The original documents are located in Box 41, folder "2000 Memos / Email - Volume I (2)" of the Frederick T. Steeper Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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Date: 5/28/99 5:29 PM

Sender: "Mark McKinnon" <mmckinnon@pstrategies.com>

To: Karl Rove <KR@rove.com>; Fred Steeper; Jan van Lohuizen

<jrvanlo@ibm.net>

Priority: Normal Subject: Message

Forget the following messenger, but consider the message:

AL GORE'S GENERATION X CRISIS

By DICK MORRIS

\_\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_

VOTERS under the age of 35, the so-called Generation X, are the key to the

failure of Vice President Al Gore to gear up his campaign.

Gore is losing the votes of these young parents by 19 points in trial

matchups against Texas Gov. George W. Bush, while President Clinton carried

them against Bob Dole by the same margin, 19 points, in the 1996 election.

This 38-point loss of Gen-X votes is the vice president's biggest problem.

They just don't like Al Gore. They like Clinton but not his hand-picked successor.

Generation X is the swing vote in our politics. Between 1992 and 1996,

President Clinton concentrated on winning the allegiance of these young

parents with his focus on education, gun control, family leave, teen

smoking,

curfews, school uniforms, health insurance reform, tougher anti-

measures and environmental programs. Almost every one of his presidential

initiatives in 1995 and 1996 was aimed squarely at these under-35 voters.

Conscious that they were the key to his re-election, he pounded away at

themes dear to their hearts.

Clinton was extraordinarily successful in switching these young parents into

his column for re-election. In 1992, he carried voters under 35 by only 9

points. In 1996, he won by 19 points. Clinton's Gen-X gains were his biggest

among any age group. While he picked up 10 points among under 35

Judy

voters, he gained only 5 points among Baby Boomers - and actually lost ground with those over 60 years of age between the two elections.

Not only did Generation Xers give Clinton his big gain in the 1996 election,

it's been their support that's gotten him through his difficulties since.

Voters over 35 feel that Clinton should not have been removed from office but only by the relatively tepid margin of 44 percent for removal and 51
percent against. The under-35 set rejects removal by a resounding 37 to 57
percent.

The under-35 voters began their political lives as Republicans. Born in the '70s and late '60s, their earliest political memories are likely to be of Jimmy Carter's ineffectuality and bumbling. They began to reach voting age as Ronald Reagan transformed America and breathed new confidence into our national psyche. They rooted for President Bush in the Gulf War and gave every signal that they would be lifelong Republicans.

The recession of 1991 crossed up that expectations. Economically vulnerable,

these voters suffered massively as unemployment rose and the prospects of a generation reared in the prosperity of the '80s began to fade. They backed Clinton tentatively in 1992 and waited for results.

In July of 1995, the president's polls showed that these young parents would

vote for Dole overwhelmingly. Turned off by Clinton's scandals, they were reverting to the social conservatism of their youth. The president courted them assiduously with his values agenda. Everywhere they turned, there he was with a program to help them raise their kids.

Now, however, Gore is finding that he cannot transfer their allegiance to him. Unless he does so, he's a dead duck.

And Gore should have an edge with these voters. Two of their biggest issues are education and the environment, two Gore strong-points. They're

passionate

advocates of gun controls and frequent users of computer and the  $\operatorname{Internet}$ 

users, the vice president should find that they are his natural constituency.

Still, the Republicans have an opportunity here - they can win back Gen-X if

they come up with programs to deal with parenting issues such as teen

violence, drug use, school killings, drunken driving and the like. If the

is smart, it will focus intently on recovering this generation of voters.

The key to winning these voters is social issues, not economic ones. When

voters are asked which they value more, Clinton's efforts to help the

economy

or his work on social issues like education, crime and the environment, most

voters break even. But the under-35 crowd prefers his work on social issues by strong margins.

If the Republicans are to win these voters back, they must 1) abandon their

refusal to consider federal involvement in education and 2) stop reflexively

opposing gun controls.

For his part, Gore needs to stake out positions on his old area of

expertise:

the environment. These Generation X voters are by far the most ecologically

sensitive of age groups. If it will help stop global warming, they're

willing

to give up gas-guzzling cars and to pay for utility companies to convert

from

coal to natural gas. On the environment, Al Gore should be their model candidate.

Forget Gore's stiffness, his formality, his lack of charisma. Those are not

what is killing him. It is his failure to appeal to the young parents of

America. If the Republicans can get their heads out of the sand and think

past the next tax cut, the disaffection of these young voters presents an

electoral opportunity they must not pass up.

You don't get a second chance often in politics, but Gore's fumbling the young vote gives the Republican Party just that.

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Date: 5/28/99 5:47 PM

Sender: "Mark McKinnon" <mmckinnon@pstrategies.com>

To: Fred Steeper

cc: Karl Rove <KR@rove.com>

Priority: Normal Subject: Re: "Slogan"

hmmm.

I also came away with the notion that "strength" and "dignity" are where we might want to head --

as in Strength and Dignity for a New Century. Or, given your thought:

Strong Leadership and Dignity for a New Century. Or drop the New Century,

although I got a sense that that rang the bells a little. Also sensed "responsibility" is strong: GWB: Dignity, Strength &

Responsibility. Or, Dignity, Responsibility and Strong Leadership.

Somewhere in this direction is where I'm headed.

>From: "Fred Steeper"<fred\_steeper@marketstrategies.com>
>To: <jrvanlo@ibm.net>, <kr@georgewbush.com>,
<mmckinnon@pstrategies.com>
>Subject: "Slogan"
>Date: Thu, May 27, 1999, 11:51 AM

>While we did not get a concensus on what the slogan should be, I think it is
>significant that the four slogans that made the initial cut in all three goups,
>"leadership" is in three of them.

Date: 5/28/99 11:33 PM

Sender: "Jan van Lohuizen" < jrvanlo@ibm.net>

To: "KR@georgewbush.com" <KR@georgewbush.com>; Fred Steeper

**Priority: Normal** 

Subject: Re: FW: CREA sprawl focus groups

As far as regions is concerned, any state that is a) western and

b) has an early

primary. Definitely Arizona, phoenix, possibly Seattle if Washington state ends

up being early.

As far as questions are concerned, this is less for the primary and more for the general. The question is what do you do about it. Someone needs to give them

some of the Gore 'smart growth' rhetoric. To me what 'smart growth' is is no

growht in disguise. What some of the enviro smart growers are saying is that

a) we should stop building roads

b) that people should choke in traffic

so that c) they will move closer in and start using alternative means to get to

work (public transit / bike to work / whatever)

In other words, don't build any more roads, because roads are the cause of (not the result of) suburban growth.

The message i have developed for this in California is something like this:

what's more important to you, to have government stop building roads and have

people change where they live and how they get to work to help fight congestion

vs. government should build roads to meet the (lifestyle) demand of people who

want to live further out. This is not exact language, but hey.

Anyway Gore will be a victim of what the enviro crazies say on this subject,

some of whihe is pretty slick. Enviros' in california, for instance want to use

highway trust funds to buy up green belts and also to use these funds to help

fight air pollution. The second one is pretty popular. I don't have that

rhetoric, but it would sure be nice to say what people react to negatively.

\_Reply Separator\_

Subject: FW: CREA sprawl focus groups

Author: Rove, Karl Date: 5/27/99 6:03 PM

FYI

> -----

> From: Italiacrea@aol.com

```
> Sent:
         Tuesday, May 25, 1999 2:22 PM
      KR@georgewbush.com
> Subject: CREA sprawl focus groups
> Hi Karl,
> Dan Barlett thought I should e-mail you regarding any sprawl
questions /
> messages you'd like to add to the focus groups we're doing.
So far we are
> definitely testing in the LA, California and the Atlanta,
Georgia areas.
> There are some issues specific to those two areas that will be
fairly
> useless
> to anyone else in the country.
> Then we are doing four more groups in generic suburban, urban,
rural
> areas.
> If you have a request for a specific area just let me know.
We're open to
> suggestions. We thought maybe the suburban area might be
somewhere in PA
> (Montgomery County).
> What CREA has done is approach GOP Members on the Hill in the
following
> groups: top ten sprawling counties, top ten electoral states,
Iowa, New
> Hampshire, open Senate seats and Members who won by 57% or
      Then we
> gave them the same option of adding questions we are offering
you
> (although
> nobody knows who else has been approached - and, of course, we
> talking to any other presidential campaigns at all).
> An interesting pattern is emerging. I originally thought that
all rural
> areas would have similar questions, then all urban, etc...
Instead,
> issues
> are breaking down by region - or rather media market.
everyone in
> Colorado reads the same two papers and watches the same news
at night and
> hears over and over again that growth is harming the quality
of life, and
> all the Members, suburban, rural, urban, mountain, have been
adding the
> type of questions to our groups. Same with California
(transportation),
> same
> with Virginia (taxes), same with Georgia (Transportation).
```

```
> If that holds true, an urban sprawl response could be targeted
by media
> market for maximum effectiveness - and one message could help
multiple
> Members in the same area. There may be flaws in my thinking,
but that's
> what
> it looks like is happening. I found it unusual.
> We hope to be done with the groups in mid-June. I will wait
until we have
> your questions.
> CREA will also do original research of somesort on climate
change,
> superfund,
> clean air and clean water. Maybe groups, maybe something
else. Again, we
> are open to suggestions.
> I look forward to hearing from you!
> Italia
```

Date: 5/6/99 1:45 PM

Sender: "Mark McKinnon" <mmckinnon@pstrategies.com>

To: Karl Rove <KR@rove.com>; Fred Steeper; Jan van Lohuizen

<jrvanlo@ibm.net>; Lionel Sosa <Lionel@garcialks.com>; "Luis A. Garcia"

<Luis@garcialks.com>

Priority: Normal Subject: FW: theme

From: StuartPS@aol.com

To: mmckinnon@pstrategies.com

Subject: Re:theme

Date: Thu, May 6, 1999, 10:57 AM

Mark,

Some thoughts on theme.

As you observed, there are two basic kinds of themes: those that describe

the

person and those that describe what the person aspires to accomplish. Of

course, the best themes probably bridge the gap and become a mixture of

both.

For instance, the classic line that Ted Kennedy used in his first Senate

race -- Ted Kennedy: He Can Do More For Massachusetts -- both describes what

he wants to do and also references the fact of who he is, I.E. a Kennedy. By

virtue of the fact that he is a Kennedy, he can do more.

It is my instinct that voters are increasingly cynical about all political

leaders. The tumultuous events of the Clinton years can only served to have

increased this cynicism. Indeed, the Clinton defense was extraordinarily

cynical by design, a combination of "Everybody does it," and "It doesn't

matter." I would bet that the long term trend toward an increase in

political

cynicism has greatly accelerated.

Thus I am afraid that voters will be exceedingly leery of anyone claiming or

suggesting that they are superior on a character or moral front. While there

was a time when we tended to believe that our leaders were made of better

stuff, now people are most likely to reject any such suggestion, unless it

comes from a credible third party. It would be more effective, I believe, to

play the character card in an implied, subtle manner that leads voter to a conclusion rather than stating it as an assumed fact.

The reality is that voters know very little about George W. Bush.

Predominately, of course, they know he is his father's and mother's son and

governor of Texas. This alone, however, can't account for the reception he is

receiving nationally. I believe voters sense certain qualities about George

W. Bush that they embrace: a stability, a sense of self, a good humored

nature, a decent man not given to extremes of the right or left. They sense

that he is a man who knows who he is and is comfortable with that knowledge.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{My}}$  instinct is to lean toward a slogan or theme that references what George

W. Bush wants to do for the country -- and in doing so, hopefully serves

better to inform voters about the man. Such a theme would be an effort to

further define George W. Bush by articulating the mission statement, if you

will, of his Presidency. We learn more about how he is by what he wants to

It is critical that a theme embrace the natural optimism of the man, a

personal trait that is particularly well suited to the times. And it is

critical that a theme strike voters as self-evident and unbombastic. It's my

belief that in the current environment, any themes perceived as overly grand

will be rejected immediately as mere political sophistry.

So, considering all this, let me make the following suggestion for a theme:

George W. Bush: Bringing Out the Best In America.

It is optimistic, simple, consistent with his record of leadership (he's

certainly brought out the best in Texas) and lends itself to rhetorical

expansion. He can lace this thematic into his speeches quite naturally: "I

want to be a President who will bring out the best in America,

to bring us together, not divide us. Give our students the best opportunities to learn, families the best opportunities to prosper...There is so much good in our national spirit, if only we can put aside the negativism of those who try to

divide us..."

It's a theme that is inspirational without being grandiose. It makes you proud and want to nod in agreement, ?Yes, that's what we need.' And it references the Clinton's tawdry legacy without seeming self-righteous. And, for what it's worth, it's a little different from the normal political fare.

