



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXI • No. 1847 • November 18, 1974

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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DEPARTMENT

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VOL. LXXI, No. 1847
November 18, 1974

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

President Ford Meets With President Echeverria of Mexico

President Ford and President Luis Echeverría of the United Mexican States held meetings at Magdalena de Kino, Sonora, Mexico, and Tubac, Ariz., on October 21. Following are remarks exchanged by the two Presidents upon President Ford's arrival at Nogales, Sonora, Mexico; their exchange of toasts at a luncheon at Tubac, Ariz.; the transcript of their news conference at Tubac; and their exchange of remarks at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Ariz., upon departure.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 28

REMARKS AT NOGALES, SONORA, MEXICO

President Echeverría¹

Your Excellency, Mr. Gerald Ford, President of the United States of America: We bid you welcome to Mexico. The people of Mexico receive you with the expression of their friendship for the American people. Through me, our people wish to offer you the most cordial welcome, to convey a cordial greeting which we would ask you to take back with you for all the American people.

Coexistence between Mexico and the United States of America has been a long one. We have an extensive borderline between us. And all along this border for a long time now the sometimes dramatic and even tragic problems have been left behind.

During the last decades, it has been possible to solve the problems that affect us both through civilized practices by applying norms of law and of reciprocal respect. And now during the very difficult period that the entire world is living through, we both—the United States, in these difficult times, and Mexico—are making efforts so that our co-

existence will be a harmonious one, an understanding one, and a respectful one.

In our country, within our country domestically, we are struggling to foster social justice in accordance with old moral guidelines and with a spirit of cooperation which we believe would benefit all the countries of the world.

Internationally, we struggle to achieve norms of cooperation, balance, understanding on the part of each nation for all other countries. In Mexico, we believe that inflation is only one of the manifestations of lack of balance between the interests of the one and the other—between the rich and the poor, between the people that are just developing and the industrialized countries. We feel that we have to reach an equilibrium in order to fight against these problems. And we believe that it is possible that we can trust international relations and that we can find a system of cooperation that would lead to international balance, that would lead to peace and not to war.

We should understand that whatever problem comes up in any corner of the world—in Asia, Africa, Oceania, Latin America—are problems that affect all of us, even the richest and most industrialized countries, because we must understand that the destiny of mankind is one and indivisible.

President Ford, this is the doctrine of Mexico, sir, with which we receive you with great cordiality. We want you to feel at home among us.

President Ford

Mr. President, *amigos*: I am delighted to be here this morning to meet with you on

¹ President Echeverría spoke Spanish on all occasions.

our border at Nogales. I am delighted and highly honored to participate in these meetings today which will be partly held in Mexico and partly held in the United States, which symbolizes, Mr. President, the relationship between our two countries.

It is a working partnership of mutual cooperation which exemplifies the spirit behind the new dialogue into which we have entered with all nations of Latin America and which we will not forget, Mr. President, which started last year at Tlatelolco in Mexico City.

In our meetings today, Mr. President, let us give new meaning to the special relationship of us as two good neighbors—Mexico and the United States—through frank and friendly consultations.

It is very significant, Mr. President, that my first trip outside of the United States as President of our country is to Mexico, our longtime friend and very good neighbor. It provides a living demonstration of how we are inextricably linked by historical ties, by geographical position, by our mutual desire to be good neighbors.

It is my fervent wish that this meeting will mark the beginning of a very close personal relationship between us and contribute to the close cooperation and the very friendly relation of our peoples and our governments.

Our relationship is of very great mutual benefit. Each of our countries, Mr. President, receives much from the other—material goods of all kinds, increased understanding through tourism and cultural exchanges, and the enrichment of human life and consciousness through expanded knowledge and warm, warm friendship.

This exchange is especially evident in the border area. I thank all of you who have come here to welcome me and to see this spirit of friendship which exists between President Echeverría and myself representing our two countries.

Actually, we witness today the flow of people, goods, food, music, art, and language. We note the existence of a binational commission—not one, but several—and binational groups of many kinds. We see the

efforts by people on both sides of the border to work together in a joint effort to solve the everyday problems of their respective lives.

There are countless other instances demonstrating the strong, the vital, the flourishing, and friendly relations that exist between us. And in this border area, Mr. President, we also see living examples of how two governments disposed to work together in good will can meet and solve problems.

Along our common border, we have jointly faced and together resolved problems of flood control, sanitation, minor border adjustments necessitated by the vagaries of the Rio Grande.

We are extremely proud, Mr. President, of our recent resolution of longstanding and complex issues involving the salinity of the water of the Colorado River delivered to your country. Our successful efforts in these areas over the past few years are precedents for the solution of problems that may arise in the future. We must continue to draw upon the spirit of mutual respect, good will, which made this cooperation possible in the past.

Mr. President, let us today consider how we can cooperate in solving common problems which will result in a better and better life for the people of our two countries and for all the people everywhere.

Muchas gracias.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, TUBAC, ARIZ.

President Ford

Mr. President, distinguished guests, friends: I am very pleased to have the opportunity to have our distinguished guest here in Tubac, Arizona, and to reciprocate on this occasion for the warm welcome that he and the people of Mexico gave to me and to the American people during the day, which was an unbelievably pleasant, warm, and just a wonderful opportunity to be together.

I am most grateful to you, Mr. President, for having suggested that we meet in Magdalena de Kino for the meetings that we had during the day. Your sense of history, your

understanding of the great role that Father Kino played in the history of this part of the world, made it an ideal setting for the discussions that we had on very important matters.

Mr. President, the Jesuit priest whose statue is in the U.S. Capitol and whose statue is in the state capitol of Sonora and the capitol of Arizona lived and worked here almost three centuries ago. His efforts gave the first great stimulant to progress among the people of this part of the North American Continent, and we are all proud of his contribution to this flourishing part of our nation as well as yours.

Mr. President, with the horse, the cross, and the plow, he explored this area of your country as well as ours. He not only served his faith, Mr. President, but he also introduced agriculture, livestock, to the inhabitants of this area. And all of these ingredients, Mr. President, are vital to the progress of your country as well as ours.

Father Kino lives in the memories of those in the town that we visited this morning. On both sides of the border we owe him a very great debt of gratitude. The heritage of Father Kino is an inspiration for all of us to continue the work that he started three centuries ago.

Mr. President, as I am sure you realize, I am a great believer in personal dialogue. I believe that the straight talk that you and I had today contributed significantly to a better understanding, greater cooperation, and greater potentialities for your country as well as ours.

Mr. President, we had straight talk today with openness and candor, and as a result, it seems to me that the relationship between your country and mine has increased very significantly.

Your great patriot Benito Juárez said over 100 years ago, and I quote, "Respect for the rights of others is peace." And this relationship that has been built between Mexico and the United States is built on that foundation, which is solid rock.

Mr. President, we have discussed a number of very important issues, and we have done it with openness and candor, and the spirit

that we discussed these matters, I think, will be the foundation upon which we can continue the dialogue—a dialogue that will be beneficial to Mexico as well as to the United States, to Latin America, and to the world as a whole.

Mr. President, we are greatly honored to have on the soil of the United States the President of Mexico and his official party. We believe that the relationship between us will grow from this beginning under my administration and during your time as President, and we will work together to build a better and better world in this hemisphere as well as throughout the globe.

May I offer a toast to the President of Mexico and to the people of the great country of Mexico and to the growing and improved relationships between our people, our country, and you and myself.

President Echeverria

Mr. President of the United States of America: I believe, Mr. President, that among the many important points of agreement that we have reached during this very brief visit—but a very intensive one—we can mention the enormous success of this visit.

The cordiality, the expressions of welcome and affection with which you have been received in Magdalena and in Nogales, we all know would have been the same whatever part of the country you would have visited.

It is not only the fact of the coexistence between Mexicans and North Americans and U.S. citizens that intensifies the bonds that bring our two countries together; it is not only the relationship that exists on the two sides of the border. It is the fact that throughout all our history, the American history and the Mexican history, we have been able to bring up our problems very openly; we have been able to foster and foment our friendship.

When you and I, Mr. President, explored the different possibilities of meeting along the border area, we decided to meet in this vast region which was at that time a desert and which Father Kino discovered and civi-

lized. Father Kino's untiring work, Father Kino's great foresight and vision, and all his dedication are examples that are to be followed in the work that needs to be done in this very vast desert area in which we are at present.

In researching the work that was done by Father Kino, many students of the United States and many students of history of Mexico participated, and similarly to the way in which they joined forces and participated, we can join forces in order to solve the problems of the United States and of Mexico.

May I say out loud, Mr. President, that to deal with you personally is very gratifying, that, very simply and very directly and fully informed, you take up the most complex matters, that you do not elude the problems with a great many high-sounding phrases, and that it is easy to perceive that you are imbued with good faith in our bilateral relations, and that this will be beneficial for an international life which every day becomes more complex throughout the world and which makes it necessary for political leaders to contribute with the greatest intelligence and experience and all of their good will.

We know that the world is living through very difficult times and that it is only through the spirit of understanding, of frankness, that we can transcend these difficult times so that they will not become too long.

And, Mr. President, I do believe that if in the future the problems and all other matters that should come up are to be dealt with as we have dealt with our problems today in this border area, we will have done a great deal to lighten our burden and to solve these problems.

Mr. President, it has been a great pleasure for me to meet you personally, to dialogue with you, Mr. President, in the direct and clear manner in which you speak, not only from conviction but also because this is your way. And in Mexico, we have no doubt that this is a very, very favorable sign so that the friendship between the two countries will become deeper and will continue into the future, strengthened, vigorous, and without ever being blemished.

Gentlemen, I offer a toast to the health of the President of the United States and of the friendship of the two countries.

NEWS CONFERENCE, TUBAC, ARIZ.

President Ford: It has been a very great privilege and pleasure, Mr. President, to have the opportunity of visiting your country today and to discuss with you a number of very important issues. And let me just emphasize one.

You, of course, are the author and promoter of some very far-reaching action in the United Nations which, we believe, as a charter for economic development throughout the world, has very great merit and very great support, and I compliment you for it. And I can assure you that I and Secretary Kissinger will work with you and others in your government in trying to find the key and the answer to the economic development of all parts of our great globe.

It is nice to have you in the United States, and I thank you for the warm welcome given to me by you as well as all the people of Mexico.

Yes.

Q. I would like to address a question to both Presidents. Among the issues you discussed today, was there a discussion of American access to the recently discovered oil deposits in southern Mexico, and could you give us an estimate of the size of those deposits?

President Echeverría: Yes, Mexico is selling to whoever wants to buy the oil at the market price in the world market. We sell our surplus oil. I hope that we can drill for more oil in Mexico in order to be able to export a greater amount. We have sold to the United States, to Uruguay, to Brazil, and to Israel, and we hope to continue to sell without making any differences among the buyers in order to contribute to satisfy the demand.

Q. I would like to know, President Ford, if, during your talks, there was any mention

made of the Trade Reform Act and, if so, what are the repercussions that this will have for Mexico?

President Ford: I am very happy and very pleased that you raised the question. The new trade legislation, which I hope will pass the Congress this year, will significantly increase the trade relations between Mexico and the United States, helping to balance the trade between Mexico and the United States. This trade legislation, which I have worked very hard to promote, which I believe will pass the U.S. Senate and, I believe, the Congress, will be very helpful in making good trade relations between the United States and Mexico.

