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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Assistant Secretary Enders Outlines Draft Agreement Reached by Energy Coordinating Group

The Energy Coordinating Group (ECG) established by the Washington Energy Conference in February met at Brussels September 19-20. Following is the transcript of a news conference held at the Department of State on September 23 by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, who headed the U.S. delegation to the Brussels meeting.

I thought it would be useful to come down here and talk very briefly and then answer questions about the agreement which has been reached in Brussels among the 12 ECG countries—that is to say, the European Community less France, Norway, Japan, the United States, and Canada—and which is now being submitted to governments for their consideration, their constitutional procedures, and approval.

This is a far-reaching agreement and a far-reaching expression of solidarity among the consuming countries. If it is approved by governments, as we expect it will be, it will form a very strong basis of cooperation in the energy field among a wide range of industrialized countries.

As such, we regard it as a very important step forward and a very important consequence of the Washington Energy Conference, which launched this cooperative work.

I would like to go into some detail on the provisions that it contains. Let me say a word about the substance and then a word about the procedure.

On the substance: I think the basic perception in this agreement is that the consuming countries need first to express their solidarity by determining what each would do in a new oil emergency and how each would

support the oil security of the group as a whole before they can fruitfully go on to other, more positive—eventually dominant—elements of the energy situation, which include major joint actions to conserve energy and thereby lower the net imports of the group as a whole; research and development; the development of alternative supplies, thereby increasing the output of energy in the group as a whole and decreasing net imports and therefore vulnerability.

This should create a situation in which the demand for and dependence on imported oil for the group as a whole will significantly diminish from what it is now.

Now, in contingency planning, the basic principle here is that each country in the group must share on an equitable basis in the preparation for a new emergency. That means that everybody must stockpile oil to cover their imports on the same basis. And the agreement sets a target of 90 days. We are very substantially below that in many countries now. This means a major commitment on the part of Japan and Western Europe—also to some degree on the part of the United States—to carry stocks equivalent to 90 days of imports.

The second thing is that all the countries agree to take similar actions in a new emergency to curtail oil consumption. This is complicated, and I will be glad to go into it. But basically what it says is that at certain levels of shortfall a given consumption cut will take place, and when the shortfall gets deeper, another level of common consumption cutback will be called for. Then, beyond a certain point, where no figures are foreseen, but where we get into a very severe crisis indeed, going toward cutbacks of

30 or 40 percent of available oil, then there is a strong commitment in the agreement to take all necessary further restrictions in demand and other actions to assure the security of the group.

So, this is a process which at the outset contains a series of very specific commitments for the kind of crisis that we had to face this past winter and a further general commitment for more serious crises should they develop.

Thirdly, there is a formula for sharing oil which is constructed as a function of the first two commitments in stockpiling and in consumption cutbacks. What it does is basically assure that available oil is sorted out as a function of the first two commitments, so that all countries use their oil stocks, their security provisions, in effect, at about the same rate and no country will run out of oil sooner than any other.

To express this basic contingency plan, the 12 countries have tentatively agreed that they should have a new institution which would be an international energy agency, an autonomous institution to be constructed within the framework of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], having its own governing council at ministerial level and its own secretariat.

They have agreed on a series of decision-making provisions which are important and represent a significant innovation in international decisionmaking. They provide, in the case of action to overcome an oil contingency, a very strong presumption of action. That is to say, once a given shortfall of oil is identified, this shortfall would create a presumption—in effect would trigger the commitments to demand restraint and to sharing, unless a very strong majority of the countries in the group were to vote to overturn it. That strong majority must be expressed in terms of both a large number of the countries involved and countries representing a large majority of the oil consumption of the group. It would take, in effect, 60 percent of the weighted votes, and the weighting is calculated in such a manner that out of a total of 136 votes of the group,

oil votes weighted on consumption count for 100 with the remainder allocated three per country.

This voting system is complex in its execution but relatively simple in its concept, and the idea is that there should be a very strong presumption that this machinery comes into effect in a crisis.

Another aspect of that voting machinery is that it also can be used for all of the ordinary business of the group, so that the ability of the group to interpret its undertakings, to act on what it thinks its basic agreement means—and this is a carefully written agreement which runs now to 82 articles and is quite fully laid out—should also be very strong.

Now, thirdly, with regard to the contingency plan itself, there is provision for both protection against a general embargo affecting the group as a whole and for protection against a selective embargo, which might target one or two countries, as the United States and Holland were targeted last winter. This provision also creates a strong presumption of action, once the shortfall is identified. This, too, could be overturned, but only by a very strong majority vote. In this case, it would require 10 countries.

I should note that because of the structure of the American oil market, with most of the imports coming into the east coast—and this is also true of Canada—there is a separate provision that this selective trigger can be used in regard to a regional market of a given country, as well as to the national market. So there is, in effect, built-in protection for the east coast of the United States and the east coast of Canada.

Now, this contingency plan is the heart of the international energy program which has been agreed at this stage, but does not exhaust it and is regarded as a first stage.

The plan now contains the following other elements:

—One, a broad program of cooperative research and development which is to be guided by the new energy agency and undertaken partly on the basis of national groupings

with one individual member in the lead and partly on the basis of cooperative research to be done through the OECD itself by, if not by the whole group, by any collection of countries in the group.

—Secondly, there will be a broad program of conservation which is to be undertaken by this group. They will attempt to develop in the group national policies which will assist conservation in each country through an exchange of information and the identification of priorities.

—Thirdly, we expect to concentrate on some specific problem such as nuclear enrichment—how to provide the nuclear enrichment services which will be required for the group as a whole in the course of the next 15 or 20 years by the location and development of additional nuclear enrichment facilities.

—Fourthly, we expect to have under this program a broad new effort at predicting the demand and supply for energy, in an effort to put planning on a surer footing than it now is.

Now, turning to the procedure, as I say, this agreement is a tentative agreement. It is, in technical jargon, an agreement “without brackets”—without reservations on the part of national delegations. It is submitted now for formal consideration and decision by member governments. Many of them will be talking to their parliaments. We have talked already quite broadly on the Hill but will expect to do more of that now.

This undertaking will be open to new members, provided they are also members of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, the OECD. And toward the end of October, we expect to be initialing this agreement, bringing it provisionally into force. We expect that in the course of November there will be a decision by the OECD as to whether or not they wish to accept this organization in their framework, and subsequently, we would expect the organization to be created.

I think the most important thing that has come out of this work is the beginning of an

expression by the consuming countries to consider their destiny and their security as energy consumers together. This is expressed in many ways—in the contingency provisions, in the majority voting, in the very strong commitments undertaken to improve their security.

Looking toward the future, though, this is an arrangement which is intended to be the base for working on the really important and positive aspects of the problem, of which the most immediate is conservation.

I think it is obvious that the conservation effort undertaken by the members of this group of 12 countries, or by any industrialized countries, has been very limited and that the group remains vulnerable as a whole to new cutbacks due to the fact that it has not slowed down very significantly its energy consumption. As a matter of fact, we saw recently in the case of the United States that gasoline consumption for the first time in a year was over its level of 12 months earlier.

This will be certainly one of the great tasks for this winter in all the industrialized countries and, we would expect, in the organization created by this undertaking.

That, in general, is where we are now. Let me see whether I can answer your questions.

Q. Mr. Enders, reports from Brussels, which are four days old already, mention 7 percent as the threshold. I don't think you mentioned this percentage.

Assistant Secretary Enders: No. If you like the detail, it is as follows.

The threshold for either a selective embargo or for a general embargo for the group as a whole is .7 percent. When there is a 7 percent shortfall, there would be a commitment to a 7 percent curtailment of oil consumption in all the countries, or in the case of a selective embargo which would not require such a general curtailment of demand, an equivalent sharing mechanism and commitment.

The next trigger level is at 12 percent. When the shortfall for the group as a whole is at 12 percent, there is a commitment to

take demand restraint measures at the 10 percent level. The idea is that one would also use some stocks in between to cover the shortfall.

There is a further general commitment that should the shortfalls exceed 12 percent the group would take the actions necessary to overcome the situation, including additional demand restraint as required.

Q. Mr. Enders, is it the premise that an active and successful conservation program would eventually have an impact on driving down the price?

Assistant Secretary Enders: I would put it the other way around, that if the price of oil remains at its present level there will be—there is already—such massive investment in alternative sources of energy that the market for imported oil from outside this group will, 10 years from now, be very small indeed.

A conservation effort would tend to result in a much more even progression of prices and demand. A major conservation effort here, I think, would convince the producers in much shorter order than they may otherwise be convinced that their present prices are unrealistic and unsustainable.

Q. Is it possible to get specific at all about the dimensions of conservation approaches which were considered, or is this in a very generalized form? Is there any estimation of what is contemplated in terms, say, of cut-back in gasoline consumption for automobiles or oil consumption for heating?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Under this agreement?

Q. Yes.

Assistant Secretary Enders: The choice of conservation measures would have to be left to each country to do. On the other hand, the group as a whole would have to be satisfied that the measures that were available on a standby basis would be adequate.

Now, in the case of the United States there are two things to be said. One is that if the United States had to execute this agreement in the relatively near future it would

have the authority in the Allocation Act and in other acts to do it—probably by creating a situation like the one that prevailed last winter, using gas lines as an informal, and often very inequitable, form of rationing.

Therefore we expect to be going to the Congress at a point, probably at the start of the next session but conceivably later this year, to propose a broad set of standby authorities in demand restraint which might include a spectrum of things ranging from allocation authority, changes in such demand restraint measures as speed limits, thermostat regulation—a whole series of administrative measures of this kind—through to emergency tax measures and rationing to give the administration the kind of broad standby authority to achieve these goals on what we would regard as a more equitable basis than could be done at present.

Q. Is all this in the law now, this authority for allocation?

Assistant Secretary Enders: The allocation authority is there now.

Q. Rationing?

Assistant Secretary Enders: No. Or at least it's uncertain just how strong it is.

Q. What is the likelihood of bringing France, and for that matter Japan as well, into this agreement?

Assistant Secretary Enders: France has not participated in these talks. The French Government has not given us its studied, considered view on how it might relate to this work. We are still hopeful that sometime in the future France will join this effort. And I think that the transfer of this whole effort from a separate country grouping, the Energy Coordinating Group, toward the OECD may be helpful to France in coming in.

Let me note in this regard that a number of other countries have expressed an interest in this work—Australia, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria—so that we would expect that there will be at least several new members. It's not certain whether France will be among them yet.

As to Japan, again I don't want to pre-judge the Japanese decisionmaking processes, but certainly their attitude toward these negotiations, toward the conclusion, and toward the prospect has been very positive.

Q. What about Norway?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Norway. I would not, again, speak specifically to Norway. They have accepted this draft on the same ad referendum basis as other countries. Their position is formally no different from others.

I think we know that all foreign policy issues, and particularly all oil issues, have a particular importance—perhaps a particular delicacy—in Norway at this time. They will be in the process of making their decision in the course of the next month.

I don't think I should really comment on it more than that, other than to say that they are exactly at the same point in terms of negotiating as the other countries.

Q. Mr. Enders, could you explain the sharing mechanism a bit further? It's unclear to me whether it would be triggered only in the case of a selective embargo so that there would be sharing of oil in the international marketplace or whether the oil to be shared would include oil produced from national resources for national uses; in other words, U.S. oil which does not normally go into the international marketplace.

Assistant Secretary Enders: Oil to be shared would come from three sources: one, oil normally imported from outside the group into the group; secondly, oil drawn from stocks on an agreed basis; and thirdly, all domestically produced oil.

Q. And you have different percentage levels?

Assistant Secretary Enders: For each?

Q. For each.

Assistant Secretary Enders: No, they are considered as a pool.

Q. They are all as a pool?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Yes, sir.

Q. But as a realistic matter, at the lower shortfall percentages you would not be going into the third reservoir, would you? I mean that would be more or less taken up from the oil that's in the international marketplace, wouldn't it? In other words, at what level would you actually be getting to a point where a nation that no longer exports oil on a net basis, such as the United States, would have to start sharing some of that oil?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Well, this would occur only in a very severe crisis, under the agreed arrangement.

Q. Is there at present a set of percentage triggers that would move the group from one level?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Only the ones that I have cited. In other words, oil is treated as one pool for the purposes of this agreement. There is no differentiation between domestically produced oil, imported oil, and oil drawn from stocks. And the triggers that are available are the ones that I have cited here—7 percent, 12 percent, the ones which are available.

Now, in point of fact, in the sort of crisis that we had last winter, then of course one would share available stocks and imported oil.

During a very severe crisis, if there were to be a total shutdown of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] production, then you would get some sharing of American oil.

