge that Israel has a right to exist, and we then might try to persuade Israel to talk to the PLO. Is there any truth to this?

President Ford: Mr. Cormier, Mr. Brezhnev and I did discuss at some length our different views on the settlement of the Middle East. There are some differences, but they are not as major as it would appear.

We indicated that, in our judgment, it was important for continuous progress to be made, perhaps with negotiations between Israel and one or more of the other Arab nations.

We also agreed that at a certain point a Geneva Conference might be the final answer. So, as we discussed our what appeared to be different views at the outset, I think we came to an agreement that it was in the interest of the nations in the Middle East, the interest of the world at large, that both parties make a maximum effort to keep negotiations going.

We think our step-by-step approach is the right one for the time being, but we don't preclude the possibility of a Geneva Conference.

Yes, sir.

Q. You say that this is going to reduce a part of the buildup. Does that mean, then, that we are going to spend less on defense next year than we are spending this year?

President Ford: It does not mean that, because only a part of our total defense program is related to strategic arms research, development, deployment, and operations and maintenance. We do have an obligation within the limits of 2,400 on delivery systems and 1,320 on MIRV's to keep our forces up to that level.

And I think we can, with about the same expenditure level for the next fiscal year as at the present.

But in the other programs, in our tactical forces and other military programs, there is an inflationary cost. The military has that inflation just like you and I do, so we will probably have to increase our military budget next year just to take care of the costs of inflation.

Yes.

Q. Just to follow up, we are not quite to that ceiling yet, are we? Do you intend to

stay below that ceiling, or are you going to try to reach that ceiling?

President Ford: I intend to stay below the ceiling. That is the agreement, but we do have an obligation to stay up to that ceiling, and the budget that I will recommend will keep our strategic forces either up to or aimed at that objective.

Q. Mr. President, since it is widely believed the Soviet Union has larger rockets capable of carrying heavier payloads and being MIRV'ed to a larger extent, carrying more warheads, can you tell us what the relative position would be between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of warheads if each side goes to the maximum number of 1,320 on the MIRV'ed limit?

President Ford: On delivery systems, we are equal. On the MIRV'ing, we are equal. I think the question you are asking is throw weight. It is recognized that the Soviet Union has a heavier throw weight, but the agreement does not preclude the United States from increasing its throw-weight capability.

A number of years ago, our military decided that we wanted smaller missiles that were more accurate. That has been the decision of our military.

Now, if the military decides at the present time that they want to increase the throw weight, we have that right under the agreement, and I can tell you that we have the capability to do so.

So, if there is an inequality in throw weight, it can be remedied if our military recommended and the Congress appropriates the money.

Q. Mr. President, if you find the Soviet Union leaning, then, toward getting the maximum throw weight or the maximum number of warheads on their MIRV missiles, would you then recommend that the United States accelerate and move from smaller missiles to larger ones?

President Ford: The Soviet military guidelines were for heavier missiles, heavier throw weight. Our military took a different point

of view some years ago. The Soviet Union is limited as to delivery systems and as to MIRV's within the delivery systems. They cannot go beyond those.

The agreement gives us the flexibility to move up in throw weight if we want to. It does not preclude the Soviets from increasing throw weight, but I think for good reasons they have no justification for doing so.

Yes, Mr. Sperling [Godfrey Sperling, Christian Science Monitor].

Q. Wouldn't your stated accomplishments in Russia have carried more long-range credibility if they had been put initially and then described later on in less sanguine and more modest terms?

President Ford: Well, if I understand the question, when I came back a week ago yesterday, we did not have in writing what is called an aide memoire, which was the specific agreement in writing that General Secretary Brezhnev and I had agreed to verbally. That has now been received.

Until that had been received and we had checked it out, we felt it was wise to speak in generalities. I am giving to you and to the American people tonight the specific figures. They are, I think, constructive. It is a good agreement. It is an agreement—if I might repeat—that puts a cap on the arms race, it makes some reductions, and it gives us an opportunity to negotiate.

So, I don't think a week's delay in the specifics has handicapped our presentation.

Q. More specifically, what percentage of the state of progress in Russia was yours, and how much was Mr. Nixon's?

President Ford: Well, I don't really think I ought to get into an evaluation of that. The United States has been working on a strategic arms limitation agreement for three or four years. I think we made headway in SALT One. I think we have made a real breakthrough in SALT Two.

Q. Mr. President, I would like to get back to the cost of missiles for one moment, if we may. I understand we are now spending about \$15 billion a year in strategic arms,

and there is an enormous amount of missile building to be done under this agreement over the next 10 years, both in MIRV's and in throw weight. Will our costs continue at about the level they are now for the next 10 years, or will it be more?

President Ford: My best judgment is that our strategic arms cost will hold relatively the same. It will not be substantially expanded other than for any increase resulting from inflation.

Yes.

Q. Mr. President, under the agreement the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at the forward bases in Europe were not included. Do you expect that they will be reduced or eliminated under some future mutual balanced force reduction agreement with the Soviet Union?

President Ford: One of the very significant benefits of the agreement from Vladivostok was the fact we didn't have to include in the 2,400 or the 1,320—either the delivery systems or the MIRV's—as far as the forward-based systems were concerned.

I am sure you know we are involved in mutual balanced force reductions in Western Europe. When we get closer to an agreement there—and I hope we will; we are presently negotiating in Vienna in this area—it is hopeful that we can make some reductions both in numbers of military personnel between ourselves and the allies on the one side and the Warsaw Pact nations and the Soviet Union on the other, as well as any arms reductions.

Q. Beyond your hope, is that a commitment that you made to the Soviet leaders in Vladivostok?

President Ford: No, we made no agreement concerning the mutual balanced force reductions. We did agree to continue negotiations.

Q. Mr. President, are you satisfied that the Soviets are carrying out the spirit and the letter of the 1972 arms limitation agreements?

President Ford: We know of no violations, either on the part of the Soviet Union or by ourselves. There have been some allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT One agreement. We don't think they have.

There are, however, some ambiguities. When the SALT One agreement was agreed to, there was established a Standing Consultative Commission made up of the Soviet Union and the United States. That Commission can meet twice a year to analyze any allegations as to violations of SALT One. It is our intention to call for a meeting of that group—I think in January of next year—to analyze any of the ambiguities that have been alleged. We don't think there have been any violations, but I have a responsibility to find out, and we intend to follow through under the agreed procedure of the 1972 agreements.

Q. Mr. President, since there is no limit in this agreement on throw weight, and since there is no limit on multiple warheads, and since additional multiple warheads could be put on the bigger missiles, more or less ad infinitum, how can you say that this is a lid or cap on the arms race?

President Ford: Well, it certainly, number one, puts a limit on the delivery systems—2,400—and as I indicated at the outset, this does result in a cutback as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

The 1,320 limitation on MIRV's does put a lid on the planned or programed program for ourselves as well as the Soviet Union.

Now, the throw-weight problem is one that we can remedy if we want to. Our military took a different point of view some years ago when they designed our ballistic missiles, but we have that flexibility.

Now, if we decide to go to a heavier throw weight, we can add on a MIRV'ed missile a greater number of individual warheads. That is a choice of flexibility that we have, and I think it is one of the benefits of this agreement.

Q. You wouldn't describe that as an arms race?

President Ford: Well, it is an attempt, if

our military wanted to achieve an equality in this particular area. We have equality on delivery systems and the right to MIRV from those delivery systems. In the other, if it is our choice, we can go up in throw weight.

Yes, Sarah [Sarah McLendon, McLendon News Service].

Q. Mr. President, I want to ask you, what about conventional weapons? We have heard from Senator [Barry] Goldwater, and we have heard from Admiral Zumwalt [Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations] that we are very weak on conventional weapons and we need more of those, rather than the kind that you have in your agreement.

President Ford: Well, of course, this agreement, Sarah, was limited to strategic arms. We hope, as I indicated a moment ago, to continue our negotiations for the mutual balanced force reductions in Europe. That, of course, would have a limit on the conventional weapons.

In the meantime, I think it is of mandatory importance for the United States to maintain its conventional capability—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines—because the United States, through a responsible military program, can maintain the peace. If we cut back our defense in conventional weapons, I think we will have weakened our position for the maintenance of peace. I don't intend to propose a budget in that regard.

Q. Mr. President, do you think that we can do both of these, then?

President Ford: I think so.

Q. To follow up on Frank Cormier's question, did you and Mr. Brezhnev discuss some kind of a trade-off whereby Israel would deal with the PLO and the PLO would recognize Israel's right to exist as a state?

President Ford: We didn't get into that detail. Israel has indicated that it would not negotiate with the PLO. We have no way of forcing them to do so.

The discussion between Mr. Brezhnev and

myself, as far as the Middle East was concerned, was to state our position and their position; and as we discussed it, I think we came to a higher degree of agreement in that our position was understood by them and the prospect of a Geneva agreement was understood by us.

Q. I understand you would like to devote about half of the news conference to domestic affairs, and I think we are about at the halfway point.

Q. Mr. President, this question perhaps goes back to the earlier part of the news conference, but it has an economic impact—and that is how much it will cost to reach the ceiling which you negotiated with Mr. Brezhnev, and when do you expect that the United States will reach this ceiling?

President Ford: As I indicated in answer to an earlier question, I think we must continue our present strategic research development, deployment, maintenance programs. And we are going to move into the present program some additional new weapons systems—the B-1 aircraft, the Trident submarine. The net result is that costs will probably go up as we phase out some and phase in some and phase out others. Now, the total annual cost will be relatively the same plus the cost of inflation.

Q. Is it \$18 billion?

President Ford: It is in that ball park.

Q. And for how many years do you expect this to continue, Mr. President?

President Ford: Until we are able to negotiate a reduction below the 2,400 delivery systems and the 1,320 MIRV systems.

Q. To follow up the question that is reaching but is still in the economic ball park, if the ceiling works, will there ever be a saving, an actual saving, in expenditures for strategic weapons?

President Ford: Very, very definitely, and that is the fundamental question that we

have answered. If there had been no ceiling of 2,400 on launchers and 1,320 on MIRV's, we would have had an arms race. The Soviet Union had plans and programs, we believe, to substantially increase the number of launchers and to substantially go beyond 1,320 on the MIRV's.

And we have the capability. And, I think, if there had been an arms race with the Soviet Union going higher and higher and higher, we as a nation, for our own security, would have been forced to do precisely the same.

So, Mr. Brezhnev and I agreed that we

first had to cap the arms race, both in launchers and in MIRV's. We have done that, and I wish to compliment Mr. Brezhnev because his opening statement, if I can paraphrase it, was that he and I, his country and ours, had an obligation to not indulge in an arms race, to put a cap on the proposed expenditures in both categories.

It was a statesmanlike approach at the outset, and because he believed that and because I believe it, I think we made substantial progress, and I strongly defend what we did.

The press: Thank you, Mr. President.

President Ford Visits Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union

President Ford made a state visit to Japan November 18-22, visited Korea November 22-23, and met with Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at Vladivostok November 23-24. Following are remarks and toasts by President Ford during the trip and the texts of joint communiques issued at Tokyo and Seoul, a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on limitation of strategic offensive arms issued at Vladivostok, and a joint U.S.-Soviet communique signed at Vladivostok.

DEPARTURE REMARKS, THE WHITE HOUSE, NOVEMBER 17

White House press release dated November 17

Let me just say a word or two, and at the outset thank all of my friends for coming out to see us off.

I think this trip has great significance, both as to timing and as to substance. We all live in an interrelated world; no longer can we, in the United States, think in the terms of isolationism. What we do overseas has great significance for some of the problems that we have here at home.

This, I think, can be defined as a quest for peace, to broaden it, to strengthen it; and as I said in Arizona earlier this week, I would rather travel 1,000 miles for peace than take a single step for war.

We are visiting three great countries. The first is Japan, the first visit of an American President, a state visit, to that great country. We have a special relationship with Japan, and although we are separated by the broadest of oceans, we have the closest of friendships.

We also will be stopping in the Republic of Korea, a courageous and brave ally, an ally that joins with us in preserving peace in that part of the world.

The trip to the Soviet Union has special significance. There has been a tremendous effort over the years to broaden an effort of peace throughout the world, and I look forward to participating in the ever-increasing strengthening of our ties with the Soviet Union.

I go with optimism. I think we, as Americans, can be optimistic about the progress that has been made and will be made. I go with a dedication of service to my fellow Americans and a pride in our great country.

Thank you very, very much.

THE VISIT TO JAPAN

Toast at Luncheon Given by Kakuei Tanaka, Prime Minister of Japan, Tokyo, November 19

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 19

Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies, gentlemen: The reception that I received upon arriving in Japan and the warm reception received during the day today is further proof of the great hospitality that the Japanese people have for the Americans.

This very kind and gracious hospitality—the warm reception—is typical of the attitude of the Japanese Government and the Japanese people. When I stopped in Anchorage on the way to Japan, the last words I said to my fellow Americans were that although Japan and the United States were separated by the broadest of oceans, they were on the other hand the warmest of friends.

Mr. Prime Minister, you spent many years in your Parliament, and I spent better than 25 years in the Congress of the United States. I have a great liking for the Congress. I called it my home outside home.

I can't speak with any personal relationship to the Congress a hundred-plus years ago when they were alleged to be lacking in civilization, but I would have to say in defense of the Congress today—whether I agree with what they do or not, they are better behaved. [Laughter.]

Let me assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Ford deeply regrets she is not with me on this trip. She had long looked forward to visiting Japan, meeting the Japanese people, and she is terribly disappointed that it is impossible for her to be here on this occasion. I spoke with her on the telephone this morning. That didn't help any, because of her desire to be here. But I can say that she is here in spirit, if not in person, and she will come on some other occasions.

Mr. Prime Minister, the United States is a nation of citizens with many backgrounds, many ancestors. Some of our very finest citizens have a Japanese ancestry. We are proud of the tremendous contributions that they make to a better America. We are proud of them because of the significant

contributions they have made to our culture, to our industry, to our trade, to our education, and to our government.

Mr. Prime Minister, the dialogue that we began in Washington and which we have continued here in Tokyo indicates that we have many, many basic ties and many areas of common purpose. We have many problems, but the frank and open discussions that we have had and will continue to have involving areas of prosperity on a worldwide basis and peace on a global basis are beneficial to your country and to ours and to the world as a whole.

Our two countries, by working together, can significantly contribute to world peace, and we will. Our two nations, cooperating with one another, can make a significant contribution to prosperity in both of our countries and to the world at large.

Mr. Prime Minister, we must discuss and coordinate our economic policies in an era of energy shortages and some international monetary crises. We must work together in order to produce and distribute, make available the need of mankind for food throughout the world.

Mr. Prime Minister, we must join together in helping those nations throughout the world that are less fortunate than we. We have in the past, and we will expand those efforts in the future.

In contemplating these problems, the expansion of peace and the betterment of the world economically, it is good to know that we can discuss the issues and problems in an attitude and an atmosphere of mutual understanding in a spirit of good will.

Mr. Prime Minister, let us join in a toast which honors the friendship and the collaboration between our people and our nations; this is a characterization of what is good for all and in the best interests of each. To Japan.

