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SUMMARY

Bilateral security ties which have developed between the United States and Turkey over the past generation have been mutually beneficial. The US has, largely through grant assistance and some recent credit sales aid, provided Turkey more than \$3 billion in military equipment. Since Turkish troops are almost entirely equipped with weapons of US origin, Turkish dependence on the US as a source of war material has been almost total. The Turks are currently implementing a long-range armed forces re-organization and modernization program for which they had expected US assistance.

Under a series of agreements negotiated with the Turks during the 1950's and 1960's, the US obtained the right to maintain roughly two dozen facilities throughout Turkey.

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Other US facilities fall under bilateral US-Turkish defense agreements, (the relevant umbrella agreement is the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969), although they, too, contribute to the overall defense of the western alliance. Among these are

[REDACTED] a LORAN-C station, and communications facilities linking all US installations.

Bilateral security cooperation between Turkey and the US was dealt a severe blow by the Turkish military intervention on Cyprus in July-August, 1974, and the subsequent imposition by the US Congress of a total embargo on US arms shipments to Turkey effective February 5, 1975. When the embargo went into effect, Turkey informed the U.S. and NATO that it considered the US to be in violation of Article III of the NATO Treaty and Article XXI of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (the "mutual assistance" provisions of these two documents), and implied that the DCA and companion agreements governing the American presence in Turkey would have to be re-examined.





Amid steadily mounting domestic pressure to retaliate against the US, the Turkish Government informed us on June 17 that in its view the DCA and several related agreements were no longer valid, and requested that negotiations begin within 30 days on the future of US facilities in Turkey. The note also indicated that at some subsequent date Turkey would place US facilities in a "provisional status" pending the outcome of negotiations.

At the opening of negotiations July 17 -- the only session held to date -- both sides stated their respective legal positions: Turkey said the DCA was dead and that a new agreement would have to be negotiated; the US side stated that the US considers the DCA still valid, but that we are willing, nonetheless, to negotiate with the Turks on the future of our facilities. On July 27, the US gave the Turkish Government a note which again stated our legal position that the DCA is still valid. Since the US legal position has thus been registered with Turkey, we have not considered it necessary to address the question of the DCA's legal validity further in this NSSM.

The Turkish Government, which has not yet asked for a second negotiating session, stated, following the July 24 vote of the House of Representatives turning down a partial lifting of the embargo, that constructive negotiations will be possible only after the arms ban is rescinded. Within 24 hours of the House vote the Turks invoked the "provisional status" for US facilities, to which they had previously alluded. They suspended operations at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] LORAN-C station, placed all US facilities under Turkish control, and began cutting back the privileges of US armed forces personnel in order to bring those privileges into strict conformity with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. They have not interfered with primary activities at Incirlik air base, which Turkey considers a NATO installation.

Not wishing to strike at the heart of Turkey's relationship with the United States, the Demirel Government has moved fairly cautiously in its retaliatory steps to date. To the extent that it is politically possible, Demirel may still search for measures against the US which will seem more severe than they actually are. On the other hand, the Turkish leadership probably



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will be unable to resist pressure to take conclusive action if the embargo is not rescinded or substantially modified. The Turkish military establishment, whose views carry heavy weight in Ankara, has also, on the whole, been generally committed to retaining ties with the US, although elements within the military were in the forefront of those demanding strong action against the US.

Turkey attaches great importance to its NATO role, both in terms of Turkey's defense and of its political identity as a western European country. The Turkish military has a strong interest in continuing full participation in NATO's military activities. We think Turkey will not want to call its basic alliance role into question, but will push other allies hard to fill the gap in its arms and equipment inventories. It may also insist on urgent NATO action on such items on its list of "urgent requirements" as communications and air defense.

In the longer term, Turkish disillusionment with the US could intensify Turkey's basic re-appraisal of all its security relationships and of its general foreign policy orientation. Decisions based on such a re-appraisal are not likely to be hasty, as Turkey judges whether NATO can meet what Turkey perceives to be its needs in the absence of a special US-Turkish relationship.

US objectives in the forthcoming negotiations with the Turks are to retain our basic facilities and preserve the fundamentals of the multilateral security relationship. These aims are intrinsically conservative. We want to preserve those things we now have which we consider desirable, and relinquish only what we must. Within these goals, opportunities may arise to realign the US presence in ways which could make it more efficient while decreasing its size, visibility, and overall cost.

One of the basic assumptions underlying what we consider to be the optional approaches to negotiations available to the US is that the US-Turkish relationship is

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undergoing some permanent change. Turkey will no longer trust the US to the same extent as heretofore, no matter what is done to lift the embargo in the weeks and months ahead. On the other hand, Turkish leaders will be reluctant to see US-Turkish bilateral security ties disappear entirely.

Four negotiating options, or approaches, deserve examination. They range from trying to accept and accommodate Turkish desires in devising a new security relationship, to abandoning our facilities in Turkey altogether. The options developed here are not mutually exclusive; each option contains a number of elements, some of which can be extracted and used in other options.

The four approaches are as follows:

Option 1 -- US acquiescence in Turkish demands for a new Defense Cooperation Agreement. We would negotiate a new agreement within parameters established by the Turks, and consult Congress on the result, even though many features of the new agreement would be unpalatable on Capitol Hill.

Option 2 -- The US would take the initiative in putting together a package which might satisfy the Turks sufficiently to enable us to retain our minimum facilities.

seek to enlist our NATO allies in providing alternative sources of arms,

Option 3 -- Drag our feet on negotiations and play for time in the hope that developments this fall and winter with respect to Cyprus, or Congressional action to lift the arms embargo, would enhance our negotiating position.

Option 4 -- Reduce US installations in Turkey by deciding internally what facilities we can do without, and then negotiating a new agreement to provide for a much-reduced US presence.

Given present uncertainties regarding Turkish intentions on both the substance and timing of negotiations as the Turks await the outcome of the US effort

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to rescind the arms embargo, we think the US should for now retain maximum negotiating flexibility by keeping its options completely open. Thus, rather than recommend a specific approach to negotiations at this time, we recommend that the US government study the options presented in this paper, but adopt no specific one during the next few weeks of watchful waiting as the Congressional situation and Turkish intentions clarify.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### History of the Bilateral Relationship

With the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the US replaced Britain as Turkey's principal foreign supporter. Our relationship became regulated by a subsequent web of bilateral understandings dealing with specific facets of Turkish-American military cooperation. Some of these were treaties openly published and ratified, such as the Status of Forces Agreement of June 1954, which is still in force. Others were contained in secret exchanges of notes, including the Military Facilities Agreement of 1954, which was the basic instrument regulating the operation of all US military installations in Turkey. This accord, along with numerous verbal arrangements, was superseded by the Defense Cooperation Agreement of July 1969, an instrument whose text has not yet been published.

Turkish public opinion generally paid little attention to American activity in their country during the 1950s. The 1960 military coup led to an upsurge of nationalist feeling that eventually contributed to Turkish moves to restrict US freedom of action in Turkey. The coup also set in train a broadening of political debate and a rise in anti-Americanism.

A turning point in US relations with Turkey occurred during the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964, when the so-called "Johnson letter", which warned the Turks against use of American supplied equipment for landings on Cyprus in June 1964, caused a sharp reaction. The Turks began a wide-ranging re-evaluation of the alliance with the US and NATO. From that time on, Turkish military leaders began to scrutinize more closely all aspects of the US-Turkish alliance. Turkish military commanders also began to fear that the NATO strategy of "flexible response" implied a willingness to sacrifice the "wings" for the interests of the countries at the center of the alliance. These doubts continue to trouble the Turks.

