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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

July 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Trip to Japan

GENERAL. It was my privilege to represent you, and to be the official guest of the Japanese Government, during the period July 4-11. During my stay in Japan, I had discussions with key Japanese officials, as well as top US civilian and military leadership. I also visited installations and units of the Japanese Self Defense Forces.

Among the Japanese officials with whom I talked were Prime Minister Sato; the outgoing Director General (Nakasone) of the Japanese Defense Agency; and the newly appointed Director General (Masuhara). As you know, PM Sato appointed a new cabinet on 5 July, the day after I arrived in Japan. The new Foreign Minister, and former Finance Minister, Fukuda had to cancel our scheduled appointment because of recurring medical problems and imminent surgery.

I went to Japan mindful of the four basic tenets of your policy towards Japan (NSDM 13), viz:

- We shall basically pursue our current relationships with Japan as our major partner in Asia, seeking ways to improve this relationship from the viewpoint of US national interests and to seek an increasingly larger Japanese role in Asia.
- We shall allow the present Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to continue
- We shall continue to make gradual alterations in our base structure and base utilization in Japan to reduce major irritants while retaining essential base functions.
- We shall continue ... (the) policy of encouraging moderate increases and qualitative improvement in Japan's defense efforts, while avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially larger forces or to play a larger national security role.

The Department of Defense has been endeavoring, since NSDM 13 was published in May 1969, to implement your policies towards Japan,

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OSO 5/9/08

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WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5

date 4/17/09

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BY del NARA DATE 5/18/09

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especially in the area of altering our base structure. During my recent visit I tried to advance your policies even further. Special attention was given (a) to confirming our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; (b) to encouraging increased effectiveness, through qualitative improvements, in the Japanese Self Defense Forces; and (c) to soliciting a larger Japanese role in Asia, especially through economic and supporting assistance. As I shall explain later, I believe there are reason and opportunity to ask Japan to play a more effective -- if not a larger -- national security role.

In this report, I shall outline my discussions and activities, provide my principal impressions, and indicate some conclusions.

DISCUSSIONS AND ACTIVITIES.

As I noted earlier, I talked at some length with PM Sato and the outgoing and incoming Directors General of the Self Defense Force (SDF). While the gist of these conversations has been reported separately from the US Embassy, Tokyo, I should like to recount the discussions briefly.

Prime Minister Sato.

The Prime Minister was obviously pleased by your congratulatory note on the Okinawa reversion agreement. He showed it to Ambassador Meyer and me with considerable relish. I relayed your personal best wishes to Sato, plus your hope for the success of the newly appointed cabinet.

Sato was relaxed and seemingly enjoying the conversation as much as I. He was forthright on a number of what I considered to be key points. He said, for example, that the essential pillars of your foreign policy -- strength, partnership, and a willingness to negotiate -- were fully understood at the top levels in Japan. They were not fully understood at lower functioning levels, however. He observed, without coaxing, that Japan needed to do more in the security and foreign policy arena. At one point, he stated explicitly that the Self Defense Forces should be modernizing at a more accelerated and meaningful pace. At another point, he said Japan was considering an economic stabilization fund to help stem the inflationary tide in Southeast Asia.

With reference to Japanese/US relationships, Sato said he had specifically instructed his newly appointed Foreign Minister, Minister of International Trade and Finance, and Finance Minister on the need for mutual cooperation and trust. He indicated his cabinet should,

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and must, grasp the significance of the US/Japan relationship. Sato said he and his cabinet would work closely with us on a "coherent" trade policy. I pressed hard on the need for more Japanese purchases from the US, particularly in the Defense area. The current annual level of \$95 million is not representative of Japan's needs, its ability to buy, or bilateral trade situation. A Sato comment that I considered especially intriguing (though the US Embassy representatives did not) was, in essence, that "in case of emergency, the Japanese industrial might will be at the disposal of the US." I did not press Sato on the precise meaning or implications of the remark. Potentially, however, the implications are substantial and important for the US.

On Defense relations, I told Sato that the US Congress consistently pressed the Administration on whether there was true partnership in our security relations with other Free World nations. Specifically, I said, there was Congressional reference to the 7 percent, or more, of Gross National Product (GNP) the US devoted to national security as opposed to the 1 percent or less provided by Japan. I tried to impress on Sato that despite the \$16.6 billion to be dedicated to defense in Japan's current (i.e., the 4th) five-year plan, such expenditures were still inadequate. I told Sato that I had had the privilege of visiting selected Ground Self Defense Force and Air Self Defense Force units. I had been struck by the facts that (a) much of their equipment was old and no match for that of other Asian powers, and (b) attempts to retain adequate numbers of trained personnel and attract new ones to the Japanese all-volunteer forces were not universally successful. The clear need, if Japan was to fulfill even a modest foreign policy role -- and with no increases in the size of the forces -- was for increased defense spending. More specifically, I told Sato that in my judgment, Japan needed to:

- Replace obsolete equipment in all of its branches with more modern weapons.
- Flesh out its forces and retain its trained people through more adequate incentives and compensation.
- Improve the effectiveness of its forces through regional joint training exercises, particularly in air defense and anti-submarine warfare.
- Adapt to Asian security needs, especially through providing economic and supporting assistance to those Free World Asian nations in dire need of such support.

