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THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

6 SEP 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: Post-Project 703 Marine Forces on Okinawa

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) has indicated that you desire a summary of the Marine Corps Post-Project 703 strength proposals relative to Okinawa, to include general costing data and plans for the deactivation of the 5th Marine Division. The attached Point Paper summarizes these proposals.

In our meeting with you on Friday, 5 September, you indicated a favorable reaction to the basic concept regarding Okinawa. In order to go ahead with firm planning, your approval of the following specific recommendations is requested, action to be effective when and if further troop reductions in Vietnam are approved by the President:

1. That the disposition of Marine Corps forces in the Pacific provide for four Regimental Landing Teams in Vietnam, two on Okinawa and one in CONUS/Hawaii. The Okinawa-based ground force would thus constitute a Marine Division (-).
2. That a Marine Corps strength of 10,000 be established for Okinawa.

John H. Chapter
JOHN H. CHAPTER



Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY NLF-LAIRD 1-8-10-1

NIE DATE 6/10/08

ASD/SA for action to prepare reply for your signature

Sec Def has seen

9/8/69

8 SEP 1969

ASD (SA) CONT. NR. 69-818

Def Cont Nr. X-4783

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POINT PAPER

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9 Sep 1969

Subj: Post-Project 703 Marine Forces on Okinawa

Encl: (1) Proposed Troop List of Marine Forces on Okinawa,
1 December 1969

1. At the request of OASD(SA), the following summary of the Marine Corps proposals for forces on Okinawa subsequent to the execution of Project 703 is submitted.

a. Upon completion of the Phase II redeployments from Vietnam, the Marine Corps forces on Okinawa will consist of a Marine Division (-) and elements of a Marine Aircraft Wing. These forces will produce an Okinawa strength of 19,249 (19.2K), which does not exceed the pre-RVN Marine Corps Okinawa strength. This total includes one of the two SLFs. The other SLF will be based at Subic Bay. The projected Okinawa status is displayed in the proposed troop list contained in enclosure (1). The present Okinawa strength plus the Phase II additions exceed the 19.2K strength. However, the consolidation of these forces on Okinawa will allow certain reductions/modifications which will keep the total below 19.2K. Representative modifications are the disestablishment of the 9th MAB, relocation of the transient facility to CONUS, and reduction of the 3d FSR support functions.

b. This proposal will provide Marine RLTs in a 4-2-1 (RVN-OKI-CONUS/Hawaii) posture for the Pacific. The 4-2-1 posture costs \$5.8M NOA/TOA more than the 4-1-2 alternative posture.

c. To achieve the projected Marine strength on Okinawa the following redeployments/actions are required:

(1) Redeployments from RVN

(a) Redeploy one RLT, 3d Marine Division to Camp Pendleton by 30 October 1969.

(b) Redeploy remaining RLT and Headquarters, 3d Marine Division to Okinawa by 30 November 1969.

(c) Redeploy 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Rear), including two CH-46 (one afloat), one CH-53, and one A-6 squadron, to Okinawa/Japan by 30 November 1969.

Note: RLT-26 remains in RVN with 1st Marine Division.

(2) Deactivation of 5th Marine Division (-) and other uncommitted Vietnam Augmentation Units

(a) Cadre one RLT, 5th Marine Division (-) commencing September 1969 and deactivate by 15 October 1969.



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5 Sep 1969

Subj: Post-Project 703 Marine Forces on Okinawa

(b) Cadre the 1st LAAM Battalion by 15 October 1969.

(c) Phased deactivation of remaining 5th Marine Division (-) units in CONUS and all uncommitted Vietnam augmentation units, less the 5th FSR between 15 October and 30 November 1969.

Note: The 5th Marine Division (-) strength at Camp Pendleton is now about 13,000. After deactivation and under the 4-2-1 posture, FMF troop strength at Camp Pendleton would be about 8,000.



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-708-69
8 November 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5
State Ex 4117109
MR08-09 #19: OSD Ltr 2/2/09

Subject: Okinawa Reversion (U)

BY dal NARA DATE 5/18/09

1. (S) Reference is made to:

a. National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) No. 13 dated 28 May 1969, subject: "Policy Toward Japan."

b. JCSM-184-69, dated 29 March 1969, subject: "Japan Policy as Pertains to Okinawa Reversion Issue (NSSM-5) (C)."

c. CM-4447-69, dated 24 July 1969, subject: "Okinawa Negotiating Strategy (U)."

d. The proposed US-Government of Japan (GOJ) Communique and GOJ unilateral statement to be issued following the meetings between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato on 19, 20, and 21 November 1969.

e. MJCS-450-69, dated 1 October 1969, subject: "Application of SOFA and Joint Committee Implementing Arrangements to Ryukyus After Reversion (U)."