Toast at Banquet Given by the Emperor, The Imperial Palace, Tokyo, November 19

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 19

Your Majesty: I am honored to be the guest of Your Imperial Majesties, and it is

with a very deep sense of this special moment that I speak this evening.

The first state visit of an American President to Japan is an occasion of very great importance to all of us. Your gracious hospitality symbolically honors the 213 million Americans that I have the honor to represent. I can reassure Japan that the United States is determined to perpetuate the unique ties that link our two nations for the common good.

Though separated by the broadest of oceans, Your Majesty, we have achieved between our two nations the closest of friendships. Our relationship transcends that of governments and heads of states. Each year the ties binding Americans with Japanese increase: trade, science, culture, sports, and many other areas, including cherished personal contact between individuals.

We share a common devotion to moral and to spiritual strength. Our paths are not always identical, but they all lead in the same direction—that of world peace and harmonious relations among mankind.

Let us continue to seek understanding with each other and among all peoples, Your Majesty. Let us trade. Let us share and perpetuate the prosperity of both nations. Let us work together to solve common problems, recognizing the interdependence of the modern world in which we all live.

America, I can assure you, Your Majesty, is determined to do its part. It is in a spirit of respect, the spirit of admiration for the Japanese nation, in dedication of our continuing collaboration, and with sincere and deep-felt confidence in the future, that I offer a toast to the health and to the well-being of Your Imperial Majesties.

**Address Before the Japan Press Club,
Imperial Hotel, Tokyo, November 20**

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20

As the first American President to visit Japan while in office, I greet you on this unprecedented occasion. I thank the Japanese Press Club for inviting me and the National Television Network of Japan for

the opportunity to speak directly to the people of Japan.

I deeply appreciate the excellent coverage of my visit by the exceptional news media of Japan. I have always sought a good working relationship with the American journalists and have the same feeling toward their Japanese colleagues. It has been my objective at all times to treat journalists and all other people in the same manner that I would like to be treated.

I bring the warmest greetings of the American people. Our bipartisan political leadership in the American Congress sends its very best wishes. The distinguished leaders of both of America's national political parties have asked me to tell you of the very high value that all Americans attach to our partnership with Japan.

It is the American custom for the President to make a report every year to the Congress on our state of the Union. In the same spirit, I thought the people of Japan might welcome a report on the state of another union—the unity of American and Japanese mutual aspirations for friendship as Americans see that relationship.

In my hometown of Grand Rapids, Michigan, a Japanese company is now assembling musical instruments. Not only are the instruments harmonious in the melodies they produce, but the labor-management relationship followed by the Japanese created a model of harmony between workers and business.

In a nearby community, Edmore, another Japanese firm is manufacturing small electrical motors. This is yet another Japanese enterprise that has injected new energy, new good will, in our industrial life. There are similar examples throughout America, and we welcome them.

The time has long passed when Americans speak only of what we contributed to your society. Today traffic flows in both directions. We are both learning from each other.

To signify the value the United States attaches to partnership with Japan, I chose this to make my first overseas trip. I also met with your Ambassador to the United States on the first day that I assumed office, August 9.

I have long admired the richness and the diversity of Japan's culture, the products of your industry, the ingenuity, creativity, and the energy of your people, your courage as a fountain of resourcefulness in a troubled world.

My only regret is that Mrs. Ford could not join me on this visit in response to your very kind invitation. We both hope that she can come at some later date.

Americans are very proud of the way that we and the Japanese have worked together during the postwar period. We have had some disagreements. But we have remained friends and we have remained partners. Together we created conditions under which both nations could prosper. Together we expanded our relations in trade and travel.

The reality of America's economic, political, and strategic interdependence with Japan is very obvious.

America is Japan's greatest customer and supplier. Japan is America's greatest overseas trading partner. Japan is the best foreign customer for America's agricultural products.

The total trade between our two nations has doubled since 1970. It will surpass \$20 billion in 1974. American investments in Japan are the largest of any foreign state. Japan's investment in America is growing rapidly and accounts for one-fifth of all Japanese investment abroad.

The flow of Japanese visitors to the United States has grown from some 50,000 in 1966 to over 700,000 in 1974. This is also a two-way street. Over 350,000 Americans visited Japan last year, accounting for nearly one-half of all foreign visitors.

Together we removed the legacies of World War II. The reversion of Okinawa eliminated the last vestige of that war from our agenda. We have made independent but mutually compatible efforts to improve our relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We have devised better channels for open consultation. I particularly want you to know that I understand the dangers of taking each other for granted.

As we talk to each other, we must ask

each other what we regard as the central needs of our times.

First, of course, is peace. Americans and Japanese know the value of peace. We want to devote our resources and ourselves to building things, not tearing them down. We do not want to send our sons into battle again.

The alliance between Japan and the United States has helped to secure peace and can continue to help secure it. That alliance is not directed against any other country. It does not prevent us from improving our relations with other countries.

Our alliance does not signify that both nations subscribe fully to identical attitudes or identical styles. It does signify, however, that we clearly share a common resolve to maintain stability in East Asia, to help in the development of other countries that need our help, and to work together to encourage diplomatic and political rather than military solutions to world problems.

Our alliance was forged by peoples who saw their national interest in friendship and in cooperation. I am confident that our relations will remain solid and very substantial. I pledge that we shall work to make it so.

Peace, however, cannot be our sole concern. We have learned that there are many international threats and dangers that can affect the lives of our citizens. We face dwindling supplies of raw materials and food. We face international economic problems of great complexity. We must be more stringent in conservation than ever before.

We have worked together to solve the problems of the cold war. We succeeded because we worked together. Now we confront these new and even more complicated problems.

The Japanese reformer Sakuma Shozan wrote some lines in 1854 that provide an insight for 1974. Sakuma said, and I quote:

When I was 20, I knew that men were linked together in one province; when I was 30, I knew that they were linked together in one nation; when I was 40, I knew they were linked together in one world of five continents.

Now, 120 years later, the links between

nations are closer than ever. Modern technology has made the world one. What each man or each nation does, or fails to do, affects every other.

Some Americans wondered why I decided to accept your invitation to come to Japan at a time when we have unsolved problems at home. I replied to those Americans that many of the problems we have at home are not just American problems but the problems of the world as a whole. Like others, we suffer from inflation. Like others, we face recession. Like others, we have to deal with rising prices and potential shortages of fuels and raw materials. America cannot solve those problems alone. Nations can only solve those problems by working together.

Just as we worked together to maintain peace, we can work together to solve tomorrow's problems.

Our two nations provide the world with a model of what can be achieved by international cooperation. We can also provide a model for dealing with the new difficulties. We both have great technological skills and human resources, great energy, and great imagination.

We both acknowledge the responsibility to developing states. We envisage the orderly and peaceful sharing of essential national resources. We can work together to meet the global economic issues.

We believe that we are not just temporary allies. We are permanent friends.

We share the same goals—peace, development, stability, and prosperity. These are not only praiseworthy and essential goals but common goals.

The problems of peace and economic well-being are inextricably linked. We believe peace cannot exist without prosperity, prosperity cannot exist without peace, and neither can exist if the great states of the world do not work together to achieve it. We owe this to ourselves, to each other, and to all of the Japanese and the American peoples.

America and Japan share the same national pastime—baseball. In the game of

baseball, two teams compete. But neither can play without the other nor without common respect for each other and for the rules of the game.

I have taken the liberty of giving you my views on the world we live in. Now let me tell you, the Japanese people, a little bit about the American people. The American people have faced some difficult times in our history. They know they will face others in the future. Their burdens are enormous, both at home and abroad. Some observers, including American observers, say that Americans have lost their confidence, their sense of responsibility, and their creativity. It is not true.

I have traveled over much of my country during the past year. Each time, I return to Washington refreshed. Our people are determined and realistic. Our people are vigorous. They are solving their problems in countless towns and cities across the country. They continue to understand that history has placed great responsibilities on American shoulders. Americans are ready and willing to play their part with the same strength and the same will that they have always shown in the past.

Americans also know that no nation, however strong, can hope to dictate the course of history by itself. But the ability to understand the basic issue, to define our national interest, and to make common cause with others to achieve common purposes makes it possible to influence events. And Americans are determined to do that for constructive purposes and in the true spirit of interdependence.

In that spirit, let me make a pledge to you today. As we face the problems of the future, the United States will remain faithful in our commitments and firm in the pursuit of our common goals. We intend not only to remain a trustworthy ally but a reliable trading partner.

We will continue to be suppliers of goods you need. If shortages occur, we will take special account of the needs of our traditional

trading partners. We will not compete with our friends for their markets or for their resources.

We want to work with them.

The basic concepts of our foreign policy remain unchanged. Those concepts have a solid bipartisan and popular support. The American people remain strong, confident, and faithful. We may sometimes falter, but we will not fail.

Let me, if I might, end on a personal note. It is a privilege to be the first American President to visit Japan while in office. It is also a very great pleasure. I look forward to seeing Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan.

Japan has preserved her cultural integrity in the face of rapid modernization. I have never believed all change is necessarily good. We must try to apply the enduring values of the past to the challenges and to the pressures of our times. Americans can learn from Japan to respect traditions even as we, like you, plunge ahead in the last quarter of the 20th century.

I also look forward to another deep privilege. Yesterday during my call upon His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan, I renewed our invitation for the Emperor to visit the United States. It would be a great pleasure to be the first American President to welcome the Emperor of Japan to Washington and to show His Imperial Majesty our national shrines and treasures, including the graceful Japanese cherry trees whose blossoms provide a setting for the monuments to the great heroes of our own past.

I hope that my visit shall be the first of many by American Presidents. I hope that the leaders of our two countries will follow the example that our peoples have already set, to visit each other frequently and freely as our nations move together to deal with the many common problems and concerns that will affect the lives of all our citizens and all humanity.

I said in my first Presidential address to the Congress that my administration was based on communication, conciliation, com-

promise, and cooperation. This concept also guides my view of American policy toward Japan.

We both have much work to do. Let us do it together. Let us also continue the quest for peace. I would rather walk a thousand miles for peace than take a single step toward war.

Toast at Reception Given by Japanese Diet, Hotel Okura, Tokyo, November 20

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20

Mr. Speaker: I am deeply grateful for the very kind remarks and the toast given to me and to my country. It is very significant that I have an opportunity of joining with the members of your Diet.

I am sure all of you have recognized that I spent a quarter of a century of my political life as a member of our legislative body, the House of Representatives—or your Parliament.

This was a great experience for me. I think it is quite significant in addition that the first American President who visited your great country was an individual who had spent some time in the Parliament or the Legislature, the House of Representatives, and the United States Senate, as Vice President.

This, in my judgment, gives a President a broader perspective of the problems, of the solutions. It has always been my feeling that a person who has served in a Parliament or in a legislative body is extremely well qualified to understand the views of the people of a country, a person who is well qualified to seek a consensus or a solution to the problems, whether they be at home or abroad.

One of my very top staff members, a number of years ago, Mr. [Donald] Rumsfeld, initiated with members from your Parliament an exchange between Japanese parliamentarians and legislators from our Congress. It is my judgment that this exchange is a very, very important way of

building a constructive relationship between your country and our country.

I was never privileged to participate in the Japanese-American interparliamentary group, or exchange group, as I understand it is called. I did have an opportunity as a Member of the House of Representatives—our Congress—to be a member of the Interparliamentary Union delegation on three or four occasions. And I found this exchange between parliamentarians of great benefit, a tremendous asset, and I hope and trust that in the years ahead this exchange between members of parliamentary groups will broaden, will be more extensive—it will be very helpful to each country, to all countries.

Let me conclude by saying that I am honored to be among a group that I grew up with in politics in my country. I understand your problems; I understand each and every one of you. I was always in the minority in our Congress. We always were trying to challenge the majority. We had many differences, but I have found that in the differences in a parliamentary group in our country—and I believe in yours—that you can disagree without being disagreeable, which in my opinion is a true test of the strength and the character of a parliamentary body.

The discussions that I have had with your government have been constructive in seeking to solve problems—domestic, international.

The great opportunity that I had to meet with your Emperor and Empress, His Majesty and Her Majesty—it has been a great experience for me, and I thank them and the people of Japan for being so warm in their welcome. I will report to my people in the United States that they have great friends in Japan, that our governments are working together to seek solutions to the problems on a worldwide basis and between us, as two governments.

We are friends, we will work together, and we have a great future—the United States with the Government of Japan. And

it is therefore my privilege and honor to offer a toast to your government and to your people on behalf of my government and the American people.

Toast at Reception by Nongovernmental Organizations ¹ Hotel Okura, November 20

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20

It is a very high honor and a very rare privilege for me to have the opportunity of joining with all of you on this occasion.

The trip by me as the first American President in office coming to Japan has been a memorable one, one that I shall never forget. The opportunity to meet with Their Majesties, the opportunity to meet with your high government officials, the opportunity to share some thoughts with the members of the Diet, the opportunity to have a governmental exchange at the highest level is of course of great significance.

It has been my experience in 25 years of political life, when I served in the House of Representatives, to work hand-in-glove with other members of the legislative branch and of course, in later years as a member of the leadership, to work with the legislative and executive branch.

And, of course, in the last 13 or so months, I have had the opportunity of serving in two offices in the executive branch.

I have learned, over a period of 26 years serving in the Federal Government, that all wisdom, all support for policies, doesn't necessarily come from government, but primarily from people in nongovernmental organizations and individuals who are not directly connected with government itself.

And as I understand it, this group here on this occasion is a nongovernmental group of Japanese and Americans who have spent a great deal of your time working together in a nongovernmental capacity to support a greater unity between our country, the United States, and your country, Japan.

¹ Given by the America-Japan Society, Inc., and the Japan-U.S. Economic Council.

I compliment you, and I thank you. Your contribution is of tremendous significance. Governments themselves can't do it.

Decisions can be made at the government level, and in our society that is essential. But if those decisions are not supported, if those decisions are not explained by people in positions of responsibility in nongovernmental areas, it is impossible for those decisions to be successful.

I learned that early in my career in politics. I always could be more successful in working to find a solution if I had the support not only among politicians but by those people, whether they were in management, in labor, in education, in local government. So I am deeply grateful for what you have done in the past, and I strongly urge that you continue these efforts in the future, because the Japanese Government and the United States Government, after the two days of talks we have had, yesterday and today, are embarking on a stronger unity, a stronger program of helping both in the maintenance of peace and the stimulation of prosperity. And this is what we want in Japan and in America and what we want for the rest of the world.

And so what you do is of tremendous significance. What you do in explaining to the thousands of Americans who are here in Japan, what the Japanese who are here can do to explain to the millions of Japanese, will not only be better for Japan and the United States but will be better for the world.

And I congratulate you, I thank you, and I wish you well. And may I offer a toast at this point to the Government of Japan and the millions and millions of Japanese.

**Toast at Dinner in Honor of the Emperor,
State Guest House, Tokyo, November 20**

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20

Your Majesties: I am honored to have the privilege of welcoming Your Imperial Majesties to this dinner this evening. It

permits me to, in a small way, in a symbolic gesture, to reciprocate the wonderful hospitality so graciously extended to me this week.

It has been a period of enlightenment for me, and I will take home an inspiring impression of the possibilities available for an even greater friendship, greater cooperation and interdependence of our two nations.