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
Since the mid-1960s there has also been concern over the level of U.S. military aid. The concept of forward defense required extensive modernization of the Turkish military establishment, an endeavor that necessitated a level of resources far greater than Turkey had received in the past. Moreover, Turkey's appetite for military modernization was further stimulated by a growing sentiment in favor of creating military units independent of NATO for deployment to Cyprus if needed.

#### Modernization of Turkish Armed Forces

In 1966, Washington proposed a five year plan for the selective modernization of Turkish forces. The plan focused primarily on the ground forces; the Air Force had second priority, and the Navy was almost entirely neglected. While that specific program was not implemented, its recommendations provided some background for the ten-year program of reorganization and modernization of their armed forces which the Turks finally launched in 1972. This \$2.9 billion plan was to be funded about 48 percent from Turkish sources and the remainder from foreign, principally American, assistance. The program was designed to bring the Turkish armed forces -- particularly combat units -- more closely into harmony with current US concepts. Like the previous plan, it too placed the principal emphasis on modernizing ground force equipment, but it also provided for the purchase of 40 F-4s, (ultimately with U.S. credit assistance).

It is this program that is threatened by the current arms embargo. In an effort to keep the project on stream, the Turks in June 1975 raised their share of the program by about 50 percent, while reducing its time span to 6 years. At the same time, Parliament granted the Cabinet further authority to raise the Turkish allocation by an additional 50 percent if needed. It is clear that despite the inflationary impact of these funds and the worsening foreign exchange position of Turkey over the past year, the military establishment still has first call on Turkish government resources.

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### U.S. Presence in Turkey

As difficulties and restrictions on the U.S. use of facilities increased through the 1960's, the U.S. began in 1966 to draw down its personnel in Turkey and to turn over certain facilities to the Turks.



An important communications site near Ankara was phased out. As a result, within a short period the number of U.S. personnel and dependents declined from approximately 22,000 to the present 13,000.


Negotiations in one form or another over military assistance and facilities have been in almost continuous process since 1966 as the Turks have sought to increase their knowledge of and control over U.S. operations and to receive greater benefits from the facilities they grant to the U.S.

### Cyprus Crisis and U.S. Arms Embargo; Turkish Reaction

The course of security cooperation between Turkey and the US was dealt a severe blow by the Turkish military intervention on Cyprus on July 20, 1974. For these operations, the 30,000-40,000 Turkish troops used weapons supplied by the US. Rejecting the appeals of American emissaries to resolve the dispute by peaceful means, the Turks asserted they were acting within the bounds of the London-Zurich Accords. Using tanks and air strikes, the Turkish forces rapidly established a foothold in northern Cyprus before accepting a cease-fire agreement. When Greek negotiators seemed to be stalling at Geneva in August, Ankara resumed military operations to seize about 40 percent of the island.

The second phase of the Cyprus action, in particular, brought the Turks sharply into conflict with the US Congress. Congress introduced bills to cut military aid as long as the Turks were in violation of the

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military assistance act. A complete arms embargo went into effect on February 5, 1975; the embargo was sustained by Congressional rejection of a compromise bill on July 24.

The embargo shocked Turkish leaders, who had thought that the U.S. Government would find some solution to the impasse. Amid mounting domestic pressure, the Turkish Government on June 17 called for new negotiations on the US-Turkish security relationship and the basic umbrella agreement covering that relationship, the Defense Cooperation Agreement of July 3, 1969. At the opening of negotiations on July 17, the Turks informed us of their intention to submit at a later session a new draft Defense Cooperation Agreement on the ground that the U.S. had unilaterally abrogated the existing agreement by ending military assistance. (See section on History of the Defense Cooperation Agreement and Current Negotiations.)

#### Turkish Perceptions of the U.S. Tie

Turkish military leaders by and large remain convinced of the value of a continuing security relationship with the US. They have been brought up in the tradition of US procedures, doctrines, and practices. They are wedded to the use of US military equipment and recognize the costs of switching to other sources of supply. More than their civilian counterparts, therefore, they are committed to retaining defense ties with the US. Yet the arms embargo hurts them both psychologically and materially and we can expect that it has drastically altered the attitudes of many military officers toward the US.

Among the civilian politicians, the arms embargo has become a central issue in the struggle for political advantage. Prime Minister Demirel, like opposition leader Ecevit, views foreign policy

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in domestic political terms. Although he continues to try to reassure the US that he appreciates the efforts of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to reverse the arms ban, Demirel is under strong pressure to relialiate definitively if US aid is not soon resumed. Demirel has not shown much inclination in the past to buck the tide of political passion. He will find it difficult to back away from the measures he has already imposed against US facilities and will, moreover, find himself under pressure to take even harsher steps.

#### Cyprus' Continuing Impact on Turkish Policy

The Cyprus issue is a matter of intense national commitment in Turkey, a cause that has emerged over the past decade as a pressing Turkish concern. During this period, successive Turkish regimes have pursued their dual aims of protecting the Turkish-Cypriot minority and ensuring that Cyprus does not, through union with Greece, become a security threat to Turkey, despite the disruptive effect of these actions on relations with the US. By now the Turks have invested so much men, material, and prestige in advancing their interests on Cyprus that it would be exceedingly difficult for them to change course. Moreover, the political situation in Ankara is not propitious for the emergence of the strong leadership required for making concessions which would contribute to resolving the Cyprus dispute.

Even if in time it became possible to overcome these powerful obstacles to a Cyprus settlement, the Turks would not give the US credit for assistance in reaching a solution; our bilateral relations, therefore, would not rapidly improve. Prolongation of the Cyprus dispute, moreover, has great potential for damaging US-Turkish relations even further, with equally unsettling consequences for stability in the eastern Mediterranean as a whole.

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II. TURKEY'S NEED FOR MILITARY  
AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

US as a source of weapons

Turkish military dependence upon the United States has been almost total. All told, the US has supplied over 90 percent of Turkey's military equipment. Since 1950, over \$3 billion of equipment has been provided through the US Military Assistance Program (MAP); an additional \$1 billion in grants and sales was programmed for the next five years. The US has supplied the Turkish Army with over 95 percent of its medium tank inventory, all of its personnel carriers, and all of its post-World War II field artillery. About 85 percent of Turkey's aircraft have come from the US. Almost all major naval combatants are former US vessels supplied through the MAP or built in Turkey under a cost-sharing program. More than 18,500 Turkish military personnel have been trained over the past 25 years with US assistance, nearly all in the US.

Turkey lacks the basic industrial capacity, investable funds, and skilled manpower needed to produce major military equipment. Hence, the Turks will not be able to satisfy their major military requirements indigenously for many years, if ever. Moreover, to replace US military equipment with weapons from other sources would take an extraordinarily expensive effort.

Turkey's major military needs center on the air force, the service which has suffered most from the arms embargo. A shortage of spare parts has made it necessary to cannibalize some aircraft in order to obtain parts for others, thus reducing the number of aircraft in service. Aircraft flying hours have been reduced, thus interfering with training and lessening aircrew proficiency. Although the air force's decline has been partially offset by purchases of some new F-104 aircraft from Italy, the acquisition of the spare parts needed to maintain the air force's current inventory of US planes is probably the major immediate priority of the Turks. The Turks also place a high priority on the acquisition of such advanced

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combat aircraft as the F-4 and related spare parts, as well as aviation ordnance and electronic warfare equipment.


