

**The original documents are located in Box 1, folder “November-December 1975 – People’s Republic of China - TOSCO (5)” of National Security Adviser's Trip Cables of Brent Scowcroft at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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## Withdrawal Sheet for Documents Declassified in Part

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The still classified portions of these RAC documents are eligible for MDR. To file a request follow these steps:

1. Obtain the Presidential Libraries Mandatory Review Request Form (NA Form 14020).
2. Complete Sections I, II, and III of NA Form 14020.
3. In Section III, for each document requested, simply provide the Executive Standard Document Number (ESDN) in the Document Subject/Title or Correspondents column. The ESDN will be printed on the top and bottom of the document, and written on the declassification authority stamp, and will follow this format:

NLF-NSC\_ILCC-5-2-4-3

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TO SCO-102

December 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: The Situation Room  
SUBJECT: Morning News SummaryThe Washington Post

News dispatches report that South Moluccan nationalists released five children from the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam yesterday but continued to hold more than 60 other hostages in the consulate and in a hijacked Dutch train 90 miles north of the city. (A-1)

The General Assembly, by a vote of 84-17, adopted a resolution asking all nations to stop supplying military or economic aid to Israel. The resolution also called on the Security Council to establish a timetable for the achievement of a settlement in the Middle East that insures Israeli withdrawal from "all the occupied Arab territories" and the "full recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people." (A-1)

Walter Pincus writes that within months of his becoming Attorney General in 1961, Robert Kennedy authorized the FBI to use wiretaps in a wide-ranging investigation of sugar lobbying in Washington on behalf of the Dominican Republic and other countries, according to information developed by the Senate intelligence committee. (A-1)

According to George Wilson, President Ford has decided to start buying the air force a new fleet of combination tanker-cargo planes -- a decision that could end up costing \$15 billion. His go-ahead, given during recent White House budget meetings, will draw fresh fire from members of Congress who have been trying to block development of the air force B-1 bomber on grounds that it would require costly new tankers to refuel it in flight. Air force leaders have steadfastly denied that building the B-1 bomber would require building new tankers as well. (A-1)

Richard Lyons reports that the House-Senate conferees yesterday took the next to final step in the historic process by which Congress will write an overall annual federal budget and set



a spending ceiling and revenue floor it must live within.  
(A-2)

Clark Clifford counseled lawmakers yesterday against abolishing CIA covert action operations but pronounced the U.S. intelligence apparatus badly in need of overhaul. (A-3)

David Ottaway says that the Western-backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola has begun to evacuate its headquarters at Ambriz, 70 miles north of the Angolan capital of Luanda, under mounting military pressure from the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. It now appears that the entire National Front army immediately to the north of Luanda is being routed by the Popular Movement's superior firepower. (A-10)

Yural Elizur says that Israel's prime minister yesterday stressed his government's determination not to negotiate with any Palestinian elements and not to agree to the establishment of another state between it and Jordan. This assertion that even talking to any Palestinian group would amount to recognition of the Palestinian right to statehood is a hardening of the Israeli position, which has simply been that it would not deal with terrorist groups. (A-12)

Jonathan Randal writes that under Soviet pressure, the PLO appears to have come closer than ever before to signaling its willingness to recognize Israel's right to exist. But the PLO itself gives every indication of wanting to play down the apparent policy change for tactical reasons. (A-12)

According to Marilyn Berger, the Kremlin has backed down on an agreement to pay premium rates for shipping of some American grain, throwing into doubt future deliveries to the Soviet Union, which is suffering from a disastrously poor harvest. Analysts of Soviet affairs suggested that Moscow was taking a hard line, despite the reports released this week about low yields in this year's harvest, because the Soviets do not like to negotiate from a position in which they appear to have a grossly inferior hand. Soviet officials are also well aware that American farmers are eager to sell their grain. It could come down to a choice for the Ford administration between the farmers and the maritime unions. Soviet officials, it was suggested, might think they can rely on Agriculture Secretary Butz to "deliver" for his constituency, the farmers. (A-13)

In connection with Admiral Zumwalt's testimony before the Pike committee, the Post wonders about Mr. Pike, who invites a witness to do a hatchet job on an administration official, who sits by while the witness levels charges which add up to nothing short of treason, who observes that the charges are grave and the subject complex, and who then closes the



hearing and passes on quickly to other affairs. Unfortunately, this was not an isolated performance. The House committee, though it got a late start by no fault of Mr. Pike, could have made a useful contribution by selecting a few problems or study areas and focusing on them in depth. Instead it is skipping from headline to headline, giving its staff scant opportunity to relate whatever it is doing to the committee's public hearings, converting potentially useful challenges to excessive executive secrecy into wasteful confrontations of strong-willed men, leaving a trail which leads not to institutional reforms but to more argument and bitterness. It is hard to imagine how the findings and conclusions which may come out of such a performance can contribute to these urgently needed reforms. (A-14)

The Evans and Novak article, "New Concessions for a SALT Accord," is being sent full text. (A-15)

The Clayton Fritchey article, "Moynihan-Kissinger Split: A Matter of Style," is being sent full text. (A-15)


#### The Washington Star

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld will make his first overseas trip next week since taking over leadership of the Pentagon two weeks ago. Rumsfeld will leave tomorrow for Brussels to attend a meeting of NATO's defense planning committee. (A-2)

Britain abandoned yesterday its controversial policy of arresting and holding suspected Irish extremists without trial. The internment policy was introduced in August 1971 in an attempt to smash the military IRA. It was later used to curb suspected Protestant extremists. The major shift in policy was aimed at easing the tension that has threatened Ulster with civil war. (A-3)

The financially troubled Labor government plans to slash \$2.8 billion more from Britain's already drastically reduced defense budget, informed sources said yesterday. Defense sources said new cuts probably will mean a reduction of Britain's crack 50,000-man Rhine army in Germany, the cancellation of warship and aircraft building programs, and the closing of more defense bases. Diplomatic sources said such pruning probably would draw strong opposition from other NATO member countries at the alliance's annual evaluation meeting in Brussels next week. (A-4)