America is now approaching its national bicentennial. Tonight I would like to recall another meaningful event 114 years ago, on May 14, 1860. That was the day when the first diplomatic mission ever sent by Japan to another nation arrived in Washington, D.C., our national capital.

I am very pleased, Your Majesties, to present on this evening to all of our distinguished guests a token of the durability of American-Japanese friendship. It is a medal bearing the likeness of President Buchanan, who had the honor of welcoming the Japanese delegation to the historic East Room of the White House. Since that occasion, the American Government has never ceased to look to the East as well as to the West.

Our visitors then regarded us as Americans, as strange creatures and observed us in every detail. It was with equal fascination that we viewed our Japanese visitors. We learned from each other then, and I and we are continuing to learn today.

The most important lesson that I have learned during this visit corresponds with a brilliant insight of one of the Japanese envoys on the first mission to the United States. The occasion was a visit to the New York home of the widow of Commodore Perry. The Japanese envoy expressed a very deep emotion at the realization that he was in the home of Commodore Perry and said—and I quote: "The time has come when no nation may remain isolated and refuse to take part in the affairs of the rest of the world."

That concept is even more compelling today. The links between our two nations can serve as a model for a world increasingly

aware of the need for greater international cooperation.

Accordingly, in recalling that first Japanese delegation to Washington, I pledge that my government will not isolate itself from the world or from Japan.

On behalf of the nation that I am privileged to represent, to lead, I reaffirm the spirit of friendship that endures between us. I reaffirm my determination to see that warm relationship continues and grows.

Your Majesties, in that spirit and with a heart filled with faith in the future and appreciation for our guests, I offer a toast to the health and to the well-being of Your Imperial Majesties.

Joint Communique Issued at Tokyo November 20

JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND PRIME MINISTER KAKUEI TANAKA

I

President Ford of the United States of America paid an official visit to Japan between November 18 and 22 at the invitation of the Government of Japan. President Ford met Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Japan at the Imperial Palace on November 19.

II

In discussions held on November 19 and 20, President Ford and Prime Minister Tanaka agreed on the following common purposes underlying future relations between the United States and Japan.

1. The United States and Japan, Pacific nations sharing many political and economic interests, have developed a close and mutually beneficial relationship based on the principle of equality. Their friendship and cooperation are founded upon a common determination to maintain political systems respecting individual freedom and fundamental human rights as well as market economies which enhance the scope for creativity and the prospect of assuring the well-being of their peoples.

2. Dedicated to the maintenance of peace and the evolution of a stable international order reflecting the high purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the United States and Japan will continue to encourage the development of conditions in the Asia-Pacific area which will facilitate peaceful settlement of outstanding issues by the parties most concerned, reduce international tensions, promote the sustained and orderly growth of developing countries, and encourage constructive relation-

ships among countries in the area. Each country will contribute to this task in the light of its own responsibilities and capabilities. Both countries recognize that cooperative relations between the United States and Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security constitute an important and durable element in the evolution of the international situation in Asia and will continue to plan an effective and meaningful role in promoting peace and stability in that area.

3. The United States and Japan recognize the need for dedicated efforts by all countries to pursue additional arms limitation and arms reduction measures, in particular controls over nuclear armaments, and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices while facilitating the expanded use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Both countries underline the high responsibility of all nuclear-weapon states in such efforts, and note the importance of protecting non-nuclear-weapon states against nuclear threats.

4. The United States and Japan recognize the remarkable range of their interdependence and the need for coordinated responses to new problems confronting the international community. They will intensify efforts to promote close cooperation among industrialized democracies while striving steadily to encourage a further relaxation of tensions in the world through dialogue and exchanges with countries of different social systems.

5. In view of the growing interdependence of all countries and present global economic difficulties, it is becoming increasingly important to strengthen international economic cooperation. The United States and Japan recognize the necessity of the constructive use of their human and material resources to bring about solutions to major economic problems. The establishment of an open and harmonious world economic system is indispensable for international peace and prosperity and a primary goal of both nations. The United States and Japan will, to this end, continue to promote close economic and trade relations between the two countries and participate constructively in international efforts to ensure a continuing expansion of world trade through negotiations to reduce tariff and other trade distortions and to create a stable and balanced international monetary order. Both countries will remain committed to their international pledges to avoid actions which adversely affect the economies of other nations.

6. The United States and Japan recognize the need for a more efficient and rational utilization and distribution of world resources. Realizing the importance of stable supplies of energy at reasonable prices they will seek, in a manner suitable to their economies, to expand and diversify energy supplies, develop new energy sources, and conserve on the use of scarce fuels. They both attach great importance

to enhancing cooperation among consuming countries and they intend, in concert with other nations, to pursue harmonious relations with producing nations. Both countries agree that further international cooperative efforts are necessary to forestall an economic and financial crisis and to lead to a new era of creativity and common progress. Recognizing the urgency of the world food problem and the need for an international framework to ensure stable food supplies, the United States and Japan will participate constructively in multilateral efforts to seek ways to strengthen assistance to developing countries in the field of agriculture, to improve the supply situation of agricultural products, and to assure an adequate level of food reserves. They recognize the need for cooperation among food producers and consumers to deal with shortage situations.

7. For the well-being of the peoples of the world, a steady improvement in the technological and economic capabilities of developing countries must be a matter of common concern to all nations. In recognition of the importance of assisting developing countries, particularly those without significant natural resources, the United States and Japan will, individually and with the participation and support of other traditional aid-donors and those newly able to assist, maintain and expand programs of cooperation through assistance and trade as those nations seek to achieve sound and orderly growth.

8. The United States and Japan face many new challenges common to mankind as they endeavor to preserve the natural environment and to open new areas for exploration such as space and the oceans. In broad cooperation with other countries, they will promote research and facilitate the exchange of information in such fields as science, technology and environmental protection, in an effort to meet the needs of modern society, improve the quality of life and attain more balanced economic growth.

9. The United States and Japan recognize that their durable friendship has been based upon the continued development of mutual understanding and enhanced communication between their peoples, at many levels and in many aspects of their lives. They will seek therefore to expand further cultural and educational interchange which fosters and serves to increase such understanding.

10. In the spirit of friendship and mutual trust, the United States and Japan are determined to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations on potential bilateral issues and pressing global problems of common concern.

11. Friendly and cooperative relations between the United States and Japan have grown and deepened over the years in many diverse fields of human endeavor. Both countries reaffirm that, in their totality, these varied relationships constitute major founda-

tion stones on which the two countries base their respective foreign policies and form an indispensable element supporting stable international political and economic relations.

III

This first visit to Japan by an incumbent President of the United States of America will add a new page to the history of amity between the two countries.

THE VISIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Arrival, Kimpo International Airport, Seoul, November 22

White House press release (Seoul) dated November 22

Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: I am very pleased to return to the Republic of Korea, our faithful ally, on a mission of peace. Twenty-one years have elapsed since I was last here in Korea. I was then a Congressman, a Member of our House of Representatives.

Now I return as the third American President to visit you while in office. President Eisenhower came here in 1952 and again in 1960. President Johnson came in 1966. Those visits as well as mine demonstrate a close involvement of different American administrations over a quarter of a century. They reflect the same reality—our long and friendly ties to the Korean people.

When I came to Korea in 1953, I saw a heartrending scene. The Republic of Korea had been ravaged by war. You had made great sacrifices to repel aggression. Your economy was in ruins. I was deeply saddened by what I saw, but I was inspired by the determination of the Korean people to rebuild.

Today I am very happy to return. I want to see the great progress that so many have described so very vividly. I want to see for myself what you have built upon the ashes of war.

I am here, Mr. President, to reaffirm our friendship and to give it new life and meaning. Nothing binds nations together closer than to have fought side by side for the

same cause. Two times we have stood together, here as well as in Viet-Nam, to preserve the peace, to preserve the stability of Asia and the world. We can never forget this.

Though we have been together with you in war, America's deepest hope is for a world of peace. Let us now join to preserve peace and to prevent any recurrence of hostilities. That is our continuing commitment, which I today reaffirm.

I thank you very much, Mr. President, for this heartwarming welcome. My only regret is that my wife, Mrs. Ford, is not here at my side. She sends her greetings to the great Korean people. She looks forward to hearing in detail from me personally about this visit.

You were most gracious, Mr. President, to invite me. I am proud to come here on this my first overseas journey as President of the United States.

**Toast at Dinner Given by President Park,
Capitol Building, Seoul, November 22**

White House press release (Seoul) dated November 22

Mr. President, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: I am greatly honored by this occasion and appreciate the gracious hospitality you have accorded us this evening.

The warmth shown by the Korean people exceeds even that which I remember from my previous visit to Korea, this very hospitable land.

I am very, very much impressed by the dynamism of the Korean society, the energy and vitality of the Korean people, and the charm and the beauty of the Korean women.

Mr. President, I wish that I had time to see not only the impressive landmarks of the Korean miracle of material progress but also the famous historical shrines of your great country. On another day perhaps, Mr. President, my wife and myself and our family can come, and certainly we would like to return.

Mr. President, it was a great pleasure to meet the leaders of many sectors of the Korean society here tonight. In particular, I

am pleased to see the Speaker, and the other members of the National Assembly, including representatives of the various major political parties.

Having spent, Mr. President, a quarter of a century of my life in parliament, or our Congress, I place a great value in the legislative process of a representative government.

I came to your country, Mr. President, to demonstrate America's continued determination to preserve peace in Korea, in Asia, and throughout the world. Koreans and Americans were friends in war. We will remain friends in peace.

America seeks world peace for the good of all and at the expense of none.

Today, Mr. President, I enjoyed a rewarding and a very inspiring visit with your people. I also drew great encouragement by meeting with the armed forces of our American troops in which all of us take such great pride.

I pledge to you, Mr. President, that the United States will continue to assist and to support you. Our relationship and our dialogue will continue.

We live in a time of new international realities and new opportunities for peace and progress in Asia and elsewhere. President Park, your statesmanlike initiative in opening a dialogue with the North contributed constructively to efforts to find a peaceful and just solution to the Korean problem. With the perseverance and with the courage so typical of the American [Korean] people, I trust you will prevail in this effort.

Let us recognize the new world in which we all live. Let us envisage the interdependence of all nations, large and small. When we plan for such new international problems as energy shortages and financial crises, the United States considers the interests of all nations. We will continue to consult with you in common interests and in common problems.

America has great confidence in the people of Korea, just as we have great confidence in ourselves in America.

Mr. President, I am here on a mission of

peace. It is my deepest hope that the entire world will lift its gaze and broaden its vision. I have said before, but I repeat here tonight, I would rather walk a thousand miles for peace than take a single step for war.

Mr. President, the relationship between our two peoples was first formalized as long ago as May 22, 1882. The preamble to that treaty spoke of permanent relations based upon amity and friendship. We have proven that by more than diplomatic phrases. Our relationship has endured through war and through peace.

The welcome you accorded me today is symbolic of our very close ties—it demonstrated the great strength of the friendship between our two peoples. I was greatly touched, Mr. President, by the outpouring of good will from the countless thousands and thousands of people who greeted me so warmly. Their cheers, I am sure, were not only for me as an individual, but for the United States of America and our 213 million of which I have the honor to represent.

I wish to thank every Korean that I saw today on behalf of all of the American people.

Today I visited a very beautiful cemetery and the monument to the brave Koreans who fell in battle. They fought side by side with Americans. And let the continued friendship of our two nations pay tribute to the memory of the supreme sacrifices of your courageous men and our own.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to rise and to join me in a toast to my distinguished host, President Park, and to the great people of the Republic of Korea.

Joint Communique Issued at Seoul November 22

JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE

At the invitation of President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America visited the Republic of Korea on November 22 and 23, 1974, to exchange views on the current international situation and to discuss matters of mutual interest and concern to the two nations.

During the visit the two Presidents held discussions on two occasions. Present at these meetings

were Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo, Presidential Secretary General Kim Chung Yum, Ambassador Richard L. Sneider, Ambassador Hahn Pyong Choon and other high officials of both Governments. President Ford also visited American forces stationed in the Republic of Korea.

President Ford laid a wreath at the Memorial of the Unknown Soldiers. He also visited the grave of Madame Park Chung Hee and expressed his deepest personal condolences to President Park on her tragic and untimely death.

The two Presidents reaffirmed the strong bonds of friendship and cooperation between their two countries. They agreed to continue the close cooperation and regular consultation on security matters and other subjects of mutual interest which have characterized the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

The two Presidents took note of significant political and economic changes in the situation in Asia in recent years. They recognized that the allied countries in the area are growing stronger and more prosperous and are making increasing contributions to their security as well as to that of the region. President Ford explained that the United States, as a Pacific power, is vitally interested in Asia and the Pacific and will continue its best effort to ensure the peace and security of the region. President Park expressed his understanding and full support for United States policies directed toward these ends.

President Park described the efforts being made by the Republic of Korea to maintain a dialogue with North Korea, designed to reduce tensions and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula, and to lead eventually to the peaceful unification of Korea. President Park affirmed the intention of the Republic of Korea to continue to pursue the dialogue despite the failure of the North Korean authorities to respond with sincerity thus far. President Ford gave assurance that the United States will continue to support these efforts by the Republic of Korea and expressed the hope that the constructive initiatives by the Republic of Korea would meet with positive responses by all concerned.

The two Presidents discussed the current United Nations General Assembly consideration of the Korean question. They agreed on the importance of favorable General Assembly action on the Draft Resolution introduced by the United States and other member countries. Both expressed the hope that the General Assembly would base its consideration of the Korean question on a recognition of the importance of the security arrangements which have preserved peace on the Korean Peninsula for more than two decades.

President Park explained in detail the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and described the threat

to peace and stability of hostile acts by North Korea, exemplified most recently by the construction of an underground tunnel inside the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone.

The two Presidents agreed that the Republic of Korea forces and American forces stationed in Korea must maintain a high degree of strength and readiness in order to deter aggression. President Ford reaffirmed the determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attack against the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 between the Republic of Korea and the United States. In this connection, President Ford assured President Park that the United States has no plan to reduce the present level of United States forces in Korea.

The two Presidents discussed the progress of the Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea armed forces and agreed that implementation of the program is of major importance to the security of the Republic of Korea and peace on the Korean Peninsula. President Ford took note of the increasing share of the defense burden which the Republic of Korea is able and willing to assume and affirmed the readiness of the United States to continue to render appropriate support to the further development of defense industries in the Republic of Korea.

President Ford expressed his admiration for the rapid and sustained economic progress of the Republic of Korea, accomplished in the face of various obstacles, including the lack of sufficient indigenous natural resources and continuing tensions in the area. President Park noted with appreciation the United States contribution to Korea's development in the economic, scientific and technological fields.

The two Presidents examined the impact of recent international economic developments. They agreed that the two countries should continue to foster close economic cooperation for their mutual benefit, and that they should guide their economic policies toward each other in the spirit of closer interdependence among all nations. They shared the view that coordination of their policies on new problems confronting the international community is necessary. Both Presidents expressed mutual satisfaction over the continuing growth of substantial bilateral economic relations which have been beneficial to both countries. They agreed that continued private foreign investment in Korea by the United States and other foreign countries is desirable. It was agreed that international efforts should focus on the reduction of trade distortions, establishment of a framework for ensuring stable food supplies, and realization of stable supplies of energy at reasonable prices.