The capability of the ground forces apparently has not yet been as badly affected as that of the air force, although spare parts for army equipment, especially tanks, are becoming more of a problem as time goes on. A program to modernize M-48 tanks has apparently been halted, probably because the modernization packages are not available following the imposition of the embargo. Moreover, the Turks had hoped to introduce new equipment into their ground forces, particularly tanks, armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, anti-tank weapons, and communications equipment.

Supplies and weapons for the navy are apparently a lower priority need for the Turks. The navy has been the service least affected by the embargo, with some important requirements already being met through other channels, e.g., by the acquisition of new submarines from Germany.

#### Economic Needs

As much as \$1 billion in economic assistance could be needed this year to bolster Turkey's dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Acute balance-of-payments problems have developed since 1973 because of higher oil prices, the costly Cyprus military operation, the global recession's effect on exports, and the decline of remittances from Turkish workers abroad. The deterioration in the foreign accounts has been particularly severe since the beginning of the year. From December to April foreign exchange reserves fell \$600 million to only \$1 billion -- equivalent to less than 4 months imports.

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The current account, which slumped into a \$700 million deficit last year after a \$470 million surplus in 1973, worsened to an estimated \$900 million in the first half of 1975. The trade deficit amounted to \$1.4 billion, up \$600 million from the first half of 1974. Although imports were held to \$1.9 billion -- only 12% higher than in the first half of 1974, exports plummeted 40% to \$520 million. Slack demand for cotton and other primary products severely undercut export sales. Moreover, Turkish workers were having difficulty finding or keeping jobs in recession-ridden Western Europe. Consequently, worker remittances -- the most important offset to the trade deficit -- were only \$517 million in January-June, a decline of 8% from last year.

Turkey is seeking loans from OPEC states, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Investment Bank, but so far without success. Earlier this year Ankara borrowed \$120 million from the IMF oil facility, and it can draw another \$70 million through March 1976. Development projects proposed to several of the international organizations might, if implemented, bring in some funds.

The government seems likely to supplement its borrowing efforts with import controls and export incentives, which have already been discussed in Parliament. A slight devaluation of the Turkish lira (2%) has just taken place.

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III. HISTORY OF DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT  
AND CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

The Johnson letter delivered during the Cyprus crisis of 1964 led Turkey to review its security relationship with the U.S. The Military Facilities Agreement of 1954, which had served as the umbrella agreement for most U.S. activities in Turkey, came to be seen by the Turks as too vague and not according Turkey appropriate benefits from and controls over US-Turkish defense cooperation. Thus, in 1966, the Turks presented the U.S. Government with a new draft umbrella Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). In its original form, this draft provided for substantial Turkish controls over all aspects of U.S. military operations and tied continued provision of facilities to the U.S. to the continuance of U.S. military assistance to Turkey, and to a U.S. commitment to support Turkey in case of any attack upon it. The U.S., after careful study of the Turkish draft, submitted a complete revision in early 1967. Two years of hard negotiation followed, ending in the signing of the DCA on July 3, 1969. While in the end Turkish leaders compromised on most points, they maintained in public that they had generally prevailed. Today, most Turkish politicians, with the exception of Demirel -- who was Prime Minister when the DCA was negotiated -- assume they have the right to deal rather summarily with the U.S. in regard to these facilities.

One major issue during and after the negotiation of the DCA was the status of agreed minutes. The Turks had insisted that for reasons of sensitivity about national sovereignty, certain elements very important to the U.S.,

[redacted] be incorporated in agreed minutes rather than appear in the DCA itself. The U.S. agreed, but made it understood that in cases of ambiguity, the agreed minutes would prevail over the main text. The Turks gave oral assurances that they understood this point, but held out for much vaguer

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language in the covering letter defining the status of the agreed minutes. In later years, the Turks attacked the prevailing status of agreed minutes, holding that the DCA's main text should govern. Since agreed minutes provide the U.S. with necessary operational flexibility, maintenance of their status vis-a-vis the main text has been very important. The Turks are not likely to grant us the flexibility we enjoyed in the past in any new agreement.

The DCA provided for negotiation of Implementing Agreements to replace existing agreements covering specific installations and operations. All agreements concluded under the Military Facilities Agreement were to be reviewed, and either recast as Implementing Agreements to the new DCA, terminated, or left as they were. One year was provided for military negotiators to complete their work on the Implementing Agreements.

When the Implementing Agreement negotiations began, it became apparent that the Turks were trying to regain what they felt had been lost in the DCA negotiations. Consequently, the military negotiators were unable to meet the one-year deadline, but did, by June 1971, manage to achieve ad referendum agreement on a substantial number of important Implementing Agreements leaving, however, a number of key issues, common to many of the Agreements, unresolved.

The Embassy in Ankara then began a dialogue with the Turkish Foreign Ministry in an effort to reach solutions to key issues in general terms which then could be referred back to the military experts for resolution of details. These talks did not succeed in resolving any of what now had become hard-core issues.

In December 1972, the Turkish Government informed the U.S. Government of its desire to begin formal Implementing Agreement negotiations at the government level. The Turkish proposal envisaged mixed civilian/military negotiating teams under the direction of the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy. After reviewing the matter carefully, the U.S. Government agreed,

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and government-level negotiations formally began in March, 1973. The Turks once again reopened old issues on which ad referendum agreement had been reached by the military negotiators. However, through intensive negotiations, most of these issues were resolved. By February 5, 1975, when the Turks suspended negotiations in reaction to the Congressional embargo on arms shipments, ad referendum agreement had been reached on seven of the eleven most important Implementing Agreements on the negotiation agenda.

#### Legal Aspects

In a note dated June 17, 1975, the Turks requested negotiations in thirty days on the principles of continued bilateral defense cooperation and the status of U.S. facilities in Turkey. The note charged that the Congressional embargo on arms to Turkey precluded U.S. fulfillment of its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and the DCA. The Turks have now officially asserted that they are consequently released from their own bilateral obligations under the DCA, on the grounds that the U.S. has materially breached an essential undertaking in the DCA namely, provision of military assistance.

The Turks placed U.S. facilities under a "provisional status", effective July 26, 1975. They have suspended

[REDACTED] U.S. installations under direct Turkish military command, and stated that hereafter U.S. armed forces personnel in Turkey will enjoy only those privileges and immunities specified in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. The U.S. maintains that Turkey has no right under the DCA or customary international law unilaterally to impose restrictions on operations or any other provisional status relating to our installations. We stated this position at the opening negotiating session July 17 and repeated it in a note to the Turkish Government on July 27. (Since our legal position on the DCA has thus been registered with the GOT, we do not discuss the legal question further in this NSSM). The Turks have not been much deterred from action by our legal presentation however, we shall continue to maintain our position in negotiations in an effort to restrain the Turks from taking extreme positions and actions relating to our activities and facilities.

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### Turkish Approach to Negotiations

The Demirel Government was impelled to demand the opening of negotiations because of growing domestic pressure for retaliatory action against the U.S. military presence in Turkey in response to the continued Congressional arms embargo. The Demirel regime had not wanted to strike at the heart of the U.S. alliance and presumably still wants to hang on to as many of the beneficial aspects of the relationship with the U.S. as possible. This desire not to disrupt the basis of the alliance was shared by President Koruturk, a consistent proponent of moderation. The Turkish military establishment as a whole was also generally committed to retaining ties with the U.S., but elements within the military were in the forefront of those who wanted to take strong action against the U.S.