Q. Can you tell us whether any progress has been made on a new approach resolving the question of migrant farmworkers from Mexico and the related questions involved in that?

President Echeverría: Yes. Yes, we did discuss this point, and I brought it up in the name of Mexico—I told the President of the United States that we have definitely desisted from our intention of signing an agreement, and this is due to the fact that we made a revision of the previous agreement and we saw that in practice, in the way it works, it is not good. It gives opposite results from the ones we want.

What happened at that time was that, attracted by this agreement that we had with the United States, the migrant workers, or the would-be migrant workers, would come to the border cities of the United States. And then it happened that they did not receive a contract, and then they stayed at the border city and increased the number of the population or else they went illegally into the United States.

Now, with the policy of self-criticism that at present prevails in Mexico, we have reviewed this matter, and we have come to realize and accept that the responsibility belongs to Mexico.

In Mexico, we need to increase the sources of employment. We need to send more re-

sources out into the countryside. We need to organize the farmers in a better way. We need to keep them within the land. I do not know if President Ford has anything to add, because we analyzed this point jointly.

President Ford: As you can see, we discussed this matter in great depth. It has a long history. It has current problems. In fact, we have some new problems. And in order to get an up-to-date reading on what should be done, how we can best help, we have decided to reanalyze through a commission that will bring up the data that involves those going from Mexico to the United States and will update data that will involve individuals who are in the United States seeking employment, trying to find the right answer. And this revitalized commission, I think, will give both of us and our countries better answers to solve the problem.

President Echeverría: Now, however, there is a point that Mexico insists upon in reference to the migrant workers—whether they are legally in the country or illegally in the country. That is, Mexico insists that they enjoy the rights and prerogatives that is granted by the law to any person.

When a person is contracted legally and comes to work in the United States, this person under contract has certain rights—the right to a decent salary, the right to social security, and, that is to say, all the rights that are granted by the law. This is when the person comes to work legally.

Now, if the migrant worker comes in illegally, he still has some rights that must be observed—this is basic.

Q. I have a question for President Ford. I would like to ask President Ford whether the hemispheric problems were taken up and, if they did take up the hemispheric problems, what is the attitude of the United States with reference to Cuba and if this attitude is to be maintained at the next conference of Foreign Ministers.

President Ford: We did take up the question of the U.S. attitude toward Cuba. I indicated that we had not seen any change in the attitude of Mr. Castro or any of the other in-

dividuals in the Cuban Government and, inasmuch as there had been no change, no attitude that was different regarding the United States, it was not expected that our attitude would change toward Cuba.

We did discuss the meeting that is to be held in Quito, I think, on November 7 or 8, where the matter will be brought before the OAS. But our attitude, as of the present time, is since no change in the attitude of Cuba, we certainly have to retain our point of view concerning them.

Q. President Echeverría, I wonder if you could answer one part of Mr. Shaw's [Gaylord Shaw, Associated Press] question which was not answered, and that is, can you give us some estimate of the size of the new oil discovery in Mexico?

President Echeverría: Yes, the discoveries are very important and significant, and the significance we can find in the following figures: Of the 640,000 barrels a day that are obtained throughout all of Mexico, 37 percent—that is 241,000 barrels—come from only a few wells. This has made it possible for us now to begin to export, after having transcended the stage where it was necessary for us to import in order to satisfy our own consumption.

Therefore this is very important for the Mexican economy, first and foremost, if we take into account the prices that prevail for oil in the world market, prices which we respect.

Q. This is a question for both Presidents. Can you give us a list of the specific agreements that you reached today?

President Echeverría: Actually, no, we did not come to international agreements. It was the first meeting between the President of the United States and the President of Mexico in order to get together to discuss, to analyze, very frankly, very openly, very clearly, very directly, some of the problems that have already been dealt with in this room.

For me, the most important part of our meeting is the way in which President Ford underlined to me personally, and later on here during our meeting in this place, the impor-

tance that he gives the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

And I thank President Ford and the people of the United States for this opinion that has been expressed to me because, actually, this is a complete change from what it was before, and this is very valuable support for this charter that is gaining ground within the United Nations, and for the already 100-and-some-odd countries that are supporting the charter.

The United States had never before expressed as much interest as it has now in the approval of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Of course, it rather matters that we still have to elucidate, that we have to define, but I feel very optimistic that we shall.

The press: Muchas gracias.

REMARKS AT DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE, TUCSON, ARIZ.

President Ford

Mr. President: It has been a very great privilege and an extremely high honor for me to have had this opportunity early in my administration to meet with you and your very distinguished delegation, to have visited Nogales and Magdalena de Kino in your very great nation, and to have had the honor of your hospitality in Tubac. Let me say that the reception received in Magdalena, in Nogales, was unbelievable, and I can say to all of my friends here in Arizona we could not have had a warmer greeting and a friendlier reception.

Now, Mr. President, the time has been all too short, but what we have shared together has been most valuable to me in the handling of the problems that we see down the road. It provided a very opportune moment for a warm welcome, to know you personally, to be able to establish a close personal friendship—the friendship between the Presidents of two great countries—a neighbor to the north for Mexico and a good neighbor to the south from the United States. This opportunity provided us the establishment of a firsthand dialogue,

which is so important in the understanding and cooperation of our peoples and our governments. It provided a chance, Mr. President, to hear your points of view representing your great country and your great people on matters of mutual concern to our countries and to give me an opportunity to express to you the views of our people and our government.

To me, Mr. President, the personal relationship we have initiated today is equal to the substantive discussions we have held. I am confident that the meeting beginning early today and ending shortly will be only the beginning of a close personal relationship, an important link in the special relationship which unites our countries.

Mr. President, during my short visit to your side of the border this morning, you and the people made me feel very much at home, and I assure you that the warmth of this friendship by our people to you I hope equals that of your people to me.

As I say goodbye and take leave, let me wish you a safe and pleasant return journey, Mr. President. I will not say goodbye, but rather, following the tradition of your country, I will say *hasta luego*.

I know there will be other opportunities in the future to meet, to discuss the vital questions, but, more importantly, to get better acquainted.

It is a privilege and a pleasure to have had this opportunity on your border and ours. Mr. President, I thank you.

President Echeverria

President Ford: It is only due to the great spirit of friendship which unites our two countries that it has been possible in a few hours, and without any personal contact between the two of us previously—it has been possible, I repeat, to revise the enormous amount of matters that we have between our two countries.

We are practicing—and this is well for the people of the United States and for the people of Mexico to know—we are practicing a simple type of democracy, a democracy in which there is no secrets, a democracy in

which there is nothing hidden, a democracy that is characterized by frankness.

I believe that this conference between the United States and Mexico can set an example—can set an example that should be followed by all, by the great and the small countries, by the industrialized nations and the developing nations.

I see that from here on in, with good will, with the study of our common problems, with mutual understanding, the relationship between our two governments will improve.

Mr. President, in expressing my gratitude for your personal acquaintance, Mr. President, and for the hospitality that has been shown to us by the United States and also this expression of good will on the part of the people of the United States, I, too, wish to say *hasta luego*, until we meet again, because we hope that we will have you in Mexico City so that the Mexican people will get to know you as I do.

Mr. President, in taking my leave, I do so with a warm handshake, with an *abrazo*, Mexican style—with an embrace that we hope will travel to all the homes of the United States and convey the great affection of Mexico.

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to UNESCO General Conference

The Senate on October 10 confirmed the nominations of the following-named persons to be Representatives and Alternate Representatives of the United States to the 18th session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization:

Representatives

R. Miller Upton
William B. Jones
Rosemary L. Ginn
E. Ross Adair
Gordon H. Scherer

Alternate Representatives

Stephen Hess
William G. Harley
J. Roger Porter

U.S. Congratulates Mozambique's Joint Transitional Government

Following is an informal translation of a letter sent by Peter Walker, U.S. Consul General at Lourenço Marques, to Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Prime Minister of the Transitional Government of Mozambique, on September 20 upon the installation of the Transitional Government.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1974.

EXCELLENCY: The Government of the United States of America has instructed me to express the congratulations and the pleasure of the people and Government of the United States for the successful conclusion of the negotiations which culminated in the installation of the government which will preside over the period of Mozambique's transition to independence.

The policy of the United States toward the peoples of Africa has long been one of support for their self-determination, and thus the United States strongly supports the efforts of the Portuguese Government in the decolonization of its African territories.

The Government of the United States is fully aware that the installation of the Transitional Government in Mozambique represents an important step toward the implementation of this policy of decolonization, and is convinced that the goodwill and enlightened leadership that made that step possible should also lead to the successful completion of the decolonization process next year.

The Government of the United States of America is hopeful that the friendship that has long existed between the people of the United States and the people of Mozambique will result in a relationship of increasing understanding and cooperation as Mozambique proceeds to independence.

I am pleased to enclose, for the information of Your Excellency, excerpts from the speeches delivered recently by the President of the United States of America and by Sec-

retary of State Kissinger to the General Assembly of the United Nations.¹

Accept, Mr. Prime Minister, sincere expressions of my respect and highest consideration.

PETER WALKER
*Consul General of the
United States of America*

Telecommunication Convention Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*²

To the Senate of the United States:

For advice and consent to ratification, I herewith transmit to the Senate the International Telecommunication Convention reached at Malaga-Torremolinos on October 25, 1973. This transmittal also includes the Annexes and Final Protocol to the Convention, as well as a report by the Department of State.

This new Convention will abrogate and replace the International Telecommunication Convention of 1965. It generally follows the

¹ Excerpt from an address made before the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 18 by President Ford:

"—We rededicate ourselves to the search for justice, equality, and freedom. Recent developments in Africa signal the welcome end of colonialism. Behavior appropriate to an era of dependence must give way to the new responsibilities of an era of interdependence."

Excerpt from an address made before the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 23 by Secretary Kissinger:

"The United States notes with particular satisfaction the continuing process of change in Africa. We welcome the positive demonstration of cooperation between the old rulers and the new free. The United States shares and pledges its support for the aspirations of all Africans to participate in the fruits of freedom and human dignity."

² Transmitted on Oct. 17 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. J, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the convention, annexes, and protocol and the report of the Department of State.

provisions of the 1965 Convention with a considerable number of minor improvements and a few major modifications to take account of technical developments in the field and developments in international organizations.

One notable change from the 1965 Convention is the deletion of the separate membership of the territories of the several member States, including the United States. Although this change will deprive the United States of its vote on behalf of the territories, the redistribution of financial obligations which accompany this change will result in a relatively lower financial contribution from this country.

The International Telecommunication Convention constitutes the procedural and organizational framework for the orderly conduct of international telecommunications, and it is in the public and commercial interest of the United States to continue to play an active role within this framework. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this new Convention, and subject to a reservation noted in the State Department report, give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 17, 1974.*

Notice of Time for Filing Claims Against Egypt by U.S. Nationals

*Department Announcement*¹

On July 14, 1974, the Governments of the United States and of the Arab Republic of Egypt agreed to establish a Joint Committee to discuss compensation of U.S. nationals for their property in Egypt, with a view to reaching an appropriate settlement.

U.S. nationals who have claims against the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the nationalization, expropriation or se-

questration of, or other measures directed against their property by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt should file their claims with the Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20520, during the period beginning October 22, 1974, and ending January 22, 1975.