President Park expressed his high expectations and respect for the efforts being made by President Ford to establish world peace and to restore world economic order.

On behalf of the members of his Party and the American people, President Ford extended his deepest thanks to President Park and all the people of the Republic of Korea for the warmth of their reception and the many courtesies extended to him during the visit.

President Ford cordially invited President Park to visit the United States of America and President Park accepted the invitation with pleasure. The two Presidents agreed that the visit would take place at a time of mutual convenience.

THE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

Toast at Luncheon Given by General Secretary Brezhnev, Vladivostok, November 24

White House press release (Vladivostok) dated November 24

Let me say a few words if I might about the very special significance of this, our first official meeting.

The world has been accustomed in recent years to regular meetings between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the American people.

Cooperation between our two countries has intensified both in tempo and, more important, in substance during the past few years. As a result, all people, Mr. General Secretary, have a better chance to live in peace and security today.

The fact that these meetings have become more regular testifies to the significance attached to them by both countries. In these meetings, we are able to conduct our discussions in a businesslike and a constructive way. We are able to make important progress on the issues that concern our countries.

Mr. General Secretary, I look forward to continuing the close working relationship developed between the leaders of our two countries. In my first address to the Congress of the United States I pledged to the Soviet Union to continue America's commitment to the course followed in the last three years.

Mr. General Secretary, I personally reaffirm that pledge to you now. As nations with great power, we share a common responsibility not only to our own people but to mankind as a whole.

We must avoid, of course, war and the destruction that it would mean. Let us get on

with the business of controlling arms, as I think we have in the last 24 hours. Let us contribute, through our cooperation, to the resolution of the very great problems facing mankind as a whole.

Mr. General Secretary, the problems of food, population, and energy are not confined to any one country or to countries at an early stage of economic development. They affect people everywhere. If this age is to be remembered favorably in the history books, it will be because we met our responsibilities—your country and my country and our friends and allies throughout the world.

May I propose a toast to our joint search for solutions to the problems facing mankind and a toast to you, Mr. General Secretary, and to those associated with you in your government and to the people of the Soviet Union and to the people of the world, who will benefit from your efforts and, hopefully, mine. To the General Secretary.

Joint Statement on Strategic Offensive Arms Issued at Vladivostok November 24

JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT

During their working meeting in the area of Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974, the President of the USA Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev discussed in detail the question of further limitations of strategic offensive arms.

They reaffirmed the great significance that both the United States and the USSR attach to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. They are convinced that a long-term agreement on this question would be a significant contribution to improving relations between the US and the USSR, to reducing the danger of war and to enhancing world peace. Having noted the value of previous agreements on this question, including the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, they reaffirm the intention to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, to last through 1985.

As a result of the exchange of views on the substance of such a new agreement, the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU concluded that favorable prospects exist for completing the work on this agreement in 1975.

Agreement was reached that further negotiations will be based on the following provisions.

1. The new agreement will incorporate the rele-

vant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.

2. The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.

3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations:

- a. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles;

- b. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles; submarine-launched ballistic missiles] equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).

4. The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985.

5. Negotiations between the delegations of the U.S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.

November 24, 1974.

Joint Communiqué Signed at Vladivostok November 24

JOINT US-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

In accordance with the previously announced agreement, a working meeting between the President of the United States of America Gerald R. Ford and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev took place in the area of Vladivostok on November 23 and 24, 1974. Taking part in the talks were the Secretary of State of the United States of America and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko.

They discussed a broad range of questions dealing with American-Soviet relations and the current international situation.

Also taking part in the talks were:

On the American side Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador of the USA to the USSR; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State; Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and William Hyland, official of the Department of State.

On the Soviet side A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador

of the USSR to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; and G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

I

The United States of America and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their determination to develop further their relations in the direction defined by the fundamental joint decisions and basic treaties and agreements concluded between the two States in recent years.

They are convinced that the course of American-Soviet relations, directed towards strengthening world peace, deepening the relaxation of international tensions and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation of states with different social systems meets the vital interests of the peoples of both States and other peoples.

Both Sides consider that based on the agreements reached between them important results have been achieved in fundamentally reshaping American-Soviet relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security. These results are a solid foundation for progress in reshaping Soviet-American relations.

Accordingly, they intend to continue, without a loss in momentum, to expand the scale and intensity of their cooperative efforts in all spheres as set forth in the agreements they have signed so that the process of improving relations between the US and the USSR will continue without interruption and will become irreversible.

Mutual determination was expressed to carry out strictly and fully the mutual obligations undertaken by the US and the USSR in accordance with the treaties and agreements concluded between them.

II

Special consideration was given in the course of the talks to a pivotal aspect of Soviet-American relations: measures to eliminate the threat of war and to halt the arms race.

Both sides reaffirm that the Agreements reached between the US and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war and the limitation of strategic arms are a good beginning in the process of creating guarantees against the outbreak of nuclear conflict and war in general. They expressed their deep belief in the necessity of promoting this process and expressed their hope that other states would contribute to it as well. For their part the US and the USSR will continue to exert vigorous efforts to achieve this historic task.

A joint statement on the question of limiting strategic offensive arms is being released separately.

Both sides stressed once again the importance and necessity of a serious effort aimed at prevent-

ing the dangers connected with the spread of nuclear weapons in the world. In this connection they stressed the importance of increasing the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It was noted that, in accordance with previous agreements, initial contacts were established between representatives of the US and of the USSR on questions related to underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes, as well as measures dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. It was agreed to continue an active search for mutually acceptable solutions of these questions.

III

In the course of the meeting an exchange of views was held on a number of international issues: special attention was given to negotiations already in progress in which the two Sides are participants and which are designed to remove existing sources of tension and to bring about the strengthening of international security and world peace.

Having reviewed the situation at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, both Sides concluded that there is a possibility for its early successful conclusion. They proceed from the assumption that the results achieved in the course of the Conference will permit its conclusion at the highest level and thus be commensurate with its importance in ensuring the peaceful future of Europe.

The USA and the USSR also attach high importance to the negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe. They agree to contribute actively to the search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of principle of undiminished security for any of the parties and the prevention of unilateral military advantages.

Having discussed the situation existing in the Eastern Mediterranean, both Sides state their firm support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and will make every effort in this direction. They consider that a just settlement of the Cyprus question must be based on the strict implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding Cyprus.

In the course of the exchange of views on the Middle East both Sides expressed their concern with regard to the dangerous situation in that region. They reaffirmed their intention to make every effort to promote a solution of the key issues of a just and lasting peace in that area on the basis of the United Nations resolution 338, taking into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people,

and respect for the right to independent existence of all States in the area.

The Sides believe that the Geneva Conference should play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and should resume its work as soon as possible.

IV

The state of relations was reviewed in the field of commercial, economic, scientific and technical ties between the USA and the USSR. Both Sides confirmed the great importance which further progress in these fields would have for Soviet-American relations, and expressed their firm intention to continue the broadening and deepening of mutually advantageous cooperation.

The two Sides emphasized the special importance accorded by them to the development on a long term basis of commercial and economic cooperation, including mutually beneficial large-scale projects. They believe that such commercial and economic cooperation will serve the cause of increasing the stability of Soviet-American relations.

Both Sides noted with satisfaction the progress in the implementation of agreements and in the development of ties and cooperation between the US and the USSR in the fields of science, technology and culture. They are convinced that the continued expansion of such cooperation will benefit the peoples of both countries and will be an important contribution to the solution of world-wide scientific and technical problems.

The talks were held in an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding, reflecting the constructive desire of both Sides to strengthen and develop further the peaceful cooperative relationship between the USA and the USSR, and to ensure progress in the solution of outstanding international problems in the interests of preserving and strengthening peace.

The results of the talks provided a convincing demonstration of the practical value of Soviet-American summit meetings and their exceptional importance in the shaping of a new relationship between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

President Ford reaffirmed the invitation to L. I. Brezhnev to pay an official visit to the United States in 1975. The exact date of the visit will be agreed upon later.

For the United States
of America:

GERALD R. FORD

*President of the United
States of America*

November 24, 1974

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

L. I. BREZHNEV

*General Secretary
of the Central Committee
of the CPSU*

ARRIVAL REMARKS, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, NOVEMBER 24

White House press release dated November 24

Mr. Speaker, my very dear friends in the Congress, members of the Cabinet, distinguished guests, my fellow Americans: I thank you all very, very much for coming out this evening and welcoming us so very warmly.

Since I left Washington eight days ago, I have traveled some 17,000 miles for the purpose of peace and not a single step toward war. And every one of those miles, in my opinion, was most worthwhile. But as always when we return to our homeland, my companions and myself are very, very happy to be here.

Secretary Kissinger has a few more miles to go on this trip, but I will assure him that this warm welcome includes him as well.

Thursday is Thanksgiving. I cannot help but reflect on the many, many blessings that we Americans have. We do have some very serious problems, but we have much, much more to be thankful for. America is a strong country; Americans are very strong people. We are free, and we are blessed with good friends and allies.

On my trip I talked with the leaders of two of our allies, Japan and Korea. In both nations, I saw how much they value their relationship with us. We will continue to work together to strengthen our ties.

The visit to Japan marked my first trip outside North America since becoming President, and it was the first time that a President of the United States has visited that energetic and productive island nation.

Our trip was historic for another reason; for it marked a change in our relationship. In the past the central concern of our alliance was military security. This security relationship has now been broadened to include energy and food. I am particularly hopeful that by working together with Japan, one of the world's most technically advanced societies, we will be able to make a substantial joint contribution to resolving the energy crisis.

Japan emerged from the destruction of war with a deep commitment to peace. In Korea, a sturdy people rebuilt a nation from the ashes of another conflict. Only a little over 20 years ago, Korea was a battleground. Today it is a showcase of economic development.

Just over two decades ago, American fighting men were battling over the rugged mountains of Korea. Today the major burden of Korea's defense is borne by the Koreans themselves. American servicemen are stationed there, but like their comrades in Europe and elsewhere, they are there to help an ally maintain the peace, not to do the job alone.

A highlight of the trip for me was the opportunity to meet with our soldiers in Korea and to have lunch with them in one of their camps. They are outstanding fighting men and women doing a fine job. We can all be very proud of them.

The final stop on our trip was the Soviet Union. The meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev, I am pleased, went very, very well. They represent both a beginning and a continuation. They were the beginning of what I hope will be a productive personal relationship between Mr. Brezhnev and myself. We both, I believe, came away from Vladivostok with mutual respect and a common determination to continue the search for peace.

They were a continuation because we maintained the steady improvement of our relations begun three years ago. We talked, as American and Soviet leaders have in the past, about the Middle East, European security, and other bilateral relations. We often agreed, but not always. When we did not, we stated our differences quite frankly.

But on perhaps the most important issue facing the Soviet and American peoples, the further limitation of strategic arms, we found a large measure of agreement. We discussed the issue fully, and in the end we established a sound basis for a new agreement that will constrain our military com-

petition over the next decade. The understanding we reached resulted from an intensive round of give-and-take, the kind of give-and-take negotiations that recognized the legitimate security of both sides.

Many details remain to be worked out by our negotiators, but ceilings on the strategic forces of both nations have been accepted. A good agreement that will serve the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union is now within our grasp. Vladivostok was an appropriate ending to a journey designed to strengthen ties with old friends and expand areas of agreement with old adversaries.

I believe we accomplished what we set out to achieve and perhaps more. And in that process I pray that we have done all we could to advance the cause of peace for all Americans and for all mankind.

Death of U Thant, Former U.N. Secretary General

*Statement by President Ford*¹

I have learned with great sorrow of the death of former United Nations Secretary General U Thant. Above all, he was a man of peace. His distinguished leadership in the world community for a decade won him wide respect and the gratitude of all who cherish world peace. He gave unselfishly of himself in the highest tradition of service to mankind, and the world is better for the example he set.

U Thant's loyalty was not to any one power or ethnic bloc, but to humanity; and it is in this same universal spirit that all men will mourn his passing. On behalf of the people of the United States, I extend condolences to his family.

¹ Issued on Nov. 25 (text from White House press release).

Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at Tokyo and Vladivostok

Following are transcripts of news conferences held by Secretary Kissinger at Tokyo on November 19 and 20, at Vladivostok on November 24 at 1:35 a.m. and 4:18 p.m., and at Tokyo on November 25.

TOKYO, NOVEMBER 19

Press release 503 dated November 19

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I will confine myself to the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister this morning, which was attended by the two Foreign Ministers and two other individuals on each side.

We concentrated in this initial meeting first on stressing the great importance that the United States attaches to its relationship with Japan for peace in the Pacific, peace in the world, and for the economic progress of our two countries as well as of all other countries.

This led to a discussion of two related questions, the problem of food and the problem of energy. With respect to the problem of food, the President pointed out the interest that the United States has in an orderly long-term evolution of world agricultural policy as we have presented it at the World Food Conference, and in this context he assured the Prime Minister that Japan could count on a stable level of supplies of agricultural supplies from the United States. There were further discussions on agricultural issues, and it was agreed that they would be continued tomorrow when the President and the Prime Minister met again.

With respect to the problem of energy, the President stressed to the Prime Minister the importance the United States attaches to the program that we outlined last week of soli-

darity among the consumers. He made very clear that this is not intended in any sense to lead to any confrontation with the producers but, rather, to pave the way for a constructive dialogue between consumers and producers for the common benefit of both.

The Japanese side explained the special problems of Japan in terms of its heavy dependence on imported oil and the difference in the proportion of the consumption of energy between the United States and Japan, in that Japan consumes about 70 percent of its oil for industrial consumption and only 30 percent for personal use while in the United States the opposite percentage obtains, so that the margin for reductions in consumption in Japan is more limited than in the United States. But within that framework the Japanese point of view was one that seemed to us sympathetic to our general approach, and we pointed out that we would put more emphasis on the development of alternative sources and that we would share the results of research and development and technological innovation with Japan with respect to the new sources of energy.

There was a general recognition that Japan and the United States should cooperate on the usual matters of bilateral relations but also on the whole area of stability of international affairs and progress toward peace.

The discussions on all of these items as well as others will be continued tomorrow morning when the President, the Prime Minister, and their advisers will meet again.

I will be glad to take questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were the Japanese sympathetic to your specific proposal in Chicago about the reduction of importing oil, or did their situation preclude that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we did not have

a chance this morning to go into every aspect of my proposal. I think that, first of all, my specific proposal was that the importation of oil should be kept level through a combination of measures of conservation and the development of new sources of energy.

It may be that the mix in Japan between conservation and development of new sources has to be different than in the United States; and as far as the United States is concerned, we do not feel that exactly the same formula or exactly the same percentage has to be applied to every country, but that rather there must be understanding for the particular situation of each country.

I would say that there was sympathy to the general approach and that we will have to work out in subsequent discussions the particular manner in which it can be implemented for each country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did your statement to the Japanese indicating they could count on a stable level of agricultural products indicate that Japan is going to have a special position in America's agricultural export market?

Secretary Kissinger: As we attempted to make clear at the World Food Conference, we believe that the whole problem of world agriculture has to be approached on a more systematic and planned basis. And the various proposals we made there, some of which got lost in the debate about food aid—the various proposals that we made there were all designed to assure a stable level of expectations and a more careful, systematic approach on an overall basis.