The Turks had sought to delay action until Congress had had a chance to lift the arms embargo. The total rejection by Congress, July 24, of any compromise for relieving the embargo forced the hand of the Turkish Government. Prime Minister Demirel, feeling profoundly let down by the action of Congress, and vulnerable to charges that his inept handling of foreign affairs had led to this situation, believed himself committed to stiff retaliatory action. While he personally may not even now wish to eliminate all vestiges of the close ties between Turkey and the U.S., Demirel lacks the political strength to face down demands for severe action by his coalition partners and the opposition. He may still seek to find measures which seem more severe than they actually are in an attempt to salvage the essential elements of the U.S.-Turkish alliance. The Turkish Government is aware that drastic actions develop a momentum of their own, and may prove irreversible; however, the Turkish leadership may not be able to resist pressures to take such actions.

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IV. U.S. DOD FACILITIES IN TURKEY

There follows a description of U.S. facilities in Turkey grouped into geographical complexes for ease of understanding (See Map at Annex 1), and a DOD-produced prioritization by functional area.

FACILITY DESCRIPTIONS

The Incirlik Complex (Near Adana on the southeastern coast of Turkey)

- Incirlik Air Base
- Incirlik Aerial Port
- Incirlik Communications Facility
- Karatas Communications Facility
- Incirlik Naval Air Facility
- Konya Range
- US Army Area Engineer
- Yumurtalik POL Pumping Facility

Incirlik, with about 2,235 US personnel, is the main US NATO operating base in Turkey, and is the sole US intertheater airlift terminal for Turkey.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At Incirlik is maintained the only US-owned and controlled refueling capacity in the Eastern Mediterranean, without which USAF aircraft operating in the area would be totally dependent on non-US fuel sources.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In wartime, Incirlik would provide bed-down for 2 F-4 squadrons, one squadron of F-111 rapid reaction aircraft, SACEUR Strategic Reserve aircraft, and KC-97 follow-on forces.


Incirlik provides peacetime training for southern flank air forces, including gunnery training at the Konya Range. US use of the Konya Range is primarily by rotational units stationed at Torrejon.

The Karatas Communications Facility is the nodal point on the main Defense Communication System (DCS) line through Turkey that serves the Incirlik communications site.





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





The Ankara Complex (in central Turkey)

- Ankara Air Station at Balgat
- 
- Esenboga Airport
- Elmadag Communications Facility
- Ankara Communications Facility
- JUSMMAT Staff
- 
- US Army Engineer (1) Civilian

Since there is no one predominant operation in the Ankara area, the interconnection among the various facilities there is less clear than elsewhere. The largest and most visible facility is the Balgat Air Station which supports various US staffs (TUSLOG, JUSMMAT, Embassy, CENTO) and other military personnel in the Ankara area. US personnel at this facility number about 400.



The JUSMMAT Staff, numbering about 200, coordinates the military assistance program with their counterparts in the Turkish military.



Esenboga Airport, where we keep a small detachment, is used to support our activities in the Ankara area, and is also a major intra-Turkey airport.

[REDACTED] It is also programmed to be the site of a DCS and NATO ACEHIGH inter-connect.

The Izmir Complex (on the Aegean Sea in western Turkey)

- Cigli Air Base
- NATO Staffs (LANDSOUTHEAST and 6 ATAF)
- Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Terminal Unit (TTU)
- US Army Special Security Office (SSO)
- Yamanlar Communications Facility
- Izmir Communications Facility
- Naval Control of Shipping Office


The facilities in the Izmir area are a mixed bag, mostly related to each other only in a geographical sense.

[REDACTED]

The NATO staffs, with about 850 US personnel, are mentioned here only as illustrative of the type of operation that requires support. Presumably the US staffs of LANDSOUTHEAST and 6 ATAF will remain in Izmir unless Turkey withdraws from NATO.

The Transportation Terminal Unit with 9 US personnel moves USG-sponsored cargo in the Izmir area. As the key link between the US defense Transportation System and the Turkish National Transportation System, it receives and turns over MAP cargo, when supplied.

The Yamanlar Communications Facility is the point where the DCS system enters Turkey from Greece. It is also the nodal point for service to the Izmir Communications Facility and is a programmed site for a DCS and NATO ACEHIGH inter-connect.



The Special Security Office (9 US Army personnel) provides [redacted] communications and support to LANDSOUTHEAST, 6 ATAF and Consul General Izmir. As in Istanbul, the Naval Control of Shipping Office is a liaison function conducted by the Consulate General.

The Iskenderun Complex ( 60 miles southeast of Adana on the southeastern coast of Turkey)

- POL Support Depot
- Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Terminal Unit (TTU)

At an established Turkish base, a small Turkish naval facility provides a NATO POL depot with tankage allocated to the US Navy capable of storing 343,000 barrels of DFM, 94,000 barrels of JP-5, and 31,000 barrels of AVGAS. There is also a limited ammunition storage capacity. This depot provides POL support to the Sixth Fleet and storage of petroleum war reserves for the Eastern Mediterranean. The Depot is one of four Mediterranean lift points (Rota, August, Iskenderun, Naples) where both DFM and JP-5 are available. The only fully operational POL depot in the Eastern Mediterranean, Iskenderun represents 20 percent of US tankage assets in the Mediterranean. Any shortfall in Med fuel storage capacity would need to be made up by tanker supply, in an emergency.

The TTU moves USG cargo in the Iskenderun area (including Incirlik). It also receives and turns over MAP cargoes when these deliveries are flowing.

Other Facilities - Loran C Kargaburun (on the western shore of the Sea of Marmara in northwestern Turkey)

The Loran C site at Kargaburun, with 22 US personnel, is a slave station in the Mediterranean Loran C chain. It is considered of major importance, since its loss would seriously degrade Loran C radio-navigational coverage in the eastern Mediterranean. US submarines (SSBNs) use the Loran C system as a primary radio-navigational update for their inertial navigation systems.

#### Communications

The Defense Communications System (DCS) enters Turkey at Yamanlar, near Izmir, its proximate western connection




being Mt. Pateras in Greece. The basic line runs from Yamanlar, to Sahin Tepesi, to Elmadag, to Karatas, to Malatya. Each of these stations is a nodal point, from which facilities in the area are served.

Yamanlar serves Izmir and Balikesir; Sahin Tepesi serves Istanbul, [redacted]


[redacted]; Elmadag serves Ankara

[redacted] Karatas serves Incirlik; [redacted]



Priorities


DOD has prioritized facilities in Turkey by functional area to enable a negotiating team to exercise potential trade-off options, thereby facilitating the retention of the most important facilities. It is not considered advisable to subprioritize between functional areas until such time as the Turkish government has disclosed its desires concerning these facilities.



Order in which functional areas are listed does NOT imply order of importance. Within functional areas, facilities are listed in descending order of importance.

First Priority Installations by Function:

A.




B. Air Force Function

1. Incirlik AB (includes Konya Range)

C. Naval Function


1. NATO POL Depot, Iskenderun
2. Loran C site

D.



Second Priority Installations by Function:

A.





B. Air Force Function

1. Cigli AB
2. Esenboga EB
3. Yesilkoy AB

C. Naval Function

1. Naval support Izmir
2. Naval support Ankara
3. Naval Air Facility, Incirlik
- 4.
5. Naval Air Facility, Eskisehir
6. Naval Air Facility, Antalya
7. Naval Facility, Eregli



Support

Support facilities have not been specifically listed nor assigned separate priorities by DOD, which regards them as sharing the priority of the personnel and activities they support. We recognize, however, that if the Turks demand reductions in the scope of activities at our installations we should be prepared to pare down support activities before making cuts in primary operational missions and activities.