U.S. nationals who, prior to June 1967, had communicated with either or both the American Embassy at Cairo and the American Consulate General in Alexandria, Egypt, concerning the nationalization, expropriation or sequestration of, or other measures directed against their property by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt should write to the Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, regarding the updating and the further preparation and development of their claims during the period October 22, 1974, to January 22, 1975.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Oil and Asian Rivals—Sino-Soviet Conflict; Japan and the Oil Crisis. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 93d Congress, first and second sessions. September 12, 1973–March 6, 1974. 476 pp.

Human Rights in Chile. Hearings before the Subcommittees on Inter-American Affairs and on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. December 7, 1973–June 18, 1974. 215 pp.

Foreign Investment in the United States. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January 29–February 21, 1974. 478 pp.

Critical Developments in Namibia. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. February 21–April 4, 1974. 305 pp.

Global Scarcities in an Interdependent World. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. May 1–22, 1974. 259 pp.

U.S. Participation in African Development Fund. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. June 27, 1974. 66 pp.

¹ Issued on Oct. 18 (press release 429).

U.S. Reviews Disaster Relief Efforts for Hurricane Victims in Honduras

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., on October 21.

USUN press release 141 dated October 21

The Government of the United States and our people should like again to express our deepest sympathy to the government and people of Honduras, who have suffered so much from the devastation of Hurricane Fifi. Perhaps we shall never know the toll in lives lost in this most terrible disaster; we shall never know how many tens of thousands of Hondurans were left homeless; we shall never know how many millions of dollars in productive capacity vanished with the winds. We do know, however, that for the people of Honduras the dimensions of the disaster are enormous and that there is an undeniably pressing need for international relief and recovery assistance.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of Honduras has already spoken of the kinds and levels of help his country will require, and he has told us of the efforts of the government and people of Honduras to do what they can to deal with the immediate and longer term emergency problems.

We in this hemisphere know the enormous devastation in human and economic terms which can be visited upon any of us by hurricanes—the scourge of our part of the world. Since the turn of the century we have ourselves been ravaged more than two dozen times by major hurricanes. We know that for a developing country the tragedy of hurricane devastation can be even more cruel.

The meeting today was called by our distinguished Executive Chairman for the purpose of reviewing what Honduras' neighbors

and appropriate international agencies have contributed and will contribute to assure survival and recovery from this tragedy.

Mr. Chairman, this is an occasion of sadness. Nonetheless I am proud to be able to report that the United States was among the many large and small countries that reacted quickly and generously to the desperate needs of the Honduran people in the first hours and days after Fifi struck.

With full appreciation of the genuinely magnanimous response of other nations in this dire emergency, I would like to review here the scale and variety of my government's efforts to help the Honduran people find relief from the enduring agony and suffering caused by Fifi.

Even before the hurricane rains ceased, my colleague U.S. Ambassador Phillip Sanchez had transmitted to our government an official Honduran request for assistance on an emergency basis. Within hours my government dispatched two disaster survey teams to Honduras to help determine the extent of damage and the dimensions of assistance required.

These were followed by the assignment of four helicopters, two transport aircraft, and four boats for use in rescue and emergency food and medical distribution missions. U.S. military personnel were flown into Honduras to help establish and maintain an emergency communications network. Our Air Force immediately commenced a series of mercy flights which over the next few weeks airlifted to Honduras almost 200 tons of relief supplies, including food, blankets, sheets, tents, portable kitchens, insecticides, fuel, and clothing. The U.S. Government has also authorized or shipped to Honduras almost 2,000 metric tons of food supplies since the beginning of the emergency. Between September 19 and October 1, the total value of U.S. Government disaster relief assistance to Honduras exceeded \$1.6 million.

As a clear indication of his great concern with this disaster President Ford sent two personal emissaries to Honduras on September 28 to assess immediate relief requirements and longer term recovery needs. The emissaries, Messrs. Herman Kleine and Russell McClure, personally reported their findings to our President on October 7.

They recommended that the United States continue to participate in the provision of critically needed assistance for life support in the posthurricane emergency phase. They also reported that assessment and planning were already underway for the postemergency task of rebuilding the economy of the shattered northern region. "The magnitude of the task," they reported, ". . . will be beyond the crippled capacity of the Honduran economy. Help from outside will be needed."¹

They outlined a role for the U.S. Government, through the Agency for International Development and through multilateral institutions. They recommended that AID assistance be addressed primarily to the rural sector and rural poor who were so grievously affected. They also noted that the requirements for the larger capital transfers might be appropriately addressed by the international agencies.

As significant as official U.S. Government assistance has been in the immediate posthurricane phase, it has not constituted the only or even the major U.S. response to the emergency. I am referring, of course, to the characteristically generous and spontaneous donations of funds and commodities by private U.S. citizens and the provision of relief supplies, equipment, funds, personnel, and transport by the state and local governments and by private groups and U.S. voluntary agencies.

We do not know and will never know the full value of private citizens' contributions to the relief efforts, as these contributions have poured into Honduras through so many different channels. We have attempted—without complete success—to record contributions of the many private organizations and volun-

tary agencies in the United States. We do know that the value of this assistance now exceeds \$5 million.

I cannot mention all of the organizations involved, but with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay particular tribute to the very significant contributions of the American Red Cross, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the Medical Assistance Program, the Salvation Army, the State of Alabama, and the Sister Cities Program.

Mr. Chairman, I am happy, too, to report that the continuing resolution voted by the U.S. Congress last Thursday, October 17, authorizes AID to conduct further relief and recovery operations in Honduras as well as in Bangladesh and Cyprus.

The U.S. AID Mission in Honduras is now consulting with appropriate agencies of the Government of Honduras on specific recovery projects where U.S. bilateral assistance efforts can best be focused. Preliminary indications are that our recovery assistance can most effectively help the Honduran Government in assisting farmers in replanting their crops, in providing minimal health facilities, getting available laborers working on small infrastructure repair projects, in cleaning up river channels and other watercourses, in repairing roads and bridges, and constructing emergency housing.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close my remarks by pointing out that this disaster has again established the need for a more effective U.N. Disaster Relief Office. Representatives of my government have been in constant touch with UNDRO officials since the beginning of the emergency period, and we have nothing but praise and admiration for the contributions they have made within their sharply limited resources.

However, the need for greater, more efficient coordination of international disaster relief assistance becomes both clearer and more pressing with each natural disaster that occurs. It is not enough that nations respond generously to the perceived needs of those afflicted by disaster. We need not only international generosity and compassion but also direction and coordination by a UNDRO staffed with people who know how to work

¹ For text of the report, see AID press release 74-70 dated Oct. 7, 1974.

with a disaster-stricken government and who can tell all of us precisely what is needed where and for whom—not just food but what kind of food and how much, not just transport or personnel or communications but what kind and how much.

Mr. Chairman, from my own personal experience I can testify as to the enormous difficulties that can be created out of unrestrained generosity of those who seek to help in a disaster. In my involvement in relief to the civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war, I found such matters as the well-intentioned donation of cans of soup. Regrettably, as we know, most American liquid soups are 90 percent water; transporting that volume of water is inefficient when one considers dried soups would permit 90 percent more of this valuable nutrient.

Moreover, in many instances one must consider the traditional diet of those victims of disaster. In such circumstances introduction of new, strange, and exotic foods can even create additional problems. These I mentioned only as illustrative of the range of what appeared to be minor difficulties but which, in a disaster context, can become major additional problems.

Mr. Chairman, people who were on the ground and active in the Honduran emergency tell me that a substantial amount of the commodity assistance provided so generously by public and private donors around the world was not appropriate for this particular emergency. In some cases, I am given to understand, receipt and distribution of critically needed emergency supplies might even have been slowed down because of the obstruction in the supply system caused by the presence of quantities of unnecessary and unhelpful items.

An authoritative and efficient and experienced and well-staffed UNDR0 with the ability to communicate with and coordinate among member governments the precise kinds and amounts of assistance needed in any particular disaster would enable the international community to respond to disasters even more effectively than it did in this case.

U.S. Reaffirms Opposition to South African Apartheid

Following is a statement made in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Joseph M. Segel on October 17.

USUN press release 138 dated October 17

Everything that can be said against apartheid has been said. Not one word has been said in defense of apartheid. And rightfully so. In a world in which there are all too many abuses of human rights, apartheid is among those which are absolutely indefensible. This pernicious form of systematized racial discrimination that continues to repress the non-white peoples of South Africa hangs heavy over the conscience of all mankind.

But what can be done to redress the wrongs of apartheid?

The worldwide attention that has been focused on this problem, principally through the efforts of the nations that are members of the Organization of African Unity, is a great help. We commend you for your persistence and for your devotion to the cause of eliminating this unjust and demeaning way of life that is imposed upon more than three-quarters of the population of South Africa.

The United States is among those countries that have taken unilateral action to help move this problem toward solution. And I just want to take a few moments to state for the record what the United States and its citizens have actually done and are doing, because there has been some incorrect information disseminated in the press and in this building regarding our government's activities and position on this important matter.

For one thing, the United States has strongly urged the relatively small number of American firms which have facilities in South Africa to set an example by improving working conditions, salaries, and wages of their non-white workers. We recognize that there are some who do not agree with this policy, but we believe that it is a help, not a hindrance. Further, this policy has borne

fruit. A number of U.S. firms in South Africa are now following the extraordinary practice (extraordinary for that country) of providing equal pay for equal work, regardless of race. American firms also have set the pace in providing improved educational, legal, and medical benefits to non-white workers in South Africa.

Secondly, the United States recognizes that it is wrong for any country to assist the South African Government in enforcing its apartheid policies. For this reason, we imposed an arms embargo against South Africa even before the United Nations did so. We have observed this embargo very carefully and continue to do so. Moreover, we have not engaged in any military or naval cooperation with South Africa in the last decade. And despite allegations to the contrary, the United States has not coordinated defense strategy with South Africa nor do we have any intention of now instituting such cooperation.

The U.S. Government and the people of the United States would like apartheid to end—to end as soon as possible. The people of South Africa have suffered far too long under this oppressive system.

We know from our own painful struggle with racial discrimination that change must be pursued vigorously and in many fields—education, labor, economic opportunities, housing, voting rights, et cetera.

Mr. Chairman, we are all aware that the diversity of South Africa's racial and economic groups creates special problems which must be taken into consideration. But five years have passed since the Lusaka Manifesto was issued, and although some changes have taken place, it is painfully obvious that the Government of South Africa has not risen to the challenge of this considered and responsible document.

We believe that apartheid can still be ended peacefully. It is clearly in the best interests of all the peoples of the world, including certainly those in South Africa, that the change come about this way.

Mr. Chairman, the United States calls on the Government of South Africa to reexam-

ine its policies and position in light of present-day realities. We say to the Government of South Africa: Your repressive racial system is indefensible; it is both wrong and unwise to try to continue to maintain it.

We most strongly urge the South African Government to bring a timely end to its apartheid policies and racial injustice and to recognize that it is in their own best interests to do this as rapidly as possible.

U.S. Takes Further Steps To Enforce Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia

Following is a statement made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Barbara M. White on October 25.

USUN press release 148 dated October 25

In his September 23 address before the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared that "The United States shares and pledges its support for the aspirations of all Africans to participate in the fruits of freedom and human dignity." I am glad to recall this statement, Mr. Chairman, as we discuss Southern Rhodesia, one of the parts of Africa where these issues are at stake today.

