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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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A Global Approach to the Energy Problem

*Address by President Ford*¹

On behalf of the American people, on behalf of my home State of Michigan, on behalf of the city of Detroit, it gives me a very great privilege and pleasure to welcome you to the city which some blame for the energy crisis.

But I hasten to add this, if I might: This is also a city [to] which we, along with the world's other great industrial nations, look for significant solutions that I know are possible. This is a "can do," a problem-solving, city and state.

It was here in Detroit that the internal combustion engine was transformed from a plaything of the rich into basic transportation on which people all over the world now depend.

The whole structure of our world society rests upon the expectation of abundant fuel at reasonable prices. I refer to cities and suburbs, farms and factories, shopping centers and office buildings, schools and churches, and the roadways that connect them all.

The expectation of an assured supply of energy has now been challenged. The repercussions are being felt worldwide. There is widespread uncertainty and deep and serious apprehension. Today, at the opening of this conference, we are determined to provide guidance to a world in crisis.

Many people became aware that there was an energy problem for the first time last October when the oil embargo was imposed.

But those who were well informed about the energy situation had known for some time that a crisis was coming.

With burgeoning demand all over the world, they knew that we could not forever expect a steady supply of low-priced fuel. The embargo merely brought to a head what experts had known for many years: that energy sources must be expanded and wasteful use eliminated to keep pace with the needs of a growing and modernizing world.

Everyone can now see the pulverizing impact of energy price increases on every aspect of the world economy. The food problem, the inflation problem, the monetary problem, and other major problems are directly linked to the all-pervasive energy problem.

The American response to the oil embargo and recent oil price increases, along with production decisions, has taken the form of a program for action under the general title Project Independence. This integrated domestic energy program will seek in many, many different ways to reduce American consumption and to increase production of energy.

Officials of my administration will more fully describe to this conference our determination to achieve energy independence. We will take tough steps to obtain the degree of self-sufficiency which is necessary to avoid disruption of our economy.

We will make sure there is heat for our homes and power for the people who work in our plants. Realistically, this does not mean zero imports.

In the immediate future, we will expand

¹ Made before the ninth World Energy Conference at Detroit, Mich., on Sept. 23 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 30).

our efforts to increase our energy efficiency. This will reduce the growing dependence on foreign petroleum. Project Independence will also require us to increase the output of existing domestic resources. In mobilizing to achieve long-term goals, we will fully exploit one of our most powerful natural resources—U.S. technology. We are moving in this direction.

Last year, for example, the U.S. Government funding for energy research and development was approximately \$1¼ billion. This year we will spend over \$2¼ billion. These funds, together with those provided by private industry, will support a growing national effort. In terms of joint private and public resources, it will mean a commitment in excess of the successful one made by John F. Kennedy to put a man on the Moon in the last decade. I mention this highly successful Moon landing to dramatize the magnitude of the energy task before us, the dedication with which we approach it, and the national mobilization of attention and talent it will require.

We are also moving to improve the organization of the U.S. Government for carrying out our energy programs. A key step now awaiting final action by the Congress is the creation of an Energy Research and Development Administration. It will provide coordination and leadership in cooperation with private industry in developing the necessary technology to fulfill our long-range energy requirements.

Even if there had been no political interference in the production and distribution of petroleum, nations today would still be facing the problem of finding enough fuel at reasonable prices to continue the modernization of our world. Our needs then and now for energy are increasing much, much faster than our ability to produce it. But in addition, most industrialized nations experienced the direct impact of the oil embargo, which obviously greatly intensified the problem.

All nations have been adversely affected by price increases. When nations use their resources as political weapons against others, the result is human suffering. It is then

tempting to speculate on how much better off man would be if nature had distributed vital resources more evenly around the world, making every nation self-sufficient. But perhaps nature had a better idea; because vital resources are distributed unevenly, nations are forced to choose between conflict and cooperation.

Throughout history, nations have gone to war over natural advantages such as water or food or convenient passages on land and sea. But in the nuclear age, when any local conflict may escalate to global catastrophe, war brings unacceptable risks for all mankind. Now, more than any time in the history of man, nations must accept and live peacefully with the fact that they need each other. Nations must turn to international cooperation as the best means for dealing with the uneven distribution of resources.

American foreign policy rests on two obvious new facts: First, in the nuclear age, there is no rational alternative to international cooperation. Second, the more the world progresses, the more the world modernizes, the more nations need each other.

As you know, a theme of the foreign policy of this administration is international cooperation in an interdependent world, stressing interdependence. You may ask, Why is our domestic energy program called Project Independence? As I see it, especially with regard to energy, national sufficiency and international interdependence fit together and actually work together.

No nation can be part of the modern world and live unto itself. No nation has or can have within its borders everything necessary for a full and rich life for all its people. Independence cannot mean isolation.

The aim of Project Independence is not to set the United States apart from the rest of the world; it is to enable the United States to do its part more effectively in the world's effort to provide more energy.

Project Independence will seek new ways to reduce energy usage and to increase its production. To the extent that we succeed, the world will benefit. There will be much more energy available for others.

As America expands existing sources and develops new ones, other nations will also benefit. We especially want to share our experience and our technology with other countries in efforts to increase their own energy supplies. We are also aware that in some respects other countries are ahead of us, and we will seek to learn from them.

Sovereign nations try to avoid dependence on other nations that exploit their own resources to the detriment of others. Sovereign nations cannot allow their policies to be dictated or their fate decided by artificial rigging and distortion of world commodity markets.

No one can foresee the extent of damage, nor the end of the disastrous consequences if nations refuse to share nature's gifts for the benefit of all mankind.

I told the U.N. Assembly last Wednesday, and I quote:

The attempt by any country to use one commodity for political purposes will inevitably tempt other countries to use their commodities for their own purposes.

There are three ways, fortunately, that this danger can and must be avoided:

—First, each nation must resolve not to misuse its resources;

—Second, each nation must fully utilize its own energy resources; and

—Third, each nation must join with others in cooperative efforts to reduce its energy vulnerability.

In doing so, we emphasize that our actions are not directed against any other nations, but are only taken to maintain the conditions of international order and well-being.

The quest for energy need not promote division and discord. It can expand the horizons of the world's peoples. I envision a strong movement toward a unifying cooperation to insure a decent life for all.

I welcome the development in Brussels last Friday of a new international energy program by the Energy Coordinating Group of the Washington Energy Conference. We were pleased to participate in that meeting.

The 12 nations reached an ad referendum

agreement on a far-reaching cooperative plan to deal with such emergencies as embargoes by sharing available oil and by cutting consumption and using stocks on an equitable basis.

While seeking conservation, we and the other nations will work for expanded production of both conventional and nonconventional fuels. The cooperating countries are also creating an international agency to carry out this program.

The United States welcomes this demonstration of international action rather than words. Just as Americans are challenged by Project Independence, the world faces a related challenge that requires a Project Interdependence.

No single country can solve the energy problem by itself. As President, I offer America's partnership to every other nation willing to join in a common effort to expand the spirit flowing from the Washington Energy Conference.

A start has been made in Brussels. The momentum must be continued if true interdependence is to be achieved.

The economy of the world is facing unprecedented challenges. Old remedies are inadequate for new problems. New and appropriate solutions must be found without delay, and I am absolutely convinced that they will be found.

I firmly believe that the unselfishness of all nations is in the self-interest of each nation. We all depend on each other in so many ways that there is no way in today's world for any nation to benefit at the expense of others, except for the very short term and at a very great risk.

Without having planned it, we find ourselves in the strange situation in which the most selfish individual can figure out that it is profitable to live by what we call the Golden Rule.

We can help ourselves only if we are considerate and only if we are helpful to others.

The energy crisis is the clearest example of the world's interdependence. The industrialized nations need the oil produced by a few developing nations. And all developing na-

tions need the technology, the services, and the products of industrialized nations.

The opportunity for a great advance for the whole world is tantalizingly apparent, but so is the danger that we will throw away this very, very rare opportunity to realize mankind's hopes. Let us build and implement a global strategy for energy.

If I may, I call on this World Energy Conference and other international organizations to accept the challenge of formulating Project Interdependence, a comprehensive energy program for the world to develop our resources not just for the benefit of a few but for all mankind.

This task is surely monumental. But the United States believes that it is possible—that it is essential. To help you in the beginning to take the first steps let me propose some principles that could guide a global approach:

—First, all nations must seek to increase production, each according to its resources and its level of technology. Some can develop known and available resources; others can try to improve methods of extraction or intensify exploration, and others are capable of developing new sources of energy appropriate to their own circumstances. But all nations can and should play a part in enlarging and diversifying the sources of usable energy. Diversification can help deter nations from resorting to monopolistic prices or practices.

—Next, the rate of increase in consumption of energy must be reduced and waste eliminated. Americans will do their part in this necessary effort. But all nations can contribute to discovering new ways to reduce the energy we consume, partly through common sense, partly through self-discipline, and partly through new technological improvements. Whatever energy-saving methods are developed anywhere must be communicated quickly to all concerned. Energy-saving possibilities are promising, especially for the short term as production increases.

—Third, a cooperative spirit, a cooperative conduct, are essential to success in a global energy program. Nothing, in my judg-

ment, could be more harmful than policies directed against other nations. If we lapse into confrontation of exporters on the one hand and consumers on the other or an unseemly scramble of consumers being played off one against another, all hopes for a global solution will be destroyed.

—Fourth, we must be especially attentive to the situation of the poorest nations, which will suffer drastically if the energy problem does not come under control. Actually, they are the chief victims, even now, of the uncontrolled inflation driving world prices up, far beyond their reach, for all the goods and all the services they must import to survive.

—Finally, a global strategy must seek to achieve fuel prices which provide a strong incentive to producers but which do not seriously disrupt the economies of the consumer. We recognize the desires of the producers to earn a fair share or a fair price for their oil as a means of helping to develop their own economies. But exorbitant prices can only distort the world economy, run the risk of a worldwide depression, and threaten the breakdown of world order and world safety.

It is difficult to discuss the energy problem without lapsing unfortunately into doomsday language. The danger is clear. It is very severe. Nevertheless, I am very optimistic. The advantages of cooperation are as visible as the dangers of confrontation and that gives me hope as well as optimism. But good intentions will not be enough. Knowledgeable people, like all of you at this important conference, are needed to give understanding, analysis, technical competence, and solutions for the people and the leaders to consider.

I call on all of you to respond to the challenge and to propose to the world your recommendations for a global energy strategy. Whether you call it Project Interdependence, or some other name, is not the essential point. What is essential is the challenge be accepted and the job be done quickly and well.

