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~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1972

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

Dear Mel:

In Secretary Rogers' ^{x2222} absence I am answering your letter of May 8 on the subject of homeporting in Japan.


We have previously informed members of your staff that we are prepared, if you so desire, to proceed immediately to inform the Japanese about plans to base the two combat stores ships in Sasebo. We feel that this could be treated as a non-sensitive and routine matter which would not require high level attention.

I can also assure you that the Department of State fully appreciates the operational requirements and morale factors which have led to the Navy's proposal to homeport a number of attack carriers overseas. Indeed, we believe that it would be highly desirable to station an attack carrier in the East Asian area. We are also mindful, however, of the vital need to ensure that all of our military services continue to enjoy maximum unrestricted use of our bases in Japan at a time when the political position of our security-minded friends in Japan has been weakened and tension over defense-related

The Honorable
Melvin R. Laird,
Secretary of Defense.

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

~~TOP SECRET~~



31 MAY 1972

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 08-11, # 8
Create date 2/11/09, OSD LSA, 9/14/09
By dal NARA, Date 11/11/09

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333.3

26 May 72

6/2/09

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

issues there is running high. In this atmosphere, to homeport a carrier in Japan would raise substantial legal and political problems

..... Therefore, before seeking the views of our Embassy in Tokyo regarding an approach to the Japanese Government, we need to be absolutely certain of our ground with respect to some of these potential difficulties and the manner in which we would propose to handle them.

Insofar as facilities ashore are concerned, we need detailed information on the specifics of the proposal to determine whether and to what degree the carrier deployment would affect past agreements we have reached with the Japanese regarding the use of facilities and areas provided to the Navy by Japan. At a meeting at the staff level on May 19, our people provided yours with a series of questions on these subjects, and I understand that the replies will be available shortly.

The aspect of greatest risk to our overall interests, however,

..... However, in view of the debate over prior consultation which the return of Okinawa and the transfer of certain aircraft units to Vietnam has aroused,

..... the Japanese Government would sooner or later be compelled by a vigorous public debate over the carrier deployment to ask for it, and we would be in no position to refuse to agree.

The Japanese Government, the opposition parties, and the media all believe or suspect that our attack carriers have nuclear weapons on board, and we believe even those who support

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
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..... We must count these possible losses most carefully against the potential gains involved in proposing homeporting an attack carrier.

These questions need additional consideration before any decision is made to move ahead with a formal approach to the Japanese Government, and I would appreciate having your views regarding them. Since the risks to Navy and other service interests do appear very grave, we would want to have the Navy's views on possible alternative homeporting arrangements elsewhere in East Asia where sensitivity may be somewhat less than in Japan, such as at Manila Bay, where appropriate family housing would presumably be available in the Manila area. We would also wish to have your assessment of the possible utility of homeporting in Japan

Let me assure you that we are approaching this question sympathetically and with a desire to find a satisfactory solution to our Pacific carrier requirements. However, the potential foreign policy difficulties with this project make it incumbent upon all of us to explore in depth all related problems and reasonable alternative courses of action.

Sincerely,



Acting Secretary

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

17 JUN 1972

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5

State ltr 4117109

MR08-09 #9: OSD ltr 519108

Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Bill:

BY del NARA DATE 5/18/09

X-2763

I am responding to the reply of Under Secretary Johnson dated 26 May, to my proposals concerning the extended deployment of an aircraft carrier to Yokosuka and two combat stores ships to Sasebo. I appreciate the willingness of the Department of State to proceed with the Sasebo portion and the fact that State shares our view that it would be highly desirable to homeport an attack carrier in East Asian waters. Our proposal to couple the two requirements was based on the need to avoid giving the impression of piecemealing our requests to the Government of Japan. However, we defer to your judgment that we should separate the proposals and inform the Japanese now about plans to base the two combat stores ships at Sasebo. Our staffs can get together on the details for implementing this portion of the proposal.

Japan 323.3

I feel that the assessment of potential problems associated with the carrier contained in Alex's letter does not give adequate recognition to the many positive factors involved, and thus paints too pessimistic a picture. I accept your staff's opinion that the matter may involve sensitive political implications for the Government of Japan. Accordingly, I will defer to your judgment and that of the American Embassy in Tokyo on how best to approach the Government of Japan. I believe that the matter can be handled without stimulating public or political controversy concerning fundamental aspects of our mutual security arrangements.