Now, on the one hand, we of course have a free market for agricultural products. On the other hand, we have set up a system which amounts to some voluntary allocations by the contacts between our major companies and the Department of Agriculture.

So, without using the word “preferred,” I think one can say that the President indicated that the United States, insofar as it is within our power of the government—and the government will have a considerable

voice in it—will see to it that Japan can count on a stable level of imports.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, will the Japanese agree to import American beef—or was that discussed?

Secretary Kissinger: That question was discussed, yes.

Q. What was the conclusion? Were there any indications they might agree to let American meat enter their country?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to speak for the Japanese Government, but my impression was that the President's point will be taken very seriously.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, does not the promise of a stable supply of U.S. agricultural products mean that we will not resort to putting off imports in order to curb rising food prices as we did with soybeans in 1973 and wheat?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, we have asked major importers from the United States to give us some indication of their requirements over a period toward which we can plan. It does mean that under foreseeable circumstances we will not impose export control.

But we would like to have an informal arrangement with the key importers in which we can have some idea of their requirements over a period of time. This is not a major problem with Japan, with which we have a very satisfactory relationship in this respect.

Q. Was Korea [inaudible]

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet had a chance to discuss the problem of Korea except in the context of our general desire to maintain peace and stability in the area. This is a subject which, if it comes up, will be discussed in greater detail tomorrow.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you had a chance to discuss China and/or the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: There has been a discussion by the President of his meeting with the General Secretary in Vladivostok, and his general approach toward détente,

and also the connection between our friendship with Japan and the general approach to the Soviet Union.

There has only been a general reference to the relationships with the People's Republic of China. It was agreed, however, that I would stop in Tokyo on my return from Peking to brief the Japanese Government about my meetings in Peking.

Q. Can you tell us what is on your agenda with your meeting tonight with the Finance Minister [Masayoshi Ohira]?

Secretary Kissinger: The Finance Minister was an old friend with whom I worked closely in his previous portfolio. He requested the meeting, and it does not have any fixed agenda, but I would assume that we will discuss some of the problems of energy and food and any other subject that he may wish to raise, but I would expect those two to be the principal items.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the matter of the ratio of consumption for industrial versus private use of fuel, did Prime Minister Tanaka make any suggestions to President Ford of the possibility of reducing U.S. consumption in its proportion or ratio?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the goals of consumption restraint in the United States were publicly stated by the President in October. They were reaffirmed by me at the request of the President in my speech last Thursday. They state both the restraint on consumption for the next year and the overall restraints on imports and the development of new sources of energy over the next 10 years.

The President has made clear that these consumption restraints will be met either by voluntary action or by other action. There was no discussion of how this relates at this time to any measures that other countries would take.

We will, however, have technical discussions with Japan within the next month to go into the details of the implications of our proposal and how it could be put on a multi-lateral basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion of the nuclear controversy or security treaty in general?

Secretary Kissinger: There was a discussion of the nuclear problem. The President expressed his understanding for the special sensitivities of Japan with regard to this matter. It was agreed that the nuclear issue would be handled as it has been handled throughout within the framework of the Mutual Security Treaty and that any special problems in connection with it would be handled on the basis of bilateral discussions between Foreign Minister Kimura and myself and within the framework of American understanding for the special sensitivities of Japan with respect to this issue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss resumed fighting in the Middle East, and did you discuss with the Japanese your plan for a step-by-step negotiation?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not—first of all, as I pointed out in Washington before we left, we do not expect renewed fighting in the Middle East in the immediate future. We did not yet have an opportunity to go into detail on the evolution of the negotiations in the Middle East. There will be a meeting, of course, again between the Prime Minister and the President tomorrow morning, and my associates and I will be meeting with the Foreign Minister for several hours in the afternoon; and I am certain that by the end of the day these issues will have been discussed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, even though you did not go into detail, has Japan begun to make any form of a request for the way that the diplomacy in the Middle East is to be conducted?

Secretary Kissinger: I am having trouble hearing you, Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Press].

Q. I am sorry. With regard to Japan's need for oil and their interest in the Middle East, have they begun to lodge a special appeal with you as to how that diplomacy should be conducted?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the President invite the Emperor to the United States in the near future?

Secretary Kissinger: The President extended an invitation to His Majesty to visit the United States for 1975, and we are pleased to report that this invitation has been accepted. We look forward to this visit.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I did not quite understand. On the nuclear issue, you mean it has been brought up by the Japanese as a problem?

Secretary Kissinger: I think I made clear that the issue has been, as I explained, the special sensitivities of Japan with respect to nuclear weapons, and then I have explained our reaction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what did the President say about Vladivostok and China?

Secretary Kissinger: The President and the Prime Minister discussed the role of détente in current diplomacy and how we believe that our relations with the Soviet Union, as well as the People's Republic of China, can contribute to stability in the Pacific area. We also stressed, however, that the close friendship between Japan and the United States was one of the prerequisites for the effectiveness of this policy, and he gave the Prime Minister a brief preview of the subjects likely to be discussed in Vladivostok.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that the President had told the Prime Minister about our own program for restricting our own oil consumption through voluntary and other means. Did the President indicate that we would be going to involuntary means shortly?

Secretary Kissinger: Excuse me, Mr. Elfin [Mel Elfin, Newsweek], I did not say that the President explained our program. The question to which I replied was whether we would allocate consumption restraints on the basis of the relative personal users; and

I said that our overall program of consumption restraints, of import restraints, involved both restraint on consumption as well as the development of new sources, that with respect to that, the American goal for consumption restraint had been publicly stated. It was not, as a matter of fact, repeated to the Prime Minister, because it is well known; and I pointed out that the President is committed to achieving these restraints on consumption for next year, and on imports over a 10-year period through a combination of consumption restraints and new sources, and that he will achieve it either through voluntary restraints or through other measures that have not yet been decided upon.

I am afraid I can take only one more question because I have to meet ex-Prime Minister Sato.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I will take two then. This gentleman and you.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in connection with the sources of energy for Japan and the United States, was there any discussion of the Siberian oilfields and possible development? Was that reviewed in any way?

Secretary Kissinger: This is one of the issues which we expect to discuss before we leave here. It has not as yet come out, but we are prepared to discuss it.

Q. What are we prepared to say?

Secretary Kissinger: We will discuss it at the briefing after our meeting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the nuclear question, and your sensitivity to the Japanese sensitivity since their introduction of nuclear weapons, did you assure the Japanese that we have never, and would never, introduce nuclear weapons even in a transit situation?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I will not go beyond what I have said. The question of nuclear weapons will be discussed within the context of the Mutual Security Treaty,

and it will be handled as it has been handled within that framework.

I am afraid I must turn it over to Ron Nessen [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford]. Thank you very much.

TOKYO, NOVEMBER 20

Press release 508 dated November 20

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, let me sum up the communique, the meeting of the President with the Prime Minister this morning, and the meeting between the Foreign Minister and myself this afternoon, because they all cover similar topics.

First of all, let me take this occasion on behalf of everybody on the American delegation to thank the Japanese Government for the excellence of the arrangements, cordiality, the hospitality with which we have been received, and for the meticulousness of the planning.

Secondly, before I get into any of the specifics, I would like to say that perhaps the most important result of the visit—beyond any of the specifics that were discussed—has been the frankness, cordiality, and completeness of our exchanges. And the reference in the communique to the fact that this first visit by the incumbent President will add a new page to the history of amity between the two countries was put into practice in the discussions.

The discussions today concentrated primarily in the morning on an elaboration of the review of the international situation that was begun yesterday which is based on the premise that Japan and the United States must understand each other's purposes and harmonize them in the common interest of the two countries and of world peace.

There was a review of Chinese relationships, Soviet relationships, and indeed, a review of the whole world situation. There were discussions of the Middle East. Foreign Minister Kimura told us about his meetings with the Egyptian leaders on his recent trip, and we exchanged views as to the pros-

pects of peace in the Middle East. And we believe that there are possibilities for hopeful negotiations.

But there was a general understanding that security in the present age cannot be confined to military matters but that the co-operation between Japan and the United States in the field of energy, in the field of food, represents a new and positive dimension of the security which must be added to this already established military security—traditional security—relationship.

There was, as I have pointed out, an exchange of views in which the Japanese told us about developments in the latest exchanges in September on the occasion of the U.N. General Assembly and Japanese and Chinese relationships, and we did the same with respect to U.S.-Chinese relationships.

Of course, as you know, at the request of the President, I am returning here after the trip to Vladivostok and after my visit to Peking to brief the Japanese leaders about those developments.

We consider the exchanges here to have been of an extraordinarily useful and important character, and they lay the basis for a new era of partnership between Japan and the United States.

Now I will be glad to answer your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the results of the visit exceeded the expectations of the President, and if so, in what specific ways?

Secretary Kissinger: I would say that the results of the visit achieved perhaps the optimum of what one had hoped for. We have always attached the greatest importance to the friendship between Japan and the United States.

One can never, in advance of any visit or any exchange of views, predict how intense and how far-ranging the exchange will actually be. But I would say this exchange has been as candid, as frank, and as constructive as any I have attended since I have been in Washington and has had the most positive results.

Q. Are there any specific results you can cite?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the approach that was taken to the question of energy, the question of food, to the realization of the interdependence of the present world economy and world political structure, was of very considerable scope.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were your meetings with officials other than the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister—specifically the International Trade Minister [Yasuhiro Nakasone] and Mr. [Masayoshi] Ohira—designed to determine in any way whether Japanese policy would continue as it is regardless of what happened?

Secretary Kissinger: The meeting with Finance Minister Ohira and Minister Nakasone were at the request of those two Ministers, and they were not initiated by us. They were, however, natural requests.

The Finance Minister, as you know, was Foreign Minister until August, and I worked closely with him until that time. We established a very close working relationship and, of course, the problem of energy and food has implications also for finance.

Minister Nakasone was a student of mine at Harvard, and I have never been in Japan without having seen him, and it would have been unnatural for me to refuse to see him when he suggested a meeting.

In other words, the meetings were in no way designed to deal with the Japanese domestic situation or to gain any particular reassurances. We believe the Japanese policy is likely to remain stable.

Q. Was the Japanese Foreign Minister sanguine about the prospects of a peaceful negotiation in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Japanese Foreign Minister ought to speak for himself, and he of course visited in the Middle East only Cairo.

As far as I am concerned, I don't know if "sanguine" is exactly the right word. I have indicated that I believe there are possibilities for a step-by-step approach. I recognize

that the situation in the Middle East is extremely complicated and that there are many issues involved.

I do believe, however, that with the determination and the good will, there are possibilities for progress in the Middle East, and I think the Japanese Foreign Minister should speak for himself, though I did not have the impression that he disagreed with my views.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you seek a specific commitment from the Japanese Government to participate in the financial safety net, and if so, what was the government's reaction?

Secretary Kissinger: We did not go into the detail of every individual measure that I have proposed. We discussed in general terms the importance of consumer cooperation along the lines of my speech and of a dialogue that would grow out of this with the producers. We will have further discussions on the individual measures and on the implementation of the program, but I had the impression that there was a general sympathy to the approach.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there anything in section 3 of the communique dealing with nuclear weapons control that should be interpreted as referring to the question of transit of nuclear weapons in Japan?

Secretary Kissinger: I discussed that subject yesterday.

Q. I understand, but the communique did not refer to that.

Secretary Kissinger: Not beyond anything I have said since yesterday.

Q. As specifically as you can, were any assurances given Japan about pooling of energy resources by the United States should there be another oil squeeze?

Secretary Kissinger: I must say, beginning a question as specifically as you have wounds me deeply. It is also against my professorial training.

Q. As generally as you would like.

Secretary Kissinger: The sharing of oil supplies is part of the emergency program

that was ratified last week and that will be formally adopted this week. There were no additional commitments made.

However, the United States has made it clear that it believes that consumer solidarity is an important element in overcoming the difficulties produced by the energy crisis and that it will work closely with the Japanese Government and other interested governments in dealing with this issue on the basis of consumer solidarity. And I repeat, I believe we had very fruitful and constructive exchanges on that range of issues.

Q. Were there any additional agreements?

Secretary Kissinger: There was no discussion on going beyond the emergency program that has just been adopted three or four days ago, so there was no reason to reach any additional agreements.

Q. You said the United States is prepared to maintain a stable food supply to Japan. Do you contemplate being able to increase the level of supply to meet the increasing demand in Japan?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain the U.S. basic approach to the food problem, which we reviewed again today in some detail in my meeting with the Foreign Minister and on which I believe there is a general agreement. And it is an approach that got overshadowed by the debate on food aid.

The United States believes that the basic problem of world food supply requires some structural adjustment. There is now in the underdeveloped countries a food shortage of about 25 million tons which will increase—may increase—to as much as 85 million tons over a decade. We therefore believe that it is important to increase agricultural production in the underdeveloped countries and to provide food reserves to cushion against emergencies.

In both of these efforts, we believe that the Japanese Government will cooperate with us, especially with respect to the underdeveloped countries, which is a problem of technology. And we will have some exchanges on that subject.

To the degree that food production rises

in those countries, more food supplies will also become available in the United States. To answer your question specifically, we will give special attention to the needs of Japan. We will, in planning our own export, also try to do this on a more long-term basis than has been the case in the past, and we will have intense consultations with Japan on what can be done to assure their needs.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Japanese officials were basically sympathetic to your oil proposal. What have they learned since last Friday, when they were basically unsympathetic?

Secretary Kissinger: I was not here last Friday, so I don't know what they said last Friday. I can only say what they said this week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you had any requests for a meeting by either Mr. [Takeo] Fukuda or Mr. [Takeo] Miki, and in particular, Mr. [Erusaburo] Shina? If so, have you met them or have you talked with them any other way?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had a request for a meeting. I have run into Mr. Fukuda at social functions as I have also with Mr. Miki, but just to exchange a few words, and neither of them requested a meeting.

Q. Were there any discussions on Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: There was just a very brief discussion about the relationship between Korean security and the security of Japan. But there was no detailed further discussions.

Q. Do you have any plans to see Le Duc Tho in Peking?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. When you are traveling there?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. In Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no plans to see Le Duc Tho anywhere.

Q. Never?

Secretary Kissinger: "Never" is a very long time, but I have no plans to see Le Duc Tho on his current trip, which I understand is to last two weeks. I read that in the newspapers. But I have no plans to meet Le Duc Tho.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President seems to spend a lot of his time in ceremonial activities here. Wasn't it an unusual sort of program?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the President spent a considerable amount of time on the bilateral talks. In addition, he spent some time on ceremonial activities, which, as I explained before we came here, constitute an important element in the symbolism of the relationship and in the mood, which is such an important attribute in which decisions tend to be made in this country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why Mr. Rumsfeld [Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President] is accompanying you to China?

Secretary Kissinger: When we were flying across the Pacific, Mr. Rumsfeld suggested that maybe on my next trip to China I would take him along. I then said, "Well, as long as you are here this time, why don't we see whether we can still arrange it?"

I asked the President what he thought about it, and the President thought it would be a good idea if his chief of staff had some exposure to China. The explanation is as simple as this. It was an off-the-cuff idea that occurred to us as we were crossing the Pacific. I believe it will be helpful to have the President's chief of staff have some exposure to China, but it has no profound significance beyond this.