Sato said he did not intend to improve the quality of the Self Defense Forces. He did not believe, as some Japanese did, that it was feasible to have a fully-independent Japanese defense industry. He

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hoped the US would lend some assistance, particularly with regard to advanced technology.

The Prime Minister repeated a theme consistent among Japanese officials, viz., the importance of the US nuclear shield and the hope the US would maintain a sufficient nuclear deterrent. Japan worries about how long it can defense itself against aggression without the nuclear shield. Sato expressed doubt regarding the ability to deter war with conventional weapons, but he agreed Japan should not be too dependent on us in the conventional field and needed to improve its conventional strength. I emphasized (a) the US and the USSR had achieved strategic nuclear parity; (b) conventional forces will take on added importance in the 1970's; and (c) the Free World nations need an effective conventional deterrent. Unlike the strategic nuclear area, all Free World nations can and must join in partnership to muster the strength needed for adequate conventional deterrence.

Sato was especially interested in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and, more specifically, any key intelligence we might be able to share with him. I outlined in broad terms the recent PRC developments in aircraft, conventional ground force equipment, and the strategic field. I also indicated we would share additional information with him on a close-hold, confidential basis. I shall, at your convenience, discuss that with you privately.

Sato commended our Vietnamization policies and commented on the much lower recent levels of US casualties. I observed that if there were a weak element in the Vietnamization program, it was in the economic area. That is where Japan can help now and over the near-term future. It was at this point Sato told me he was studying the possibility of an economic stabilization fund for Southeast Asia (SEA). Such a fund, if correctly conceived and prudently administered, could help in the universal fight against SEA inflation and balance of payments disequilibriums.

Again, the meeting with Sato was congenial, yet forthright. He impressed me as a man who, though faced with many troublesome and delicate issues is definitely in charge.

Director General Nakasone.

The meeting with Nakasone was unusual in a sense. He literally had only hours -- if not minutes -- left in office when I talked with him on 5 July. He will remain influential in the Liberal Democratic Party, however. It is conventional wisdom to suggest we shall see and hear more of Nakasone over the coming years.



Nakasone covered a number of the same topics outlined in the Sato discussion. I did have to spend more time with Nakasone than with the Prime Minister explaining your foreign policy and the Administration's national security strategy for the 1970's. Nakasone was particularly interested in the concept of Total Force Planning. I had the feeling, based on subsequent discussions, it was good for some of our own people to hear the US policies and programs enunciated. (Our Ambassador and his politico-military counsellor accompanied me to each of the meetings.)

Turning to the list of items we had discussed in September 1970, when Nakasone was my guest in the United States, the outgoing Director General expressed gratification for a number of actions. Significant among the actions had been realignments of the US basing structure in Japan and, of course, the perpetuation of our Mutual Security Treaty.

Nakasone expressed the conviction that future US/Japanese problems could be handled effectively. He referred especially, as did other top Japanese officials, to economic and trade issues. On defense matters, Nakasone felt the treaty could be managed to maintain the vital ties between the US and Japan. Nakasone also described the 4th Defense Buildup Plan, which is currently underway. While the \$16.6 billion five-year program is better than previous plans (more than twice the most recent plan), Nakasone did not make a convincing case (a) that the current plan was enough, (b) that the plan represented coherent outlays in conjunction with a realistic security strategy, or (c) that Japan could not afford to do much more.

As with Sato, Nakasone was vitally interested in US policy toward the Peoples Republic of China. I told Nakasone we were proceeding cautiously and that, from a military standpoint, I could see no imminent fundamental changes on either side. Again, Nakasone expressed intense interest in any military intelligence the US could share with Japan I had the feeling that Nakasone was skeptical and even somewhat cynical about recent activities -- actions which Nakasone

Perhaps the strongest appeal Nakasone made was for a four-point verification plan The purpose of such a plan was ostensibly The real reason for such a plan was to provide Sato's party with political ammunition. The four points Nakasone made were:

- Verification would be undertaken only after reversion was completed.



- All verification procedures would be
- Japan would send a team of officersto receive, briefings to the extent necessary
- The Japanese team would then report to the Director General, who, in turn, would report to the Diet.


Nakasone, with an obliging air, told me I need not answer him at the time of our meeting.

I told Nakasone I would look at his proposition. But, I referred him to your communique with Prime Minister Sato and the express call for mutual trust. I suggested the effectiveness of the deterrent, was based on mutual awareness and mutual trust. Furthermore, I noted there could never be a fool-proof verification plan. Moreover, I commented that those who enjoy the fruits should be willing to help us to help them. (I was referring, of course, not only issue but also to the recurring problems caused for our forces by the Japanese sensitivity Nakasone then told me that in case of need, and subject to prior consultation, Japan would consider..... I was impressed by the fact a senior Japanese official would make such a statement, though our Embassy people commented later it was not particularly new or noteworthy. I believe, whatever the vintage of the idea, it has considerable potential significance.