Ladies and gentlemen, I now declare the ninth World Energy Conference officially open and thank you very, very much.

President Hails Release of Mr. Kay; Urges New Efforts on Indochina MIA's

*Statement by President Ford*¹

With all Americans, I welcome the news that Mr. Emmet Kay has been released as part of the prisoner exchange in Laos. This release marks a major positive step in carrying out the Vientiane accords which ended the war in that country last year. We are encouraged by this development and hope it will be followed by other positive steps to achieve peace and reconciliation in Laos.

At the same time, I remain concerned about the many Americans still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. As Vice President, and during my time in the Congress, I had the opportunity to meet with the families of a number of our missing men. I have the highest regard for the strength and courage these families have shown in the long period since their loved ones were lost.

It has now been more than 18 months since the Paris agreement on Viet-Nam was signed in January 1973. In addition to the return of prisoners that agreement contained specific provisions on accounting for the missing and the return of the remains of the dead. The record shows that there has been almost no compliance with these humanitarian provisions. Although the Government of North Viet-Nam returned the remains of 23 American servicemen who died in captivity, there has been no progress on accounting for the missing and no further arrangements for the return of the remains of the dead.

The Communist side has refused to permit searches in areas under their control for crash sites, graves, and other information on the MIA's [missing in action]. We are prepared to carry out such searches by unarmed American teams, and we stand ready to discuss arrangements for the conduct of such searches by teams from neutral countries, the International Red Cross, other humanitarian

organizations, or by local authorities. The important thing is that we get on with this job now.

The families of our men have waited too long already, and I am sure that families of those of other nationalities who remain unaccounted for have a similar desire to know the fate of their loved ones. There should be no political or military controversy about this humanitarian problem, and I call for renewed efforts to resolve it.

AID Donates Additional \$3 Million for U.N. Relief Fund for Cyprus

AID Announcement, September 13

AID press release 74-64 dated September 13

Daniel Parker, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, has pledged an additional AID grant of \$3 million to the United Nations for relief for an estimated 200,000 victims of the conflict on Cyprus.

The grant is in response to a Security Council resolution passed unanimously August 30, urging immediate relief measures for the Cypriots, and a September 6 request from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

The AID grant to the U.N. relief fund is in addition to a grant, relief supplies, and air transport provided by AID in recent weeks and valued at more than \$3,558,000. Included were a cash grant of \$725,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross, tents, blankets, water trailers and containers, and cots, as well as several air-lifts.

AID has also responded to a request from Ambassador Crawford in Nicosia for two relief specialists from AID. AID's Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator Russell S. McClure and AID specialist Bruno Kosheleff were to visit Nicosia to participate in an evaluation of additional requirements for emergency housing, food, and other needs.

¹ Issued on Sept. 18 (text from White House press release).

An Age of Interdependence: Common Disaster or Community

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*¹

Last year, in my first address as Secretary of State, I spoke to this Assembly about American purposes. I said that the United States seeks a comprehensive, institutionalized peace, not an armistice. I asked other nations to join us in moving the world from détente to cooperation, from coexistence to community.

In the year that has passed, some progress has been made in dealing with particular crises. But many fundamental issues persist, and new issues threaten the very structure of world stability.

Our deepest problem—going far beyond the items on our agenda—is whether our vision can keep pace with our challenges. Will history recall the 20th century as a time of mounting global conflict or as the beginning of a global conception? Will our age of interdependence spur joint progress or common disaster?

The answer is not yet clear. New realities have not yet overcome old patterns of thought and action. Traditional concepts—of national sovereignty, social struggle, and the relation between the old and the new nations—too often guide our course. And so we have managed but not advanced; we have endured but not prospered; and we have continued the luxury of political contention.

This condition has been dramatized in the brief period since last fall's regular session. War has ravaged the Middle East and Cyprus. The technology of nuclear explosives has resumed its dangerous spread. Inflation

and the threat of global decline hang over the economies of rich and poor alike.

We cannot permit this trend to continue. Conflict between nations once devastated continents; the struggle between blocs may destroy humanity. Ideologies and doctrines drawn from the last century do not even address, let alone solve, the unprecedented problems of today. As a result, events challenge habits; a gulf grows between rhetoric and reality.

The world has dealt with local conflicts as if they were perpetually manageable. We have permitted too many of the underlying causes to fester unattended until the parties believed that their only recourse was war. And because each crisis ultimately has been contained we have remained complacent. But tolerance of local conflict tempts world holocaust. We have no guarantee that some local crisis—perhaps the next—will not explode beyond control.

The world has dealt with nuclear weapons as if restraint were automatic. Their very awesomeness has chained these weapons for almost three decades; their sophistication and expense have helped to keep constant for a decade the number of states who possess them. Now, as was quite foreseeable, political inhibitions are in danger of crumbling. Nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible—whether through design or miscalculation; accident, theft, or blackmail.

The world has dealt with the economy as if its constant advance were inexorable. While postwar growth has been uneven and some parts of the world have lagged, our attention was focused on how to increase participation

¹ Made before the 29th United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 23 (text from Office of Media Services news release).

in a general advance. We continue to deal with economic issues on a national, regional, or bloc basis at the precise moment that our interdependence is multiplying. Strains on the fabric and institutions of the world economy threaten to engulf us all in a general depression.

The delicate structure of international cooperation so laboriously constructed over the last quarter century can hardly survive—and certainly cannot be strengthened—if it is continually subjected to the shocks of political conflict, war, and economic crisis.

The time has come, then, for the nations assembled here to act together on the recognition that continued reliance on old slogans and traditional rivalries will lead us toward:

—A world ever more torn between rich and poor, East and West, producer and consumer.

—A world where local crises threaten global confrontation and where the spreading atom threatens global peril.

—A world of rising costs and dwindling supplies, of growing populations and declining production.

There is another course. Last week before this Assembly, President Ford dedicated our country to a cooperative, open approach to build a more secure and more prosperous world. The United States will assume the obligations that our values and strength impose upon us.

But the building of a cooperative world is beyond the grasp of any one nation. An interdependent world requires not merely the resources but the vision and creativity of us all. Nations cannot simultaneously confront and cooperate with one another.

We must recognize that the common interest is the only valid test of the national interest. It is in the common interest, and thus in the interest of each nation:

—That local conflicts be resolved short of force and their root causes removed by political means.

—That the spread of nuclear technology be achieved without the spread of nuclear weapons.

—That growing economic interdependence

lift all nations and not drag them down together.

We will not solve these problems during this session, or any one session, of the General Assembly.

But we must at least begin to remedy problems, not just manage them; to shape events, rather than endure them; to confront our challenges instead of one another.

The Political Dimension

The urgent political responsibility of our era is to resolve conflicts without war. History is replete with examples of the tragedy that sweeps nations when ancient enmities and the inertia of habit freeze the scope for decision. Equally, history is marked by brief moments when an old order is giving way to a pattern new and unforeseen; these are times of potential disorder and danger but also of opportunity for fresh creation. We face such a moment today. Together let us face its realities:

—First, a certain momentum toward peace has been created—in East-West relations and in certain regional conflicts. It must be maintained. But we are only at the beginning of the process. If we do not continue to advance, we will slip back.

—Second, progress in negotiation of difficult issues comes only through patience, perseverance, and recognition of the tolerable limits of the other side. Peace is a process, not a condition. It can only be reached in steps.

—Third, failure to recognize and grasp the attainable will prevent the achievement of the ideal. Attempts to resolve all issues at one time are a certain prescription for stagnation. Progress toward peace can be thwarted by asking too much as surely as by asking too little.

—Fourth, the world community can help resolve chronic conflicts, but exaggerated expectations will prevent essential accommodation among the parties. This Assembly can help or hinder the negotiating process. It can seek a scapegoat or a solution. It can offer the

parties an excuse to escape reality or sturdy support in search of a compromise. It can decide on propaganda or contribute to realistic approaches that are responsive to man's yearning for peace.

The Middle East starkly demonstrates these considerations. In the past year we have witnessed both the fourth Arab-Israeli war in a generation and the hopeful beginnings of a political process toward a lasting and just peace.

We have achieved the respite of a ceasefire and of two disengagement agreements, but the shadow of war remains. The legacy of hatred and suffering, the sense of irreconcilability, have begun to yield—however haltingly—to the process of negotiation. But we still have a long road ahead.

One side seeks the recovery of territory and justice for a displaced people. The other side seeks security and recognition by its neighbors of its legitimacy as a nation. In the end, the common goal of peace surely is broad enough to embrace all these aspirations.

Let us be realistic about what must be done. The art of negotiation is to set goals that can be achieved at a given time and to reach them with determination. Each step forward modifies old perceptions and brings about a new situation that improves the chances of a comprehensive settlement.

Because these principles were followed in the Middle East, agreements have been reached in the past year which many thought impossible. They were achieved, above all, because of the wisdom of the leaders of the Middle East who decided that there had been enough stalemate and war, that more might be gained by testing each other in negotiation than by testing each other on the battlefield.

The members of this body, both collectively and individually, have a solemn responsibility to encourage and support the parties in the Middle East on their present course. We have as well an obligation to give our support to the U.N. peacekeeping forces in the Middle East and elsewhere. The United States applauds their indispensable role, as well as the outstanding contribution of Secre-

tary General Waldheim in the cause of peace.

During the past year my country has made a major effort to promote peace in the Middle East. President Ford has asked me to reaffirm today that we are determined to press forward with these efforts. We will work closely with the parties, and we will cooperate with all interested countries within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

The tormented island of Cyprus is another area where peace requires a spirit of compromise, accommodation, and justice. The United States is convinced that the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be maintained. It will be up to the parties to decide on the form of government they believe best suited to the particular conditions of Cyprus. They must reach accommodation on the areas to be administered by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as well as on the conditions under which refugees can return to their homes and reside in safety. Finally, no lasting peace is possible unless provisions are agreed upon which will lead to the timely and phased reduction of armed forces and armaments and other war materiel.

The United States is prepared to play an even more active role than in the past in helping the parties find a solution to the centuries-old problem of Cyprus. We will do all we can, but it is those most directly concerned whose effort is most crucial. Third parties should not be asked to produce miraculous outcomes not anchored in reality. Third parties *can* encourage those directly involved to perceive their broader interests; they can assist in the search for elements of agreement by interpreting each side's views and motives to the other. But no mediator can succeed unless the parties genuinely want mediation and are ready to make the difficult decisions needed for a settlement.

The United States is already making a major contribution to help relieve the human suffering of the people of Cyprus. We urge the international community to continue and, if possible, to increase its own humanitarian relief effort.

