

The original documents are located in Box 1, folder “November-December 1975 – People’s Republic of China - TOSCO (2)” of National Security Adviser's Trip Cables of Brent Scowcroft at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 30 //

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

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SITUATION ROOM

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1975 DEC 1 21 37

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

ACTION

Memo No. 1376-75
December 1, 1975

FOR: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
FROM: Jon Howe^{md}
SUBJECT: Vice President's Message to General Scowcroft

Please cable to Peking the attached message to
General Scowcroft from the Vice President.



TO: Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, Peking

FROM: The Vice President

On the occasion of your retirement from the Air Force, I want to express my deep personal admiration and my gratitude for all that you have done for our country.

Few men in our history have served this Nation so well and so selflessly. Your extraordinary dedication and skill is an inspiration to all of us who have worked closely with you.

I regret that the Air Force is losing a General of your unique talent and experience, but I am gratified that the President and the Nation will continue to benefit from your counsel in a position of such tremendous importance.

With warm personal regards.



~~SECRET~~
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EYES ONLY



TOSCO _____

FROM: WILLIAM G. HYLAND

Following is draft text of proposed reply from the President to the two letters from Senator Jackson. Realize you do not have incoming, and that the letter will have to await your return, but perhaps you could review text and we can position package here for your return.

BEGIN TEXT

Dear Senator Jackson: Thank you for your views on the SALT negotiations and questions of compliance. I continue to believe, as you noted, that the views of the Legislative Branch should be fully taken into account in formulating the US position in these critical negotiations.

There are still important issues on which the two sides have not agreed. Nevertheless, we are continuing to pursue the negotiations, and I think it would be imprudent at this point to defer them until 1977. This would put any Administration in the undesirable position of negotiating against the expiration of the Interim Agreement. In such a situation we might seek an extension of the Interim Agreement, but there is no reason to believe that an extension of the Interim Agreement would be easier to achieve than a new agreement or necessarily more advantageous. In addition, an extension of the Interim Agreement would risk the loss of those genuine advances achieved at Vladivostok and in the subsequent negotiations. In particular, we might jeopardize the agreement on

negotiations.

I firmly believe we should continue on our present course in the negotiations with the objective of achieving an agreement which will enhance our national security and receive the full support of the Congress and the American people.

You have also raised questions of compliance and possible violations, specifically a new development in the ABM area. I was, of course, aware of this new information, which is being analyzed by the experts. Based on their findings we will take whatever action is required as we have done in the past. END TEXT



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T09CO-32

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7944


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIA LDX

ACTION

December 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Mr. Clift 

SUBJECT: President's Reports to Congress on Assistance to Greece, Progress on Cyprus and Turkish Opium



Summary

Public Law 94-104, which was signed by the President October 5, requires the President to submit within 60 days reports to Congress on (1) his recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for Fiscal Year 1976; (2) progress made toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem; and (3) means of preventing diversion of Turkey's opium poppy crop into illicit channels. The reports are due by December 4, 1975.

Under Log Number 7523742 of November 28, the Department of State has forwarded proposed reports for the President's submission to the Congress. Under Secretary Sisco and Peter Rodman are both carrying copies of the State package.

We have reviewed State's drafts, made the revisions explained below and cleared the revised drafts with Paul Theis' office. The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would forward the reports for his review and approval.

Once you have notified us of the President's decisions, we will have the reports as approved by the President prepared in final form for delivery to the Congress.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/GDS
Automatically Declassified
on December 31, 1981.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (EXEMPTED) 25033
NSC Memo, 6/22/75, Cite Dept. Circulars
by HR 1077, 625 2/1/11

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- 2 -

Assistance to Greece

P. L. 94-104 requests the President to submit a report to the Speaker of the House and the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees containing the President's recommendations for economic and military assistance for Greece in Fiscal Year 1976.

The report at Tab A advises that the President has forwarded his recommendations to the Congress on this issue (in the amended budget requests for the Fiscal 76 security assistance program, submitted on October 30), requesting \$50 million in grant military aid, \$90 million in FMS credit and \$65 million as a supporting assistance loan. The report urges the Congress to give early and favorable consideration to this request for Greece.

The draft at Tab A has been revised from the earlier State draft to delete the numerous references to the former Greek junta government. This history is not necessary in terms of the requirements of P. L. 94-104, and I do not believe it is appropriate.

I have deleted the reference in the State draft to the fact that the President's request to the Congress has been reviewed with the Government of Greece and the Greeks have asked us to increase the grant military assistance from \$50 million to \$75 million. As this Greek request has been considered and then decided against by the Administration, it seems to me counter-productive to include it in the report.

I have deleted State's proposed annexes to the report, entitled: Report on the Greek Economy, Table I - Greece's Balance of Payments and Table II - Greece's International Reserves. This detailed statistical information, prepared by State and AID, is not required by the Congress; it is my understanding that the figures are open to some question and debate, and I am not sure that the Government of Greece would welcome this "state of the Greek economy report" by the United States.

Report on Cyprus Negotiations

P. L. 94-104 requests the President to submit a report to the Congress -- the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate -- on the progress made toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/GDS

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The report at Tab B reviews the steps taken by the President and the Secretary of State, together with the steps taken by the parties directly involved, to realize progress. It notes the delay brought about by the recent U. N. debate, it advises that Cyprus will be the subject of discussion on the fringe of the upcoming NATO Ministerial meeting, and it concludes that these efforts will bring results if the Administration continues to have the support and understanding of the Congress.

The State draft made general reference to the Secretary of State's September 22 U. N. G.A. address as the current basis for the U. S. position on Cyprus. As we cannot expect people to have this speech readily available, we have revised the report to include the explicit language. In forwarding the draft reports on November 28, State noted that we should check on the results of Congressman Hays' visit to Turkey. The reporting from Ankara indicates that while the visit was positive in tone there was no major breakthrough. Accordingly, there is no reason to include specific reference to the visit in the President's report to the Congress.

Turkish Opium Control

P. L. 94-104 requests the President to submit a report to the Speaker of the House and the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees on the poppy control discussions being held with the Government of Turkey. The report at Tab C states the President's continuing satisfaction with the steps being taken by the Government of Turkey, and notes that on November 28, the President received renewed assurances from Prime Minister Demirel of the Government of Turkey's determination to maintain effective poppy control. We have added the specific date of the Turkish Prime Minister's letter to the report, and we have deleted the actual texts of the letters between the President and the Prime Minister in keeping with normal practice relating to such correspondence.

Les Janka concurs. The reports have been coordinated with Paul Theis.


RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
2. Following Presidential approval, that you provide us with the report texts as approved, so that they can be put in final form for delivery to the Congress.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/GDS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TAB I



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

at Tab B reviews the steps taken by you and the Secretary of State, together with the steps taken by the parties directly involved, to realize progress. It notes the delay brought about by the recent U. N. debate, it advises that Cyprus will be the subject of discussion on the fringe of the upcoming NATO Ministerial meeting, and it concludes that these efforts will bring results if the Administration continues to have the support and understanding of the Congress.

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Your reports have been coordinated with Paul Theis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the reports at Tabs A, B and C.



~~CONFIDENTIAL/GDS~~

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TAB
A



30

PRESIDENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE FOR FY 1976



Dear Mr. Speaker: (of the House)

Dear Mr. Chairman: (of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)

Dear Mr. Chairman: (of the Senate Appropriations Committee)

Pursuant to Section 2(b) (2) of P. L. 94-104, I am pleased to submit to the Congress my recommendations for economic and military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976.

The bonds between the United States and Greece have historically been close and deep. Both countries were linked together as allies in World War II. They later cooperated in defeating the communist guerrilla movement in Greece in the late 1940's. Subsequently, Greece sent a military force to Korea to assist the United Nations' effort against the communist aggression. In 1952, Greece joined NATO. The bonds between our two nations are not only political, but ethical and cultural as well. The peoples of Greece and the United States cherish a common heritage and a common belief in freedom and human dignity.

My Administration has worked with the new Greek Government in this spirit of friendship and alliance to identify areas in which we might be of assistance and, thereby, advance our common interests. Following consultations with the Greek Government, we began consideration of a program aimed at assisting Greece economically. We supported increased financial assistance for Greece at the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. For fiscal year 1975, we also raised the level of military



credit assistance to Greece from \$71 million to \$86 million. In addition, to increase the amount of Export-Import Bank lending to Greece, the Bank Chairman visited Athens last spring to discuss with Greek businessmen and officials ways in which Greece could take better advantage of the Bank's programs. This visit was followed by a further Export-Import Bank mission in November.

The Greek Government itself has moved vigorously to confront its most serious problems. It has dramatically reduced the level of inflation. It has reversed the decline in its Gross National Product. In addition, it has moved to restore public confidence in the military establishment as a non-political force capable of defending Greece's security interests.

