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Current Foreign Relations



June 25, 1975

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Current Foreign Relations

Issue No. 26
June 25, 1975

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E U R O P E

GREECE PASSES IMPORTANT MILESTONES

June 1975 has been a month of milestones for the step-by-step return of democratic government to Greece and Greek association with democratic Europe. The new Greek Constitution which has been under public and parliamentary discussion since last December was approved by Parliament on June 7 and went into force on June 11. The first President to serve under the new Constitution was elected by Parliament on June 19. Greece formally applied for an acceleration of its movement toward full membership in the European Community on June 12.

Constitution Is Approved

The new Constitution received the required two-thirds majority with the support of the new Democracy Party headed by Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis. The opposition--the Center Union/New Forces Party (CU/NF) headed by George Mavros and the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) headed by Andreas Papandreou--boycotted the vote, but Mavros has indicated that the opposition's abstention did not mean nonrecognition of the validity of the Constitution. Mavros has called for revisions of the Constitution while Papandreou has called for a new constituent assembly to draft a new Constitution. In attacking the Constitution, the opposition has charged that it grants



Caramanlis (Right) Differed with Mavros over Constitution

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excessive powers to the executive at the expense of the legislative branch; that it fails to protect the civil rights of individuals and press freedom; and that it fails to promote democratic education and trade unionism.

New President Is Elected

The first President of the Greek Republic under the new Constitution is Constantine Tsatsos, a close friend of Prime Minister Caramanlis. He has been a Deputy-at-Large of the new Democracy Party since December 1974 and was primarily responsible for shepherding the Constitution through Parliament. He was born in Athens in 1899 and studied law, economics and political science at the Universities of Athens and Heidelberg. Tsatsos served a brief stint as Secretary to the Greek Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Between 1924 and 1929 he practiced law in Athens and published a number of academic treatises. From 1930 until 1946 he taught at the University of Athens, where he was recognized as an outstanding law professor. He is the author of many scholarly articles and books.

He resigned from the faculty of Athens University in 1946 to enter politics. In the course of his political career, Tsatsos has held many ministerial positions, including Minister of the Air Force, Minister of Education, Minister of Social Welfare, and Minister of Health.



Tsatsos Caps Long Career

President Has Substantial Powers

Under the new Constitution the President is elected to a five-year term. He can only be reelected once. He has the power to

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declare war and to conclude agreements of peace, alliance and participation in international organizations. He appoints the Prime Minister and on the Prime Minister's advice, appoints and dismisses the remaining members of the Government. He can dismiss the Government and dissolve Parliament, acting in both cases with the advice of the Council of the Republic. (The Council of the Republic is composed of former presidents of the Republic elected democratically, the Prime Minister, the President of Parliament, the principal leader of the opposition, and former Prime Ministers who "were elected by or enjoyed the confidence of Parliament.") The President can return legislation to Parliament for reconsideration, call for a plebiscite on crucial national issues, and in some circumstances issue legislative decrees. Answering charges that the Constitution gives excessive powers to the Greek President, Caramanlis has cited the US, France and Finland as countries whose presidents have more authority.

Greece Seeks Community Membership

The Greek application for a full membership in the European Community climaxes a concerted campaign over the past six months, through bilateral efforts as well as with Community institutions, to achieve full membership status at the earliest possible date. The Greek desire for membership is based to a large degree on political considerations--the desire to participate in Western European political cooperation, particularly as a means of serving Greek interests in Greek-Turkish problems. There may be economic hurdles to be overcome, however, before full membership is possible. Moreover, despite public declarations of support for the Greek request by EC member states, many of the Nine may in fact balk on early action for political reasons (potential isolation of Turkey and a possible setback for development of the EC and momentum for European unification). The Community is expected to take some time to give a considered response to Greece. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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~~SECRET~~ITALIAN ELECTIONS SHOW SHIFT TO LEFT

The results of regional elections in Italy June 15-16 were characterized by a marked shift to the left, with the Communists getting the lion's share of the increases in the left-wing vote. The Communists made their strongest showing of the postwar period with 33 percent of the vote--only slightly less than the 35 percent for the Christian Democrats, who have been Italy's leading party continuously since World War II. (In regional elections in 1970, the Christian Democrats got 38 percent of the vote compared to 28 percent for the Communists.)