Over the past year, the continent of Africa has faced frustration, but it has also been the scene of historic progress. Guinea-Bissau has joined our ranks with universal acclaim for its newly won independence. Mozambique and Angola are moving quickly toward full independence and majority rule. These dramatic events are reshaping the face of Africa. They must also have telling effects—not the least of them psychological—upon the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia.

Up to now, that illegal regime has seemed to show little comprehension of what is happening within and beyond its borders. But we are hopeful that the quickening pace of events will induce it, too, to face the crying

need for change—to work out a peaceful settlement acceptable to the whole population of Southern Rhodesia as well as to the United Kingdom, which retains primary responsibility.

We believe that the effective enforcement by all nations of the Security Council's mandatory sanctions is necessary to increase the pressures upon the minority regime in Salisbury and thereby contribute toward an acceptable solution. Thus my government has been and is an active member of the Security Council Sanctions Committee.

During the past year, the United States has taken further steps to tighten its own enforcement of sanctions. When made aware that U.S. airlines maintained interline agreements with Air Rhodesia and that U.S. travel firms and airlines issued tickets for Air Rhodesia, the Federal Aviation Administration acted to end these practices. When it became evident that the operator of the Air Rhodesia office in New York was engaging in unauthorized transactions, the Department of the Treasury closed the office.

This committee is familiar with the Byrd amendment, which permits U.S. imports of certain strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia. I would like to report on the current situation.

The amendment has been repealed by the Senate and is awaiting action by the House of Representatives. On August 12, the White House announced the support of President Ford, who had assumed the office only three days before, for repeal of the amendment. The executive branch of the U.S. Government is committed to returning the United States to full conformity with the U.N. sanctions. In no way am I lessening that commitment, Mr. Chairman, when I point out that U.S. imports under the Byrd amendment have been minimal in relation to total Rhodesian trade, amounting to less than 5 percent of all exports from that country. Any realistic discussion must include this fact.

During this debate we have heard allegations that the United States, through South Africa, is assisting the Smith regime in military matters. I can state categorically that

these charges are totally without foundation.

Mr. Chairman, the United States deeply believes in and supports the principle of majority rule. It has been a fundamental part of our national tradition; it remains so today.

The United States wants to see a government in Southern Rhodesia which is the result of a free choice by all the people of that land.

We firmly support British efforts to end the Rhodesian rebellion.

We will do our best to see that U.N. sanctions are respected.

We earnestly hope that the march of events in Africa over the past six months will bear fruit in Southern Rhodesia as well and that she will move to become a true member of the African community, where her destiny must lie.

U.S. Supports Extension of Mandate of U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on October 23, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 147 dated October 23

Mr. President [M. Michel Njine, Representative of the United Republic of Cameroon]: It is with great pleasure that I congratulate you for the good will and the patience and the leadership that you have demonstrated in leading us to this happy result—13 affirmative votes and no dissenting voices in approving this important resolution. At a time when there were dissenting and differing views, you have successfully led us to a consensus I think of which we can all be proud.

One year ago, renewed war broke out between Israel and her Arab neighbors, endangering the peace and the security of the

entire area. Today, a year later, the Security Council has made a second important contribution to preserving the present ceasefire and disengagement and, hopefully, to moving us closer to a lasting peace. By extending the mandate of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) for another six months, we seek to allow the necessary time and opportunity for negotiations, which are indispensable.

This U.N. peace force has already made a historic impact for good in this highly strategic part of the world. It has a record of which we can all be proud. Despite some problems, UNEF has not only separated the combatants but has helped create the climate of peace that is essential to successful negotiations.

With this renewed mandate and our vote of confidence, we are confident these soldiers for peace will overcome any difficulties as successfully as they solved the inevitable problems that occurred in the first 12 months of the existence of the Force. No force of this kind can expect perfect conditions for its task. The important point is that it has been an effective force for good, and we are confident that it can continue its effective role.

Last year's tragic conflict brought about a realization by the parties that the only realistic means of settling disputes is by a process of step-by-step negotiations based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. For the first time in 26 years, this approach has produced concrete progress toward such a settlement. Significant steps have been taken, particularly in the Egyptian-Israeli and the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreements.

The United States has been privileged to participate actively in the negotiating process. Our government is convinced, and the successes of the past year have strengthened our conviction, that the only way to break through existing stalemates and move concretely toward peace is through a progressive series of agreements. Each step helps to change attitudes and create new situations in which further steps toward an equitable and permanent settlement can be agreed upon. The United States pledges to continue strenuous efforts to achieve this goal.

We thus note with approval that the Secretary General in his report, document S/11536, states that he considers the continued operation of UNEF essential not only for the maintenance of the present quiet but also to assist, if required, in further efforts for the establishment of peace in the Middle East as called for by the Security Council.

I am grateful for this opportunity to commend the UNEF for its outstanding work in maintaining the peace and preserving the climate in which the negotiating process can go forward. It is difficult to exaggerate the constructive role played by the soldiers for peace in these important first steps.

Therefore, I am pleased to extend my government's highest appreciation to the Secretary General and his headquarters staff and to the Commander in Chief of UNEF for their faithful and dedicated performance. I also wish to commend the civilian staff, the UNTSO [U.N. Truce Supervision Organization] observers, and most of all, the UNEF troops, who daily risk their lives far from their homes and families in the tasks of peace.

Our deepest sympathy is extended to the Governments of Canada, Peru, Finland, Panama, Indonesia, and Austria for the tragic loss of lives of members of their contingents who in the past few months have given their lives in the service of peace. We ask the delegations of these countries to convey our condolences to the bereaved families of these brave men. May their sacrifice inspire our efforts to achieve a permanent settlement.

We also wish to commend the troop-contributing countries for their commitment to international peace and security, for the beliefs which have motivated them to contribute troops for this peacekeeping operation.

The operation of UNEF has demonstrated effectively that the willingness of U.N. members to assume collective responsibility for international peacekeeping is important. All of us have agreed that it is vitally important that UNEF should operate with a maximum possible efficiency and at the lowest cost to U.N. members, all of whom share the financial burdens of peacekeeping.

We also are aware that the Secretary General, the troop contributors, all U.N. members, the Security Council, and the General Assembly are vitally interested in the effective and efficient operation of this Force. Efficient operation, in my government's view, must be coupled with maximum attention to economy. Indeed, the most efficient force is usually the leanest. My government strongly urges the Secretary General to continue his policy of keeping UNEF costs as low as possible consistent with efficient operation and fair compensation to troop-contributing governments. My delegation will be working to achieve these ends in the responsible organ of the General Assembly, the Fifth Committee.

Mr. President, the United States has voted in favor of the resolution just adopted which extends UNEF's mandate for another six months in the belief that further progress toward a Middle East settlement can be made during this period. We know that peacekeeping operations in the Middle East are essential to maintaining stability during the negotiations among the parties. But we also firmly believe that peacekeeping must not become a substitute for a just and permanent settlement.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973) and 346 (1974),

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11536),

Noting the opinion of the Secretary-General that "although quiet prevails in the Egypt-Israel sector, the over-all situation in the Middle East will remain fundamentally unstable as long as the underlying problems are unresolved",

Noting also from the report of the Secretary-General (S/11536) that in the present circumstances the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force is still required,

1. *Decides* that the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force should be extended for an additional six-month period, that is, until 24 April

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/362 (1974); adopted by the Council on Oct. 23 by a vote of 13 to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

1975, in order to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

2. *Commends* the United Nations Emergency Force and those Governments supplying contingents to it for their contribution towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

3. *Expresses* its confidence that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy;

4. *Reaffirms* that the United Nations Emergency Force must be able to function as an integral and efficient military unit in the whole Egypt-Israel sector of operations without differentiation regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents as stated in paragraph 26 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/11536) and requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to that end.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

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**U.S. Policy Toward Governments of Peru, 1822–Present:
Questions of Recognition and Diplomatic Relations**

A TABULAR SUMMARY

Foreword

This project is one of a series on U.S. policy toward various Latin American countries prepared at the request of former Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Jack B. Kubisch. It is based upon published and unpublished official documents and upon published secondary works. It represents a substantial revision and updating of this office's Research Project No. 350, "United States Recognition of Latin American Governments: A Tabular Summary of United States Recognition Action on Changes and Attempted Changes of Government and of Chief Executives; Part 4, Peru, 1821–1952."

The research and drafting for the revised paper were done by Dr. Ronald D. Landa under the direction of Dr. Mary P. Chapman, Chief of the Area Studies Branch.

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Research Project No. 1066A (Revised)
September 1974

NOTE: The paragraphs on the left describe developments in Peru; the indented paragraphs describe U.S. responses to those developments.

Developments

U.S. Response

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF PERU
AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 1822-27

JULY 28, 1821. The independence of Peru was proclaimed by José de San Martín.

JAN. 30, 1822. The House of Representatives asked President James Monroe to furnish it with the correspondence with Spanish-American governments, as well as with information regarding the "political condition" of the new American nations.

MAR. 8. President Monroe complied with the House request by providing the desired correspondence and by pointing out in a special message to Congress that Peru and four other Spanish-American nations—Buenos Aires, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico—were in the "full enjoyment" of their independence and that the new governments had "a claim to recognition by other Powers, which ought not to be resisted."

MAR. 28. The House of Representatives passed two resolutions, one indicating concurrence with the President that the American provinces of Spain which had declared and were enjoying their independence "ought to be recognized by the United States as independent nations," and the other asking the Committee on Ways and Means to report a bill appropriating a sum to enable the President "to give due effect to such recognition."

MAY 4. Congress passed, and President Monroe signed into law, a bill providing an appropriation of \$100,000 to defray the expenses of "such Missions to the independent nations on the American continent" as the President might deem proper.

JAN. 13, 1823. President Monroe nominated John M. Prevost as the first U.S. Chargé d'Affaires to Peru, but the nomination was soon withdrawn.

MAY 2, 1826. The Senate confirmed the nomination of, and the President commissioned, James Cooley as Chargé d'Affaires to Peru. By this action the United States completed the formal recognition of the independence of Peru.

MAY 21, 1827. Cooley presented his credentials to the Peruvian Government in Lima, thus establishing diplomatic relations with Peru.

U.S. NON-RECOGNITION OF THE BERMUDEZ REGIME, 1834

JAN. 4, 1834. With the assistance of former President Agustín Gamarra, Pedro Bermúdez deposed President Luis José Orbegoso through a military coup and named himself "Supreme Provisional Chief."

JAN. 11. The U.S. Chargé, Samuel Larned, informed Washington that he was "compelled to consider the administration of the general government in Peru as in abeyance" until the Bermúdez government took control of most of the other Departments (provinces) of the country. The "established practice of our government is to acknowledge governments *de facto* whenever they shall have succeeded in establishing themselves in the country," said Larned.

JAN. 28. After a popular uprising forced Bermúdez and his supporters to abandon Lima, Orbegoso reclaimed the office of President.

FEB. 13. Larned referred to the Bermúdez-Gamarra insurrection as the "late scandalous military movement" and expressed his belief that its purpose was to establish a monarchical government in Peru.

JUNE 25. Larned observed that "the civil war may now be considered at an end:—all the Departments, and the whole of the Army, having recognized the legitimacy of the Government" of President Orbegoso.