At the same time, the government in Athens has made clear to this Administration its need for increased levels of assistance for the current fiscal year. Based on that request and in keeping with the spirit of Congressional debate preceding passage of P. L. 94-104, I sent an expert team to Athens from the Department of State and the Agency for International Development in October to consult with senior Greek officials on that Nation's most urgent needs for economic and military assistance.

The team of experts concluded that Greece, faced with continued domestic economic difficulties and a need to modernize its military establishment, merited increased U. S. support for fiscal year 1976. Based on Greek requests and the findings of our own experts, I submitted to

the Congress on October 30, 1975, a request for fiscal year 1976 for \$50 million in grant military aid, \$90 million in FMS credit and \$65 million as a supporting assistance loan. This latter loan is designed specifically to ease Greece's temporary balance of payment difficulties.

This package of assistance is justified on three grounds. First, it will help strengthen the foundation of representative democracy in Greece. Second, it will demonstrate our interest in modernizing and improving the Greek armed forces, and will be consistent with our stated desire that Greece return at an early date to a full participation within the NATO Alliance. Finally, it will assist the Greek Government and the Greek people in a moment of critical economic need.

Based on my review of Greece's need as well as our overall budgetary situation, I have concluded that my proposals of October 30 are appropriate for this fiscal year. I strongly urge the Congress to give them early and favorable consideration.


Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford



5-1AB

B



CYPRUS

Dear Mr. Speaker: (of the House)
Dear Mr. President: (of the Senate)

I am submitting, pursuant to Public Law 94-104, the first of a series of reports on efforts this Administration is making to help resolve the Cyprus problem. Subsequent progress reports, as required by this legislation, will be forwarded to you at sixty-day intervals.

In his speech before the U. N. General Assembly on September 25, 1975, the Secretary of State outlined the Administration's policy on the complex Cyprus problem as follows:

"The details of a Cyprus settlement are for the two communities themselves to decide. However, in keeping with U. N. resolutions which the United States has fully supported, the following principles are essential:

"A settlement must preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

"It must insure that both the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs;

"The present dividing lines cannot be permanent. There must be agreed territorial arrangements which reflect the economic requirements of the Greek-Cypriot community and take account of its self-respect;



"There must be provisions for the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under the authority of international agreements; and,

"There must be security for all Cypriots; the needs and wishes of the refugees who have been the principal victims and whose tragic plight touches us all must be dealt with speedily and with compassion."

These elements, which we consider essential to a settlement, are consistent with the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the people of Cyprus. Beyond that, only the Cypriot people can decide how to rebuild and preserve their sovereign, independent nation so it may again serve the interests of all its citizens.

With this appreciation of both the opportunities and limitations of U.S. action, I declared immediately following enactment of P. L. 94-104 on October 5 that the United States would make a major effort to encourage a resumption of the Cyprus negotiations and to facilitate progress by all the parties involved -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus -- toward a peaceful and equitable solution. I also stated that the United States would undertake whatever role the parties themselves wanted us to play in achieving a settlement.



Immediately thereafter, we took a number of steps through diplomatic channels aimed at helping the parties find a basis for resuming the intercommunal talks under the aegis of U. N. Secretary General Waldheim. As a first step, I wrote directly to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey to stress the importance the United States attaches to the resumption of the intercommunal Cyprus talks and to emphasize our wish that the Cyprus problem be removed as a source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. My letters were followed by a series of communications from Secretary Kissinger to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and to President Makarios of Cyprus. In each of these communications, an effort was made to define the differences as we saw them between the negotiating positions of the other parties and to urge that an effort be made to narrow the gap.

The Secretary of State, during the past sixty days, also has consulted extensively with several of our major European allies who have engaged in corresponding and complementary initiatives with the Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot governments. Parallel initiatives also were undertaken during this period by the European Community.

These initiatives have not produced a major breakthrough; but taken together they have advanced prospects for a negotiated settlement. A



new appreciation now exists in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia that delay in resuming the intercommunal talks will harden attitudes and make future progress more difficult. In each capital, there is a desire to begin anew an earnest search for a solution. Each party also has a realistic understanding of what it must do to make progress possible.



In Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister announced on October 21, shortly after the Turkish senatorial elections, that the time was opportune to search for a solution and that all aspects for a settlement could be discussed at the intercommunal talks. Turkey has also indicated that it would encourage the Turkish Cypriots to engage in meaningful negotiations within the intercommunal framework. There is also a recognition in Ankara that a discussion of their position on territory is essential once the intercommunal talks have been resumed and that troop reductions as well as steps to resolve the refugee issue are essential ingredients to any Cyprus settlement.

Similar meaningful changes have occurred in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot negotiating positions with respect to such subjects as the organization of the future central government and the division of responsibilities and delegation of authority to the future regional administrations.

In sum, we have seen, as have our principal Western allies, a narrowing of differences on most of the key issues necessary to negotiate a Cyprus solution. The range of disagreement between the parties now

seems to us surmountable. Under such circumstances, it should have been possible in November to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. However, once a date had been scheduled in New York for the Cyprus debate at the U. N. General Assembly, the parties felt compelled to await the outcome before sitting down with the U. N. Secretary General to resume actual negotiations.

Now that the United Nations has completed its consideration of the Cyprus question and passed a new resolution calling for intercommunal negotiations, efforts to schedule new talks are underway. We have consulted U. N. Secretary General Waldheim and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. Our common interest is to have renewed negotiations of sufficient depth and duration to allow full discussion of all key substantive issues. There is every reason to believe this kind of negotiation will begin in the very near future. To facilitate this effort, I have asked the Secretary of State to give special emphasis to the subject of Cyprus negotiations when he meets with the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers during the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels in the second week of December.



We now find ourselves at an important juncture in the search for a Cyprus settlement. The negotiating framework which has emerged finally

should allow early and orderly discussion of the most serious substantive issues, including refugees which hold the key to a final settlement. We have succeeded in moving to this point in large part because, since early October, the United States has been free to resume an active, even-handed role among all the parties. The outcome of the resumed Cyprus negotiations may depend upon our ability to maintain this role in the months ahead.

An important beginning has been made in the past sixty days toward the elusive goal of a peaceful, equitable, and enduring Cyprus solution. In the days ahead, I believe our efforts will bring results if we continue to have the support and understanding of the Congress. I intend to review with you in subsequent reports the progress that has been made in the common quest to restore peace and stability to the island of Cyprus.


Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford



[Faint, illegible handwritten text]

TAB
C



PRESIDENTIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON POPPY CONTROL
DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Dear Mr. Chairman (of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee):

Dear Mr. Chairman (of the Senate Appropriations Committee):

Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, discussions have been held with the Government of Turkey on effective means of preventing diversion of the Turkish opium poppy crop into illicit channels. These discussions continue long-standing consultations between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Turkey on suppression of the illegal international traffic in narcotics.



The Government of Turkey is aware of our concern and that of other nations of the world regarding the terrible blight of drug abuse. This concern has been made known to successive Governments of Turkey by this and previous Administrations, by many other governments, and by the United Nations.

I have been encouraged by reports from our Embassy in Ankara, from the Drug Enforcement Administration and from the United Nations, indicating the Government of Turkey's efforts to keep poppy cultivation under effective control thus far have been successful. I have received no evidence to date that there has been any illicit diversion of the current Turkish crop.

When Turkey permitted the resumption of poppy cultivation in 1974, the production of opium gum was forbidden and the poppy straw harvesting process was adopted instead. At the same time, Turkey implemented

stringent inspections and controls of the poppy crop. The poppy straw process makes control of the crop much easier. It has been used successfully in several countries to facilitate efforts to prevent illicit diversion from legal opium poppy growing areas. Turkey has reissued the same control decree to cover next year's crop. We expect the controls to be as effective as before, because of the introduction of more modern communications and surveillance equipment and more experience in administering the controls.



The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control has provided Turkey with technical assistance in meeting the requirements of the poppy straw process. I believe the United States should continue to support the good work of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control in its assistance to Turkey and other countries in combating the diversion of legally produced opiates from legitimate pharmaceutical uses.

I also share the views of the majority in the Congress that close bilateral cooperation with Turkey is essential to prevent illicit diversion of poppy crops. In July of this year at our meeting in Helsinki, I discussed with Prime Minister Demirel my continuing deep concern about the ravages of drug abuse and the need to suppress diversion of opiates into illicit channels. Prime Minister Demirel strongly concurred in my views and affirmed his personal commitment to the prevention of illicit diversion of opiates from his country.