Socialists Gain Leverage

Despite the heavy Communist gains, the center-left parties--the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Social Democrats, and the Republicans--as a whole held their own, with roughly the same proportion of the total vote (56 percent) as in the last national parliamentary elections in 1972. Moderate gains by the Socialists, together with small increases by the Republicans and Social Democrats, counter-balanced losses by the Christian Democrats. The net effect was a shift to the left within the center-left coalition, which has ruled Italy almost uninterruptedly since 1962, giving the Socialists greatly increased leverage vis-a-vis the Christian Democrats.

Uncertainty Looms

Uncertainty is the outlook on the Italian national political scene following these elections. A protracted period of intra-party consultations and inter-party negotiations seems to be in prospect. It is generally expected that changes in the relative party strengths expressed in these elections will be reflected in some change in the national government which remains to be determined. The key to the political future now

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Communists Rejoice in Rome

lies with the leadership of the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties. The center-left in some form or another seems to remain the only viable formula for the national government. Early elections are highly unlikely since all the major parties are opposed to them. The prospect for the coming months is therefore a tug of war between the Christian Democrats and Socialists. Although logic dictates a compromise between them, differences among factions within both parties can be expected to make it very difficult to reach a workable *modus vivendi*. If they cannot reach such a solution, a period of serious instability could ensue. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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MOZAMBIQUE GAINS INDEPENDENCE

6-25-75 UPR

The former Portuguese Overseas Territory of Mozambique became an independent state on June 25 when Portugal turned over control to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), whose leader, Samora Machel, has become President of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique.



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FRELIMO Emerged As Leader of Independence Movement

FRELIMO was formed in June 1962 to unite three other groups that then existed, and Dr. Eduardo Mondlane was elected FRELIMO's President in the same year. The party, organized along orthodox communist lines, began its guerrilla activities in Cabo Delgado province in 1964 and by late 1973 had extended its activities to the south central portions of Mozambique. By the time of the coup in Portugal, FRELIMO was building momentum and achieving some successes against the Portuguese. At best, however, its control over any part of Mozambique fluctuated and it was far from achieving victory by force. After the coup the Portuguese proposed a decolonization scheme to FRELIMO.

The party suffers internal conflicts, both tribal and ideological. These have led to many defections over the years and probably were the reason for Mondlane's assassination in 1969. Some of the defections led to the formation of a rival offshoot, COREMO (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique). Some COREMO leaders were recently put on public display as "traitors" by FRELIMO and "confessed" to being influenced against FRELIMO by US Embassy officers in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka.

Samora Machel was head of FRELIMO's Department of Defense when Mondlane was assassinated. He had organized the first 250 "freedom fighters" (Mozambicans based in Tanzania) and led them into Mozambique in 1964. He was renowned as a military leader but was no ideologue, believing the revolution should come from practice and not from dogma. After becoming FRELIMO president, he traveled widely in communist countries--receiving the Lenin Centenary Medal in 1971--and his recent statements have taken on a more strident Marxist tone.



Samora Machel

President Ford Highlights US Policy

President Ford stated our Government's policy toward Mozambican independence in his toast to Zambia's President Kaunda on April 19. Speaking of all the former Portuguese colonies, he said, "We have been following developments in southern Africa with great, great interest. For many years the United States has supported self-determination for the peoples of that area



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and we continue to do so today. We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola and the island territories with great satisfaction, as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau just last year... America stands ready to help the emerging countries...and to provide what assistance we can." A letter from the President, extending recognition and an offer of diplomatic relations was delivered to the new Mozambican Government on June 25.

Further to the President's remarks, Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Davis, testifying on June 13 before the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said: "We are aware of the major administrative and development challenges which face Mozambique. It is basically an agrarian nation--with 85 percent of its population living in rural areas--and its new leaders have indicated that they will concentrate their efforts on rural development and the agricultural sector. Mozambique's development plans will also emphasize other areas, in particular health care, but also education and training. We are ready to give a prompt and sympathetic response to an expression of interest in US assistance and cooperation in these areas. We are also ready to consider balance-of-payments support and PL-480 assistance, subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation."

Outlook on US-Mozambique Relations

We expect our relations with Mozambique to be affected for some time to come by an official coolness toward US officials on the part of FRELIMO's leaders who control the new government and by FRELIMO's lack of experience in administration and world affairs. We closed our Consulate General on June 25 in line with FRELIMO's instructions, and have not received, up to this time, any response to our offer to open diplomatic relations.