Q. On the nuclear issue, what kind of further understandings came out between you and the President and the Japanese leaders?

Secretary Kissinger: I mentioned yesterday the discussions, and of course there are always discussions within the framework—the Mutual Security Treaty that permits issues to be raised—and as I have said, we

will take into account the very special sensitivities of the Japanese people with respect to nuclear weapons.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you talk about U.S. and Japan's general approach to Siberian development planning?

Secretary Kissinger: The Japanese side explained to us the general approach to Siberian development planning. We are in no position to make any judgments until the trade bill and the Export-Import Bank bill have been passed by our Congress. And therefore we will have to defer any decision and consideration of these issues until that time.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions with Japanese officials and former officials, have you made any inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics?

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't made any inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics. It is impossible to have lunch with press people without being told certain things, but you must be as familiar with those as I am.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the answer that the President gave in Phoenix on the subject of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] was a bit confusing. At one point he referred to the desirability of Israel negotiating with the parties, and another time he was saying negotiations among nations. Could you say whether the United States favors negotiations with Israel and the PLO?

Secretary Kissinger: I think I went into that issue in detail at my press conference on Friday before we left Washington. I made clear then that the United States is not urging anybody to negotiate with anybody else and any negotiation is of course up to the parties concerned. And it is our understanding that Israel has refused to negotiate with the PLO.

Q. What was meant when the President said today at the press club, "We will not compete with our friends for their markets or for their resources." Is there a carving

up of sections of the world into Japanese markets and into American markets?

Secretary Kissinger: I think what the President had in mind is we do not look at our relationship with Japan in terms of competition but that the relationship between the industrial nations and especially between Japan and the United States in the Pacific area should be on the basis of cooperation and that in an expanding world economy there is sufficient place for both of us. There is no carving up of markets that was discussed or is contemplated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think the next time an American President visits Japan, visits Tokyo, he could do it without having 25,000 police mobilized for his visit?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the security arrangements for the visit of any President are of course up to the host government, and it is natural that they would tend to over-insure his safety.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to say further, your statement yesterday about the U.S. position on industrial oil consumers and their cooperation seems milder than the tone of your speech in Chicago just before you left. Is that a correct interpretation, and if so, has the position softened as a result of talks with the Japanese?

Secretary Kissinger: Our position is unchanged. Our position is that the industrial oil consumers have to cooperate and establish some basic principles before there can be a productive dialogue with the producers. This position has not softened. It is not a position of confrontation either, because we believe that the ultimate solution must be found on a cooperative basis.

In developing cooperation among the consumers, obviously consideration has to be given to the special circumstances of individual countries in applying these various measures that were proposed. This is what I intended to point out yesterday. But the position remains as I outlined it on Thursday.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been renewed speculation—I know you answered this last

Friday—but there has been renewed speculation that the fact that you and the President are meeting Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok has been a source of irritation in Peking. Is there any substance to that?

Secretary Kissinger: We have had no indication whatever from Peking directly or indirectly through any sources that have reached us that it is a source of irritation to Peking. I repeat, we have had opportunity to obtain Peking's views.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your Chicago speech, you said you had the impression the Japanese Government was sympathetic to the approach spelled out in that speech. When do you anticipate seeing some concrete evidence of that?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that over the next month concrete exchanges will begin on the implementation of these ideas with various consuming countries, and I think that my statement will then be proved correct.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in view of the Japanese expression yesterday of their difficulty with reducing their energy consumption by the standards you outlined in Chicago, did you give them any refinement, especially for Japan to think about over the next month or so?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is very important to separate two things—the basic approach and individual technical applications of it on a Presidential trip with the relatively limited amount of time that is available. The conversations have to concentrate on the basic approach. They cannot go into the details of all the technical matters.

Secondly, as I pointed out yesterday, we did not say consumption had to be reduced by 10 percent in every country. We said that over a period of 10 years, imports should be kept level by the whole group on the basis of consumption restraints and the development of new sources of energy. The precise apportionment within the group of either consumption restraints or the bringing into being of new sources of energy has to be discussed.

I would like to remind you the same prob-

lems existed when the emergency sharing program was first proposed last February, and it took about three or four months to work out all the details. This is a technically highly complex issue, but we are on the whole encouraged by the talks that took place here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how does the President feel about his first big foreign trip?

Secretary Kissinger: I think he feels extremely good about it.

Q. Did he talk to you about it and say why?

Secretary Kissinger: He talked to me about it in the two minutes from the south wing of the [Hotel] Okura to the main building, and therefore I don't think he could give me all the refinements of his judgment in that period.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that we are going to leave Japan and go to Korea, can you tell us whether the President is going to express any degree of dissatisfaction with the degree of political oppression in South Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: We have stated the importance that we attach to the security of South Korea. We have also, I believe, made clear our general view with respect to the form of domestic conduct we prefer, but I do not want to predict now what the President will discuss in his private talks with President Park.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been considerable talk in the Defense Department over the last few years about reducing the size of U.S. troops in South Korea. Are you about to do that now? Has the decision been made to do that? Is that why you are going to Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not going to South Korea in order to discuss—much less to announce—any reduction of forces. We are going to South Korea for the reason that I indicated before. It is an ally. It is a country whose security is important not only to the United States but also to Japan, and

it would have created all the wrong impressions for the President to be in Japan and not pay the visit over such a short distance to Korea.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the President and Tanaka discuss the implications of the Indian nuclear explosion?

Secretary Kissinger: Not in my presence, and I was present at all the meetings.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I believe you did not answer the last question, which was: Are we going to reduce the troops in South Korea? Your answer was, We are not going to discuss, much less announce, it. But are we going to reduce?

Secretary Kissinger: I know of no plans. There are no plans to reduce troops in Korea.

I will take two more questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding that Israel is refusing to negotiate with PLO, Palestinians in general, or only those Palestinians who want a separate Palestinian state?

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't had an opportunity to learn all the refinements of the Israeli position on that point. My understanding is that they will not negotiate with the PLO, and I am not familiar with any other group that labels itself Palestinian that has come forward as a candidate for negotiations.

Last question.

Q. Have you received any explanation why the Japanese Parliament hasn't yet been presented with a bill to ratify the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and are you satisfied with the explanations?

Secretary Kissinger: Since we have not received such an explanation on this trip, I can't, obviously, express any satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it. The United States favors the ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The press: Thank you.

VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 24, 1:35 A.M.

Press release 511A dated November 25

Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford: Gentlemen, as you can see, the Secretary will brief you on today's meeting.

Let me quickly run through the sequence of events so the Secretary can devote his time to substance.

The first meeting lasted from 6:15 to 8:15 and all the participants who are listed in the briefing that Jack [John W. Hushen, Deputy Press Secretary] gave you took part in that. There was then a half-hour break, during which the President and the Secretary took a walk. The meetings resumed at 8:45 and lasted until 11:30.

The second meeting lasted from 8:45 to 11:30. The President, the General Secretary, the Secretary of State, and the Foreign Minister attended that. Then there was a half-hour break from 11:30 until midnight.

The last meeting lasted from midnight until 12:30. The four participants, plus Ambassador [Anatoliy F.] Dobrynin, took part in that. The dinner was then postponed. The President walked back to his dacha with his staff and had a snack, about which I will tell you later.

The schedule for tomorrow is for the meetings to resume at 10 o'clock until approximately 2 o'clock, at which time the dinner that was canceled tonight will take place—at 2 o'clock.

I will give you further details later, but I think at this point you would like to hear about the substance of the meetings from Secretary Kissinger.

Secretary Kissinger: I can't go into too much substance, and as a matter of fact, I am here primarily because I promised some of you on the airplane that I would be here.

There were two major topics discussed today on the train ride.¹ For about an hour and a half, there was a general review of

U.S.-Soviet relations and the world situation. It was a get-acquainted session between the President and the General Secretary. And I think it went very well.

All the rest of the discussions this evening concerned SALT—that is, all of the discussions that Ron Nessen mentioned dealt with the subject of SALT.

I think that you remember, as I told you, I believe that progress was made in October. I think that we went further along the road that was charted in October. We went into considerable detail and many aspects of it, and we will continue the discussions tomorrow morning. And certainly, enough has already been discussed to give impetus to the negotiations in Geneva.

Now, how much more precise we can be tomorrow, what further details can be developed, that remains to be seen, and we will of course brief you after the session tomorrow and let you have the results.

We will undoubtedly discuss other issues tomorrow, including the Middle East and Europe, but today, the exclusive focus after the train ride was on SALT.

Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you say that there would be nothing left to discuss because you have already achieved the optimum of what you expected to achieve at this meeting?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if we had already achieved the optimum that is achievable, there would not be anything left to discuss tomorrow.

We had a very satisfactory talk today. I didn't have any very precise expectations about what we could get. I talked to a number of you, and I think I had explained that we will try to build on the discussions of October. That has been done. How much further we can go—we are really now in areas of considerable technical complexity and relationship of various types of forces to each other, but I would expect that we will make some further progress tomorrow morning. In fact, I am reasonably confident that we will.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

¹ President Ford was greeted at Vozdvishenka Airport in Ussuriysk by General Secretary Brezhnev on Nov. 23; they traveled by train to Vladivostok.

Q. Do you know if what has happened today could be called a breakthrough?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I would not call this a breakthrough. The last time I used the word "breakthrough" I suffered from it for months to come.

I think, certainly, enough was discussed today to help the negotiators considerably.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, was there a specific proposal that was put forward by one side or the other?

Secretary Kissinger: The sequence of events has been as follows: In October, in Moscow, the Soviet Union made a proposal, or advanced considerations, that I considered that we have described as constructive. Building on these considerations, the United States made some counterproposals which will be before the Soviet leaders when we meet today.

The Soviet leaders, in turn, advanced some considerations of their own to which the President, in turn, responded today; so it is a process in which the views of the two sides are being brought closer without as yet being identical but we are in the same general ball park. We are talking about the same thing, on the same principles, and each exchange refines the issues more clearly and brings them closer.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you talking about MIRV's? Can you give us any specifics of what area you are talking about?

Secretary Kissinger: We are talking about comprehensive limitations including numbers as well as MIRV's.

Q. Including numbers?

Secretary Kissinger: Including overall numbers as well as MIRV's.

Q. Do you think now that you have come closer to your goal in 1975 on an agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we have come closer to our goal of having an agreement in 1975.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, when you say overall

numbers, as well as MIRV's, you are talking about total delivery systems or are you talking about total warheads or what?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is one of the issues that is being discussed. But generally speaking, we are talking about total delivery systems.

Q. Total delivery systems?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. What—

Secretary Kissinger: Total delivery systems.

Q. Has this been one of the subjects of discussion, how to define the number that you then will make known?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, obviously, when you discuss strategic limitations, you discuss what sort of numbers would be considered appropriate as well as how you would then define them and this is part of the discussion.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, to follow up what I asked before, as I understand the events as you described them, the sequence, today the Soviets came forward with a proposal modifying their views on what we had given them earlier?

Secretary Kissinger: Today, the Soviets responded to what we put before them, which in turn was the response to what they had put before us in October. That is correct.

Q. And when was it that we gave this response to them?

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, let's see. I guess on the Tuesday or Wednesday, whenever I had lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin. I guess on Wednesday before we left on the trip.

Q. And it was at that lunch?

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in connection with this meeting, are you optimistic?

Secretary Kissinger: I am optimistic about this meeting, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do the two men get along? Is there anything you can tell us about your personal view?

Secretary Kissinger: I have the impression that the two men get along excellently. On the train ride, the atmosphere was friendly and was turning to cordiality toward the end. The subject of strategic arms is not one that lends itself to small talk, but in the breaks there was an easy relationship, and I think both sides are conscious of the responsibility they have in trying to make progress in this area and are conducting themselves accordingly. I think the relationship between the two men is good.

Q. Was the absence of the Watergate ever—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is a different atmosphere from the one in July for many reasons.

Q. How so?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in any event, President Nixon was a lameduck President, leaving Watergate aside. President Ford has announced that he is running for reelection in 1976, so he is not a lameduck President.

In July, for a variety of reasons, things were not ripe for an agreement. I think now—I am not saying things are ripe for an agreement here, but I think both sides are making a very serious effort to come to an agreement during 1975.

Q. Did you ask President Ford to run to improve his negotiating stance?

Secretary Kissinger: Would you repeat that question?

Q. Did you urge President Ford to run to improve his negotiating stance?

Secretary Kissinger: Did I urge him to run to improve—that he run? Oh, did I urge him to run?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I saw that article. I am not involved in domestic politics, and any-

one who takes my advice on that is in deep trouble.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you say that the amount of time you spent on SALT today and the canceled dinner indicate that you are behind schedule in terms of your own expectations of the pace of this meeting?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I would say that we have gotten into technical subjects of a complication that might indicate the opposite.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the walk that you took with the President—was this just for relaxation, or was it necessary to discuss with the President in private certain decisions or other matters?

Secretary Kissinger: It was to take relaxation in private.

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the decision to go for a 10-year treaty was a decision by a lameduck President, is it still the way to go about this? Has there been any change in your assessment?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not saying that a lameduck President cannot make correct decisions.

Q. I realize that.

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying a lameduck President runs up against the difficulty that his protagonists know the time limit of his term in office, and I think that the decision to go for a 10-year agreement was absolutely the correct one—remains the correct one.

Q. There were suggestions that it was an option that was not the top option, but it was an option just taking what could be—

Secretary Kissinger: No. The fact of the matter is that when we analyzed in July, we were talking primarily about a five-year agreement, five years from now. As we analyzed the difficulties we faced, we came unilaterally to the conclusion that to try to resolve these difficulties would not be worth it

because both sides would be straining against the date that the agreement would last and therefore the breakout considerations would almost dominate the agreement itself. So, President Nixon and I came to the conclusion that in any event the effort that would have to be put into negotiating a five-year agreement and then selling it at home would not really be worth it in terms of its substantive merit and therefore we did not attempt to narrow the gap by concession here or there which could have kept the project going but, rather, moved it into a framework which seemed on substance more promising.

Q. Has the progress been such that some sort of agreement will be signed here, and is there any change in our plans to leave tomorrow?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am certain that we will leave tomorrow. It may be a few hours later in the day than had been tentatively planned.

There is no possibility of signing a SALT agreement here. Whatever is provisionally agreed to here will have to be spelled out in very detailed negotiations which are going to be extremely complicated and which can easily fail. What we can do here is reach orders of magnitude, of directions in which to go, relationship of various categories to each other. That sort of thing can be done here.

Spelling this out, what it means, what restraints are necessary, what inspection, what requirements there are for this, there is not enough technical expertise here, and in any event it is inconceivable that an agreement will be signed here. How the guidelines will be given, that remains to be seen after the session tomorrow morning.

Q. I take it that the Soviets are willing, however, to go into more detail here than you anticipated. You are saying that the Soviet Government is eager to sign an agreement next year. How much will the chance be improved now?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I really would rather wait with making an estimate on that

after the session tomorrow. I would think the chances have been somewhat improved.

Q. Is it fair to say that the Soviets were willing to go into more detail here than what you had anticipated?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I thought that there was a possibility that—we knew the order of magnitude of the discussion, because we had reached a point where a specific set of considerations had been put before us. We had replied in somewhat those terms.