The Nationalist Chinese foreign ministry declared "strong opposition" yesterday to what it called "the dealings made between the U.S. and Chinese Communist regime." The statement,



issued while President Ford was en route from Peking to Indonesia, said: "Recent events have demonstrated that the seeking of accommodation with Peiping since the publication of the so-called Shanghai communique, far from promoting the security of the free countries in Asia, has had the effect of encouraging communist infiltration and subversive activities and has resulted in the fall of the Indochinese countries into communist hands." (A-6)

According to a Star editorial, independence for Angola, after centuries of Portuguese colonial rule and little preparation for self-government, had loomed for many months as a potentially violent affair. There are three "liberation" groups divided along tribal and ideological lines, and African and Portuguese intermediaries have failed to hold them together in a coalition. Last month, the Portuguese left on schedule. The long-anticipated civil war commenced. The fight could be bloodier and more prolonged as a result of the substantial foreign involvement that has surfaced since then. There are dangers for all. Angolans of all persuasions face the prospect of more casualties and more destruction of their emergent country because of the additional firepower introduced by foreigners. All will bear blame for any larger catastrophe that results. And as Secretary of State Kissinger has repeatedly warned, the cause of East-West detente could be hurt in the Angolan confrontation. If it is not too late, the OAU should try again to bring the Angolan parties to the conference table and seek an end of foreign intervention. (A-14)

### The New York Times

John Finney discloses that the size and shape of next year's defense budget, in the opinion of Pentagon officials, now depends in large measure on a political chess game being played between two young and ambitious officials -- Donald Rumsfeld and James T. Lynn. For the moment, Mr. Lynn appears to have the upper hand in imposing cuts in the projected defense budget for the next fiscal year, which begins on October 1, 1976. (1)

Henry Giniger reports that King Juan Carlos I decided yesterday to retain Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister, a move that seemed to satisfy rightists and to disturb liberals and leftists. (1)

Marvine Howe says that the Portuguese government announced yesterday that it drafted a program to reorganize the state-owned press, which has been closed since last week's unsuccessful military coup. The primary aim of the reorganization is to end the domination of the Lisbon press by communists and leftists, according to sources close to Prime Minister



Pinheiro de Azevedo. (4)

The Associated Press reports the president of CBS news said yesterday that the network had been unable to get information about two of its newsmen seized in Angola two weeks ago. (5)

A special to the Times reports from Tel Aviv that representatives of Jewish communities in 27 countries signed a declaration yesterday pledging help for Israel "to fulfill its historic mission in the return to Zion." At the close of the two-day conference, Prime Minister Rabin said Israel could not expect to find justice in the General Assembly for the foreseeable future. (10)

Bill Kovach reports from Jakarta that President Ford sought to reassure the government of Indonesia yesterday that the U.S. continued to be committed to the "peace and security of Southeast Asia. Little more than an exchange of views and a report on President Ford's talks with Chinese leaders was planned for this stop, encompassing only 21 hours. (11)

In its lead editorial, the Times says that the decisions by the chiefs of government of the nine Common Market states on a uniform passport and direct elections to the European parliament in 1978 are a dramatic recommitment to the ultimate objective of a U.S. of Europe. Direct election of the European parliament, whose members now are named by national legislatures, undoubtedly will add to this political momentum. Authorized by the Common Market treaty, but never implemented, it should revive flagging public interest in the EEC and could enhance the parliament's very limited powers. A common future demands a common energy program for the Nine right now, within the framework of the 18-nation IEA. The way to that common program has effectively been opened by three EEC decisions at the Rome summit. By agreeing to a common minimum price for oil within the EEC and to share oil with other EEC countries in an emergency, French President Giscard d'Estaing now has in effect accepted de facto membership in the IEA. The nine chiefs of government were divided on major issues when they arrived in Rome for their two-day meeting. They left apparently united. What brought the summit to agreement was a political compulsion, a commitment to unity in Europe that permits divergent economic and political interests at home to be overridden. (28)

In another editorial, the Times states that almost every element in the Rhodesian situation indicates failure for the projected new round of constitutional negotiations between Prime Minister Smith and the African nationalist leader, Joshua Nkomo. In fact, the only hopeful sign is that the talks have been denounced in advance as a sellout by the most extreme forces in both black and white camps. Rhodesia potentially represents as great a threat to international peace



as Angola does and a greater danger of becoming the cockpit of catastrophic black-white conflict in southern Africa. The Smith-Nkomo talks therefore deserve a fair chance -- but it is impossible to be optimistic about their outcome. (28)

C.L. Sulzberger summarizes economic changes in Brazil since the army takeover in 1964 and notes that the economic growth rate has been phenomenal. All kinds of jiggery-pokery have successfully violated the usual rules. There were back-breaking inflation, enormous deficits, spendthrift waste. At last these were succeeded by disciplined monetary reforms and ordered planning. Politically, Brazil has been in an icebox since 1964 but the freeze is starting to melt. Although civil rights were suspended in 1968, they are now slowly working their way back, supported by many elements of the nation. Where will all this lead is predictable. Some day South America's elephant will have both stability and freedom. But when, is another question. This continent tends to develop spasmodically, with long naps separating sprints. (29)

### The Baltimore Sun

In the opinion of Ernest Furgurson, an alliance of convenience was confirmed in Peking between the most unnatural of allies, the U.S. and China. It is informal, unstated, and not long ago would have been a scandal. Even today it cannot be spelled out by the leaders involved, largely because of domestic politics. It will be denied on and off the record by "senior American officials." (A-1)



Henry Trewhitt believes that the most important results of the latest violence in the Middle East and the bitter debate in the UN may be the political ones still obscured by immediate events. American specialists on the Mideast listed two such results yesterday. One is the louder voice of the PLO and its growing political stature. The other is the public confirmation of the dim outlook for progress toward a Syrian-Israeli settlement. (A-2)

Muriel Dobbin reports that former top-level national security officials and an ex-intelligence agent yesterday recommended the reduction of covert American operations abroad and criticized Congress for its failure to accept responsibility in espionage decisions. (A-5)