U.S. NON-RECOGNITION OF THE SALAVERRY REGIME, 1835

FEB. 23, 1835. Felipe Santiago Salaverry, Inspector-General of the Army, led a revolt which again overturned the Orbegoso government. Two days later Salaverry named himself "Supreme Chief."

JUNE 23. Larned reported to the Department of State that he, as well as most of the Diplomatic Corps, was continuing to withhold recognition of the Salaverry regime as the *de facto* government, and that he had been addressing its representatives only as local authorities, "without once making use of a style of address, or phrase, that could be construed to imply a recognition, in them or their 'Supreme Chief', of a *national* government or administration . . ."

JUNE 24. Orbegoso signed a treaty with Bolivian President Andrés Santa Cruz, who agreed to enter Peru with his armies in order to help defeat Salaverry, who had allied himself with Gamarra.

JULY 10. Santa Cruz issued a declaration in which he outlined his plans for a Peru-Bolivian Confederation.

AUG. 13. Santa Cruz defeated Gamarra's forces in a battle near the lake of Yanacocha. Gamarra fled but was subsequently captured and, on October 19, 1835, was banished to Costa Rica.

Nov. 13. As the fighting continued between the forces of Salaverry and the combined armies of Orbegoso and Santa Cruz, Larned reaffirmed his support of Orbegoso: ". . . as the Council of State has been dissolved, and the Congress has not been allowed to assemble at its legal period,—President Orbegozo [sic] is the only member or representative of the constitutional government now in existence:—and he has all the forms and presumption of right and popular will on his side; whilst his adversary has neither the one nor the other; having nothing to support his authority but the armed force [sic]."

FEB. 7, 1836. Salaverry's troops were defeated near Arequipa. Salaverry was later taken prisoner and executed.

FEB. 13. Larned reported that all of Peru was again under Orbegoso's "undisputed sway," which he called "a splendid and cheering example afforded of the triumph of law, order and principles, over ambition, usurpation, and licentious despotism."

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE PERU-BOLIVIAN CONFEDERATION, 1836-39

OCT. 28, 1836. A decree was issued formally establishing the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, a union of North and South Peru and Bolivia. The Confederation had been taking shape for over a year. It was headed by Santa Cruz under the title of "Supreme Protector."

DEC. 20. Having learned of the plans for a Peru-Bolivian Confederation, Secretary of State John Forsyth told James B. Thornton, the new Chargé to Peru, who had also been accredited to the Bolivian Government to negotiate a commercial treaty, that when he arrived in Lima, "the government that may have been constituted to manage the joint affairs of Peru and Bolivia" hopefully "would not permit a matter of mere form to be an obstacle to your reception or to the transaction of business with you."

DEC. 28. Chile, supported by Gamarra and other Peruvian opponents of Orbegoso, declared war on the Confederation.

FEB. 16, 1837. Thornton, who had arrived in Lima on Feb. 9 just after Santa Cruz had left the city, submitted his letter of credence by mail to the Santa Cruz government. As there was no personal presentation of credentials, this action presumably consummated U.S. recognition of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which formally recognized Thornton as Chargé by a decree of Mar. 16.

AUG. 6. Chilean forces and Peruvians under Gamarra landed at Ancón and later in the month captured Lima.

JUNE 9, 1838. J. C. Pickett was commissioned as U.S. Chargé to the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, the first to be so accredited.

SEPT. 20. As two rival governments emerged to challenge the Confederation Government in North Peru, Acting Chargé Edwin Bartlett, who was in correspondence with all three, said that he had carefully avoided "anything like a committal of the United States in a recognition of either of the New Governments."

JAN. 20, 1839. The armies of the Confederation were defeated at the Battle of Yungay.

FEB. 20. The Peru-Bolivian Confederation was officially dissolved and Santa Cruz abdicated.

MAR. 7. According to a despatch from Bartlett, all the military authorities in Peru had acknowledged the authority of Gamarra as Provisional President when his forces captured Callao.

JUNE 13. Acting Secretary of State Aaron Vail rejected a proposal by recently appointed Chargé Pickett to send him new credentials to replace those addressed to the Peru-Bolivian Confederation and to accredit him to the Gamarra government.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE GAMARRA GOVERNMENT, 1839-40

AUG. 15, 1839. Having put down the last traces of resistance, Gamarra was confirmed by Congress as Provisional President.

AUG. 23. The Gamarra government informally advised Pickett that his credentials, which were addressed to the Confederation, would not be accepted if presented.

OCT. 19. The Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs officially told Pickett that "the restored Republic of Peru, after having driven the conqueror from her territory, does not find herself in a situation to receive agents accredited to him, because the relations of the usurping Government were very different from those of the Republic."

OCT. 28. Pickett informed Washington that the Peruvian refusal to receive him was "rather unexpected," but that it was due to Gamarra's wish to avoid "any act that can be construed into an admission, that the Peru-Bolivian Confederation ever had a legal existence."

JAN. 30, 1840. Pickett was formally received by the Gamarra government, an action which he later called "as unaccountable as it was unexpected." He pointed out, however, that he was "required to produce new credentials, within a reasonable time, to be addressed to the Government of Peru." He added that he probably would hear nothing more of it, but should the new credentials be forwarded, "it may not be necessary to present them . . ." Apparently the new credentials were never sent.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF ELIAS' ASSUMPTION OF POWER, 1844

JUNE 17, 1844. After two years of civil war and several changes of government, the prefect of Lima, Domingo Elías, renounced allegiance to President Manuel Ignacio Vivanco and invested himself as the supreme authority.

JUNE 20. At a conference of the Diplomatic Corps, Pickett signed a protocol which said that, because of a multiplicity of *de facto* governments, none of which exercised complete sovereignty, it was necessary to recognize each.

OCT. 30. In setting down guidelines for John A. Bryan, who had just been commissioned Chargé, Acting Secretary of State Richard K. Crallé said that "whoever may be in actual possession and exercise of the supreme power, whether by consent of the governed or by force, must be regarded as the *de facto* government of the country . . ." Whether rightfully or not, Elías was "in the actual possession and exercise of the supreme power at Lima, the seat of Government: and it appears that not only the civil and military authorities of the capital and other places had quietly submitted to his government, but there has been no actual resistance on the part of the people at large. He must, therefore, under such circumstances, be regarded as representing the Supreme Directory of the Republic . . ."

DEC. 23. Pickett reported that his signing the protocol recognizing various factions was an error, since it had been construed by the Diplomatic Corps as a U.S. commitment to join the other powers in protecting foreign commerce.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE CASTILLA GOVERNMENT, 1855

MAY-JUNE 1854. Political disintegration occurred as rival centers of power were established in four different cities.

JUNE 10. One of the contenders for power, Ramón Castilla, issued a circular proclaiming himself President.

JUNE 10. The Diplomatic Corps in Lima, including U.S. Minister John R. Clay, ignored Castilla's circular.

JAN. 5, 1855. Civil strife, which took on some characteristics of a popular upheaval against the army, was ended by Castilla's victory near Lima and his assumption of the position of Provisional President.

JAN. 8. Congratulations were offered to Castilla by Minister Clay, who remarked that the United States "have adopted the principle of recognizing the Government *de facto* in countries with which we are in amity."

U.S. DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF THE INSURRECTIONARY VIVANCO GOVERNMENT, 1858

OCT. 31, 1856. A revolt, whose leaders proclaimed General Manuel Ignacio Vivanco President and "Regenerator of the Republic," broke out at Arequipa.

DEC. 29. Vivanco's forces seized control of some guano islands off the coast of Peru and began selling guano there to anyone who wished it.

JAN. 24, 1858. A Peruvian Government steamer captured and confiscated the cargo of two U.S. vessels, the *Lizzie Thompson* and the *Georgiana*, for having loaded with guano at islands not open to foreign commerce and having done so under licenses from Vivanco's forces.

FEB. 8. Clay protested to the Peruvian Foreign Minister that the seizures were unlawful, since Vivanco's supporters had taken over the functions of government for more than a year in some of the guano islands. As belligerents in a civil war, declared Clay, Vivanco's party must be considered a *de facto* government.

MAR. 6. The civil war ended as President Castilla routed the insurgent forces at Arequipa and drove Vivanco into exile.

MAR. 18. The Peruvian Minister in Washington informed Secretary of State Lewis Cass that his government considered that Clay had behaved in an unfair and hostile way toward Peru and that his position on the case involving the two U.S. ships was imperiling the "friendly harmony" existing between the two nations.

MAY 28. Supported by the opinion of the U.S. Attorney General, Cass told the Peruvian Minister that the Vivanco forces had constituted a "*de facto* authority," whether or not recognized as a belligerent, and certainly had the authority to dispose of any national property even if contrary to the regulations of the national government.

Nov. 26. After several unsuccessful efforts to convince the Peruvian Government of the correctness of the U.S. position, Secretary Cass, in instructions to Clay, reaffirmed his belief that Peru had no right to capture a U.S. vessel whose master obeyed the authorities he found in a Peruvian port, "though they had been set up by a recent revolution." Clay was directed to inform the Peruvian Government that the United States expected reparation for the parties involved.

U.S. SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS, 1860-62,
OVER THE LIZZIE THOMPSON AND GEORGIANA AFFAIR

DEC. 2, 1858. The Peruvian Minister in Washington informed Cass that Peru was ready to submit the *Lizzie Thompson* and *Georgiana* controversy to the decision of any European nation chosen by President James Buchanan.

MAR. 2, 1859. Cass instructed Clay to reject the Peruvian suggestion of arbitration by a third power, since the majority of the owners of the vessels involved were opposed to the idea.

FEB. 27, 1860. Having already made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain indemnification from the Peruvian Government, Clay suggested to Cass that a U.S. embargo of two Peruvian frigates bound for the United States would "bring this Government to reason."

MAR. 12. After Cass had indicated on Feb. 23 that "further discussion with the Government of Peru upon the subject of the claims of our citizens is useless," Clay remarked that the time had come "when decisive action is required, to convince Peru and the other Republics of Spanish origin, that citizens of the United States are not to be dealt with at will, by military rulers"

JUNE 4. Delivering an ultimatum from the Department of State, Clay warned the Peruvian Foreign Minister that continued refusal to settle claims concerning the *Lizzie Thompson* and the *Georgiana* would be regarded as "incompatible with the continuance of cordial relations."

OCT. 19. Since the Peruvian Government remained intransigent on the issue, Clay suspended relations with Peru.

Nov. 26. At his own request, the Peruvian Minister in Washington was given his passport.

JUNE 8, 1861. Christopher Robinson received a recess commission as Minister to Peru, thus indicating the U.S. intention to resume relations with Peru. President Lincoln had decided that the differences between the two countries were "not as such to recommend a state of war."

JAN. 11, 1862. Relations were restored when Robinson was officially received in Lima.

JULY 9, 1864. Following an abortive attempt to have the King of Belgium arbitrate the dispute, Secretary of State William Seward informed the Peruvian Minister in Washington that the matter would not be pursued further.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE DIEZ CANSECO AND PRADO GOVERNMENTS, 1865-66

AUGUST 1865. After war had broken out the previous year between Spain and Peru, Mariano Ignacio Prado led a rebellion protesting the peace terms demanded by Spain and accepted by the government of President Juan Antonio Pérez. The rebels gained control of all Peru except Lima.