On October 29, following enactment of Public Law 94-104, I sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Turkey urging that already existing discussions between our two governments on opium poppy controls be intensified in the period ahead. On November 28, Prime Minister Demirel sent me a very positive response confirming his earlier assurance that he fully supports continuing effective poppy controls and maintaining a dialogue between the two governments on this vital subject.

Since the passage of Public Law 94-104, discussion and meetings on poppy controls have been held with Turkish Government officials at many levels. Ambassador Macomber has reviewed the issue with the Turkish Prime Minister. Additionally, the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Embassy Narcotics Control Coordinator have met with the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Director of Narcotics Control Affairs. The U.S. AID poppy specialist in Ankara has held consultations with Turkish Soils Product Office and Agriculture Ministry officials in Ankara, Izmir, and in the poppy growing areas. In addition, the Regional Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration in Ankara has been in continuing contact with high Turkish law enforcement officials. Our Ambassador and his staff will continue these meetings and discussions on poppy controls.

I believe the desire of the Congress that meaningful discussions be conducted with the Government of Turkey on insuring continued effective poppy controls have been met by the actions described above.

Sincerely,

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEACTION
December 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH: WILLIAM G. HYLAND *WGH*
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *ROO*
SUBJECT: Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan -- Proposed Meeting with the President, December 9 or 10

Attached is a schedule proposal which you could use in seeking the President's approval of a meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan in Washington on December 9 or 10. State NEA is on board for a meeting on one of those dates (Ambassador Pickering has reported that King Hussein is agreeable) and plans for a meeting with the Vice President will be dropped.

We have checked informally with the scheduling office here and have been told that a meeting on December 9 is doable, or alternatively, December 10 if necessary.

RECOMMENDATION: That you seek the President's agreement to a meeting with the Crown Prince on December 9 or 10 via the attached schedule proposal and that you report your decision back to us as soon as possible.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
DATE:
FROM: Brent Scowcroft
VIA: William Nicholson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEETING: With Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan

DATE: December 9 or 10

PURPOSE: To reaffirm our continuing interest in strong bilateral relations with Jordan, and cooperating with Jordan in the Middle East negotiations.

FORMAT: -Oval Office call
-20 minutes

CABINET PARTICIPATION: Secretary Kissinger

SPEECH MATERIAL: Talking points will be provided through the NSC staff.

PRESS COVERAGE: Meeting will be announced as part of your schedule; White House photo session at beginning of meeting.

STAFF: Brent Scowcroft

RECOMMEND: Brent Scowcroft

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: You met with the Crown Prince in May 1974 during his last visit to the US.

BACKGROUND: King Hussein has delegated full responsibility for Jordan's economic development to Crown Prince Hassan. Hassan comes to Washington periodically to discuss Jordan's needs with State, AID and members of the Congress, as well as to promote interest among US business firms in investment possibilities in his country, and he is extremely serious in his efforts. Hassan is also one of the inner council of Hussein's



advisors on political affairs. He is thus an important asset to our own interests in a viable Jordan, particularly with respect to the future of the West Bank and the eventual resolution of the Palestinian problem.

The Crown Prince will want to review Jordan's economic plans as well as the prevailing Middle East situation, in advance of King Hussein's planned visit to the US in March.

At this sensitive period in the Middle East negotiations, a meeting with Hassan would provide you a timely opportunity to emphasize to the Jordanians the importance we attach to their cooperation in the peace-making process and our determination not to permit the momentum of the negotiations to falter.

_____ APPROVE

_____ DISAPPROVE



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOSCO _____

FROM: WILLIAM G. HYLAND

General Wickham called to relay an appeal from Secretary Rumsfeld to HAK on the proposed breakfast in Brussels on SALT. Rumsfeld believes he must leave Brussels on the night of the 10th to prepare for budget meetings with the President and proposes that he and HAK meet on the afternoon of the 10th. Can you check this out with the Secretary and let us know.



~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONTAINS~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY CONTAINS CODEWORD WH52349~~

TOSCO 35

DECEMBER 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING: NOTHING UNUSUAL WAS REVEALED IN THE FIRST PUBLIC REPORT OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON DECEMBER 1. THE COMMITTEE ANNOUNCED THAT GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV WILL DELIVER THE MAIN REPORT AT THE PARTY CONGRESS WHICH OPENS FEBRUARY 24. PREMIER KOSYGIN WILL SPEAK ON THE ECONOMY.

ECONOMIC PLAN AND BUDGET WERE APPROVED; THEY WILL ALSO BE TAKEN UP AT THE SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, WHICH OPENS DECEMBER 2. NEXT YEAR'S

PROBABLE SCUD MISSILE LAUNCHED IN SYRIA: DAMASCUS RADIO ANNOUNCED ON NOVEMBER 27 THAT PRESIDENT ASAD AND OTHER HIGH-LEVEL SYRIAN OFFICIALS OBSERVED A MILITARY DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH A MISSILE, PROBABLY A SCUD, WAS LAUNCHED. THIS IS THE FIRST OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION THAT SYRIAN FORCES ARE EQUIPPED WITH A LONG-RANGE GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILE. WHEN REPORTING THAT "THE ROCKETS HIT THEIR TARGET WITH GREAT ACCURACY," DAMASCUS RADIO INDICATED THAT MORE THAN ONE FIRING TOOK PLACE.

FINLAND: HAS NEW, UNSTABLE COALITION: A FIVE-PARTY COALITION GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THE COMMUNISTS WAS ANNOUNCED IN FINLAND ON SUNDAY. MARTI MIETTUNEN OF THE CENTER PARTY WILL BE THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PROGNOSIS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS NOT BRIGHT. FOUR OF THE FIVE PARTIES MADE UP THE COALITION WHICH FOUNDERED LAST SPRING BECAUSE OF DEEP DIFFERENCES OVER ECONOMIC POLICY. THE "NATIONAL EMERGENCY" COALITION WAS PUT TOGETHER ONLY AFTER PRESIDENT KEKKONEN APPLIED STRONG PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE POLITICIANS TO STOP THEIR HAGGLING AND GET TO WORK ON THE COUNTRY'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. MIETTUNEN DECLARED THAT HIS FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO HALT

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Presidential Library Review

ND OF PAGE 01 ~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONTAINS~~

RISE UNEMPLOYMENT, WHICH HAS ALREADY HIT POLITICALLY SENSITIVE LEVELS. THE GOVERNMENT WILL ALSO HAVE TO DEAL WITH A LARGE TRADE DEFICIT AND A 17 PERCENT RATE OF INFLATION.

THE WASHINGTON STAR

THE STAR PICTURES PRESIDENT AND MRS. FORD BEING ESCORTED BY CHINESE VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING ON ARRIVAL IN PEKING TODAY.

HENRY S. BRADSHER REPORTS FROM PEKING THAT CHINA GAVE PRESIDENT FORD A FORMALLY PROPER RECEPTION TODAY ON HIS ARRIVAL TO REVIEW THE WORLD SITUATION BUT NOT -- U.S. OFFICIALS EXPECT -- TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS. FOREIGN DIPLOMATS TURNED OUT TO GREET FORD AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS FOUR-DAY VISIT, WHILE LIFE CONTINUED NORMALLY IN THIS GREY, WINTRY CAPITAL.

HENRY BRADSHER FURTHER REPORTS FROM PEKING THAT THE HAZE OF WINTRY WEATHER HUNG OVER PEKING ON PRESIDENT FORD'S FIRST DAY IN THE CHINESE CAPITAL TODAY. AS IT WAS WHEN FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON ARRIVED ALMOST FOUR YEARS AGO IN EVEN COLDER FEBRUARY WEATHER, THE CITY WAS GOING ABOUT ITS NORMAL WAYS WITH LITTLE NOTICE OF THE VISITOR.

JEREMIAH O'LEARY REPORTS THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER, WHO NEEDS SOMEONE TO DO THE TALKING FOR HIM ABOUT AS MUCH AS INDIA NEEDS A POPULATION EXPLOSION, IS ABOUT TO GET HIMSELF A NEW PRESS SPOKESMAN. HEIR-APPARENT TO THE GRUELLING JOB OF DEALING WITH THE PRESS FOR THE DEMANDING AND SOMETIMES THIN-SKINNED SECRETARY OF STATE IS ROBERT L. FUNSETH.

THE PRESIDENT IS ALSO PICTURED BEING WELCOMED IN PEKING BY HUANG CHENG.

IN THE FINAL EDITION OF THE STAR, HENRY BRADSHER REPORTS THAT CHINA'S LEADERS RECEIVED PRESIDENT FORD TODAY WITH CONSIDERABLE WARMTH FOR A RELATIONSHIP STILL CLOUDED BY THE TAIWAN ISSUE, BUT REITERATED THEIR VIEW THAT SOVIET-AMERICAN CONTENTION CREATES A GREAT DANGER OF WORLD WAR. THE ARTICLE IS ACCOMPANIED BY A PHOTO OF THE HONOR GUARD OF MILITARY MEN SNAPPING TO ATTENTION AT PEKING AIRPORT AS PRESIDENT FORD ARRIVED. THE STAR HEADLINE READS "SOVIETS ON WAR COURSE, CHINA TELLS FORD."