Your Department's concern over the carrier appears to focus on the belief that prior consultation should be avoided, and that public debate over the possibility of nuclear weapons aboard our ships might jeopardize U.S.-Japan security arrangements.

..... Nor do I believe that stationing a carrier in Japan will necessarily raise the issue of prior consultation, particularly since the GO specifically requested that our homeporting of six destroyers be treated as a matter of notification rather than prior consultation.

17 June 72

Classified by DASD (ISA)
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1980



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Another factor that supports this belief is the routine nature of our visits and repair calls at Yokosuka during the past 20 years. The extended deployment will relate primarily to the presence of dependents in the area rather than a substantial change in the overall pattern of aircraft carriers in port in Yokosuka. In any case, it would appear that the recommended approach would provide the GOJ an opportunity to raise -- and resolve -- the matter of prior consultation in private if so desired. We might as well face up to this issue now since it is a fundamental factor in shaping our future relations with Japan in the area of military security.

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..... Under the Nixon Doctrine, one of our major responsibilities is to provide a nuclear shield and credible deterrent posture in the Far East. Japan certainly realizes its need for our nuclear umbrella,

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..... We have examined this alternative carefully, but feel that it is neither militarily practical nor legally necessary.

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On the legal side, the record of our negotiations with the Japanese Government on the matter is quite clear.

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..... No Japanese Government since then has challenged this interpretation.




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In response to questions concerning carrier homeporting submitted by State representatives at the staff level meeting on May 19, my staff provided replies on May 26. The Navy staff is continuing to develop more detailed information on such matters as pros and cons of alternative locations for CVA/CVW, use of Atsugi versus Yokota, Yokosuka/Yokohama housing, and other subjects of State concern. This information will be forwarded to you as soon as staffing is completed.

On balance, I believe that we must be forceful in not permitting U.S.-Japan relationships to evolve to the point where U.S. actions are unduly inhibited. U.S. forces in Japan are there to give substance to the treaty, and the fundamental facts of Asian security must be faced by the Government of Japan. I believe therefore that we should proceed with our carrier proposal by initiating private discussions with the GOJ. We can then base subsequent USG decisions as to how best to proceed in the matter on the Japanese response.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. A. S. S.", written in a cursive style.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301


21 AUG 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka

Your meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka may present an opportunity to convey to him our position concerning a number of defense issues which affect the US-Japan security relationship. These include the need for close cooperation under the terms of the security treaty, US military operations from bases in Japan, and our security relationships with the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea.

Although these issues have been the subject of past discussions, I believe that a reiteration of our intent to uphold our security commitments in the Far East, and the attendant continuing need for bases in Japan, would be appropriate. The major issues between the US and GOJ in this broad area have been identified in the attached in the form of talking point papers for your possible use.



Attachment

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

date rev 4/17/09

MROB-09 #10: OSD Ltr 5/9/08

BY dal NARA DATE 5/18/09

Classified by Director, EAPR
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
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AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON DEC 31, 1980.



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DOD FACT BOOK

PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE WITH

PRIME MINISTER TANAKA

31 AUG - 1 SEPT 1972

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.8
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5
State ltr 4117109
MR08-09, #10; OSD ltr 5/9/08

BY *del* NARA DATE *5/18/09*

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
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18 August 1972

PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE

WITH

PRIME MINISTER TANAKA

AUGUST 31 - SEPTEMBER 1, 1972

CONTENTS

ISSUES WE SHOULD RAISE

(Red Tabs)

- A - US-Japan Security Relationship
- B - Okinawa Reversion Related Construction
- C - The Future of Taiwan
- D - US Security Commitment to Korea

ISSUES GOJ MAY RAISE

(Blue Tabs)

- A - Okinawa Bases
- B - Prior Consultation



SUBJECT: US-Japan Security Relationship

BACKGROUND - The United States remains dedicated to the cause of Asian security and has pledged to uphold its security commitments. However, a budget-minded Congress and public pressure require more effective utilization of our limited defense resources. We are continuing to seek ways and means of maintaining an effective and credible defense posture in Asia. Effective use of bases in Japan will continue to play an important role in our forward deployment concept. Public opposition in Japan to US bases seems to reflect a serious gap in understanding about the importance of a continuing American presence to Japanese and regional security. We would hope the Japanese government will take the initiative to educate public opinion on this question and begin to develop a consensus of support for a long-term US security presence in Japan and East Asia. In this respect, the agreements on extended deployment of a US naval destroyer squadron and continued use of the ship and submarine repair facilities at Yokosuka were important milestones.

RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS

- Reiterate the deterrent value of bases in Japan.
- Express appreciation for continued use of the bases under the provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
- Emphasize the responsibility of the GOJ in ensuring US is accorded access to and movement between US facilities and ports in Japan in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement.
- Emphasize that continued support in these areas by the GOJ and people of Japan serves to strengthen the bonds of our security relationship.



SUBJECT: Okinawa Reversion Related Construction

BACKGROUND - The reversion agreement includes, within a \$65 million credit to the USG for goods and services to be provided over a five year period, construction by GOJ in Japan and Okinawa of facilities to permit relocation of US flying activities to free Naha Air Base flight line for use by GOJ. The initial construction phase, now estimated at \$25 million, was to be completed prior to reversion. However, review as to acceptability of relocation program and projects and release of funds have not been made by the new government. The GOJ now desires relocation by 15 April 1973. Relocation from Naha requires construction in order of priority at Misawa and Iwakuni, Japan, and at Futema and Kadena, Okinawa. Projects for construction have been submitted to the GOJ.

RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS

- The key to this relocation is construction at Misawa where the construction season ends in October due to severe winters.
- Relocation of US aircraft from Naha Air Base cannot be effected until completion of the initial \$25 million facilities package tabled with the GOJ early in 1972.
- The design and construction required is impossible to complete by the GOJ desired date of April 1973.
- Acceptance of the projects, release of funds and start of design by the GOJ is urgently required if any progress is expected to be made this next year.

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SUBJECT: The Future of Taiwan

BACKGROUND - The Prime Minister has indicated GOJ willingness to break formal relations with Taiwan as a necessary precondition to normalization of Japan - PRC relations. Tanaka also noted, however, that Japan has long had relations with Taiwan which cannot be easily cut and that he would handle trade and economic relations realistically.

RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS

- Assure Tanaka that we intend to maintain our diplomatic and economic ties with Taiwan and to uphold our defense commitments.
- Note that, with Japan assuming defense responsibility for Okinawa, Taiwan becomes of greater strategic interest to Japan.
- Indicate that continued economic progress in Taiwan is essential to GRC capability to maintain adequate defensive posture and capability.
- Thus, assure Tanaka that we shall continue to support an international role for GRC wherever feasible and to reassure US business and other countries regarding the future of Taiwan and thereby assist expanded trade and investment.
- Express the hope that GOJ will follow similar policies.

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SUBJECT: US Security Commitment to Korea

BACKGROUND - Close association between the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the security area will continue, and the US has embarked on a five-year (FYs 1971-75) balanced force modernization program to improve ROK deterrent capability. It is anticipated that, in keeping with the concepts of the Nixon Doctrine, the ROK will assume increasing responsibility for its own defense as its economy continues to grow. The US has informed the ROK Government that the US division stationed in Korea will remain through the FY73, and the continuance of a strong US military presence in the ROK is considered a significant factor in providing the ROK with the necessary confidence to deal with the North in developing bilateral contacts.

RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS

- Emphasize Korea's continuing importance to the security of Japan.
- Assure the Prime Minister that we are sensitive to the importance and implications attached to the US military presence on the peninsula.
- Express the hope that bilateral ROK-North Korea contacts will lead to a lessening of tension on the peninsula.
- Point out that the US anticipates that our contribution in form of grant assistance to the ROK will be reduced on fulfillment of the 5 year program.
- Such reduction is primarily dependent upon ROK ability to assume larger share of defense costs.
- Thus, continued ROK economic growth which Japan can materially assist is of prime importance.
- GOJ should consider more direct assistance to ROK defense through provision of non-lethal type materiel.