OCT. 10. Before his departure for Peru, Minister Alvin P. Hovey was instructed to recognize only Pérez's administration as the constitutional government, for "the United States are slow to recognize revolutionary governments."

Nov. 6. Pedro Díez Canseco became Provisional President upon the overthrow of Pérez's government.

Nov. 8. The Diplomatic Corps, meeting at the U.S. Legation, resolved unanimously to recognize Díez Canseco.

Nov. 9. Robinson, while awaiting Hovey's arrival, prematurely offered congratulations and "most friendly relations" to Díez Canseco.

Nov. 17. Upon his arrival, Hovey requested an audience for the presentation of his credentials to the new regime.

Nov. 26. Military leaders overthrew Díez Canseco and proclaimed Mariano Ignacio Prado as dictator. The decision was approved by a meeting of citizens in Lima.

Nov. 28. Hovey reported that he would not seek to present his credentials nor for the present recognize the new regime. He acknowledged that the Diplomatic Corps had been hasty in recognizing Díez Canseco.

DEC. 21. Relations were interrupted and the Prado government was still unrecognized when Robinson left Peru.

MAR. 8, 1866. Secretary of State Seward rejected a subsequent request by Hovey to recognize the Prado government. "The policy of the United States," said Seward "is settled upon the principle that revolutions in republican states ought not to be accepted until the people have adopted them by organic law, with the solemnities which would seem sufficient to guarantee their stability and permanency."

APR. 13. Hovey reported that "should the United States wait until Peru is governed by organic law, in fact as well as in name, . . . it will . . . be a far distant day before our country is represented at all in Peru."

APR. 21. Because of evidence of stability in Prado's government and concern over continuing hostilities between Spain and Peru, Hovey was instructed to recognize the Prado government.

MAY 22. Relations were resumed when Hovey presented his credentials to the Prado government.

U.S. NON-RECOGNITION OF THE DIEZ CANSECO REGIME AND SUBSEQUENT RECOGNITION OF THE BALTA GOVERNMENT, 1868

JAN. 22, 1868. Pedro Díez Canseco arrived in Lima after defeating President Prado's armies and claimed the executive office on the basis of his former election as Vice President.

FEB. 14. Hovey indicated that Díez Canseco had been recognized as President *de facto* by all other diplomatic representatives, but that he had withheld U.S. recognition in accordance with the Department of State's instructions of Mar. 8, 1866.

APR. 1. José Balta was the apparent victor in a popular election for President, the results of which were to be sanctioned by Congress in July.

APR. 14. Hovey asked Washington that he be authorized, after Balta's confirmation as President, to establish relations with the Balta government immediately, because both he and the United States had been sharply criticized in Peru for withholding recognition from the Díez Canseco government.

MAY 7. In instructing Hovey to wait further for "legal evidence that the existing administration had been deliberately accepted by the people of Peru," Secretary of State Seward pointed out that the United States "must be entirely indifferent to political persons and parties in Peru, as in all South American republics, so long as all those persons and parties agree in maintaining a republican system as the only admissible form of government." Without this principle, he said, the constitutional vigor of the U.S. Government would be impaired, thus favoring "disorganization, disintegration, and anarchy throughout the American continent."

AUG. 2. Balta was inaugurated President after Congress had certified his election.

AUG. 5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the U.S. Legation announcing Balta's assumption of the Presidency and giving assurances that the rights of foreigners would be respected and that international agreements would be honored.

AUG. 10. In a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hovey acknowledged receipt of its note of Aug. 5, thus extending formal recognition to the Balta government. Hovey believed that he was acting in accordance with the Department of State's instruction of May 7.

AUG. 17. Prior to receiving word of Hovey's recognition of the Balta government, Secretary of State Seward notified Hovey that, with Balta's election and confirmation by Congress, "no objection is now entertained to your holding full official intercourse with that government."

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PARDO GOVERNMENT, 1872

OCT. 15, 1871. The Presidential election was accompanied by riots and the loss of lives, with each of five factions controlling its own voting tables and preventing a fair counting of the votes.

Nov. 17. The electoral colleges met but were unable to decide who had won the election. That decision was left to the Congress, which was to convene the following July.

JULY 15, 1872. Congress assembled and decided that Manuel Pardo had won the Presidential election. President Balta, who had supported another candidate in the electoral campaign, nevertheless accepted Congress' decision and prepared to transfer power to Pardo within a few weeks.

JULY 22. Angered by President Balta's inclination to yield the election to Pardo, Minister of War Tomás Gutiérrez took control of the army, dispersed Congress, made himself "Supreme Chief," and four days later had Balta assassinated.

JULY 25. U.S. Minister Francis Thomas replied to a note of July 23 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs announcing Gutiérrez's assumption of power by indicating that he would inform the U.S. Government of the developments in Peru and would await instructions. The Diplomatic Corps had agreed to recognize Gutiérrez only as a *de facto* ruler simply to secure protection for the lives and property of the citizens of their respective countries.

JULY 28. Gutiérrez was killed by a mob infuriated by his repressive measures. Balta's First Vice President, Mariano Heréncia Zevallos, assumed the Presidency until Pardo could be inaugurated.

AUG. 2. Pardo was inaugurated President.

SEPT. 26. Acting Secretary of State Charles Hale informed Thomas that "the indignation of the people of Peru at a cruel assassination and an attempted usurpation and overthrow of a representative government commands admiration, and their calm return to order gives promise of a stable condition of public affairs."

NOV. 23. Thomas formally extended recognition to the Pardo government by presenting to Pardo a letter from President Ulysses S. Grant congratulating him on his inauguration.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PIÉROLA GOVERNMENT, 1880

DEC. 18, 1879. Faced with serious military setbacks eight months after Peru had joined Bolivia in a war against Chile (the War of the Pacific), President Mariano Prado left the country, reportedly to seek help in Europe. Although the First Vice President legally assumed the Presidency, the Minister of War, Manuel de La Coterá, became the real head of the government.

DEC. 24. After supporters of Gen. Nicolás Piérola had staged a mutiny in the army, La Coterá yielded the government to Piérola.

JAN. 1, 1880. Minister Isaac P. Christiancy joined the other members of the Diplomatic Corps in paying respects to Piérola, with the understanding that recognition was not thereby extended.

JAN. 31. Secretary of State William Evarts formally announced that the United States would recognize the Piérola regime, since it was understood that Peru was "driven to the acceptance of a new government on a provisional basis by the external pressure of their affairs and that the accession of General Piérola to power was not accomplished by civil strife or factious insurrection."

FEB. 5. In a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christiancy extended recognition on the basis that the Piérola government had the "cordial concurrence of the people."

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE CALDERON GOVERNMENT, 1881

JAN. 17, 1881. As the War of the Pacific continued, an invading Chilean army captured Lima. President Piérola left the city in an attempt to rally the interior of the country against the Chileans.

MAR. 12. Encouraged by the Chilean occupation authorities, who refused to recognize the Piérola government, Francisco García Calderón, who had been chosen Provisional President by an assembly of leading citizens in Lima and Callao, established a new government in the hamlet of Magdalena outside Lima.

MAR. 16. Christiancy told Secretary of State James G. Blaine, that he could not recognize the Calderón government "until it shall appear to be a government of Peru, instead of Lima and Callao." Without instructions from Washington, he emphasized, he could not extend recognition, even if Calderón held half the country, until he was satisfied that the majority of the people approved of the Calderón government and until it showed evidence it could sustain itself as the Government of Peru.

MAY 9. Blaine told Christiancy that if the Calderón government was supported by "the character and intelligence of Peru" and if it was "really endeavoring to restore constitutional government with a view both to order within and negotiation with Chile for peace," he was authorized to extend recognition. In addition, Blaine noted that he had already received in Washington a confidential agent of the Calderón government.

JUNE 16. Christiancy responded to Blaine's May 9 instruction by pointing out that the Calderón regime had the support of the wealthy sugar plantation owners and merchants and that it was attempting to restore order and reestablish constitutional government, but that it lacked a broad political base. It was not a government *de facto* in any part of Peru except in the hamlet of Magdalena.

JUNE 26. Rather reluctantly, Christiancy extended recognition to the Calderón government in a note to the Foreign Ministry. He later explained to Washington that he had done so, because *de facto* political control had not been made a condition of recognition and because Blaine had already received Calderón's agent in Washington. Moreover, Christiancy had heard a rumor, which turned out to be false, that his successor would not come to Peru until a peace settlement between Chile and Peru was reached. Therefore, he admitted, he did not want it to appear that he was delaying his successor's coming by withholding recognition.

JULY 6. Christiancy reported that he feared recognition may have been premature since some of Calderón's forces had begun to desert to Piérola's side.

JULY 11. Congress confirmed Calderón as President until a new President could be elected.

AUG.10. Stephen A. Hurlbut, who had replaced Christiancy as Minister to Peru earlier in the month, told the Department of State that he approved of Christiancy's recognition of the Calderón government. Even though it was not "a regular or constitutional government," he contended that it was "infinitely more so than that of Piérola, which was "a violent usurpation, autocratic and despotic." Hurlbut remarked, however, that Chile was not formally recognizing the Calderón government until it accepted Chile's terms for a peace settlement, something which Calderón had been reluctant to do.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE MONTERO GOVERNMENT, 1881

SEPT. 26-28, 1881. The Chilean forces of occupation seized the Peruvian treasury, stopped payments, took over revenue collection, and decreed an end to President Calderón's authority.

SEPT. 29. In order to insure the constitutional succession, Congress quietly assembled in Lima and elected Adm. Lizardo Montero, then in command of the north of Peru beyond Chilean lines, as Vice President.

OCT. 4. Hurlbut gave Washington his view that "no act of Chile, whether from its civil or military authorities, can in any way operate upon the relations which the United States have maintained or may choose to maintain with any government in Peru, nor can any military order prevent my treating with Mr. Calderón as representing the sovereignty of Peru."

OCT. 31. Secretary of State Blaine instructed Hurlbut to continue to recognize the Calderón government.

Nov. 4. Calderón's Foreign Minister sent a circular note to the Diplomatic Corps in Lima announcing that Montero had declared his allegiance to Calderón.

Nov. 6. The Chilean forces in Lima arrested Calderón and his Foreign Minister and had them sent to Chile.

Nov. 9. Hurlbut informed the Department of State that Chile's obvious policy was to hold Peru under armed occupation until it could find or create a government with which to make peace on Chile's terms.

Nov. 15. Montero formally succeeded Calderón as President and established his government at Arequipa.

Nov. 30. Hurlbut answered a letter which had announced Montero's succession to the Presidency with a formal communication acknowledging Montero as "the lawful head" of the Government of Peru. However, Hurlbut did not transfer the Legation to Arequipa but remained in Lima, where he died on Mar. 27, 1882.

APR. 25, 1882. William H. Trescott, the special U.S. envoy to the three belligerent nations in the War of the Pacific empowered to help negotiate a peace settlement, visited President Montero in the interior of Peru and presented his credentials to Montero. He later explained to Washington that he had undertaken the journey because he believed that the presentation of his credentials "would strengthen what is unquestionably the real government of Peru, recognized and obeyed at present by all parties of the Peruvian people."

DELAYED U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE IGLESIAS GOVERNMENT, JANUARY 1883–APRIL 1884

JAN. 2, 1883. Miguel Iglesias was chosen President of Peru by an assembly handpicked by Chile to serve as an instrument for making peace between the two countries.