The United States notes with particular

satisfaction the continuing process of change in Africa. We welcome the positive demonstration of cooperation between the old rulers and the new free. The United States shares and pledges its support for the aspirations of all Africans to participate in the fruits of freedom and human dignity.

The Nuclear Dimension

The second new dimension on our agenda concerns the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The world has grown so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will never be used. But today, technology is rapidly expanding the number of nuclear weapons in the hands of major powers and threatens to put nuclear-explosive technology at the disposal of an increasing number of other countries.

In a world where many nations possess nuclear weapons, dangers would be vastly compounded. It would be infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, to maintain stability among a large number of nuclear powers. Local wars would take on a new dimension. Nuclear weapons would be introduced into regions where political conflict remains intense and the parties consider their vital interests overwhelmingly involved. There would, as well, be a vastly heightened risk of direct involvement of the major nuclear powers.

This problem does not concern one country, one region, or one bloc alone. No nation can be indifferent to the spread of nuclear technology; every nation's security is directly affected.

The challenge before the world is to realize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology without contributing to the growth of nuclear weapons or to the number of states possessing them.

As a major nuclear power, the United States recognizes its special responsibility. We realize that we cannot expect others to show restraint if we do not ourselves practice restraint. Together with the Soviet Union we are seeking to negotiate new quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic arms. Last week our delegations recon-

vened in Geneva, and we intend to pursue these negotiations with the seriousness of purpose they deserve. The United States has no higher priority than controlling and reducing the levels of nuclear arms.

Beyond the relations of the nuclear powers to each other lies the need to curb the spread of nuclear explosives. We must take into account that plutonium is an essential ingredient of nuclear explosives and that in the immediate future the amount of plutonium generated by peaceful nuclear reactors will be multiplied many times. Heretofore the United States and a number of other countries have widely supplied nuclear fuels and other nuclear materials in order to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This policy cannot continue if it leads to the proliferation of nuclear explosives. Sales of these materials can no longer be treated by anyone as a purely commercial competitive enterprise.

The world community therefore must work urgently toward a system of effective international safeguards against the diversion of plutonium or its byproducts. The United States is prepared to join with others in a comprehensive effort.

Let us together agree on the practical steps which must be taken to assure the benefits of nuclear energy free of its terrors:

—The United States will shortly offer specific proposals to strengthen safeguards to the other principal supplier countries.

—We shall intensify our efforts to gain the broadest possible acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, to establish practical controls on the transfer of nuclear materials, and to insure the effectiveness of these procedures.

—The United States will urge the IAEA to draft an international convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear material. Such a convention should set forth specific standards and techniques for protecting materials while in use, storage, and transfer.

—The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which this Assembly has

endorsed, warrants continuing support. The treaty contains not only a broad commitment to limit the spread of nuclear explosives but specific obligations to accept and implement IAEA safeguards and to control the transfer of nuclear materials.

Mr. President, whatever advantages seem to accrue from the acquisition of nuclear-explosive technology will prove to be ephemeral. When Pandora's box has been opened, no country will be the beneficiary and all mankind will have lost. This is not inevitable. If we act decisively now, we can still control the future.

The Economic Dimension

Lord Keynes wrote:

The power to become habituated to his surroundings is a marked characteristic of mankind. Very few of us realize with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic organization

The economic history of the postwar period has been one of sustained growth, for developing as well as developed nations. The universal expectation of our peoples, the foundation of our political institutions, and the assumption underlying the evolving structure of peace are all based on the belief that this growth will continue.

But will it? The increasingly open and cooperative global economic system that we have come to take for granted is now under unprecedented attack. The world is poised on the brink of a return to the unrestrained economic nationalism which accompanied the collapse of economic order in the thirties. And should that occur, all would suffer—poor as well as rich, producer as well as consumer.

So let us no longer fear to confront in public the facts which have come to dominate our private discussions and concerns.

The early warning signs of a major economic crisis are evident. Rates of inflation unprecedented in the past quarter century are sweeping developing and developed nations alike. The world's financial institutions are staggering under the most massive and

rapid movements of reserves in history. And profound questions have arisen about meeting man's most fundamental needs for energy and food.

While the present situation threatens every individual and nation, it is the poor who suffer the most. While the wealthier adjust their living standards, the poor see the hopes of a lifetime collapse around them. While others tighten their belts, the poor starve. While others can hope for a better future, the poor see only despair ahead.

It can be in the interest of no country or group of countries to base policies on a test of strength; for a policy of confrontation would end in disaster for all. Meeting man's basic needs for energy and food and assuring economic growth while mastering inflation require international cooperation to an unprecedented degree.

Let us apply these principles first to the energy situation:

—Oil producers seek a better life for their peoples and a just return for their diminishing resources.

—The developing nations less well-endowed by nature face the disintegration of the results of decades of striving for development as the result of a price policy over which they have no control.

—The developed nations find the industrial civilization built over centuries in jeopardy.

Both producers and consumers have legitimate claims. The problem is to reconcile them for the common good.

The United States is working closely with several oil producers to help diversify their economies. We have established commissions to facilitate the transfer of technology and to assist with industrialization. We are prepared to accept substantial investments in the United States, and we welcome a greater role for the oil producers in the management of international economic institutions.

The investment of surplus oil revenues presents a great challenge. The countries which most need these revenues are generally the least likely to receive them. The world's financial institutions have coped thus far, but

ways must be found to assure assistance for those countries most in need of it. And the full brunt of the surplus revenues is yet to come.

Despite our best efforts to meet the oil producers' legitimate needs and to channel their resources into constructive uses, the world cannot sustain even the present level of prices, much less continuing increases. The prices of other commodities will inevitably rise in a never-ending inflationary spiral. Nobody will benefit. The oil producers will be forced to spend more for their own imports. Many nations will not be able to withstand the pace, and the poorer could be overwhelmed. The complex, fragile structure of global economic cooperation required to sustain national economic growth stands in danger of being shattered.

The United States will work with other consuming nations on means of conservation and on ways to cushion the impact of massive investments from abroad. The preliminary agreement on a program of solidarity and cooperation signed a few days ago in Brussels by the major consumer countries is an encouraging first step.

But the long-range solution requires a new understanding between consumers and producers. Unlike food prices, the high cost of oil is not the result of economic factors—of an actual shortage of capacity or of the free play of supply and demand. Rather it is caused by deliberate decisions to restrict production and maintain an artificial price level. We recognize that the producers should have a fair share; the fact remains that the present price level even threatens the economic well-being of producers. Ultimately they depend upon the vitality of the world economy for the security of their markets and their investments. And it cannot be in the interest of any nation to magnify the despair of the least developed, who are uniquely vulnerable to exorbitant prices and who have no recourse but to pay.

What has gone up by political decision can be reduced by political decision.

Last week President Ford called upon the oil producers to join with consumers in de-

fining a strategy which will meet the world's long-term need for both energy and food at reasonable prices. He set forth the principles which should guide such a policy. And he announced to this Assembly America's determination to meet our responsibilities to help alleviate another grim reality: world hunger.

At a time of universal concern for justice and in an age of advanced technology, it is intolerable that millions are starving and hundreds of millions remain undernourished.

The magnitude of the long-term problem is clear. At present rates of population growth, world food production must double by the end of this century to maintain even the present inadequate dietary level. And an adequate diet for all would require that we triple world production. If we are true to our principles, we have an obligation to strive for an adequate supply of food to every man, woman, and child in the world. This is a technical possibility, a political necessity, and a moral imperative.

The United States is prepared to join with all nations at the World Food Conference in Rome to launch the truly massive effort which is required. We will present a number of specific proposals:

—To help developing nations. They have the lowest yields and the largest amounts of unused land and water; their potential in food production must be made to match their growing need.

—To increase substantially global fertilizer production. We must end once and for all the world's chronic fertilizer shortage.

—To expand international, regional, and national research programs. Scientific and technical resources must be mobilized now to meet the demands of the year 2000 and beyond.

—To rebuild the world's food reserves. Our capacity for dealing with famine must be freed from the vagaries of weather.

—To provide a substantial level of concessionary food aid. The United States will in the coming year increase the value of our own food aid shipments to countries in need. We make this commitment, despite great

pressures on our economy and at a time when we are seeking to cut our own government budget, because we realize the dimensions of the tragedy with which we are faced. All of us here have a common obligation to prevent the poorest nations from being overwhelmed and enable them to build the social, economic, and political base for self-sufficiency.

The hopes of every nation for a life of peace and plenty rest on an effective international resolution of the crises of inflation, fuel, and food. We must act now, and we must act together.

The Human Dimension

Mr. President, let us never forget that all of our political endeavors are ultimately judged by one standard—to translate our actions into human concerns.

The United States will never be satisfied with a world where man's fears overshadow his hopes. We support the U.N.'s efforts in the fields of international law and human rights. We approve of the activities of the United Nations in social, economic, and humanitarian realms around the world. The United States considers the U.N. World Population Conference last month, the World Food Conference a month from now, and the continuing Law of the Sea Conference of fundamental importance to our common future.

In coming months the United States will make specific proposals for the United Nations to initiate a major international effort to prohibit torture; a concerted campaign to control the disease which afflicts and debilitates over 200 million people in 70 countries, schistosomiasis; and a substantial strengthening of the world's capacity to deal with natural disaster, especially the improvement

of the U.N. Disaster Relief Organization.

Mr. President, we have long lived in a world where the consequences of our failures were manageable—a world where local conflicts were contained, nuclear weapons threatened primarily those nations which possessed them, and the cycle of economic growth and decline seemed principally a national concern.

But this is no longer the case. It is no longer possible to imagine that conflicts, weapons, and recession will not spread.

We must now decide. The problems we face will be with us the greater part of the century. But will they be with us as challenges to be overcome or as adversaries that have vanquished us?

It is easy to agree to yet another set of principles or to actions *other* nations should take. But the needs of the poor will not be met by slogans; the needs of an expanding global economy will not be met by new restrictions; the search for peace cannot be conducted on the basis of confrontation. So each nation must ask what it can do, what contribution it is finally prepared to make to the common good.

Mr. President, beyond peace, beyond prosperity, lie man's deepest aspirations for a life of dignity and justice. And beyond our pride, beyond our concern for the national purpose we are called upon to serve, there must be a concern for the betterment of the human condition. While we cannot, in the brief span allowed to each of us, undo the accumulated problems of centuries, we dare not do less than try. So let us now get on with our tasks.

Let us act in the spirit of Thucydides that "the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding go out to meet it."