Q. It depends on the length of the crisis.

Assistant Secretary Enders: It depends on the depth, too.

Q. If there is a selective embargo, boycott, as against, say, two countries, as there was in October, then the other countries involved, ones engaged in the sharing of their oil, would obviously become exposed to retaliatory measures from the oil producers in the normal course of events?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Oh, I think that is true. I think the selective embargo is

by nature a very aggressive act. And I think one of the important aspects of this is that it would provide group solidarity against that. I think that's a fundamental principle.

Q. Besides group solidarity, I'm under the impression that the agreement doesn't contain anything in the way of joint consultation, negotiation, or contact with the producers. Why?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Yes, it does.

Q. It does?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Yes, it does. A chapter of the agreement, one out of 10 chapters in the agreement, is devoted to the process of consultation with the producers. And it contains there a strong commitment to explore ways of developing the dialogue with producers.

I should add that there's another provision of it that I've overlooked, and that is that the international oil companies—and that includes not only the majors but major national oil companies—are to provide to this new organization a range of information on their activities including their pricing and financial structure, which are important matters of national policymaking.

Q. Well, could you clarify that point? Does it specifically provide for consultation by the consuming nations on oil pricing per se?

Assistant Secretary Enders: No, it does not provide for consultation on oil pricing per se. The language is more broadly drawn.

Q. Mr. Enders, on a question of the stockpile provisions—

Assistant Secretary Enders: Yes.

Q. —in terms of available supplies right now, how long would current stockpiles last? And, also, how long would it take—

Assistant Secretary Enders: It depends on how deep the cut is.

Q. —how long would it take to build up stockpiles so that they'd last for 90 days?

Assistant Secretary Enders: It's very dif-

ficult to answer those questions in the abstract, because it depends on what kind of a cut you have. But I think you can get some idea from the following.

A few Europeans have 75 days of stocks; most have closer to 60 days of true emergency stocks, or maybe even less. The Japanese have 60 days of stocks at the present time, but how much of those are pure emergency stocks in the sense that they could be withdrawn and used without the system breaking down in the sense that there were major stock shortages throughout the economy is not entirely clear.

I think the important thing to say here is that there will be a substantial new demand for oil in order to build those stocks up to 90 days of true emergency stocks, and that will take probably several years.

Q. How large is the U.S. stock?

Assistant Secretary Enders: On this basis, we think that overall U.S. stocks are currently about 110 days of imports. However, the true emergency element in that is substantially smaller. I can't give you a specific figure; but it is definitely less.

Q. Because of domestic production?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Well, of course, the fact that we have domestic production means that we haven't carried emergency stocks in the same way other countries have.

On the other hand, there is a complicated engineering matter we still haven't got a clear fix on, as to just where the collapse point is of the system. Once we can identify that, we can answer this kind of question for the group as a whole.

Q. Is this in the case of the 90-day stocks?

Assistant Secretary Enders: In the case of individual countries, that is again a matter that has to be determined for each country.

Q. In our case, would it be government stocks or would it be oil company stocks?

Assistant Secretary Enders: That is a matter in which we have yet to make a proposal.

That would be included in our legislative package for this fall.

Q. In practical terms, you mean it's unclear whether the naval petroleum reserves would be counted. Is that what you're saying?

Assistant Secretary Enders: No. There's another detail of it that I've not mentioned. And that is that standby production can be counted against these stock totals under the terms of the agreement on a basis which has been agreed—a rather complicated formula—which takes account both of the lag in bringing in standby production in the course of a crisis and of the fact that of course standby production will last you much longer than stocks will. So that standby production for a country like the United States—Norway, prospectively—Great Britain, Canada—surely can count against the stock total.

Q. If it takes several years, as I understood you to say, to build up to the 90-day stocks in most countries, doesn't that also mean that it will be several years before the useful impact of this plan is felt?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Before its full impact is felt—yes.

The question of how rapidly you go up on stocks is a question of what the price impact would be. Obviously, a major new demand for oil in the world at the present time, at a time when the OPEC countries are making an effort to sustain a price that is threatened by an incipient surplus, would tend to have a price-strengthening effect—which is not desired, surely, by the consumers. Therefore we would expect that the stockpiling would occur over a certain length of time.

Q. Is this agreement in itself subject to Senate confirmation?

Assistant Secretary Enders: What we have told our contacts on the Hill is that given the fact that a broad program of legislation would, we think, be desirable and required to put it into effect, we have proposed that the agreement itself be an executive agreement—and of course it would be submitted

to lay before the Congress in the normal manner—and then we'd come in with a package of implementing legislation which would be acted on in a normal way.

Q. Do your contacts on the Hill understand that the implementing legislation perhaps would involve rationing authority and tax changes?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Yes, they do.

Q. And they're favorable to them?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Well, in principle. They obviously are going to look very closely at the package that comes up, and nobody in advance of an agreement of this kind is going to commit himself.

This is why we have had extensive consultations so far, and will again have, before going back and committing ourselves by initialing. Then we would envisage the further legislative process.

Let me say that in this regard, though, I think a great many people on the Hill, in the public—as well as in the administration—feel that we ought to be doing something about this problem. And I think that the notion that we must diminish our vulnerability by means of this kind and by means of conservation is a very widely held view.

Q. I'm not sure of the chronology. Are you going to go before Congress for the implementing legislation before you sign the agreement or what?

Assistant Secretary Enders: No. I think, legally, the way this would be set up would be to have an initialing—which is, basically, a commitment in principle, or the equivalent, a political commitment rather than a legal commitment—sometime in the course of the fall. And then countries would be asked to submit a certification that they had undertaken all necessary ratification and had all necessary authority to execute the agreement within a certain time period.

Q. Is this proposal intended to be discussed this coming weekend when France's Foreign [and Finance] Ministers are here?

Assistant Secretary Enders: That's an interesting—sort of a backdoor—question on that! [Laughter.]

Q. Really.

Assistant Secretary Enders: I'm sorry that I really can't get into the question about a meeting this weekend—

Q. Why?

Q. Well, there have already been public references that a meeting Saturday and Sunday will take place.

Assistant Secretary Enders:—other than to say that such a meeting is being worked out. But as to whether it will in fact occur and how it's going to occur, what might happen— [laughter].

Q. You referred to an agreement of 82 articles. What is the volume size of this agreement here? Is it something in 30–40 pages? I'm just trying to get an approximation of what it is.

Assistant Secretary Enders: Well, I can't really tell, to tell you the truth, because I think each of the articles has been written on a separate page at this time.

Q. Mr. Enders, what about the weight of the votes? How many votes does the United States have, for instance?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Each country would have three votes under this proposal, and then 100 votes would be allocated to the group for oil consumption. And of that total, I think the United States has 51. So it makes the U.S. vote 54.

Q. Mr. Enders, is there anything in this program in a broad, general sense that you think would help drive down the price of oil?

Assistant Secretary Enders: The purpose of this program is, in the first instance, defensive. The oil crisis—oil embargoes of last winter—caught the industrial countries very much unprepared. And the result was an extraordinary increase in prices and a lot of political friction and competition among them.

The first objective of this agreement is to create a situation in which a new shortfall in oil could be handled by those countries without that extraordinary increase in prices, the competition, and the friction—to enable them to adjust to it in a rational manner, should it occur.

Beyond that, of course, this is an expression of the solidarity of the consuming countries and a first step toward their doing something about their basic energy predicament—about the fact that they are more vulnerable than they would wish to be, and they should be, to foreign imports.

But the next steps, as I think I said before, are in terms of changing the demand-supply balance, getting prices down. The next steps are the important ones.

Q. I'd like to ask just a variation of a question I asked earlier in terms of a selective boycott or embargo. Wouldn't the net effect of this be that if a selective boycott were attempted, the countries imposing the boycott would be faced with the probability that there would have to be a general boycott against all these countries, or not, because of the sharing arrangement?

Assistant Secretary Enders: Well, I think that what you say suggests that you can't have solidarity without facing up to that danger. In effect, what the solidarity means is that producing countries cannot target individual countries without expecting that their embargo will be offset by this solidarity; and it raises that possibility. As such, I would expect it to be some deterrent to action of that kind.

Q. I'm not clear yet, Mr. Enders. You said something about the enabling legislation would go to Congress either later this year or early next year.

Assistant Secretary Enders: That's right. A decision hasn't been made.

Q. Could we properly report then the Ford administration is going to ask Congress for rationing authority either later this year or early next year?

Assistant Secretary Enders: I use the word "rationing" as illustrative. We have not yet determined the kinds of authority we wish to have under the heading of demand restraint. There's a very broad range of possibilities. And one possibility for the Ford administration would be to ask for some standby authority in each of the categories I mentioned. Another, of course, would be to ask for some specific authority in a given situation.

Let me just repeat that certainly tax authority, standby authority to raise the prices of petroleum products—which would have a similar effect—administrative measures such as changing speed limits, limits on thermostat settings, as well as rationing, are all potential possibilities. And these would be on a standby basis.

Q. I'm interested in the whole question of conservation and whether there is unanimity of view about the need to think seriously about it throughout the government. And my question is really based on the publicly expressed attitudes of the Secretary of the Treasury, who has been going around talking about oil surpluses and prices going down and "Don't worry too much about this, fellows. It will all go away." Now, are you speaking today for the whole government or for part of it?

Assistant Secretary Enders: With all due respect, you've set up a strawman whom I can't recognize as the Secretary of the Treasury. I could not answer to that. For his views, you can ask him his views now. But they don't in my view, as I understand him, correspond to what you said.

As to the question of conservation, that clearly is one of the major items that must be included and which is under serious study

in Project Independence. I'm not attempting to prejudge what measures the administration will adopt to accomplish that goal; but I think its goal is very clear, has been very clear, from the start of Project Independence—that this must be a major part of reducing our dependence on imported oil.

United States Extends Recognition to Republic of Guinea-Bissau

Following is the text of a letter from President Ford sent on September 10 to Luis de Almcida Cabral, President of the Council of State of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am pleased to inform you that the United States Government extends recognition to the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. It is our hope, with your agreement, that diplomatic relations can be established between our countries.

We congratulate your leaders and their Portuguese colleagues on the wise statesmanship, patience and depth of vision they have demonstrated in their negotiations.

In extending the congratulations of my country, I speak for a people who share with the people of Guinea-Bissau the knowledge that hard-won individual liberty and independence can be preserved only by unremitting labor and great sacrifice.

In the coming days we wish to strengthen and multiply our bonds of friendship with the Government and people of Guinea-Bissau. I am confident of a future in which our two peoples shall work together in the cause of freedom, peace and the welfare of mankind.

GERALD R. FORD.

President Leone of Italy Makes State Visit to the United States

Giovanni Leone, President of the Italian Republic, made a state visit to the United States September 25-29. He met with President Ford and other government officials in Washington September 25-26. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and President Leone at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on September 25, their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, and an exchange of toasts between Secretary Kissinger and President Leone at a luncheon that day, together with the text of a joint statement issued September 26.

REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 30

President Ford

Mr. President, and ladies and gentlemen: Mr. President, I warmly welcome you to the United States of America. I warmly welcome you on behalf of all Americans who are deeply grateful for the gifts of genius and beauty your country has given to all mankind. On behalf of the millions and millions of Americans who are proud to claim Italy as their ancestral homeland, I welcome you with a very special family affection.

You, Mr. President, are an honored leader of one of America's truest allies. In the past three decades, America has been very, very proud to have been associated with Italy in your successful efforts to build a democratic industrial society. I assure you, Mr. President, of America's continued commitment to a stable, free, and democratic Italy.

I also wish to restate most emphatically our intention to work closely with your coun-

try in strengthening Atlantic cooperation and Atlantic security. I think we must all admit that the road will not be easy. The problems of inflation and of assuring equitable access to fairly priced resources, for example, threaten the stability of every economy and the welfare of people in developed as well as in developing countries alike. The very—very nature of these problems defies solution by unilateral measures.

Mr. President, I look forward to our discussions over the next two days. I am confident that our talks will contribute to our mutual efforts to secure peace for all nations of the world. There is no doubt that they will serve to reinforce the ties that have bound our friendship over the many years.

Mr. President, you are most welcome to America.

President Leone ¹

Mr. President: I thank you for the invitation that you extended to me immediately after taking over your high office as President of the United States of America, thus confirming an invitation I had received last year. Thank you for the warm welcome you have given me and for the kind words of welcome that you have just spoken.

It is a great honor for me to represent Italy on this official visit to this great country, which is striking in its vitality and creative capacity, which is in the vanguard of progress, which is strong in its democratic institutions which date back to the birth of a free nation.