OCT. 3. After months of uncertainty over the degree of support Iglesias had among the people, the new U.S. Minister, Seth L. Phelps, told a Chilean representative that recognition would be extended to the Iglesias government when there was proof the country accepted him. In the meantime, Phelps withheld the presentation of his credentials.

OCT. 20. Iglesias signed a peace treaty negotiated with Chile at Ancón, whereupon Chile recognized the Iglesias government.

NOV. 15. Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen instructed Phelps to recognize the Iglesias government if the new Constitutional Assembly, which was to be elected the following January, represented Peru and favored Iglesias.

MAR. 1, 1884. The Constitutional Assembly elected in January named Iglesias Provisional President.

MAR. 19. In response to an inquiry from the Department of State, Phelps said that he now rejected recognition because the Iglesias government was supported by Chilean troops, had organized the assembly by fraud, and had proposed to govern without constitutional restraint.

MAR. 28. The Treaty of Ancón was ratified by the Peruvian Constitutional Assembly.

APR. 2. The Constitutional Assembly conferred dictatorial powers on Iglesias.

APR. 9. Informed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Iglesias government, in an interview with the Diplomatic Corps, had demanded of them immediate recognition and when they had refused had suspended relations with the various legations, Secretary of State Frelinghuysen noted that the question of recognition was addressed to the "independent judgment and discretion" of the United States, uninfluenced by "anything in the nature of a menace."

APR. 18. Frelinghuysen authorized Phelps to present his credentials to President Iglesias if the Minister of Foreign Affairs would retract his statement to the Diplomatic Corps.

APR. 23. The Minister of Foreign Affairs told Phelps that his government desired to renew diplomatic relations "precisely as if nothing had occurred to interrupt them."

APR. 24. Phelps presented his credentials to President Iglesias, thus recognizing the Iglesias government.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE CACERES GOVERNMENT, 1886

DEC. 2, 1885. Following several months of rebellion by forces of Andrés Avelino Cáceres against the government of President Iglesias, both men, through the good offices of the Diplomatic Corps, agreed that the government should be turned over to a Council of Ministers until popular elections for President could be held.

DEC. 16. In instructing Minister Charles W. Buck to withhold recognition, Secretary of State Thomas Bayard pointed out that the United States, "holding steadfastly to the principles of constitutional self-government, can not assume to forejudge the popular will of Peru by ratifying and confirming an experimental and provisional order of things they may have indirectly helped to create." While he was authorized to maintain relations with whatever government happened to be in power, Buck was also told that it was "for the President to determine when and how formal recognition of the new government of Peru by the United States shall be effected."

MAR. 14-21, 1886. National elections were held which resulted in the election of Cáceres as President.

APR. 28. President Grover Cleveland received the Peruvian Minister, who presented his letter of recall. The United States interpreted this action as having the effect of recognizing the Provisional Government under the Council of Ministers, with the understanding that it was soon to be succeeded by a President and Congress already elected by the people. Buck was authorized to announce "this friendly action" in Peru on the same day.

JUNE 3. Cáceres was inaugurated President.

JUNE 5. In acknowledging a note from the Foreign Minister the previous day, which had announced Cáceres' assumption of the Presidency, Buck called attention to President Cleveland's remarks to the former Peruvian Minister in Washington on Apr. 28 as a sign of the "sympathetic disposition" of the United States to Peru. By this acknowledgment the United States recognized the Cáceres government.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE BORGONO AND CACERES GOVERNMENTS, 1894

APR. 1, 1894. After the death of President Remigo Morales Bermúdez, former President Cáceres led a faction which opposed the succession of First Vice President Pedro Alejandrino del Solar. In support of Cáceres police and military officers took orders from the Second Vice President, Justiniano Borgoño, who assumed the Presidency.

APR. 3. Minister James McKenzie withheld recognition and referred the matter to Washington.

MAY 26. The Department of State transmitted to the Legation at Lima President Grover Cleveland's acknowledgment of Borgoño's assumption of office.

JUNE 18. McKenzie personally delivered President Cleveland's letter to Borgoño, thus formally recognizing his government.

AUG. 10. Cáceres was inaugurated President after his election on June 3.

AUG. 14. McKenzie extended recognition to the Cáceres government by acknowledging receipt of the Foreign Ministry's note of Aug. 11 which announced the change in government and by reciprocating the new government's wish to continue friendly relations.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PIEROLA GOVERNMENT, 1895

MAR. 20, 1895. Following a revolt led by former President Piérola, President Cáceres turned over executive power to a Provisional Council, which was to call for a Presidential election in the near future.

MAR. 22. U.S. Minister McKenzie, who had joined the Diplomatic Corps in encouraging the transfer of power, extended recognition to the Provisional Council through a note addressed to the new government's Foreign Minister.

SEPT. 8. After his popular election in June and subsequent confirmation by the electoral college, Piérola was inaugurated President.

SEPT. 9. Chargé Richard R. Neill extended recognition to the Piérola government by acknowledging receipt of a note from the Foreign Minister on the same day announcing Piérola's assumption of the Presidency and by expressing the wish of the United States to continue friendly relations with the new government.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE BENAVIDES GOVERNMENT, 1914

FEB. 4, 1914. A junta assumed power after rebel forces had stormed the palace of President Guillermo Billinghurst, taking him prisoner and forcing his resignation. Col. Oscar Benavides was named President of the junta.

FEB. 8. Minister Benton McMillin reported that there was no evidence of organized opposition to the new government and that none seemed probable. He requested instructions concerning recognition and gave his own view that ultimate recognition was inevitable.

FEB. 12. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan advised McMillin that recognition should be extended to the junta as a provisional government, pending the establishment of a permanent executive, on the basis of the "uncontested exercise of executive power" by the junta and its acceptance by the people.

MAY 15. Oscar Benavides was elected Provisional President by Congress and immediately sworn in.

MAY 27. Under instructions, McMillin called on the Foreign Minister and informed him that the United States recognized the Benavides government.

U.S. DE FACTO AND DE JURE RECOGNITION OF THE LEGUIA GOVERNMENT, 1919-20

JULY 5, 1919. President-elect Augusto Leguía assumed the office of Provisional President after the forcible deposition of President José Pardo, who allegedly was planning to annul Leguía's election in May.

JULY 7. Minister McMillin was instructed to "quietly avoid for the present any action" which would lead the new regime to believe it had been recognized.

AUG. 9. In answer to an inquiry from the Department of State, McMillin indicated that Leguía's support was strong enough, especially in the army, to enable him "to overcome any and all opposition that may arise against his rule for the present and near future."

AUG. 26. In elections for a new Congress, Leguía's party won an overwhelming victory.

AUG. 30. Under instructions, McMillin recognized the Leguía regime as the *de facto* government.

OCT. 12. Leguía was inaugurated President.

FEB. 6, 1920. Secretary of State Robert Lansing urged recognition of Leguía's government as *de jure* because of its absolute control, the new liberal constitution which had just been promulgated, its safeguarding of foreigners' rights to real and subsoil property, its efforts to place loans in the United States, and its recognition by other powers. President Woodrow Wilson deferred action on the recommendation.

APR. 24. *De jure* recognition was extended when the newly appointed Ambassador, William E. Gonzales, presented to President Leguía his credentials as well as a congratulatory letter from President Wilson on Leguía's assumption of the Presidency.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE SANCHEZ CERRO GOVERNMENT, 1930

AUG. 25, 1930. President Leguía resigned under threat of a military revolt.

AUG. 27. A junta headed by Col. Luis M. Sánchez Cerro assumed power.

AUG. 29. Authorizing the Embassy in Lima to convey his feelings to Sánchez Cerro, Secretary of State Henry Stimson expressed the hope that the new government would not revert to the days of "personal revenge" and implied that the new government's ability to protect the deposed members of the last government would be a factor in considering recognition.

SEPT. 13. Ambassador Fred Dearing recommended recognition of the junta because the people accepted it, it controlled all of Peru, it promised to live up to its obligations and restore constitutional government, and it was treating Leguía well.

SEPT. 18. Under instructions, Dearing informed the Foreign Minister that he was entering into full diplomatic relations with the junta, thus according it recognition.

U.S. CONTINUANCE OF RELATIONS WITH THE SAMANEZ OCAMPO GOVERNMENT, 1931

MAR. 1, 1931. Faced with increasing discontent among the armed forces and the civilian population, President Sánchez Cerro and the entire junta handed their resignations to an assembly of representative citizens, which then gave executive power to a Triumvirate headed by Ricardo Leonicia Elías.

MAR. 5. The Triumvirate headed by Elías was overthrown in a coup planned and executed by army officers led by Gustavo A. Jiménez.

MAR. 6. Ambassador Dearing rejected a request by Sánchez Cerro that Dearing and other members of the Diplomatic Corps help create a demand for his return to the country in about three months' time so that he could run for the Presidency.

MAR. 11. A new junta was installed, with David Samánez Ocampo as its head.

MAR. 12. The Foreign Ministry sent a note to the U.S. Embassy, informing it of the change of government and giving assurances that the new government would strictly comply with Peru's international obligations.

MAR. 13. Dearing reported that in view of signs of disaffection in the south of Peru, he was deferring any recommendations concerning recognition of the new government.

MAR. 18. Dearing was authorized to attend a reception being given that evening by the Foreign Minister for the Diplomatic Corps, but was instructed to make it clear that he was not attending in his "representative capacity."

APR. 10. The Department of State informed Dearing that it did not favor his suggestion that the United States support a joint mediation in Peru by several nations or by the League of Nations, a suggestion based on Dearing's belief that renewed civil strife may have been Communist-inspired.

MAY 8. Noting that only Spain and Norway had so far extended recognition, Secretary Stimson requested further information from Dearing on the government's stability and popular support.

MAY 15. Dearing reported that the government had the support of the military and the police and the acquiescence of the people in general. He recommended that the United States adopt the position of most of the other Latin American nations; namely, to continue relations with the new government without taking any special recognition action. He argued that such action would tend "to stabilize conditions in Peru and by regularizing our intercourse will greatly facilitate our current business."

MAY 20. Acting on instructions received the previous day, Dearing addressed a note to the Foreign Ministry acknowledging its note of Mar. 12 and stating that the recent change in government made no difference in the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE SANCHEZ CERRO GOVERNMENT, 1931

JULY 2, 1931. Sánchez Cerro returned to Lima from abroad. Prior to his arrival, clashes occurred at Lima and Callao between his supporters and police, resulting in many injuries and several deaths.

OCT. 11. In a bitterly contested election for President, Sánchez Cerro defeated Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the candidate of the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA).

DEC. 8. Following certification of his election by the National Electoral Board despite claims by impartial observers that Haya de la Torre had won, Sánchez Cerro was inaugurated President.

DEC. 11. At a reception for members of the Diplomatic Corps, Dearing, in accordance with the Department of State's instruction of Dec. 2, conveyed to Sánchez Cerro the congratulations of President Herbert Hoover and his best wishes for the success of Sánchez Cerro's administration.

U.S. CONTINUANCE OF RELATIONS WITH THE BENAVIDES GOVERNMENT, 1933

JULY 7, 1932. After President Sánchez Cerro had instituted a campaign to crush opposition parties and had Haya de la Torre arrested, an uprising broke out in Trujillo which resulted in widespread casualties.