Hannah Arendt died Thursday of an apparent heart attack in New York City. (A-18)

Garry Wills argues that we are punishing ourselves into the same no-win situation over the Panama Canal as over Vietnam. We cannot let it appear that we "lost" any control over any



part of "our" world. Yet what would be lost by returning the canal zone to Panama? We keep a force there professedly to counter a large threat, which the force does not affect; and our maintenance of the force creates a small but more immediate threat, one that is growing. What on earth do we have to gain by our refusal of Panama's demands? Nothing but the ability to say we did not "back down," give up, cut and run, betray our commitment. By saying that we can do anything, we force ourselves to try doing everything at once; and we are bound to come off the loser, even if we win -- because we always said we should and could win big. Well, we cannot. The sooner we realize that, the stronger we shall be. It will save us from wasting our efforts meeting foolish tests we set for ourselves. (A-21)




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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 5, 1975



~~TOSCO~~

TO: Peter Rodman

FROM: Bud McFarlane *RM*

Please tell the Secretary that his SALT books will be with the double-enveloped pilot of 86970 when he boards the aircraft in Manila. They are/clearly marked "Hold for Secretary Kissinger/Eyes Only."

Warm regards

DECLASSIFIED  
EO 12859 (as amended) GPO 93  
NSC Memo, 8/25/88, State Dept. Guidelines  
HR 1978, Date 2/7/11



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXESDX

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IMM  
PRECEDENCE

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CLASSIFICATION

FROM: RUSS ROURKE  
TO: GENERAL SLOWCROFT  
DICK CHENEY

DEX \_\_\_\_\_

(DAC) 24 \_\_\_\_\_

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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BY: [unclear] [unclear] 2/2/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RUSS ROURKE

I had a very extensive conversation with Rabbi Korff this morning; the basic purpose of which was to completely turn-off the request to provide military aircraft to pick up Dr. Sakharov in Moscow. I was pleasantly surprised by Rabbi Korff's reaction. Although he did attempt to rebut certain of my arguments, he could not really dispute the three basic points we were able to make, i. e., the Soviets have given no evidence whatever of their willingness to permit Sakharov to leave; the convenient commercial airline schedule with which I was able to provide him presented irrefutable evidence that military aircraft was totally unnecessary even if the Soviets were to permit his departure; the law, 31USC665, clearly prohibits monies being spent for purposes other than that for which they were appropriated. In addition, I was able to advise Rabbi Korff that in the event the Soviets permitted Sakharov's departure and he was scheduled to come to Washington aboard commercial flight, we could assist in resolving any administrative or mechanical problems he might encounter either prior to leaving Moscow or upon his arrival in Washington.

Rabbi Korff expressed his deep appreciation for the very comprehensive effort we had made in exploring all facets of his request. In fact he invited me to attend the December 14 dinner if my schedule permitted. He again added that he had no desire to embarrass the White House. He was instrumental in turning off a man from Holland who asked Korff to invite Solzhenitsyn to the dinner. Korff felt that such an effort might again present an embarrassing situation for the President.

DECLASSIFIED  
EO 12958 (incorporating) E.O. 13526  
PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS DIVISION  
HR 2/7/11



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-2-

conversation with Korff.

A last problem we had concerned a Jack Anderson inquiry on this matter. Korff, who denies he initiated Anderson contact, and I tend to believe him, says he received a direct call from Anderson yesterday. I received a similar call from Gary Cohen of Anderson's staff less than three hours after my original conversation with Korff.

Following my final turn off to Korff, I gave Cohen a promised wrap-up report. He accepted our entire statement with the same practical understanding that characterized my last discussion with Korff.

cc: DCheney  
JMarsh  
PBuchen  
BHyland



~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

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CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMM CENTER USE ONLY

FROM: RUSS ROURKE  
TO: GEN. SLOWCROFT  
DICK CHENEY

DEX \_\_\_\_\_

DAC 26 \_\_\_\_\_

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PAGES 1 \_\_\_\_\_

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INFO:

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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OF BUSINESS



1975 DEC 5 21 25

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 5, 1975

Dear Rabbi Korff:

This is in further reference to our conversation concerning your request that the United States Government provide a military aircraft to bring Dr. Sakharov from Moscow to Washington for your U. S. Citizens Congress Bicentennial Awards Dinner. Following our initial conversation, I staffed your request through the appropriate offices at the White House.

A major problem, as I indicated to you, was we had no evidence that the Soviet authorities were in fact prepared for Dr. Sakharov to leave the Soviet Union. As far as special transport was concerned, it appeared that commercial transportation was available that would fit your schedule; and in this connection the Legal Counsel's Office has advised us that the law, specifically 31USC665, prohibits monies from being spent for purposes other than that for which they are appropriated.

Nevertheless, let me reiterate that should the opportunity present itself, our Embassy would be only too happy to do whatever we can to assist Dr. Sakharov, should he decide to visit the United States.

Your very understanding manner and helpful attitude are deeply appreciated.

I enjoyed our conversations and look forward to the pleasure of chatting with you again in the future.

Sincerely,

Russell A. Rourke  
Deputy to Presidential Counsellor,  
John O. Marsh, Jr.

Rabbi Baruch Korff  
1221 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036  
cc: JMarsh

DChency  
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BHyland  
BScowcroft



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FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 103//  
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

ZEM

~~SECRET~~, EYES ONLY WH52423

TOSCO 103

FM: STANLEY R. RESOR (MBFR DELEGATION-VIENNA) 859  
TO: SECRETARY KISSINGER (WHITE HOUSE) EYES ONLY IMMEDIATE  
SUBJECT: MBFR: NATO MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION OF TIMING OF  
OPTION III OFFER

1. THE MBFR ISSUE DUE TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE NATO MINISTERIAL IS WHETHER TO TABLE OPTION III IN VIENNA BEFORE OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CHRISTMAS RECESS WHICH STARTS ON DECEMBER 18.