Masuhara.

Though newly appointed as Director General when I met with him, Masuhara is no newcomer to the defense field. As you know, he held the post now called Director General when the function was created in the early 1950's. My initial assessment is that he will bring depth, maturity, and considerable practical savvy to the position.

As with the Prime Minister, I met with Masuhara after I had had the opportunity to visit Self Defense units and installations and to talk with senior US and Japanese military officials. That experience helped me. I could express with more conviction the fact that Japan could do more to further its own security interests, particularly in the area of making more effective the forces in its current and projected plans.



I explored with Masuhara the prospects for modernizing and increasing the effectiveness of all its Service elements -- ground, sea, and air. I also raised the prospect for making more effective -- as opposed to enlarging -- its regional security role. Participation in joint training exercises -- particularly air, sea, and command post maneuvers -- with US and ROK forces is a logical area to explore. Officer exchange programs and periodic top-level discussions among key civilian and military officials are other areas which, if managed correctly, could add immeasurably to more effective regional security.

Otherwise, in the discussions with Masuhara, the points covered were duplicative of the conversations with Sato and Nakasone. The Masuhara meeting was considerably more narrow in scope than either of the other two talks. The one point raised with Masuhara that did not come up otherwise was my request for consideration of pre-positioning the families for 6 US destroyers and one US aircraft carrier in Japan. Actually, the 6 destroyers can and will be considered separately from the carrier. The DDs constitute a relatively benign issue. The carrier involves political sensitivities for the Japanese. I did not make a formal request at the time of our meeting but did ask for Japanese thinking on the subject. Masuhara said he understood the proposal, and would communicate, after study, Japan's official views through our Embassy.

As with the other senior Japanese officials, the talk with Masuhara was warm and friendly. Harmony and commonality of Free World interests were at all times evident.

MAIN IMPRESSIONS.

The main impressions I carried away from Japan are as follows:

- The main elements of NSDM 13, i.e., your policies toward Japan, are being carried out.
- Japan is intent on preserving and strengthening its security relationships with the US. I was particularly impressed by Sato's reference to making Japan's industrial might available in emergencies and to Nakasone's assertion that.....
.....
... if a serious need arose.
- Japanese officials at the top understand -- at least since my trip -- the basic tenets of your foreign and national security policies.

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- Japan is reaping substantial benefits from the security provided by other major and developed Free World nations. Japan is not sharing proportionately in assuming the cost and burden of that security.
- Japan wants the US to maintain an effective strategic nuclear deterrent and to provide Japan that so-called "nuclear umbrella."
- In the conventional area, Japan's forces are markedly obsolescent. It is not clear what threat, other than internal disturbances, the current Self Defense Forces could handle.
- Japanese officials understand and at least give lip-service to the need for modernizing and making more effective its Defense establishment. The modernization would be limited solely to conventional weapons.
- While there are many areas in which Japan could and should bolster its conventional deterrent, there is no prospective role for Japanese nuclear weapons. Such use of Japanese resources would, in fact, be a gross political, economic, and military mistake.
- The Japanese are deeply interested in activities of the PRC and in evolving US policy towards the PRC.
- US/Japanese relations on all major issues are harmonious. There is no reason to believe they cannot continue to be so.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. NSDM 13 can continue to serve as a sufficient basic guideline for US policies toward Japan. More specifically, however:

a. There may be ways to improve our basic relationships from the viewpoint of US national interests and to provide for an increasingly larger Japanese role in Asia. On the former point, regularized personal consultations between top US and Japanese officials in the military, economic, and diplomatic arena would be in my judgment

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productive. On the latter point, cultivation of such ideas as the Japanese stabilization fund for SEA and vastly expanded supporting assistance throughout the other free nations of Asia would be helpful.

b. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security can be continued. It should not be taken for granted, however.

c. Our base structure and base utilization in Japan have been effectively realigned. We should not be hesitant, however, to ask for further realignments in our behalf, particularly where such realignments directly help to facilitate the US nuclear and conventional deterrents which benefit Japan directly.

d. We should not only encourage but virtually insist on qualitative improvements and increased effectiveness in Japan's Self Defense Forces. While we need not modify NSDM 13 to suggest substantially large forces or a larger regional security role, we should emphasize the theme of quantum jumps in effectiveness in both Japan's forces and its regional security posture.

2. Japan has no need for developing or otherwise obtaining any nuclear weapons. In fact, given the many higher priority prospective uses for Japanese resources, we should openly oppose any such contemplation by Japan if it were to occur.

3. Japan, despite its acceptance of the principle of force modernization, shows no immediate prospects of increasing its annual outlays for security. We should take every feasible step to encourage Japan to do so. Resources should be used within the policy guidelines of NSDM 13, to (a) modernize their forces, (b) acquire in full measure the planned SDF manpower levels, (c) insure that current SDF units are effective and well trained, (d) participate in joint exercises to accentuate further the force effectiveness, and (e) help to provide the supporting assistance needed elsewhere throughout Asia. Japan may be tempted to use arguments of convenience to avoid assuming its equitable share of the Free World Security burden. Avoidance of rising or resurgent Japanese militarism is one such argument. The economic needs of the Japanese people (redistributing income) who have not yet shared fully in the fruits of its miraculous post-World War II growth is another such argument. We should, in my judgment, not allow such arguments to gain undue currency. Japan can and should -- within your conceptually and practically sound policy guidelines -- do more.