And it is precisely to celebrate with just pride the birth of a free nation that you are

¹ President Leone spoke in Italian on all occasions.

about to celebrate the bicentennial of the Declaration of Independence, which also carries the signature of an Italian, Guglielmo Paca.

It is an historic and solemn document which prepared the Constitution of the United States of America, among whose inspirers may I recall with pride the name of a great Neapolitan lawyer, Gaetano Filangieri.

The relations between our two nations have deep and longstanding roots embodied by those millions of Italians who at all times in every capacity, with their work and their intelligence and their thought, have made substantial contribution to the well-being and progress of this country.

Those relations are sustained by our common dedication to the principles of democracy and freedom and to the cause for peace.

Our common efforts, within the purview of our respective possibilities, are aimed at a constant quest for peace. The Atlantic alliance is conceived and experienced by the United States, by Italy, and by all its members as an instrument for security and peace.

The commitment that Italy is pursuing with constancy, energy, and firmness is to achieve a unity that is not only economic but also political, so as to convey and channel the considerable resources of the old continent, in the light of its great traditions, to the service of the well-being of nations and the consolidation of peace. The work of détente that Italy, like the United States and other countries, has been pursuing for years with constancy and firmness in close cooperation with its allies, knowing that we have the will of the peoples of the world behind us.

And it is in the same spirit that we think we must study and tackle the great economic problems which beset the world and the even greater problems posed by modern civilization, problems which affect very closely our social and private lives.

The vastness and urgency of the task and the importance of the resources that it requires are such as to call for a global answer resulting from the joint efforts of all.

I feel certain, Mr. President, that our talks

will consolidate the friendship between the people of America and of Italy and that they will develop our already excellent relations.

And I should like to extend to you also, on behalf of the Italian Government represented here by our Foreign Minister Signor Moro, my warmest greetings and my good wishes to you for your Presidency, and I should like also to extend those greetings on behalf of my wife to Mrs. Ford and to your children.

And in conclusion, Mr. President, it is with great pride that I bring the fraternal greetings of the people of Italy to the great and generous people of the United States of America.

TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 30

President Ford

Mr. President: It is wonderful to have you and Mrs. Leone and your three sons with us this evening. As I said this morning at the time you came and joined us, the United States has a great debt of gratitude and a great sense of friendship for Italy because of the many, many people in this United States who have an ancestral background from Italy.

As I read and listen and look around our country, some 10 percent of our people have a background from Italy. We have superb artists, we have outstanding individuals in science, we have some very renowned athletes, we have many, many people in public life who have had a background from your country. And we are proud of them and their contributions to our country.

But I think, Mr. President, the broadest relationship that we have is what Italy has contributed to the United States, without personal identification, in the field—in those areas that one could describe as grace, humanity, tolerance, and an awareness of beauty.

We have a great American writer by the name of Mark Twain who once wrote—and he wasn't very complimentary to foreign-

ers—but one of his nicer moments, he wrote, “The Creator made Italy from the designs of Michelangelo.” And that was a nice comment. It was probably the best he ever made about any foreigners.

But to be serious, Mr. President, in all of the time that I had the privilege of serving in the Congress, the United States and Italy were building together. We were building in the process of reconstruction following the war. We were building in the process of Europe as a whole in the reconstruction period.

This 25-year span led, of course, to our alliance, where we have developed a friendship and an agreement for diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural expansion and reciprocity.

We dealt with Italy on a personal basis, and we have worked together in our relationships with our allies in Western Europe. And the net result has been a better relationship between us as people and our governments on behalf of our people.

But, Mr. President, it was a pleasure for me to meet you this morning and to be reassured of your willingness to talk in a frank and candid way about our mutual problems. And from one who spent a good share of his life in the political arena in the United States, I was greatly impressed with your wise statesmanship and your great knowledge of the problems in Europe and the rest of the world.

And so it was a privilege and a pleasure for me to meet you and to discuss these matters with you and to help in the process of building a better relationship between Italy and the United States.

And if I might, may I ask all of you to stand and join with me in a toast to the President of the Republic of Italy.

President Leone

For the second time today, Mr. President, I take my set speech and I set it aside. I am putting it back into my pocket because I want to speak from my heart. The set speech, the written paper, will remain. It will perhaps go

into the archives of state, but my speech will spring from my heart.

You, Mr. President, have said some very nice things about me and about my country. Now, the things you said about me, I am sure, were totally undeserved, and they merely stemmed from your very great kindness. But what you said about my country makes me very proud indeed.

You recalled the contribution that Italy has made to arts and to civilization. We present this heritage to you, which is the heritage of centuries. We present it to you as our friendly ally, not with pride—which might perhaps be justified—but as a sort of visiting card for you to understand us better.

Italy has inherited the greatest legal tradition of all times and Italy is the mistress of the arts. It can therefore only pursue ideals of democracy and freedom for all. And what other nation can better support us in these ideals than the United States.

Your Constitution, Mr. President, the first written constitution that ever existed, has laid the foundations of the free world. And we are making this visit to this great country with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Moro, who is an authoritative representative of my government, to reassert four things.

The first is the faithful, loyal, and constant friendship between our two nations, which is based, as you said, in part also on our common ancestry.

The second point is the Atlantic alliance. That is the second point we want to reassert. As I said this morning, it is seen by Italy, by the United States, and by all the member countries, as an instrument for détente and peace.

And we want to reassert, thirdly, our firm belief in the need to build a united Europe which will be complementary to the Atlantic alliance and which will not be against America, but with the United States of America.

And, fourthly, we want to tell you how very much we support your policy of détente, in which you have the great cooperation of your Secretary of State, which policy of détente expresses the will of the peoples

of the world that thirst for peace and justice.

Now, if these four points are confirmed—and they have already been confirmed indeed by our talks this morning with you, Mr. President, and this afternoon with your Secretary of State, and I am sure they will be reconfirmed again in the meeting you were kind enough to arrange with me tomorrow—if they are reconfirmed, Mr. President, then I can only say that I thank God for allowing me to represent Italy in this great country.

And, Mr. President, you were good enough to extend your greetings to my whole family, and this is somewhat unusual, because in Italy we tend to hide our families away. And I have broken away from this tradition; I have brought my wife and children with me to present to you a typical Italian family, one that is a sound family, that is respectful of moral values, and that is united.

Mr. President, may I take this opportunity to say how satisfied I am with the talks that we have had and how very glad I am that you have accepted my invitation to come and visit us in Italy. This has already made a favorable impression outside.

And I hope that the burden that is now weighing on your shoulders—but you have very square shoulders, indeed; I know that you are an athlete; I am not referring only to your physical strength—I hope that burden will yet give you some time to come to Italy where I can assure you of a very warm and affectionate welcome from the people of my country. And I hope that Mrs. Ford will be able to come with you.

And so I say to you, God bless you. And I invoke the blessings of God upon you as I do upon my own family.

And so I want to say now, thank you to the United States of America, and thank you very much for the music that you provided tonight. It was a touch of sentiment that I very much appreciated. I appreciated the Neapolitan song that was played.

I told you, Mr. President, in our private talk that Naples is my hometown. It is very beautiful, generous, and poor. And many parts of Italy are poor, and that causes us

some concern. I am mentioning this not with cup in hand at all but merely as a matter of interest.

And so now, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I give you the toast: The health and prosperity of President Ford and his family, and the success and well-being of the people of America, and the consolidated friendship of the peoples of Italy and the United States of America.

TOASTS AT LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 378 dated September 26

Secretary Kissinger

Mrs. Leone, ladies and gentlemen: I speak here with some nervousness, not only because of the natural timidity which you all so frequently have seen in me, but also because I know I'm going to be followed by one of the great orators that I am familiar with. So if I prolong my remarks, it is to postpone the moment of truth. [Laughter.]

Mr. President, you are here at a time when many American institutions are under attack. But there is one American institution that seems to survive all trials, and that is your Ambassador to the United States. [Laughter.] I have had occasion at the lunch you so kindly arranged for me at the Quirinale to see whether my requirement to report to him could be reduced from twice to once a week, and I want to say that of course I'm delighted to report to him regularly, but I wonder whether it is really required that he gives a grade to my secretary as he leaves the office. [Laughter.]

Mr. President and Mrs. Leone, it is always a great joy to meet with you. You represent a country that has grown wise with many battles fought on its soil and skeptical with many ideas that proved to be not all that were presented—but also grown profound by the knowledge that ultimately everything depends on the quality of human relations. So we deal with you not only as political but as personal friends.

We have often spoken about the interdependence of the modern world. There is no country in Europe and few countries in the world which have experienced at such close hand the difficulties and the opportunities of the contemporary period. Italy is a country which has prospered enormously since the war, despite the absence of natural resources, because of the diligence of its population and the inventiveness of its leadership. In recent months, as a result of circumstances outside the control of Italy, many of these conditions have changed, and Italy faces economic difficulty. When Italy's friends, therefore, attempt to work out cooperative arrangements, it is not something that they do for Italy; it is something they do for themselves and for the structure of the modern world. It is no longer possible to conduct affairs on a national basis. It is a duty for all nations to attempt to face the fact that we are living in a period of enormous transformations of the nature of the economy, of the nature of political relations, and we in the West cannot possibly cope with our problems unless we develop a new feeling of creativity and a new spirit of cooperation.

That spirit always has existed in the relationship between Italy and the United States, and in all the great issues that confront us we have seen matters very much alike. We have supported Italy's participation in a united Europe because we in turn knew that Italy's attitude toward the United States would make such a Europe—if it depended on Italy—a partner and a friend of the United States. Our guest today has played a very noble role in these efforts.

Beyond all the political and economic matters that concern us, there is a very important gift that Italy has bestowed on all of its friends. We hear so much about the danger of conformity in the modern world and the loss of individualism. But who can speak of a lack of individualism in Italy? And whatever problems Italy has, conformity happily isn't one of them.

And so we welcome you, Mr. President and

Mrs. Leone, as old associates, as friends in the field of politics, and as personal friends. I'd like to propose a toast to President and Mrs. Leone, to the friendship of Italy and the United States.

President Leone

Dr. Kissinger has set a trap for me. He sent me a beautiful speech in which he even quoted Cicero, in the hope that I would follow the written outline that he'd prepared. And that is what we call in English a dirty trick; in Neapolitan we say "priest's trick." [Laughter.] So I'm going to counter that by setting aside my written speech, and fully respecting the political outline, the political policy, and guidelines of the Italian Government, which is authoritatively represented here by its Foreign Minister, Signor Moro, I shall now ad lib.

First of all, Mr. Secretary, I should like to thank you very much for the cordial invitation that you extended to me to come to this luncheon, which is attended by exponents of the U.S. political, economic, and journalistic worlds and also by my delegation and by some outstanding Italian representatives of the press. I should like to take this opportunity to thank you very much for your words of praise for our Ambassador, Signor Ortona. You had already told me how much you appreciated him in Rome, and I'm only sorry that I cannot vote on the retirement law now. I would like to do it at once so as to have Mr. Ortona at home.

Also, on behalf of the Foreign Minister of Italy, I would like to say how much we appreciate the work that has been done by your Ambassador, Mr. Volpe, who succeeds in combining a complete and untiring dedication to the interests of the United States with his affection for the country that his family came from originally. So I want to salute him here as a servant of the United States in his capital city and to thank him for what he does to further Italian-American relations.

Mr. Secretary, I agree with all that you

have just said. First of all, I share your global view of the economic drama that is being enacted on the world stage now and that we might consider to be a Biblical scourge that has hit humanity. There is, as you said, even more than ever before a great need for international cooperation and solidarity shown to the weaker nations by those nations that are privileged either because of their geographical position or because of their natural resources. Italy's most vital interests are at stake.

But it is not only of that that I want to speak now but also of the human solidarity that you are displaying. We have a poet in Italy who said that the life of man is mystery and only he who aids his brothers makes no mistake. This human solidarity, this realization, this understanding of the need for global cooperation, was expressed not only by you, Mr. Secretary, but by the President of the United States. I am happy to turn my thoughts to him now.

In any global vision of human affairs there are certain details, some more particular aspects that must be considered and which we are here to emphasize before you. They need your understanding, and it is in that spirit that we have come here. We have come here to reassert a century-old friendship with your country. We have only looked at each other in enmity across the ocean once in the course of history in the cause of the war that the Italian nation neither wanted nor decided. Our friendship was then reconfirmed in the Atlantic alliance, which was then reasserted in the Ottawa Declaration. As I said this morning, we consider that alliance to be an instrument of security, détente, and peace.