Detente With the Soviet Union: The Reality of Competition and the Imperative of Cooperation

Statement by Secretary Kissinger¹

I. The Challenge

Since the dawn of the nuclear age the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for peace have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Throughout history men have sought peace but suffered war; all too often, deliberate decisions or miscalculations have brought violence and destruction to a world yearning for tranquillity. Tragic as the consequences of violence may have been in the past, the issue of peace and war takes on unprecedented urgency when, for the first time in history, two nations have the capacity to destroy mankind. In the nuclear age, as President Eisenhower pointed out two decades ago, "there is no longer any alternative to peace."

The destructiveness of modern weapons defines the necessity of the task; deep differences in philosophy and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union point up its difficulty. These differences do not spring from misunderstanding or personalities or transitory factors:

—They are rooted in history and in the way the two countries have developed.

—They are nourished by conflicting values and opposing ideologies.

—They are expressed in diverging national interests that produce political and military competition.

—They are influenced by allies and friends whose association we value and whose interests we will not sacrifice.

Paradox confuses our perception of the problem of peaceful coexistence: if peace is pursued to the exclusion of any other goal, other values will be compromised and perhaps lost; but if unconstrained rivalry leads to nuclear conflict, these values, along with everything else, will be destroyed in the resulting holocaust. However competitive they may be at some levels of their relationship, both major nuclear powers must base their policies on the premise that neither can expect to impose its will on the other without running an intolerable risk. The challenge of our time is to reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative of coexistence.

There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union and the United States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind.

Thus we must be clear at the outset on what the term "détente" entails. It is the search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union reflecting the realities I have outlined. It is a continuing process, not a final condition that has been or can

¹ Presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Sept. 19 (text from press release 366). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

be realized at any one specific point in time. And it has been pursued by successive American leaders, though the means have varied as have world conditions.

Some fundamental principles guide this policy:

The United States cannot base its policy solely on Moscow's good intentions. But neither can we insist that all forward movement must await a convergence of American and Soviet purposes. We seek, regardless of Soviet intentions, to serve peace through a systematic resistance to pressure and conciliatory responses to moderate behavior.

We must oppose aggressive actions and irresponsible behavior. But we must not seek confrontations lightly.

We must maintain a strong national defense while recognizing that in the nuclear age the relationship between military strength and politically usable power is the most complex in all history.

Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny is concerned, we are not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is recognition of the necessity of peace—not moral callousness. The preservation of human life and human society are moral values, too.

We must be mature enough to recognize that to be stable a relationship must provide advantages to both sides and that the most constructive international relationships are those in which both parties perceive an element of gain. Moscow will benefit from certain measures, just as we will from others. The balance cannot be struck on each issue every day, but only over the whole range of relations and over a period of time.

II. The Course of Soviet-American Relations

In the first two decades of the postwar period U.S.-Soviet relations were characterized by many fits and starts. Some encouraging developments followed the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, for example. But at

the end of the decade the invasion of Czechoslovakia brought progress to a halt and threw a deepening shadow over East-West relations.

During those difficult days some were tempted to conclude that antagonism was the central feature of the relationship and that U.S. policy—even while the Viet-Nam agony raised questions about the readiness of the American people to sustain a policy of confrontation—had to be geared to this grim reality. Others recommended a basic change of policy; there was a barrage of demands to hold an immediate summit to establish a better atmosphere, to launch the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], and to end the decades-old trade discrimination against the Soviet Union, which was widely criticized as anachronistic, futile, and counterproductive.

These two approaches reflected the extremes of the debate that had dominated most of the postwar period; they also revealed deep-seated differences between the American and the Soviet reactions to the process of international relations.

For many Americans, tensions and enmity in international relations are anomalies, the cause of which is attributed either to deliberate malice or misunderstanding. Malice is to be combated by force, or at least isolation; misunderstanding is to be removed by the strenuous exercise of good will. Communist states, on the other hand, regard tensions as inevitable byproducts of a struggle between opposing social systems.

Most Americans perceive relations between states as either friendly or hostile, both defined in nearly absolute terms. Soviet foreign policy, by comparison, is conducted in a gray area heavily influenced by the Soviet conception of the balance of forces. Thus Soviet diplomacy is never free of tactical pressures or adjustments, and it is never determined in isolation from the prevailing military balance. For Moscow, East-West contacts and negotiations are in part designed to promote Soviet influence abroad, especially in Western Europe—and to gain formal acceptance of those elements of the

status quo most agreeable to Moscow.

The issue, however, is not whether peace and stability serve Soviet purposes, but whether they serve our own. Indeed, to the extent that our attention focuses largely on Soviet intentions we create a latent vulnerability. If détente can be justified only by a basic change in Soviet motivation, the temptation becomes overwhelming to base U.S.-Soviet relations not on realistic appraisal but on tenuous hopes: a change in Soviet tone is taken as a sign of a basic change of philosophy. Atmosphere is confused with substance. Policy oscillates between poles of suspicion and euphoria.

Neither extreme is realistic, and both are dangerous. The hopeful view ignores that we and the Soviets are bound to compete for the foreseeable future. The pessimistic view ignores that we have some parallel interests and that we are compelled to coexist. Détente encourages an environment in which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation.

A. *American Goals*

America's aspiration for the kind of political environment we now call détente is not new.

The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union is not made in the name of any one administration or one party or for any one period of time. It expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for an easing of international tensions and their expectation that any responsible government will strive for peace. No aspect of our policies, domestic or foreign, enjoys more consistent bipartisan support. No aspect is more in the interest of mankind.

In the postwar period repeated efforts were made to improve our relationship with Moscow. The spirits of Geneva, Camp David, and Glassboro were evanescent moments in a quarter century otherwise marked by tensions and by sporadic confrontation. What is new in the current period of relaxation of tensions is its duration, the scope of the

relationship which has evolved, and the continuity and intensity of consultation which it has produced.

A number of factors have produced this change in the international environment. By the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies the time was propitious—no matter what administration was in office in the United States—for a major attempt to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. Contradictory tendencies contested for preeminence in Soviet policy; events could have tipped the scales toward either increased aggressiveness or toward conciliation.

—The fragmentation in the Communist world in the 1960's challenged the leading position of the U.S.S.R. and its claim to be the arbiter of orthodoxy. The U.S.S.R. could have reacted by adopting a more aggressive attitude toward the capitalist world in order to assert its militant vigilance; instead, the changing situation and U.S. policy seem to have encouraged Soviet leaders to cooperate in at least a temporary lessening of tension with the West.

—The prospect of achieving a military position of near parity with the United States in strategic forces could have tempted Moscow to use its expanding military capability to strive more determinedly for expansion; in fact, it tempered the militancy of some of its actions and sought to stabilize at least some aspects of the military competition through negotiations.

—The very real economic problems of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe could have reinforced autarkic policies and the tendency to create a closed system; in actuality, the Soviet Union and its allies have come closer to acknowledging the reality of an interdependent world economy.

—Finally, when faced with the hopes of its own people for greater well-being, the Soviet Government could have continued to stimulate the suspicions of the cold war to further isolate Soviet society: in fact, it chose—however inadequately and slowly—to seek to calm its public opinion by joining in a relaxation of tensions.

For the United States the choice was clear: To provide as many incentives as possible for those actions by the Soviet Union most conducive to peace and individual well-being and to overcome the swings between illusionary optimism and harsh antagonism that had characterized most of the postwar period. We could capitalize on the tentative beginnings made in the sixties by taking advantage of the compelling new conditions of the seventies.

We sought to explore every avenue toward an honorable and just accommodation while remaining determined not to settle for mere atmospherics. We relied on a balance of mutual interests rather than Soviet intentions. When challenged—such as in the Middle East, the Caribbean, or Berlin—we always responded firmly. And when Soviet policy moved toward conciliation, we sought to turn what may have started as a tactical maneuver into a durable pattern of conduct.

Our approach proceeds from the conviction that, in moving forward across a wide spectrum of negotiations, progress in one area adds momentum to progress in other areas. If we succeed, then no agreement stands alone as an isolated accomplishment vulnerable to the next crisis. We did not invent the interrelationship between issues expressed in the so-called linkage concept; it was a reality because of the range of problems and areas in which the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union impinge on each other. We have looked for progress in a series of agreements settling specific political issues, and we have sought to relate these to a new standard of international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age. By acquiring a stake in this network of relationships with the West, the Soviet Union may become more conscious of what it would lose by a return to confrontation. Indeed, it is our hope that it will develop a self-interest in fostering the entire process of relaxation of tensions.

B. The Global Necessities

In the late 1940's this nation engaged in a great debate about the role it would play

in the postwar world. We forged a bipartisan consensus on which our policies were built for more than two decades. By the end of the 1960's the international environment which molded that consensus had been transformed. What in the fifties had seemed a solid bloc of adversaries had fragmented into competing centers of power and doctrine; old allies had gained new strength and self-assurance; scores of new nations had emerged and formed blocs of their own; and all nations were being swept up in a technology that was compressing the planet and deepening our mutual dependence.

Then as now, it was clear that the international structure formed in the immediate postwar period was in fundamental flux and that a new international system was emerging. America's historic opportunity was to help shape a new set of international relationships—more pluralistic, less dominated by military power, less susceptible to confrontation, more open to genuine cooperation among the free and diverse elements of the globe. This new, more positive international environment is possible only if all the major powers—and especially the world's strongest nuclear powers—anchor their policies in the principles of moderation and restraint. They no longer have the power to dominate; they do have the capacity to thwart. They cannot build the new international structure alone; they can make its realization impossible by their rivalry.

Détente is all the more important because of what the creation of a new set of international relations demands of us with respect to other countries and areas. President Ford has assigned the highest priority to maintaining the vitality of our partnerships in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Our security ties with our allies are essential, but we also believe that recognition of the interdependence of the contemporary world requires cooperation in many other fields. Cooperation becomes more difficult if the United States is perceived by allied public opinion as an obstacle to peace and if public debate is polarized on the issue of whether friendship with the United States is inconsistent with East-West reconciliation.

One important area for invigorated cooperative action is economic policy. The international economic system has been severely tested. The Middle East war demonstrated dramatically the integral relationship between economics and politics. Clearly, whatever the state of our relations with the U.S.S.R., the international economic agenda must be addressed. But the task would be infinitely more complex if we proceeded in a cold war environment.

International economic problems cut across political dividing lines. All nations, regardless of ideology, face the problems of energy and economic growth, feeding burgeoning populations, regulating the use of the oceans, and preserving the environment.

At a minimum, easing international tensions allows the West to devote more intellectual and material resources to these problems. As security concerns recede, humane concerns come again to the fore. International organizations take on greater significance and responsibility, less obstructed by cold war antagonisms. The climate of lessened tensions even opens prospects for broader collaboration between East and West. It is significant that some of these global issues—such as energy, cooperation in science and health, and the protection of the environment—have already reached the U.S.-Soviet agenda.

