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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22 MAY 1969

Dear Bill:

Secretary Resor has advised me that the Department of the Army is undertaking a study of the civil and administrative aspects of any agreement to return the administration of the Ryukyu Islands to the Government of Japan. I believe that such a study is timely, and that the Department of the Army is best equipped, by virtue of its responsibility for the administration of the Ryukyus, to direct such a study. At the same time, very close coordination with other concerned agencies and departments will be required as the study progresses.

Initially, our task is to identify the problems with which we will be confronted in reversion negotiations in the transfer of administrative control from the U.S. Government to the Government of Japan and to develop alternative solutions. This is the scope of the present Department of the Army study. After completion of that study, and depending on decisions made by the National Security Council, I believe it would be appropriate to form an ad hoc interdepartmental group, chaired by the Department of State, to develop a U.S. negotiating position on the various matters involved.

I would appreciate knowing if you concur in our thus proceeding.

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.8

MR 08-09, #17, OSD Ltr 5/9/08

Honorable William P. Rogers

BY dal NARA DATE 12/12/08

Secretary of State

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

20 MAY 1969

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to:
I-21509/69

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Administrative Aspects of Okinawa Reversion

Reference: Secretary of the Army Memorandum, dated
25 March 1969, subject as above

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

DATE 08-09-87 BY 17: OSD-Ltr 5/9/08

BY dcl NARA DATE 12/12/08

In the referenced memorandum (Tab A), Secretary Resor stated that he had directed the Army Staff to begin a study of the administrative and civil aspects of reversion of the Ryukyu Islands in order to identify the problems and alternative solutions associated with the return of authority over the islands to Japan should agreement to do so be reached with the Government of Japan. Secretary Resor requested your signature on the attached letter to the Secretary of State requesting the concurrence of the Department of State in this approach.

The NSC addressed the question of Okinawa Reversion on 29 April when it considered the response to NSSM 5, Japan policy. The joint OSD/OJCS talking paper prepared for that meeting recommended that the U.S. agree to the return of administrative control over the Ryukyus to Japan by 1972 if negotiations are completed at that time, provided that there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing post-reversion U.S. military-use. In view of this recommendation, I support Secretary Resor's initiative in directing that work begin to develop, on a timely basis, a U.S. position with regard to the administrative and civil aspects of any reversion agreement and consider it appropriate that the Department of the Army prepare an initial study on this matter.

Recommend you sign the letter to the Secretary of State.

Attachments

Coordination:

ASD (I&L)

ASD (Comp.)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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CM-4447-69
24 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Okinawa Negotiating Strategy (U)

1. ~~(TS)~~ Reference is made to:

a. NSDM-13 which stated that the United States is "willing to agree to reversion in 1972 provided there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing US military use and provided detailed negotiations are completed at that time."

b. IG/EA memorandum, dated 21 June 1969, which circulated a Draft Strategy Paper on Okinawa Negotiations.

2. ~~(TS)~~ I am seriously concerned by the manner in which US strategy for negotiating the important issue of Okinawa reversion is developing. I have had indications from the Department of the Treasury that they also are concerned at the unnecessary haste developing on the negotiations. At the USC meeting on the Okinawa negotiating strategy held on 3 July, there was only a few days notice of the meeting and little opportunity to discuss this important question.

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THE

Q State Dec 4/17/09
MRS 08-09 #18: OSD LHA 12/11/08

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4. ~~(S)~~ In my view, since the GOJ has fully recovered from WW II and is enjoying a prosperity and economic strength never before known in that country, it is time the Japanese participate as a full member of the Free World nations, enjoying the benefits but also accepting the responsibilities.

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7. (TS) I believe it is essential that the Department of Defense immediately raise the question whether it is really in US interests to rush into these negotiations with hastily prepared positions which, in my view, have not been fully explored. A President-to-President meeting in November 1969 would amount to a basic commitment and limitation for all further negotiations on this subject, and I have serious doubts as to the benefits to result. I believe the case for slowing down negotiating momentum is reinforced by the many unknowns of our SEA posthostilities posture and the possibility that major decisions on strategy and force posture will be considered over the next year. This, of course, includes the renewal or renegotiation in 1970 of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.

8. (TS) Specifically, I recommend that the issue of US negotiating strategy for Okinawa reversion be reconsidered by the USC to determine whether:

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b. The tentative meeting between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon for November 1969 should be postponed at least six months. It has been informally suggested by the Japanese that unless Prime Minister Sato has an assurance of success in his meeting with President Nixon, he would prefer to postpone the meeting. I believe such a postponement is in US interests.

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9. (TS) I suggest we meet at an early opportunity to discuss this important question and to consider the possibilities of taking some action to slow down this precipitious rush into commitments which are so critical to our security and interests in the next decade.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff



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