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SUBJECT: Okinawa Bases

BACKGROUND - The Tanaka administration is likely to continue where Sato left off by urging a reduction in the number and consolidation of our bases on Okinawa, especially in the densely populated south. This pressure is augmented by a popular feeling in Japan that the US is seeking a detente with Peking while encouraging Japan to expand its defense capabilities to include the defense of Okinawa. The GOJ has been told that we foresee a continuing need for the bases and that the Senate's favorable vote on the Reversion Treaty was due in substantial part to Japan's assurances that reversion would not impair the effectiveness of the base structure.

RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS

- Express understanding of the political problems generated over the base issue.
- State that we continuously review our base requirements as evidenced by our past actions in Japan and the current Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan which we are prepared to implement in concert with the GOJ.
- If pressed, inform Tanaka that the Okinawa base structure is under study by CINCPAC. When the results are known, we will discuss the matter further with the GOJ.

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SUBJECT: Prior Consultation

BACKGROUND - The Japanese may request that we intensify our consultative efforts drawing on their political need to learn more, and release publicly, data relating to US bases in Japan and to the Vietnam war. Prior consultation is provided for by the Treaty. The three subjects which require prior consultation are (1) major changes in the deployment into Japan of US armed forces, (2) major changes in equipment and (3) the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations other than those conducted for the defense of Japan. The existing arrangements have served both nations well and provide us with the necessary degree of flexibility required to meet our security commitments in the Far East.

RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS

- Agree that we should increase the frequency and depth of exchange of views on important matters arising in these areas.
- Resist any proposal that would require formal changes in the existing treaty arrangements pertaining to "prior consultations".

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

In reply refer to:
I-26392/72



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Honolulu Summit

Attached is a proposed Memorandum For The President and an Issues and Talking Paper on selected defense matters for use by the President in his meeting with Japan's Prime Minister Tanaka, 31 August 1972.

Recommend approval.

Attachments

Coordination:
ASD(I&L) - Mr. B. Shillito
Jt/Staff, J-5 - BGEN A. Hanket

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.8

date rev 4/17/09
MROS-09 #10 OSD ltr 6/9/08

BY *dal* NARA DATE *5/18/09*

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DOC. NO. 16

11

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

21 AUG 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka

Your meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka may present an opportunity to raise the issue of our increasing concern over signs which indicate a decline in Japan's support and cooperation in the conduct of US military activities in Japan. This untoward mounting trend has reached a point where it is undermining the purpose of the Mutual Security Treaty, the cornerstone of peace in Asia.

Although most Japanese may appreciate the importance of the US-Japan security relationship for peace in Asia and the world, they must not take for granted a continuation of such benefits which are threatened from within by irresponsible opposition-led strikes, demonstrations and impediments. Both governments must act vigorously to overcome these forces and preserve a cooperative security relationship that is vital to Asian security.

The United States remains dedicated to the cause of Asian security and has pledged to uphold its security commitments. Effective utilization of bases in Japan will continue to play an important role in our forward deployment concept which is necessary to deter aggression or provocation. Recent harassments and public opposition in Japan to US bases and activities seem to reflect a serious gap in understanding about the importance of a continuing American presence to Japanese and regional security. We would hope that the new Tanaka administration will take the necessary initiative on this issue to bring about a consensus of support for a long-term US presence in Japan and East Asia.

A continued and measured US military presence in Japan should not preclude gradual development of Japan's more autonomous defense capability without modification or termination of the Mutual Security

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

State Dep 441-1109

MR08-09 #11: OSD Ltr 519108



BY dal NARA DATE 5/18/09


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Treaty. Our common interest is to avoid the twin specters of a defenseless Japan in the face of a nuclear threat, or a necessity for a nuclear armed Japan. In this respect, the US and Japan must convince China that the treaty does not constitute a threat to China and that there is no necessity for Japan to produce a nuclear deterrent; thus, the obstacle to a Japan-China rapprochement may be removed.

The full support by the people and government of Japan of actions necessary to attain our mutual objectives in Asia cannot help but strengthen the bond of the Mutual Security Treaty.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'D. L. ...', written in a cursive style.

~~SECRET~~