It also allows voters to read into it what they want; moderate, conservative

or liberal voters might well have different ideas of what is best for the country but all would agree that we need a leader who will aspire to bring out our best. In that sense, the theme has a bit of a Rorschach test quality

which I think is good.

Hope this is helpful.

```
> >> ----Original Message----
> >> From: Rove, Karl <KR@georgewbush.com>
>>> To: 'Dave Pearson (E-mail)' <Dave-Pearson@email.msn.com>
> >> Date: Friday, April 30, 1999 12:02 PM
> >> Subject: RE: [cobush2000] NM POLL
> >>
> >>
>> > interesting -- what's the source? who ran the poll?
> >> >
> >> >> -----
> >> >> From: Dave Pearson
> >> Sent: Friday, April 30, 1999 12:11 PM
> >> >> To: cobush2000; Bush2000_
> >> >> Subject: [cobush2000] NM POLL
> >> >>
>>>> Here is an interesting poll in a state that Clinton
carried in '96
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Statewide survey in New Mexico
> >> >= n=500
> >> >> Margin of error +/- 4.4%
> >> >> 95 % Confidence level
> >> >> April 22 - 25 (after CO shooting)
> >> >>
> >> Seorge W. Bush
                                51%
 >> >> Al Gore
                                         37%
> >> >> ?
                                               12%
> >> >>
> >> >> Elizabeth Dole
                                    46%
> >> > Al Gore
                                         37%
> >> ?
                                               17%
> >> >>
>>>> Most Important Issue facing US
> >> >>
> >> >> Foreign Policy
> >> >> Education issues
> >> >> Crime/drugs/violence 15%
> >> >> Morals/ethics/values 9%
> >> >> Gun Control
                                        5%
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >>
> >> % @Backup - #1 Online Backup Service Free for 30 days
> >> >> INSTALL now and win a Palm Pilot V!
> >> http://clickhere.egroups.com/click/137
> >> >>
> >> >>
>> >> eGroup home: <a href="http://www.eGroups.com/group/cobush2000">http://www.eGroups.com/group/cobush2000</a>
> >> > <a href="http://www.eGroups.com"> http://www.eGroups.com"> Simplifying group</a>
communications
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >>
> >>
```

Date: 4/30/99 3:46 PM

Sender: "Rove Karl" < KR@georgewbush.com>

To: Fred Steeper; "'Jan van Lohuizen (E-mail)'" <JRVANLO@IBM.NET>

**Priority: Normal** 

Subject: FW: [cobush2000] NM POLL

```
Dave Pearson
> From:
           Friday, April 30, 1999 3:46 PM
> Sent:
> To:
             Rove, Karl
> Subject:
             Re: [cobush2000] NM POLL
> We asked respondents to state their race... and we asked if
Spanish is
> spoken in the home on a regular basis.
> Among self-identified Hispanics:
> Bush 42 Gore 45
> Among HH where Spanish is spoken
> Bush 41% Gore 50%
> Among women under 40
> Bush
         55%
                Gore
                        35%
> Dole
         33% Gore
                        45%
> Among women over 40
> Bush 49%
               Gore 41%
> Dole 51% Gore 37%
> Do you want a whole set of Pres. crosstabs?
> Any news on the e-campaign, etc. front?
> ----Original Message----
> From: Rove, Karl < KR@georgewbush.com>
> To: 'Dave Pearson (E-mail)' <Dave-Pearson@email.msn.com>
> Date: Friday, April 30, 1999 1:23 PM
> Subject: RE: [cobush2000] NM POLL
>
> >t would be great if you had the #s among Hispanics, Bush v
Gore
> >
> >> -----
> >> From: Dave Pearson
> >> Sent: Friday, April 30, 1999 1:25 PM
> >> To: Rove, Karl
> >> Subject: Re: [cobush2000] NM POLL
> >>
> >> I'm the source, Chris Wilson did the poll. It was testing
Bingaman...
>>> Redmond's running and we're setting the stage... we didn't
test GWB
> >> against
> >> Dole in primary. If you want more let me know...
```

Date: 4/19/99 10:29 AM Sender: Judy Perry
To: Fred Steeper
Priority: Normal

Subject: Karl Rove Message

This is the content of that message/attachment you wanted me to look at on Friday. I cleaned out the e-mail routing junk.

Fred/Jan: how bad would this screw up the California general election ballot?

From: JimBrulte@aol.com on Wed, Apr 14, 1999 10:43 AM

Subject: Fwd: voucher initiative To: Kristen; KR; GoodmanLA@aol.com

Thought you should see this.

Hey Jim --

Good to talk to you today. As I mentioned, I wanted to give you an early heads-up on Tim
Draper's ballot initiative for school vouchers. Draper, as you know, is the Silicon Valley
venture capitalist looking for a high-profile role in the Bush campaign. He's been putting
together an initiative for the March primary ballot, but because of drafting changes and tight
qualifying deadlines, he's now looking to November. That means it may be something for you guys
to weigh in on now, so you don't end up with being jammed up by an initiative that you're not comfortable with next year.

I'd referred Tim to Bob Naylor some months ago for help on the drafting and legal issues.
Nielsen-Merksamer apparently dropped the client because of what they felt were insurmountable problems in the way it was written. I'd heard some scary info from other people about the way
Draper was headed, so I went down to have lunch with him today to figure out what was going on.

There's some decent stuff in the initiative, but there's some really dangerous things too. (Like a repeal of Prop 98, which I tried to convince him would give the "no" side a huge weapon.) I was able to convince him, though, that if he wanted a big role

in the Bush campaign, it would be in his interest to make sure that people who the Governor and Rove trusted were comfortable with it. It might be in his interest to allow some of the savvier California Bush people (or failing that, Brulte...) to weigh in while it was still being redrafted.

They've already submitted the language for title and summary, but it would be easy to convince them to pull it if some changes would be helpful to the Bush effort. In any case, you may want to contact Barry Hutchinson, who's Tim's political guy to set up a meeting. (I suggested that Barry call Tom Ross, but it might be worth reaching out.) I don't think you can talk him off the initiative altogether, but maybe you can help shape it into something that works politically.

Let me know if you need anything else. (And thanks for the thought on Pacheco -- I'll call him tomorrow.)

Dan



April 16, 1999

Mr. Karl Rove c/o Governor George W. Bush Presidential Exploratory Committee, Inc. Post Office Box 1902 Austin, Texas 78767-1902

Dear Karl:

Thank you for your correspondence of April 8, 1999.

First I want to let you know that I would be willing to help raise resources for Governor Bush in New York. Over the past several years, I have raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for Attorney General Dennis Vacco, Al D'Amato, George Pataki, et. al. To the extent that I could assist in the effort here, I would certainly be willing to do so. I am curious as to whether corporate checks are acceptable, as I am not totally familiar with the Federal Election Exploratory Committee rules. If you could have someone reach my office and/or fax to me those rules, I would be happy to be helpful. My Assistant's name is Ms. Lisa Hinman and if anybody wanted to reach out to her with information, along these lines, please have them so do.

With respect to George Pataki, I believe you know I found him as Mayor of Peekskill and convinced him to run for the Assembly in 1984. We won an uphill fight defeating an incumbent, for which he continually thanks me everytime I see him. In addition, when his Gubernatorial campaign ran into trouble with the Giuliani endorsement of Cuomo, I was called into the fray much to the dismay of his political consultants, Kieran Mahoney and Arthur Finklestein. In spite of that, my advice was followed. Obviously, it worked and we won. This was all done pro bono, as I was in the private sector, but deeply committed to the Pataki campaign to defeat Mario Cuomo.

Following that, Decision Strategies Group was retained to structure the transition. In that process I was involved in all substance, personnel and budgetary decisions that lead to Pataki's first term. I am still very close to all of the players that surround the Governor, both in the Administration, in the political establishment of the Republican Party, including Bill Powers, and what is known as the "914's" (the Westchester County, New York personal friends and advisors of the Governor).

One Commerce Plaza, Suite 2001, Albany, New York 12210 telephone 518.436.0607 fax 518.432.4359 To the extent that I could help sort out from my knowledge of what is going on here in New York for you, as I indicated earlier, I would be more than willing to so do.

It is my perception that the Governor recognizes that he is not going to be a Presidential nominee, but holds out some brief glimmer of hope that if all others stumble, lightening might strike. I do not believe that is going to happen, but as you are aware, having been around this business for as long as we both have been, once the sniff of "1600 Pennsylvania Avenue" gets into the air, close advisors tend to lose their objectivity. Quite frankly, New Yorkers have a relatively myopic view of the National Political scene.

I have indicated to most that I talk to, that while New York and California certainly are significant contributors to the Electoral College vote, clearly over 80% of that vote is elsewhere in America. Furthermore, strategically, one could get elected President without contesting either of those States. Quite frankly, a strategy driven by the electoral context of the further devolution to the States of power, with a Governor like George W. Bush and a mid-west Governor as Vice-President carrying that message, against a Washington insider, such as Al Gore, would in fact resonate quite strongly in the States where a Republican needs to succeed in winning the Presidency.

I look forward to hearing from you. If there is any way I can be helpful, as outlined above, I would be more than willing to so do. By the way, Fred Steeper and I work closely on a host of commercial clients together, as well as one political client, the Mayor of Providence, Buddy Cianci. The Mayor is my only remaining political client, although most of my work for him is pro bono. I have been working with him since 1978.

Sincerely,

I. Lynn Mueller

ILM/lkh

bcc: Fred Steeper



# Memorandum to Fred Steeper

From

Mark Allen

Date

April 5, 1999

Subject

GWB Web Site Testing

# **Background -- The Argument for Web Testing**

The case has been made by many that the 2000 elections will be the first to be significantly affected by the Internet, not only for polling on the web, but as a source of information. The websites for political candidates will come under increased scrutiny by the media, potential and confirmed supporters, and primary and general election opponents. Keep in mind that anyone can find you at any time of day and you have no opportunity for follow-up, clarification or improvement once they have visited your site and formed an impression. This puts an incredible premium on getting the web site right from the very start.

Web pages need to be designed in a way that is informative, creative, visually appealing, easy to navigate and glitch-free – all at the same time. Information on the web is not consumed in the same way as any other media, yet many web designers forget this. The restricted size of the screen and the interactive nature of the web force the website to be seen from a different perspective. The user will define what they see and where they go, so every angle must be considered.

The nature of the varied uses of the web demand that websites be thoroughly tested before they see the light of day. The media is keenly focused on these sites not only for their own research purposes, but on the sites themselves as news stories.

## The Research

There are two different approaches that can be taken with web-testing:

A. Single Site Testing – We could gather a focus group of targeted individuals (primary voters – young or old, policy attentives, web-savvy voters, media types) and expose them to the GWB web site. There is a method of tracking which specific pages within a web site have been "visited" and how long someone stayed on that page. This "mapping" helps you to understand how people will use the website and where information needs to rest. This process also helps you to see how easy the site is to navigate. We would then could create a series of exercises to execute on the site (i.e. donate money on the web, volunteer, find the Governor's position on abortion, etc.) and see how easily that can be done. Then we would get diagnostics on the web site, much like we do with the PA dials for ad testing. Dials could be used for ease of compilation (IT has used them in the

confusing

past). Then we could conduct a moderated discussion including: a) likes and dislikes about the site; 2) how it compares to other sites (both political and non-political); 3) what other information you would like to see on the site; 4) how likely you would be to visit this (and other) sites in anticipation of the 2000 election, and 5) the role of the web in the 2000 elections.

For this exercise, we would need to locate a facility that offered web access for 12 PC's (or laptops) or we could download a dummy version of the GWB website onto a CD-ROM and simulate the web-page using the CD-ROM. The latter option eliminates the possibility of lost internet connections or slow down-load times. MSI has conducted these in-house (Portland) utilizing the LAN web connection. Costs might range from \$6,000 to \$7,000 per group with the incremental costs associated with the technology.

A. Comparative Site Testing – We could set up a group in the same manner as above, but expose participants to the competing sites of both Democratic and Republican candidates and treat it as we would a clutter reel for competing advertisements. We could track the participants' movement through the sites, determining which areas garnered more time, which areas went untouched and the paths chosen within the sites. We could also ask them to perform similar tasks across the selected websites (donate, volunteer, find a speech by the candidate) and compare ease of navigation, degree of information provided, site attractiveness, etc. We could also discuss high points and low points of style, content, navigation, etc. We should also incorporate a discussion of what people expect to find on the website and how they might use this information.

Again, we would need to locate (or equip) a facility with computer/laptop capabilities and internet connectivity. The CD-ROM look-a-like approach does not work effectively in this context. Again, costs will be in the \$6,000 to \$7,000 range.

# **Some More Things to Consider**

In addition to the material covered above, we should consider what <u>links</u> should be included on the GWB web site (e.g. RNC, State of Texas – if permitted, "friendly sites", issue-related links if there are issues of importance to GWB – education, domestic abuse, etc., news sites that have provided beneficial coverage).