2. (TS) Reference 1a indicated that the Okinawa issue would be negotiated with the GOJ on the basis of:

a. US willingness to agree to reversion in 1972, provided there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing US military use and provided detailed negotiations are completed at that time.

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 36146109 0788 011/83A

b. US desire for maximum free conventional use of the military bases,

c.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views in reference 1b in which they cautioned that the US Government should fully recognize the adverse consequences of Okinawa's reversion under conditions which fail to provide adequate safeguards for military requirements in Okinawa and specifically recommended that negotiations insure continued use of existing military facilities with present rights and privileges unimpaired. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that negotiations have not yet achieved this assurance with respect to maximum free conventional use of bases in Okinawa.

4. (S) Reference 1c expressed concern at the excessive haste in negotiating for reversion of Okinawa and recommended a delay in the proposed summit meeting in order to make certain that this important issue is deliberately and formally considered. In the 3 months since reference 1c was forwarded, relatively little progress has been made toward obtaining specific GOJ commitments regarding US essential military requirements. Time is now critically short, if necessary assurances are to be obtained prior to the 19-21 November meetings.

5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the recommendations in reference 1e that:

a. Specific assurances (either public or confidential) be obtained from the GOJ guaranteeing the rights to base tenure and continued presence of US Forces on Okinawa. This is particularly important in view of the fact that, after 23 June 1970, the US-GOJ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security can be terminated on a 1-year's notice resulting in the loss of all base rights in Japan and Okinawa (after reversion).

b. The US-GOJ Joint Communique and the final US position which has resulted from negotiations should be formally considered (by the National Security Council) prior to the summit meetings in November 1969.

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6. (S) Reference 1d announces the US-GOJ positions which have evolved from several months of negotiations. Although there may be as much as 2 years of detailed negotiations after November, the basic principles for reversion will be established during the meetings between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that this broad agreement, as reflected in the proposed communique and GOJ unilateral statement, meets the requirements of NSDM-13 nor does it make possible reliable future defense planning for US security in Asia. Specifically:

a. That portion of the NSDM-13 which requires agreement regarding essential military elements, i.e., maximum free conventional use of military bases (particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam), is not fulfilled in the proposed communique. The proposed GOJ unilateral statement is more specific and would be a meaningful assurance if it were in an official document like the Joint Communique. However, since it is not a bilateral commitment, it could be repudiated or ignored and, therefore, does not provide the necessary assurances to the United States.

7. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The Department of State be advised that the essential military elements, as stipulated in NSDM-13, are not adequately guaranteed by the proposed US-GOJ Joint Communique or the GOJ unilateral statement. In view of the fact that it has not been possible to obtain public assurances, the United States should, prior to or during the summit meetings, obtain confidential written assurances, for a period at least through the decade of the seventies, to guarantee:

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(1)
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b. Necessary action be taken to insure that the final proposed Joint Communique, the GOJ unilateral statements, and the US position which has evolved from negotiations with the GOJ will be considered by the National Security Council prior to the meetings between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato in November 1969.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 8 NOV 1969


MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


SUBJECT: Okinawa Reversion


I have received the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the reversion of Okinawa. Given the importance of this subject, I believe it appropriate that I forward to you their specific views:


The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

In view of the fact that it has not been possible to obtain public assurances, the United States should, prior to or during the summit meetings, obtain confidential written assurances, for a period at least through the decade of the seventies, to guarantee:

a) 

Accepted 

b) 



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 08-09 #20

OSD Ltr 5/9/08; State Ltr 3/1/10

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Although time will not permit, the Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommended that the final proposed Joint Communique, the GOU unilateral statements, and the U.S. position which has evolved from negotiations with the Government of Japan be considered by the National Security Council prior to the meetings with Prime Minister Sato this week.

cc: Secretary of State Rogers

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-6257



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

17 NOV 1969

In reply refer to:
1-36146/69

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Okinawa Reversion

The attached JCSM 708-69, dated 8 November 1969, contains the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the issue of the reversion of Okinawa. I understand that the Chiefs would appreciate it if their views can be forwarded to the President. I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum which complies with their wishes. I also recommend you sign the attached memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, informing him of your action.

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1958 (as amended) EEC 30
MR # 09-08, #20
OSD Ltr 519/08: State Ltr 311/10
del NARA OIA 4/1/10

John S. Galt

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE



DM

See Doc #

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-NOT SIGNED

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Okinawa Reversion


Thank you very much for your memorandum of November 18, 1969 in which you outlined the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the reversion of Okinawa.

You should be aware that the considerations outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given careful weight in the discussions with Prime Minister Sato regarding the reversion of Okinawa.

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.0

MR 08-12, #21; State 445 5/21/08

BY dal NARA DATE 1/27/09


Henry A. Kissinger

OKINAWA 323.3



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400-150 will prepare - [unclear] [unclear]

Sec Def Cont Mr. [unclear]

C12/35A