We expect the answer to come back again in those terms, but the discussion obviously required some detailed analyses. I think that it has gone reasonably well.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please speculate on what considerations, political or otherwise, may have prompted the Russians to move in this direction and come this far and this much progress?

Secretary Kissinger: Don't go overboard yet on progress. I am trying to give you a sense of movement. I have always stressed that this is a very difficult subject, and it is quite possible that when we resume tomorrow, it will turn out that we will not go further than where we have reached tonight. I think both sides have realized, and I think the Soviet side has also realized, that at some point we will be so deeply involved on both sides in the next round of weapons development and procurement that that cycle will become irreversible. The cycles can really be mastered only at certain strategic intervals, and once they have gone a certain time, whatever that particular cycle is will tend to be completed, and one has to wait for the next one to come around.

I think that realization that we have been stressing for a year, I think it is now accepted by both sides. And it is obvious that if the race continues that the United States will have to enter certain areas of weapons development that it would prefer not to have to do. I think it was a combination of factors like this that has accounted for the progress of the discussions of recent months.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to carefully

delineate between a provisional agreement and a formal signing. Is there a possibility that by the time you leave here tomorrow evening you might have reached a provisional understanding?

Secretary Kissinger: I have always believed, and have said so, that out of this meeting some guidelines to the negotiators could emerge, and some guides will certainly emerge. Now, whether they will take the form of announced guidelines or simply a general agreement to instruct the delegation, it is still too early to say.

I don't know what you would call a provisional agreement. There will not be a binding agreement; there will not be an agreement that reflects itself in the actions of the two sides at this meeting.

Q. The question then is whether you are going to sign or not going to sign.

Secretary Kissinger: That we cannot say until after the meeting tomorrow, but it depends on what you mean by "announce." There will certainly be something about SALT in the communique.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say whether or not the Soviets want to have our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe counted into numbers, strategic weapons?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think I should go into all the individual details, but when I said that the discussions concerned the relationship of various categories of weapons to each other, that has been one of the questions—overseas systems has been one of the questions that in the past has been raised.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in the past, you talked about the desirability of trying to work out an agreement that would in fact be more simple than the complex arrangements that have previously been discussed. Are we in fact saying in our response that both we and the Soviets have started moving toward this more simple, more basic formulation?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is hard to answer this in the abstract. I think

it is probably fair to say that we are moving toward simplicity, yes, but that is a very relative concept.

Q. Do you have any limit on the amount of time you will devote to the SALT, and how much time are you prepared to spend on the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: These meetings are not clocked, and both of the principals are fairly gregarious and easygoing so you get into a topic and it runs, and we are not leaving on a scheduled airliner or from a regular airport. So, we will talk about the Middle East as long as either side has something to say about it. There is no fixed time. We are prepared to discuss it.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, you also said that you would take advantage, in the negotiations, of the momentum that has built up. Are you building up the kind of momentum now that would require the benefit from the additional time here? Do you feel pressured—the fact that we are sitting here at 2 o'clock in the morning—against some kind of a deadline?

Secretary Kissinger: No, because we don't have anything that we must finish here. We didn't come here to make an agreement. We are not going to make an agreement here. We have come here principally, as I said before we left, for the two leaders to have an opportunity to get to know each other and to review Soviet-American relations, hopefully to give some impetus to the SALT negotiations. That probably will be achieved.

Beyond that, we have no necessity—no intention, in fact—to reach any specific agreements because, after all, the two principals are going to meet again for a much more extended summit when the General Secretary visits the United States in the spring.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why haven't the two principals met alone, President Ford and Brezhnev?

Secretary Kissinger: They will certainly meet alone before the end of the visit here.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Press release 511 dated November 25

Secretary Kissinger: If you are all through with reading the joint statement, let me deal with that. There is also a communique which we will distribute, and if it should not be finished by the time when I get through with the joint statement, I will talk from it.

The joint statement, in our judgment, marks the breakthrough with the SALT negotiations that we have sought to achieve in recent years and produces a very strong possibility of agreement, to be signed in 1975.

Perhaps the best way to talk about it would be to go back to the history of the negotiations, starting with the summit in July and the conclusion of the discussions since then, in relation to some specific issues before us.

In all of the discussions on SALT, there is the problem of aggregate numbers and then there is the problem of the numbers of weapons with certain special characteristics such as MIRV's. And finally, there is the problem of duration of the agreement.

In July, we were talking about an extension of the interim agreement for a period of two to three years, and we attempted to compensate for the inequality of numbers in the interim agreement by negotiating a differential in our favor of missiles with multiple warheads.

This negotiation was making some progress. But it was very difficult to establish a relationship between aggregate numbers. It would be an advantage on aggregate numbers on one side and an advantage in multiple warheads on the other. All the more so as we were talking about a time period between 1974 and at the end of 1979, during which various new programs of both sides were going into production at the precise moment that the agreement would have lapsed. That is to say, the United States was developing the Trident and the B-1, both of which will be deployed in the period after 1979, and the Soviet MIRV development would really not reach its full evolution until the period 1978 to 1979.

In other words, while we were negotiating the five-year agreement we became extremely conscious of the fact that it would lapse at the moment that both sides would have the greatest concern about the weapons programs of the other. And this was the origin of the 10-year proposal and the negotiation for a 10-year agreement that emerged out of the July summit.

No preparatory work of any significance could be undertaken in July on the summit, so that when President Ford came into office, the preparations for a 10-year agreement started practically from scratch.

Now, in a period of 10 years, the problem of numbers has a different significance than in the shorter period, because over that period of time, one would have to account, really, for two deployments of a cycle that is usually a five-year effort. And also, inequalities that might be bearable for either side in a five-year period would become much more difficult if they were trying over a 10-year period.

Finally, since we considered that any agreement that we signed with respect to numbers should be the prelude to further negotiations about reduction, it was very important the debates for reduction for both sides represent some equivalence that permitted a reasonable calculation.

I won't repeat on this occasion all the internal deliberations through which we went, the various options that were considered. There were five in number, but various combinations of quantitative and qualitative restraints seem possible for the United States.

Finally, prior to my visit to the Soviet Union in October, President Ford decided on a proposal which did not reflect any of the options precisely but represented an amalgamation of several of the approaches. This we submitted to the Soviet leaders about a week before my visit to the Soviet Union in October, and it led to a Soviet counterproposal which was in the general framework of our proposal and which, I have indicated to you, marked a substantial step forward on the road to an agreement.

It was discussed in great detail on the oc-

casion of my visit in October. The Soviet counterproposal was studied by the President and his advisers, and it caused us to submit another refinement, or an answer to the Soviet counterproposal, about a week before we came here, and then most of the discussions last night, all of the discussions last night, and about two and a half hours this morning, were devoted to the issue of SALT.

President Ford and the General Secretary, in the course of these discussions, agreed that a number of the issues that had been standing in the way of progress should be resolved and that guidelines should be issued to the negotiators in Geneva, which we expect to reconvene in early January.

They agreed that obviously, as the joint statement says, the new agreement will cover a period of 10 years; that for the first two years of that period, the provisions of the interim agreement will remain in force, as was foreseen in the interim agreement, that after the lapse of the interim agreement, both sides could have equal numbers of strategic vehicles, and President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed substantially on the definition of strategic delivery vehicles.

During the 10-year period of this agreement, they would also have equal numbers of weapons with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and that number is substantially less than the total number of strategic vehicles.

There is no compensation for forward-based systems and no other compensations. In other words, we are talking about equal numbers on both sides for both MIRV's and for strategic delivery vehicles, and these numbers have been agreed to and will be discussed with congressional leaders after the President returns.

The negotiations will have to go into the details of verifications, of what restraints will be necessary, how one can define and verify missiles which are independently targeted. But we believe that with good will on both sides, it should be possible to conclude a 10-year agreement by the time that the General Secretary visits the United States at the summit, and at any rate, we will make a ma-

jor effort in that direction.

As I said, the negotiations could be difficult and will have many technical complexities, but we believe that the target is achievable. If it is achieved, it will mean that a cap has been put on the arms race for a period of 10 years, that this cap is substantially below the capabilities of either side, that the element of insecurity, inherent in an arms race in which both sides are attempting to anticipate not only the actual programs but the capabilities of the other side, will be substantially reduced with levels achieved over a 10-year period by agreement.

The negotiations for reductions can take place in a better atmosphere, and therefore we hope that we will be able to look back to this occasion here as the period of—as the turning point that led to putting a cap on the arms race and was the first step to a reduction of arms.

Now, I will be glad to take your questions. Barry and then Peter [Barry Schweid, Associated Press; Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

Q. Mr. Secretary, excuse me, but are bombers under "a"?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. Bombers are included. When you say no compensation, you mean what we have in Europe counts against ourselves?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. Excuse me.

Secretary Kissinger: What I mean is forward bases, which are not included in these totals.

Q. They don't count in this?

Secretary Kissinger: Strategic bombers are included.

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Forward-base systems are not included.

Q. My question follows on that. What are the advantages for the Russians in agreeing

on the numbers of MIRV's being equal, that they would not raise questions about compensating for our forward-base system?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that we should ask the General Secretary for an explanation of why he—I can explain to you our point of view on these matters, but I believe that both sides face this problem.

The arms race has an impetus from at least three sources: one, political tension; second, the strategic plans of each side; and third, the intent of each side to anticipate what the other side might do. The most volatile of those in a period of exploding technology is the last one.

There is an element that is driving the arms race of insuring one's self against the potentialities of the other side that accelerates it in each passing year. I would suppose that the General Secretary has come to the same conclusion that we have, that whatever level you put for a ceiling, it is enough to destroy humanity several times over, so that the actual level of the ceiling is not as decisive as the fact that a ceiling has been put on it and that the element of your self-fulfilling prophecy that is inherent in the arms race is substantially reduced.

I would assume that it was considerations such as these that induced the General Secretary to do this.

Q. My question derives from the fact that no bargainer would put himself at a disadvantage, and I am just wondering what, from our standpoint, would be the net advantage of maintaining our forward bases without the Soviets complaining that there is some imbalance or some inequality or inequation in the overall purpose.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, the Soviet Union had maintained that forward-base systems should be included in the totals, and this was one of the big obstacles to an agreement previously. The progress that has been made in recent months is that the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking for compensation for the forward-base systems partly because most of the forward-base

systems, or I would say all of them, are not suitable for a significant attack on the Soviet Union. At any rate, this is an element that has disappeared from the negotiation in recent months.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, have you reached agreement on the number of MIRV vehicles or the number of MIRV warheads?

Secretary Kissinger: The number of MIRV'ed vehicles. The number of warheads could differ, and of course, there are some differentials in the throw weight of individual missiles at any given period, though there is nothing in the agreement that prevents the United States, if it wishes to, from closing the throw-weight gap. We are not going to do it just to do it.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, when was the discussion of SALT matters concluded, and was that time used to discuss any other matter?

Secretary Kissinger: The discussion of SALT matters was concluded around 12:30, and all the time between 12:30 and the time I came over here was devoted to other matters. The discussions were practically uninterrupted, and I will get into these other matters after we are finished with SALT.

Q. I have a question on the delivery vehicles.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. You speak of equality, which I take to mean some level that is roughly an equality of total U.S. delivery vehicles in a TRIAD mix and the same on the other side.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Q. Would this, therefore, involve a larger number of total U.S. vehicles than existed under SALT One or by taking in the bombers are you still maintaining roughly the same number of land bases?

Secretary Kissinger: By agreement, we are not giving up the number until the President has had enough opportunity to brief, but roughly speaking, the total number is composed of a combination of missiles, of

land-based missiles, submarine missiles, bombers, and certain other categories of weapons that would have the characteristics of strategic weapons. The total number that accurately is equal, and each side, with some constraints but not very major ones, has essentially the freedom to mix—that is to say the composite force—in whatever way it wants. There are some constraints.

Q. Is there any further constraint on the total throw weight that one side or another side could have? Under SALT One, as I remember, there was a limit on the number of heavy missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: The constraints of SALT One with respect to the number of heavy missiles are carried over into this agreement.

Q. Up to 1985?

Secretary Kissinger: Up to 1985.

Q. Throughout the whole period of the agreement, you said there will be a substantial reduction. Is this approximately—

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am saying it will be the objective of the United States now that we have achieved a cap on the arms race. We have achieved a cap on the arms race if we can solve the technical problems of implementing the agreement that was made here; but I believe, with good will, that should be possible.

We have always assumed that once we agreed on numbers, we could solve all the other problems, that from the basis of the cap that has been put on the arms race—so that both sides now have a similar starting point—it will be the U.S. objective to bring about a substantial reduction of strategic forces; but there has not yet been an agreement to any reduction, obviously.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, is there any provision in here concerning other types of modernization—improvements, for example, of MIRV's? Was there any limitation of MIRV's discussed?

Secretary Kissinger: No, there is no such

limitation, but this is something that can still be raised in the discussions; but there is no such limitation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what does this initial statement have to do with the Trident and B-1 program, if anything?

Secretary Kissinger: Each side has the right to compose—what it means is that the Trident and the B-1 program had to be kept within the total number of the ceiling that will be established by the agreement. But except for the limitations on heavy missiles, the rest of the composition of the force is up to each side.

Q. Are these limits higher than the existing forces of both sides and will both have weapons to reach the—

Secretary Kissinger: No. By the United States. This is somewhat more complex to calculate, depending on what weapons you count. For the Soviet Union, it is clearly below the limits, and for both sides, it is substantially below their capability.

Q. Will either side reduce its arms totals? I was not quite certain of your answer.

Secretary Kissinger: I would say yes. But I think you will know about that better when the numbers become more—

Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you identify for us what the main hangup was in the five earlier options, and what mix the President decided upon that was the key to advancing an acceptable proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: The big hangup earlier was the combination of time periods and perhaps the complexity of the proposals; that is to say, when you are trying to calculate what advantage in the number of warheads compensates for a certain advantage in the number of launchers, you get into an area of very great complexity, and when you are dealing with a short, or relatively short, time period, you face the difficulty that each side throughout this time period will be preparing for what happens during the break-out period.

So, those were the big hangups through July. What I believe contributed to this agreement was, first, that with a 10-year program we were able to put to the Soviet Union a scheme that was less volatile than what we had discussed earlier for the reasons of the breakout problem.

Secondly, I believe that one of the problems that was raised yesterday—namely, that they were dealing with a new President—may have influenced Soviet decisions because it created a longer political stability.

Thirdly, the discussions, I think it can be safe to say, moved from fairly complex proposals to substantially more simple ones, and this permitted both sides finally to come to an agreement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the goal at the end of the road is the signing of a strategic arms limitation treaty, in terms of percentages how far down that road does this joint statement put us?

Secretary Kissinger: Whenever I have given percentages and made predictions, I have got into enormous difficulties. I would say I would stick by my statement earlier. I would say that we are over the worst part of the negotiation if both sides continue to show the same determination to reach an agreement that they did earlier.

The issues that are before us now are essentially technical issues; that is to say, they are issues of verifications, issues of collateral restraints, issues of how you identify certain developments. But those are issues on which substantial studies were made before we made our original proposals, and therefore, had we not believed that they were soluble, we would not have made the proposals, so we think that it is going to be a very difficult negotiation which could fail. But I think we are well down the road.