But there is a second aspect involved in the Atlantic alliance, and that is solidarity from the economic point of view. As I said this morning to President Ford, we in Italy are well aware of the need for European unity to foster the well-being of the peoples of Europe, many of which provided you with many of your ancestors. You here who have

originated from Europe, many of you, represent a seed of culture and civilization which must be safeguarded. The Ottawa Declaration showed that European unity can be complementary to the Atlantic alliance.

We have also come here, Mr. Secretary, to show you the true face of Italy. We thank you for saying so openly, so unreservedly, that you recognize that our problems were not generated entirely by ourselves. After all, Italy is a country which only 25 years ago lived on an outmoded and obsolete form of agriculture. A hundred years ago our best people used to come to the United States, seeking for jobs. Then there was the economic miracle, but we hardly dare speak of that nowadays; that's all over because Italy has been affected by the economic hurricane that has swept through the world. Now, we recognize, of course, that we have made mistakes, that there are shortcomings on our part, and we must be the first to put our house in order. We have taken at home what many considered to be extremely stringent measures to try and do that.

But Italy is here to say to you that it does not want to hide its difficulties; and through its President, it wants to say to you that it feels its difficulties can be overcome if Italy can be certain of the staunch support of the great nations of this world.

You said, Mr. Secretary, that the United States of America, this great and generous country, is prepared to look with sympathy on our problems. And so I say to you, we shall overcome. I should like to express to you here, Mr. Secretary, my personal friendship and also for Mrs. Kissinger. Unfortunately, I shall be away when you come to Rome, but one of these days I hope to welcome you there again.

I should like now to thank all of the American guests who are here for having attended this luncheon. I give you the toast to the President of the United States, the well-being of your country, and the friendship between the United States of America and Italy.

TEXT OF U.S.-ITALIAN JOINT STATEMENT

President Giovanni Leone of Italy made a State visit to the United States of America September 25-29, 1974, at the invitation of President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Leone, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro, and other Italian officials.

During the visit, President Leone and President Ford held extensive and cordial discussions on a wide variety of international questions in which Minister of Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro and Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger participated. Minister Moro and Secretary Kissinger also held detailed talks on current issues of mutual interest.

President Ford and President Leone expressed their mutual satisfaction with the results of the talks. It was agreed that frequent consultations in the spirit of the Atlantic Declaration signed in Brussels on June 26 were a most desirable means of achieving better understanding of problems of common interest and possible solutions.² They were in full agreement that such consultations should in no way prejudice other existing obligations. As a result of their exchanges of views, the two Presidents noted the broad agreement between them with respect to their policies in numerous areas:

1. They noted that their policies will continue to be guided by their desire for the maintenance of peace, adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and promotion of a stable structure of peace which reflects the diverse nature and needs of the nations of the world. In this connection, both sides emphasized their commitment to overcoming the sources of tension and conflict which are divisive factors in the international community.

2. There was full agreement on the importance of the North Atlantic Alliance as an instrument which has guaranteed the security of its members, strengthened international stability, enhanced confidence among peoples, and thus has permitted them growing and fertile contacts with all the peoples of the world and provided the indispensable basis for the process of détente.

3. They reemphasized in this connection the importance they attach to the Atlantic Declaration and their determination to seek the fulfillment of the principles set forth in the Declaration in concert with their other NATO allies. President Ford underlined the importance the United States attaches to

² For text of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted by the North Atlantic Council in ministerial session at Ottawa on June 19 and signed by NATO heads of government at Brussels on June 26, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1974, p. 42.

Italy's continuing valuable contributions to the Alliance.

4. They recognized the importance attached by the Nine members of the European Community to their efforts toward European union, and welcomed the reciprocal undertaking by the members of the Community and the United States to strengthen their relations on the basis of enhanced consultations within the broad framework of Atlantic cooperation. President Ford welcomed particularly the constructive role played by Italy in strengthening this cooperation.

5. They noted their determination that current negotiations in furtherance of détente on matters related to security and cooperation in Europe must result in enhanced stability in the relationships among all nations concerned. They also emphasized their continuing commitment to achieving balanced and effective international arms control agreements resulting in undiminished security for all nations.

6. They noted their concern with developments in the Mediterranean Basin and pledged their efforts to achieve equitable solutions. The United States noted in this connection that it looks to Italy, as a Mediterranean nation which has made a signal contribution to world civilization, to play a leading role in the common pursuit of lasting peace in that area.

7. They expressed their conviction that only international cooperative efforts can overcome the trade and financial problems confronting the nations of the world. They recognized that the solutions to national problems have their impact on the international community as a whole. While individual nations have primary responsibility for their own problems, the two Presidents recognize that the solutions required in a modern and complex interdependent world may go far beyond individual capabilities and require cooperation among members of the international community. In this regard, the United States has taken careful note of Italy's major efforts to meet its own domestic economic and financial problems and the responsiveness of the international community to these efforts. President Ford stated that the United States is prepared to play an appropriate, constructive and responsible role in a return to economic equilibrium in Italy.

8. They recognized the great importance of industrial, technical, and cultural cooperation among all nations and the imperative need for the equitable distribution of world resources among all nations. They agreed to facilitate initiatives in this regard in appropriate forums.

9. Finally, the two Presidents particularly noted the extraordinarily broad human ties between Italy and the United States of America, and the shared values and goals which bind together the Italian and American peoples.

10. President Leone extended to President Ford an invitation to visit Italy in the near future. President Ford accepted with pleasure.

Dinner at the National Gallery Honors French Foreign Minister

Following is an exchange of toasts between Secretary Kissinger and Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, at a dinner at the National Gallery of Art at Washington on September 27.

Press release 383 dated September 30

SECRETARY KISSINGER

Mr. Foreign Minister, Madame Sauvagnargues, ladies and gentlemen: My staff had prepared some remarks for me of really devastating profundity but impossible to read by candlelight. So I will have to improvise a few remarks. [Laughter.]

As I was sitting at the table I thought of a reception I attended this afternoon. I was invited to a retirement party, and having read the New York Times for the last few weeks, I thought perhaps something had happened that I hadn't been officially informed of yet. So on the one hand I was reassured when I came to the reception to find out it was a retirement for Senator Fulbright. But on the other [hand] I was extremely sad. And I reflected about the special role that Senator Fulbright has played in our national life.

It occurred to me that the relationship that France has had with the United States has some similarity to the relationship that Senator Fulbright has had with the State Department. [Laughter.] There have been occasional criticisms, all the more irritating because they usually turned out to be right. But there also has been at the basis of the relationship an understanding that real friends are meaningful only if they have opinions of their own.

The great problem of our contemporary world is to know how much unity we need and how much diversity we can stand. In a period of great revolutionary change, there is the great danger on the one hand that

countries may lose their identity but on the other hand the problem, the danger, that one may not be able to find the basis for cooperative effort.

In the last year the United States and France have had some different perspectives. But on our side—and I know on the side of France as well—we have always understood that we belong to the same family and that we have common interests. We respect France's efforts to build Europe as a contribution to the cooperation on a larger scale that is an inevitable requirement of the present world. And we understand, too, that the insistence on achieving one's own identity can in the long run provide the basis for the best form of cooperation.

Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues and I have known each other only for a few months. In that period, I believe I can say that many of the misunderstandings have been worked out and also that we are meeting tomorrow to look at one of the deepest problems that faces the world today, the problem of achieving a cooperative approach to the big alteration in economic relationships that threatens to engulf us all. On our side, we are confident that France, in the position of leadership of Europe to which its history entitles it and in cooperation with the United States, will continue to play the role of a good friend, occasional critic, but always a steady partner.

We are delighted that we can welcome Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues, and Madame Sauvagnargues on her first visit to Washington. I would like to propose a toast to the Foreign Minister and to the friendship between the United States and France.

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES

Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Kissinger, ladies and gentlemen: I am, of course, rather overwhelmed by this grand reception by this gathering of what's best in Washington [in] politics, science, arts, press, and even outer space. I can hardly find words, so I choose English because I've found in my

experience that when you are at a loss to say anything you must choose English. That doesn't mean that I won't say anything now; I'll try, although I just read [in] the Herald Tribune a nice anecdote about the head of government who suddenly found he had nothing to say to the United Nations and so said he would renounce his address, and of course the Foreign Minister had to speak for him. [Laughter.]

This doesn't mean that foreign ministers don't have anything to say, because the Secretary of State just told us fundamental things about the relations between the United States and France. And he told them with the simple words, without high-flown rhetoric, without any rhetoric as is apt to that kind of subject. That is also the lesson which is taught us by another messenger from France, the picture of the Magdalen de la Tour—a picture, I think, which we shall see a few minutes from now.¹

Of course the relations between France and the United States is something that, when you talk about them you tend to invoke Lafayette, two-centuries-old traditions, et cetera. This is true, but it's also sort of engrained habit, and it's sort of family sentiment—a sort of belonging together, a sort of deeply engrained trust and confidence in each other which permits big fights and big quarrels as in families where quarrels are at their bitterest and yet the feeling of togetherness is not touched.

In our relations we had and we may still have—although if it's up to Secretary of State Kissinger and myself it won't happen—artificial quarrels. Thank God, they have been disposed of, and now we are faced with the real problems, and these real problems are bad enough. They are bad enough.

We are facing, as you said, Mr. Secretary,

¹“The Repentant Magdalen,” by Georges de la Tour was acquired by the National Gallery on Sept. 26.

revolutionary times; the balance of the world has been deeply disturbed and disturbed for a long time to come. We will have to adjust to a new set of things, to this reshuffle of cards, where the industrialized nations will have to live up to the fact that they got poorer and they'll have to tighten their belts somehow. So that speaks for, certainly, for solidarity, even if it doesn't speak for confrontation, and on that I know you are in full agreement, Mr. Secretary, contrary to what the New York Times had to report yesterday or the day before yesterday.

But let's not attack the press, because the press is a very important power in this country and also in mine. Let's only wish that the press could now make news of the very important news, which is that the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of France are not fighting with each other. [Laughter.]

Well, I won't go on much longer on that. I'm convinced that the working relationship we have established, Mr. Secretary, will enable our governments to work together more closely as they should and deal with the very complex problems that are facing us. And I trust that this mutual effort will lead to a good result.

I again want to express the thanks and the gratitude of my wife for this grand reception. It's really the first time since I became Foreign Minister of France that I do feel not only the burden of this office but also its honor and its advantages, its joys. I understand this is one of the first occasions where dinner is given in this National Gallery I knew very well 20 years ago in Washington—I haven't been here to 20 years, you see; it's like Alexander Dumas remarked: *vingt ans après*. But this is really, truly a grand occasion. I want to thank the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger for that. We will cherish that memory.

I want to raise my glass to the Secretary of State and his wife.

The Dilemma of Controlling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons While Promoting Peaceful Technology

Address by Fred C. Iklé

*Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*¹

The U.S. Congress and successive administrations have had to grapple with the control of nuclear technology for almost three decades. The essence of the difficulty lies in the dual nature of this technology. From the very beginning there have been high expectations concerning peaceful uses of the atom. If nuclear power served only destructive purposes, we would not have had the ambivalence that has bedeviled all our attempts to control the spread of nuclear technology.

It is as if mankind had been burdened with a Biblical curse. The fruit of the tree of knowledge—the great accomplishment of our nuclear scientists—holds both promise and threat; it can help keep alive our civilization and it can destroy it.

It is hardly surprising that, historically, our ways of dealing with the nuclear presence on earth have pulled in two inconsistent directions. We have tried by one means and then another to reconcile the dichotomy of nuclear power.

In November 1945, some three months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, President Harry Truman set a policy for the United States when he joined the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada in signing a declaration among the three powers whose nuclear scientists and resources had been united during the war to build the first atomic bombs. The declaration argued

against the disclosure of information even about “the practical industrial application of atomic energy” before an international system of control was set up.

The following year Bernard Baruch, President Truman’s representative, made the American proposal to the United Nations for which he is still remembered. It called for placing the nuclear resources of the world under the ownership and control of an independent international authority. That is to say, the Baruch plan provided for strict international control of all nuclear technology that might be diverted to destructive purposes. You doubtless know the rest of the story: The Soviet Union did not find this proposal acceptable, and it was subsequently learned that the Soviets had in fact been working on the development of an atomic bomb since the middle of World War II.

The first legislation passed by Congress to control the atom was in the spirit of the 1945 three-power declaration in that it placed major emphasis on maintaining nuclear secrecy. Ironically, it went so far in this direction as to terminate nuclear collaboration with the other two signers of the declaration, Canada and Great Britain.