Prioritization of facilities in the communications functional area has not been provided since the significance of individual sites is derived from the importance attached to the activities they support.

The sites that form the backbone of the DCS in Turkey-- Yamanlar, Sahin Tepesi, Elmadag, Karatas, Malatya -- will retain their full essentiality as long as there are important US operations at the eastern end of the line. Even if major US installations are removed, [REDACTED]


First Priority

[REDACTED] However, the aerial port operation has often been criticized by the Turks. Suspension of that operation would cause us great difficulty in supporting military operations throughout Turkey.

[REDACTED] is one of our smaller installations, but highly important. Turkish authorities have been following activities and changes there very closely, and we had expected it to be included in any Turkish proposals for provisional status or other restrictions on operations. Following Congress' July 24 refusal to lift the arms embargo, the Turks asked us to suspend primary operations [REDACTED]







Second Priority

Izmir support facilities enjoy a form of NATO mantle because of their connection with the two major NATO Headquarters there.

Ankara Air Station, the airport and the water port operations may experience suspension or restrictions as the Turks seek to apply pressure against our logistics support network.

JUSMMAT and TUSLOG

If Congress refuses to come up with any relief of the embargo, JUSMMAT will surely be abolished, with only



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a residual office left under Embassy aegis to discharge the CINCEUR Contact Officer responsibility in regard to remaining US military units in Turkey. If Ankara Air Station is closed, most of the TUSLOG command and support functions could be relocated to Incirlik, while the Commander himself, a general officer with a skeleton staff, would come under Embassy aegis, perhaps combining the residual JUSMMAT duties with the remaining U.S. military units in Turkey.

### Logistical Considerations

Certain logistical support activities such as APO and dependent schools have come under Turkish criticism and pressure as being contrary to Turkish law. We can thus expect such activities to be high on Turkish target lists.

Commissaries, post exchanges, and clubs could be closed or have their sources of supply cut off by Turkish customs officials at the ports of entry.

The Turks may move to terminate use of the Armed Forces Radio and TV service and military tactical radios (walkie talkies and mobile units in cars) on US installations and in cities such as Ankara as being contrary to Turkish law. They may also move against AUTOVON since we have never granted their request for AUTOVON lines.

Internal transportation flights by USAF C-130's may be halted because of the cabotage issue. The alternative would be to contract Turkish ground and air transport which would be costly, but a feasible substitute.

If duty-free import of privately owned vehicles and household effects for US military personnel is rescinded by the Turks, and if duty-free goods for commissaries, PX and clubs are blocked, then the military manning pattern for Turkey would have to be limited for the most part to unaccompanied tours under field conditions. Action against the APO and the dependent schools would also tend to have the effect of making long, accompanied tours impossible.

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If the military population were drastically reduced in Ankara, the Embassy could set up a pouch, school, commissary, PX, and club operation under diplomatic aegis to support them as well as its own personnel. The Consular Offices may also be able to mount similar operations, but the lack of a consular convention with Turkey would make their status somewhat doubtful.



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## VI. TURKEY AND NATO

### Background

On February 18, 1952, Turkey and Greece became members of NATO. The US was the prime mover in their admission; the new members were seen by many Allies as somehow lying beyond an Atlantic community of shared values and outlook -- for cultural, historical, and ideological reasons. There are still occasional indications among some Allies that Greece and Turkey are different from the others, and are the United States' problem.

The US, in effect, became Turkey's patron, and the Allies were quite content to see the special bilateral relationship continue to develop. Only Germany among the Allies subsequently developed anything like a special relationship of its own with Turkey, primarily in conjunction with its military assistance program.

Turkey, with its deep-rooted, historic distrust of the Soviet Union and quarrels with the Balkan states, was in many ways a natural in an anti-Soviet alliance. Several thousand Turkish troops had served with distinction in Korea, giving added meaning to the promise of a major Turkish contribution to NATO force levels. For its part, Turkey would receive enhanced security and continued force modernization and would, at long last, be permitted to join Europe. Time has shown Turkey to be a loyal, steadfast member of NATO.

### Turkish Armed Forces

Turkish military manpower is approximately 376,000 Army, 40,000 Navy, and 44,000 Air Force, or a total of 460,000 men on active service.

The Turkish Army is the largest of all non-US NATO members. Re-organization and modernization of Turkey's forces are proceeding apace, but Turkey continues to place heavy reliance on foreign assistance. "Mobilization-Day" readiness capabilities are very good, although manning levels, reserve supply stocks, and reservist training programs need improvement.

Except for the newly formed Aegean Forth Army, Turkish land and air forces are 100 percent NATO-committed ("earmarked"). Naval forces are under national

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
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command, the Turks claiming that because they are surrounded on three sides by water, they must keep naval forces under close control.

#### Turkish Force Goals

In 1974 the NATO Defense Planning committee agreed that Turkey's "existing acquisition and modernization" program should be pursued vigorously over the next five years. The Turks committed themselves to achieving most of the recommended force goals, with the proviso that external aid would be needed for a major part of the equipment purchases. For illustrative purposes, the following are some major equipment categories involved: 400 new tanks; 266 armored personnel carriers; DRAGON anti-tank weapons systems; 54 F-4 or MRCA-type aircraft; and 58 helicopters. The Turks had planned to procure in 1975-1976 half the helicopter and anti-tank weapons earmarked for the entire five year period. This program is in disarray as a result of the US cut-off.

#### NATO Infrastructure Program Projects in Turkey



Approximately \$62 million (18.3 million IAU's) has been programmed by NATO for Turkey for 1972-1974 (Slices XXIII - XXV).

While they might maintain they have no national interest in some of the projects, under infrastructure programs the Turks have been receiving a tremendous advantage in cost/benefit terms. They have paid NATO an average of 1.3 percent of overall program costs, and received an average of 16 percent of project value allotted to the Allies.

The list of individual infrastructure program projects in Turkey is a lengthy one. It would appear that, except for US security agency monitoring facilities, installations used by US forces in Turkey have

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benefited from the program in one way or another. The NATO Defense Planning Committee would be confronted with an issue if the Turks were to terminate US use of NATO-funded facilities. There is a general rule that host countries, as long as they accept common funds for construction, are not free to accept some users and reject others when use is in consonance with the plans of major NATO Commanders. (See below, "Current Issues in Turkish-NATO Relations").

#### Major Allied Suppliers

In August 1974 the FRG suspended arms shipments to Greece and Turkey, but resumed them in May, 1975. The Turks are receiving small patrol boats, submarines, ammunition, supplies, and spare parts. Next to the US, Germany has been Turkey's major arms supplier, with \$245 million worth of deliveries since 1964, and some \$175 million in commitments. Eighty percent has been in grant aid, in many cases including the value of equipment surplus to the Germans.


Italy has concluded sales agreements with Turkey to date amounting to \$139 million (\$52 million already delivered). A \$75 million sale concluded in late 1974 of 18 F-104 fighters built in Italy under US license is being financed by Libya; 16 aircraft were delivered before February 5. An \$11 million sales agreement of 20 AB-204B Bell helicopters was also signed in the latter part of 1974 and is unaffected by the US arms cutoff. In April the Turks gave Italy a long equipment shopping list, mainly for cash, suggesting probable financing by Arab countries.