Signed
MEL LAIRD

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Sec. of Defense ^{Doc. NO 7.}

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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September 7, 1971

National Security Decision Memorandum 130

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: U.S. -Japan Joint Economic Committee Meeting

The President has reviewed your memorandum of September 1, 1971 on this subject, as well as the CIEP paper of August 24, 1971.

The President has directed that in the ECONCOM meetings, the U.S. Delegation be guided by the following principal points:

1. Throughout the meetings, as proposed by the Secretary of State, we should endeavor to re-establish in the minds of the Japanese the significance and closeness of the U.S. -Japanese relationship through a series of forthcoming political and psychological measures. We should:

-- Assure the Japanese that shortly after the ECONCOM meeting the President will send the Agreement for Reversion of Okinawa to the Senate with a strong recommendation for its early ratification.

-- Reaffirm our offer to explore with Japan and other countries the possibility of selling them U.S. technology for use in gaseous diffusion plants in third countries for enrichment of uranium.

-- Indicate our desire for closer scientific collaboration in seeking solutions to common problems in the fields of transportation and ecology.

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AUTHORITY NSC memo 4/20/05

BY dal NLF, DATE 10/23/07

"Sec Def Cont No. 4139"
9 SEP 1971

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-- Indicate our desire to cooperate to seek liberalization of the trade policies of the European Community.

-- Indicate our desire to work within the OECD High Level Group to prepare the way for a major multilateral attack on trade barriers.

-- Indicate our desire to develop international procedures for adjudicating investment disputes in developing countries.

2. The U.S. new economic policy, with special emphasis on our balance of payments goals, should be clearly explained to the Japanese delegation. We should state strongly that it is our conviction that a reasonably balanced trade account between our two countries is necessary, and feasible by the end of 1973. It should be pointed out that, as we understand Japanese balance of payments and trade projections, they are incompatible with our objectives. It should be proposed that we work together to achieve mutually agreed compatible balance of payments goals.

3. The overriding U.S. objective is to obtain a revaluation of the currencies of our major trading partners, which will include a substantial revaluation of the yen. While negotiations on the exact amount of yen revaluation sought should be carried out multilaterally, Secretary Connally is authorized privately, if he wishes, to inform the Japanese Ministers that a revaluation in the range of 15 to 20 percent is necessary.

4. We should indicate that we would remove the 10 percent surcharge only when our external position is assured.

5. Beyond this, we wish to achieve our balance of payments goals primarily through trade liberalization, and we expect the Japanese to remove quotas and other import restrictions illegal under the GATT. We are particularly interested in prompt removal of quotas on agricultural items, computers, aircraft, and integrated circuits.

6. We should welcome the Japanese eight-point program, commend their efforts so far, and urge them to go further.

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
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7. It should be made clear to the Japanese that we still seek a negotiated voluntary restraint agreement for textiles but will be prepared to solve the problem in other ways if an agreement is not forthcoming. Our continuing need for a voluntary restraint agreement for steel exports should also be made clear.

8. We should stress our desire for even closer economic cooperation in the future. To this end, we should propose periodic meetings with the Japanese, starting with a special interagency mission to Japan by next January to assess with the Japanese specific progress toward agreed upon balance of payments goals, compatible economic policies and the eight-point program, to identify remaining or emerging trade problems, and to work out constructive, timely solutions to common economic problems.

9. In discussing lower priority economic objectives, including increased Japanese defense procurement in the United States, increased aid on softer terms, and investment liberalization, our delegates should make clear our wishes in low key, relating such secondary points to our overall balance of payments goals.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Transportation
Ambassador-at-Large David M. Kennedy
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant to the President for International
Economic Affairs



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

23 OCT 1971

Honorable Strom Thurmond
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Strom:

This is in further reply to your letter of June 24, 1971, concerning access by United States nuclear powered warships to essential US naval facilities in Japan.


In my letter to you of August 31, 1971, I described our on-going efforts to resolve our differences with Japan quietly at the administrative and technical level in accordance with Prime Minister Sato's request.

I am happy to report to you now that these efforts have been successful and that the Government of Japan has given us an unequivocal guarantee that it will not conduct air-monitoring within 50 meters of visiting nuclear powered warships. Thus, the Navy can recommence the normal program of nuclear powered warship visits to Japan, and the first visit under this new agreement is expected before the end of the year.

This guarantee will also apply to Okinawa following reversion, should the Senate advise and consent to the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.

We have agreed with the Government of Japan that no public statements concerning these arrangements will be made without mutual consent.