The promotion of peaceful uses was thus relegated to a distinctly secondary position, while full attention was given to preventing the spread of nuclear-weapons technology. In 1951 the Atomic Energy Act was amended but not with a view to promoting peaceful uses. It was amended so that military nuclear information could be shared to

¹ Made before the Duke University Law Forum at Durham, N.C., on Sept. 18 (text from ACDA press release).

strengthen the North Atlantic alliance. In practical terms this meant nuclear assistance to Great Britain.

The "Atoms for Peace" Program

Meanwhile, however, the potentialities for peaceful uses of atomic energy became increasingly evident, particularly the use of reactors for generating electric power. And as these new possibilities opened up, a new American policy began to take shape. In part it was a policy of exploiting the inevitable—or so it must have been viewed by its proponents—but it was clothed in very appealing language: The program was called "Atoms for Peace."

More importantly, the promotion of peaceful commercial uses had now come to be regarded as a means of actually exorcising the evil side of nuclear energy, of reversing the trend toward acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition, we had a commercial interest in reactor exports. Possibly, too, we were eager to demonstrate to the world that the United States had let loose a benevolent genie, not an evil one.

In the hearings on this new program, held by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1954, Secretary Dulles said that knowledge in this field was developing in so much of the world that we could not hope to set up an effective "dam against the flow of information, and if we try to do it we will only dam our own influence and others will move into the field with the bargaining that that involves." In general, these crucial hearings showed a tolerant attitude toward the proliferation of nuclear technology, or so it would seem to us today. The resultant Atomic Energy Act of 1954 called for making available to cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy "as widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common defense and security would permit." The act authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to negotiate cooperation agreements without Senate approval.

Based on this act, the U.S. Government facilitated the participation of American in-

dustry in atomic power activities abroad. Eventually, 26 American research reactors were installed in other countries. We organized large conferences to transmit technical know-how. We licensed foreign firms to produce and sell our reactors. And we shipped materials abroad to help other countries move ahead in nuclear technology. For example, in 1955, with the encouragement of Congress, we sold 10 tons of heavy water to India for her research reactor. All told, we spent hundreds of millions of dollars on spreading nuclear technology abroad (exclusive of weapons assistance to our allies but including the interest subsidy on Export-Import Bank loans).

The Eisenhower administration also took practical steps to build an international institution that could facilitate cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology with safeguards against diversion for military purposes. In his "Atoms for Peace" address at the United Nations, President Eisenhower had proposed the creation of an international atomic energy organization; and notwithstanding early Soviet objections to this idea, it finally was carried out. In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency, with headquarters in Vienna, was established, and the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution approving its statute. Today, this Agency is a viable organization making a substantial contribution toward the separation of peaceful from military uses of nuclear technology.

From hindsight, we might regard this Agency and the network of international agreements supporting it as the quid pro quo that the United States obtained in exchange for its very generous—perhaps overly generous—assistance in nuclear technology to a great many countries throughout the world.

The Problem of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives

In the 1960's Congress maintained its interest in the peaceful application of nuclear technology. But now it showed renewed concern with the risk of spreading weapons technology. It took initiatives of its own to pave the way for the Nonproliferation

Treaty of 1968. Particularly important was the Pastore resolution in 1966, urging the government to negotiate a nonproliferation agreement.

As for the Nonproliferation Treaty itself, although there have been, and continue to be, some important holdout countries, the fact remains that it has been a successful arms control measure. Eighty-three countries have ratified it, another 23 have signed it, and there are prospects for additional adherences in the not too distant future.

This treaty obligates all parties not to facilitate the acquisition of nuclear explosives—whether called bombs or peaceful devices—by countries not possessing nuclear weapons. This obligation implies that the transfer of materials and know-how ought to be controlled or curtailed. At the same time, the treaty obligates the nuclear-weapons states that are party to it to provide assistance to all other parties on peaceful nuclear technology, including explosives for peaceful purposes. Thus this legal instrument incorporates the very dilemma that has troubled international control of nuclear technology from the first day.

The idea of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes has been around for some time. As early as 1949, after the first Soviet nuclear test, Andrei Vyshinsky told the United Nations that the Soviet purpose in developing nuclear explosives was to “blow up mountains and change the course of rivers.” Little was heard of this idea until the mid-1950’s, when American scientists promoted the Plowshare program—the use of nuclear devices for excavation. Thereafter the United States stressed the possible benefits of this technology, while the Soviet Union had turned skeptical. The program found considerable support in Congress in the 1960’s. But the American interest in peaceful nuclear explosives has since declined, and this year Congress explicitly prohibited the use of energy R&D funds for field testing such explosives. Now, in the meantime, some nuclear experts in the Soviet Union have become eager about exploring this technology. Hence it was at Soviet in-

sistence that the recent Threshold Test Ban Treaty left open the question of peaceful explosives for subsequent negotiations.

How can one distinguish “peaceful” from “military” explosives? The U.S. Government has gone on record many times to insist that the technology of making nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons.

The Indian explosion dramatized this dilemma. In the wake of the Indian explosion and the subsequent U.S. offer to sell nuclear reactors to Egypt and Israel, there has been very intense congressional interest in the problem of nonproliferation, as is evidenced by the number of bills and resolutions which have been generated. Of two bills providing for more stringent requirements in nuclear cooperation agreements and increased control by Congress, one has already been signed into law this year, and the other has been through conference; and a series of other bills, in somewhat similar vein, has been under consideration.

Avoidance of Further Proliferation

Turning now to the future prospects, I would stress to this audience that the avoidance of further nuclear proliferation is increasingly a matter of political restraint, which has to be reinforced by laws. The technical barriers to nuclear proliferation are gradually crumbling; and while export controls are now helpful and even essential, we have to assume that their effectiveness will diminish in the years ahead. Hence, the only dike to hold back the flood is the political self-interest of sovereign countries. And the political inhibitions can be greatly reinforced through international legal instruments—treaties and agreements—that will spell out and codify the mutual obligations.

Whether or not a country turns to nuclear weapons depends, of course, on a combination of capability and intent. Capability is governed by two factors: access to nuclear explosion technology, the principles of which are widely known, and access to nuclear

materials such as plutonium or enriched uranium, over which there are some controls.

In the matter of nuclear fuels, it has been widely assumed that a country wishing to take the nuclear-weapons road would use plutonium, which is produced as a byproduct in electric power reactors and can then be reprocessed into plutonium usable for nuclear explosives. There is, however, another possibility—that of enriching uranium. A relatively new technique, using centrifuges, may make this a more feasible route. The centrifuge process has proven to be effective, although the economics are not yet proven. A centrifuge plant is much smaller and less visible than the huge gaseous diffusion plant that we have used to enrich uranium in large quantities. Finally, we hear about a new possibility, involving the use of lasers to enrich uranium.

It is apparent that several of the industrial countries, like West Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada, could produce nuclear arsenals of great power within a relatively short time. These countries with the greatest capabilities have taken clear political action, however, to indicate that they do not intend to pursue that course, by signing or ratifying the Nonproliferation Treaty and in other statements of their policies.

What is the United States doing to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons? First of all, we are strong supporters of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of its safeguards inspection program, which seeks to prevent the diversion of nuclear fuels from peaceful uses to weapons manufacture. We give them technical advice and help them in devising instrumentation to make their safeguards more effective. We also use our influence in the Agency to make its agreements with other countries as effective as possible.

On the diplomatic front, we are naturally talking to some countries which have not ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty, pointing out the advantages of their doing so.

We are also preparing for the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference called for by the treaty, to be held by the parties in

May 1975. The outcome of this conference could be important for the future of the treaty. It is very much to be hoped—and it seems possible—that by the time the review conference is held, a substantial portion of the key industrial states will be parties to the treaty. If this indeed happens and if the review conference evokes an impressive degree of solidarity among them in support of preferential treatment for treaty parties, then the Nonproliferation Treaty will be given a new lease on life. Like any international treaty, this one has to accord with the self-interest of the parties. For the countries that decided to forgo nuclear weapons, it is, in essence, a mutual pledge among many neighbors in many regions. It expresses the national self-interest of these countries not to initiate a nuclear arms competition at their doorstep.

There are a few lines of policy and emphasis which I would like to suggest:

—We should provide more money for the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I think Congress would now be receptive to this idea.

—More emphasis should also be placed on measures of physical security against theft and sabotage. We have already briefed Congress on this subject, in connection with our nuclear assistance agreements with Egypt and Israel. While physical security is inherently a national problem, the International Atomic Energy Agency can help in this respect by drawing up guidelines and insisting that agreements take physical security into account.

—There is an obvious relationship between what the United States and the Soviet Union do in restraining their “vertical proliferation” and the willingness of other countries to give up their own nuclear option. It is clearly important that the United States and the Soviet Union be able to demonstrate to these other countries that they can accomplish effective limitations and reductions in their massive nuclear arsenals.

—Many countries are now keenly interested in nuclear reactors, particularly since

the increase in the cost of oil. In responding to this interest, we can seek to encourage multinational cooperation so as to strengthen the acceptability and reliability of safeguards. Particularly, the processing of nuclear fuel can best be done in cooperative arrangements.

For the longer run, new efforts will be needed to cope with the worldwide diffusion of nuclear technology. We can slow down the spread of nuclear materials suitable for destructive purposes, but we cannot stop it. We can rely on international safeguards to help us detect diversion of material from peaceful uses to destructive ones, but we cannot rely on these safeguards to prevent such diversion altogether. We can give full support to the Nonproliferation Treaty, but we cannot expect this treaty to cover all countries or all the risks inherent in the spread of nuclear technology.

Thus, within a decade or two, nuclear explosives might be acquired by a much larger number of governments than today—even by subnational groups. Our strategic forces, on which we now rely to deter deliberate attack from a major nuclear power, are not designed to protect the security of the United States in such a world. A more diffused availability of nuclear explosives could lead to terrifying threats against the American people or disastrous destruction in our country. At such a time, the pressures on Congress and the administration for the most drastic action would be enormous.

Preventing a new dark age of unprecedented violence will depend on the determination and foresight we show today. We must not become disheartened. Our government had the courage to propose the Baruch plan; it had the vision to create the International Atomic Energy Agency; it had the farsightedness to promote the Nonproliferation Treaty. There seems no reason why we should not be able to create the additional international institutions and to advance the necessary arms control measures which will enable us to live in a world of widespread nuclear technology.

1973 Report on U.S. Participation in the U.N. Transmitted to Congress

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to send to the Congress the 28th annual report on United States participation in the work of the United Nations.

This report, covering Calendar Year 1973, encompasses the wide range of activities carried on by the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations. It demonstrates the growing conviction of United Nations members that many problems of international concern are best resolved through multilateral action, utilizing the machinery of mature international institutions.

In the fall of 1973 the United Nations demonstrated once again its ability to foster peace by the crucial role it played in the Middle East. Following the outbreak of war, the Security Council arranged a ceasefire and deployed United Nations troops to supervise disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and, later, between Israel and Syria. We cannot know what might have happened in the absence of such United Nations action. However, it is clear that the efforts of the United Nations, combined with bilateral diplomacy, are still crucial to promoting a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East dispute.

One area of increasing concern is the production and distribution of adequate supplies of food. Our concern with feeding the world can no longer be limited to relief activities in aid of victims of natural disasters. Population growth and better living standards have increased the total demand for food which in turn has increased the demand for energy sources and fertilizer. The pressure of these interlocking demands has pushed against limited supplies and caused spiraling prices. This is a worldwide problem requiring world-

¹ Transmitted on Sept. 19 (text from White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 93-360, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the text of the report.

wide action for its solution. Secretary Kissinger proposed to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1973 that the organization sponsor a World Food Conference. The General Assembly acted favorably on this proposal and the Conference will be held in Rome in November 1974. The United States also took an active participation in the preparation for the first United Nations Conference on World Population, convened in Bucharest in August 1974.

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which convened an organizational session in December 1973, is another example of how the United Nations can be utilized to attack contemporary world problems. The goal of the Law of the Sea Conference is a comprehensive international convention to govern man's use of the oceans. We need new understandings to govern international navigation, rational management of the ocean's living and non-living resources, and the protection of the life-sustaining processes of the marine environment. Success in the efforts to resolve conflicting claims over ocean jurisdiction would remove a major and growing source of conflict from the international arena.

The regular economic and social activities of the United Nations' family of organizations continued to absorb over 90 percent of its funds and personnel during 1973. In addition to the traditional operational programs, many special conferences during the year provided opportunities for nations to enlarge their understanding of and work toward consensus on such major international economic and social issues as development assistance, the role of multinational corporations, commodity agreements, and the economic rights and duties of states. Perhaps the most important series of negotiations were those held to carry out the first biennial review and appraisal of the progress toward the goals of the Second United Nations Development Decade. In these negotiations delegations from all parts of the world worked for months to formulate a report that refined the broad measures necessary to improve the world's economic and social situation. The United

States played a leading role in these negotiations.

