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~~SECRET~~

Doc. No. 27

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

14 MAY 1971

Honorable David M. Kennedy  
Ambassador at Large  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.8

WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5

State Dept Dec 4/17/09

MR 08-09 #26: OSD LU 5/9/08

Dear David:

BY dal NARA DATE 5/18/09

Since our recent phone conversations, I have reviewed the entire DoD position on the financial aspects of the Okinawa reversion negotiations. As you are aware from the various letters we have sent you and your staff during the past year, Defense has consistently held that the \$200 million package must represent a net financial benefit to the USG. This position is based on a November 12, 1969, reporting message from our negotiators in Tokyo and fully described in a August 13, 1970, letter to you from Dave Packard. I can see no reason why we should change our position at this point.

All of the items making up the \$200 million package, as well as the balance of the financial arrangements, are acceptable to me as agreed to with the GOJ except for the \$65.0 million item for facilities. This item for facilities was originally developed to facilitate the GOJ's justification to the DIET of the transfer of funds to the USG such that this transfer could be publicly supported by the GOJ while the funds would still serve to reduce the DoD budget and thereby represent a net financial benefit to the USG.

In the latest round of negotiations, however, the GOJ has been insisting: (1) that this \$65.0 million (which is intended to be used by us over a five-year period to accomplish contractual maintenance and repair of facilities along with some necessary construction) be spent under the provisions of the SOFA, i.e., only for the relocation of facilities responding to the political needs of the GOJ and not on the basis of our facilities requirements which would reduce the DoD budget; (2) that these funds (or alternatively part of the agreed upon lump sum payment) be used for the relocation of the Naval Air Facility at Naha (cost \$35 - \$40 million), and (3) possibly that these funds be used for the relocation of the Naha Port (cost \$40 - \$50 million) and for part of the relocation of the Machinato Housing Area (cost \$30 - \$40 million). Our agreement to any one of these items, not to speak of all of them, would be contrary to our basic understanding of the agreement with the GOJ and, in our view, would represent a significant financial loss to the

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USG. I must reaffirm, therefore, my support for our negotiating instructions of April 21, 1971, (State Message No. 067505) and reject any proposed modifications.

The U.S. Government took the initiative to turn over the Naha airfield to the Government of Japan, reserving only a small part of the facility for use of U.S. Navy aircraft. Relocating these aircraft to Kadena or Futenma would not only be expensive but would create serious operational problems because of already crowded conditions at both of these air bases. Furthermore, we still have a contingency requirement for use of the Naha airfield facility.

My understanding on Naha Port is that the GOJ has agreed to our continued presence at the port in those facilities and areas we currently occupy. Should the GOJ wish to provide us with a new port which would meet our requirements in order to convert the Naha Port to complete civilian use, we would agree as long as the new port was provided at no cost to the USG. There are ample precedents for this in Japan proper. However, the funding for the new port would have to be separate from and in addition to the \$200 million package.

As regards the Machinato Housing Area, we have already agreed that the GOJ could relocate this 1,200 unit area under the provisions of the SOFA at no cost to the USG, separate from and in addition to any financial arrangements related to reversion.

You should also be aware of all the things we have already agreed to do for the GOJ on Okinawa in addition to the fundamental fact of having agreed to reversion. We are already releasing to the GOJ about 70% of Naha Air Base airfield facilities, with a real property investment on our part of approximately \$22.0 million. We are also releasing permanent billeting and messing facilities at Naha Air Base and the entire Naha Wheel Area, which represent 1,800 billet spaces with a real property investment value of approximately \$17.0 million. This is being accomplished in a spirit of good will since all of these facilities could be used to provide improved living conditions for our forces on Okinawa in working towards our goal of an all Volunteer Armed Service. In addition, we also expect to release the Yogi POL tank farm in the Naha Area with a U.S. real property investment of approximately \$3.5 million as well as a number of other properties in which they have expressed interest. Furthermore, I approved last December, in response to both Okinawan and Japanese desires, the expenditure of a second \$6.0 million in contingency funds to speed the construction of storage facilities on Johnston Island in order to permit the ..... this summer.