Sincerely,

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

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BY del NARA DATE 5/18/09

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23 Oct 71



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

22 OCT 1971

In reply refer to:
I-28363/71

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Thurmond on Monitoring of Nuclear Powered Warships in Japan

On June 24, 1971, Senator Thurmond wrote you expressing his concern about the difficulties we were having with Japan over the monitoring procedures for our nuclear powered warships in Japan (Tab A). You replied to his letter on August 31, 1971 (Tab B) reporting on your conversation with Prime Minister Sato and our efforts to solve this problem with Japan quietly at the technical level.

We have now reached an agreement with the Government of Japan (GOJ) which guarantees that they will not air-monitor our NPWs within 50 meters. For domestic political reasons, the GOJ wishes to keep this agreement confidential. Nonetheless, the issue is resolved, and our NPW visit program under this new agreement should begin before the end of the year.

As a courtesy and to preclude his raising this issue at the Okinawa Reversion hearings, it is recommended that you sign the attached letter to Senator Thurmond. The State Department has sent a similar letter to Senator Thurmond, as well as letters on this subject to Senators Fulbright, Pastore and Aiken.

John V. L. [Signature]

Attachments

Coordination:

ATSD/LA: R. Johnson

ATSD/AE: BGEN Hill

Navy/Op61: RADM Small

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

DATE 4/17/09

MA08-09, 05; OSD Ltr 4/26/08

BY del NARA DATE 5/18/09

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

31 AUG 1971

Honorable Strom Thurmond
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Strom:


attached
This is in reply to your letter of June 24, 1971, concerning access by United States nuclear powered warships to essential US naval facilities in Japan.

I have purposely delayed in answering your letter in order that I might report on the results of my recent meeting in Japan with Prime Minister Sato, at which this issue was discussed.

There is nothing of a factual nature concerning this problem that I can add to Admiral Rickover's testimony, excerpts of which you introduced into the Congressional Record on 24 June 1971. However, in my meeting with him, Mr. Sato suggested that this problem could probably be resolved quietly at the administrative and technical level. Because it is such an extremely sensitive issue with the Japanese, any publicity incident to such discussions would be harmful.

Two representatives from Japan will arrive in Washington this month for the purpose of negotiating this problem in a manner which will accommodate our mutual interests.

Sincerely,



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E.O. 12858 SEC. 3.6

state dec 4/17/09
MR08-09 E5 OSD dec 4/18/08

BY dal NARA DATE 5/18/09

Ans to U-11-9, attached

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-3984

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DOD DIR 5200.10

JAPAN 523.3

(24 Jun 71)

31 Aug 71



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

25 AUG 1971

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to
1-26,584/71

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Japanese Radiation Monitoring of US Nuclear
Powered Warships

On 24 June, Senator Thurmond denounced the Japanese in a floor statement in connection with their tactics in monitoring the radiation of our nuclear powered warships. He introduced into the Congressional Record (1) a Chicago Tribune article on Japanese hostility in this regard and (2) excerpts of Admiral Rickover's testimony before the JCAE in which the situation was explained in detail (Tab A).

By letter of the same date, Senator Thurmond requested your views and a detailed assessment of the military implications of the situation (Tab B). We arranged to delay your reply pending your return from Japan where you discussed this with Mr. Sato.

Japanese representatives arrived in Washington on 22 August to discuss this problem.


Recommend that you sign the attached letter at Tab C. It has been coordinated with the General Counsel and Rady Johnson.

Edw. Tamm

Attachments
a/s

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12058 SEC. 3.8
DATE 4/17/09
MR 08-09 #5 OSD-22 4/28/08

BY dal NARA DATE 5/18/09



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June 28, 1971

Honorable Strom Thurmond
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Thurmond:

Secretary Laird has asked that I acknowledge your letter of June 24 concerning facilities for U.S. nuclear powered warships in Japan and Okinawa.

Your letter is receiving attention and you can expect a further reply at an early date.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

J. F. Lawrence
Brigadier General, USMC
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary
for Legislative Affairs

cc: ASD(LA) w/basic corres for direct reply.

Note: Please furnish OSD(LA) w/cy of reply.

#11920

Col Palmer/bae
3D920/73782



Japan

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124 June 27

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STUART SYMINGTON, MO.
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EDWARD W. BROOKE, MASS.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 24, 1971

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It has come to my attention that the United States Navy has lost the use of essential facilities for nuclear powered warships at our Naval bases in Japan because of administrative restrictions imposed by the Japanese outside the purview of our Security Treaty with Japan.

It is also my understanding that these restrictions will preclude the use of Okinawan ports by U.S. nuclear warships if the change to the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan is ratified by the Senate. Will you please provide me with your comments on this situation, to include a detailed assessment of the military implications involved with specific reference to the consequences of losing access to Okinawan ports in addition to the loss of access to our bases in Japan?

I am writing separately to Secretary Rogers on the political aspects of this question.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Very truly,


Strom Thurmond

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USE OF JAPANESE AND OKINAWAN PORTS BY U.S. NUCLEAR-POWERED WARSHIPS

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I invite attention to an article entitled: "Japanese Hostility in New Footnote," written by Willard Edwards, which appeared in the Chicago Tribune on June 10, 1971. The article, which was based on testimony given by Admiral Rickover to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, concerns onerous and unreasonable conditions imposed by the Japanese Government on U.S. nuclear-powered warships visiting U.S. naval bases in Japan under the terms of our Mutual Security Treaty with Japan.