In the present period mankind may be menaced as much by international economic and political chaos as by the danger of war. Avoiding either hazard demands a cooperative world structure for which improved East-West relations are essential.

III. The Evolution of Detente—The Balance of Risks and Incentives

The course of détente has not been smooth or even. As late as 1969, Soviet-American relations were ambiguous and uncertain. To be sure, negotiations on Berlin and SALT had begun. But the tendency toward confrontation appeared dominant.

We were challenged by Soviet conduct in the Middle East cease-fire of August 1970,

during the Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970, on the question of a possible Soviet submarine base in Cuba, in actions around Berlin, and during the Indo-Pakistani war. Soviet policy seemed directed toward fashioning a détente in bilateral relations with our Western European allies, while challenging the United States.

We demonstrated then, and stand ready to do so again, that America will not yield to pressure or the threat of force. We made clear then, as we do today, that détente cannot be pursued selectively in one area or toward one group of countries only. For us détente is indivisible.

Finally, a breakthrough was made in 1971 on several fronts—in the Berlin settlement, in the SALT talks, in other arms control negotiations—that generated the process of détente. It consists of these elements: An elaboration of principles; political discussions to solve outstanding issues and to reach cooperative agreements; economic relations; and arms control negotiations, particularly those concerning strategic arms.

A. *The Elaboration of Principles*

Cooperative relations, in our view, must be more than a series of isolated agreements. They must reflect an acceptance of mutual obligations and of the need for accommodation and restraint.

To set forth principles of behavior in formal documents is hardly to guarantee their observance. But they are reference points against which to judge actions and set goals.

The first of the series of documents is the statement of principles signed in Moscow in 1972.² It affirms: (1) the necessity of avoiding confrontation; (2) the imperative of mutual restraint; (3) the rejection of attempts to exploit tensions to gain unilateral advantages; (4) the renunciation of claims of special influence in the world; and (5) the willingness, on this new basis, to coexist peacefully and build a firm long-term relationship.

An Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War based on these principles was

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p. 898.

signed in 1973.³ It affirms that the objective of the policies of the United States and the U.S.S.R. is to remove the danger of nuclear conflict and the use of nuclear weapons. But it emphasizes that this objective presupposes the renunciation of *any* war or threat of war not only by the two nuclear superpowers against each other but also against allies or third countries. In other words, the principle of restraint is not confined to relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.; it is explicitly extended to include *all* countries.

These statements of principles are not an American concession; indeed, we have been affirming them unilaterally for two decades. Nor are they a legal contract; rather, they are an aspiration and a yardstick by which we assess Soviet behavior. We have never intended to "rely" on Soviet compliance with every principle; we do seek to elaborate standards of conduct which the Soviet Union would violate only to its cost. And if over the long term the more durable relationship takes hold, the basic principles will give it definition, structure, and hope.

B. *Political Dialogue and Cooperative Agreements*

One of the features of the current phase of U.S.-Soviet relations is the unprecedented consultation between leaders, either face to face or through diplomatic channels.

Although consultation has reached a level of candor and frequency without precedent, we know that consultation does not guarantee that policies are compatible. It does provide a mechanism for the resolution of differences before they escalate to the point of public confrontation and commit the prestige of both sides.

The channel between the leaders of the two nations has proved its worth in many crises; it reduces the risk that either side might feel driven to act or to react on the basis of incomplete or confusing information. The channel of communication has continued without interruption under President Ford.

But crisis management is not an end in itself. The more fundamental goal is the elaboration of a political relationship which in time will make crises less likely to arise.

It was difficult in the past to speak of a U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship in any normal sense of the phrase. Trade was negligible. Contacts between various institutions and between the peoples of the two countries were at best sporadic. There were no cooperative efforts in science and technology. Cultural exchange was modest. As a result, there was no tangible inducement toward cooperation and no penalty for aggressive behavior. Today, by joining our efforts even in such seemingly apolitical fields as medical research or environmental protection, we and the Soviets can benefit not only our two peoples but all mankind; in addition, we generate incentives for restraint.

Since 1972 we have concluded agreements on a common effort against cancer, on research to protect the environment, on studying the use of the ocean's resources, on the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, on studying methods for conserving energy, on examining construction techniques for regions subject to earthquakes, and on devising new transportation methods. Other bilateral areas for cooperation include an agreement on preventing incidents at sea, an agreement to exchange information and research methods in agriculture, and the training of astronauts for the Soviet-U.S. rendezvous-and-docking mission planned for 1975.

Each project must be judged by the concrete benefits it brings. But in their sum—in their exchange of information and people as well as in their establishment of joint mechanisms—they also constitute a commitment in both countries to work together across a broad spectrum.

C. *The Economic Component*

During the period of the cold war, economic contact between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. was virtually nonexistent. Even then, many argued that improved economic relations might mitigate international tensions; in fact, there were several congress-

³ For text, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1973, p. 160.

sional resolutions to that effect. But recurrent crises prevented any sustained progress.

The period of confrontation should have left little doubt, however, that economic boycott would not transform the Soviet system or impose upon it a conciliatory foreign policy. The U.S.S.R. was quite prepared to maintain heavy military outlays and to concentrate on capital growth by using the resources of the Communist world alone. Moreover, it proved impossible to mount an air-tight boycott in practice since, over time, most if not all the other major industrial countries became involved in trade with the East.

The question, then, became how trade and economic contact—in which the Soviet Union is obviously interested—could serve the purposes of peace. On the one hand, economic relations cannot be separated from the political context. Clearly, we cannot be asked to reward hostile conduct with economic benefits, even if in the process we deny ourselves some commercially profitable opportunities. On the other hand, when political relations begin to normalize, it is difficult to explain why economic relations should not be normalized as well.

We have approached the question of economic relations with deliberation and circumspection and as an act of policy, not primarily of commercial opportunity. As political relations have improved on a broad basis, economic issues have been dealt with on a comparably broad front. A series of interlocking economic agreements with the U.S.S.R. has been negotiated side by side with the political progress already noted. The 25-year-old lend-lease debt was settled; the reciprocal extension of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment was negotiated, together with safeguards against the possible disruption of our markets and a series of practical arrangements to facilitate the conduct of business in the U.S.S.R. by American firms; our government credit facilities were made available for trade with the U.S.S.R.; and a maritime agreement regulating the carriage of goods has been signed.

These were all primarily regulatory agree-

ments conferring no immediate benefits on the Soviet Union but serving as blueprints for an expanded economic relationship if the political improvement continued.

This approach commanded widespread domestic approval. It was considered a natural outgrowth of political progress. At no time were issues regarding Soviet domestic political practices raised. Indeed, not until *after* the 1972 agreements was the Soviet domestic order invoked as a reason for arresting or reversing the progress so painstakingly achieved. This sudden *ex post facto* form of linkage raises serious questions:

—For the Soviet Union, it casts doubt on our reliability as a negotiating partner.

—The significance of trade, originally envisaged as only one ingredient of a complex and evolving relationship, is inflated out of all proportion.

—The hoped-for results of policy become transformed into preconditions for any policy at all.

We recognize the depth and validity of the moral concerns expressed by those who oppose, or put conditions on, expanded trade with the U.S.S.R. But a sense of proportion must be maintained about the leverage our economic relations give us with the U.S.S.R.:

—Denial of economic relations cannot by itself achieve what it failed to do when it was part of a determined policy of political and military confrontation.

—The economic bargaining ability of most-favored-nation status is marginal. MFN grants no special privilege to the U.S.S.R.; in fact it is a misnomer, since we have such agreements with over 100 countries. To enact it would be to remove a discriminatory holdover of the days of the cold war. To continue to deny it is more a political than an economic act.

—Trade benefits are not a one-way street; the laws of mutual advantage operate, or there will be no trade.

—The technology that flows to the U.S.S.R. as a result of expanded U.S.-Soviet trade may have a few indirect uses for military

production. But with our continuing restrictions on strategic exports, we can maintain adequate controls—and we intend to do so. Moreover, the same technology has been available to the U.S.S.R. and will be increasingly so from other non-Communist sources. Boycott denies us a means of influence and possible commercial gain; it does not deprive the U.S.S.R. of technology.

—The actual and potential flow of credits from the United States represents a tiny fraction of the capital available to the U.S.S.R. domestically and elsewhere, including Western Europe and Japan. But it does allow us to exercise some influence through our ability to control the scope of trade relationships.

—Over time, trade and investment may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system, invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political equation.

D. *The Strategic Relationship*

We cannot expect to relax international tensions or achieve a more stable international system should the two strongest nuclear powers conduct an unrestrained strategic arms race. Thus, perhaps the single most important component of our policy toward the Soviet Union is the effort to limit strategic weapons competition.

The competition in which we now find ourselves is historically unique:

—Each side has the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it.

—Failure to maintain equivalence could jeopardize not only our freedom but our very survival.

—The lead time for technological innovation is so long, yet the pace of change so relentless, that the arms race and strategic policy itself are in danger of being driven by technological necessity.

—When nuclear arsenals reach levels involving thousands of launchers and over 10,000 warheads, and when the character-

istics of the weapons of the two sides are so incommensurable, it becomes difficult to determine what combination of numbers of strategic weapons and performance capabilities would give one side a militarily and politically useful superiority. At a minimum, clear changes in the strategic balance can be achieved only by efforts so enormous and by increments so large that the very attempt would be highly destabilizing.

—The prospect of a decisive military advantage, even if theoretically possible, is politically intolerable; neither side will passively permit a massive shift in the nuclear balance. Therefore the probable outcome of each succeeding round of competition is the restoration of a strategic equilibrium, but at increasingly higher levels of forces.

—The arms race is driven by political as well as military factors. While a decisive advantage is hard to calculate, the *appearance* of inferiority—whatever its actual significance—can have serious political consequences. With weapons that are unlikely to be used and for which there is no operational experience, the psychological impact can be crucial. Thus each side has a high incentive to achieve not only the reality but the appearance of equality. In a very real sense each side shapes the military establishment of the other.

If we are driven to it, the United States will sustain an arms race. Indeed, it is likely that the United States would emerge from such a competition with an edge over the Soviet Union in most significant categories of strategic arms. But the political or military benefit which would flow from such a situation would remain elusive. Indeed, after such an evolution it might well be that *both* sides would be worse off than before the race began. The enormous destructiveness of weapons and the uncertainties regarding their effects combine to make the massive use of such weapons increasingly incredible.