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
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There is, of course, no need to mention the problems all of us would have with the Congress should we not secure a favorable reversion agreement.

In view of the above and our understanding of the agreement with the GOJ, I believe that the time has come when we must hold firm to our negotiating positions.

Sincerely,



cc:  
Dr. Kissinger

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~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

14 MAY 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFSUBJECT: Transfer of Facilities to the Japanese Government in  
Connection With the Reversion of Okinawa (U)

I have received a memorandum from each of you on the above subject (SecAF dated February 26, 1971, and CJCS March 24, 1971, CM-739-71).

Guidance on the release of personal property related to real property being released to the Government of Japan (GOJ) on Okinawa is contained in Enclosure 1 of my memorandum of April 7, 1971, subject "Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibility for Okinawa."

The release of property, both real and personal, remains the responsibility of the Service Secretaries. Inter-Service coordination in the field must be accomplished, however, through unified command channels. I leave to the discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the determination of the most appropriate unified command level for this purpose.

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

MR08-09 #27: OSD Ltr 118/09BY dal NARA DATE 4/13/09

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
Declassified after 12 years.

DOD Dir. 5200.10

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-\_\_\_\_\_

2260



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

8 MAY 1971

In reply refer to:  
I-21411/71

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Transfer of Facilities to the Japanese Government in  
Connection With the Reversion of Okinawa (U)

Recommend signature of the attached memorandum to the Secretary  
of the Air Force and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff replying to  
their memoranda to you on the above subject.

*William West*

Attachment

Coordination

ASD:I&L (Mr. Gibson)



Sec Def Cent Mr. Y-2250

ASD: I&L (Mr. Gibson)

55/91

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

FEB 28 1971

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The transfer of facilities to the Japanese Government in connection with the reversion of Okinawa involves not only the cost and relocation of facilities but also the question of how we are to be compensated for personal property which the Japanese will probably expect to receive with the real property with which it is intimately associated. While we may consider that title to the real property reverts to the host government upon its relinquishment by us, this clearly does not take care of the personal property necessary to the continuing tactical use of the real estate of which it is not a legal part. Such associated personal property consists of both installed items (excellent examples are the generators in the power plants) and unattached equipment necessary for the continued use of the installed items such as special servicing and testing devices.

Except where these items of personal property cannot be replaced within the necessary time frame and are necessary for our operations at other locations, they could be sold, given, or abandoned to the Japanese, depending upon their true economic value in proportion to the cost of removing them and adapting them for installation elsewhere and in the light of their remaining economic life. Gifts to the Japanese, however, would be limited by the absence of a grant Military Assistance Program for Japan and transfer would, therefore, have to be either a sale to the Japanese Government or abandonment in those cases in which it is not economically feasible to remove the items for use elsewhere.

We presume, in the light of your letter of January 21 to the Secretary of the Treasury, you do not consider that the sale of any such items was included within the \$200 million payment to be expected by us for goods and services and therefore, we assume that each transfer of this kind will have to be priced and the sale arranged on a case-by-case basis. However, we believe it most important that, the



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M-15A action



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polices governing such arrangements be uniform between Services and therefore we recommend that your office issue instructions toward that end.

We suggest that although authority regarding property flows from you through the Military Departments to their field commands, rather than through Unified Command channels, compatible procedures can be provided, at your direction, by the guidance of the Unified Command, as was done in the FRELOC removal from France. Since COMUS Japan now has the SOFA Task Group working on related problems and will ultimately be responsible for Okinawa, that office could logically provide the desired coordinated guidance. The actual property transfer would, of course, be accomplished by local representatives of the holding Military Departments.