Recently, Turkey has also turned to Belgium, the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark for help in meeting its needs for arms and equipment. Thus far, France has been only a minor source of military supplies.

#### Future Prospects for Third-Country Sales

Much of the equipment Turkey has been getting from other Allies was either made in the US or in Europe under licensing arrangements. This is true

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of equipment purchased since the first Congressional move was made to cut off the flow of US arms to Turkey. The Allies are aware that they are not legally required to get US approval to transfer items of US design which they manufacture under licensing arrangements with the US which antedate the February 5 US cut-off, provided the licensing arrangements permit export to other NATO Allies without US approval. Turkey has attempted to take advantage of this legal situation by submitting a list of urgently needed items to other Allies through the DPC mechanism. Subsequently, Turkey has intensified its efforts through bilateral channels, including urgent requests to other NATO allies in conjunction with its June 17 note to the US.

While the Allies can fill some of Turkey's critical needs, they are unlikely, in the near term, to bridge the gap that would be caused by a continuing suspension of US items. Later, as equipment wears out, an even more difficult period may ensue, involving a basic degradation of the Turkish military. By then, if not before, Turkey will be faced with the decision of whether to switch primarily to non-US origin or design equipment, including from France. In the longer run, if Turkey changes to a diversified military organization, overall costs will be higher and effectiveness lower than with a constant source of US equipment.

The Turkish military appears to be pessimistic about its ability to fill its short-term needs from non-US sources. In the future, if the US cut-off is prolonged, Turkey will probably make a basic assessment of whether it can rely on other Allies as its major suppliers. Such an assessment will have major implications for Turkey's future role in NATO -- either formally (in terms of steps to loosen its NATO ties) or de facto, by becoming dependent in some significant part on Eastern or other non-NATO sources, such as Iran, Pakistan, or Japan.

Another theoretical course of action would be NATO claims against Turkey based on the theory advanced in the French case following French closure of common-use NATO facilities in France after 1966. By this theory, claims based on the initial NATO cost of the facilities are pro-rated based on the estimated "remaining life" of the facility. While Turkey joined other Allies in

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


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proposing this claims formula against France, France rejected it, and the formula is not reflected in the Martinique Agreement between France and the US. Moreover, a claims procedure of any form against Turkey would be a major escalation, might not be supported by other Allies, and might prompt drastic reactions by Turkey against NATO.

NATO Counter to Turkish NATO Policy Changes



If Turkey denied the US use of NATO-funded facilities in Turkey, or indicated it might change its status in NATO, the US or other Allies could raise the question of continuing NATO infrastructure benefits. (Turkey is well aware of the implications of such steps, having taken the lead in seeking to challenge continuing infrastructure benefits to Greece.)

Constructive Roles for Our Major NATO Partners

We could enter into confidential bilateral discussions with the UK, FRG, France, and possibly others, aimed at getting their agreement to make a maximum effort to keep Turkey a member of the Western Alliance. Our objectives would be to gain more than just agreement from these countries to use their suasion with Turkey; we would also try to delineate some rational approach by which these countries could supply Turkey's military needs over the coming years. (At this stage, it is hard to predict whether such a system could be developed. Among other factors, we would have to contend with commercial interests among these and other Allies, since they would face the prospect of substantial arms sales -- even arms competition -- as a result of deteriorating US-Turkish relations.) We could also

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
discuss ways in which these Allies could fill other US roles in Turkey, including (if the US presence is drastically reduced) the psychological role of providing a "Western" military presence in Turkey, a role the UK might be uniquely qualified to fit. We could also discuss other ways in which the Allies could tie Turkey to Western Europe, including EC membership or increased commercial and investment activities in Turkey.

Compensatory NATO Measures

In late April, Turkey set forth a list of "urgent requirements" for NATO action in the face of the stated Greek withdrawal. NATO subsequently asked the International Military Staff to study the list, in large measure because a number of items on the Turkish list tended to prejudge the Greek role in NATO, and because most of the Allies preferred to postpone action on them until after the NATO summit. Thus, the list is still outstanding, and Turkey is likely to press hard on one or more of these items in the weeks and months ahead. Major items are:

-- Communications. Most of Turkey's communications links with NATO pass through Greece. At various times in the past year, Greece has cut the flow of communications through these lines. Turkey has asked for NATO to provide alternative links with NATO independent of Greece, involving satellites. The new circuits requested will increase overall capacity, leaving existing land circuits through Greece as redundant capacity. Moreover, there is general agreement among Allies that it is unacceptable for one ally (Greece) to cut off communications between NATO and another ally, and that it is in the interests of the Allies as a whole to assure future uninterrupted contact with Turkey.

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
-- Air Defense. Turkey has complained that Greece has interrupted the flow of early warning information from Turkey (which, like NATO communications links, runs through Greece), and has also interrupted the supply of Greek-generated early warning information to NATO. Turkey is asking NATO to provide alternative means of communicating to other Allies the early warning information it generates, as well as "increased responsibility" for early warning in the region, and increased NADGE and related capabilities for monitoring the region. In effect, Turkey appears to be asking the Allies to agree that Turkey should provide early warning coverage in place of Greece, a step that prejudices Greece's future role in NATO and would be badly received in Athens.

-- Air Links Between Europe and Turkey. Since August 1974, Greece has not permitted flights over its airspace to and from Turkey. Turkey has called on the Allies to assist in resolving this problem. In June, Turkey began bilateral discussions with Greece on issues relating to overflights, and at present appears to prefer handling the subject in a bilateral context.

-- NATO Exercises. Turkey refused to take part in the WINTEX-75 exercise in February, 1975 apparently on the grounds that Greece's overflight restrictions made Turkish participation, even in a largely CPX framework, unrealistic. Turkey also implied that the exercise scenario was faulty because it did not assign to Turkey the exercise functions Greece would normally carry out. In April, Turkey called on the Allies for help in solving its problems with exercises. The US and others responded that the issue depended in good part on the future Greek role in NATO.

-- Defense Plans. Turkey asked the IPC to NATO to initiate contingency plans for NATO on the assumption Greece may formally withdraw from NATO. Most Allies consider this premature, and prejudicial to Greece's eventual role in NATO.

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### Likely Turkish Tactics in NATO

Turkey attaches great importance to its role in NATO, both in terms of its defenses and its political identity. The Turkish military have a strong interest in continuing full participation in NATO's military activities, and their views carry heavy weight in Ankara. Moreover, Turkey's adversary relationship with Greece provides an added incentive to stay fully in NATO, among other reasons to preserve the distinction between Greece as a partial member and Turkey as a full member, and to preserve for Ankara the option of pressuring Greece on its role in the Alliance. We think Turkey will not want to call its military role in NATO into question, but will push other Allies hard to fill the gap in its arms and equipment inventories, and may also insist on urgent NATO action on such items on its list of "urgent requirements" as communications and air defense. Furthermore, political factions within Turkey may intensify their charges that Ankara is being too soft on the US or on NATO (such charges were made immediately following the Turkish note of June 17). For these reasons, Turkey may want to put pressure on the Alliance, threatening suspension of its military participation. If so, Turkey will probably move cautiously, plan its steps carefully, and move in such a way as to avoid irreversible actions or legal problems relating, for example, to its benefits under the infrastructure programs.