The coolness stems from FRELIMO's perception that the US was hostile to it during its long struggle against Portugal, and from its difficulty in dealing with "former enemies", a category which appears to include the FRG, Italy, Japan and Brazil. (FRELIMO considers most Marxian socialist, African and Scandinavian countries to be its friends.) Our relations with FRELIMO have been further complicated by excessive insistence on protocol by its leaders. It has translated these attitudes into

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almost complete inaccessibility to our representatives, and has been equally inaccessible to representatives of most other Western nations.

In our relations with independent Mozambique, we will thus be dealing with ideological, suspicious and inexperienced men. It is likely to be some time before they are able to subordinate their personal feelings and to get on with dealing dispassionately with "former enemies" who have the most to offer them in terms of development and other assistance. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

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NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

SYRIAN PRESIDENT VISITS JORDAN

Hussein and Asad Take Off Together

Syrian President Asad visited Jordan June 10-12, the first Syrian chief of state to do so in 18 years. The visit caps a phase of rapprochement in the often troubled relations between the two countries. It reflects Asad's efforts to improve relations with Arab countries with whom his predecessors had been at odds, as well as Jordanian efforts to improve relations with nearby Arab countries.

Communique Calls for "Joint Supreme Committee"

The final joint communique calls for creation of a "Joint Supreme Committee" (a sort of joint commission) headed by the two prime ministers. This committee would develop and supervise Syrian-Jordanian cooperation in political, military, economic, cultural, and other fields. Israel has been concerned that a joint military command is to be set up between Syria and Jordan, but we do not believe that this is the case. The Jordanians have been careful to distinguish between cooperation and a joint command.

Jordan Apparently Opposes Joint Command

One reason for Jordanian opposition to a joint command is that it could involve stationing Syrian troops in Jordan. This could

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lead to Syrian involvement in Jordanian internal affairs; the Jordanians still remember when Syrian tanks intervened on the Palestinian side during Jordan's 1970 civil war.

Another reason is King Hussein's desire to keep in his own hands the ability to decide if, when, and how Jordan might participate if there is another Arab-Israeli war. A joint military command would probably be headed by a Syrian officer, in view of the larger size of Syrian forces; this would be risky from the Jordanian point of view. And the Jordanians fear that having Syrian troops in Jordan would give Israel an excuse to attack through Jordanian territory, in order to outflank the Syrians, in the event of war.

Contingency Planning Can Be Expected

It is to be expected, nevertheless, that Jordan and Syria will engage in joint contingency planning for the event of another war. This, however, would probably not involve a firm Jordanian commitment to specific action unless decided on at that time by King Hussein; but short of a formal commitment, the Syrian-Jordanian relationship and cooperation have improved.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

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IRAQI-IRANIAN TREATY CONCLUDED

6-25-75
OPK

On June 13, Iranian Foreign Minister Khalatbari and Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi signed a treaty and three protocols in Baghdad establishing land and water frontiers and settling border security issues between their two countries. The treaty formalizes the understanding reached in Algiers in early March by the Shah and Iraqi strong man Saddam Hussein. Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika participated in the signing since President Boumediene had played a key role in bringing together the long-estranged regimes in Tehran and Baghdad.



~~SECRET~~Rapprochement Is Insured

The prompt resolution of long-outstanding and complicated bilateral questions reflects an apparent determination on the part of both countries to ensure the success of their recent rapprochement. Both sides have a vital interest in regional stability in order to get on with economic development, OPEC solidarity and Persian Gulf security.

Negotiations Continue on Other Issues

An Iranian Foreign Ministry official, who had accompanied Khalatbari to Baghdad, told our Embassy in Tehran that, with the settlement of water and land border definitions and questions relating to the Kurds behind them, the two countries were now working on another package deal which would address such issues as the navigation rights on the Shatt-al-Arab and operation of a joint border commission. Pilgrimage rights of Iranian Moslems who want to visit Shia shrines in Iraq would be dealt with separately, as there were some difficult logistic problems (i.e., security issues) that had to be worked out.

Persian Gulf Security Discussed

The official stated that the matter of a Persian Gulf security pact had been discussed in Baghdad and that it was agreed that both sides would keep each other informed of their soundings with other Persian Gulf states. Iran's position was that any such agreement had to involve all of the Gulf states and that none should be given the impression that the terms were being dictated by one party or another.

Suspicious Are Still Harbored

The Iranian described the atmosphere in Baghdad as "friendly", but he added that the Iraqis still harbor deep suspicions about Iranian motives and objectives. Undoubtedly, the same can be said of Iranian suspicions of Iraq. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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NEW INDIAN COURT RULING WEAKENS MRS. GANDHI

On June 23, Supreme Court "vacation" Justice Iyer announced that Mrs. Gandhi's appeal of the Allahabad High Court's judgment would be placed before the Supreme Court when it reconvenes July 14 for a decision on when hearings will commence.