IN ANOTHER PHOTO, THE PRESIDENT IS PICTURED IN A CONVERSATION WITH TENG YING-CHAO, WIFE OF PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI.

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
DECEMBER 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

CHINA READY TO SIGN CONTRACT FOR WEST GERMAN PETROCHEMICAL PLANT: THE CHINESE ARE REPORTEDLY READY TO SIGN A SIX PERCENT DEFERRED PAYMENT CONTRACT WITH A WEST GERMAN FIRM FOR A \$23.6 MILLION U.S.-LICENSED LINEAR ALKYL BENZENE (LAB) PLANT. AN INTERESTED JAPANESE GROUP REPORTED THAT THE CHINESE HAD REJECTED THEIR OFFER BECAUSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT-LIMITED 7.5 PERCENT INTEREST RATE WAS BETTERED BY THE SIX PERCENT OFFER OF THE WEST GERMAN FIRM. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, THE CHINESE HAD FREQUENTLY STATED THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE WASHINGTON AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE WERE TAKING THIS OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THEIR CONTINUING OPPOSITION TO IT BY DECIDING ON THE WEST GERMAN OFFER. NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE 50,000 TONS-PER-YEAR LAB PLANT HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS SINCE JULY 1974 WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF JAPANESE, WEST GERMAN, AND ITALIAN FIRMS. THE CHINESE APPARENTLY HAVE SIGNED A SEPARATE TECHNOLOGY CONTRACT WITH A U.S. FIRM FOR THIS PROJECT, A DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS WHOLE PLANT CONTRACTS WHEREIN TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION WERE INCLUDED UNDER ONE CONTRACT.

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BRAZIL PRESSING FOR CLOSER ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT;
BRAZILIAN EFFORTS TO STIMULATE AND INCREASE FINANCIAL AND
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ARE NOW TAKING ON THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF A VERITABLE BRAZILIAN ASSAULT ON THE KU-
WAITI MARKET." IN ADDITION TO A MISSION ORGANIZED BY THE
BANK, THE DIRECTORS OF THE ARAB-BRAZILIAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
(ABICO) AND OTHER BRAZILIAN ENTITIES ARE NOW PRESSING FOR THE
IMMEDIATE EXPANSION OF TRADE WITH KUWAIT. [REDACTED]
KUWAIT'S MINISTER OF FINANCE TOLD [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THAT HE VIEWED ABICO AS A KUWAITI PRESENCE IN BRAZIL
AND THAT HE CONSIDERED THE BRAZILIAN PRESENCE IN KUWAIT IN
THE FORM OF JOINT VENTURE "INDISPENSABLE." HE ADDED THAT
ABICO SHOULD BE A HOLDING COMPANY FROM WHICH OTHER COMPANIES
ORIGINATE. IN ADDITION, HE STATED THAT BRAZIL COULD EXPORT
HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND SOPHISTICATED MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS AS
ITS CONTRIBUTION AND COOPERATION FOR THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR DE-
VELOPMENT PLAN OF KUWAIT, "NOW IN THE BEGINNING STAGES OF IM-
PLEMENTATION."

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032844

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE TOSCO 37

CREATION DATE 12/02/1975

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000004

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER 1

FOLDER TITLE November-December 1975 - People's
Republic of China - TOSCO (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
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TOSCO 38

THE PEKING CANDIDATE

OBSERVER
BY RUSSELL BAKER

THE MIRACLE OF NETWORK TELEVISION TAKES YOU NOW TO ANCIENT CHINA WHERE OUR WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT, BUCKY SHORES, IS STANDING OFF THE ANCIENT GREAT WALL WAITING FOR THE ANCIENT TEA CEREMONY TO BEGIN. WE HAVE AN EXCELLENT PICTURE OF YOU AND THE ANCIENT GREAT WALL, BUCKY. HOW IS EVERYTHING IN CHINA?

"IT IS EXTREMELY ANCIENT, CASPER."

CAN YOU TELL US MORE ABOUT THE ANCIENT TEA CEREMONY, BUCKY?

"INDEED I CAN. THE ANCIENT TEA CEREMONY IS JAPANESE AND, OF COURSE, IT IS NEVER PERFORMED IN CHINA, AND WILL NOT BE PERFORMED TODAY."

THEN PERHAPS YOU'LL TELL US, BUCKY SHORES, JUST WHAT IT IS THAT YOU ARE AWAITING ON THE ANCIENT GREAT WALL.

"ACTUALLY, CASPER, THIS IS NOT THE ANCIENT GREAT WALL. THIS IS A BRAND NEW GREAT WALL CONSTRUCTED BY THE CHINESE HERE IN PEKING LAST NIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR ANCIENT PROFICIENCY IN WALL CONSTRUCTION. THIS ENTIRE WALL, EXTENDING FOR MORE THAN 700 MILES, WAS CONSTRUCTED BETWEEN MIDNIGHT AND 6 O'CLOCK THIS MORNING BY 800,000 LABORERS USING NOTHING MORE THAN STONES, MORTAR AND CRUDE, HAND-MADE BROOMS."

THAT WILL CERTAINLY GIVE THE SOVIET UNION PLENTY TO THINK ABOUT. WHAT IS THE PRESIDENT DOING, BUCKY?

"THE PRESIDENT IS NOW CLOSETED WITH HENRY KISSINGER DISCUSSING PLANS TO BUY SOUVENIRS FOR HIS FAMILY, AND PEKING IS RIFE WITH RUMOR OF AN IMPENDING SECRET FLIGHT TO SHANGHAI."

THE PURPOSE OF THAT, I SUPPOSE, WOULD BE A SECRET MEETING WITH

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THE ANCIENT MAO TSE-TUNG.

"NO. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO BUY SOUVENIRS. THE HUGE AMERICAN PRESS CONTINGENT, WHICH THE PRESIDENT ACCOMPANIED ON THIS TRIP, HAD CLEANED OUT ALL THE PEKING SOUVENIR SHOPS BEFORE AIR FORCE ONE ARRIVED. UNLESS THE PRESIDENT GETS TO SHANGHAI BEFORE THE AMERICAN PRESS, SOURCES CLOSE TO KISSINGER BELIEVE, THE SOUVENIR SHOPS WILL BE DEPLETED."

IS ANYONE IN THE AMERICAN DELEGATION TALKING FOR THE RECORD ABOUT THIS SOUVENIR CRISIS, BUCKY?

"A NUMBER OF THE REPORTERS, CASPER, ARE BITTERLY OUT SPOKEN ABOUT THE CHINESE FAILURE TO SUPPLY NEW SOUVENIRS DIFFERENT FROM THE STUFF THE REPORTERS BOUGHT WHEN THEY WERE HERE WITH PRESIDENT NIXON IN 1972. THEY ARE FED UP WITH THE SAME OLD MAO CAPS, BLUE QUILTED JACKETS AND CHOPSTICKS. THERE IS TALK OF A PRESS WALKOUT."



HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS THREAT?

"I SHUDDER AT THE PROSPECT, CASPER. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOTHING TO DO IN CHINA EXCEPT BE REPORTED AND PHOTOGRAPHED. IF REPORTERS, PHOTOGRAPHERS AND TELEVISION WALK OUT, HE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO FOLLOW THEM."

WHERE WOULD THE PRESS GO IF THEY LEFT CHINA, BUCKY?

"WE ARE SPLIT RIGHT DOWN THE MIDDLE, CASPER. A LARGE FACTION FAVORS GOING TO DISNEYLAND--"

A REMARKABLE VARIETY OF MICKEY MOUSE SOUVENIRS THERE, ALL RIGHT--

"--BUT ANOTHER GROUP WANTS TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO BUY BURNOOSES AND CAMEL SADDLES."

I ASSUME THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW WHICHEVER ROUTE THE PRESS TAKES.

"THERE IS NO OTHER WAY HE CAN GET THE PUBLICITY HE NEEDS TO BOLSTER HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN, CASPER. THERE'S NO POINT IN HIS SITTING HERE AND DOING THE CHOPSTICKS-AT-THE-BANQUET BIT IF THERE'S NOBODY AROUND TO REPORT IT."

I GUESS WHAT WE'RE REALLY TALKING ABOUT IS THE POWER OF THE PRESS.

"WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT, CASPER, IS SOUVENIRS. WHAT'S THE POINT OF COMING ALL THE WAY OUT HERE AND GOING THROUGH THIS ANCIENT CHINA ACT AGAIN IF YOU CAN'T EVEN FIND A DECENT SOUVENIR

END OF PAGE 02

TO TAKE BACK TO WASHINGTON? THE CHINESE COULD AT LEAST HAVE LAID ON SOME YAK SADDLES IF THEY WANTED TO GET FORD ELECTED."

BUCKY SHORES, PUTTING ASIDE FOR THE MOMENT YOUR OUTRAGED SENSE OF PERSONAL DISAPPOINTMENT--

"I WANT A CAMEL SADDLE TO GIVE MY WIFE FOR CHRISTMAS."

I SAY, PUTTING ASIDE YOUR OWN SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT, IS THERE ANY WAY THE TRIP CAN BE SALVAGED? SUPPOSE SECRETARY KISSINGER NEGOTIATED WITH THE CHINESE LEADERS TO HAVE SOME NEW SOUVENIRS FLOWN IN FROM AFRICA?

"OUT OF THE QUESTION, CASPER. NOBODY CAN FIND OUT WHO THE CHINESE LEADERS ARE. IF THE AMERICANS KNEW WHO WAS IN CHARGE, THEY MIGHT TRANSACT SOME DIPLOMATIC BUSINESS, BUT THEY DON'T, SO THERE'S NOTHING TO REPORT, AND SINCE THERE IS NOTHING TO REPORT AND NO NEW SOUVENIRS TO BUY, THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE PRESS TO STAY ON."

THANK YOU, BUCKY SHORES--

"I DON'T THINK A CAMEL SADDLE IS TOO MUCH TO EXPECT--"

--FOR THAT BRILLIANT ANALYSIS OF THIS DESPERATE CRISIS WHICH HAS BLOWN UP SO UNEXPECTEDLY--

"--EVEN A SET OF MICKEY MOUSE PANTS FOR THE KIDS, THE KIND WITH THE BIG BUTTONS AND SUSPENDERS--"

--IN ANCIENT CHINA, CRADLE OF THE WORLD'S MOST ANCIENT CIVILIZATION.

"--EVEN A YAK SADDLE--"

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TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
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DECEMBER 2, 1975



NEW YORK TIMES--
"OF EISENHOWER AND THE C.I.A. PLOTS"

TO THE EDITOR:

ON THE BASIS OF MY SERVICE WITH PRESIDENT EISENHOWER FROM 1954 TO 1961 AND OUT OF RESPECT FOR HIS MEMORY, I WOULD LIKE IT KNOWN THAT THE RECENT REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE REGARDING THE SUBJECT OF ASSASSINATION ACTIVITIES, AND THE NEWS REPORTING BASED UPON IT, ARE ACCORDING TO MY KNOWLEDGE INCORRECT AND UNFOUNDED IN THE REFERENCE THEY MAKE TO HIS ACTIONS AND HIS VIEWS.

TOGETHER WITH GORDON GRAY, THEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, AND JOHN EISENHOWER, THEN MY ASSISTANT, I WAS IN A POSITION -- AS STAFF SECRETARY AND DEFENSE LIAISON OFFICER, WITH DUTIES INCLUDING STAFF ASSISTANCE ON DAY-TO-DAY SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITIES -- TO KNOW HIS THINKING IN THIS REGARD.

THERE WAS NO INSTANCE WHATSOEVER, WITHIN MY KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY OF SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION BEING PROPOSED TO HIM OR REPORTED TO HIM, IN N.S.C. MEETINGS OR OTHERWISE -- THAT IS, NEITHER EXPLICITLY NOR TACITLY WAS HIS APPROVAL EVER SOUGHT OR EVER GAINED. NOR WOULD SUCH ACTIONS HAVE BEEN IN ACCORD WITH THE EISENHOWER GOALS OF A PEACEFUL WORLD ORDER AND IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING AMONG NATIONS, TO WHICH HE WAS SO DEEPLY AND ENDURINGLY DEDICATED.

I GAVE TESTIMONY ALONG THE FOREGOING LINES BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE LAST JULY. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT GORDON GRAY AND JOHN EISENHOWER TESTIFIED TO THE SAME EFFECT.

IN THIS REGARD, I CONSIDER THAT THE BRIEF STATEMENT IN THE COMMITTEE REPORT AS CARRIED BY THE PRESS THAT "...OTHERS ATTENDING THOSE MEETINGS TESTIFIED THAT THEY DID NOT RECALL HEARING SUCH A PRESIDENTIAL ORDER" (FOR ASSASSINATION) IS SO INADEQUATE A REPRESENTATION OF THE VIEWS I GAVE, AND I BELIEVE OF THEIRS AS WELL, AS TO SERVE TO OBSCURE RATHER THAN CLARIFY THE PRESIDENT'S TRUE

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ATTITUDE IN THIS MATTER.

THERE CAN, OF COURSE, BE NO OBJECTION TO CAREFUL, NONPARTISAN INQUIRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER APPROPRIATE CONTROLS WERE ESTABLISHED AND WERE OBSERVED IN A MATER OF THIS SENSITIVITY AND IMPORTANCE.

BUT ANY ASSOCIATING OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WITH ACTIVITIES OF THIS KIND, ON THE BASIS OF AMBIGUOUS AND INFERENTIAL TESTIMONY OF THE NATURE CITED IN THE REPORT, IS IN MY OPINION NEITHER PROPER NOR JUST TO THE MEMORY OF THIS OUTSTANDING AMERICAN, A MAN DEVOTED TO OUR COUNTRYS HIGHEST VALUES AND FINEST IDEALS.

ANDREW J. GOODPASTER
GENERAL, U.S. ARMY (RET)
ALEXANDRIA, VA., NOV. 25, 1975

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DECEMBER 2, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: BOB HORMATS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO BROSELETTE ON AGRICULTURE

WHILE I CAN UNDERSTAND YOUR RELUCTANCE TO SEND THE MESSAGE ENCLOSED IN TOSCO 8, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE AN INPUT INTO THE ELYSEE ON THIS ISSUE. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IS 8 TO 1 AGAINST THE FRENCH ON THIS. THE RAMBOUILLET DECLARATION COMMITS THE LEADERS TO SEEK A SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF AGRICULTURE TRADE. IF THE UP-COMING TRADE MEETINGS CANNOT RESOLVE THIS PROCEDURAL IMPASSE ON AGRICULTURE, IT WILL CASE SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE USEFULNESS OF RAMBOUILLET, AND HURT THE PRESIDENT AT HOME. I AM FULLY AWARE THAT AGRICULTURE IS A SENSITIVE ISSUE WITH THE FRENCH, BUT WE CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT LET THEM GET AWAY WITH BLOCKING A PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT WHICH IS EMINENTLY REASONABLE AND SUPPORTED BY VIRTUALLY EVERYONE ELSE.

IF YOU STILL FEEL YOU DON'T WANT TO SEND THIS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR KISSINGER TO SEND IT TO SAVAGNARGUES OR THROUGH OTHER STATE CHANNELS (E.G. ROBINSON). HOWEVER IT IS DONE, I FEEL WE MUST GO ON RECORD.

WARM REGARDS.

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By HR 1070, Date 2/1/11

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TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
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TOSCO 041

PART ONE OF TWO

DECEMBER 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM
SUBJECT: MORNING NEWS SUMMARY

THE WASHINGTON POST

LOU CANNON REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA OPENED ON A BLUNT NOTE LAST NIGHT AS VICE-PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING WARNED THE U.S. AT THE WELCOMING BANQUET NOT TO TRUST THE SOVIET UNION. "RHETORIC ABOUT 'DETENTE' CANNOT COVER UP THE STARK REALITY OF THE GROWING DANGER OF WAR," TENG SAID DURING A TOAST TO MR. FORD. AT THE SAME TIME TENG INDICATED THAT CHINA VALUES THE RELATIONSHIP CREATED BY FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO CHINA AND REAFFIRMED BY MR. FORD. TENG SAID THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD BEEN IMPROVING EVER SINCE NIXON AND PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI SIGNED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE IN SHANGHAI ON FEB. 27, 1972, RECOGNIZING DIFFERENCES BUT LOOKING FORWARD TO "NORMALIZATION" OF RELATIONS. (A-1)

ISRAEL SAID MONDAY THAT IT WOULD BOYCOTT THE UN DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST NEXT MONTH BECAUSE THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION TO INVITE THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION TO PARTICIPATE THREATENS PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE. THE INVITATION TO THE PLO WAS LINKED TO SUNDAY NIGHT'S RESOLUTION EXTENDING THE MANDATE OF THE UN OBSERVER FORCE ON THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED GOLAN HEIGHTS. (A-1)