An alternative procedure would be to designate one of the Military Departments to act as executive agent for this same purpose and accomplish the guidance in the field through that Service's command lines. However, this alternative seems less desirable because COMUS Japan will be in continuous day-to-day contact with the problems of all three Services after the reversion of Okinawa to Japan and can well do so during the reversion period, whereas one of the Military Departments would have to develop an additional capability to deal with the other Services' problems in the field. The Military Department Command Headquarters and Japan would not be equipped to do this job. Hence, it is probable that designation of an executive agent would remove the actual direction either to the major command level in Hawaii or back to Washington to the detriment of administrative efficiency.

Robert C. Smith

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-253-71  
28 May 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Okinawa Reversion: Japanese Assumption  
of Defense Responsibilities (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to a proposed agreement (Annex hereto) between the US Department of Defense and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) concerning assumption by Japan of responsibilities for the immediate defense of Okinawa upon reversion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese sovereignty.
2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposed DOD-JDA agreement and concur that it represents a satisfactory arrangement for Japanese assumption of the mission of the defense of Okinawa after reversion.
3. (S) It is noted that the proposed agreement includes deployment schedules, a statement of intent to purchase US air defense equipment, and commitments on timing for assumption of defense mission responsibilities which, if carried out, will result in substantial dollar savings for the US Department of Defense. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, in order to obtain guarantees that JDA plans will receive requisite financial and political support of the Government of Japan and that the agreement will be carried through in a complete and timely fashion, a government-to-government agreement should be concluded.
4. (S) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
  - a. The proposed DOD-JDA agreement concerning assumption by Japan of responsibilities for the immediate defense of Okinawa be approved as written, for signature by the US Military Representative, Okinawa Negotiating Team.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

MA08-09 # 27 OSD LEX 116109  
BY dal NARA DATE 4/13/09

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Sec Def Cont Nr. 2-

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
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611 - 154 action

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b. You request the Secretary of State to conclude a government-to-government affirmation of the referenced DOD-JDA defense agreement at the time the Okinawa reversion agreement is approved.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
BRUCE PALMER, Jr.  
Acting Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

Copy to:  
USMILRONT  
CINCPAC

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## ANNEX

TEXT OF PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING ASSUMPTION BY JAPAN  
OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA

With respect to assumption by Japan of the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa upon reversion, representatives of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the United States Department of Defense (DOD) agree as follows:

1. Assumption by Japan of Immediate Defense Responsibility.

Japan will assume, in accordance with the schedule as described in the following paragraph, the mission for the immediate defense of Okinawa, namely, ground defense, air defense, maritime defense patrol and search and rescue to be assigned to JDA.

2. Timing of Japan's Assumption. Assumption by Japan of the above defense mission will be completed by the earliest practicable date subsequent to the date of the reversion of Okinawa (R-day), but not later than 1 July 1973.

a. Initial Deployment. Initially and within about six months after R-day Japan will deploy the following units of approximately 3,200 personnel:

(1) Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) - A headquarters, two infantry companies, one engineer company, one aviation unit, one supporting unit and others.

(2) Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) - One base unit, one antisubmarine patrol unit and others.

(3) Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) - A headquarters, one fighter interceptor unit, one aircraft control and warning unit, one air base unit and others.

b. Additional Deployment. Additionally, and not later than 1 July 1973, Japan will deploy a NIKE group (3 batteries), a HAWK group (4 batteries) and appropriate supporting troops to carry out the surface-to-air missile defense and to operate the aircraft control and warning system.



3. Installations,

a. JDA intends to station the units at the following installations:

(1) Naha Airport - JASDF fighter interceptor unit and others and JGSDF aviation units. JMSDF antisubmarine patrol unit will also utilize Naha Airport.

(2) Naha Wheel - JGSDF units and such other JSDF units as may be required.

(3) White Beach and Naha Port - JMSDF units. SOFA Article II-4-A arrangements as necessary will be worked out for JMSDF's use of piers, staging areas and others.