We'll also need to discuss how people will find out about the website and its address and what will drive them to it.

We should establish how often people will visit the site and how fresh the information needs to be. Sites are often criticized for being stale. You need to give people a reason to return for visit.

We should also consider having a section of the website devoted to GWB volunteers and/or activists. A number of the other sites have such restricted sites that provide "insider" (but not too guarded) information to let the troops have a little better sense of what is going on. We need to let people know how they can get involved.

We might suggest that they capture as much information about people as possible when they visit the site. We could add a question of the day/week and solicit opinion on topics of interest. This is another reason to have people come back to the site. We could also suggest that the Governor might see some of this input, perhaps even have him reply to emails or questions posed by voters.

We should also consider testing other sections to add including:

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)	published poll results
)	recent articles about GWB (once reprinting permission is
	granted or web-links can be created)
)	his Texas success story
)	a list of endorsements
)	position statements or white papers
)	books and/or articles that have influenced Bush's thinking
)	the personal side of GWB (interests, background, hobbies,
	sports, etc.)

# Recommendation

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I would recommend that we consider doing four groups, mixed as to geography and target set. We should go to a web-intensive environment (Silicon Valley, Seattle, Boston, etc.) for a baptism by fire among those who know the capabilities of the web and might be able to lend some interesting creative input. We should also go to a "middle America" location (Chicago or St. Louis suburbs) to see how the less-connected might use the web. The media group could be conducted in the Midwest. I don't think we want to raise any antennae along the way, but I think their input would be important. Finally, we may wish to target primary voters in either Iowa or New Hampshire since retail politics plays such a significant part in those early elections and the web will play a role there.

Let me know your reaction and how you would like to proceed. This is something we can (and should) be doing now.

## Memorandum

To

Fred Steeper

From

Jan R van Lohuizen

Date

3/29/99

Subject

Outline / Plan / Budget

Think of this as a document in progress.

**First** of all the calendar. The lowa and New Hampshire dates haven't been set yet, but the fun will start in the last few days of January and will be mostly done by 3/14, although Illinois and Michigan aren't till 3/21. New Hampshire is not set but was held on 2/20 the last time around. Arizona and S Carolina have been set for 2/22 and 2/26 respectively, so I assume NH will be somewhere around 2/15, that being a Tuesday. Won't know till this fall.

Question: do we propose national tracking as well as state by state tracking for that period? The more I think about it, the more this will probably be a national media driven campaign and less a state by state ad campaign.

Question: do you have state by state delegate counts? These would obviously help prioritize.

**Second**: total spending. Are you sure it's 40 million .. I saw that in the Hotline, but don't actually believe it? I think it's half that.

Third: a very rough plan:

✓ We start with focus groups. I am with you, the biggest mystery for me right now is what makes these numbers tick, and the answer has to be in what they think about the candidate, the product as you put it so delicately. Focus groups are the way to answer the question, and yes indeedy, showing video clips of 'the product' is the right way to go. Add-on thought: should we do separate groups with men and women. My Democrat friends tend to do it this way. Sounds like a good idea to me. I have a female moderator on staff, and have done f groups myself.

Rough proposal: conduct 8 groups: 4 mixed / 2 male / 2 female; California / Mid West / Deep South / Yankeeland.

- N If Mark McKinnon is proposing a group grope / planning session in mid June, should we propose to have some of these results done by then, so that we can talk with some data in hand?
- ✓ We plan to do a fairly regular national survey: say once a month. This starts in August and goes through December. It's a vehicle to do tracking / analyze shifting coalitions and a way of doing specialty topics, like abortion, as per your memo. Other topics: education and health care. Sample is national voter with oversample of likely Republican primary voters.

assrepate V/CR+

- N I'll respond in more detail on your 'topics' memo.
- N Either you or I or both of us will be a part of the team that will do the RNC polling. I hope it's both. We'll get a lot of opportunity to milk that for national issues data.
- At some point before the state by state campaigning starts, we need to start generating state by state data. This is where the bulk of the budget will go I guess. I haven't gone into this seriously, but just to get the thinking process going, we will do state by state in two types of states: early states and big states.

Early States: Iowa, New Hampshire, Arizona, South Carolina. This **ex**cludes Louisiana (Caucuses, impossible to track, people are nutso Buchanan voters) Hawaii (similar logic, plus who cares). On the maybe list is Delaware.

Big states: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Mass, New York, Maryland. If it ain't over by 3/7, maybe also: Florida, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee. This **ex**cludes Maine (too small), Rhode Island (too small), Vermont (too small), Utah (too small), Wyoming (too small), Mississippi (too small???) **And:** Texas (save money on this one). It also excludes Illinois, Michigan, Washington and Ohio (all on 3/21, it's over), and everything coming after those dates (Wisconsin, Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Indiana, N Carolina, Nebraska, W Virginia, Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, W Va).

The schedule on the following states is up in the air: Alabama, Montana, New Jersey (big one, may move to 3/7), N Mexico, S Dakota, Alaska, Nevada.

- We'll track only in key states: Iowa, New Hampshire, Arizona, South Carolina, California, New York (/New Jersey).
- We need to plan for ad testing. I am not especially fond of your dial test method, preferring standard focus

groups. At some point in December / January we should conduct some form of ad testing somewhere.

## Here is an extremely rough timeline / outline:

June '99

Focus groups to prepare for message

planning session

August September Monthly track Monthly track

October November

Monthly track Monthly track

lowa benchmark New Hampshire benchmark

December

Monthly track

Arizona benchmark

South Carolina benchmark

January

Monthly track

lowa tracking

California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York,

Maryland benchmarks

Ad testing

Follow up focus groups

February

Monthly track

New Hampshire tracking

Arizona tracking

South Carolina tracking

March

Monthly track New York tracking

California tracking

This is as far as I got. Let me know if this makes sense to you.

Jan.

PSIam

on the

road

most of

the

week,

the best

way to

reach

me is by

e-mail,

or by

leaving

me a

voice

mail.

4915 St

Elmo

Ave #505

Bethesd

a, MD

20814

301 907

7551

Ext12

301 907

0881 Fax

**JRVANL** 

O@IBM.N

FT

Date: 3/26/99 2:33 PM

Sender: "Jan van Lohuizen" <jrvanlo@ibm.net>

To: "Mark McKinnon" <mmckinnon@pstrategies.com>

cc: "Karl Rove" < kr@rove.com>; Fred Steeper

**Priority:** Normal

Subject: what makes it tick

In our lunch we talked about what makes the Bush numbers go up the way they have been. The data below still doesn't tell me, but at least it's something. It's data from Yankelovitch for CNN / Time; the bigges difference is on 'strong and decisive'; the next biggest difference is on 'new ideas'; I'll file this somewhere. FYI. Jan.

Do each following apply to Bush/Gore?

Bush Gore

Yes No Yes No Has sympathy for problems of ordinary people

52% 21% 58% 26%

Understands the nations problem

59 17 60 26

Is honest

63 13 62 22

Is intelligent

81 6 77 12 A strong and decisive leader

60 14 39 41

Has new ideas

50 18 44 33 Has strong moral character

67 9

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<DIV><FONT color=#000000 size=2>In our lunch we talked about what makes the Bush

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me, but at least it's something. It's data from Yankelovitch for CNN /

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difference is on 'new ideas'; I'll file this
somewhere. FYI.

Jan.</FONT></DIV>

<DIV><FONT color=#000000 size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>

Art smart on 3/31/49

Date: 3/26/99 3:09 PM

Sender: "Jan van Lohuizen" < jrvanlo@ibm.net>

To: "Karl Rove" < kr@rove.com>; "Mark McKinnon" < mmckinnon@pstrategies.com>; Fred Steeper

**Priority:** Normal

Subject: California data

I don't know if you saw the hotline today, but there is some data on Dole vs. Feinstein for Veep from the Field poll. I did a survey a month ago that has some interesting data regarding GWB. This e-mail is a summary of that data. I had been sitting on it, because my client wanted to hand it over in person. Having waited for them to actually do this for a month now, I think I've waited long enough. If / when they do show up with it act surprised.

Rather than summarize data, i'll summarize results, and only give data where necessary.

1. Data was collected in mid February. At that time we found the following matchups:

Bush 50 Gore 43

Bush with Dole for Veep 51
Gore with placebo Veep (Evan Bayh) 39

Bush with Dole for Veep 50
Bush with Feinstein for Veep 43

#### Conclusion:

- (1) California is definitely in play.
- 2. Veepstakes. Dole for veep helps a little bit but not a lot. DiFi for Veep helps Gore a little but does not help him carry California. This is not too different from what the Field poll says.

Early Veep California scenario: DiFi does not help you carry the state. However, if we pick Dole, they can pick DiFi, so we don't have an edge on the women's vote.

2. Primary. Open primary or closed primary we beat all comers by a huge margin. The Field poll as of yesterday had us getting more total votes than Gore in the open primary. In February we were trailing Gore in the open primary: this confirms that we've gained and he's slipped in the last 6 weeks. In the closed primary we (49%) beat EDole (18%) by a huge margin. No one else gets out of single digits.

Conclusion: at this point I don't see that the whole open vs. closed primary, winner take all vs. proportional makes all that much of a difference. Of course we're better off with a winner take all, but it's not worth a lot of chips.

- 3. Regional data: we're doing much better than would be expected in the Bay Area. We are where were supposed to be in all parts of the state but way ahead of normal in the San Fran market. It's the principal reason we're ahead statewide. Keep and eye on this one .. it's not normal .. SF is also not a swing market. I know we've gotten good visits and media coverage there, but still.
- 4. Same story on education: we're doing well among people who

feel education is the top issue. Normally these voters are quite democratic, we're narrowly behind Gore in this group.

- 5. Gender gap: We're tied among women, beat Gore by double digits among men. We lose by 20% among single women, beat gore by 12% among married women.
- 6. Hispanics: Among hispanics: bush 32%, Gore 57%.
- 7. Abortion issue

	GWB	Gore
pro life	78	17
pro choice	34	58
in between	56	37

8. Crosstabs in the primary only make two significant points: a) we're stronger among conservatives than among moderates. While we beat her easily EDole picks up some votes among moderates. b) we're stronger among men than among women: while we beat her among women, EDole picks up some votes among women. The type of vote she gets more off appears to care about education.

#### FYI

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jan.
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<META content=text/html;charset=iso-8859-1 http-equiv=Content-</pre> <META content='"MSHTML 4.72.3110.7"' name=GENERATOR> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=#ffffff5> <DIV><FONT color=#000000 size=2>I don't know if you saw the hotline today, but there is some data on Dole vs. Feinstein for Veep from the Field poll. I did a survey a month ago that has some interesting data regarding GWB. This e-mail is a summary of that data. Enbsp; I had been sitting on it, because my client wanted to hand it over in person. Having waited for them to actually do this for a month now, I think I've waited long enough. If / when they do show up with it act surprised.</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#000000 size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#000000 size=2>Rather than summarize data, i'll results, and only give data where necessary. </FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#000000 size=2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#000000 size=2>1. Data was collected in mid February. At

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Bush&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 50</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT color=#000000 size=2>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Gore&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Bush&nbsp;&nb

3/25/99 2:29 PM Sender: "Mark McKinnon" <mmckinnon@pstrategies.com> Jan van Lohuizen <jrvanlo@ibm.net>; karl rove <kr@rove.com>; Fred Steeper Subject: Re: Mark McKinnon passed this on... I think the Lundgren case is instructive, and I think you've touched on some of the reasons why it didn't work for him. I do believe we have distinctly different candidate with a distinctively more positive cut to the message which I believe means it will meet a more receptive audience. I simply find it interesting and encouraging that about 70 percent of the American people believe that just having a geyer-spouting economy ain't enough. So if Gore is seduced by a strong economy and into simply saying "More of the Same, Stay the Course, Don't Go ON a Blind Date with our Economic Future" -- that won't be enough -- especially if we're out there tapping into what people really believe. >From: "Jan van Lohuizen" <jrvanlo@ibm.net> >To: "Mark McKinnon" <mmckinnon@pstrategies.com>, "Karl Rove" <kr@rove.com>. "Fred Steeper" <fred\_steeper@marketstrategies.com> >Subject: Re: Re: Mark McKinnon passed this on... >Date: Thu, Mar 25, 1999, 11:46 AM >Let's be really careful in how we interpret these results and how we use Dan Lungren tried to do it and it did not work. >them. press wants to >write the story that it backfired and hurt him, which I don't buy, but it >sure did not work for him. There are subtleties here that we need to >discuss and test. For instance: >the difference between sharing values and imposing values >the difference between teaching by communicating and discussing (power of >the pulpit) and legislating morality >I agree with the data, I agree with the conclusion, but we're a long way >away from having a message we can communicate. >Jan. >----Original Message----->From: Fred Steeper <fred\_steeper@marketstrategies.com> >To: kr@rove.com <kr@rove.com>; jrvanlo@ibm.net <jrvanlo@ibm.net>

>Date: Thursday, March 25, 1999 12:56 AM

Date:

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>Subject: Re:Mark McKinnon passed this on...
>
>
>>we are finding that majority say country on right track
economically, but
>wrong
>>track morally (need to send you this; very dramatic)
>>
>> that's where public wants the next President to change things
>>
>> Gore will be right on continuing "economic policy"
>>
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## VNS 1992 & 1996 EXIT POLLS FOR EARLY PRIMARY STATES IN 2000

Fred Steeper (August 23, 1999)

MSI compiled a summary table of the VNS (Voter News Service) exit polls for the Republican primaries in 1992 and 1996 - from the documents the Campaign purchased and were sent to MSI. The summary table lists the 18 states that have primaries on or before March 7, 2000. If a post-March 7 state moves up, it can be added to the summary table.