Mrs. Gandhi Appeals to Followers

"Conditional" Stay Granted

On the following day, Justice Iyer made an important ruling on the Prime Minister's request for a stay of sentence pending Supreme Court action on her appeal. Mrs. Gandhi and her attorneys had requested an "absolute" stay which legally would have allowed her to continue as a member of Parliament and Prime Minister while awaiting a Supreme Court decision. Her defense lawyers argued that anything short of an "absolute" stay would cause "irreparable damage" to her career and might "ruin" her political life regardless of the outcome of the appeal. However, Justice Iyer granted Mrs. Gandhi only a "conditional" stay.

Iyer's "conditional" stay permits Mrs. Gandhi to remain Prime Minister and to attend Parliament in that capacity, but it bars her from participating as a member of Parliament (including voting or drawing an MP's salary).

Ruling Is Expected To Fuel Opposition Demands

Justice Iyer drew a fine line between Mrs. Gandhi, MP, and Mrs. Gandhi, Prime Minister, in effect suspending her from the former position while allowing her to retain the latter. (This



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is compatible with the Indian Constitution under which a person may serve as Prime Minister for up to six months without being an MP. Parliament, in any event, is now in recess.)

The decision on the stay is a fresh setback for Mrs. Gandhi and will fuel renewed opposition demands for her resignation. It may even stir dissension within the Congress Party among those who do not view the Party's fate and the Prime Minister's as inseparable. However, the Congress hierarchy hurriedly called top-level meetings June 24 to discuss the situation and reaffirmed their faith in Mrs. Gandhi and urged her to stay on as Prime Minister. Her resignation is conceivable but not likely. It is more probable she will hold onto office until the Supreme Court decides her appeal. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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NEA NOTEAlgerian President Announces Plans for Elections

*Boumediene's Move
Was Unexpected*

On June 19, in a speech marking the 10th anniversary of the coup which deposed Ahmed Ben Bella, President Boumediene announced that presidential and National Assembly elections would be held within twelve months. He said work would begin immediately to prepare for a national congress of the National Liberation Front, the sole political party--presumably to prepare slates of candidates. The last National Assembly was dissolved in 1965 following the coup, and since then President Boumediene and the National Revolutionary Council have wielded supreme power, ruling by decree.

Although there have been reports of dissension within the upper echelons of the Algerian Government over the

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question of increased popular participation in government and criticism of the concentration of power in Boumediene's hands, his announcement at this time had not been foreseen. It is considered unlikely that the advent of either a National Assembly or elections will change the basic Algerian power structure based on the military. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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THE USSR AND THE SUEZ CANAL

6-25-75 CFR

The Soviets, who have never spent any of their own political capital to get the Suez Canal reopened, responded coolly to the opening of the waterway earlier this month. Moscow views Sadat's move as symptomatic of his inclination to deal with the West, particularly with the US, and to seek additional partial agreements with Israel. Moreover, the USSR realizes that:

- The canal will no longer be a divisive issue between Israel and the Western trading nations.
- Its reopening will reduce Soviet ability to exploit that issue as they have in the past.
- Yet, the Arabs will continue to pressure Moscow to bring about further Israeli withdrawals.

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Canal's Importance to Moscow Has Increased

When the canal was open in the past, it did not prove to be crucial to Soviet economic and strategic interests:

- Less than 5 percent of Soviet trade passed through the canal in 1967.
- The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean developed after the closure of the canal and has been drawn primarily from the Pacific Fleet.

At the same time, the reopening of the canal does reduce the costs and difficulties of carrying out ongoing operations:

- The distance from Soviet Pacific ports to those in the Baltic and Black Seas will be significantly reduced, with a commensurate increase in available maritime capacity.
- The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean will benefit from the fact that the distance from the Arabian Peninsula to Soviet naval bases is cut in half.
- Soviet aid programs in such states on the Indian Ocean littoral as Somalia and India will benefit thanks to the easier direct access now possible.
- Moscow will be in a better position to respond to crisis situations east and south of the canal.

Nevertheless, Soviet military and commercial passage will be hostage to the Arab-Israeli situation and the uncertainties of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Cairo presumably will try to exploit any Soviet dependence on Suez.