As a result of these conditions, which appear to be wholly unwarranted, access to American naval bases in Japan had to be suspended for a total of 11 months in 1968 and 1969; since early 1970, the United States has been deprived altogether of the use of our naval base at Sasebo for these ships, and has lost access for its nuclear warships to all facilities at our base at Yokosuka except one drydock.

Mr. President, it is important to note in this connection that, unless this situation is resolved, our nuclear warships could similarly lose access to U.S. base facilities in Okinawa if the Senate ratifies the change to the treaty which provides for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. I look on this matter with grave concern. I am strongly opposed to reversion and the restrictions on bases in Japan. Our national security is at stake by these actions; consequently, I am directing inquiries on this subject to the Secretaries of State and Defense. I am sure that Senators will wish to give careful consideration in evaluating the United States relationship with Japan.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article by Mr. Edwards and the pertinent extracts of Admiral Rickover's testimony on this problem be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Chicago Tribune, June 10, 1971]

JAPANESE HOSTILITY IN NEW FOOTNOTE (By Willard Edwards)

WASHINGTON, June 9—Recent closed-door testimony before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee reveals Japanese government harassment of the United States Navy's nuclear warships in Japanese ports.

The testimony, now available in censored form, supplies a chilling footnote to the history of strained relations between this nation and Japan. It implies a Japanese hostility of unreasonable proportions.

In discussions this week in Paris and next month in Tokyo, American Cabinet officers and diplomats will seek to adjust the economic factors which are the prime cause of dispute between the two nations.

The U.S. is understandably concerned about the tardiness of Japan in lightening its tight import quotas, high duties and restrictions against foreign investment while it invades to reap big profits.

Secretary of the Treasury John Connally has promised a new "get tough" policy with both Germany and Japan, two foes defeated in 1945 who have since prospered mightily with American aid and under the protection of American arms. He has dared to suggest that both should share more of their defense costs.

High-ranking representatives will discuss these issues in guarded terms, preserving the amenities.

But Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover, director of the Navy's nuclear propulsion program, is no diplomat. When questioned at the closed session, he minced no terms in accusing the Japanese government of manufacturing false propaganda for political purposes.

Rickover was asked about an incident in May, 1968, when an American nuclear submarine was accused by Japan of contaminating Sasebo Harbor thru the release of radioactivity.

A long and exhaustive investigation, he said, proved beyond doubt that the submarine had not released radioactivity. Its nuclear reactor in fact had been closed down for 96 hours prior to the alleged detection of radioactivity in readings taken by Japanese agents in a small boat. The low-level readings, it was shown, came from welding machines and similar gear on other Navy ships, a common phenomenon.

The Japanese government, highly sophisticated in the atomic energy field, was fully aware that the issue was "phony," Rickover



and, but deliberately set out to use the incident to harass Navy movements.

It intensified its monitoring activities, "giving the Japanese public the impression that the ships were dangerous." Access to American naval bases in Japan by nuclear warships was suspended for a total of 11 months. Since early 1970, no nuclear warship has been permitted in the base at Sasebo and all facilities at Yokosuka were barred, with the exception of one drydock.

"I do not challenge the right of the Japanese Government to monitor our nuclear-powered ships," Rickover told the committee. "But let us bear in mind that the context of these visits is that of a cooperative defense relationship in which the U.S. has undertaken to defend Japan in certain circumstances and the Japanese in return have agreed to grant us certain base rights in Japan.

"In practice, however, the Japanese government has imposed onerous and unreasonable conditions on these visits. It has chosen to build up false fears and anxieties in the minds of the Japanese public as a political expedient. This is a situation which potentially could do us great harm."

Some of Rickover's testimony was deleted, and the political reasons for Japan's attitude were left unexplored. The testimony provoked in several committee members melancholy reflections on the prevalence of ingratitude among nations as among men.

JAPANESE MONITORING OF U.S. NUCLEAR WARSHIPS

(Extracts from Report on the Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Congress of the United States, 92d Congress, 1st Session on Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, Testimony of Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover, March 10, 1971)

In classified testimony, Admiral Rickover covered in detail the problems which the Navy has experienced as a result of false "contamination" allegations raised against U.S. nuclear-powered warships in Japan, and described the extreme measures being applied by the Japanese authorities to these ships at U.S. naval bases in Japan. Some of these measures appear to go well beyond what is reasonable and proper for their stated purpose. They have resulted in the loss of essential U.S. base facilities in Japan to our nuclear warships for extended periods of time, and have caused other interferences to the operations of these important ships. This situation has been allowed to develop despite the overwhelming evidence of the safety of these ships, and the truly remarkable record Admiral Rickover has achieved in the control of radioactive waste (see pp. 81 to 85).