The VNS data is a combination of demographic and attitudinal information. The questions are not always the same between the two election years or the same among the states in the same year. Blank "cells" in the summary table mean the question was not asked for that state in that year.

This is valuable information. Exit poll data provides more accurate profiles of who votes than do pre-primary polls. The summary table provides a profile of who *actually* voted in these relatively low turnout events. Pre-primary surveys will contain an over-reporting by respondents of their intention to vote. Consequently, the profiles of who will vote in surveys are not as accurate as the exit poll data.

Particularly noteworthy results are bolded in the Summary Table. The following summarizes some important highlights of the VNS 1992 and 1996 exit poll data for the early Republican primary states.

#### **HIGHLIGHTS**

## ATTITUDINAL PROFILE

Ideology: The 1992 and 1996 VNS exit polls provide a quantification of the known conservatism of the Republican primary state electorates. Of the 18 early primary states, eight have conservative majorities of 60% or greater lead by lowa's 75% and Louisiana's 74%. Conservatives are in the 53% to 57% majority in seven more early states. The least conservative electorates are in Rhode Island, Ohio, and Vermont where liberal and moderate Republicans equal or slightly exceed the proportions of conservative Republicans.

	<u>Lib</u>	Mod	Cons		<u>Lib</u>	Mod	<u>Cons</u>
lowa *Lou. Ariz. Wash. S.C.	4% 6 6 7 8	21% 20 25 23 27	75% 74 69 69	*Md. N.H. *Conr Mass. Mich.	11	32 35 36 36 34	56 55 54 53 53
Geor. N.D. Maine N.Y. Cal.	9 10 10 8 10	29 28 30 35 34	62 62 60 57 56	*R.I. Ohio Vt.	14 12 16	36 40 40	50 48 43

\*The VNS exit polls recorded 8% to 15% more conservatives for Louisiana, Maryland, Connecticut, and Rhode Island in 1996 compared to 1992. For the other states the results are very similar for 1992 and 1996 where data exists for both years. The above results represent the average 1992/1996 result. See the full Summary Table for the differences.

"Christian Right:" In 1996, VNS included a question asking if the voters considered themselves "to be of the Christian Right." The results probably *understate* the proportion of voters who support a "Christian right" issue agenda or hold attitudes that fit a "Christian right" profile: "Christian right" is more a journalistic and academic short-hand for a set of attitudes and carries pejorative overtones. It is not necessarily a term that Christian conservatives would want to identify with. Having said that, the state rank order on this question quantifies where religious right organizations and religious right attitudes are strongest and weakest in the early Republican primaries.

Not surprisingly, the three early **Southern states** have the *highest* proportions of voters willing to identify themselves with the term "Christian right" among the 18 early states. **Iowa** caucus-goers are not far behind. **Washington**, also, ranks high in "Christian right" voters.

Five of the six **New England** early primary states have the *lowest* proportions of "Christian right" identifiers. **Maine** is the exception with about 10% more of its Republicans identifying as "Christian right" compared to the other New England states.

Arizona, Michigan, Maryland, California, and Ohio rank between the "Christian rightheavy" and the "Christian right-light" states.

Christian Right-Heavy	Christian Right-Medium	Christian Right-Light
Louisiana (43%)	Arizona (29%)	New York (19%)
South Carolina (36%)	Michigan (29%)	Rhode Island (18%)
Georgia (36%)	Maryland (28%)	New Hampshire (17%)
lowa (35%)	Maine (27%)	Connecticut (16%)
Washington (32%)	California (26%)	Vermont (16%)
	Ohio (26%)	Massachusetts (15%)
	North Dakota (24%)	

**Abortion Plank:** In 1996, VNS asked the voters if the Republican Party should support an amendment to ban abortion. In all but two of the early states, **Louisiana** and **lowa**, pluralities or majorities of the voters said the Party *should not* support such an amendment. The states with the largest majorities (over 60%) against an amendment to ban abortion include the same five **New England** states with low proportions of "Christian right" voters, but, also, **Maine** (62% opposed). Other states with 60% or larger majorities opposed include **Arizona**, **California**, **Maryland**, and **New York**.

In Louisiana 52% supported the amendment, and in lowa 46% supported the amendment, and 44% opposed it. Other states with 40% and higher believing the Party should support an amendment to ban abortions include the two southern states of **South Carolina** and **Georgia** as well as **Michigan**, **North Dakota**, **Washington**, and **Ohio**.

The constitutional amendment question is probably the most difficult test of pro-life attitudes. These findings should only be interpreted as a measure of the amendment solution to the abortion issue and not as a quantification of the proportion of "pro-life" and

"pro-choice" voters in each state. As a surrogate measure of general abortion attitudes, it probably does do a reasonably good job of *ranking* the states.

#### **DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE**

**Gender:** Welcome to the male side of the gender gap! A majority of Republican primary/caucus voters in all states *are male*. This is especially true for:

lowa (-/56%)<sup>1</sup>
New Hampshire (57%/57%)
Connecticut (53%/56%)
Maryland (56%/52%)
Massachusetts (60%/55%)
New York (-/59%)
Rhode Island (58%/58%)

Age: The early primary states have fairly similar age distributions with the major exception of Arizona. Arizona's status as a retirement state clearly is reflected in the 1996 Republican primary. Over 40% of the Arizona primary voters were 60 years old or older, and 33% were 65 years old or older. The next oldest states are California and New York, both with 35% 60 and older voters in the primary.

Across all the states, younger Republicans were a larger part of the 1992 turnout than the 1996 turnout. This is a pattern seen in the general elections of the two election years as well.<sup>2</sup>

<u>Age</u>	<u>Arizona</u> <sup>3</sup>	All Other <u>Average</u>			
18-29	9%	12%			
30-44	25	31			
45-59	25	28			
60+	42	29			
65 <b>+</b>	33%	21%			

**Income:** Republican primary voters definitely are not as well off as the GOP's rich man's image implies. Forty-six percent of the early state Republican primary voters are in the lower middle-class or the middles class with incomes between \$15,000 and \$50,000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The first percentage is for 1992. The second percentage is for 1996. "-" means no VNS data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See our report on the age distribution of the general election electorates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The age distribution for Arizona is for 1996. The age distribution for the other 17 states is the average for 1992 and 1996. The 65+ percentages are for 1996 for all states.

Another 25% are in the moderately affluent category of incomes between \$50,000 and \$75,000. The super-affluent (\$75,000-\$100,000) number 12%. The "rich," with incomes exceeding \$100,000, are just 10%. Of course, the income data does not include investment worth, and, perhaps, more Republicans would match their wealthy stereotype if investment worth was known.

Connecticut is the major exception to the preceding results. Connecticut is one of the wealthiest states in the country, and the Connecticut Republican primary voters reflect that fact. California has the image of being a very affluent state, but the income distribution of its 1996 primary voters is very close to the average for the other early primary states.

Three states stand-out as somewhat "poorer" in their Republican income distributions than the average: **North Dakota** (34% under \$30,000/12% \$75,000+), **Maine** (31% under \$30,000/15% \$75,000+), and **Vermont** (36% under \$30,000/13% \$75,000+).

Income	Conn.⁴	All other <u>Average</u>
Under \$15,000	3%	7%
\$15,000-29,999	10	17
\$30,000-49,999	19	29
\$50,000-74,999	26	25
\$75,000-99,999	16	12
\$100,000+	26	10

**Religion:** Some Republican primaries include a significant number of *Roman Catholics*, especially (but not only) in the **Northeast** with its heavy Catholic population, in general. The states with a significant Catholic presence in the early Republican primaries/caucus are:

Louisiana (36%/33%)<sup>5</sup>
New Hampshire (32%/36%)
Michigan (30%/31%)
North Dakota (-/33%)
Connecticut (38%/41%)
Massachusetts (47%/43%)
New York (-/48%)
Rhode Island (41%/45%)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The income distribution uses the 1996 VNS data for all the states except lowa. VNS used different income categories for lowa; the lowa income results are in the Summary Table. The 1996 distribution is generally "richer-looking" than the 1992 distribution which could reflect both income inflation and the expanding economy. The 2000 distribution could be "richer," yet, for the same two reasons.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The first percentage is for 1992. The second percentage is for 1996. "." means no VNS data.

# MSI U.S. NATIONAL SURVEYS<sup>1</sup> TREND TO PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY VOTE

		2000 Presidential Primary Vote (N=689)							
	Pct Pop	Bush	E. Dole	Quayle	Forbes	McCain	Other	Undec	None
Total	100%	47%	20	7	5	4	13	4	1
Region									
Texas	7%	78%	8	2	2		8	2	
Balance of South	28	48%	23	6	4	2	12	4	1
West	21	44%	18	3	6	8	16	5	1
Midwest	26	37%	25	11	7	2	11	5	2
Northeast	19	49%	17	7	6	5	13	2	1
Republican Intensity									
Strong GOP	34%	54%	18	8	4	3	11	1	1
Weak GOP	34	45%	20	6	3	4	14	5	1
Independent GOP	32	40%	22	7	8	4	13	6	0
Ideology									
Very Conservative	20%	46%	11	10	9	1	20	3	1
Somewhat Conservative	34	45%	22	7	7	6	9	2	1
Lean Conservative	28	47%	25	6	2	5	9	6	1
Moderate	3	33%	29	5	10	5	14	5	
Liberal	15	50%	16	3	5	1	16	7	3
Political Segmentation									
Fundamentalist/Evangelical	28%	50%	15	11	6	3	12	3	1
Other Churchgoers	21	51%	16	7	5	5	9	6	1
Secular High Income	16	42%	28	5	7	5	10	3	1
Secular Low Income	23	44%	23	6	4	3	16	3	2
Blacks	2	41%	18	6	12		12	12	
Hispanics	2	50%	19	6		6	19		
Jews	1	75%	13				13		
Other	7	28%	30	4		4	20	9	4
Marital Status									
Married	65%	47%	20	7	4	4	12	4	1
Not Married	35	45%	20	6	7	3	13	5	1
Gender									
Men	53%	49%	14	7	7	6	12	4	2
Women	47	43%	27	7	3	2	13	4	0
Age									
18-24	11%	45%	21	4	8	1	13	6	3
25-34	21	47%	25	4	5	3	13	1	2
35-44	27	43%	17	11	5	1	14	8	1
45-54	16	47%	23	5	5	5	8	4	2
55-64	9	47%	13	6	6	11	13	3	
65+	15	53%	19	7	3	6	12		
Age and Gender									
Men under 40	19%	49%	15	5	8	4	13	2	3
Men 40+	33	48%	13	7	6	7	11	5	1
Women under 40	19	45%	30	4	3		16	2	1
Women 40+	27	44%	26	10	3	2	11	5	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Interviews conducted February 25-28, 1999 (N=349 self-identified Republicans) and May 3-5, 1999 (340 self-identified Republicans).