Reactions from Moscow Are Mixed

When the announcement of last year's Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement provided for the eventual reopening of the canal, Moscow's reaction was largely defensive. Soviet commentaries denied that it would offer any significant naval advantages to the USSR and countered Chinese allegations that the Soviet-



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American naval rivalry would lead to gunboat diplomacy against the major Arab oil producers. Moscow tried to create the impression that its Indian Ocean squadron would remain about the same whether the canal were open or closed.

In the wake of the actual reopening, the Soviets surfaced their suspicion that Sadat's maneuver, which was preceded by Israel's "thinning of forces" on the canal's east bank, would lead to a return of the step-by-step process of "partial agreements."

- In an Arabic-language broadcast on June 5, Moscow stated that the reopening of the canal was not uniformly regarded in the Arab world as the correct decision and noted that "some Arab papers" had suggested that the canal should remain closed as a means of influencing various countries in Western Europe to pressure Israel.
- The broadcast challenged the view in "some Egyptian quarters" that Sadat's action would be "met by a certain step by Israel."
- On the following day, Moscow Radio noted that the "Israeli aggressors and their protectors" were already making "tendentious attempts to exploit the reopening of the Suez."

The Soviet commentary linked the event to an increase in Egyptian criticism of Soviet policies in the Middle East. It reminded Arab audiences of Soviet assistance during the 1967 and 1973 wars. In a particularly snide observation, the Soviets also informed Cairo that income from the Suez should provide Egypt with the funds to repay its foreign debts and make it unnecessary to request postponement.

Conclusion

There is no question that the reopened canal will be a major convenience to the USSR, particularly in terms of its presence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the reopening do not augur well for Soviet efforts to move Sadat away from additional step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East or from increased diplomatic activity in the West. The Soviets must act, moreover, with a certain amount of prudence;

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they must reckon that a naval buildup in the Indian Ocean as a result of the reopening of the canal could well confront them with an increased Western presence in the area. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

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ROMANIA AND PORTUGAL SIGN FRIENDSHIP TREATY



*Costa Gomes Visited
Bucharest*

Romania has once again shown its proclivity for the different by becoming the first Warsaw Pact country to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with a member of NATO, Portugal. The treaty brings together the two mavericks of the Eastern and Western military alliances.

- Within their respective pacts, each is considered to be of uncertain reliability.
- Both have expressed a desire to identify themselves with the Third World.

Treaty Restates Traditional Romanian Principles

The treaty, which follows very closely the text of the one that Romania signed with North Korea during the recent visit to Bucharest of Kim Il-sung, stresses three points that are common to the foreign policy of Romania and Portugal:

- national political and economic independence and sovereignty;
- the fundamental right of each people to decide ~~its own fate by itself~~ without any outside immixture (sic), pressure or coercion; and
- full equality of rights of all states irrespective of size, development level, or political, economic, and social system.



~~SECRET~~Additional Principles

Other principles, which were inaugurated in the Romanian-North Korean treaty and repeated in communiques issued at the conclusion of Ceausescu's recent visits to Brazil and Mexico, were:

- obligation of all states to observe the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of another state;
- right of self-defense in keeping with the United Nations Charter; and
- duty and obligation of all states to solve their disputes peacefully in accordance with the fundamental principles of international law and the United Nations Charter.



*Ceausescu Seeks
Nonaligned Coloring*

These principles, which reflect the Romanian position in the ongoing CSCE talks, constitute a retort to Soviet claims of the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another socialist state. Also, they serve as a reminder of the still outstanding, though unspoken, territorial issues related to Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina.

Treaty Seen As New Direction in Romanian Foreign Policy

The signing of this treaty--like that with North Korea--appears to signal a new Romanian foreign policy gambit. Its aim is to bring together countries which pursue similar foreign policy while belonging to different alliances and groupings.

Both countries have made known their interest in becoming affiliated with the nonaligned group of states. Romania has campaigned openly for support of the Third World in its quest to obtain observer status at forthcoming meetings of the non-aligned grouping. Portugal has voiced its desire to improve and strengthen its ties with the nonaligned countries.

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At the same time, the treaty, reflecting the signatories' desire to avoid negative reactions from their respective allies, states that its provisions do not infringe upon obligations which derive from other international agreements--i.e., Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Soviet Reaction

How far this disclaimer will go in minimizing the impact of the treaty and the exchange of military visits on Soviet-Romanian relations is difficult to determine. However, in view of the oft-proclaimed approval and support given by the Soviets to the present Portuguese regime, it would be awkward for Moscow to be openly critical of the treaty itself. It appears that once again Ceausescu has scored well in his confrontation with Moscow; he remains the true believer without being the true follower.

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