In the longer term, Turkish disillusionment with the US could intensify a process of basic re-appraisal by Turkey of its security arrangements, including a search for new arrangements beyond NATO, possibly including Iran and the Muslim world. Decisions based on such a re-appraisal are not likely to be hasty. The process may last a period of months, or longer, while Turkey judges whether NATO meets what Turkey feels to be its needs in the absence of a special US-Turkish relationship. The implications for overall Turkish identity in the future will be profound.

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U.S. OBJECTIVES, NEGOTIATING  
ASSUMPTIONS, AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS

Our objectives in the forthcoming negotiations with the Turks are to retain our basic facilities, preserve the fundamentals of the multilateral security relationship, and assist Ankara in portraying to the Turkish public the value of continued close ties with the U.S. and the West. These aims are intrinsically conservative; we want to preserve those things we now have which we consider desirable, and relinquish only what we must. While pursuing these objectives, we should be alert to opportunities to realign the U.S. presence in ways which could make it more efficient while decreasing its size, visibility, and overall cost. At the same time, we should resist Turkish pressures for reductions or changes which run counter to our needs in Turkey over the long run.

We also wish to keep Turkey as a full participant in NATO. This means retaining -- perhaps with some modification of the current command relationships and some change in designations -- all present NATO facilities in the country, including such entities as LANDSOUTHEAST and SIXATAF headquarters in Izmir which, once disbanded, would be difficult to restore regardless of future developments. It also means trying to find ways in which our other NATO allies can assist Turkey, both as a way of preserving US bilateral assets in that country, and as a device for preserving Turkey's orientation to the West. Fortunately, the Turks are not pressing to alter their relationship with NATO. Thus, emphasizing the essentiality of NATO and the importance of the Turkish role in the alliance should, at least for the time being, be well received in Ankara.

In outlining below possible future U.S. options, we have made a number of assumptions based on developments in US-Turkish relations over recent months. These assumptions can be summarized as follows:

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(a)



(b) The Turkish Government will insist upon a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) which guarantees that the US will be a source of military equipment for Turkey.

(c) Congress will not in the next 30 to 60 days lift fully the Turkish embargo.

(d) Use of the Presidential waiver alone to provide \$50 million of grant assistance to Turkey without legislation to lift the embargo on sales, would have only a modest effect on Turkish attitudes and actions.

(e) Despite continued U.S. requests and pressure on Turkey, there will probably be neither definitive early progress toward a Cyprus solution nor sufficiently visible Turkish flexibility or concessions on Cyprus to persuade those in Congress who have taken the lead in imposing the arms embargo to change their minds.

(f) Turkey's desire to retain its NATO ties will perhaps restrain to some extent its efforts to alter its bilateral relationship with the US.

(g) Other NATO allies will make useful statements about assisting Turkey, but probably will not pledge substitute arms or (even more important) substitute financing for arms in quantities and varieties which will satisfy Turkey.

(h) The US-Turkish relationship will be much less close than heretofore. Although Turkish leaders will be reluctant to see US-Turkish bilateral security ties disappear entirely, they will no longer trust the US to the same extent as previously, no matter what is done on Turkey's behalf in Washington in the weeks and months ahead.

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Given this set of assumptions, four negotiating options, or approaches, deserve examination. They range from trying to accept and accommodate Turkish desires in devising a new security relationship to abandoning US facilities in Turkey altogether. These options are not mutually exclusive; each option contains a number of elements, some of which can be extracted and used in other options. Thus, it may be possible to combine options or elements of options into a game plan and negotiating package. Moreover, most of the options are sufficiently flexible to permit a shift of negotiating tactics to take advantage of opportunities as they arise. Regardless of our approach, we must recognize that we are on the defensive in the present situation. The Turks are now calling the shots. Since we have only partial insights into the political and bureaucratic pressures at work within Turkey, we do not know what these will be in the future. However, to a greater or lesser extent, we will be obliged to respond to Turkish demands, perceptions, and initiatives.

OPTION I: US Acquiescence in Turkish Initiatives:

We would rapidly negotiate a new defense cooperation agreement along lines proposed by the Turks and expeditiously consult with Congress on the result.

This would be a reactive and fairly acquiescent strategy -- waiting for the Turks to propose changes in the relationship and then negotiating a new defense agreement within the parameters they have established. Under this approach we would not prematurely reveal the relative importance of US facilities or risk giving up more than the Turks are prepared to insist on.

On the other hand, we would not unnecessarily prolong negotiations on a new umbrella agreement. We would, within the limits of what we sensed to be Turkish tolerance, defend US interests and negotiate the best possible bargain. To the extent that we could do so without jeopardizing our chances of reaching agreement with the Turks, we would seek to maximize use of our facilities at the lowest cost and with the fewest Turkish constraints on our operations and our personnel.

Once the new agreement had been reached ad referendum, we would discuss it with the US Congress so that

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Congress could confront the monetary and other costs the US would have to pay for continuing operations in Turkey. If Congress balked at the terms set down in the new agreement, as we would expect, we would simply, much as a mail carrier, pass the word back to the Turks. The blame for the downward spiral in US-Turkish relations would rest with the Congress.

As for practical interim operational decisions, we would endeavor to avoid confrontation with the Turks by generally acceding to their demands. During this period we would direct our operational requests to those offices in which they would receive the most sympathetic hearing -- considering carefully whether issues should initially be brought to the military or political levels, while recognizing that since there appears to be close coordination between the Turkish General Staff and the political leadership on the question of US facilities, we should be careful not to be seen to be trying to bypass the civilian side of the GOT.

This reactive and basically acquiescent course -- like all our options -- has obvious drawbacks. It might portray the US as weak and vacillating, inflate the price we have to pay to regain use of our facilities, and perhaps further inflame Congress against lifting the arms embargo. It would likely establish the pattern of US-Turkish defense cooperation for the long-term on the basis of Turkish demands at a time when the US negotiating position is the weakest. On the other hand, presentation to Congress of a new agreement, even an unpalatable one, could stimulate the Congressional action necessary to preserve our mutual security relationship with Turkey.

OPTION II: US Initiative

We would, at an early date, lay before the Turks a negotiating package consisting of proposals for:

(a) re-opening those facilities we consider most valuable under US-Turkish direction and/or under the aegis of NATO; and

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


(b) negotiating a new Defense Cooperation Agreement. We would simultaneously propose to our NATO allies that they undertake joint action to meet Turkey's military equipment needs, and that NATO reply positively to Turkey's recent request for assistance in communications and early-warning systems.

Recognizing that goodwill toward the US still runs deep among Turkish leaders, we might choose to take the initiative in an effort to preserve our most essential operations and the basic core of our bilateral mutual security relationship. Such an approach could consist of developing a package of proposals which could be brought into play in Ankara, NATO, and Washington simultaneously.

In Ankara, once negotiations get under way, we could offer incentives to the Turks that do not require Congressional action involving:

(a) increased technical cooperation in the



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[REDACTED]

As part of our negotiating package, we might propose in NATO and in various European capitals, such as Bonn, London, and Paris, some form of joint European action to supply Turkey with alternate weapons systems and to provide financing for these Turkish purchases. We could also consider specific new arrangements in NATO which Turkey has already asked for, such as communications and early-warning systems, despite the problems they might cause in our relations with Greece.

Following further consultation with the Turks, we could seek the exercise of the Presidential waiver authority to make available \$50 million in grant assistance to Turkey.

The purpose of all these actions would be to make clear to Turkey that we still value our security relationship and are prepared to take all reasonable measures to preserve it. In return, we would want early use of our most vital installations. Before making specific proposals to Turkey about which facilities we want re-opened, we would have to determine internally exactly what operations we are prepared to abandon, consolidate, and scale down in Turkey. The prioritization in Section IV above, possibly with further refinement, would appear to be a good basis on which to proceed.