# FEBRUARY STUDY ONLY (DO NOT PRINT)

		2000 Presidential Primary Vote (N=349)									
	Pct Pop						Other	Undec	None		
Total	100%	44%	22	7	5	3	11	7	2		
Region											
Texas	7%	85%	8				8				
Balance of South	27	42%	26	6	5	2	10	7	1		
West	21	39%	18	4	6	7	15	10	1		
Midwest	26	37%	28	12	4	1	8	7	3		
Northeast	19	45%	20	5	8	2	15	5	2		
Republican Intensity											
Strong GOP	30%	31%	23	9	10	2	15	10	1		
Weak GOP	36	46%	19	6	3	6	9	8	2		
Independent GOP	34	52%	26	4	3		11	2	2		
ldeology											
Very Conservative	25%	45%	13	9	8	1	18	5	1		
Somewhat Conservative	32	49%	24	6	5	4	6	4	2		
Lean Conservative	26	38%	32	7	1	2	9	9	2		
Moderate	3	38%	15		8	8	23	8			
Liberal	14	40%	16	4	8	2	16	12	2		
Political Segmentation											
Fundamentalist/Evangelical	28%	51%	16	11	8	1	8	4	1		
Other Churchgoers	22	52%	18	6	5	1	9	8	1		
Secular High Income	15	44%	27	4	5	4	9	5	2		
Secular Low Income	21	34%	30	4	3	5	15	7	1		
Blacks	2		25		25		25	25			
Hispanics	2	50%	13	13	-		25				
Jews	1	100%									
Other	7	15%	33	4		4	22	15	7		
Marital Status											
Married	67%	46%	22	7	4	2	13	6	2		
Not Married	33	39%	24	5	8	3	10	9	2		
Gender											
Men	55%	43%	18	6	7	3	13	7	3		
Women	45	44%	27	7	3	3	11	6	ŭ		
Age				•	<u> </u>		······································				
18-24	10%	51%	23	3	6		6	9	3		
25-34	19	47%	24	4	4	4	13		3		
35-44	28	365	22	11	6	r	11	12	1		
45-54	18	42%	24	8	3	3	9	8	3		
55-64	9	41%	14	7	7	7	17	7	•		
65+	14	55%	27	•	4	4	10	•			
Age and Gender	• •			······································							
Men under 40	24%	41%	18	6	8	4	13	6	4		
Men 40+	30	45%	19	6	7	2	11	8	3		
Women under 40	18	48%	27	8	2	_	13	3	3		
Women 40+	26	43%	26	7	3	4	9	8			
TYOHIGH FOT	20	40/0	۷		3	+	ਹ	Ö			

#### **MEMORANDUM**

TO:

Karl Rove

Mark McKinnon Jan Van Lohuizen

FROM:

Fred Steeper

DATE:

June 23, 1999

SUBJECT:

Age Groups

#### Generation X

Late last May, Mark emailed a Dick Morris column, "Al Gore's Generation X Crises," and commented, "forget the following messenger, but consider the message." This got me to thinking about what we know about age and voting patterns, so I had some very basic material put together to share with you. The material focuses just on turnout and the share of the November electorate we can expect from Generation X and all the other generation and life cycle groups.

As to some of Morris' substantive points - He does a breathless recitation of how Generation X has swung back and forth, first from President Bush to Clinton and now back to Governor Bush; and declares "Generation X is the swing vote in politics." Well, that is true, but not for generation reasons or for all the issues he sites. Political scientists have known for a long time that younger voters have much weaker partisan predispositions than older voters have, and, consequently, are much more susceptible to dramatic swings from election to election. This is all "life cycles" effect rather than a generation effect. These Generation X voters, 20 years from now, will have more stable voting patterns, and it will be the under 35's of tomorrow (Generation Y?) who will be "the swing vote in our politics."

Morris offers a lot of issues that he believes especially motivate younger voters. I won't take issue with any of his assertions now. Our own research will help match issues with age groups. Many of his assertions are actually good ones - as hypotheses for us to test. One in particular that I think has potential is what he labels "parenting issues." That is an interesting and perhaps useful way to bundle a set of issues that represent threats to the health and lives of kids, e.g. drug use, school violence (the issue de jour), drunken driving, youth crime culture, and the like. Being a parent of young kids must be a fearful experience for many these days. If so, we could "connect" with these young parents in a very meaningful way by bundling some specific threats as "parenting issues." Jan and I should try to identify this as a real issue cluster, and, if it is, then Mark and his group could work on the proper communication language for it.

Certainly, younger voters are more "moveable" by campaigns and the issues of the day than are older voters. However, we also know that younger voters "don't vote." That's an exaggeration, of course, but they do vote at significantly lower rates than do older voters. Consequently, their importance is reduced compared to their share of our adult population (or shares of television viewing audiences, for that matter). Even so, many do vote. We do need to be certain that some of our messages are especially relevant to them.

#### **Current Population Reports (CPS)**

In the government's monthly survey collecting labor force data, it adds supplementary voting questions in its November survey. This is a big sample, N=50,000+. (Something Jan and I are unlikely to do.) It provides the best estimate of who votes and what the resulting composition of the electorate is. The attached figures summarize what it found in our last two presidential elections by age and gender. The focus of this memo is on age. I thought I should include the gender data, too, because it was easy to do and seemed to make this a more complete definition of the life cycle groups.

#### **Basic Age Groups**

Under 35s were 29% of the 1992 vote and 24% of the 1996 vote. So, I would not tailor most of our strategy for them. Some of it should be.

Taking the idea of "parenting issues" and saying parents of young kids are predominately 25 to 39 years old - this age group was 31% of the 1992 vote and 28% of the 1996 vote (Figure 7). This is a slightly larger grouping than "Generation X."

Assuming parents of older kids are 40 to 54 years old - this age group was 27% of the 1992 vote and 31% of the 1996 vote (Figure 7).

Put the two parenting age groups together and you have 25-54 year olds accounting for 58% of the 1992 vote and 59% of the 1996 vote. Of course, not all these people are parents, so these are over-estimates of parents. By how much, I don't know (we might be able to retrieve this from the CPS data).

To round out the ages of the two electorates: Empty Nesters (55-64 year olds) were 14% of the 1992 vote and 13% of the 1996 vote. Seniors (65+) were 19% of the 1992 vote and 20% of the 1996 vote.

You probably noted the drop in the younger voters' share of the 1996 vote compared to 1992. There was a horrible decline in turnout for the 1996 election, the lowest on record. Officially (from the Clerk of the House), the turnout for 1996 was 49.8% compared to 55% in 1992. The CPS records a 54.2% turnout in 1996 compared to its estimate of a 61.3% turnout in 1992. The difference between the "official" turnout and the CPS estimates has to do with a lot of technical issues including an admitted over-report of turnout in the CPS survey (although the official count has problems, too). The difference need not concern us; I wanted to avoid any confusion for those aware of the official numbers.

Turnout declined for people of all ages, both males and females, and for whites and blacks. Interestingly, turnout declined more for whites than blacks and did not change significantly for Hispanics. The decline was greater among younger people than older people as you can see in Figure 3. Consequently, the 1996 turnout had fewer Generation X and young families in it, as noted above.


The reasons for this decline and what it might mean for us I'll save for some other memo, if we need it. For now, I just want to draw your attention to it to explain why the estimates for the age shares of the vote vary as much as they do for the younger age groups.


#### **Other Turnout Factoids**

Yes, women have a slightly better turnout rate than do men (Figure 1) and are a larger part of the voting public than are men, 53% in 1992 and 54% in 1996 (Figure 2). But, heh, 46%-47% are men so let's not feminize our agenda and language too much. (Our winning coalition probably will be majority male, but that is another memo from Jan and I.)

Older men (60+) have a better turnout rate than older women do. I am not sure why this is, but it is fairly dramatic and consistent in 1992 and 1996 (Figures 4 and 5). The upshot is that while there are many more senior women than senior men in the general population, the gap narrows among those who vote. Among 1992 voters, 10% were senior (65+) women and 8% were senior men. In 1996, 11% were senior women and 10% were senior men. (See Figure 8.) Perhaps, the senior women are still of the culture than politics is a male domain.


The attached material has more information in it than I have reviewed here. Consider this a basic source document. We are also including the detailed table for 13 age groups by the 2 genders by the 2 elections in case you want to arrange the data in ways other than what we did in Figures 1-8.






# FIGURE 3: 1992 & 1996 TOTAL REPORTED VOTE by Age





AGE GROUP

Data from the U.S. Census Voting & Registration in the Election of November 1992 & 1996 respectively - Current Population Reports.




**AGE GROUP** 


Data from the U.S. Census Voting & Registration in the Election of November 1992 & 1996 respectively - Current Population Reports.


FIGURE 5: 1992 REPOTED VOTE by Aze & Gender


Percentages are percent within age group reported voting



Data from the U.S. Census Voting & Registration in the Election of November 1992 & 1996 respectively - Current Population Reports.







92 AGE	TOTAL	REP VOTE	% IN AGE	% TOTAL	96 AGE	TOTAL	REP VOTE	% IN AGE	% TOTAL
18+	185684	113866	61.3%		18+	193651	105017	54.2%	100.0%
18-19	6584		37.9%	/ \	18-19	7302	2202	30.2%	
20-24	17788		44.7%	1	20-24	17348	5794	33.4%	5.5%
25-29	19480		49.9%	1	25-29	19048	7653	40.2%	7.3%
30-34	22123		56.1%	1	30-34	21017	9613	45.7%	9.2%/
35-39	21007	12897	61.4%	11.3%	35-39	22363	11713	52.4%	11.2%
40-44	18710	12372	66.1%	10.9%	40-44	20964	12072	57.6%	11.5%
45-49	15572	10814	69.4%	9.5%	45-49	18450	11503	62.3%	11.0%
50-54	12487	8478	67.9%	7.4%	50-54	14234	8856	62.2%	8.4%
55-59	10644	7528	70.7%	6.6%	55-59	11263	7520	66.8%	7.2%
60-64	10445	7579	72.6%	6.7%	60-64	9773	6736	68.9%	6.4%
65-74	18445	13607	73.8%	12.0%	65-74	18176	12748	70.1%	12.1%
75-84	9810	6677	₹ 68.1%	5.9%	75-84	10790	7147	<del>-</del> 66.2%	6.8%
85+	2591	1353	52.2%	1.2%	85+	2922	1461	50.0%	1.4%
92 MEN					96 MEN				
	TOTAL	REP VOTE	% IN AGE	% TOTAL		TOTAL	REP VOTE	% IN AGE	% TOTAL
18+	88557	53312	60.2	76.8	18+	92632	48909	52.8%	46.6%
18-19	3299	1195	36.2%	1.0%	18-19	3656	1017	27.8%	1.0%
20-24	8735	3677	42.1%	3.2%	20-24	8616	2645	30.7%	2.5%
25-29	9545	4470	46.8%	3.9%	25-29	9341	3412	36.5%	3.2%
30-34	10921	5854	53.6%	5.1%	30-34	10334	4517	43.7%	4.3%
35-39	10364	6126	59.1%	5.4%	35-39	11005	5468	49.7%	5.2%
40-44	9144	5868	64.2%	5.2%	40-44	10325	5814	56.3%	5.5%
45-49	7586	5228	68.9%	1	45-49	9019	5431	60.2%	5.2%
50-54	6023		' 67.4%	3.6%	50-54	6878	4258	61.9%	4.1%
55-59	5095		69.9%			5441	3612	66.4%	3.4%
60-64	4917		74.1%			4607	3228	70.1%	3.1%
65-74	8289		76.2%			8162	5926	72.6%	5.6%
75-84	3805		₹74.0%			4292	3022	₩70.4%	2.9%
85+	835	496	59.4%	0.4%	85+	954	558	58.5%	0.5%
92 WOME	:N				96 WOM	IEN			
<del>-</del>	TOTAL	REP VOTE	% IN AGE	% TOTAL		TOTAL	REP VOTE	% IN AGE	% TOTAL
18+	97126	60554	62.3%	53.2%	18+	101020	56108	55.5%	53.4%
18-19	3285	1299	39.5%	1.1%	18-19	3645	1185	32.5%	1.1%
20-24	9053	4271	47.2%	3.8%	20-24	8732	3149	36.1%	3.0%
25-29	9935	5246	52.8%	4.6%	25-29	9708	4241	43.7%	4.0%
30-34	11202	6550	58.5%	5.8%	30-34	10683	5095	47.7%	4.9%
35-39	10641	6771	/ 63.6%	5.9%	35-39	11357	6244	55.0%	5.9%
40-44	9565	6503	68.0%	5.7%	40-44	10638	6259	58.8%	6.0%
45-49	7986	5586	69.9%	4.9%	45-49	9431	6071	64.4%	5.8%
50-54	6464	4420	68.4%	3.9%	50-54	7357	4598	_62.5%	4.4%
55-59	5549	3967	71.5%	3.5%	55-59	5822	3907	67.1%	3.7%
60-64	5528	3937	71.2%	3.5%	60-64	5166	3508	67.9%	3.3%
65-74	10157	7289	71.8%	6.4%	65-74	10014	6822	68.1%	6.5%
75-84	6005	3860	64.3%	3.4%	75-84	6498	4124	63.5%	3.9%
85+	1756	857	48.8%	0.8%	85+	1968	903	45.9%	0.9%

#### **MEMORANDUM**

TO:

Karl Rove

Mark McKinnon Jan Van Lohuizen

FROM:

Fred Steeper

DATE:

May 26, 1999

SUBJECT:

Initial Thoughts

# **Candidate Credibility**

One of the major findings of the May focus groups is the Governor's personal credibility with the voters. They believe he believes in what he is saying. This is extremely important in a period of high cynicism about politics and politicians. It is a huge advantage that many campaigns don't have. Other research is showing, to jump ahead a bit, that this is a Gore weakness. One of the big advantages we may have in 2000 is that the voters will believe the Governor is expressing his true beliefs while Gore is simply pandering. (The Governor's ratings on "just saying what people want to hear/genuinely believes in what he is saying," taken after each segment, are very impressive for this measure of a political message.)