2. ALLIED REPS HERE -- INCLUDING THE FRG -- INDICATE THEIR GOVERNMENTS ARE PREPARED TO TABLE THE OPTION III PROPOSAL BEFORE THE RECESS. THE UK APPEARS TO BE THE ONLY ALLY WHICH PREFERS TO MAKE THE PRESENTATION IN JANUARY INSTEAD. MINISTER CALLAGHAN MAY ADVANCE THE ARGUMENT THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE TIME TO MAKE A COMPLETE PRESENTATION BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS RECESS.

3. HOWEVER, WE AND ALL ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HERE OTHER THAN THE UK BELIEVE IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION BEFORE THE RECESS IF A DECISION TO DO SO IS REACHED IN THE MINISTERIAL.

4. AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO TABLE OPTION III BEFORE THE RECESS IN ORDER TO GET INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR AS EARLY THIS WINTER AS POSSIBLE. THERE MAY BE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE IN JUNE OVER AMERICAN TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE, AND IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO TAKE DECISIONS LATER IN THE YEAR WHEN THE FRG ELECTION CAMPAIGN GETS UNDER WAY. WITHHOLDING OPTION III UNTIL AFTER THE RECESS COULD DELAY BY SIX WEEKS THE POINT AT WHICH A SOVIET RESPONSE IS MADE AND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BEGIN.

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E.O. 12958 (maximum) GPO 29

1980 (max), GPO 29, Class. (max), GPO 29

HR NARA, Date 2/2/11



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P 061843Z DEC 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 105//  
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
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TOR | 061900Z DEC 75

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TOSCO 105

FM: SECRETARY RUMSFELD

TO: MR. SCOWCROFT

REF: TOSCO 66, 79, 97; SCOTO 11, 20, 22

1. I REALIZE THAT TIME IS SHORT AND THAT ALL OF OUR SCHEDULES ARE TIGHT. IN VIEW OF THE RECENT CORRESPONDENCE, I SEE THE DESIRABILITY OF TRYING TO ARRANGE OUR MEETINGS SO THAT HAK WILL AT LEAST BE ABLE TO GO TO MOSCOW LATER THIS MONTH, ASSUMING AGREEMENT IS REACHED INTERNALLY. BECAUSE OF THIS, I CAN SEE THE NEED, IF NOT THE DESIRABILITY, TO HAVE A MEETING IN BRUSSELS. I PROPOSE WEDNESDAY, DEC 10, 7:00 PM BRUSSELS TIME AT THE US NATO MISSION. KISSINGER, RUMSFELD BROWN AND IKLE CAN BE IN ATTENDANCE. YOU SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER YOU OR HYLAND SHOULD BE PRESENT, AND WHAT CIA PARTICIPATION IS DESIRABLE. A THURSDAY MEETING IN BRUSSELS IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR SEVERAL REASONS, THE MOST IMPORTANT BEING THAT WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING HOW MUCH TIME SUCH A MEETING WILL TAKE, AND I PREFER NOT TO HAVE THE PRESSURE OF HAK'S NECESSARY NAC MEETING INVOLVEMENT TO ABBREVIATE OUR DISCUSSIONS IN ANY WAY. IF A WEDNESDAY BRUSSELS MEETING IS AGREEABLE, I WOULD STILL RECOMMEND WE PLAN ON A VERIFICATION PANEL MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY, DECEMBER 12TH OR 13TH. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN FIRMING UP RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS, AS WELL AS IN ASSURING THAT THE PROCESS IS SOUND.

2. HOWEVER, I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THERE MUST BE AN NSC MEETING IN WASHINGTON WITH ALL PRINCIPALS IN ATTENDANCE, PRIOR TO ANY TRIP TO MOSCOW, FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED IN REFERENCED CABLES. THEREFORE, HAVING A MEETING IN BRUSSELS WOULD UNFORTUNATELY NOT RELIEVE KISSINGER OF THE BURDEN OF RETURNING TO WASHINGTON FROM EUROPE PRIOR TO ANY TRIP TO MOSCOW. HOWEVER, HAVING SUCH A MEETING IN BRUSSELS, FOLLOWED BY A VERIFICATION PANEL MEETING IN WASHINGTON, WOULD ALLOW THE TIME NECESSARY BEFORE THE NSC MEETING IN WASHINGTON FOR STAFF WORK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED, AND FOR THE PRESIDENT TO HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO REVIEW PAPERS PRIOR TO THE NSC MEETING.

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AUTHORITY DAO Directive 5200.30

BY LR NARA, DATE 2/7/11

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
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON D C 20301

70  
TO 9CO-106  
Cruise Missiles - FYI  
Staffed  
Ben Sch...  
6 DEC 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: BACKFIRE and Cruise Missiles in SALT (U)

(U) As part of the preparation for the next Verification Panel meeting on SALT, the attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which provides their views on the current issue of BACKFIRE and Cruise Missiles in SALT is forwarded.



Attachment

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~



Sec Def Cont Nr. X-3594

76

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032853

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . George S. Brown

CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Donald Rumsfeld

RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . Secretary of Defense

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re: SALT

CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/05/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000007

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1975



MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY  
BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH/BILL HYLAND *Jack*

1. The following information should be treated on a very close hold basis since Congressman McClory has met with us concerning the information and is desirous at this time that other Members of the Committee not be aware of his activity in this regard.
2. Attached is a series of documents which have been sanitized for declassification purposes. A request has been made by the House Select Committee for approval of their declassification for further Committee use. This request is now pending before the NSC. You should be aware that in addition to Committee staff who have been working on this project, thus far only Congressmen Pike and McClory are believed to be aware of these documents.
3. The documents the Committee has picked relate to highly sensitive subjects. This limited selection does not objectively portray or explain the SALT-hold procedures so that the conclusion reached on first examination by a person without background leads to conclusions that could be very adverse insofar as we are concerned. In fact, Bob McClory called late yesterday to express grave concerns and he visited with me personally at the White House this morning to further outline his views. After a meeting with myself, Friedersdorf, Buchen and Hyland, he left with a much better understanding of the situation although I do not feel he is completely satisfied.
4. From McClory we learned of a likely Committee effort to try to move this subject into the public sector probably early this

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526 (continued) 02023  
1920 Memo, 02023, Class. Auth. Guidelines  
HR 5000, 02023 2/7/11

week. Over the weekend, we understand staff are attempting to interview Cline, Proctor, de Poix and probably others to obtain information. McClory believes that Pike will ask the Committee on Tuesday to request their approval for declassification and publication which would be subject to the President's certification unless such permission was previously granted. Although this subject is not relevant to the contempt citation, nevertheless it can be troublesome from the standpoint of creating an unfavorable environment when the House considers the citation on Thursday, unless we take steps to offset this one-sided presentation.