(4) The facilities and areas in use of US NIKE, HAWK and aircraft control and warning units - JSDF surface-to-air missile units and aircraft control and warning units being deployed.

b. The United States will cooperate in the location of JSDF communications receiver and transmitter sites and will consider their accommodation within US facilities and areas where possible.

4. Air Defense.

a. JASDF will:

(1) Deploy units to Naha Airport beginning on or about R-day,

(2) Assume air defense alert with F-104J aircraft by R-day plus six months and,

(3) Assume operation of the aircraft control and warning system by 1 July 1973.

b. JASDF NIKE group and JGSDF HAWK group will deploy to Okinawa, so as to assume the surface-to-air missile defense mission by 1 July 1973.

c. Operational responsibility for the air defense of Okinawa will be retained by the USAF until JSDF assumes responsibility by 1 July 1973.





Command, however, of US Forces and JSDF will be exercised	<u>1</u>
through their respective national command channels.	<u>2</u>
5. <u>Surface-to-Air Missile and Aircraft Control and Warning</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>System.</u> In the interest of facilitating the early assumption of	<u>4</u>
the air defense of Okinawa, JDA intends to buy and the US	<u>5</u>
Government, through the US DOD, offers to sell, on terms and	<u>6</u>
conditions to be specified separately, the basic aircraft control	<u>7</u>
and warning system and the NIKE and HAWK surface-to-air missile	<u>8</u>
systems to be agreed upon.	<u>9</u>
6. <u>Ground Defense, Maritime Defense Patrol and Search and</u>	<u>10</u>
<u>Rescue.</u> JSDF will assume the responsibility for ground defense,	<u>11</u>
maritime defense patrol and search and rescue to be assigned	<u>12</u>
to JDA in Okinawa as JSDF deployed forces become operational,	<u>13</u>
within six months after R-day. JSDF and US Forces representa-	<u>14</u>
tives will in concert prepare detailed plans for the deployment	<u>15</u>
to Okinawa of forces associated with the foregoing functions.	<u>16</u>
7. <u>Detailed Implementation Plans.</u> For the purpose of	<u>17</u>
implementing the aforementioned JSDF's assumption of the defense	<u>18</u>
mission and its deployment program, detailed implementation plans	<u>19</u>
and arrangements for coordination will be worked out between	<u>20</u>
representatives of JDA and the US DOD.	<u>21</u>

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COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

29 May 1971

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

HOLDERS OF JCSM-253-71

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

Holders of JCSM-253-71, dated 28 May 1971, subject: "Okinawa Reversion: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibilities (U)," are requested to substitute the attached revised page 2 thereof and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

J. K. BRATTON

W. P. CANTWELL, JR.

Joint Secretariat

UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachment

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1st Corrig to JCSM-253-71

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-2584 A

OKINAWA 3233 (28 MAY 71)

29 MAY 71

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Doc. No. 30

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

9 AUG 1971

Honorable George P. Shultz  
Director, Office of Management  
and Budget  
Washington, D. C. 20503

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12058 SEC. 3.6

State Dec 417109

MR08-09 #22: OSD 121 5/9/08

Dear George:

BY dal MARA DATE 5/18/09

Executive Order 10713 vests the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for the civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands. It also establishes the basic charter for the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), including a provision that the GRI Chief Executive and the 32 members of the unicameral GRI Legislature will be elected directly by the Ryukyuan people every three years. The last such elections were held on November 10, 1968. Those elected entered office on December 1, 1968, and their terms will thus expire on November 30, 1971. Accordingly, new elections would normally be held this November.

As agreed by the President and Prime Minister Sato during their discussions of November 19 - 21, 1969, negotiations were undertaken with the Government of Japan to work out arrangements whereby the Ryukyus would be returned to Japan during 1972. The negotiations were recently concluded, and the reversion agreement was signed by Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Aichi on June 17, 1971. The Department of State is currently preparing the necessary papers for submitting this agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent. The Japanese Diet also will consider the agreement -- probably this fall. Reversion is expected to take place in 1972.