APR. 7, 1933. Because of a variety of repressive acts by Sánchez Cerro, Ambassador Dearing told Washington that the basis for U.S. recognition of his government had been invalidated. Dearing proposed new courses of action toward Sánchez Cerro, including withdrawal of recognition, severance of diplomatic relations, and publicity of Sánchez Cerro's misdeeds.

APR. 30. Sánchez Cerro was assassinated. The government was turned over to a Council of Ministers which asked Congress, under the provisions of the Constitution, to elect a new President. That same day Congress chose Oscar Benavides to serve the remainder of Sánchez Cerro's term.

APR. 30. The United States continued diplomatic relations with the Benavides government, although there is no apparent record of the decision to do so or of the manner in which this was communicated to the Benavides government.

JULY 11. While noting that the situation had "changed materially" since Apr. 7 when Dearing had made his recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Sánchez Cerro, the Department of State informed Dearing that it had disapproved those recommendations.

U.S. CONTINUANCE OF RELATIONS WITH THE ODRÍA GOVERNMENT, 1948

OCT. 30, 1948. In a bloodless coup d'état Gen. Manuel Odría forced the resignation of President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero and established himself at the head of a military junta.

OCT. 31. The Foreign Ministry informed the U.S. Embassy of the change in government and promised that the new government would respect Peru's international obligations.

OCT. 31. Ambassador Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., told the Department of State that unless he was instructed otherwise, he would contact Odría and his Foreign Minister within the next two days, basing his action on Resolution 35 of the Bogotá Conference held earlier in the year. This resolution said that continuity of diplomatic relations among the American states was desirable, that action with regard to diplomatic relations should not be used as a political weapon, and that establishment of diplomatic relations with a government did not imply any judgment on its domestic policy.

NOV. 12. The Department of State informed the U.S. representatives in the American Republics that in view of the "revolutionary and military character" of the Odría government, it was consulting with Organization of American States representatives in Washington before resuming relations. It also observed that it was not acting contrary to the Bogotá Conference Resolution 35, which had set no time limit concerning the resumption of relations.

Nov. 21. Acting on instructions received the previous day, Tittmann delivered a note to the Foreign Ministry, acknowledging receipt of its note of Oct. 31 and stating the desire of the U.S. Government to continue friendly relations with the Odría government.

SUSPENSION OF RELATIONS WITH AND DELAYED U.S. RECOGNITION
OF THE PEREZ GODOY GOVERNMENT, 1962

JUNE 10, 1962. In the Presidential election, although Haya de la Torre had more votes than either of his two opponents, none of the candidates received the necessary one-third plurality required for election. By law the President would be chosen by Congress when it convened on July 28.

JULY 13. The Joint Armed Forces Command, fearful of a deal that would give former President Odría the Presidency and Haya de la Torre control of the Cabinet, demanded that President Manuel Prado annul the entire election as fraudulent and that an interim government be established to serve after the end of Prado's term until new elections could be held.

JULY 18. An army combat team drove a tank through the gates of the Presidential Palace and arrested President Prado. Gen. Ricardo Pérez Godoy proclaimed himself President. Constitutional guarantees were suspended, Congress was dissolved, and the election results were annulled, with the promise that free elections would be held in June 1963.

JULY 18. The Foreign Ministry addressed a note to the U.S. Embassy announcing the change in government and giving assurances that the new government would honor its international obligations.

JULY 18. A statement issued by the Department of State said, "We must deplore this military coup d'état which has overthrown the constitutional Government of Peru. . . . our diplomatic relations with Peru have been suspended." The Department of State announced the following day the suspension of the various assistance programs to Peru, "with certain relatively minor exceptions where important humanitarian factors are involved."

JULY 23. When asked at a press conference about the apparent inconsistency in withholding aid from a military dictatorship in Peru while at the same time asking Congress for discretionary power to continue most-favored-nation status for Communist dictatorships in Poland and Yugoslavia, President John F. Kennedy replied: "We are anxious to see a return to constitutional forms in Peru, and therefore until we know what is going to happen in Peru, we are prudent in making our judgments as to what we shall do. We think it's in our national interest, and I think the aid we're giving in other areas is in our national interest, because we feel that this hemisphere can only be secure and free with democratic governments."

AUG. 1. At a press conference President Kennedy indicated that the United States had been encouraged by signs that Peru was returning to "constitutional free government, which is the object of the Alliance for Progress."

AUG. 17. The Department of State announced that the United States was resuming relations with the Peruvian government and extending recognition to the Pérez Godoy junta by having Chargé Douglas Henderson acknowledge receipt of the Foreign Ministry's note of July 18. It is also stated that economic assistance to Peru was being resumed. Military assistance, however, was withheld.

U.S. SUSPENSION AND RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE VELASCO GOVERNMENT, 1968

OCT. 3, 1968. A group of military officers, supported by a column of tanks, forcibly removed President Fernando Belaúnde Terry from office and put him on a plane to Buenos Aires. A junta of military service commanders issued a Revolutionary Manifesto and Statutes, dissolved the Congress, and proclaimed as President Juan Velasco Alvarado, Commanding General of the Army and Acting President of the Armed Forces Command.

OCT. 4. It was announced at a Department of State press briefing that "the overthrow of the Peruvian Government by the military forces has the effect of suspending normal diplomatic relations between Peru and the United States." Aid programs to Peru were also suspended.

OCT. 9. The new government officially seized the major holdings of the International Petroleum Company.

OCT. 25. At a Department of State press briefing, a spokesman said that "the American Embassy in Lima advised the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at noon today that the United States Government has resumed diplomatic relations with the Government of Peru." The decision was made, he said, after consultations with other Organization of American States members in accordance with Resolution 26 of the 1965 Rio de Janeiro Conference and after the new government had stated its intention to honor Peru's international obligations and to return to constitutional government. He also said that the seizure of the International Petroleum Company's holdings had not been a factor in the decision to resume relations. Aid programs for Peru remained "under review." (Most aid programs were soon resumed.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Memorandum of understanding in the field of nuclear science and technical information, with minutes of signature. Done at Brussels September 19, 1974. Entered into force September 19, 1974.

Signatures: Belgium, European Atomic Energy Community, Federal Republic of Germany,^{1,2} Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United States, September 19, 1974.

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974. Open for signature November 1, 1974, through March 31, 1975. Enters into force definitively October 1, 1975, if governments which have signed not subject to approval, ratification, or acceptance or which have deposited instruments of approval, ratification, or acceptance represent at least 20 exporting members holding a majority of the votes of exporting members and at least 10 importing members holding a majority of the votes of importing members or, provisionally, October 1, 1975, if above number of governments deposit notifications undertaking to apply protocol provisionally and to seek approval, ratification, or acceptance.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.³

Ratification deposited: Jordan, March 15, 1974.

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Signature: The Gambia, October 1, 1974.

International Court of Justice

Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055).

Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited: India, September 18, 1974.⁴

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965

(TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.⁵

Acceptance deposited: Denmark, March 28, 1974; United Kingdom, October 7, 1974.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.⁵

Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, October 14, 1974.

Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971.⁵

Ratification deposited: Brazil, October 3, 1974.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), as amended by additional protocol, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

Accession deposited: The Gambia, July 2, 1974.

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

Ratifications deposited: Malagasy Republic, January 9, 1973; Malaysia, May 17, 1974.

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agreement, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 1971. TIAS 7236.

Approval deposited: Malagasy Republic, January 9, 1973.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Netherlands (applicable to Surinam and Netherlands Antilles), October 10, 1974.

¹ With reservation.

² Applicable to Land Berlin.

³ Not in force for the United States.

⁴ With conditions.

⁵ Not in force.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands (applicable to Surinam and Netherlands Antilles), October 9, 1974.

Notifications of intention to apply transitional provisions: Cyprus, Indonesia, September 20, 1974.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

Ratification deposited: New Zealand, October 30, 1974.⁶

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.⁵

Signature: Ecuador, August 27, 1974.¹

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.⁵

Ratification deposited: Mexico, September 25, 1974.

BILATERAL

Iceland

Agreement relating to the continuation of the defense agreement of May 5, 1951 (TIAS 2266), with memorandum of understanding and agreed minute. Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik October 22, 1974. Entered into force October 22, 1974.

Japan

Arrangement concerning trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles, with related letters. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 27, 1974. Entered into force September 27, 1974, effective October 1, 1974.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement of November 8 and December 14, 1972 (TIAS 7534), relating to the transfer of scrap to Viet-Nam as supplementary military assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon September 3 and October 14, 1974. Entered into force October 14, 1974.

¹ With reservation.

⁵ Not in force.

⁶ With declaration.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$16.35; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$14.50; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 25¢ each.

Bermuda	Cat. No. S1.123:B45
	Pub. 7907 4 pp.
Haiti	Cat. No. S1.123:H12
	Pub. 8287 4 pp.
Iraq	Cat. No. S1.123:IR1/2
	Pub. 7975 4 pp.
Jamaica	Cat. No. S1.123:J22
	Pub. 8080 4 pp.
Libya	Cat. No. S1.123:L61
	Pub. 7815 5 pp.

International Coffee Agreement. Amending and extending the agreement of March 18, 1968. TIAS 7809. 237 pp. \$1.90. (Cat. No. S9.10:7809).

Nonscheduled Air Services. Agreement, with protocol, with Yugoslavia. TIAS 7819. 56 pp. 65¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7819).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 7828. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7828).

Space Research Project. Agreement with Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 7830. 10 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7830).

Finance—Public Law 480 and Other Funds. Agreement with India. TIAS 7831. 39 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7831).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea. TIAS 7835. 11 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7835).

Extradition. Treaty with Paraguay. TIAS 7838. 26 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7838).

Claims. Notice of Time for Filing Claims Against Egypt by U.S. Nationals 669

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**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: October 28–November 3**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to October 28 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is 429 of October 18.

No.	Date	Subject
†445	10/28	Kissinger: Indian Council on World Affairs, New Delhi.
*446	10/29	Shipping Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Maritime Law, Nov. 20.
*447	10/29	Chinese art and archaeological exhibition to tour U.S., Dec. 13–June 8.
†448	10/29	Kissinger, Chavan: toasts, New Delhi, Oct. 28.
†449	10/30	U.S.-India joint communique.
*450	10/30	U.S. delegation to the World Food Conference.
†451	10/30	Kissinger: news conference, New Delhi.
*452	10/30	Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Nov. 22.
*453	10/31	Emmet J. Kay to receive Tribute of Appreciation (biographic data).
†454	10/31	Kissinger: remarks on All-India Radio, Oct. 30.
†455	10/31	Kissinger: remarks to press, Dacca, Oct. 30.
†456	10/31	Kissinger, Hossain: exchange of toasts, Dacca, Oct. 30.
†457	10/31	U.S.-Bangladesh joint communique.
†458	11/1	Ingersoll: remarks at presentation of award to Emmet J. Kay.
†459	11/1	Kissinger, Bhutto: exchange of toasts, Rawalpindi, Oct. 31.
†460	10/31	U.S.-Pakistan joint communique.
*461	11/1	Kissinger: departure, Islamabad.
†462	11/1	U.S.-Afghanistan joint statement.
†463	11/2	U.S.-Iran joint communique.
†464	11/2	Kissinger, Ansary: news conference, Tehran.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.