5. Those of us who have been working on this here feel it is essential to develop a concise and orderly presentation for each of the instances cited in the attached documents. This is necessary to not only bring the matter into proper perspective, but to rebut the allegations as they now appear in isolated form. Hyland and a number of members of his staff have been working continuously since we learned of this to pull together the facts and other memoranda necessary to prepare this type of presentation.
6. Further, we feel that it is necessary to move the first of the week into the public forum with a broader SALT verification statement supported by more detailed backup which can be provided on a sensitive basis to the Pike Committee and other appropriate Committees of the Congress. In this regard, you may wish to accelerate the SALT white paper which is nearing completion.
7. We are also pressing for a briefing of the Select Committee by Duckett in order that they can have at hand the total picture rather than be influenced by a limited selected presentation as reported by these documents.
8. In addition to the events that are underway in preparation for a House vote on Thursday, it is my view that we should be prepared to brief key Congressional leaders on the SALT-hold matter in order to minimize as much as possible this issue.



9. The Hyland group has been tasked to have available for use early Monday morning a paper which develops fully the SALT-hold matter.
10. Although we are dealing with a matter that relates to the House, nevertheless on this particular issue we must also be prepared to move quickly to the Senate and brief key Senate leaders to offset any public criticism that might come from that body.
11. Because of the sensitivity of this subject, we feel phone conversations should be minimal, if at all.

In the meantime, we would appreciate any help and guidance you might have.

NOTE: The letter to Pike from Buchen which you approved has been delivered to his office with copies to the offices of other Committee Members. It was changed as per your instructions.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032854

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇList

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re: Intelligence Matter

CREATION DATE . . . . . 1975

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000007

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032855

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇLetter  
  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re: Intelligence Matter  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/04/1975  
VOLUME . . . . . 1 page  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000007  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (5)  
  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032856

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇNote

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re: SALT

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/24/1972

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000007

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . CCG

( OFFICE ~~TOP SECRET~~ )

25 October 1972

7:30  
15:3

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Information  
Bearing on SALT Monitoring

This morning I told the Director about the discussion concerning dissemination of reports from the Steering Group for SALT. I told him that both Cline and de Poix felt that they had to inform their principals about findings of the Steering Panel before dissemination might be authorized by Kissinger. The Director's response was that we should put things through the Steering Panel mechanism only when we thought it would do no harm to have the information released. He said that we should try to keep things that were not ready for release within (a building) until we were ready to have the word "spread all over town."

I also related Cline's request for alerts to hold items connected with SALT. He said that I should not respond to this request.

Ed  
Ed Proctor

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DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY RAC m F-TB-BS-1-5-6-2

BY llh NSG 3/12/09 NLF DATE



~~TOP SECRET~~

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Given to General Walters on 16 July -- he is holding.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Odeen

Phil--

Attached is a draft of the USIS monitoring report for your review. The Item 1 material is covered on pages iii, 20-21, and 30-31 (clipped)

Please note that the draft does not include anything on the Item 3. Even if you have no problems with the draft as it stands, I would recommend against issuing the report without any discussion of the Item 3.

15 July 1973


Edward W. Proctor  
Deputy Director for Intelligence (DATE)

*File*

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 19-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

(47)

*Review Draft*



DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY EAC/NLF-IB-BS-1-5-7-1 9/10/04  
BY ada NLF DATE 3/10/09



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13 July 1973

## NOTE FOR THE RECORD

At yesterday's Morning Meeting, Duckett reported on the session he and D/OSR had Wednesday with Odeen and other NSC Staffers on the hold item. He felt that the hold situation was getting worse rather than better.

At this point in time, the hold on [redacted] is still on and there is little likelihood that it will be lifted soon.

Odeen would like to see a draft of the Monitoring Report with the [redacted] item in it to recommend to Kissinger whether the Report should be published and whether it should have the [redacted] item in it. (There had been some confusion about whether Item 3 should also be in the Report, but it was D/OSR impression--later checked with the NSC Staff--that it should not be.) [redacted] is to have the draft ready later today.

After talking with General Walters around noon yesterday, I called Ray Cline to tell him about the status outlined above. Cline was of course disappointed. He said that he had talked to Rush about the situation. Although Rush recalled being briefed by Duckett on Item 3 shortly after they were discovered, his recollection was very vague. Rush had not realized that Secretary Rogers had not been briefed. Ray reported that Rush was very concerned that Alex Johnson and Sid Graybeal had not been told. Rush is to talk to Rogers and urge that Rogers talk to Kissinger to get permission to tell Johnson and Graybeal.

I tried to reach Admiral de Poix yesterday, but he was on the hill. He will call back today.

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt

AUTHORITY RAC n6-10-BS-1-5-8-0BY lh NLF DATE 3/10/09

MORI/CDF

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~~TOP SECRET~~

\* Admiral de Poix returned my call at about 1030 today and I relayed the substance of the second and third paragraphs above. Admiral de Poix was quite concerned about the continuation of the hold. After some discussion, he recommended: "The DCI should go directly to the President and inform him of the problem." I told de Poix that something like this was being considered. (Earlier this morning I had discussed with General Walters and Mr. Colby the DCI's obligation--a la Watergate--to make sure that the President knew of the withholding of intelligence, was aware of the consequences of prolonged delay in informing others in the Executive and Legislative Branches, and nonetheless had approved the continuation of the restrictions.)

I gave the attached memo (dated 13 July [redacted] to General Walters at about 1430 to take with him to a meeting with Kissinger and Scowcroft. Just before I gave General Walters the memo, D/OSR [redacted] called to say that Odeen had asked D/OSR to brief Graybeal on these and other developments. General Walters was informed of this before he left.