If the Turks expressed a willingness to bargain with us in this way, we would then proceed to negotiate a new Defense Cooperation Agreement and a new bilateral status of forces arrangement implementing the NATO SOFA, our assumption being that the results of these negotiations would be more favorable to our interests than similar negotiations conducted under the set of circumstances outlined in Option I above.

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The advantage to this option is that it would provide us maximum negotiating flexibility by allowing us to change direction and tactics as circumstances dictate. It would allow us to appear forthcoming as discussions with the Turks begin, and, at the same time, allow us maximum use of a combined carrot and stick package as we sought to protect our basic interests in Turkey. Disadvantages of this approach are:

(a) The Turks may not be willing to negotiate except on their own terms;

(b) If current indications are correct, the Turks may refuse to negotiate at all until the embargo is lifted. By the same indications, if the embargo is not lifted, the only negotiations the Turks may be interested in would be those associated with dismantling the bases.

(c) The NATO allies may be unable or unwilling to meet Turkey's equipment needs; and


(d) Using NATO as a forum to coordinate action on Turkey's overall material needs, and providing Turkey communications and other assistance it has requested from NATO, may adversely affect Greece's attitude toward its own future relationship with the alliance.

OPTION III: Watchful Waiting:

We would stall effective substantive negotiations with Turkey as unobtrusively as possible in order to gain time for (1) possible progress in the Cyprus negotiations; (2) Congress to re-think the embargo issue; and, hopefully (3) the US negotiating position to improve as Turkey reconsiders the worth of the bilateral relationship.

Assuming that no early Congressional action is possible or that any early lifting of the embargo will be partial at best, our negotiating position is probably at its weakest during the present period.


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We could find that our best course of action is to drag our feet and play for time in the hope that developments this fall or winter would enhance our negotiating position. US negotiators might thus respond to Turkish negotiating initiatives by referring to Washington any specific Turkish proposals or drafts and agreeing to negotiate actively only on practical working level problems.



A posture of delay carries considerable risk, however. Deterioration of US-Turkish relations may be accelerated by unanticipated events or incidents. Moreover, a Turkish perception that we are stalling deliberately could precipitate further actions against us.




At the same time, a go-slow approach could be appealing to the Turks, who seem to prefer to defer negotiations until the Congress has had an opportunity to consider the embargo issue further following its August recess. The Turks traditionally slacken off in August, with the majority of Foreign Ministry and other civilian agency officers on leave, and the military occupied with promotions, retirements, and transfers. Moreover, we still believe that the Turks will be wary of taking any steps which would cause the US to pull out of Turkey entirely.

OPTION IV: Prepare Drastic Cut-back of US Presence in Turkey:

Acting on the sound premise that an Alliance is viable only to the extent both parties consider it

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valuable, and to the extent it is supported by public and official opinion in both countries, we would tell the Turks that the time has come for a fundamental review of our overall relationship, with an eye to scaling it down to more realistic, mutually palatable dimensions.


We could tell the Turks that we will continue our efforts to remove the arms embargo, but that in the interim we wish to explore the level of US operations which Turkey would permit on terms no worse than those prevailing before mid-July. We could inform the Turks that, in line with their own position, and in preparation for talks regarding a new and obviously lower level of mutual defense cooperation, [redacted] withdrawing personnel from various facilities less important to our mutual interests (Cigli, Esenboga Air Base, Yesilkoy Air Base, and low priority naval facilities). [redacted]

[redacted] We would also reduce the JUSMMAT staff to a small holding group.

[redacted]

This option has the virtue of obliging the Turks to stop and look at the US-Turkish relationship in the broader context of Turkey's position in the world instead of focusing exclusively on the narrow issues of bases, arms, and Cyprus. If we show that we mean business, the Turks might well conclude that it would be in their best interests to maintain an active relationship with the US, with at least a few US activities permitted on reasonable terms, in return for the continued goodwill and support of the US -- and the hope of a renewed arms program in better times.

The option also has the virtue of side-stepping the inflexible equation the Turks have set up between bases and arms. We would be restating some of the



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basic principles of NATO: that the military strength of each ally is the concern of all; that facilities used by one ally benefit all; and that quid-pro-quo arrangements for common defense facilities have no place among allies. If we could establish a stable mutual defense relationship with Turkey -- at whatever level -- without the arms program, we would have regained the leverage that prospective military assistance can give us. As things now stand, our arms program will give us no leverage at all, even if it can be resumed; it will buy us only a sadly reduced level of operations under uncooperative conditions.

The risk of this option is that a tough stance on our part, unless very carefully presented, could trigger an even more severe Turkish reaction than the Turks might otherwise intend. We could find ourselves quickly shut out of Turkey altogether. It is likely that in the absence of such a US approach, Turkey's geographical situation would keep it in the NATO camp, and would eventually impel the Turks to restore much of their relationship with the US. With such an approach, however, there could be an awkward hiatus in the US-Turkish alliance, and the resumption of satisfactory relations after such a complete break would be problematic.

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


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RECOMMENDATION

Given present uncertainties regarding Turkish intentions on both the substance and timing of negotiations as the Turks await the outcome of the US effort to rescind the arms embargo, we think the US should for now retain maximum negotiating flexibility by keeping its options completely open. Thus, rather than recommend a specific approach to negotiations at this time, we recommend that the US Government study the options presented in this paper, but adopt no specific one during the next few weeks of watchful waiting as the Congressional situation and Turkish intentions clarify. We would anticipate that in the second half of September or early in October -- i.e., following the next Congressional vote on the embargo and our subsequent receipt of some indication of how Turkey expects to approach the negotiations -- there would be a high-level, interagency meeting to determine the US negotiating approach.

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Attachment I.

U.S. Note of July 27

The Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of February 10, June 17, July 16, and July 25.

As stated by the Secretary of State in his message to the Foreign Minister, delivered by the United States Charge d'Affaires on July 4, the Government of the United States of America is fully prepared to pursue the discussions which have been requested by the Government of Turkey concerning Turkish-United States defense cooperation.

The United States Government anticipates that these discussions, which we view as taking place within the continuing framework of the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and related agreements, will ensure that our cooperation in the sphere of defense, which is vital to security of both countries and to our NATO allies, is maintained on a mutually satisfactory basis. In this connection, we are prepared to discuss any aspect of this relationship.

The United States Government cannot accept the conclusion of the Government of Turkey that the Defense Cooperation Agreement of July 3, 1969 and related agreements are void of legal effect or that United States facilities and activities under these agreements may be placed in a provisional status inconsistent with those agreements by the unilateral action of the Government of Turkey. The Defense Cooperation Agreement establishes the procedures to be applied for the review of activities or operations at common defense installations and for the modification or termination of the Agreement.

In taking the necessary steps to respond to the action of the Government of Turkey, the Government of the United States of America reserves all its rights under the agreements in force governing our security relationship and under international law. In this regard, the Embassy also recalls the assurances of the Foreign Minister of Turkey that the conditions described by the Government of Turkey as a "provisional status" constitute neither a point of departure nor a precedent for the negotiations.

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The Government of the United States of America remains confident that the long history of deep and close friendship and cooperation between our countries and our mutual concern for the strength of the NATO alliance will assure the conclusion of the negotiations on a basis that is mutually agreeable and consistent with the interest of both nations.

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