In view of these developments, the Chief Executive and the GRI legislature have requested that no elections be held this November and that their tenure be extended to the day of reversion. Otherwise, they point out, since Japan will hold elections shortly after reversion, the newly elected officials would serve for less than a year. They further note that the incumbents will be too heavily engaged in preparing for the transfer of Okinawa to a prefectural status to devote their time and energies to an electoral campaign. The Government of Japan has expressed its support for extending the terms of office until reversion.

The Department of the Army, which has been designated as the executive agency for the civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands, views the extension of the tenure of the incumbent Chief Executive and legislators

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

as an adjunct of reversion preparations, and it regards as valid the reasons advanced in support of the GRI request. This would also benefit the United States Government by avoiding an election campaign in the last few months of our administration, when an opportunity would exist for leftist candidates to stir up popular opinion regarding each element of the reversion agreement. Emphasis during such a campaign could be expected to center on controversial issues, particularly those which would have an adverse impact on the U.S. base in Okinawa.

Accordingly, it is recommended that you support the aforementioned request, which requires an amendment to Executive Order 10713. It would be most desirable if arrangements could be made to ensure that the High Commissioner in the Ryukyu Islands will be notified in advance of the timing of the signing of the amendment. This would permit making a proper announcement in the Ryukyu Islands, with timely advisory information being furnished to Japan.

Attached is an appropriate draft Executive Order, together with a suggested press statement for release at the White House upon issuance of the order. It is informally understood that the Department of State supports this proposal.

It would be most helpful if the Executive Order were to be issued and the statement released as soon as possible, since Ryukyuan candidates would normally be named and the election campaign would be launched in mid-summer.

Sincerely,



Enclosures

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

August 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Ryukyuan Executive Order

The attached Army proposal has been cleared with the Department of State and the Government of Japan.

ISA has concurred. (MR SELDEN)

Your signature is recommended.

*J. Fred Buzhardt*  
J. Fred Buzhardt

ASD(PA) - Mr. FRIEDHEIM - CONCURS.



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(WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS)

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58/73  
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

6 AUG 1971


In reply refer to:  
I-10642/71

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Tenure of Ryukyuan Chief Executive and Legislators

This is to notify you that ISA concurs with the attached Department of the Army memorandum, dated 30 July 1971.

*Amended J. Secord*



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WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

58/73

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DOC. NO. 32

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

24 DEC 1971

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WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5  
State Ltr #117108  
MR08-09 #89: OSD Ltr 519108

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Issue of ..... from Okinawa

SI dal JARA DATE 12/12/08

The Japanese are desirous of a public statement by you or the Secretary of State which will confirm the ..... from Okinawa at reversion. Ambassador Meyer has recently recommended (in his message of December 11) that after your meeting with Prime Minister Sato spokesmen for both countries: (a) say that the President reiterated to Prime Minister Sato his pledge concerning ..... made in paragraph 8 of the Sato/Nixon communique, and (b) indicate that in response to a suggestion by Prime Minister Sato, the U.S. Government will provide the Government of Japan on R-day with a formal assurance that no ..... are stationed on Okinawa.

I believe an explicit assurance, given in such a manner, would establish a dangerous precedent and is probably not necessary. As an alternative I propose that at reversion the Secretary of State, by letter to the Foreign Minister, recall the pledge given by President Nixon in the November, 1969, Joint Communique and the solemn commitment contained in the text of the Treaty. Such a letter would say that the commitments envisaged by those documents have been carried out and that Okinawa has been returned to Japan in a state consistent with Japanese policy ..... This letter would, with Japanese agreement, be made public. If necessary, this agreed procedure could be briefed by spokesmen for both countries after your meeting with Prime Minister Sato.