ACCORDING TO MARILYN BERGER, SECRETARY KISSINGER ORDERED THE AMERICAN VOTE IN FAVOR OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION THAT WILL BRING THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION INTO A UN MIDDLE EAST DEBATE DESPITE SOME ADVICE THAT A FIRMER U.S. STAND WOULD HAVE BROUGHT A RESULT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS. (A-1)

TIMOTHY S. ROBINSON SAYS FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON PERSONALLY

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ORDERED THAT SECRET FILES ON FBI WIRETAPS OF 17 NEWSMEN AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BE BROUGHT TO THE WHITE HOUSE IN 1971 FOR SAFEKEEPING, FORMER NIXON AIDE JOHN EHRLICHMAN HAS TESTIFIED. ACCORDING TO A COURT DEPOSITION BY EHRLICHMAN, NIXON ISSUED THE ORDER AFTER EHRLICHMAN REPORTED TO HIM THE FEARS OF ROBERT MARDIAN, AN ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL WHO HAD BEEN KEEPING THE FILES, THAT J. EDGAR HOOVER MIGHT ORDER FBI AGENTS TO BREAK INTO HIS JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OFFICE AND REMOVE THE FILES FOR POSSIBLE "BLACKMAIL" PURPOSES. EHRLICHMAN, ONE OF NUMEROUS HIGH LEVEL GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS AGAINST WHOM THE SUIT WAS FILED, APPEARS IN HIS SWORN DEPOSITION TO PORTRAY ANOTHER DEFENDANT -- SECRETARY KISSINGER -- AS THE MOVING FORCE BEHIND THE SELECTION OF HALPERIN AND OTHERS AS TARGETS OF THE WIRETAPS. THROUGHOUT HIS TESTIMONY, EHRLICHMAN REFERS TO THE PROJECT AS "THE KISSINGER TAPS." (A-1)

ACCORDING TO DAVID OTTAWAY, THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR IS RAPIDLY BECOMING A "MINI-VIETNAM" FOR WHITE-RULED SOUTH AFRICA, AND IT HAS ALREADY CREATED A MAJOR DILEMMA FOR ITS HERETOFORE CAREFULLY ENGINEERED POLICY OF DETENTE TOWARD BLACK AFRICA. AS VIETNAM PROVED TO BE FOR THE U.S., ANGOLA HAS ALL THE MAKINGS OF A POLITICAL AND MILITARY QUAGMIRE FROM WHICH SOUTH AFRICA MAY FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO EXTRICATE ITSELF. INDEED, IT MAY ALREADY BE TOO LATE, AND SOME POLITICAL COMMENTATORS ARE CALLING IT "A DESPERATELY DANGEROUS WAR" IN WHICH SOUTH AFRICA COULD EASILY FIND ITSELF TRAPPED ALONE. (A-1)

ACCORDING TO LOU CANNON, GEORGE BUSH WILL RETURN TO THE U.S. THIS SUNDAY. IN A BRIEF CONVERSATION AT THE PEKING AIRPORT WHERE HE WAS WAITING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL MONDAY, BUSH DECLINED TO DISCUSS EITHER HIS CONFIRMATION PROSPECTS OR HIS POLITICAL PLANS. HE SAID IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO DO THIS BEFORE SENATE HEARINGS ON HIS NOMINATION. (A-10)

AFRICAN NATIONALIST LEADER JSSHUA NKOMO AND RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER IAN SMITH YESTERDAY SIGNED A PACT PLEDGING TO RESOLVE THE TEN-YEAR DEADLOCK BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES IN THE BREAKAWAY BRITISH COLONY. (A-11)

THE LEAD EDITORIAL THIS MORNING SAYS IN PART THAT THE SIX-MONTH EXTENSION OF THE LIFE OF THE UN OBSERVER FORCE ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IS IMPORTANT CHIEFLY FOR THE COLLATERAL DEAL BY WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE FIRST TIME IN EFFECT RECOGNIZED THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. THE PLO'S PREVIOUS UN ACHIEVEMENTS HAVE ALL BEEN IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE PLO DOES NOT ACCEPT THE COUNCIL'S BASIC SETTLEMENT RESOLUTIONS (242 AND 338), WHICH IN ANY EVENT AL-



LUDE TO PALESTINIANS ONLY INDIRECTLY AS "THE REFUGEE PROBLEM." SYRIA, AS ITS PRICE FOR GRANTING EXTENSION OF THE OBSERVER FORCE, HAD DECIDED TO PASS UP ISRAEL'S OFFER OF A TOKEN, MILITARILY MEANINGLESS NEXT-STAGE DISENGAGEMENT ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND INSTEAD TO DEMAND A PLO ROLE IN COUNCIL DEBATE. SO STARTING ON JAN. 12 THERE WILL BE A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE "ON THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION." ITS VALUE WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON WHAT THE PLO AND ISRAEL CHOOSE TO MAKE OF IT. IF THE PLO COMES ROARING IN WAVING THE BANNERS OF ITS MOST UNRECONSTRUCTED ELEMENT, AND THE COUNCIL RESPONDS WITH AN EXTREMIST RESOLUTION, THEN WASHINGTON WILL HAVE TO VETO IT AND THE PLO WILL HAVE LOST A PRECIOUS OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE TOWARDS ITS LEGITIMATE GOALS. THE ONLY THING THAT WOULD THEN "HELP" THE PLO WOULD BE AN ISRAELI STANCE SO HARSH AND UNRESPONSIVE TOWARDS THOSE GOALS THAT ISRAEL WOULD LOSE SOME MEASURE OF ITS SUPPORT IN THE U.S. FAR IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI HARDLINERS NOURISH EACH OTHER. NO ONE CAN IGNORE THE IMMENSE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE IN BEGINNING TO MOVE TOWARDS MORE MODERATE POSITIONS. BUT NO ONE CAN IGNORE, EITHER, THE COMPELLING NEED FOR COMPROMISE AND CHANGE. THAT IS WHY BOTH SIDES NEED THE RESPECTFUL UNDERSTANDING, AS WELL AS THE FIRM PRODDING, OF THEIR RESPECTIVE FRIENDS. (A-14)

RICHARD HARRIS SMITH WRITES THREE YEARS AFTER HIS RESIGNATION AS DIRECTOR OF CIA, ALLEN DULLES WAS ASKED BY A FRIEND IF HE WOULD HAVE BEEN WILLING TO "TAKE THE HEAT" DURING THE U-2 AND BAY OF PIGS AFFAIRS -- TO STATE PUBLICLY, AND FALSELY, THAT HE ALONE HAD BEEN ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ERRORS OF SECRET SERVICE COMMITTED IN THOSE TIMES OF CRISIS. "I'VE ALWAYS FELT," HE REPLIED, "THAT I SHOULD ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANYTHING THE AGENCY HAS DONE. I SHOULD SHIELD AND PROTECT THE PRESIDENT IN ANY WAY I CAN." WERE HE ALIVE TODAY, DULLES MIGHT WELL STAND BEFORE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AND SOLEMNLY SWEAR THAT HE HAD NEVER DISCUSSED CIA ASSASSINATION PLOTS WITH PRESIDENTS EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY. GIVEN HIS PERSONAL ETHIC AS A PUBLIC SERVANT IN SEVEN PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS, IT IS ENTIRELY CONCEIVABLE THAT HE WOULD PROTECT THE REPUTATIONS OF THOSE CHIEF EXECUTIVES, EVEN IF IT WERE PERSONALLY EMBARRASSING, OR TO THE DETRIMENT OF HIS BELOVED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. BUT IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT DULLES WOULD HAVE HIDDEN SUCH SENSITIVE STATE SECRETS FROM THE PRESIDENT. "I AM UNDER HIS ORDERS," DULLES WOULD OFTEN SAY. "HE IS MY BOSS." DULLES MIGHT "CONSIDER ANYTHING" IF HE FELT IT WOULD PRESERVE AND PROTECT THE IMPERIAL POWER OF THE U.S. BUT HE WAS TOO POLITICALLY ASTUTE, TOO DEDICATED TO AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, TO ALLOW HIS AGENCY TO BECOME A "ROGUE ELEPHANT," HATCHING PLOTS ABROAD WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF THE NATION'S HIGHEST ELECTED



OFFICIAL. ALLEN DULLES LIKED TO REMIND HIS AIDES THAT HE AND THEY SERVED AT THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT. IF HIS CIA COMMITTED ACTS SEEN IN HINDSIGHT, AS MORALLY REPREHENSIBLE THE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE SOUGHT IN THE OVAL OFFICE. (A-15)