25X1

16 July 1973

General Walters and Carl Duckett met with Scowcroft and Kissinger, separately and together.

Neither Duckett nor General Walters discussed my 13 July memorandum with Kissinger. General Walters did discuss it with Scowcroft and left a copy of my memo with Scowcroft for discussion with Kissinger.

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Meanwhile, a clean draft of the USIB monitoring report was prepared for review by Odean. This draft covers the material but has nothing on the Item 3 matter with General Walters who said not to send the draft to Odean until we had the matter of the /cleared up. After talking to Scowcroft around noon today, General Walters reported that Scowcroft would be talking with Kissinger about Item 3 and would be getting back to General Walters tomorrow.

25X1

20 July 1973

At about 1300 on 18 July, reported to me that he had heard that there will be no release on Item 3 until Kissinger had seen the paper on what the Soviets could do to convince us that Item 3. At the Morning Meeting of 19 July, General Walters reported the same. He urged that the paper be ready for him to bring to the SALT VP meeting later that afternoon.

At the Morning Meeting on 20 July, Duckett reported that Kissinger had read the paper on what the Soviets might do to convince us about Item 3. Kissinger was not satisfied with the paper. He asked that we try again. Meanwhile, we have been instructed to prepare an annex for the USIB SALT Monitoring Report on the matter of Item 3. This together with the entire draft is to be sent down to either Kissinger or Odean for review. General Walters mentioned that he and Duckett might take the package down personally. General Walters again expressed his concern about the length of time ("it's now 31 days since we informed the NSC.") that this information is being held.



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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : The "Hold" On Item 3

1. It is now 24 days since we reported to Dr. Kissinger on the [redacted]

During this period this and related evidence have been held in a strict hold status on instructions of the NSC Staff. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger learned of the matter as Director of CIA, and Admiral de Poix indicated that he had briefed Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, Admiral Moorer, and Mr. Nitze and General Roway of the SALT delegation. The only other senior officials outside CIA and the NSC staff who have been informed are Dr. Cline and Undersecretary of State Rush, who was briefed with NSC Staff authorization. No one else in ACDA or the State Department is aware of this information, nor, of course, are any members of the key Congressional Committees concerned with SALT Verification matters. Among those not now authorized to know about the matter are Ambassador Johnson, head of the SALT delegation, and Sidney Graybeal, the US Commissioner on the US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission set up to deal with problems of compliance with the strategic arms limitation accords.

2. A principal reason for establishing the "hold" on this information was to insure that there be no leakage while the Soviets were being queried on the matter, and our general expectation was that once these delicate exchanges had been completed the "hold" could be readily lifted. However, progress of the dialogue so far suggests that though the exchanges may be ultimately be successful in defusing the problem, they are not likely to produce an early definitive result.

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[redacted]

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MORI/CDF



DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt.  
AUTHORITY (ACNLF) 10-05-1-5-5-9 8/6/07  
BY [signature] NLF DATE 3/10/09

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3. Under the circumstances I feel obliged to recapitulate for you how much of a bind the indefinite continuation of the "hold" on this material puts us in. As you know, [redacted]

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[redacted] and a number of people within the intelligence community are aware of the evidence even though knowledge has been more than usually limited. Meanwhile, we face increasing problems in carrying out normal intelligence reporting responsibilities without either disclosing the hold material or raising suspicions that important information is being withheld. One case in point, as you know, is that of the SALT Monitoring Report in which the USIB Steering Group regularly reports to a select group of some 15 senior officials concerned with SALT matters on the status of Soviet compliance with the 1972 accords.

4. Thus the longer the present situation continues, the more likely it is that additional people will inadvertently become aware of it. Moreover, the longer the information is held as closely as it is, the more likely is it that questions will arise as to why others with specific responsibilities and concerns regarding Soviet compliance with strategic arms control agreements were not brought in.

5. At this stage, I think that you as Acting Director of CIA must get concrete assurance from Dr. Kissinger that the President is aware of the decision to withhold this information from key officials in the Executive Branch and from members of Congress who would almost certainly feel that they have the right and a need to know about the problem and that the President is also aware of our concern. The President should be aware of the potential difficulty of trying to answer a question, say from Senator Jackson, as to why this information has been withheld from the key committees of the Congress, and from such directly concerned officials as Ambassador Johnson and Commissioner Graybeal, when the Administration has known about it for almost a

-2-

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~~TOP SECRET~~



month or more. Another complication is that persons who do know about the matter, such as Secretary Schlesinger, Mr. Colby and Admiral de Poix, are frequently called to testify before committees of the Congress on Soviet strategic matters and may be asked to comment on Soviet compliance with the 1972 agreements. Although there are ways in which they could truthfully answer without immediately compromising the "hold" information, such an answer would presumably hasten the time when full disclosure would be demanded.


6. At a minimum I think you should seek Dr. Kissinger's assurance that he has informed or will inform the President of this situation and the concerns it generates. In addition, I think you should press for an early decision on release of the information to additional persons with an identifiable need to know. I will not presume to judge how the problem of dealing with key members of Congress should be handled. I do think, however, that there is a strong case for informing Secretary of State Rogers, Ambassador Johnson, Commissioner Graybeal, and his Deputy SCC Commissioner, Brigadier General William Georgi. If desirable, they could be briefed orally. Indeed, a good case could be made for informing all of those on the select list of recipients of the USIB Steering Group SALT Monitoring Report.