I believe a big reason for this credibility is the seeming spontaneity of most of the Governor's remarks in the segments we showed, even the formal, inaugural speech. He is very good (very credible) delivering statements he knows well.

From this, I draw two conclusions. One, have him begin in June with the ideas and statements he delivers so well and limit "new material." Second, looking way ahead, the paid media should make ample use of the Governor as his own spokesperson, and, use less, anonymous voice-overs.

#### **Candidate Passion**

Segment Four, from the luncheon talk, is special. It scored the best in Michigan and South Carolina, impressively so. I'm convinced it was the way he delivered his ideas that drove the numbers for this segment. His style was a notch of energy and passion above all the other segments and a level above what is usually seen in a presidential candidate. The campaign should have in hand large supplies of whatever juice the Governor needs to recreate this passionate delivery in the coming months. I'm sure this is related to some of my above points his talking about familiar topics in what seemed to be his own words.

#### **Old Testament and New Testament**

The Governor's newest rhetoric, "prosperity with a purpose" and "compassionate conservatism" may be ahead of the game. First, Republicans need to hear he believes in the Party's Old Testament before he begins writing the Party's New Testament. As noted in our report, the focus groups reacted in a neutral way when the Governor used his new rhetoric. What drove the positive reactions was his recitation of support for familiar conservative principles and general moral principles. On the other hand, there is the need for the Governor to distinguish himself from the rest of the conservative field and put a fresh look on the familiar principles. He needs to be very careful to do this in a way that makes his new rhetoric an extension of familiar principles and not a break from those principles.

#### **Bugle Calls and Ropa-Dope**

The current situation looks so good that the campaign, unconsciously, may practice a form of political ropa-dope over the summer and fall. However, with 40% to 50% of the Republican primary voters already predisposed to make the Governor the Party's nominee, and all sorts of psychological research demonstrating the persistence of preferences once formed, there is the real opportunity "to put this away" this summer and fall with the right bugle call. What are needed are the right messages with the right delivery (see above) disseminated in a broad fashion. It would be worth a day of brainstorming on how this might be effected while the opportunity is still there (or reexamine current plans for maximum impact).

#### Presidential Rhythms and the Morality Issue

There is a lot of academic research demonstrating that our presidential elections are 20% prospective and 80% retrospective. (The percentages are mine to state the bottom line of this research.) Johnson's Vietnam War begot Nixon, Nixon's Watergate blunder begot Carter, Carter's screw-ups begot Reagan, Reagan's peace and prosperity begot Bush, the 1991 recession and Bush's perceived indifference begot Clinton, and the country's "moral decay" coupled with Clinton's moral laxity will beget George W. Bush. That is a simplification, of course, but it is essentially true of our past elections. There is a very good reason for it. Voters know with certainty what has recently happened, and they deeply discount what candidates say will happen if they are elected. The voters may be uninformed, but they are not fools.

Now, consider the following data from a recent national survey:

Thinking about the state of the COUNTRY'S ECONOMY, do you feel things are generally going in the right direction, or do you feel things have gotten off on the wrong track?

71% Right direction 23 Wrong track

6 No opinion

Thinking about the state of the COUNTRY'S MORALS AND VALUES, do you feel things are generally going in the right direction, or do you feel things have gotten off on the wrong track?

20% Right direction74 Wrong track7 No opinion


I think these are the two most important survey results I could possibly present the campaign. The 2000 campaign will revolve around which perception the voters use to make their retrospective judgment about who should be President. If we don't address the morality issue in a major way, we will have missed the most certain way to elect the Governor, President.

# F. Paying for Extending Service to the Area

There is very little support among residents for sharing in a portion of the cost for extending the proposed MP&W services to their area (6% say they are extremely or very likely to pay).

- Thirty-six percent (36%) say they are not at all likely to pay a portion of this
  cost.
- ◆ Support is lowest in Mulberry Manor.

Figure 8



# **Conclusions**

- ◆ The market potential level for MP&W's cable services is more moderate than in the 1997 survey of MP&W customers, and there is less dissatisfaction with current providers.
- ♦ The market potential for the cable modem service is actually higher in this set of neighborhoods than it was in 1997 in the MP&W service territory, likely because of the larger percent with computers in these neighborhoods.
- ♦ It appears that MP&W may alienate some residents by asking them to pay a portion of the cost to extend their services to the area.
- ◆ MP&W will need to weigh the market potential results against estimated costs for the services to determine whether these potential penetration levels support the investment.

# BUSH2000 RESEARCH DESIGNS State Surveys, National Surveys, & Focus Groups

#### STATE SURVEYS

All state surveys, except California, have two prices - one for a list sample and one for a RDD sample. The list sample price assumes a 80% contact rate with qualifying Republican primary voters. The RDD sample assumes a 35% contact rate with qualifying Republican primary voters. Individual states will vary from these contact rates, but it is assumed that over the course of the research program these will be the average contact rates achieved.

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Survey lengths assume an average correspondence of number of questions and actual length of the interview that will be achieved over the research program. The shorter questionnaires assume 2 open ended questions; the longer questionnaires assume 6 open ended questions. Open ended questions will produce verbatims or quantitative coding or both depending on the nature of the question.

California designs and prices are listed separately. California surveys will use list samples and have one price per type of survey.

### **State Strategic Surveys**

State Strategic Surveys collect early comprehensive planning information.

Strategic Surveys: N=400 Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$/\$ Strategic Surveys: N=400 Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$/\$ Strategic Surveys: N=500 Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$/\$ Strategic Surveys: N=500 Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$/\$

California Strategic Survey: N=??? Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$ California Strategic Survey: N=??? Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$

#### **State Monitor Surveys**

State Monitor Surveys evaluate the competitive situation ("the horse race"); can include some essential strategic questions; and can be done early to make relative state assessments or during the later stages of the state campaign to monitor changes. State Monitor Surveys, also, can be used in lieu of State Tracking.

Monitor Surveys: N=300 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ Monitor Surveys: N=300 Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$/\$ Monitor Surveys: N=400 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ Monitor Surveys: N=400 Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$/\$

California Monitor Survey: N=??? Length=6 min./20-25 questions Price=\$ California Monitor Survey: N=??? Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$

#### **State Tracking**

State Tracking keeps the campaign abreast of changes in voter preferences and perceptions on a frequent and regular basis. Mini-samples are used, representing voters in the entire state. The samples can be executed in a single evening or in two or more evenings, referred to as "units" of N=100 or N=150, below. The prices assume a minimum of five units.

State Tracking: Unit N=100 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ per unit Minimum 5 units or Total=\$/\$

State Tracking: Unit N=150 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ per unit Minimum 5 units or Total=\$/\$

California Tracking: Unit N=??? Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ per unit Minimum 5 units or Total=\$/\$

California Tracking: Unit N=??? Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ per unit Minimum 5 units or Total=\$/\$

#### **NATIONAL SURVEYS**

National surveys will use RDD samples and assume a 35% contact rate with qualifying Republican primary voters. Individual national surveys will vary from this contact rate, but it is assumed that over the course of the research program 35% will be the average contact rate achieved.

Survey lengths assume an average correspondence of number of questions and actual length of the interview that will be achieved over the research program. The shorter questionnaires assume 2 open ended questions; the longer questionnaires assume 6 open ended questions. Open ended questions will produce verbatims or quantitative coding or both depending on the nature of the question.

#### **National Strategic Surveys**

National Strategic Surveys collect comprehensive planning information that has general application to Republican primary voters, regardless of state residence.

Strategic Surveys: N=500 Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$ Strategic Surveys: N=500 Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$ Strategic Surveys: N=600 Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$ Strategic Surveys: N=600 Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$

## **National Monitor Surveys**

National Monitor Surveys evaluate the competitive situation ("the horse race"); can include some essential strategic questions; and can be done whenever an update of the overall picture is needed, especially following a major campaign or national "event" that has the potential of changing the competitive situation in many primary states.

Monitor Surveys: N=300 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$
Monitor Surveys: N=300 Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$
Monitor Surveys: N=400 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$
Monitor Surveys: N=400 Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$

\* State

# **National Piggybacks**

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state pissybacks

The Campaign can add questions to non-Bush2000 national surveys for \$1.00 per interview per question for close-ended questions and \$1.25 per question per interview for open-ended questions. Questions can be asked of all registered voters or asked of just Republicans. The price would be based on the number of interviews receiving the question, whether all voters or Republicans only. The Campaign will have the opportunity to add questions to Voter/ Consumer Research and Market Strategies, Inc. national surveys at least once a month. The Campaign, however, can not dictate the exact timing of these surveys or assume the opportunity will exist in any regular pattern.

#### **FOCUS GROUPS**

All focus groups, except those done in California, have two prices - one for a list sample recruitment and one for a RDD sample recruitment. The list sample price assumes a 70% contact rate with qualifying Republican primary voters. The RDD sample assumes a 25% contact rate with qualifying Republican primary voters. Individual focus groups will vary from these contact rates, but it is assumed that over the course of the research program these will be the average contact rates achieved.

California prices are listed separately. California focus groups will use list samples and have one price per type of focus group.

Travel expenses for senior researchers, moderators, and Perception Analyzer technicians (when required) are billed separately, at cost.

Focus groups can be held in key primary states or in "neutral" states depending on the research objectives.

#### **Conventional Focus Groups**

Conventional focus groups give the Campaign information on voters' unanticipated beliefs and perceptions through a wide-ranging discussion outline and the ability to explore topics as they are volunteered. Any quantitative and private ratings would be done with pencil and paper. Two sessions are usually conducted at the same location with a brief time lapse between them.

Conventional Focus Groups: 12 participants. 1 3/4 hours. Two groups per location. Price=\$9,000? (for two groups)

California Conventional Focus Groups: 12 participants. 1 3/4 hours. Two groups per location. Price=\$9,000? (for two groups)

## **Perception Analyzer Focus Groups**

Perception Analyzer Focus Groups measure voter reactions to visual or detailed written information. Hand held dials record the voters' private opinions of the materials. Discussions of the material are conducted but only after private reactions have been fully recorded. The quantitative ratings are observed the moment they are taken and full summaries are available immediately following the sessions. A structured questionnaire is programmed for each session. One session is usually conducted per location.

PA Focus Groups: 24 participants. 1 3/4 hours. One group per location. Price=\$14,000/\$15,000? (for one group)

California PA Focus Groups: 24 participants. 1 3/4 hours. One group per location. Price=\$14,000/\$15,000? (for one group)

#### **Mixed Method Focus Groups**

The research purposes of Conventional Focus Groups and Perception Analyzer Focus Groups can be combined when each purpose needs about one-half of the session time.

Mixed Method Groups: 15 participants. 1 3/4 hours. Two groups per location. Price=\$16,000/17,500? (for two groups)

California Mixed Method Groups: 15 participants. 1 3/4 hours. Two groups per location. Price=\$16,000/17,500? (for two groups)

#### **DESIGN AND PRICE SUMMARY**

#### **State Surveys**

Strategic Surveys: N=400 Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$/\$ Strategic Surveys: N=400 Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$/\$ Strategic Surveys: N=500 Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$/\$ Strategic Surveys: N=500 Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$/\$

California Strategic Survey: N=??? Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$ California Strategic Survey: N=??? Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$

Monitor Surveys: N=300 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ Monitor Surveys: N=300 Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$/\$ Monitor Surveys: N=400 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ Monitor Surveys: N=400 Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$/\$

California Monitor Survey: N=??? Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$ California Monitor Survey: N=??? Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$

State Tracking: Unit N=100 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ per unit Minimum 5 units or Total=\$/\$ State Tracking: Unit N=150 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ per unit Minimum 5 units or Total=\$/\$

California Tracking: Unit N=??? Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ per unit Minimum 5 units or Total=\$/\$ California Tracking: Unit N=??? Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$/\$ per unit Minimum 5 units or Total=\$/\$

#### **National Surveys**

Strategic Surveys: N=500 Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$ Strategic Surveys: N=500 Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$ Strategic Surveys: N=600 Length=18 min./60-65 questions Price=\$ Strategic Surveys: N=600 Length=24 min./75-80 questions Price=\$

Monitor Surveys: N=300 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$
Monitor Surveys: N=300 Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$
Monitor Surveys: N=400 Length=6 min./18-20 questions Price=\$
Monitor Surveys: N=400 Length=10 min./30-35 questions Price=\$

#### **Focus Groups**

Conventional Focus Groups: 12 participants. 1 3/4 hours. Two groups per location. Price=\$9,000? (for two groups) California Conventional Focus Groups: 12 participants. 1 3/4 hours. Two groups per location. Price=\$9,000? (for two groups)

PA Focus Groups: 24 participants. 1 3/4 hours. One group per location. Price=\$14,000/\$15,000? (for one group) California PA Focus Groups: 24 participants. 1 3/4 hours. One group per location. Price=\$14,000/\$15,000? (for one group)

Mixed Method Groups: 15 participants. 1 3/4 hours. Two groups per location. Price=\$16,000? (for two groups) California Mixed Method Groups: 15 participants. 1 3/4 hours. Two groups per location. Price=\$16,000? (for two groups)

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#### **MEMORANDUM**

TO:

Karl Rove

FROM:

Fred Steeper

DATE:

March 22, 1999

SUBJECT:

Market Strategies' National Monitor Survey

In late February we conducted our first in-house 1999 National Monitor Survey. I placed the primary trial heat on it as we did last year. The total results (Bush 44%, Dole 22%, all others less than 10%) were included in my memo to you summarizing the public poll date "through March 12."