Although very little of Admiral Rickover's testimony on this subject involves military security information, the departments of State and Defense have requested that the full text not be published at the time in the interest of negotiations now in progress to secure satisfactory access by U.S. nuclear-powered warships to essential U.S. base facilities in Japan on a stable and realistic basis. While complying with this request, the committee regards the situation described by Admiral Rickover as unwarranted and inconsistent with good relations. If the problem cannot be resolved in the current negotiations, or if U.S. nuclear-powered warships should again be subjected to sensationalized false charges in Japan, the committee feels all the facts of the situation should be made available to the public as a matter bearing on the relationship between the United States and Japan. The Joint Committee has asked Admiral Rickover to keep the committee advised of further developments relative to this problem.

NAVAL NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS OUTSTANDING RECORD IN PROTECTING ENVIRONMENT


Representative HOLIFIELD. I want to say that I have had an opportunity to review this report briefly, and I feel Admiral Rickover and his people deserve a great deal of credit for this effort. That Admiral Rickover has been able to take a program as big and complex as the Navy's nuclear fleet—some 100 operating reactors—and all of their support facilities, shipyards, and so forth, and operate them without affecting the environment is a truly remarkable achievement. It is particularly remarkable since the procedures and controls he uses were not installed as an afterthought, in response to laws or political pressures. They have been built into the program since its inception because of Admiral Rickover's own personal concern for the environment we live in.

FALSE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT IN JAPAN

Senator BAKER. What happened in the big flap over contamination in Japan?

Admiral Rickover. I believe you are referring to the incident which occurred in May 1968, in which it was alleged that one of our nuclear submarines had contaminated Sasebo Harbor by releasing radioactivity. However, there was never any contamination; that was a phony issue. The investigation conducted at that time by the Navy and the AEC showed conclusively that the allegation was without foundation, that the submarine had not released any radioactivity. In fact, the reactor had been shut down for 4 days.

Representative PRICE. As I recall, the problem appeared to be more or less inherent in the kind of monitoring system used by the Japanese. I would also be interested in learning how this matter was resolved, and whether there are currently any problems in this aspect of our nuclear submarine visits to Japan.



MONITORING SYSTEM

Admiral Rickover. It has not been resolved, sir; we are still having serious difficulties in Japan. Although our nuclear warships visiting Japan have adhered scrupulously to our safety assurances, and no levels of radioactivity have ever been observed which could be considered significant from the standpoint of public safety, the Japanese monitoring system has grown progressively more [deleted]. Since the political crisis generated at Sasebo in 1968, which, as I have said, was in no way attributable to our nuclear-powered warships, the monitoring system employed by the Japanese has created a continuing atmosphere of suspicion and fear surrounding these visits. Because of this, the Navy in 1968 and 1969 had to suspend nuclear warship visits to our naval bases in Japan for periods totaling 11 months, and has experienced numerous other disruptions of essential Navy work to facilitate pointless investigations of irrelevant and untraceable electronic phenomena. Since early 1970, we have been deprived altogether of the use of the U.S. Naval Base at Sasebo for these ships, and have lost access to all facilities at Yokosuka except one drydock. [Deleted.]

I am deeply concerned that another Sasebo-type incident could occur at any time, creating more sensational allegations against our nuclear ships [deleted].

UNREASONABLE CONDITIONS IMPOSED ON U.S. SUBMARINES

I would emphasize here that I do not challenge the right of the Japanese Government to monitor our nuclear-powered warships or impose conditions on their entry into their ports. They have the right, in fact, to keep them out altogether. This is true of any warships, however they may be propelled.

But let us bear in mind that the context in which U.S. nuclear-powered warships visit Japan is that of a cooperative defense relationship between our Governments in which the United States has undertaken to defend Japan in certain circumstances, and the Japanese in turn have agreed to grant us certain base rights in Japan. They have specifically consented to the use of these bases by our nuclear-powered warships. In practice, however, the Japanese Government has imposed onerous, unnecessary, and unreasonable conditions on these visits at an administrative-level [deleted].

It is not as if Japan were imposing these unreasonable restrictions out of ignorance or superstition. They are highly sophisticated in the atomic energy field, and are, in fact, building a nuclear-powered ship of their own. They understand perfectly [deleted] that there is no technical justification for the onerous conditions being imposed on our nuclear warships. What they are doing, however, is building up false fears and anxieties regarding nuclear power in the minds of their own public, as a political expedient. These fears will not be easily overcome in future years. [Deleted.]

This is an involved and complicated issue, sir, but it is one on which I believe this committee should be fully informed, for I feel it could potentially do us great harm. With your permission, I will provide a complete report on this for the record.

Representative PRICE. We would be very much interested in having that in the record.

WATER COOLED REACTORS RELEASE MINIMUM RADIOACTIVITY

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question in that connection? This really was behind my question a minute ago about whether there was any new or radical type powerplant in the offing.

As you know, there is this concern of the environmentalists who want us to stop building reactors and stop the breeder program and wait until we get controlled thermonuclear fusion. I don't advocate this for a second. I think it is very shortsighted and as unrealistic as the Japanese episode was unrealistic. It is important, I think, from the standpoint of public relations as well as from the standpoint of efficiency to make sure we not only have new techniques but that we advertise them well and carry our point.