*Edward W. Proctor*

EDWARD W. PROCTOR

Deputy Director for Intelligence

~~TOP SECRET~~



25X1

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032857

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Associate Deputy Director of  
Intelligence

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Director of Central Intelligence

TITLE . . . . . Items Requiring Action by Dr. Kissinger

CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/01/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000007

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . CCG

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032858

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇList

TITLE . . . . . "Hold" Items Awaiting Instruction from  
Dr. Kissinger

CREATION DATE . . . . . 1975

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000007

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032859

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

TITLE . . . . . Phone call from Colonel Merritt, NSC  
Staff

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/17/1972

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000007

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG

17 October 1972

84

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Phone call from Colonel Merritt, NSC Staff

1. Jack Merritt called today in connection with the recently received SALT baseline report. He said he had been asked to get in touch with us and say that, in the reports of the intelligence community concerning SALT monitoring, Dr. Kissinger wanted to avoid any written judgments to the effect that the Soviets have violated any of the SALT agreements. If the Director believes that the Soviets may be in violation, this should be the subject of a memorandum from him to Dr. Kissinger. The judgment that a violation is considered to have occurred is one that will be made at the NSC level.

2. Colonel Merritt asked that I pass this on to Mr. Duckett and Dr. Proctor.

3. I told him I would relay his message and pointed out that I thought our whole approach to this matter was in line with what he had just said. I reminded him that the position of the Director has historically been that the intelligence community considers itself responsible for monitoring SALT agreements but that the question of verifying them is considered to be the business of the policy level of the government.

Director  
Strategic Research

## Copies furnished:

- ✓ Deputy Director for Intelligence
- Deputy Director for Science & Technology
- Special Assistant to the DCI for SALT



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(unless impossible, insert date)	



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032860

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

TITLE . . . . . Release of Recent Information

CREATION DATE . . . . . 07/05/1973

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000007

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES  
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November-December 1975 - People's  
Republic of China - TOSCO (5)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG

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FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO: DICK CHENEY  
BRENT SCOWCROFT  
SIM LYNN

INFO:

RELEASED BY:  
SC

DEX \_\_\_\_\_

DAC 2011

LDX \_\_\_\_\_

TTY \_\_\_\_\_

GPS \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 1

CITE \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: - 061507Z DEC 75

TOR: 061535Z DEC 75

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:





Washington Post

Saturday, December 6, 1975

TO: DICK CHENEY  
JIM LYNN  
BRENT SCOWCROFT

gb

FROM: JACK MARSH *JM*

# Ford Backs Fleet Of A.F. Tankers

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford has decided to start buying the Air Force a new fleet of combination tanker-cargo planes—a decision that could end up costing \$15 billion.

His go-ahead, given during recent White House budget meetings, will draw fresh fire from members of Congress who have been trying to block development of the Air Force B-1 bomber on grounds that it would require costly new tankers to refuel it in flight.

Air Force leaders have steadfastly denied that building the B-1 bomber would require building a

new tanker-cargo aircraft..."

Senate aides said yesterday that Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) and William Proxmire (D-Wis.) will demand that the Ford Administration explain its tanker procurement plan in light of past testimony that the fleet would not be needed for the B-1.

McGovern, in his unsuccessful attempts this year and earlier to postpone production of the B-1 until less expensive alternatives could be assessed, has insisted that new, faster, and less

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PRECEDENCE

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FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO: DICK CHENEY  
BRENT SCOWCROFT

INFO:

DEX \_\_\_\_\_  
DAC 012 GPS \_\_\_\_\_  
LDX \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES 13  
TTY \_\_\_\_\_ CITE \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: 061570Z DEC 75

RELEASED BY:

TOR: 061544Z Dec 75

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:



106

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
THROUGH: DICK CHENEY  
FROM: JACK MARSHALL *JM*  
SUBJECT: Energy Bill

Zarb requests President be advised of the following:

"Jim Broyhill recommends the President sign the energy bill, but use as a lever to get Dingell to withdraw objections to Administration gas deregulation proposals.

"Zarb believes we have a good chance to get gas deregulation on the House Floor, and if Dingell takes a walk, chances will be enhanced."



Washington Post  
Saturday, December 6, 1975

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## One Day of the Pike Committee

CONSIDER ONE OF the more recent, not untypical, days of the House intelligence committee. It had invited just one witness, former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Elmo Zumwalt. No other witness, either from inside or outside the administration, has yet been called to respond, one way or the other, to what the admiral had to say about intelligence and strategic arms limitation, though the House inquiry is but days away from its close. This is so, despite the fact that the committee had invited Adm. Zumwalt for a very specific purpose: to attack

did not seem to know, for instance, that it was not a violation of the SALT I agreement, but rather of a unilateral understanding which the United States stated in regard to that agreement, that the Russians replaced some SS-11 intercontinental missiles with more powerful SS-19s. Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, by calmly but completely undercutting the heart of the Zumwalt testimony the following day, furnished that particular corrective—to another committee of Congress. Mr. Schlesinger, we observe, does not see eye

TO: CHENEY & SCOWCROFT FROM: JACK MARSH

*gm*

100  
Washington Post  
Sat., December 6, 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

# New Concessions For a SALT Accord

While President Ford prepared to be lectured in China on the dangers of detente, his national security bureaucracy was drafting top secret proposals for major concessions to Moscow in order to save a SALT II agreement at almost any cost.

"I think it's a disaster," said one outraged administration official in describing the unexpected developments. He and other hard-liners waged a furious rearguard action the past week to assure that Mr. Ford's offer of a full-scale

Meanwhile, papers were prepared by lower-level staffers fulfilling this syndrome of U.S.-Soviet negotiations: rewarding Kremlin intransigence with further U.S. concessions.

Coincidentally on Nov. 25, members of the Verification Panel, which makes U.S. SALT policy, received a letter from NSC Director Brent Scowcroft classified secret: "The President...wishes that the Secretary of State chair the Verification Panel."

**Optimistic:** While lower-level staffers will draft papers "totally biased" for concessions, says one official, Mr. Ford will see all options—including those from "hang tough" hard-liners. Moreover, Hyland and Sonnenfeldt, plus Kissinger himself, are playing fair with all sides, including the no-retreat Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Pessimistic:** The rearguard action to broaden the options involves a handful of

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gm

MEMORANDUM TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH, PHIL BUCHEN, LARRY EAGLEBURGER, WILLIAM HYLAND

SUBJECT: State Department Subpoena



The following are our thoughts concerning the contempt resolution against Secretary Kissinger and the chances of compromise.