The Soviet Union must realize that the overall relationship with the United States will be less stable if strategic balance is sought through unrestrained competitive

programs. Sustaining the buildup requires exhortations by both sides that in time may prove incompatible with restrained international conduct. The very fact of a strategic arms race has a high potential for feeding attitudes of hostility and suspicion on both sides, transforming the fears of those who demand more weapons into self-fulfilling prophecies.

The American people can be asked to bear the cost and political instability of a race which is doomed to stalemate only if it is clear that every effort has been made to prevent it. That is why every President since Eisenhower has pursued negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms while maintaining the military programs essential to strategic balance.

There are more subtle strategic reasons for our interest in SALT. Our supreme strategic purpose is the prevention of nuclear conflict through the maintenance of sufficient political and strategic power. Estimates of what constitutes "sufficiency" have been contentious. Our judgments have changed with our experience in deploying these weapons and as the Soviets expanded their own nuclear forces. When in the late 1960's it became apparent that the Soviet Union, for practical purposes, had achieved a kind of rough parity with the United States, we adopted the current strategic doctrine.

We determined that stability required strategic forces invulnerable to attack, thus removing the incentive on either side to strike first. Reality reinforced doctrine. As technology advanced, it became apparent that neither side *could* realistically expect to develop a credible disarming capability against the other except through efforts so gigantic as to represent a major threat to political stability.

One result of our doctrine was basing our strategic planning on the assumption that in the unlikely event of nuclear attack, the President should have a wide range of options available in deciding at what level and against what targets to respond. We designed our strategic forces with a substantial measure of flexibility, so that the U.S. re-

sponse need not include an attack on the aggressor's cities—thus inviting the destruction of our own—but could instead hit other targets. Translating this capability into a coherent system of planning became a novel, and as yet uncompleted, task of great complexity; but progress has been made. In our view such flexibility enhances the certainty of retaliation and thereby makes an attack less likely. Above all, it preserves the capability for human decision even in the ultimate crisis.

Another, at first seemingly paradoxical, result was a growing commitment to negotiated agreements on strategic arms. SALT became one means by which we and the Soviet Union could enhance stability by setting mutual constraints on our respective forces and by gradually reaching an understanding of the doctrinal considerations that underlie the deployment of nuclear weapons. Through SALT the two sides can reduce the suspicions and fears which fuel strategic competition. SALT, in the American conception, is a means to achieve strategic stability by methods other than the arms race.

Our specific objectives have been:

1. To break the momentum of ever-increasing levels of armaments;
2. To control certain qualitative aspects—particularly MIRV's [multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles];
3. To moderate the pace of new deployments; and
4. Ultimately, to achieve reductions in force levels.

The SALT agreements already signed represent a major contribution to strategic stability and a significant first step toward a longer term and possibly broader agreement.

When the first agreements in 1972 were signed, the future strategic picture was not bright:

—The Soviet Union was engaged in a dynamic program that had closed the numerical gap in ballistic missiles; they were deploying three types of ICBM's [interconti-

mental ballistic missiles], at a rate of over 200 annually, and launching on the average eight submarines a year with 16 ballistic missiles each.

—The United States had ended its numerical buildup in the late 1960's at a level of 1,054 ICBM's and 656 SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles]. We were emphasizing technological improvements, particularly in MIRV's for the Poseidon and Minuteman missiles. Our replacement systems were intended for the late 1970's and early 1980's.

—By most reasonable measurements of strategic power, we held an important advantage, which still continues. But it was also clear that if existing trends were maintained the Soviet Union would, first, exceed our numerical levels by a considerable margin and then develop the same technologies we had already mastered.

The agreements signed in 1972 which limited antiballistic missile [ABM] defenses and froze the level of ballistic missile forces on both sides represented the essential first step toward a less volatile strategic environment.⁴

—By limiting antiballistic missiles to very low levels of deployment, the United States and the Soviet Union removed a potential source of instability; for one side to build an extensive defense for its cities would inevitably be interpreted by the other as a step toward a first-strike capability. Before seeking a disarming capability, a potential aggressor would want to protect his population centers from incoming nuclear weapons.

—Some have alleged that the interim agreement, which expires in October 1977, penalizes the United States by permitting the Soviet Union to deploy more strategic missile launchers, both land based and sea based, than the United States. Such a view is misleading. When the agreement was signed in May 1972, the Soviet Union *already* possessed more land-based intercontinental

ballistic missiles than the United States, and given the pace of its submarine construction program, over the next few years it could have built virtually twice as many nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

The interim agreement confined a dynamic Soviet ICBM program to the then-existing level; it put a ceiling on the heaviest Soviet ICBM's, the weapons that most concern us; and it set an upper limit on the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile program. No American program was abandoned or curtailed. We remained free to deploy multiple warheads. No restraints were placed on bombers—a weapons system in which we have a large advantage. Indeed, the U.S. lead in missile warheads is likely to be somewhat greater at the end of this agreement than at the time of its signature.

The SALT One agreements were the first deliberate attempt by the nuclear superpowers to bring about strategic stability through negotiation. This very process is conducive to further restraint. For example, in the first round of SALT negotiations in 1970–72, both sides bitterly contested the number of ABM sites permitted by the agreement; two years later both sides gave up the right to build more than one site. In sum, we believed when we signed these agreements—and we believe now—that they had reduced the danger of nuclear war, that both sides had acquired some greater interest in restraint, and that the basis had been created for the present effort to reach a broader agreement.

The goal of the current negotiations is an agreement for a 10-year period. We had aimed at extending the interim agreement with adjustments in the numbers and new provisions aimed at dealing with the problem of MIRV's. We found, however, that our negotiation for a two- or three-year extension was constantly threatened with irrelevance by the ongoing programs of both sides that were due to be deployed at the end of or just after the period. This distorted the negotiation and, indeed, devalued its significance. We shifted to the 10-year approach because the period is long enough to cover

⁴For texts of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, pp. 918 and 920.

all current and planned forces but not so long as to invite hedges that would defeat the purpose of an arms control agreement. In fact, it invites a slowing down of planned deployments; further, a period of this length will allow us to set realistic ceilings that represent more than a temporary plateau from which to launch a new cycle in the arms race. Future reductions thus become a realistic objective.

With respect to ceilings on strategic forces, we have defined our goal as essential equivalence in strategic capabilities. What constitutes equivalence involves subjective judgment. Because U.S. and Soviet forces are different from each other—in number and size of weapons, in technological refinement, in performance characteristics—they are difficult to compare.

Yet in the negotiations we shall, for example, have to compare heavy bombers, in which the United States is ahead, with heavy missiles, which the U.S.S.R. has emphasized. We shall have to decide whether to insist on equivalence in every category or whether to permit trade-offs in which an advantage in one category compensates for a disadvantage in another. The equation does not remain static. We shall have to relate present advantages to potential development, existing disparities to future trends. This is a difficult process, but we are confident that it can be solved.

Numerical balance is no longer enough. To achieve stability, it will be necessary to consider as well the impact of technological change in such areas as missile throw weight, multiple reentry vehicles, and missile accuracy. The difficulty is that we are dealing not only with disparate levels of forces but with disparate capabilities, MIRV technology being a conspicuous example. The rate of increase of warheads is surging far ahead of the increase in delivery vehicles. This is why the United States considers MIRV limitation an essential component of the next phase of the SALT negotiations. If we fail, the rate of technology will outstrip our capacity to design effective limitations; constantly proliferating warheads of increasing

accuracy will overwhelm fixed launchers. An arms race will be virtually inevitable.

The third area for negotiations is the pace of deployments of new or more modern systems. Neither side will remain in its present position without change for another decade. The Soviets are already embarked on testing an initial deployment of a third generation of ICBM's and on a third modification of submarine-launched missiles—though the rate of deployment so far has been far short of the maximum pace of the late sixties.

For our part, we are planning to introduce the Trident system and to replace the B-52 force with the B-1; we also have the capability of improving our Minuteman ICBM system, adding to the number as well as capability of MIRV missiles, and if we choose, of deploying mobile systems, land based or airborne. Thus our task is to see whether the two sides can agree to slow the pace of deployment so that modernization is less likely to threaten the overall balance or trigger an excessive reaction.

Finally, a 10-year program gives us a chance to negotiate reductions. Reductions have occasionally been proposed as an alternative to ceilings; they are often seen as more desirable or at least easier to negotiate. In fact, it is a far more complicated problem. Reductions in launchers, for example, if not accompanied by restrictions on the number of warheads, will only magnify vulnerability. The fewer the aim points, the simpler it would be to calculate an attack. At the same time, reductions will have to proceed from some baseline and must therefore be preceded by agreed ceilings—if only of an interim nature. But a 10-year program should permit the negotiation of stable ceilings resulting from the start of a process of reductions.

Détente is admittedly far from a modern equivalent to the kind of stable peace that characterized most of the 19th century. But it is a long step away from the bitter and aggressive spirit that has characterized so much of the postwar period. When linked to such broad and unprecedented projects as

SALT, détente takes on added meaning and opens prospects of a more stable peace. SALT agreements should be seen as steps in a process leading to progressively greater stability. It is in that light that SALT and related projects will be judged by history.

IV. An Assessment of Detente

Where has the process of détente taken us so far? What are the principles that must continue to guide our course?

Major progress has been made:

—Berlin's potential as Europe's perennial flashpoint has been substantially reduced through the quadripartite agreement of 1971. The United States considers strict adherence to the agreement a major test of détente.

—We and our allies are launched on negotiations with the Warsaw Pact and other countries in the conference on European security and cooperation, a conference designed to foster East-West dialogue and cooperation.

—At the same time, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are negotiating the reduction of their forces in Central Europe.

—The honorable termination of America's direct military involvement in Indochina and the substantial lowering of regional conflict were made possible by many factors. But this achievement would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, in an era of Soviet and Chinese hostility toward the United States.

—America's principal alliances have proved their durability in a new era. Many feared that détente would undermine them. Instead, détente has helped to place our alliance ties on a more enduring basis by removing the fear that friendship with the United States involved the risk of unnecessary confrontation with the U.S.S.R.

—Many incipient crises with the Soviet Union have been contained or settled without ever reaching the point of public disagreement. The world has been freer of East-West tensions and conflict than in the fifties and sixties.

—A series of bilateral cooperative agreements has turned the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a far more positive direction.

—We have achieved unprecedented agreements in arms limitation and measures to avoid accidental war.

—New possibilities for positive U.S.-Soviet cooperation have emerged on issues in which the globe is interdependent: science and technology, environment, energy.