Unfortunately, not all international problems dealt with by the United Nations were successfully approached in 1973. For example, it is generally believed in the United States that terrorism against innocent third parties, including the hijacking of aircraft, is a matter of international concern that calls for international solutions. The divergence of political views among member states, however, has made it impossible to agree on either a general definition of terrorism or a remedy for it. Despite the limit thus placed on the effectiveness of the United Nations forum in dealing with the problem, a start was made in 1973 with the adoption by the General Assembly of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. On the other hand, neither the International Conference on Air Law nor the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which met simultaneously, made progress on measures to improve security for aircraft passengers.

An important part of the United Nations record in 1973 was the admission to membership of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and The Bahamas—admissions the United States supported. The United Nations has thus become still more representative of the world community.

Our participation in the United Nations reflects our fundamental belief that to assure a peaceful world it is necessary to cooperate with other nations in a multilateral framework on mutually agreed upon activities. This report records the successes and failures, the hopes and frustrations of many of those activities. Above all it records what we tried to accomplish through the United Nations to further the many interests that our citizens and our country share with the world community.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 19, 1974.*

President Ford Establishes Economic Policy Board

Following are texts of a White House announcement issued on September 28 and an Executive order signed by President Ford on September 30.

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated September 28

President Ford announced on September 28 the formation of a new Economic Policy Board, which will oversee the formulation, coordination, and implementation of all economic policy, and named Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon as Chairman.

Secretary Simon will act as the principal spokesman for the executive branch on matters of economic policy. The new Board will be the focal point for economic policy decisionmaking, both domestic and international. Secretary Simon will also chair an Executive Committee of the Board, which will meet daily.

The President also announced the appointment of L. William Seidman as Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs. In addition to a wide range of other duties, Mr. Seidman will serve as a member and Executive Director of the Economic Policy Board and its Executive Committee. In his new roles, Mr. Seidman will be responsible for coordinating the implementation of economic policy and providing liaison with the Presidential staff and with other governmental activities.

Secretary Simon and Mr. Seidman will have responsibility for insuring that there is adequate coordination among existing and proposed committees relating to economic policy. Secretary Simon will serve as Chairman, and Mr. Seidman as Deputy Chairman, of the Council on Wage and Price Stability as well as the Council on International Economic Policy, the National Advisory Council on International Economic Policy, the National Advisory Council on International

Monetary and Financial Policies, and the President's Committee on East-West Trade Policy.

The other members of the Economic Policy Board will be:

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton
Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz
Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent
Secretary of Labor Peter J. Brennan
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development James T. Lynn
Secretary of Transportation Claude S. Brinegar
Director of the Office of Management and Budget Roy L. Ash
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Alan Greenspan
Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy William D. Eberle

Mr. Greenspan, Mr. Eberle, and a senior member of the Office of Management and Budget will serve as members of the Executive Committee. Dr. Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, will attend both Board and Executive Committee meetings when appropriate.

TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11808¹

ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC POLICY BOARD, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established the President's Economic Policy Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board).

SEC. 2. The Board shall consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall be its Chairman, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the

¹ 39 *Fed. Reg.* 35563.

Federal Reserve System is invited to attend meetings of the Board.

SEC. 3. The Economic Policy Board shall provide advice to the President concerning all aspects of national and international economic policy, will oversee the formulation, coordination, and implementation of all economic policy of the United States, and will serve as the focal point for economic policy decision-making. The Chairman of the Board shall act as the principal spokesman for the Executive Branch on matters of economic policy.

SEC. 4. (a) There is hereby established the Executive Committee of the Board. The Executive Committee shall consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall be its Chairman, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is invited to attend meetings of the Executive Committee.

(b) The Executive Committee shall meet daily to consider matters involving responsibilities of the Board.

SEC. 5. The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs shall be the Executive Director of the Board and of the Executive Committee, and, as such, shall be responsible for coordinating the implementation of economic policy and providing liaison with the Presidential staff and with other Governmental activities.

SEC. 6. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall be a member of the Council on Wage and Price Stability and be its Chairman. The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs shall be a member of the Council and be its Deputy Chairman.

(b) The Secretary of the Treasury shall be the Chairman of the Council on International Economic Policy. The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs shall be a member of that Council and be its Deputy Chairman.

(c) Section 1(b) of Executive Order No. 11269, as amended (prescribing the composition of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies), is further amended by inserting after "the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall be Chairman of the Council," the following "the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, who shall be Deputy Chairman of the Council,".

(d)(1) Section 1(1) of Executive Order No. 11789 (prescribing the composition of the President's Committee on East-West Trade Policy) is amended to read as follows:


"(1) The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs."

(2) Section 2 of that Order is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury shall be the Chairman of the Committee, and the Assistant

to the President for Economic Affairs shall be its Deputy Chairman."

SEC. 7. All departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Board, including the Executive Committee thereof, and shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide it with such assistance and information as the Chairman or the Executive Director of the Board may request.



THE WHITE HOUSE, September 30, 1974.

Department Urges Prompt Action on North Atlantic Air Fares

Department Statement, September 24

Press release 377 dated September 24

The Department welcomes the positive action of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in undertaking to expedite consideration of the recent International Air Transport Association (IATA) agreement on North Atlantic scheduled fares before expiration of the old agreement November 1. The Board's action was in the form of a letter from CAB Chairman [Robert D.] Timm sent September 24 to the President of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC). An ECAC resolution had called on governments to approve these agreements on scheduled and nonscheduled (charter) prices without undue delay. In view of the serious financial problems confronting our international air carriers, the Department believes it imperative that governments move promptly to insure that there is no lengthy period of uncertainty regarding the establishment this winter of cost-related North Atlantic air fares.

The CAB's announcement that it will move promptly toward a final decision on the fare package submitted September 5 for the Board's approval by the carriers of the International Air Transport Association should make it clear that U.S. Government action will be prompt and effective.

We also note that the proposed IATA package is dependent on an agreement being

reached by the North Atlantic scheduled and charter carriers establishing a minimum charter price (charter floor). Discussions have been underway to this end for several months, but full agreement has not yet been reached. Failure to agree on the charter floor would threaten the agreement already reached on scheduled services. We would urge the carriers participating in the scheduled-charter negotiations to resume their discussions and try to move without further delay toward a final agreement. If the charter talks were to break down or if the participants were unable to resolve their differences within a reasonable time before expiration of the present IATA fares, the Department is prepared to initiate direct consultations or negotiations with foreign governments as a means of removing remaining obstacles to the early institution for the winter season of a rational airfare system on the North Atlantic.

U.S. and U.K. Agree To Reduce Excess Airline Capacity

Representatives of U.S. and U.K. Government agencies met at Washington September 17-19. Following are texts of a Department announcement and a joint U.S.-U.K. press statement issued September 20.

Press release 369 dated September 20

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State welcomes the agreement reached between U.S. and U.K. aviation delegations this week which will result in the improvement of the economic climate for U.S. airlines operations in the North Atlantic by cutting down excess airline capacity between the United States and the United Kingdom.

This agreement has been undertaken in accordance with the U.S. action plan approved by President Ford on September 18 to improve the competitive climate in which Pan Am and our other international air car-

riers operate. The Department of State is initiating early consultations with other European governments to achieve the elimination of capacity excess to market demand on services to these countries.

JOINT U.S.-U.K. PRESS STATEMENT

Aviation delegations representing the United Kingdom and United States Governments reached agreement this week on the need for vigorous action to restore profitable airline operations in the North Atlantic market by eliminating excess capacity and establishing a cost-related fare structure.

Traffic demand across the North Atlantic for the coming winter season is expected to decline by some 10-20 percent over last winter.

In accordance with the objective agreed by the two governments, U.S. and British airlines providing scheduled services between the two countries have agreed to capacity reductions for the winter season November 1974 through April 1975 of some 20 percent compared with the equivalent period of last year. This covers services between London and New York, Boston, Washington, Philadelphia, Detroit, Miami, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Despite these substantial reductions, the airlines are confident that their services this winter will fully meet the public need. Consideration will be given later on to appropriate measures to rationalize capacity between the two countries for next summer.

During the consultations the two delegations expressed their full support for the current efforts of the North Atlantic airlines to develop an improved airline fare structure, taking account of the increased costs, particularly for fuel, being encountered by the industry. They welcomed the substantial progress already made towards establishing cost-related fares and minimum charter prices.

These actions reflect the determination of both governments to return the North Atlantic market to profitable conditions.

General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency Holds 18th Session at Vienna

The 18th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was held at Vienna September 16-20. Following is a statement made before the conference on September 17 by Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, who was chairman of the U.S. delegation.

U.S. AEC press release dated September 17

Mr. President [Gen. (ret.) Fernando Medina, of the Philippines]: It is a great pleasure to congratulate you, on behalf of my government, upon your election as our presiding officer. And for my part, once again I am proud to represent the United States at the Agency's General Conference. It has been a pleasure to renew personal acquaintances with many of you and to meet delegates whom I had not known before.

Director General [A. Sigvard] Eklund and the staff of the Secretariat deserve high praise and commendation for their responses to the difficult, urgent, and complex demands made upon them during the year just over. The initiative, imagination, and professional competence of the Agency probably will be tested even more in the years ahead. As his address clearly indicated, the Director General knows full well that these challenges must be faced and surmounted.

It is my privilege now to read the following message from President Ford:

On this, my first occasion to address the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, I want to emphasize the strong and affirmative role the United States has played in support of the IAEA. Our policy was initiated under President Eisenhower, sustained under succeeding Presidents and will continue.

The IAEA helps all nations in promoting world-wide peaceful development of nuclear energy, meeting the challenge of increased energy requirements, protecting both man and his environment and providing assurance against diversion of this resource for nuclear explosives.

The Agency exercises important responsibilities in carrying out safeguards in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which I regard as one of the pillars of United States foreign policy. I wish to reaffirm my Government's offer to permit the application of IAEA safeguards to any U.S. nuclear activity except those of direct national security significance. This offer will be implemented when safeguards are being broadly applied under the Treaty in other industrial states. Our offer was made in order to encourage the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by demonstrating to other nations that they would not be placed at a commercial disadvantage by reason of the application of safeguards under the Treaty.

I have become increasingly aware of the world-wide expectation that nuclear energy should provide a far greater portion of power needs and of the world-wide concern about nuclear safeguards. The Member States of the IAEA and Agency staff face important challenges in simultaneously expanding nuclear power production and safeguarding its fuel cycle.

We in the United States look forward to continuing, and in fact increased, IAEA contributions in bringing the benefits of the peaceful atom to all mankind and in bringing about closer collaboration among the nations of the world.

It is a pleasure to extend to all delegates to this Conference my warmest greetings and best wishes for a successful meeting.

President Ford has clearly reaffirmed the strong support we give to the Agency's program.

As many of you may recall, the U.S. Atoms for Peace program and the establishment of this great international Agency were proposed by President Eisenhower in his historic message before the U.N. General

Assembly in December 1953. The development of peaceful uses of atomic energy during the subsequent 20 years has been characterized by an impressive record of international cooperation.

The ability of many countries to enter the nuclear age has been facilitated by the work of this Agency. There are 104 member nations in IAEA. There are nearly 50 countries who are actively probing the nature of matter and investigating the many effects and applications of radioactivity with research reactors. By the end of this year, the Agency has estimated that there will be 121 operational power reactors in 17 IAEA member countries other than the United States, with a total installed capacity of nearly 32,000 megawatts electric. And similar Agency projections this year show that by 1980 these figures will have risen to 244 power reactors in 25 member countries, with a total installed capacity of over 125,000 megawatts electric.

The significant role of the IAEA in fostering dissemination of nuclear knowledge and encouraging the responsible use of the technology that arises from it has been a remarkable accomplishment in the short period of 20 years. The importance of the IAEA certainly will increase in the years to come.

U.S. Support for IAEA Activities

Now, what does lie ahead? The Director General has provided us with a carefully conceived and thought-provoking analysis of the problems facing nuclear energy throughout the world.

The United States strongly supports a broad review, as described by the Director General, of the prospects and problems of nuclear power in a world energy situation that is increasingly complex. As the availability of nuclear power for generating electricity expands in both developed and developing countries, problems of safety, fuel supply, and waste management will grow. They will require cooperation and exchange of information on an ever-broadening scale.