First, all of the information available to the various Congressional liaison staffs indicates that if the contempt citation is put to a floor vote next week the vote will be heavily against Pike. Estimates range from two to one or three to one. At the same time there is, of course, no guarantee of the level of votes that might be cast against the Secretary of State. Les Aspin, for example, estimates about 75 to 100 votes against, but the White House staff believes that it could run higher, especially if there is a rather emotional and acrimonious debate about Kissinger.

Pressure has been put on Pike from many sources including the Speaker and key Congressional leaders to dissuade him, but our information is that he is determined to force a vote and go down fighting. Indeed, he may relish this role as a martyr and use it as a pretext to close down his Committee. ~~On the other hand, it is thought that he is playing chicken with Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.~~

Third, the rumor is spreading that a compromise is in the air, and accordingly, if we do not now go forward with something, however minimal, we may be accused of provoking a conflict and alienate some

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (Declassify on) GPO 83

F200 Memo, CIA, OIG, State Dept, GAO, CIA, OIG

HR 1098, Dec 2/7/11

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-2-

Congressional elements and increase at least somewhat the size of the vote against us.

Thus, all of us (Jack Marsh, Phil Buchen, Larry Eagleburger, Nino Scalia and Bill Hyland) believe that an offer should be made. However, any offer raises two problems: (1) should we tie the offer to the Executive privilege issue (and thereby appear to be compromising with the principle) or make the offer in the context of the "40 Committee" Subpoena. We recommend the latter as a unilateral gesture of cooperation. We also recommend reaffirming the President's assertion of Executive privilege although this would alienate some members. (2) should we agree to provide information or State recommendations which were disapproved by the 40 Committee. We have consistently declined to provide disapprovals because to do so erodes the confidentiality of the President's decision process. On the other hand, not to include them may make it harder to get a compromise.



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A new development is that Pike intends to file his report on Monday morning, thereby circumventing any Committee meeting in which he could be voted down. Even if this is so, we still have the problem of whether to offer a compromise, if only to strengthen the hands of our supporters in the House debate.

The unanimous recommendation here is (a) that a letter be sent to Pike signed by Phil Buchen answering the Pike letter of November 21; (b) that the letter address itself only to the issue of extending the examination of 40 Committee material to the period of 1961 to 1965; that this be offered under the same "guidelines" as followed thus far -- which as you know would mean looking at highly sanitized descriptions and decision lines; (c) that we not specifically offer State Department recommendations nor mention in any way examination of disapprovals.

We believe that this will be seen as a constructive move that does not impair the principle of executive privilege but will demonstrate a willingness to work out a reasonable compromise. On balance, we believe this will not be read as a last-minute capitulation, which has been our main concern here. The text for you, the Secretary, and the President to consider follows.

BEGIN TEXT:



~~SECRET~~



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Dear Mr. Chairman:

The President has asked me to reply on his behalf to your thoughtful letter of November 21. He has further asked me to tell you that he appreciates the fact that you and your Committee permitted representatives of the Executive Branch to appear for testimony on November 20, and shares your hope that the remaining "underlying issues" may be removed.

We are pleased that, by working together in a spirit of compromise, we have already moved a long way toward resolving the issues that have arisen since November 6. It is our hope that by continuing to work together in that same spirit, we can find a way to accommodate the few issues still outstanding.

As you know, in order to provide your Committee with the substance of the information it sought to obtain by the November 6 subpoenas, the Executive Branch identified the originating agency with respect to all covert actions conducted from 1965 to the present. The President authorized this step because of his desire to meet the legitimate needs of the Committee for information on covert operations, although such detail was not required under any of the three subpoenas.

As a further demonstration of our desire for accommodation, the President has authorized me to inform you and your Committee that,



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

since the 40 Committee subpoena covered only the period 1965 to the present, we will supplement the information already given to your Committee by providing similar information for the years 1961 through 1964 under the guidelines we have followed thus far. This additional step should, we believe, make it possible for the Committee to obtain the information that your letter indicated was necessary without affecting the President's claim of Executive privilege.

I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that this further example of the President's desire to help the Committee carry out its important responsibilities will receive a favorable response by the Committee.



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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We feel that if we are to make this move we <sup>should so</sup> need to do ~~it~~  
tomorrow morning (saturday) Washington time, in order to permit our  
supporters on the Pike Committee to mount a counteroffensive and  
to have it on the public record for the weekend press and for the opening  
of Congressional business on Monday.



~~SECRET~~

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BY JOHN ROUBICEK

DARWIN, AUSTRALIA, DEC 7 (SAYDAY), REUTER - RADIO REPORTS MONITORED HERE TODAY SAID DILI, CAPITAL OF THE UNILATERALLY-DECLARED REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR, WAS UNDER ATTACK TODAY FROM WARSHIPS AND PARATROOPERS.

THE REPORTS SAID MORE THAN A THOUSAND PARATROOPERS HAD LANDED IN THE CITY AND AT LEAST FOUR WARSHIPS WERE STATIONED OFF THE PORTUGUESE COLONY, LOCATED NORTH OF AUSTRALIA.

THE MESSAGES PICKED UP HERE REPEATEDLY CALLED FOR AUSTRALIAN HELP.

"WOMEN AND CHILDREN ARE BEING SHOT INDISCRIMINATELY IN THE STREETS. WE ARE GOING TO BE KILLED. S.O.S. DO SOMETHING, DO SOMETHING....," SAID ONE MESSAGE.

MORE 2015

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TIMOR-REPORTS 2 DARWIN

THE MESSAGES GAVE NO INDICATION WHETHER THE ATTACK WAS BEING RESISTED BY FRETILIN FORCES WHO SET UP A REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE PORTUGUESE COLONY MORE THAN A WEEK AGO.

IN ONE MESSAGE FROM DILI AN EYEWITNESS REPORTED:

"THEY ARE ALL AROUND THE AIRFIELD AND IN DILI. THEY HAVE US SURROUNDED.

"PLEASE HELP US. THEY ARE KILLING WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE STREETS. THEY ARE KILLING INDISCRIMINATELY."

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(MORE INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED IN SUNDAY CABLE SUMMARY)