These accomplishments do not guarantee peace. But they have served to lessen the rigidities of the past and offer hope for a better era. Despite fluctuations a trend has been established; the character of international politics has been markedly changed.

It is too early to judge conclusively whether this change should be ascribed to tactical considerations. But in a sense, that is immaterial. For whether the change is temporary and tactical, or lasting and basic, our task is essentially the same: To transform that change into a permanent condition devoted to the purpose of a secure peace and mankind's aspiration for a better life. A tactical change sufficiently prolonged becomes a lasting transformation.

But the whole process can be jeopardized if it is taken for granted. As the cold war recedes in memory, détente can come to seem so natural that it appears safe to levy progressively greater demands on it. The temptation to combine détente with increasing pressure on the Soviet Union will grow. Such an attitude would be disastrous. We would not accept it from Moscow; Moscow will not accept it from us. We will finally wind up again with the cold war and fail to achieve either peace or any humane goal.

To be sure, the process of détente raises serious issues for many people. Let me deal with these in terms of the principles which underlie our policy.

First, if détente is to endure, both sides must benefit.

There is no question that the Soviet Union obtains benefits from détente. On what other grounds would the tough-minded members of the Politburo sustain it? But the essential

point surely must be that détente serves American and world interests as well. If these coincide with some Soviet interests, this will only strengthen the durability of the process.

On the global scale, in terms of the conventional measures of power, influence, and position, our interests have not suffered—they have generally prospered. In many areas of the world, the influence and the respect we enjoy are greater than was the case for many years. It is also true that Soviet influence and presence are felt in many parts of the world. But this is a reality that would exist without détente. The record shows that détente does not deny us the opportunity to react to it and to offset it.

Our bilateral relations with the U.S.S.R. are beginning to proliferate across a broad range of activities in our societies. Many of the projects now underway are in their infancy; we have many safeguards against unequal benefits—in our laws, in the agreements themselves, and in plain common sense. Of course, there are instances where the Soviet Union has obtained some particular advantage. But we seek in each agreement or project to provide for benefits that are mutual. We attempt to make sure that there are trade-offs among the various programs that are implemented. Americans surely are the last who need fear hard bargaining or lack confidence in competition.

Second, building a new relationship with the Soviet Union does not entail any devaluation of traditional alliance relations.

Our approach to relations with the U.S.S.R. has always been, and will continue to be, rooted in the belief that the cohesion of our alliances, and particularly the Atlantic alliance, is a precondition to establishing a more constructive relationship with the U.S.S.R.

Crucial, indeed unique, as may be our concern with Soviet power, we do not delude ourselves that we should deal with it alone. When we speak of Europe and Japan as representing centers of power and influence, we describe not merely an observable fact but an indispensable element in the equilibrium needed to keep the world at peace. The coop-

eration and partnership between us transcend formal agreements; they reflect values and traditions not soon, if ever, to be shared with our adversaries.

Inevitably, a greater sense of drama accompanies our dealings with the Soviet Union, because the central issues of war and peace cannot be other than dramatic. It was precisely a recognition of this fact and our concern that alliance relations not be taken for granted that led to the American initiative in April of 1973 to put new emphasis on our traditional associations. We sought political acts of will which would transcend the technical issues at hand, symbolize our enduring goals, and thus enhance our fundamental bonds. Much has been accomplished. The complications attendant to adapting U.S.-European relations should not be confused with their basic character. We were tested in difficult conditions that do not affect our central purposes. Today relations with Europe and Japan are strong and improving. We have made progress in developing common positions on security, détente, and energy. The experience of the past year has demonstrated that there is no contradiction between vigorous, organic alliance relations and a more positive relationship with adversaries; indeed, they are mutually reinforcing.

Third, the emergence of more normal relations with the Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to maintain our national defense.

There is a tendency in democratic societies to relax as dangers seem to recede; there is an inclination to view the maintenance of strength as incompatible with relaxation of tensions rather than its precondition. But this is primarily a question of leadership. We shall attempt to be vigilant to the dangers facing America. This administration will not be misled—or mislead—on issues of national defense. At the same time, we do not accept the proposition that we need crises to sustain our defense. A society that needs artificial crises to do what is needed for survival will soon find itself in mortal danger.

Fourth, we must know what can and can-

not be achieved in changing human conditions in the East.

The question of dealing with Communist governments has troubled the American people and the Congress since 1917. There has always been a fear that by working with a government whose internal policies differ so sharply with our own we are in some manner condoning these policies or encouraging their continuation. Some argue that until there is a genuine "liberalization"—or signs of serious progress in this direction—all elements of conciliation in Soviet policy must be regarded as temporary and tactical. In that view, demands for internal changes must be the precondition for the pursuit of a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

Our view is different. We shall insist on responsible international behavior by the Soviet Union and use it as the primary index of our relationship. Beyond this we will use our influence to the maximum to alleviate suffering and to respond to humane appeals. We know what we stand for, and we shall leave no doubt about it.

Both as a government and as a people we *have* made the attitude of the American people clear on countless occasions in ways that have produced results. I believe that both the executive and the Congress, each playing its proper role, have been effective. With respect to the specific issue of emigration:

—The education exit tax of 1971 is no longer being collected. We have been assured that it will not be reapplied.

—Hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government have been given increased attention, and remedies have been forthcoming in many well-known instances.

—The volume of Jewish emigration has increased from a trickle to tens of thousands.

—And we are now moving toward an understanding that should significantly diminish the obstacles to emigration and ease the hardship of prospective emigrants.

We have accomplished much. But we cannot demand that the Soviet Union, in effect, suddenly reverse five decades of Soviet, and centuries of Russian, history. Such an at-

tempt would be futile and at the same time hazard all that has already been achieved. Changes in Soviet society have already occurred, and more will come. But they are most likely to develop through an evolution that can best go forward in an environment of decreasing international tensions. A renewal of the cold war will hardly encourage the Soviet Union to change its emigration policies or adopt a more benevolent attitude toward dissent.

V. Agenda for the Future

Détente is a process, not a permanent achievement. The agenda is full and continuing. Obviously the main concern must be to reduce the sources of potential conflict. This requires efforts in several interrelated areas:

—The military competition in all its aspects must be subject to increasingly firm restraints by both sides.

—Political competition, especially in moments of crisis, must be guided by the principles of restraint set forth in the documents described earlier. Crises there will be, but the United States and the Soviet Union have a special obligation deriving from the unimaginable military power that they wield and represent. Exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain is not acceptable.

—Restraint in crises must be augmented by cooperation in removing the causes of crises. There have been too many instances, notably in the Middle East, which demonstrate that policies of unilateral advantage sooner or later run out of control and lead to the brink of war, if not beyond.

—The process of negotiations and consultation must be continuous and intense. But no agreement between the nuclear superpowers can be durable if made over the heads of other nations which have a stake in the outcome. We should not seek to impose peace; we can, however, see that our own actions and conduct are conducive to peace.

In the coming months we shall strive:

—To complete the negotiations for compre-

hensive and equitable limitations on strategic arms until at least 1985;

—To complete the multilateral negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe, so that security will be enhanced for all the countries of Europe;

—To conclude the conference on European security and cooperation in a manner that promotes both security and human aspirations;

—To continue the efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries without depriving those countries of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy;

—To complete ratification of the recently negotiated treaty banning underground nuclear testing by the United States and U.S.S.R. above a certain threshold;

—To begin negotiations on the recently agreed effort to overcome the possible dangers of environmental modification techniques for military purposes; and

—To resolve the longstanding attempts to cope with the dangers of chemical weaponry.

We must never forget that the process of détente depends ultimately on habits and modes of conduct that extend beyond the letter of agreements to the spirit of relations as a whole. This is why the whole process must be carefully nurtured.

In cataloging the desirable, we must take care not to jeopardize what is attainable. We must consider what alternative policies are available and what their consequences would be. And the implications of alternatives must be examined not just in terms of a single issue but for how they might affect the entire range of Soviet-American relations and the prospects for world peace.

We must assess not only individual challenges to détente but also their cumulative impact:

If we justify each agreement with Moscow only when we can show unilateral gain,

If we strive for an elusive strategic "superiority,"

If we systematically block benefits to the Soviet Union,

If we try to transform the Soviet system by pressure,

If in short, we look for final results before we agree to any results, then we would be reviving the doctrines of liberation and massive retaliation of the 1950's. And we would do so at a time when Soviet physical power and influence on the world are greater than a quarter century ago when those policies were devised and failed. The futility of such a course is as certain as its danger.

Let there be no question, however, that Soviet actions could destroy détente as well:

If the Soviet Union uses détente to strengthen its military capacity in all fields,

If in crises it acts to sharpen tension,

If it does not contribute to progress toward stability,

If it seeks to undermine our alliances,

If it is deaf to the urgent needs of the least developed and the emerging issues of interdependence, then it in turn tempts a return to the tensions and conflicts we have made such efforts to overcome. The policy of confrontation has worked for neither of the superpowers.

We have insisted toward the Soviet Union that we cannot have the atmosphere of détente without the substance. It is equally clear that the substance of détente will disappear in an atmosphere of hostility.

We have profound differences with the Soviet Union—in our values, our methods, our vision of the future. But it is these very differences which compel any responsible administration to make a major effort to create a more constructive relationship.

We face an opportunity that was not possible 25 years, or even a decade, ago. If that opportunity is lost, its moment will not quickly come again. Indeed, it may not come at all.

As President Kennedy pointed out: "For in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."⁵

⁵ For President Kennedy's commencement address at American University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1963, p. 2.

Department Surveys U.S. Policy and Developments in South Asia

Following is a statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on September 19.¹

It has been 18 months since my predecessor, Mr. Sisco, now Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, met with you for a similar review of the situation in South Asia and of our relations with the nations of that region. The period has witnessed progress toward regional reconciliation and a strengthening of our own bilateral ties with individual countries but also a distressing deterioration in South Asian economic prospects, largely because of factors external to the region.

South Asia is an area that has long involved the concern and interest of the United States. The record of our contributions in development and food assistance, and of relief in the case of all too frequent natural disasters, is evidence of the strong humanitarian regard of the American people for the people of South Asia and their hopes for development. While South Asia is not central to U.S. global strategic concerns, it is contiguous geographically to the Soviet Union and China, and their rivalries have an important impact on the area.

Our principal interest in a strategic sense has been to keep South Asia from becoming an area of great-power confrontation or conflict. We seek no political advantage, nor do we wish to impose any economic or political system. We look to other powers to exercise similar restraint, and with a regard for the legitimate interests of others. Within this context, we wish to see South Asia develop as a region which is characterized by:

—Peace and stability, so that energies may be fully devoted to the urgent tasks of development;

—Balanced relations with outside powers, in order that regional problems should be settled peacefully in a regional context;

—Accelerating development, particularly in the critical agricultural sector and complemented by effective measures to reduce population pressures; and

—Over the longer term, meaningful progress toward satisfactory regional relationships resting on the secure independence and integrity of each of the states of the area.