The United States supports the Agency's

expanded program in the safety field. As you know, we have just published in draft form results of a two-year independent study of safety in U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, referred to as the Rasmussen study. This definitive analysis finds the risks of serious accidents to be extremely low. Furthermore, even if an improbable accident should occur, the likelihood of deaths or illness or financial losses is far smaller than from several types of non-nuclear accidents to which people are already commonly exposed. The main report and a summary have been distributed to atomic energy organizations throughout the world, and a full set of the 14 volumes still in draft form has been provided to the Agency. We invite your review and comments. Detailed attention to safe design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants is essential everywhere because an accident in any nation would be of concern to all.

The less developed countries should benefit considerably from expanded IAEA activities in providing assistance in planning for nuclear power projects. The IAEA guidebook being circulated in draft at this General Conference, and the advisory services that the Agency provides, make this Agency the leading international body for assistance in evaluating an introduction of nuclear power in less developed countries.

With regard to fuel supply and fuel cycle services, the United States, as a major supplier of enriched uranium, views its responsibility in this area very seriously. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has recently contracted up to the present limit of its authority to meet the needs of approximately 355 domestic and foreign power reactors (representing about 320,000 megawatts). These contracts cover reactors that will require initial fuel deliveries through June 30, 1982. We are also examining the methods we will employ to extend our capacity so that we continue to serve the international market reliably for decades to come.

We recognize the need for much better data on uranium resources and enrichment capacity, and we fully support the Director

General's call for a major international conference in 1977 on prospects and problems for nuclear energy. We will, of course, participate actively in such a conference that will deal broadly with many issues in the nuclear field.

High-level radioactive wastes continue to pose long-term problems. We welcome the Board action on September 13 to define the kinds of wastes that are unsuitable for dumping at sea, pursuant to the London Convention. I can see the Agency playing a significant role in the development of standards and safety criteria and perhaps also of methodology for the handling of these wastes.

Technical Assistance Programs

The technical assistance programs of the IAEA have long been of great value to many countries. We continue to support and participate in the Agency's multifaceted programs. For example, as an important early step in helping to prepare the less developed countries to use nuclear power, the United States has proposed to cosponsor with the IAEA a two- to three-week course in the principles and techniques of regulating nuclear power for public health, safety, and environmental protection. This course, proposed to be held at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission headquarters, would assist representatives of perhaps 20-30 countries to organize and administer effective national energy regulatory programs. U.S. experience in this area has been wide ranging and intense and should be of considerable interest and utility to those member states planning to embark on nuclear power programs. We fully recognize the essential role of specialized manpower training in this relatively new area as well as those in which the IAEA has been engaged for some time.

In the same connection, it is most gratifying that the Agency has reached agreement on its program for the preparation of a set of standards, in the form of codes of practice and safety guides, for nuclear power reactors. Ambassador Tape [Gerald F. Tape,

U.S. Representative to the IAEA] made clear at the time the Board approved this program last Friday the great importance which my government attaches to this activity. The program will have the strong support of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and we hope that it will receive similar support from appropriate organizations in other member states. We are prepared to make important contributions, including expert services without cost to the Agency, to help accomplish the objectives of this program.

Also, may I suggest a possible new emphasis for IAEA, in close cooperation with the World Health Organization, to bring to developing countries the full benefits of nuclear medicine. Adequately trained medical personnel exist already in many countries, and the requisite radioactive materials can be shipped with modern air transportation. What appear to be lacking are sturdy, reliable, low-cost, yet sensitive instruments for diagnostic and therapeutic uses in a wide variety of facilities and environmental conditions. We suggest that the IAEA prepare an inventory of the potential world market for such equipment as a stimulus to manufacturers.

The United States renews its pledge, for the 16th consecutive year, to donate up to 50 thousand dollars' worth of special nuclear materials for use in Agency projects. As announced at the June Board of Governors meeting, parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), will be given preferential consideration in the donation of these materials.

We continue to support the financing by voluntary contributions of the technical assistance program. We are confident that voluntary contributions bring more funds and more in-kind assistance than can assessments. The U.S. cash and in-kind assistance last year amounted to about \$2 million. For the coming year, subject to governmental appropriations, my government intends to contribute generously to the cash target and to make additional in-kind grants. Beginning in 1975 we intend to give preference in allo-

cation of in-kind grants to developing countries that are parties to the NPT. We consider both of these actions consistent with our obligations under article IV of the NPT.¹

Safeguarding Nuclear Materials

Events of the past year have caused a dramatic and renewed interest in nuclear energy as all nations reassess their requirements for energy supplies. And so I wish now to focus discussion upon what I believe is the most serious challenge facing this Agency and all of us interested in nuclear energy: The need to design and apply even more effective safeguards to nuclear materials and facilities in order to deter proliferation of nuclear-weapon capability and to provide additional measures to prevent the theft of nuclear materials.

Director General Eklund has taken the lead in addressing safeguards and proliferation issues at this General Conference. I am hopeful that my remarks will generate additional comments from other delegates. These remarks reflect policy developments in my own country, bilateral discussions with other nations, and a desire to share these views with all of you here.

Nations that export and nations that purchase nuclear technology, equipment, and fuels both have much to gain by making the international nuclear situation more secure. We are concerned about export practices, reasonable control of the entire fuel cycle, physical security of nuclear materials, safeguards accountability for nuclear materials, clearly defined international responses to acts or threats of nuclear terrorism, and implications of peaceful nuclear explosions for nuclear proliferation.

We continue to endorse fully the Nonproliferation Treaty and urge that nations which still have not become parties to the treaty do so as soon as is feasible for them. We also hope that nonparties, as well as parties to

the NPT, can join here at the IAEA in a concerted effort to enhance security and safeguards for nuclear plants and materials throughout the world. Let us examine a few aspects of this situation in a bit more detail:

1. *Conditions for export.* Some of the major nuclear-exporting countries, including the United States, have reached agreement on procedures and criteria that serve as minimum common standards for implementation of the requirements of article III.2 of the NPT, which calls for IAEA safeguards in connection with nuclear materials and equipment exported to non-nuclear-weapon states. Furthermore, the United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. have agreed, beginning October 1, to report to the IAEA detailed information on their export and import of nuclear materials to and from non-nuclear-weapon states.

We recognize that many nations have well-trained scientists and engineers capable of applying or developing sophisticated nuclear technology for military as well as for peaceful purposes. It is to their great credit that so many of these nations have chosen not to develop nuclear weapons. As Ambassador Tape emphasized at the June Board of Governors meeting, the use in or for any nuclear explosive device of any material or equipment subject to an agreement with the United States for cooperation for civil uses of atomic energy is precluded. We intend to maintain this policy, and we believe that other exporting countries share the view that explicit agreements and effective verification are essential.

2. *Control of the fuel cycle.* With the proposed and planned sale of reactors to countries in regions throughout the world, including areas that are politically troubled, questions have been raised about the impact of such sales on proliferation. If each country that moves into nuclear-generated electricity is faced with the necessity to develop its own means of handling the spent fuel, then each country will have to develop the technology for this purpose. As an alternative, the es-

¹ For text of the treaty, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1968, p. 8.

tablishment of internationally approved facilities to handle all the spent fuel arising from power reactors may be helpful to participating countries. It may also be reassuring to the rest of the world.

Attention must be directed to the different types of fuel cycles as well. In the United States our experience has been mainly with the light water reactor using low-enriched uranium. Cycles using natural uranium and heavy water moderation, uranium and thorium, highly enriched uranium, or uranium and plutonium each will require careful analysis to provide the best safeguarding methods and most efficient handling. Each fuel cycle has different degrees of vulnerability and should be analyzed from that point of view also. In such analyses the member states and the staff of the IAEA could make great contributions. The United States is committed to such efforts on a national basis and will be pleased to participate in international activities in this area.

3. *Physical security.* In the face of terrorist activity in many places around the world, we have taken action in the United States to enhance significantly the physical security at AEC and AEC-licensed facilities and for materials during transport. We encourage other nations to do the same. Widespread publicity concerning details of security plans would be unwise, but through appropriate technical working groups we would be pleased to share useful aspects of our approaches to greater physical security.

In addition to improving conditions at existing locations, we anticipate that important changes can be incorporated into construction designs to enhance physical security in new facilities. The booklet "Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials," published by the IAEA in 1972, provides useful guidelines and a basis for further IAEA recommendations.

We support the Director General's suggestion that prospects for an international agreement on minimum standards for physical security be explored. Further, we agree with his recommendation that the Agency prepare itself to serve as a source for advice

and assistance to those nations that recognize the desirability of improving their capability in physical security systems.

4. *Safeguards accountability for nuclear materials.* The IAEA has taken the lead for many years in safeguards accountability. Further improvements in methods can be anticipated and increased attention must be paid to correction of deficiencies identified in the process. As President Ford has reaffirmed, we are prepared to implement our offer to permit the Agency to apply its safeguards to any of the nuclear activities in the United States other than those with direct national security significance. We have offered to permit such safeguards when they are applied broadly in non-nuclear-weapon countries, in order to demonstrate our belief that there is no risk to proprietary information and no danger of suffering commercial disadvantage under NPT safeguards.

5. *Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's).* The use of PNE's is a highly complicated matter, with ramifications under the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the case of surface excavation, and with importance to the defining of threshold and complete test ban treaties. The IAEA has taken important actions to facilitate the exchange of information and to anticipate the needs for services. At the Board of Governors meeting last Friday, initial procedures were approved for Agency response to requests from members for such services. Also the Board authorized the Director General to establish within the Secretariat, at a suitable time, a separate organizational unit for implementing an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control.

I would like to emphasize the need for in-depth studies to establish the feasibility and desirability of using peaceful nuclear explosions in any project under consideration. The United States stands ready to contribute to the planning and performance of such feasibility studies. Where these studies demonstrate the practicability of conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion project consistent with the provisions of pertinent treaties or

agreements, we are prepared to meet our obligations under article V of the NPT to provide PNE services at prices that will exclude any charges for research and development.

In closing, let me say that, clearly, the role of nuclear power is being accepted increasingly around the world and that significant progress has been made in enhancing reactor safety. I am confident that cooperative international effort will meet the serious challenge of safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities as the benefits of nuclear energy are brought to many more countries.

Let us resolve to attack these problems with all the good will and intelligence of which mankind is capable.

U.S. Calls for Worldwide Commitment To Assist Poorer Nations

Following is a statement by John Scali, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made on September 27 before the first ministerial meeting of potential contributors to the United Nations Emergency Program, established by the sixth special session of the General Assembly.

USUN press release 120 dated September 27

I am pleased to reaffirm what President Ford said in addressing the U.N. Assembly last week: That our government will not only maintain but increase the amount of funds we will spend for food shipments to other countries.

The exact sum, as well as the quantities of food to be provided, is still being reviewed at the highest levels of my government in an effort to maximize our response despite the new weather problems which have affected our late harvests.

The final figures will depend on cooperation by our Congress, the weather, and assistance in holding back the tide of inflation which threatens all. It is only too evident that recent rises in the price of oil, food, and fertilizer have created severe hardships for all nations.

The richer nations, however, can cut their consumption of food or fuel; and more importantly, they can pay the new, higher prices by increasing their exports or their borrowing. For the poorer nations, on the other hand, reduced consumption can mean mass starvation and economic collapse. These countries cannot, for the most part, increase their exports significantly in the short run, nor do they have the credit to finance even minimum consumption at the new and higher prices.

Clearly the only long-term solution is to increase the supply of critically needed commodities and lower their prices sufficiently to put them within the reach of all. Such a policy is in the real interests of not only the consuming nations, but of those who are the major producers. Fast profits may be made by temporary restrictions on production, but over the long run only a prosperous, dependable, and expanding market can protect the producer against equally dramatic losses in the future.

The United States is committed to a policy of expanding supply to meet legitimate demand. We are going all out to increase American food production. We are seeking to plant every acre which can produce food for a hungry world, and every planted field is now being harvested.

Unhappily, however, inflation is a global problem, and it requires a global response. Thus, in about a month the United States will join with other nations in Rome to determine what steps we can take in common to dramatically increase global food supplies and to put the price of bread within the reach of every man.

Just as no single nation can hope to contend with the force of global inflation, so no price reduction of any single commodity will be able to reverse the current trend.

We believe therefore that oil producers and oil consumers must cooperate in the same way that food producers and consumers are doing to meet legitimate world demand for fuel at prices which the poor, as well as the rich, can afford.

We are meeting here today, however, not

to focus on the long-range solution of the current world economic crisis but, rather, to determine what immediate steps can be taken to prevent the world's poorest nations from being overwhelmed even as we talk.