Admiral Rickover. There are no reactors that I can envisage which are capable of producing less radioactivity into the environment than water-cooled reactors. The issue then becomes how well you operate and maintain them and the care you take of radioactive emissions. What I told you about the 110 naval reactors shows that it can be done.

With your permission, sir, I will include greater details on the Japanese episode.

Representative PRICE. Please include it in the record.

(The information referred to follows:)



...this situation, not only because of its effects on the nuclear Navy, but also because this is precisely the sort of thing which undermines public confidence in and acceptance of nuclear power, both in the United States and abroad.

To see this issue in perspective, you must bear in mind that the so-called incident at Sasebo in 1968 was, in fact, a nonincident, consisting entirely of a brief series of spurious low-level readings registered on radioactivity monitoring instruments operated by Japanese Government personnel in a small boat about 100 yards from the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine moored in the harbor. These readings were transitory in nature; they were not reproducible even 10 minutes after the peak reading was recorded. No contamination existed; no radioactivity was ever found, nor was cobalt-60 detectable in the harbor bottom sediment, as it would have been if reactor plant effluent from the submarine had been the cause of the readings.

NUMEROUS CONDITIONS COULD CAUSE READINGS

A U.S. Navy repair ship was located between the submarine in question and the monitoring boat when the peak readings were registered, masking the submarine from the monitoring instruments completely. The repair ship was operating a number of welding machines in open doors in a direct, unobstructed line with the position of peak readings, and several other U.S. Navy ships were operating radar and other electronic gear in the vicinity. Any of these, or any combination of them, could easily have caused the slight instrument aberrations recorded by the Japanese monitoring boat. Such electronic interference to radioactivity monitoring instruments is a common phenomenon.

I would also note that the readings themselves were so low as to be inconsequential from the standpoint of public safety. Even if one assumes that the abnormal readings were, in fact, caused by radioactivity—and I emphasize there was no evidence whatever that this was the case—the radiation levels and radioactivity concentrations would have been about 1,000 times less than those considered acceptable for the general public by such authorities as the International Commission on Radiological Protection.

UNITED STATES DEMONSTRATES SUBMARINE NOT RESPONSIBLE

The U.S. Government went to great trouble and expense to demonstrate to the Japanese Government and public that the submarine had not caused the instrument aberration. At the request of the Japanese Prime Minister, three of my senior people were immediately sent to Japan to investigate the incident and attempt to find the cause of the readings. In addition, a legally constituted joint AEC-Navy examining board was dispatched to conduct an independent audit of the submarine. These groups, on the basis of official records, logs, and personal interviews with personnel of both the submarine and the facilities which supported it during its stay in Sasebo, established beyond doubt that the ship's reactor had in fact been shut down for

not allowing any... to either the harbor or the surrounding atmosphere. In short, they established that the U.S. submarine in question was in no way to blame for the small aberration which comprised this incident. The ship had scrupulously complied with all the assurances we had given the Japanese Government, as have all other U.S. nuclear-powered warships in Japan, both before and since.

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IGNORES FACTS

However, the Japanese Government did not accept the evidence, but proceeded as if the investigation had shown the submarine to be at fault. They greatly intensified their atmospheric monitoring during visits by U.S. nuclear-powered warships and asked us to give them additional assurances with respect to the discharge of effluent. These actions inevitably conveyed to the Japanese public the impression that the ships were dangerous, and that our assurances were questionable.

INCIDENT DISRUPTS USE OF VITAL BASES

Access by nuclear-powered warships to our naval bases in Japan was interrupted for over 7 months while the Japanese installed additional air monitoring equipment. After visits were resumed, in December 1968, it soon became apparent that transitory, low-level aberrant readings of the type that occurred at Sasebo were frequently being caused by interference from nearby U.S. Navy electronic equipment entirely unrelated to our nuclear propulsion plants. We repeatedly urged that the Japanese authorities disregard these phenomena, since they are virtually impossible to trace, and are so small as to be negligible in any case. However, they adopted the policy of attempting to track down the cause of each of these small aberrations, and undertook progressively elaborate measures in these attempts.

JAPANESE MAKE UNREASONABLE DEMANDS

In April 1969, the Japanese Foreign Ministry submitted a list of equipment which they asked the Navy to use while nuclear-powered warships were in port, in order to reduce interference to their monitoring instruments. This list included radar, radiography and X-ray machinery, and other radiating equipment. This, in effect, would have closed down a large portion of these naval bases, interrupting essential work for no purpose except to facilitate the investigation of trivial electronic phenomena. For obvious reasons, the Navy did not accede to these requests; however, the fact that such measures were seriously suggested by the Japanese Government demonstrates how far these monitoring policies had departed from reality. On one occasion, the Navy was asked to postpone for several weeks the entry into port of a submarine returning from an arduous patrol, for the convenience of the Japanese monitoring boat and its crew.

[Deleted.]

I will keep the Joint Committee informed of further developments in this matter.