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JCSM-184-69  
29 March 1969

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Subject: Japan Policy as Pertains to Okinawa Reversion  
Issue (NSSM-5) (C)

- b. JCSM-472-67, dated 24 August 1967, subject: "Ryukyu Base Study (U)," which provided the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an Interdepartmental Regional Group/East Asia Report, subject: "Ryukyu Base Study."

2. ~~(C)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have, in keeping with the objective of reference 1a, reexamined the Okinawa reversion issue. They recognize that there are political pressures which may militate against maintaining the status quo for very much longer. Accordingly, it appears appropriate that further comment be provided at this time on the military implications considered by reference 1b.

.....While there may be a political necessity of settling the Okinawa problem as quickly as possible, the US Government, in its desire to attain an early and amicable solution of this issue, should recognize fully the adverse consequences of Okinawa's reversion under conditions which fail to provide adequate safeguards for our military requirements.

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6. ~~(S)~~ In consideration of the alternatives to the current arrangements..... it would appear necessary for the US Government to negotiate a separate agreement with the Government of Japan which would ensure the continued use of

.....at least until such time as free world Asian interests are not threatened. This is considered a reasonable Japanese concession in return for early reversion and continued US protection. In US negotiations, it should be additionally stipulated that Japan would assume appropriate defense responsibilities for the Ryukyu Islands and surrounding waters at the time of reversion.

7. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the above views be used as the DOD policy position on the conditions for the reversion of Okinawa when this issue is considered by the NSC Review Group and the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earl F. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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