As a related matter, I further recommend that there be no weakening in our position against inspection/verification in any form. We should not permit ..... whether public or private, to verify ..... However, simply as a result

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DEC 17 1971

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.8  
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12060 SEC. 1.5  
Date Dec 4/17/08  
MK08-09 #29 OSD Ltr 5/9/08

BY dal NARA DATE 12/12/08

COVERING BRIEF

TO: Secretary of Defense .....  
FROM: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense .....  
SUBJECT: Issue of .....from Okinawa

Ambassador Meyer has recommended that, as a concession to Prime Minister Sato, the President should reiterate, publicly, his pledge of November, 1969, concerning.....and indicate that, in response to a suggestion by Prime Minister Sato, the USG will provide on R-day the GOJ with a formal assurance that .....

.....are on Okinawa (Tab A). I believe such an explicit assurance would establish a dangerous precedent and is not necessary. It would be more palatable to announce after the Nixon/Sato meeting that the Secretary of State will write to the Foreign Minister after R-day, recalling President Nixon's pledge and the commitment contained in the text of the Treaty, and assuring him that Okinawa has been "returned in a state consistent with Japanese policy ..... This "oriental-type" statement would give some protection to our very useful..... policy. Later, if pressure mounts, will be soon enough to get more explicit.

A related issue is the Japanese desire to ..... of the.....Such a procedure should not be permitted; however, I have outlined an alternative procedure in the attached memorandum (Tab B) to the President which achieves the same objective. It could be discussed with Sato in confidence.

ASD(ISA) and ASD(PA) concur in the proposed memorandum.

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Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

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
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of ..... many actions will be accomplished  
at the ..... which will indicate that .....  
..... For example, the security lighting will be turned off  
and some of the guard posts will no longer be manned. Additionally,  
routine and normal maintenance will be carried out under greatly  
relaxed security precautions and day-to-day security procedures  
will be largely revoked. Should we conclude that a more obvious  
signal is needed that ..... we  
could contract with an Okinawan contractor for site work, for  
example . . . . . These actions would  
demonstrate the . . . . . without broaching the  
sensitive question of . . . . .

In short, I believe that the word of the President of the United States  
needs no reenforcement or additional "formal assurance."



cc:  
Secretary Rogers



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

13 MAY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Discontinuance of U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu  
Islands


The Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands providing for the return of administrative rights over these islands to Japan signed on June 17, 1971, enters into force two months after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification took place in Tokyo on March 15, 1972 and it is the understanding between the United States of America and Japan that the Agreement shall enter into force at 0000 hours, Tokyo time on May 15, 1972.

Upon entry into force of the Agreement and the return of the administrative rights to Japan the responsibility for the exercise of the powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the Ryukyu Islands by the Secretary of Defense under the terms of Executive Order 10713 of June 5, 1957, as amended, shall cease and henceforth the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Japan, signed on April 2, 1953 and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements will apply to Okinawa. These arrangements include the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960; the exchange of notes of January 19, 1960 respecting the continuation of the notes exchanged between Prime Minister Yoshida and Secretary of State Acheson on September 8, 1951; and the exchange of notes of January 19, 1960 respecting the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed on March 8, 1954.

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

MR08-09, #30; OSD 411 5/9/08

BY dal NARA DATE 12/12/08


Sec Def Cont Nr. X-2313

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Okinawa 523.5

13 May 72





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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

10 MAY 1972

In reply refer to:  
I-6219/72

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Discontinuance of U.S. Administration of Ryukyu Islands


As you are aware, the instruments of ratification of the Agreement between the United States and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands were exchanged in Tokyo on 15 March 1972 and the reversion of Okinawa will take place on 15 May 1972. Until that date the administration of the Ryukyu Islands will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 10713 of 5 June 1957, as amended, under the delegation of authority of 17 June 1957 from the Secretary of Defense.

It is believed proper, as a matter of record, that the change of authority in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands be brought to the attention of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries. The attached memorandum is recommended for this purpose.

Recommend that you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachment

Coordination: General Counsel J.F. Buzhardt



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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

MR08-09 #30; OSD Jtr 5/19/08

BY dal NARA DATE 12/12/08

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