ACCORDING TO EVANS AND NOVAK, THE OVAL OFFICE PIPEDREAM THAT A SACKED JAMES SCHLESINGER WOULD DISAPPEAR INTO THE MISTS HAS BEEN EXPLODED BY FACT: SCHLESINGER IS PREPARED TO INFORM AND ADVISE RONALD REAGAN ON DEFENSE MATTERS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY, WHO WAS SUMMARILY FIRED BY PRESIDENT FORD, IS JOINING REAGAN'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. SCHLESINGER IS WILLING AND EAGER TO TALK OVER DEFENSE MATTERS WITH A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ("RIGHT ON DOWN TO GEORGE MCGOVERN"). BUT SEN. MCGOVERN HAS NOT ASKED HIS ADVICE. REAGAN HAS. SCHLESINGER'S WILLINGNESS TO ADVISE REAGAN SHOWS HOW BADLY HE HAS BEEN MISJUDGED BY THE WHITE HOUSE. AFTER THE NATIONAL NOTORIETY ACHIEVED BY HIS OUSTER IN THE HALLOWEEN MASSACRE, MR. FORD'S ADVISERS FIGURED SCHLESINGER WOULD SOON RETREAT FROM THE HEADLINES TO A CUSHY CORPORATE JOB PROVIDING FINANCIAL SECURITY FOR HIS LARGE FAMILY AND MUZZLING HIM PERMANENTLY. "THEY DON'T KNOW THEIR MAN," A SCHLESINGER INTIMATE TOLD EVANS AND NOVAK. "HE FEELS VERY DEEPLY ABOUT THESE MATTERS, AND, IN A GENTLEMANLY WAY, IS GOING TO GIVE FORD HELL." (A-15)

PETER OSNOS REPORTS THAT SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER BREZHNEV WAS NAMED YESTERDAY AS THE MAIN SPEAKER AT NEXT FEBRUARY'S 25TH PARTY CONGRESS, THE STRONGEST INDICATION YET THAT BREZHNEV WILL NOT STEP DOWN AT THE SESSION AS ONCE THOUGHT POSSIBLE. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THOSE JUDGMENTS WAS IN THEIR IMPACT ON U.S. ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET ACTIONS ON SUCH CRITICAL MATTERS AS THE STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, THE MIDDLE EAST AND NOW ANGOLA. IT IS STILL POSSIBLE THAT BREZHNEV WILL BE ELEVATED TO SOME CEREMONIAL POSITION IN WHICH HE WOULD BE THE NOMINAL PARTY CHIEF WHILE OTHER, HEALTHIER PEOPLE TOOK OVER THE BURDEN OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. AND IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT HE WOULD RETIRE SHORTLY AFTER THE CONGRESS. THIS VIEW IS SUPPORTED BY MANY DIPLOMATS. (A-16)

THE NEW YORK TIMES

JAMES NAUGHTON REPORTS FROM PEKING THAT PRESIDENT FORD UNDERTOOK A MISSION OF MODEST EXPECTATIONS YESTERDAY AFTER ENGAGING IN A FRANK EXCHANGE WITH CHINA'S DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, TENG HSIAO-PING, OVER WASHINGTON'S POLICY OF DETENTE WITH MOSCOW. BOTH SIDES SUGGESTED THAT NO MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS IN RELATIONS WERE LIKELY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE TALKS. (1) ACCORDING TO BERNARD GWERTZMAN, THE U.S. SAID YESTERDAY THAT



IT WOULD PARTICIPATE IN NEXT MONTH'S UNSC DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST ALONG WITH THE PLO BUT DENIED THAT THIS MEANT AN END TO THE DIPLOMATIC BOYCOTT OF THE PALESTINIAN GROUP. THE U.S. WAS FACED WITH A RIFT WITH ISRAEL OVER ITS REFUSAL YESTERDAY TO VETO A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT SEEMED TO GIVE ADDED PRESTIGE TO THE PALESTINIANS IN EXCHANGE FOR EXTENSION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. BUT WASHINGTON SOUGHT TO ASSURE THE ISRAELIS THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE POLICY TO WITHHOLD RECOGNITION UNTIL THE PALESTINIANS ACCEPTED ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE. (1)

A SPECIAL TO THE TIMES FROM TEL AVIV SAYS THAT AFTER A SPECIAL SIX-HOUR SESSION, THE ISRAEL CABINET DECIDED YESTERDAY TO BOYCOTT NEXT MONTH'S DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE UNSC AND APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED GOLAN HEIGHTS. ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE SIX-MONTH RENEWAL OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE YESTERDAY BUT DENOUNCED THE COUNCIL'S LINKING OF THE EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE WITH THE MIDDLE EAST DEBATE, TERMING IT A SURRENDER TO SYRIAN PRESSURE. (1)

HENRY GINIGER REVEALS THAT TORCUATO FERNANDEZ MIRANDA, AN EXTREME RIGHTIST WHO ONCE TUIORED KING JUAN CARLOS I IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, IS EXPECTED TO BECOME THE NEXT SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF THE REALM, THE COUNTRY'S HIGHEST CONSULTATIVE BODY. (3)

PAUL HOFMANN WRITES THAT SYRIA SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD MADE A "HISTORIC AFFIRMATION" BY RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION TO SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. SYRIA'S CHIEF DELEGATE, MOUAFFAK EL-ALLAF, ANNOUNCED THE INTRODUCTION OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION THAT WOULD CALL ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER A "TOTAL SOLUTION" TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, INCLUDING RESTORATION OF THE "INALIENABLE RIGHTS" OF THE PALESTINIANS WHEN IT MEETS ON JAN. 12 TO TAKE UP THE ISSUE. (5)

REUTERS REPORTS THAT P&IME MINISTER IAN SMITH AND THE NATIONALIST LEADER JOSHUA NKOMO SIGNED AN AGREEMENT YESTERDAY PLEDGING TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM. (8)

ACCORDING TO REUTERS, THE NEUTRALIST PRIME MINISTER OF LAOS PRINCE SOUVANNA PHOUMA, WAS REPORTED TO HAVE LEFT VIENTIANE IN SEMIRETIREMENT AS MORE RALLIES WERE HELD DEMANDING THE END OF THE COALITION CABINET IN PREPARATION FOR RULE BY THE COMMUNIST-LED PATHET LAO. PROMINENT LAOTIANS HAVE FLED TO NEIGHBORING THAILAND. (9)



ALVIN SHUSTER REPORTS FROM ROME THAT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE NINE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES STRUGGLED YESTERDAY WITH WAYS TO OVERCOME BRITISH DEMANDS FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT AT THE CONFERENCE OF INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SCHEDULED FOR NEXT MONTH. THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSIONS WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THE SO-CALLED "NORTH-SOUTH" CONFERENCE WILL GO AHEAD NEXT MONTH OR FACE A DELAY. (11)

A TIMES EDITORIAL DISCUSSES THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON UNDOF AND CONCLUDES THAT A SUBTLE SHIFT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE FOCUS OF ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS: THE ISSUE OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS' POLITICAL FUTURE HAS FINALLY BEEN THRUST INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS JUST SIGNALLED ITS INTENTION TO HEAR FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AT ITS NEXT MEETING ON THE MIDDLE EAST JANUARY 12. IF SUCH AN INVITATION WERE TO BE HERALDED AS FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE PLO AS THE "SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE," WHICH IS THE POSITION OF THE LEADING ARAB STATES, THEN THE U.S AND ISRAEL WOULD CERTAINLY BE RIGHT TO RESIST IT. AT THE SAME TIME, ISRAEL'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO BOYCOTT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DEBATE IF THE PLO PARTICIPATES IN ANY CAPACITY IS SHORT-SIGHTED AND CONTRARY TO ISRAEL'S LONGER-TERM INTERESTS IN ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR CONCILIATION. THE POLITICS OF THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT -- INCLUDING WITHIN THE PLO ITSELF -- ARE SO FRAGILE AND FRAGMENTED THAT, AT THE FIRST SIGN OF BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY, A WIDE RANGE OF INTERESTS AND SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS WOULD LIKELY COME INTO THE OPEN. ENTERING UPON EXCHANGES OF VIEWS, EVEN UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, NEED NOT IMPLY FORMAL RECOGNITION OR ANY OTHER CLAIM; SUCH TOPICS WOULD BE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISCUSSION TO BE PURSUED. TO OPEN TALKS IS NO GUARANTEE OF SUCCESS AT THE OUTCOME; BUT REFUSAL TO OPEN TALKS IS GUARANTEE OF FAILURE FROM THE START. (38)