The United States believes that the primary responsibility for helping those nations whose economies are being devastated by higher oil prices rests with the oil-producing states. Nevertheless, we will not turn a deaf ear to the appeals of those in real need. In the 12-month period which ended in June 1974, U.S. aid to the countries which Secretary General Waldheim has listed as the "most seriously affected" amounted to \$714 million. During that same period, the United States provided another \$2 billion in aid to other countries, many of which have also suffered greatly as the result of higher oil and other prices.

For the next 12 months—that is, through June of 1975—the U.S. Government has asked Congress for nearly \$1 billion in aid for those countries on the Secretary General's list of most seriously affected. We have taken this step to increase our already substantial assistance to these countries at a time when we are trying to cut our Federal budget and economize in the face of inflation.

The American people and the American Congress have responded generously to appeals for help in the past. I believe that they will continue to do so, even at a time when our ability to help is increasingly limited. But we cannot be expected, nor should we be asked, to shoulder this burden alone.

My government welcomes the statements from a number of oil-producing countries announcing various forms of aid. We believe, however, that far more can and must be done. We encourage, therefore, further commitments from all states in a position to contribute, and particularly from those nations whose new wealth is growing so rapidly that it challenges their ability to spend it productively.

As the single largest provider of aid in the world for so many years, the United States has already established various bi-

lateral and multilateral channels for assistance to countries on the Secretary General's list. We believe that our assistance will be most effective if it continues to flow through these channels. We recognize, however, that donors who have not yet established aid programs may find the new United Nations Emergency Program, or the proposed Special Fund of the Secretary General, to be a useful and effective means for channeling their new aid.

In speaking frankly, as President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger have done, about the need to control inflation, the United States seeks to draw world attention to the grim facts. We wish not to force confrontation, but to generate constructive cooperation. We believe that only by working together can the world community stop inflation, increase economic development, and create the more just world order which we all seek. We are calling, therefore, on others to join us in this effort. Let us go forward together in a spirit of friendship, in an atmosphere of mutual respect, and with a genuine belief that the interests of all nations can best be reconciled in a more prosperous and stable world.

U.S. Welcomes Bangladesh, Grenada, and Guinea-Bissau to the U.N.

Following is a statement made in the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on September 17.

USUN press release 116 dated September 17

Mr. President [Abdelaziz Bouteflika, of Algeria]: I would like to offer my sincere congratulations and those of the United States to you as you assume the Presidency of this 29th session of the General Assembly.

As the Representative of the host country, I have the great honor of welcoming three new members to this parliament of the world. Although Bangladesh, Grenada, and Guinea-

Bissau are located in three very different regions of this planet, they jointly share a desire to participate in this organization. Nothing could symbolize more dramatically the universality of man's aspirations for which the United Nations stands.

The United States recognized the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on April 4, 1972. Formal diplomatic relations were established on May 18 of that year. My government has had continuous representation in Dacca since 1949. Through these years, ties of trade, shared concern for economic development, and personal friendships have grown even stronger. Consequently the U.S. Government has taken particular satisfaction in the development of the friendly bilateral relations which now exist between our two countries.

The American and Grenadan peoples have had warm and cooperative relations through the years. We share a deep interest in the affairs of the Caribbean region. We have been and will continue to be good neighbors. On February 7 of this year my government welcomed Grenada into the family of independent nations, and we wish Grenada well as she travels the road of independence.

Now Guinea-Bissau joins this world body as the culmination of a major historical process. As President Ford stated, the U.S. Government looks forward to a productive and friendly relationship with the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, which we recognized on September 10. In the months and years ahead, the United States hopes to broaden and strengthen the bonds between the governments and peoples of our two countries. We look forward to the constructive contribution Guinea-Bissau will make to the important work of the United Nations.

The President of the United States will speak to this Assembly tomorrow, and I would at this time like to express the hope of my government that the 29th session of the General Assembly will be a productive one where we will take new steps to move from ideological confrontation toward resolving of differences among nations.

Agenda of the 29th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly¹

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Ecuador.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of the Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. General debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Court of Justice.
15. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
16. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council.
17. Election of eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council.
18. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial Development Board.
19. Election of nineteen members of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme.
20. Strengthening of the role of the United Nations with regard to the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and security, the development of co-operation among all nations and the promotion of the rules of international law in relations between States: report of the Secretary-General.
21. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General.
22. Admission of new Members to the United Nations.
23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

¹ Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 21 (U.N. doc. A/9751).

24. Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
25. Restoration of the lawful rights of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia in the United Nations.
26. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
27. Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General.
28. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
29. Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
30. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General.
31. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.
32. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
33. Preparation of an international convention on principles governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
34. World Disarmament Conference: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.
35. General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
36. Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Secretary-General.
37. Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa:
 - (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
38. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:
 - (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
 - (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
 - (d) Report of the Secretary-General.
39. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.
40. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.
41. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
42. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: report of the Trade and Development Board.
43. United Nations Industrial Development Organization:
 - (a) Report of the Industrial Development Board;
 - (b) Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization: report of the Executive Director;
 - (c) Establishment of a United Nations industrial development fund: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (d) Confirmation of the appointment of the Executive Director of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
44. United Nations Institute for Training and Research: report of the Executive Director.
45. Operational activities for development:
 - (a) United Nations Development Programme;
 - (b) United Nations Capital Development Fund;
 - (c) Technical co-operation activities undertaken by the Secretary-General;
 - (d) United Nations Volunteers programme;
 - (e) United Nations Fund for Population Activities;
 - (f) United Nations Children's Fund;
 - (g) World Food Programme.
46. United Nations Environment Programme:
 - (a) Report of the Governing Council;
 - (b) United Nations Conference-Exposition on Human Settlements: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (c) Criteria governing multilateral financing of housing and human settlements: report of the Secretary-General.
47. Reduction of the increasing gap between the developed countries and the developing countries
48. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.
49. Economic co-operation among developing coun-

- tries: report of the Secretary-General.
50. Quantification of scientific and technological activities related to development, including the definition of the quantitative targets contemplated in paragraph 63 of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade.
 51. United Nations University: report of the University Council.
 52. Human rights in armed conflicts: protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions in areas of armed conflict.
 53. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination:
 - (a) Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination;
 - (b) Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination;
 - (c) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General.
 54. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance.
 55. Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights: report of the Secretary-General.
 56. Human rights and scientific and technological developments: report of the Secretary-General.
 57. Freedom of information:
 - (a) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information;
 - (b) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information.
 58. Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: report of the Secretary-General.
 59. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
 60. Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster situations:
 - (a) Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Aid to the Sudano-Sahelian populations threatened with famine: report of the Secretary-General.
 61. United Nations conference for an international convention on adoption law.
 62. National experience in achieving far-reaching social and economic changes for the purpose of social progress.
 63. Unified approach to development analysis and planning.
 64. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 *e* of the Charter of the United Nations:
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
 65. Question of Namibia:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia;
 - (c) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (d) United Nations Fund for Namibia: reports of the United Nations Council for Namibia and of the Secretary-General;
 - (e) Appointment of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia.
 66. Question of Territories under Portuguese domination:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
 - (b) Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Reported Massacres in Mozambique;
 - (c) Report of the Secretary-General.
 67. Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
 68. Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in southern Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
 69. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations:
 - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of

- Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General.
70. United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa: report of the Secretary-General.
 71. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General.
 72. Financial reports and accounts for the year 1973 and reports of the Board of Auditors:
 - (a) United Nations;
 - (b) United Nations Development Programme;
 - (c) United Nations Children's Fund;
 - (d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (e) United Nations Institute for Training and Research;
 - (f) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;
 - (g) Fund of the United Nations Environment Programme.
 73. Programme budget for the biennium 1974-1975.
 74. Review of the intergovernmental and expert machinery dealing with the formulation, review and approval of programmes and budgets.
 75. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
 76. Joint Inspection Unit:
 - (a) Reports of the Joint Inspection Unit;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
 77. Pattern of conferences:
 - (a) Report of the Joint Inspection Unit;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
 78. Publications and documentation of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General.
 79. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.
 80. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary organs of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
 - (b) Committee on Contributions;
 - (c) Board of Auditors;
 - (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointments made by the Secretary-General;
 - (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal.
 81. Personnel questions:
 - (a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Other personnel questions: reports of the Secretary-General.
 82. United Nations salary system:
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Report of the International Civil Service Advisory Board.
 83. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.
 84. Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force: report of the Secretary-General.
 85. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General.
 86. Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression.
 87. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-sixth session.
 88. Participation in the United Nations Conference on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations, to be held in 1975.
 89. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its seventh session.
 90. United Nations Conference on Prescription (Limitation) in the International Sale of Goods: report of the Secretary-General.
 91. Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism.
 92. Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: report of the Secretary-General.
 93. Review of the role of the International Court of Justice.
 94. Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country.
 95. Need to consider suggestions regarding the review of the Charter of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General.
 96. Declaration on Universal Participation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
 97. Question of issuing special invitations to States which are not Members of the United Nations or members of any of the specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice to become parties to the Convention on Special Missions.
 98. Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.
 99. Question of the establishment, in accordance with the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, of a body to which persons claiming the benefit of the Convention may apply.
 100. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the

- Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).
101. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.
 102. Status of the European Economic Community in the General Assembly.
 103. Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health.
 104. Question of Korea:
 - (a) Withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;
 - (b) Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula.
 105. Diplomatic asylum.
 106. Translation of some official documents of the General Assembly and of resolutions of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council into the German language.
 107. Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia.
 108. Question of Palestine.
 109. The situation in the Middle East.
 110. Question of Cyprus.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Japan Sign New Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on October 2 (press release 389) that in reference to article 4 of the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, the United States and Japan had entered into a new bilateral agreement covering trade in cotton, man-made fiber, and wool textiles by exchange of notes in Washington on September 27. (For texts of the exchange of notes and related letters, see press release 389). The new agreement supersedes two previous agreements.

Under the terms of the new agreement, which runs from October 1, 1974, through

December 31, 1977, Japan will limit its exports of all textiles to the United States in the first agreement year to 1,691,272,000 square yards equivalent. The new agreement also provides inter alia for a higher rate of annual growth and increased inter- and intra-fiber flexibility, pursuant to the provisions of the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Pakistan, October 3, 1974.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Ratification deposited: Haiti, October 3, 1974.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, September 30, 1974.²

BILATERAL

Czechoslovakia

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and related notes. Signed at Prague July 9, 1973.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: September 30, 1974.

¹ Not in force.

² Including Dominica, Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Vincent, The Bailiwick of Guernsey, The Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, The British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, The Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Saint Helena and Dependencies, and Seychelles.

Jordan

Nonscheduled air service agreement, with annexes. Signed at Amman September 21, 1974. Entered into force September 21, 1974.

Khmer Republic

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 10, 1974. Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh September 17, 1974. Entered into force September 17, 1974.

Sample Questions From the Written Examination for Foreign Service Officers. This booklet describes the written examination and presents samples of the kinds of questions that are asked in the written examination for selection of Foreign Service officers. Available free of charge from the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Space Laboratory—Cooperative Program. Agreements with certain governments, members of the European Space Research Organization. TIAS 7722. 45 pp. 55¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7722).

Use of Veterans Memorial Hospital—Grants-in-Aid for Medical Care and Treatment of Veterans and Rehabilitation of the Hospital Plant. Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 7814. 9 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7814).

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961—Addition of DifenoXin to Schedule I and Amendment of Schedule III. TIAS 7817. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7817).

Reciprocal Fishing Privileges. Agreements with Canada extending the agreement of June 15, 1973. TIAS 7818. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7818).

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 30 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 369 of September 20, 377 of September 24, and 378 of September 26.

No.	Date	Subject
	383 9/30	Kissinger, Sauvagnargues: exchange of toasts, Sept. 27.
*384	9/30	Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, Miami, Fla., Oct. 24.
*385	9/30	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, Oct. 22.
*386	9/30	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Oct. 24.
*387	9/30	Study Group 5 of U.S. National Committee for CCITT, Oct. 30.
†388	10/1	Kissinger, Naffa'; exchange of toasts, New York, Sept. 30.
	389 10/2	U.S. and Japan sign textile agreement (rewrite).
†390	10/3	Kissinger, Molina: exchange of toasts, New York, Oct. 2.
*391	10/4	Program for the official visit of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, Oct. 6-13.
*392	10/4	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law Study Group on Hotelkeepers' Liability, New York, Nov. 8.
*393	10/4	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law Study Group on Matrimonial Matters, New York, Nov. 7.
*394	10/4	Advisory Committee on "Foreign Relations of the United States," Nov. 8.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.