The special benefit of the National Monitor surveys is that I can compute custom cross tabulations for our purposes and aggregate the results across subsequent National Monitors to build the subgroup sample sizes. We did this last year, as you probably recall. This is the same analysis, but starting fresh with just our 1999 surveys. (I am attaching last year's table for your files.)

In our first survey we had N=349 self-identified Republicans who were asked the primary ballot question. This is too few to produce reliable subgroup results. As we add interviews from subsequent national surveys, the subgroup results will become more reliable.

For now, I want to bring to your attention the use and importance of the following groups:

#### Turnout/Predictive

Strong Republicans (30% of all Republicans): they are more knowledgeable, they vote, and they will comprise a disproportionate number of the primary turnouts. It is important to maintain a clear lead with them. In our current data, Bush's margin over Dole is narrower (31% to 23%) than with other Republicans. Forbes (10%) and Quayle (9%) do better with them than with less committed Republicans. More of Bush's vote comes from less committed Republicans: "weak Republicans" (46%) and "independent Republicans" (52%). This is not a good pattern....if it holds, it shows much of Bush's substantial lead is based on superficial perceptions. (His large overall lead in the public polls helps project Bush as "inevitable," but let's be careful.)

#### Conservative Credibility

<u>Fundamentalist/Evangelical</u> ( 28% of all Republicans): The fundamentalist/evangelical Republicans are a marker on how we are doing with the "social conservatives" most likely influenced by the religious-right organizations and leaders. The initial result looks fine: Bush 51%, Dole 16%. Quayle gets double-digits at 11%; Forbes has only 8%.

Other Churchgoers (22% of all Republicans): this group is a marker for cultural conservatives outside the religious-right network. The initial result also is a good one: Bush 52%, Dole 18%. No other Republican reaches double-digits with them.

<u>Very conservative</u> (25% of all Republicans): whether they are using economics or cultural issues, these Republicans take their conservatism seriously. Bush has a wide lead with them over Dole, 45% to 13%, and no other Republican is in double-digits.

Those are some things to watch for in the coming weeks. I look forward to discussing some of my underlying strategy assumptions for these comments with you soon.

Attached/enclosed: 1999 MSI National Survey table, 1998 MSI National Survey table.

# PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY SUBGROUP RESULTS: 1999 MSI U.S. NATIONAL SURVEYS<sup>1</sup>

		2000 Presidential Primary Vote (N=349)									
	Pct Pop	Bush	E. Dole	Quayle	Forbes	McCain	Other	Undec	None		
Total	100%	44%	22	7	5	3	11	7	2		
Region											
Texas	7%	85%	8				8				
Balance of South	27	42%	26	6	5	2	10	7	1		
West	21	39%	18	4	6	7	15	10	1		
Midwest	26	37%	28	12	4	1	8	7	3		
Northeast	19	45%	20	5	8	2	15	5	2		
Republican Intensity											
Strong GOP	30%	31%	23	9	10	2	15	10	1		
Weak GOP	36	46%	19	6	3	6	9	8	2		
Independent GOP	34	52%	26	4	3		11	2	2		
ldeology											
Very Conservative	25%	45%	13	9	8	1	18	5	1		
Somewhat Conservative	32	49%	24	6	5	4	6	4	2		
Lean Conservative	26	38%	32	7	1	2	9	9	2		
Moderate	3	38%	15		8	8	23	8			
Liberal	14	40%	16	4	8	2	16	12	2		
Political Segmentation											
Fundamentalist/Evangelical	28%	51%	16	11	8	1	8	4	1		
Other Churchgoers	22	52%	18	6	5	1	9	8	1		
Secular High Income	15	44%	27	4	5	4	9	5	2		
Secular Low Income	21	34%	30	4	3	5	15	7	1		
Blacks	2		25		25		25	25			
Hispanics	2	50%	13	13			25				
Jews	1	100%									
Other	7	15%	33	4		4	22	15	7		
Marital Status									, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
Married	67%	46%	22	7	4	2	13	6	2		
Not Married	33	39%	24	5	8	3	10	9	2		
Gender											
Men	55%	43%	18	6	7	3	13	7	3		
Women	45	44%	27	7	3	3	11	6			
Age						***************************************					
18-24	10%	51%	23	3	6		6	9	3		
25-34	19	47%	24	4	4	4	13	_	3		
35-44	28	365	22	11	6	,	11	12	1		
45-54	18	42%	24	8	3	3	9	8	3		
55-64	9	41%	14	7	7	7	17	7	-		
65+	14	55%	27	•	4	4	10	-			
Age and Gender	<u> </u>	T			-						
Men under 40	24%	41%	18	6	8	4	13	6	4		
Men 40+	30	45%	19	6	7	2	11	8	3		
Women under 40	18	48%	27	8	2	-	13	3	•		
Women 40+	26	43%	26	7	3	4	9	8			
TTOMOT TOT		7070				-т					

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Interviews conducted February 25-28, 1999. N=349 self-identified Republicans.

# PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY SUBGROUP RESULTS: 1998 MSI U.S. NATIONAL SURVEYS1

Pot   Pop   No		2000 Presidential Primary Vote											
Total Non-Texas		Pct Pop	N=	Bush	Kemp					Buchanan	Ashcroft	Other	Undec
Pegion   Toxas   7%   174   62%   4   7   5   4   4   5   2   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3   3	Total	100%	2600	27%	13	12	7	10	5	4	2	9	8
Taxas	Total Non-Texas <sup>2</sup>	93%	2426	25%	13	13	7	10	5	4	2	9	8
Balance of South	Region												
West	Texas	7%	174	62%	4	7	5	4	4	5	2	3	3
Midwest         24         609         21%         12         15         8         12         4         3         4         9         9           Northeast         19         504         23%         16         13         8         9         4         5         9         9         Northeast           Strong GOP         31%         759         27%         13         11         9         11         6         5         3         8         5           Weak GOP         35         846         26%         14         12         9         11         6         5         3         8         5           Independent GOP         34         821         21%         13         15         7         10         5         4         1         11         10           Ideactory         19%         471         22%         11         8         12         11         5         2         2         2         9         7           Lear Conservative         29         704         25%         13         15         5         10         4         4         2         1         7         12	Balance of South	29	763	29%	11	11	7	9	6	4	2	12	7
Northeast   19   504   23%   16   13   8   9   4   5   * 9   9	West	21	551	24%	14	13	7	9	7	5	2	8	9
Republican Intensity   Strong GOP	Midwest	24	609	21%	12	15	8	12	4	3	4	9	9
Strong GOP	Northeast	19	504	23%	16	13	8	9	4	5	*	9	9
Weak GOP         35         846         26%         14         12         6         9         4         3         2         9         9           Independent GOP         34         821         21%         13         15         7         10         5         4         1         11         10           Idealogy         Very Conservative         19%         471         22%         11         8         12         11         6         8         5         10         6           Somewhat Conservative         30         721         26%         15         14         6         11         5         2         2         9         7         7         10         6         8         5         10         6         8         5         10         6         8         5         10         6         4         2         11         7         12         12         11         7         12         11         7         12         11         7         12         12         13         13         13         8         8         6         5         1         7         7         12         2         1         12 <td>Republican Intensity</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>******</td> <td>***************************************</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	Republican Intensity							******	***************************************				
Independent GOP	Strong GOP	31%	759	27%	13	11	9	11	6	5	3	8	5
Idealogy   19%	Weak GOP	35	846	26%	14	12	6	9	4	3	2	9	9
Very Conservative         19%         471         22%         11         8         12         11         6         8         5         10         6           Somewhat Conservative         30         721         26%         15         14         6         11         5         2         2         9         7           Lean Conservative         29         704         25%         13         15         5         10         4         4         2         11         7           Moderate         4         85         26%         12         9         4         5         4         0         1         9         23           Liberal         18         445         24%         13         13         8         8         6         5         1         7         12           Political Segmentation           Fundamentalist/Evangelical         42%         1019         25%         13         12         6         13         4         4         4         9         8           Scular High Income         12         29%         21         18         9         5         6         4         1         10 </td <td>Independent GOP</td> <td>34</td> <td>821</td> <td>21%</td> <td>13</td> <td>15</td> <td>7</td> <td>10</td> <td>5</td> <td>4</td> <td>1</td> <td>11</td> <td>10</td>	Independent GOP	34	821	21%	13	15	7	10	5	4	1	11	10
Very Conservative         19%         471         22%         11         8         12         11         6         8         5         10         6           Somewhat Conservative         30         721         26%         15         14         6         11         5         2         2         9         7           Lean Conservative         29         704         25%         13         15         5         10         4         4         2         11         7           Moderate         4         85         26%         12         9         4         5         4         0         1         9         23           Liberal         18         445         24%         13         13         8         8         6         5         1         7         12           Political Segmentation           Fundamentalist/Evangelical         42%         1019         25%         13         12         6         13         4         4         4         9         8           Scular High Income         12         29%         21         18         9         5         6         4         1         10 </td <td>Ideology</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>***************************************</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	Ideology								***************************************				
Somewhat Conservative		19%	471	22%	11	8	12	11	6	8	5	10	6
Lean Conservative	-	30	721	26%	15	14	6	11	5			9	
Liberal   18	Lean Conservative	29	704	25%	13	15		10			2	11	7
Liberal 18 445 24% 13 13 13 8 8 6 5 1 7 7 12  Political Segmentation Fundamentalist/Evangelical 42% 1019 25% 13 12 6 13 4 4 4 9 8 8  Other Churchgoers 16 387 27% 111 12 8 9 4 3 2 2 12 7  Secular High Income 12 291 20% 21 18 9 5 6 4 7 9 6  Secular Low Income 18 432 27% 11 13 7 6 6 6 4 1 100 111  Blacks 3 75 27% 10 12 5 17 3 4 3 5 10  Hispanics 3 61 21% 7 7 7 7 20 12 7 0 8 7  Jews 1 25 28% 12 4 16 0 4 8 0 20 8 7  Jews 1 25 28% 12 4 16 0 4 8 0 20 8  Other 6 135 16% 16 14 7 7 7 9 5 1 8 12   Marital Status Married 38 928 22% 13 13 7 11 5 5 1 9 9   Gender Men 53% 1294 24% 17 9 8 9 5 5 2 2 11 6 8 10  Momen 47 1132 26% 9 17 6 11 5 3 2 8 10   Secular Low Income 18 432 27% 11 1 10 12 5 17 3 1 1 5 5 1 1 9 9 9   Gender Men 53% 1294 24% 17 9 8 9 5 5 2 2 11 6 8 10   Marted 18-24 21 513 27% 11 1 10 8 10 5 4 2 8 11  35-44 22 574 22% 18 14 7 9 4 4 2 8 8 11  35-44 24 574 22% 18 14 7 9 4 4 2 8 8 11  35-44 24 574 22% 18 14 7 9 4 4 2 8 8 8	Moderate	4	85	26%	12	9	4	5	4	0	1	9	23
Fundamentalist/Evangelical 42% 1019 25% 13 12 6 13 4 4 4 9 8 8 Other Churchgoers 16 387 27% 11 12 8 9 4 3 2 12 7 Secular High Income 12 291 20% 21 18 9 5 6 4 7 9 6 Secular Low Income 18 432 27% 11 13 7 6 6 6 4 7 9 6 Secular Low Income 18 432 27% 11 13 7 6 6 6 4 1 100 111 Blacks 3 75 27% 10 12 5 17 3 4 3 5 10 Hispanics 3 61 21% 7 7 7 7 20 12 7 0 8 7 Jews 1 25 28% 12 4 16 0 4 8 0 20 8 Other 6 135 16% 16 14 7 7 7 9 5 1 8 12 Married Status  Married 6 62% 1498 26% 13 12 7 9 5 4 2 10 8 Not Married 38 928 22% 13 13 7 11 5 5 5 1 9 9 Gender  Men 53% 1294 24% 17 9 8 9 5 5 5 2 11 6 Women 47 1132 26% 9 17 6 11 5 3 2 8 10 Age 18-24 21 513 27% 11 10 8 10 5 4 2 8 11 35-44 24 574 22% 18 14 7 9 4 4 4 2 8 8 15 5-64 11 268 22% 15 12 9 8 5 5 2 3 9 9 Age and Gender  Men under 40 24% 591 24% 16 7 7 10 6 6 6 1 10 7 Men 40+ 29 700 23% 18 10 9 9 5 5 4 2 11 5 5 Women under 40 20 497 27% 7 18 5 12 5 4 2 6 11	Liberal	18	445	24%	13	13	8	8	6	5	1	7	
Fundamentalist/Evangelical 42% 1019 25% 13 12 6 13 4 4 4 9 8 8 Other Churchgoers 16 387 27% 11 12 8 9 4 3 2 12 7 Secular High Income 12 291 20% 21 18 9 5 6 4 7 9 6 Secular Low Income 18 432 27% 11 13 7 6 6 6 4 7 9 6 Secular Low Income 18 432 27% 11 13 7 6 6 6 4 1 100 111 Blacks 3 75 27% 10 12 5 17 3 4 3 5 10 Hispanics 3 61 21% 7 7 7 7 20 12 7 0 8 7 Jews 1 25 28% 12 4 16 0 4 8 0 20 8 Other 6 135 16% 16 14 7 7 7 9 5 1 8 12 Married Status  Married 6 62% 1498 26% 13 12 7 9 5 4 2 10 8 Not Married 38 928 22% 13 13 7 11 5 5 5 1 9 9 Gender  Men 53% 1294 24% 17 9 8 9 5 5 5 2 11 6 Women 47 1132 26% 9 17 6 11 5 3 2 8 10 Age 18-24 21 513 27% 11 10 8 10 5 4 2 8 11 35-44 24 574 22% 18 14 7 9 4 4 4 2 8 8 15 5-64 11 268 22% 15 12 9 8 5 5 2 3 9 9 Age and Gender  Men under 40 24% 591 24% 16 7 7 10 6 6 6 1 10 7 Men 40+ 29 700 23% 18 10 9 9 5 5 4 2 11 5 5 Women under 40 20 497 27% 7 18 5 12 5 4 2 6 11	Political Segmentation												
Other Churchgoers         16         387         27%         11         12         8         9         4         3         2         12         7           Secular High Income         12         291         20%         21         18         9         5         6         4         *         9         6           Secular Low Income         18         432         27%         11         13         7         6         6         4         1         10         11           Blacks         3         75         27%         10         12         5         17         3         4         3         5         10           Hispanics         3         61         21%         7         7         7         7         20         12         7         0         8         7           Jews         1         25         28%         12         4         16         0         4         8         0         20         8           Other         6         135         16%         16         14         7         7         9         5         4         2         10         8           Not	-	42%	1019	25%	13	12	6	13	4	4	4	9	8
Secular High Income         12         291         20%         21         18         9         5         6         4         *         9         6           Secular Low Income         18         432         27%         11         13         7         6         6         4         1         10         11           Blacks         3         75         27%         10         12         5         17         3         4         3         5         10           Hispanics         3         61         21%         7         7         7         20         12         7         0         8         7           Jews         1         25         28%         12         4         16         0         4         8         0         20         8           Other         6         135         16%         16         14         7         7         9         5         1         8         12           Marited         82%         12%         13         12         7         9         5         4         2         10         8           Not Married         38         928         2		16	387	27%	11		8	9	4	3		12	7
Secular Low Income         18         432         27%         11         13         7         6         6         4         1         10         11           Blacks         3         75         27%         10         12         5         17         3         4         3         5         10           Hispanics         3         61         21%         7         7         7         20         12         7         0         8         7           Jews         1         25         28%         12         4         16         0         4         8         0         20         8           Other         6         135         16%         16         14         7         7         9         5         1         8         12           Marital Status             7         9         5         4         2         10         8           Not Married         38         928         22%         13         12         7         9         5         4         2         10         8           Gender          13 <td< td=""><td>Secular High Income</td><td>12</td><td>291</td><td>20%</td><td>21</td><td>18</td><td>9</td><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>4</td><td></td><td>9</td><td>6</td></td<>	Secular High Income	12	291	20%	21	18	9	5	6	4		9	6
Hispanics 3 61 21% 7 7 7 7 20 12 7 0 8 7  Jews 1 25 28% 12 4 16 0 4 8 0 20 8  Other 6 135 16% 16 14 7 7 7 9 5 1 8 12  Marital Status  Married 62% 1498 26% 13 12 7 9 5 4 2 10 8  Not Married 38 928 22% 13 13 7 11 5 5 1 9 9  Gender  Men 53% 1294 24% 17 9 8 9 5 5 2 11 6  Women 47 1132 26% 9 17 6 11 5 3 2 8 10  Age 18-24 12% 281 22% 9 14 5 14 8 8 8 0 9 8 8 10  Age 18-24 24 574 22% 18 14 7 9 4 8 8 0 9 8 8 10  Age 18-24 24 574 22% 18 14 7 9 4 4 2 8 11 35-44 24 574 22% 18 14 7 9 4 4 2 8 8 8 45-54 16 381 25% 11 13 6 11 6 5 2 13 6 55-64 11 268 22% 15 12 9 8 5 2 3 12 8 65+ 17 401 29% 13 12 8 8 5 2 3 9 9  Age and Gender  Men under 40 24% 591 24% 16 7 7 7 10 6 6 6 1 10 7 Men 40+ 29 700 23% 18 10 9 9 5 4 2 11 5  Women under 40 24 97 70 23% 18 10 9 9 5 4 2 11 5  Women under 40 20 497 27% 7 18 5 12 5 4 2 6 11	_	18	432	27%	11	13	7		6	4	1	10	11
Jews         1         25         28%         12         4         16         0         4         8         0         20         8           Other         6         135         16%         16         14         7         7         9         5         1         8         12           Marital Status         Married         62%         1498         26%         13         12         7         9         5         4         2         10         8           Not Married         38         928         22%         13         13         7         11         5         5         1         9         9           Gender         Wen           Men         53%         1294         24%         17         9         8         9         5         5         2         11         6           Women         47         1132         26%         9         17         6         11         5         3         2         8         10           Age         18         2         9         14         5         14         8         8         0         9         8 <td>Blacks</td> <td>3</td> <td>75</td> <td>27%</td> <td>10</td> <td>12</td> <td>5</td> <td>17</td> <td>3</td> <td>4</td> <td>3</td> <td>5</td> <td>10</td>	Blacks	3	75	27%	10	12	5	17	3	4	3	5	10
Jews         1         25         28%         12         4         16         0         4         8         0         20         8           Other         6         135         16%         16         14         7         7         9         5         1         8         12           Marital Status         Married         62%         1498         26%         13         12         7         9         5         4         2         10         8           Not Married         38         928         22%         13         13         7         11         5         5         1         9         9           Gender         Wen           Men         53%         1294         24%         17         9         8         9         5         5         2         11         6           Women         47         1132         26%         9         17         6         11         5         3         2         8         10           Age         18         2         9         14         5         14         8         8         0         9         8 <td>Hispanics</td> <td>3</td> <td>61</td> <td></td> <td>7</td> <td>7</td> <td>7</td> <td>20</td> <td>12</td> <td>7</td> <td>0</td> <td>8</td> <td>7</td>	Hispanics	3	61		7	7	7	20	12	7	0	8	7
Marital Status         Married         62%         1498         26%         13         12         7         9         5         4         2         10         8           Not Married         38         928         22%         13         13         7         11         5         5         1         9         9           Gender         Men         53%         1294         24%         17         9         8         9         5         5         2         11         6           Women         47         1132         26%         9         17         6         11         5         3         2         8         10           Age         18-24         12%         281         22%         9         14         5         14         8         8         0         9         8           25-34         21         513         27%         11         10         8         10         5         4         2         8         11           35-44         24         574         22%         18         14         7         9         4         4         2         8         8		1	25	28%	12	4	16	0	4	8	0	20	8
Married       62%       1498       26%       13       12       7       9       5       4       2       10       8         Not Married       38       928       22%       13       13       7       11       5       5       1       9       9         Gender       Men       53%       1294       24%       17       9       8       9       5       5       2       11       6         Women       47       1132       26%       9       17       6       11       5       3       2       8       10         Age       18-24       12%       281       22%       9       14       5       14       8       8       0       9       8         25-34       21       513       27%       11       10       8       10       5       4       2       8       11         35-44       24       574       22%       18       14       7       9       4       4       2       8       8         55-64       16       381       25%       11       13       6       11       6       5       2       3	Other	6	135	16%	16	14	7	7	9	5	1	8	12
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Interviews conducted November 26-December 7, 1997; January 21-25; February 20-24; March 30-April 2; and April 20-26; May 27-June 3, 1998; June 24-28, 1998; July 28-August 2, 1998 N=2600 self-identified Republican voters.

These 174 Texas interviews are excluded from all other rows to show subgroup patterns as they exist outside the state of Texas.

Heder PT

#### **MEMORANDUM**

TO:

Karl Rove

FROM:

Fred Steeper

DATE:

March 18, 1999

SUBJECT:

Various Subjects

#### Research

I think there are five pretty obvious areas of research that are needed in the coming months. These are all in the category of "basic" research, rather than urgent - and will be needed at some point. I want to list them for you so you can begin to think about when to do them. (Personally, I'd get them all going as soon as possible, of course.)

1. George W. Bush, up close and personal: okay, we are far ahead in all the polls, but what will be Republican reactions when they actually see and hear GWB? Will they be thrilled about who they have been telling the pollsters they support or disappointed? Thrilled about what? Disappointed about what? What do they like most about GWB and what do they think he needs to work on, after they see and hear them. Let's do some focus groups showing GWB videos of a formal speech, a television interview show, talking into the camera from the living room couch....different settings and styles. This could be real "touchy-feely" stuff. But, let's let the consumer feel this product and find out what they like and dislike. Should be done anytime, now.

Sh

2. Abortion: the radioactive issue of the campaign, primaries and general. We need an in-depth poll that tells us everything we need to know about this issue on a macro scale. Sure, it will vary state by state, but a set of overall findings (both Republicans and general electorate) will help guide the general strategy and give us a yardstick to gauge individual state variations. I probably don't need to say this, but....none of this research would be designed to determine GWB's positions. But, given his positions, what are the support consequences?

So set data France MRTL

Way ,

3. <u>Hispanics</u>: much is expected about GWB's unique support with this groups. We need to determine how much potential he has with Hispanics in other states. Does it have any relevance for the Republican primaries or is this strictly a potential general election asset? Will there be any perceptions of "pandering" from other primary Republicans? (This we could cover in the focus groups in no. 1 above.) I expect there will be those in the campaign that will assume a big plus from Hispanics that will affect the state strategy. Let's find out how true.



4. <u>Women</u>: the gender concern just will not go away. We should plan some early female research so we have a "woman's strategy" early, rather than allow this to be a nagging problem throughout the campaign, both primaries and general election.

Short )

5. <u>California</u>: same deal as women - big vote and needs its own strategy document - both primary and general - or it will be a persistent headache throughout. In past campaigns, you would be surprised at how divisive California became within the core planning groups as to how much of the campaigns' resources should be allocated to this mega state. 2000 is like a two-country election: California and the other 49. I'd do one or two of the No. 1 focus groups, above, in California, plus some strategic issue polling this year. Also, No. 3 applies here.

I think the common denominator to all five of these is that they are important and the public opinion information is out there now for us to collect, i.e., much of the information won't change with time and events.

#### **Other Matters**

<u>VNS exit poll results</u>: We need them for the 1996 Republican primaries. If nothing else, they will give us the basic demographic profiles of who votes, state by state. Do you have these already? We are looking into getting them and there likely will be a cost involved.

Abortion Issue: My advice on the abortion issue is don't, under any circumstances, revise one little point on what GWB has already said. It drives everyone crazy when the candidate begins to "clarify" his abortion position. Clarifying is almost always perceived as waffling, and this is one issue not to waffle on. One thing I may have missed - has GWB made a statement on the abortion plank in the Party platform? (Roy Blunt said he would discuss the politics of this issue with me, and, of course, I can consult with Ashcroft.)

Health Care Issue Staffer: It may be a bit early to be thinking about issue staff people, but, by chance, I met a law school woman who is specializing in health care law. (She also is a registered nurse!) She could be our Debbie Steelman. She is a Republican and likes Bush. I am attaching her resume. She appears perfect for this role. Should I share it with Goldsmith?

Swing '98 Essay: I finished my essay on the 1998 election (what it means) and mailed you a final copy. I think it has more in it than what I sent you a while back. Did you receive? I can send more copies, if needed.

Market Strategies National Monitor: We started our national surveys again, and I put the Republican presidential primary ballot in it. I will send you a separate memo on the subgroup results. This is the analysis we were sending you last year where we built up the subgroup cell sizes over a number of polls. I am starting that analysis fresh this year. A couple more nationals are needed to stabilize the subgroup results.

<u>Public Poll Summary, Memo and Tables</u>: A couple of days ago we sent you (fax and fed-ex) our summary of the public poll results on 2000. Essentially, horse race data. This is the third time for this summary. Did you see? Do you like?