Q. Sir, a couple of clarifiers, if I may, that I am not clear on. Do I understand that there will be a reduction in the number of U.S. MIRV's? And secondly, is there some limit on throw weight? Is that what you are saying or did I hear you wrong?

Secretary Kissinger: No. There is no re-

straint on throw weight except the restraint that is produced by the continuation of the ban—of the limitation of heavy missiles, and there is a restraint on the number of vehicles that can be MIRV'ed.

What was the first part of the question?

Q. Are we past that point where we have to cut back?

Secretary Kissinger: No. We are not past that point, but we could easily go past that point if we wanted to.

Q. I realize that, but we are not physically past that point.

Secretary Kissinger: No. But don't forget, the Soviets have not even begun to MIRV their missiles yet. We are well down the road toward that goal.

Q. I realize we have a larger plan at the moment. My question is whether we have to start to subtract.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not have to start subtracting.

Q. One other clarification question. This aggregate number is yet to be agreed upon?

Secretary Kissinger: No, that number is agreed upon.

Q. It has been agreed upon?

Secretary Kissinger: The numbers in both "a" and "b" have been agreed upon.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please—

Secretary Kissinger: And the President will discuss them with the congressional leaders, but both leaders thought that they did not want to include them in this statement.

Q. Well, they would then be included in a treaty?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. Ratified?

Secretary Kissinger: In other words, the agreement will not fail because of the numbers. The numbers have been set and the definition of what is counted in each number has already been set.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what you are saying in effect is that you have already fixed the ceiling, but you are not prepared yet to disclose what that ceiling is?

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Q. And that will be disclosed at what point?

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, I would expect during the week and certainly no later than by the time the instructions are drafted for the delegation.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, does this not mean—in other words, will not our MIRV reduction be considerably greater than theirs if we have many more, and will not their reduction in nuclear missiles be greater than ours because they are allowed to have more in 1972?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, when you are talking about a 10-year program, I would say within a 10-year program in the absence of an agreement both of these questions are highly theoretical, because over a 10-year period both we and they could easily go over the total number of permitted vehicles and easily go over the total number of MIRV vehicles.

In starting from the present programs I think it is correct to say that this strain on the Soviet total numbers is going to be greater and the strain on our MIRV numbers is going to be greater; but in practice it comes out about the same, because there is no question that, if we both kept going, the numbers of MIRV'ed vehicles would soon reach a point where even the most exalted military planner would find it difficult to find a target for the many warheads that are going to be developed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that this will be acceptable to the congressional leaders, particularly those—

Secretary Kissinger: I think this will certainly be acceptable to the congressional leaders that have been—

Q. Including Senator Jackson?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am sure you can find a more convincing spokesman for

Senator Jackson than me, but it would meet many of the criticisms that he has made in the past. It meets the point that has been made by critics of the interim agreement, in my view, only about the inequality in numbers, because as I pointed out on many occasions, the inequality in numbers was not created by the interim agreement—that existed when the interim agreement was signed and it simply froze the situation that existed on the day the interim agreement was signed for a five-year period. But at any rate, what was acceptable for a five-year period was not acceptable for a 15-year period—5 plus 10—and therefore that principle of equality has to be maintained here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one last question, please. Would you address yourself to the question of good faith on this? This is very important and will be a very important agreement to the security of the people of both nations. What will you say as a statement of faith and a guarantee?

Secretary Kissinger: When the security of both countries is involved and the national survival of both countries is involved, you cannot make an agreement which depends primarily on the good faith of either side. And what has to be done in the negotiations that are now starting is to assure adequate verifications of the provisions of the agreement. We think that this is no problem, or no significant problem, with respect to the total numbers of strategic vehicles. It may be a problem with respect to determining what is a MIRV'ed vehicle. Nevertheless we believe that that, too, is soluble, though with greater difficulty than determining the total numbers.

Good faith is involved in not pressing against the legal limits of the agreements in a way that creates again an element of the insecurity that one has attempted to remove by fixing the ceiling or, to put it another way, by putting a cap on the arms race. But I think that the agreement will be very viable, and that the element of good faith is not the principal ingredient in releasing the agreement, though it was an important element in producing the agreement.

Mr. Nessen: Mr. Secretary, you are going to miss your tour if you don't leave now. Also, we are now passing out the joint communique. The Secretary wants to make this tour.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me take another question.

Q. I want to get this right. Do I understand while you are putting a cap on the future numbers, this agreed-upon total is higher than what each side has now in aggregate. The combination?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not say this, no.

Q. That is the inference I get.

Secretary Kissinger: I said specifically it is lower than what the Soviet Union has and in our case it depends on how you compose the total number.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion on what each side will do for resuming the work of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East as soon as possible?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. Does that mean the end of your own efforts, for example, in the area?

Secretary Kissinger: No. This is a phrase that was also in the summit communique, and it has always been assumed that my efforts are compatible with the prospective efforts of the Geneva Conference.

Q. To what extent did the talks get into the Middle East situation, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Kissinger: There was a rather lengthy discussion of the Middle East. Let me go through the topics that were discussed in addition.

There was discussion of the Middle East, of the European Security Conference, and forces in Europe and a number of issues connected with bilateral relations. These were the key other topics that were discussed.

Q. Can you tell us about your discussions on the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think there is an agreement by both sides that the situation

has elements of danger, that an effort should be made to defuse it. We are not opposed to the Geneva Conference, and we have always agreed that it should be reconvened at an appropriate time and we agree to stay in further touch with each other, as to measures that can be taken to alleviate the situation.

Q. What role does the Soviet Union think the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] should play in the negotiations? How should they be recognized, and how should they—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the Soviet view has been publicly stated. We did not go into the modalities of how they would execute it since we made our position clear at the United Nations last week.

Q. Specifically the trade reform bill in the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: That was touched upon.

Q. Where did you leave the ESC?

Secretary Kissinger: The European Security Conference. We had a detailed discussion of all the issues before the European Security Conference in which, as you all know, Foreign Minister Gromyko is one of the world's leading experts, and we sought for means to move the positions of East and West closer together, and we hope that progress can accelerate.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you compare the progress made on nuclear weapons with the progress made by the Soviets with the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: Not even remotely.

Q. You did not make any progress on the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that progress on the Middle East is for us to make, and it was a different order of discussion. The progress on SALT was a major step forward to the solution of a very difficult problem. The discussions on the Middle East I think may have contributed, and we hope will contribute, to a framework of restraint in enabling the two countries that have such

a vital interest in the area to stay in touch with each other, but it cannot be compared.

Q. How much time do you estimate, Mr. Secretary, you spent discussing the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: How much time was spent? I didn't keep track of it. An hour, but that is a rough order of—

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Q. Was there a question of future sale of any U.S. commodities with the Soviet Union?

Q. Questions—

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't hear the question either, but it dealt with economics so I don't want to answer it.

TOKYO, NOVEMBER 25

Press release 512 dated November 25

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us about your meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister?

Secretary Kissinger: We had a very good meeting in the spirit of partnership that was strengthened last week, and I briefed the Foreign Minister about our visit to Korea and the Soviet Union. He in turn told me about his conversations with the French Foreign Minister. And I thought it was a very friendly and satisfactory meeting.

Q. And you discussed the latest developments on SALT?

Secretary Kissinger: I explained to the Foreign Minister in great detail the breakthrough that was achieved in SALT.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you foresee in the China visit?

Secretary Kissinger: We will have an exchange of views and a review of the situation, as we do on an annual basis. I have no specific expectations.

Q. Is there anything to the reports that this visit to China is meant to reassure the Chinese?

Secretary Kissinger: No. It was scheduled

for a long time, and it's a regular annual visit. It has no purpose of reassuring—

Q. And obviously SALT will be discussed there?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I will give the Chinese a report of it, but it is not the purpose of my visit. The purpose of my visit was agreed a long time ago before the Vladivostok trip was scheduled. It is in terms of Chinese-American relations, and it is not based on any need of specific reassurance.

Secretary Kissinger Makes Visit to the People's Republic of China

Secretary Kissinger visited the People's Republic of China November 25–29. Following are exchanges of toasts by Secretary Kissinger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Chiao Kuan-hua at a banquet given by the Foreign Minister on November 25 and at a banquet given by Secretary Kissinger on November 28, together with the text of a communique issued at Peking and Washington on November 29.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, NOVEMBER 25

Press release 513 dated November 26

Foreign Minister Chiao

The Honorable Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, all the other American guests, comrades and friends: The last three years or more, Dr. Kissinger has come a long way across the ocean to visit our country on six occasions. We are glad that he has now come to Peking again, providing our two sides with an opportunity to continue the exchange of views on the normalization of Sino-American relations and on international issues of common interest. Here I wish to bid welcome to Secretary of State Kissinger, to Mrs. Kissinger, who is in China for the first time, and to the other American guests accompanying the Secretary of State on the visit.

A year has elapsed since the last visit of

Mr. Secretary of State. In this year the international situation has undergone great changes, which further demonstrate that the current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven. The entire world is amidst intense turbulence and unrest. This reflects the sharpening of various contradictions and is something independent of man's will. The history of mankind always moves forward amidst turmoil. In our view, such turmoil is a good thing, and not a bad thing.

The Chinese and American peoples have always been friendly to each other. After more than two decades of estrangement, the door was opened for exchanges between the two countries, and the friendly relations between the two peoples have developed. Here we ought to mention the pioneering role Mr. Richard Nixon played in this regard, and we also note with appreciation President Ford's statement that he would continue to implement the Shanghai communique.

China and the United States have different social systems, and there are differences between us on a series of matters of principle. But this does not hinder us from finding common ground on certain matters. It is always beneficial for the two sides to have candid exchanges of views and increase mutual understanding. On the whole, Sino-American relations have in these years been moving ahead. We believe that the current visit of Mr. Secretary of State will contribute to the further implementation of the principles established in the Shanghai communique.

I propose a toast to the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, to the health of the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, to the health of all the other American guests, and to the health of all comrades and friends present here.

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Vice Premier [Teng Hsiao-ping], Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished guests, friends: I appreciate this warm reception on my seventh visit to China, which is all the

more meaningful to me because I am accompanied by my wife and by my children. I am glad that they can share what to the American people and to all of us in public life will always be one of the most significant initiatives of American foreign policy.

The beginning of the process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, and its continuation in the years since then, has not been a matter of expediency but a fixed principle of American foreign policy.

Since I was here last, there have been many changes internationally and some changes in the United States. But it was no accident that the new American President saw your ambassador the first afternoon he was in office, within a few hours of having taken his oath of office, and that he reaffirmed on that occasion that we would continue to pursue the principles of the Shanghai communique and that we would continue to follow the goal of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China.

And President Ford has sent me here to continue the fruitful exchanges of views that we have had in every year, to continue the process of normalization, and to affirm again the fixed principles of American foreign policy.

I look forward to my talks with the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister. I am glad that I have already had an opportunity to see the Prime Minister and to recall the many occasions of previous visits when we exchanged views.

We live in a period of great change and a period that is characterized by much upheaval. We believe that this change must lead to a new and better order for all of the peoples of the world, and it is to this goal that American foreign policy is dedicated.

We consider the exchanges on these subjects as well as others with the leaders of the People's Republic of China of the greatest consequence.

We agree that in the last years, relations between our two countries have moved ahead steadily. I am here to continue this process,

and I am confident that it will succeed.

So, I would like to propose a toast to the friendship of the American and Chinese peoples and to the health and long life of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister, and to the health and long life of Chairman Mao, and to our lasting friendship.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, NOVEMBER 28

Press release 514 dated November 29

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Foreign Minister, friends: On behalf of all my colleagues, on behalf of my wife and my children, I would like to thank our Chinese hosts for the very warm and very friendly reception we have had here.

The Foreign Minister and I reached a very important agreement today, which is that we would keep our toasts short, to spare the mental agility of the press which is here.

I do want to say that this visit, my seventh to the People's Republic, continues the progress that has been made on each previous occasion. We reviewed international problems and deepened our common understanding. We committed ourselves to continuing the process of normalization along the lines of the Shanghai communique. Beyond the formal exchanges, we gained a better understanding of the Chinese point of view, which we will take seriously into account in conducting our foreign policy.

I said when I arrived here that the process of improving relations between the People's Republic and the United States is a fixed principle of American foreign policy. This principle was reaffirmed and strengthened during our conversations.

So, my colleagues and I and my family leave with very warm feelings and a feeling of substantive satisfaction. In this spirit, I would like to propose a toast to the friendship of the Chinese and American peoples, to the good health and long life of Chairman Mao, to the good health and long life of Pre-

mier Chou En-lai, to the good health and long life of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister. *Gan bei.*

Foreign Minister Chiao

Mr. Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, all the other American guests, comrades and friends: First of all, on behalf of all my Chinese colleagues present, I wish to thank Secretary of State Kissinger for giving this banquet tonight to entertain us.

In the last few days, our two sides have, in a candid spirit, reviewed the development of the international situation over the past year and exchanged views on international issues of common interest and the question of Sino-American relations. This has increased our mutual understanding and deepened our comprehension of our common points. Both sides have expressed their readiness to work, in accordance with the principles established in the Shanghai communique, for the continued advance of Sino-American relations.

Dr. Kissinger and his party are leaving Peking tomorrow for a visit to Soochow before returning home. Here we wish them a pleasant journey.

I propose a toast to the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, to the health of President Ford, to the health of the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, to the health of all the other American guests, and to the health of all comrades and friends present here. *Gan bei.*

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

JOINT U.S.-PRC COMMUNIQUE

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The U.S. and Chinese sides held frank, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial talks. They reaffirmed their unchanged commitment to the principles of the Shanghai Communique. The two Governments agreed that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Accession deposited: Colombia, December 4, 1974; Iraq, September 10, 1974.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Zaire, September 23, 1974.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, with protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952; for the United States November 2, 1966. TIAS 6129.

Notification of succession: Zambia, November 1, 1974.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Colombia, November 19, 1974.

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.²

Extension by the United Kingdom to: Hong Kong, November 12, 1974.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London October 20, 1972.²

Extension by the United Kingdom to: Hong Kong, October 30, 1974.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.²

Signature: Hungary, November 6, 1974.³

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Spain, December 2, 1974.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 25, 1974. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago November 22, 1974. Entered into force November 22, 1974.

Pakistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Islamabad November 23, 1974. Entered into force November 23, 1974.

Syria

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Damascus November 20, 1974. Entered into force November 20, 1974.

Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement extending and amending the agreement of June 20, 1968, as amended and extended, relating to a program of technical assistance in the field of tax administration. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-of-Spain October 22 and November 12, 1974. Entered into force November 12, 1974.

² Not in force.

³ With a reservation.

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**Checklist of Department of State
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Releases issued prior to December 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 503 of November 19, 508 of December 20, 511, 511A, and 512 of November 25, 513 of November 26, and 514 of November 29.

No.	Date	Subject
*515	12/2	Program for the official visit of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt, Dec. 4-7.
†516	12/3	Kissinger: Senate Finance Committee.
*517	12/3	Claxton receives John Jacob Rogers Award.
†518	12/7	Kissinger: news conference.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.