Against this background of what we seek, let us look now at the record of what has happened. In the recent past, regional trends as a whole have seemed to us reasonably encouraging from the political perspective, while the reverse is true on the economic front. Turning first to the good news, the process of peaceful reconciliation of regional problems initiated by Mrs. Gandhi [Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi] and Prime Minister [of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto at Simla in July 1972 has again been resumed. For a period after the Indian nuclear test, the Simla process was stalled, but Indian and Pakistani representatives resumed their talks recently with discussions in Islamabad September 12–14 on ways to restore telecommunications and travel links existing before 1971. Last year, with the active participation of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan agreed to a massive exchange of POW's and civilians stranded by the results of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the breakup of Pakistan. Over 300,000 people were moved, largely in an airlift supervised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to which this government contributed \$4.55 million. In related developments, Bangladesh agreed not to try Pakistani military personnel charged with committing war crimes, and Pakistan and Bangladesh exchanged mutual diplomatic recognition.

Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India have thus taken decisive steps to heal the wounds of

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

war and to adjust to the new situation created by the events of 1971. The United States welcomes these developments. We hope that the steps already taken foreshadow further advances toward a new era of regional stability.

Some developments, however, have aroused old suspicions and have had an unsettling effect on political relations. Among these was the explosion by India of an underground nuclear device on May 18. This event obviously introduced a new element into regional calculations, although it does not in itself alter the balance of power in the area. The implications for regional stability and the effect on the wider issues of nuclear non-proliferation cannot yet be fully assessed. Our own position is clear: We will continue to support nuclear nonproliferation as a fundamental element in our pursuit of world peace. We remain opposed to nuclear proliferation because of the adverse impact on regional and global stability.

A second source of concern has been increased tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. From our perspective, both sides seem to desire a peaceful resolution of their differences. An effective and constructive dialogue, however, has failed to develop either in public or in private. The present atmosphere is a source of concern to this government and to others who are friends of both.

Since the dramatic events of 1971, however, it has been the chronic problems of poverty, inadequate food supplies, and unchecked population growth rather than politics that have preempted the attention of South Asian governments and dominated their relations with the outside world. No region has been more seriously affected or less capable of initiating offsetting policies in the face of the unprecedented worldwide price inflation in basic commodities such as petroleum, fertilizer, and food grains. Hardest hit has been Bangladesh, where an unprecedented international relief and rehabilitation effort mounted after independence has not yet proved adequate to create the conditions necessary for the beginning of solid

development. Another serious flood this year has further exacerbated an economic crisis which will engage the attention of this government and other donor nations at an IBRD-sponsored [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] meeting next month.

A generally below normal monsoon, coupled with decreased availability of fertilizer, has also placed Indian hopes for food-grain self-sufficiency in serious jeopardy and contributed to the stagnation and galloping inflation that have dimmed its economic prospects. Of the major countries of South Asia, Pakistan has perhaps managed best to moderate the damage of recent international economic events. Pakistan's recovery from the effects of both civil war and last year's flood has been impressive, but continuing balance of payments difficulties cause some concern.

For both humanitarian reasons and in the interests of promoting a just and stable international economic system, the United States has continued to be an important participant in international efforts to encourage economic development in South Asia. Since 1971, new U.S. aid commitments, including concessional food sales, to Bangladesh and Pakistan have approached \$500 million for each country. We have participated in debt-rescheduling exercises for India and continue to discuss the framework for a cooperative economic relationship with that country. We have small but important assistance programs in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan.

Recent developments, however, have brought home as never before the point that this country on a bilateral basis cannot substantially alter the development prospects of the nations of South Asia. There is a growing recognition that these problems are international in scope and require international solutions. For this reason we have encouraged global conferences on both population and food in a search for new ideas and increased cooperation. On an urgent basis, however, South Asia also needs substantial direct resource transfers of the traditional

sort, and in this, the burden must be broadly shared, including by those who may possess surplus capital as a result of recent oil price increases. The development of closer ties, political as well as economic, between Iran and the nations of South Asia is an important demonstration of the potential for mutually productive relations between South Asia and the Middle East.

U.S. policy toward each of the countries of South Asia through this period has remained constant and in accord with our broad range of interests that I described at the outset above. Thus in the case of India, it should have become clear to all over the past 18 months that we appreciate the importance to regional questions which is imparted by its power and size. No one should doubt that we wish India well. As the Secretary said in his confirmation hearings:

We recognize India as one of the major forces in the developing world and as a country whose growth and stability are absolutely essential to the peace and stability of South Asia.

In this spirit, we have joined with the Government of India in a conscious search for the framework of what has come to be called a "more mature" relationship. The atmosphere surrounding Indo-American relations has improved significantly during this period. An important contributing factor in this was the agreement on disposition of our large holdings of Indian rupees reached earlier this year, a matter in which we consulted very closely with Congress. We are now engaged in a continuing and serious dialogue with the Indian Government which we trust and hope will result in putting our relationship on a solid long-range footing based on equality, reciprocity, and mutual interests. This is a goal which we are confident the Government of India also seeks.

The development of better relations with India need not be at the expense of any other nation. In particular, we intend to retain and strengthen our excellent relations with Pakistan. The warmth and importance of these ties were demonstrated again during the successful official visit to Washington in

September 1973 by Prime Minister Bhutto. As we made clear at that time, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan remain an important concern of our foreign policy, as it should of all governments who wish to see stability and tranquillity firmly established in the area.

A stable regional system must provide for the prosperity and security of all states, large or small. We are gratified by the success of our efforts to develop good relations with all the nations of South Asia:

—With the new nation of Bangladesh, which we have this week warmly welcomed as a member of the United Nations, we have been generous. The long-suffering Bengalee people can be assured of our continuing sympathy and help.

—In Afghanistan, our traditional friendship has withstood the test of a transition to a new republican regime under the leadership of President Mohammed Daoud.

—We have maintained our warm ties, including a modest assistance program, with the Kingdom of Nepal, whose continued independent national development we strongly support.

—We feel a special affinity to Sri Lanka in its efforts to achieve economic development while maintaining a vigorous democracy. We are heartened by our continuing friendly relations.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I believe you will agree that our policies toward South Asia are constructive. We are concerned, we are realistic, and we are determined to play a role which complements rather than impedes the natural dynamics of the region itself. We place great stock in a frank and open dialogue with the leaders of South Asia—a dialogue which Secretary Kissinger hopes to pursue when he makes his long-planned visit to South Asia. We have every confidence that this visit will give new meaning and substance to our relationship with what we hope will be an evolving system of progressive and peaceful state relationships in the region.

Senate Asked To Approve Protocol to U.S.-U.S.S.R. ABM Treaty

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. This Protocol was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to its ratification.

The provisions of the Protocol are explained in detail in the report of the Department of State which I enclose. The main effect of the Protocol is to limit further the level and potential extent of ABM deployment permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty. The Protocol furthers fundamental United States objectives set forth in President Nixon's message to the Senate of June 13, 1972 transmitting the Agreements reached at SALT ONE.

The ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of operational ABM systems or their components except at two deployment areas, one centered on a Party's national capital area and the other in a separate area containing ICBM silo launchers. The Protocol would amend the Treaty to limit each Party to a single ABM deployment area at any one time, which level is consistent with the current level of deployment. However, each side would retain the right to remove its ABM system and the components thereof from their present deployment area and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative deployment area permitted by the ABM Treaty. This right may be exercised only once.

This Protocol represents a further advance in the stabilization of the strategic relationship between the United States and the So-

¹ Transmitted on Sept. 19 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. I, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the protocol and the report of the Department of State.

viet Union. It reinforces the ABM Treaty provision that neither Party will establish a nationwide ABM defense or a base for such a defense.

I believe that this Protocol strengthens the ABM Treaty and will, as an integral part of the Treaty, contribute to the reduction of international tension and a more secure and peaceful world in which the security of the United States is fully protected. I strongly recommend that the Senate give it prompt and favorable attention.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 19, 1974.*

U.S.-Australia Extradition Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Australia, signed at Washington on May 14, 1974. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

The Treaty will, upon entry into force, terminate, as between the United States and Australia, the Treaty on Extradition between the United States and Great Britain of December 22, 1931, as made applicable to Australia. This new Treaty represents a substantial modernization with respect to the procedural aspects of extradition.

The Treaty includes in the list of extraditable offenses several which are of prime international concern, such as aircraft hijacking, narcotics offenses, and conspiracy to commit listed offenses.

¹ Transmitted on Aug. 22 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. F, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the text of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

The Treaty will make a significant contribution to the international effort to control narcotics traffic. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 22, 1974.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.

Accession deposited: Bahamas, August 16, 1974.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Ratification deposited: Turkey, September 26, 1974.

Sea, Exploration of

Protocol to the convention of September 12, 1964 (TIAS 7628), for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen August 13, 1970.¹

Ratified by the President: September 18, 1974.

Seals—Antarctic

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, September 10, 1974.²

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement for ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.¹

¹ Not in force.

² Extended to Channel Islands and Isle of Man.

Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, April 10, 1974.

Acceptance deposited: Italy, September 10, 1974.

BILATERAL

Bahamas, The

Agreement relating to pre-sunrise operation of certain standard broadcasting stations. Effected by exchange of notes at Nassau January 30 and September 4, 1974. Entered into force September 4, 1974.

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo September 11 and 12, 1974. Entered into force September 12, 1974.

Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: September 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to September 19 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 366 of September 19.

No.	Date	Subject
†372	9/23	"Foreign Relations" volume on Council on Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria; 1948 (for release Sept. 30).
373	9/23	Kissinger: U.N. General Assembly.
*374	9/23	Study Group 5 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Boulder, Colo., Oct. 18.
*375	9/23	Study Group 6 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Boulder, Colo., Oct. 18.
*376	9/24	Program for the state visit of Italian President Giovanni Leone, Sept. 24-29.
†377	9/24	North Atlantic airfare negotiations.
†378	9/26	Kissinger, Leone: exchange of toasts, Sept. 25.
*379	9/26	Study Group 4 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Oct. 24.
*380	9/27	Regional foreign policy conference, Chicago, Oct. 16.
*381	9/27	Habib sworn in as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (biographic data).
†382	9/27	U.S. and Jordan sign nonscheduled air service agreement (re-write).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