ROBERT KLEIMAN, A MEMBER OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE TIMES COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL POWER OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND NOTES THAT INCREASINGLY, THERE IS AN AIR OF INEVITABILITY ABOUT COMMUNIST PROPOSALS FOR PARTICIPATION IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. SOME NONCOMMUNISTS APPEAR TO BE LEANING WITH THE WIND. OTHERS SPEAK IN FAVOR OF TAKING THE RISKS AS THE ONLY AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE INCOMPETENCE, FACTIONALISM, CORRUPTION AND CONFUSION VISITED UPON THE COUNTRY BY THE FAILING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS. A MORE IMPORTANT COMMENT, WHICH HAS IMPRESSED MANY ITALIANS, IS THAT "THE COMMUNISTS HERE HAVE LEARNED THE CHILEAN LESSON." "WE DECIDED," THE COMMUNIST EDITOR SAID "THAT A 51 PERCENT MAJORITY ACHIEVED BY SPLITTING THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WOULD, AS IN CHILE, SEND THE CATHOLIC MASSES INTO THE ARMS OF RE-



ACTION. THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE' SECRETARY GENERAL BERLING-
UER PROPOSED THEN WAS TO FORM A STABLE MAJORITY OF AS MUCH AS
70 PERCENT THROUGH AN ALLIANCE OF THE TWO BIG ITALIAN
PARTIES, THE COMMUNISTS AND THE WHOLE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC
PARTY." IT IS EVEN SUGGESTED THAT DEMOCRATIC COMMUNISM IN
ITALY AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES MIGHT SPLIT THE COM-
MUNIST WORLD MORE PROFOUNDLY THAN TITOISM AND UNDERMINE
AUTHORITARIANISM IN EAST EUROPE. THIS SIREN SONG, WHICH
TEMPTS ITALIANS, TROUBLES ITALY'S NATO AND COMMON MARKET
PARTNERS. THEY FIND IT HARD TO ENVISAGE COMMUNIST PARTICI-
PATION IN A MILITARY ALLIANCE DIRECTED AGAINST THE USSR OR
EVEN IN A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY THAT ASPIRES TO
ULTIMATE POLITICAL AND DEFENSE UNION. SECRETARY KISSINGER
HAS BEEN URGING THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS TO STOP SQUABBLING,
TO REVITALIZE THEIR PARTY AND TO REGAIN THE COOPERATION OF
THE SOCIALISTS AND THEIR OTHER FORMER COALITION PARTNERS.
BUT IF ITALY'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 1977 CONFIRM LAST
JUNE'S RESULTS, COMMUNIST ACCESSION TO POWER WILL BE HARD
TO HALT. (39)

GENERAL GOODPASTER'S LETTER TO THE EDITOR RE PRESIDENT
EISENHOWER AND CIA PLOTS WILL BE SENT SEPARATELY.

THE BALTIMORE SUN

NORTH VIETNAM'S PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG AND OTHER OFFICIALS
EXPECT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. "SOON" AND
SAY WASHINGTON HAS FORCED THE SPEED-UP OF REUNIFICATION OF
THE TWO VIETNAMS, AN AMERICAN JUST RETURNED FROM HANOI SAID
YESTERDAY. (2)

ACCORDING TO GILBERT LEWTHWAITE, BRITIAN YESTERDAY FOUND
ITSELF FACING SOLID OPPOSITION FROM ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS
TO ITS DEMAND FOR A SEPARATE SEAT AT THIS MONTH'S NORTH-
SOUTH DIALOGUE ON ECONOMICS AND ENERGY IN PARIS. LEADERS
OF FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY MET PRIVATELY ON THE SIDELINES
OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNIST SUMMIT MEETING IN ROME
AND AGREED TO LEAD THE CHALLENGE TO BRITAIN'S STANCE. THE
ISSUE WAS SIDESTEPED IN YESTERDAY'S OPENING SESSION, BUT
IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE EEC'S EIGHT OTHER MEMBERS WERE
ADAMANT IN THEIR REFUSAL TO ALLOW BRITAIN ITS OWN SEAT IN
THE CONFERENCE OF INDUSTRIAL, DEVELOPING AND OIL-PRODUCING
NATIONS DECEMBER 16. (A-4)

THE STATE DEPARTMENT YESTERDAY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT U.S. WEA-
PONS MIGHT BE GOING INTO ANGOLA FROM NEIGHBORING ZAIRE.
BUT A DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN INSISTED THE U.S. WAS NOT DIRECTLY
ASSISTING ANY SIDE IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR. (A-5)

A SUN EDITORIAL SAYS THE SENATE PRUDENTLY RESTRAINED THE

END OF PAGE 07



PENTAGON BY VOTING TO DELAY CONSTRUCTION OF A NAVAL BASE AT THE INDIAN OCEAN ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA UNTIL NEXT APRIL. NOW THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAS ACCEPTED THIS PROVISION, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO SEEK AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT WOULD AVOID A SUPER-POWER ARMS RACE IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN PROVOCATIVE BY ESTABLISHING NAVAL INSTALLATIONS IN SOMALIA THAT HAVE OBVIOUS STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF SHIPS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. BUT BEFORE THE U.S. RESPONDS IN KIND, WE SHOULD TRY AGAIN TO MAKE THESE WATERS AN "OCEAN OF PEACE." (A-14)

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TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
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TOSCO 42

WASHINGTON POST (12/2/75)

KISSINGER ORDERED VOTE AT U.N. DESPITE ADVICE ON U.S. STAND BY MARILYN BERGER

SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER ORDERED THE AMERICAN VOTE IN FAVOR OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION THAT WILL BRING THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION INTO A U.N. MIDDLE EAST DEBATE DESPITE SOME ADVICE THAT A FIRMER U.S. STAND WOULD HAVE BROUGHT A RESULT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS.

THE ACTION CAME SUNDAY ON A RESOLUTION EXTENDING FOR SIX MONTHS THE MANDATE OF THE U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS SYRIAN-ISRAELI BORDER.

THAT RESOLUTION ALSO CALLED FOR A DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM "INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS."

SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT YAKOV MALIK OF THE SOVIET UNION ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS THE "UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAJORITY" THAT "REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION WILL BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBATE," WHICH IS TO BEGIN JAN. 12, 1976.

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION WENT ON FROM FRIDAY TO SUNDAY.

IN THE COURSE OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, U.S. OFFICIALS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD VETO ANY MENTION OF THE PLO IN THE RESOLUTION ITSELF AND ANY MENTION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3375, WHICH CALLS FOR PLO PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, UNLIKE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, ARE NOT BINDING.

KISSINGER WAS EN ROUTE TO CHINA WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDED.

EACH TIME THE UNITED STATES TOOK A STRONG STAND, DIPLOMATIC SOURCES AT THE UNITED NATIONS SAID, SYRIA, WHICH WANTED THE



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PEACEKEEPING MANDATE EXTENDED, BACKED DOWN ON ITS OWN DEMANDS.

KISSINGER WAS TOLD THAT SOME DIPLOMATS BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD GET THE REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION TAKEN OUT OF THE RESOLUTION AND COULD FORESTALL A STATEMENT BY MALIK IF IT TOOK A STRONG POSITION.

U.S. OFFICIALS ARGUED THAT IT WAS ENOUGH TO GET REFERENCES TO THE PLO TAKEN OUT OF THE RESOLUTION. FOR THESE OFFICIALS, THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GET THE MANDATE OF THE U.N. OBSERVER FORCE EXTENDED.

THE U.S. VOTE SUNDAY WAS SEEN AS A LOGICAL FOLLOW-UP TO A CALL BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR "A DIPLOMATIC PROCESS WHICH WILL HELP BRING FORTH A REASONABLE DEFINITION OF PALESTINIAN INTERESTS." HAROLD SAUNDERS, WHO WAS THEN DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS MADE THAT STATEMENT NOV. 12. SAUNDERS WAS SWORN IN YESTERDAY AS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH.

ISRAEL CONSIDERS THE U.S. VOTE A VIOLATION OF UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AS PART OF THE SINAI AGREEMENT INITIATED SEP. 1. ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO BECAUSE THAT ORGANIZATION DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL.

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CLASSIFICATION

IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

FOR COMM CENTER USE ONLY

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 4311

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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**DELIVER UPON OPENING OF
BUSINESS**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6700
Add-on #2

ACTION
December 1, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH: WILLIAM G. HYLAND
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY
CLINTON E. GRANGER
SUBJECT: Matter of Offer on Peace Hawk V Project
for Saudi Arabia



On November 5 we sent you a memo recommending notification to Congress on the PEACE HAWK V project for Saudi Arabia, a project involving training and the construction of logistical facilities for previously-furnished aircraft, valued at an estimated \$2.015 billion. You suggested holding up the LOA pending the outcome of our efforts to kill or vitiate the Case Amendment, which would have effectively ended our FMS program with Saudi Arabia. The Case Amendment was watered down in Conference to the point where it has no practical effect on our ability to do business with Saudi Arabia and no longer refers at all to FMS.

The favorable outcome on the Case Amendment argues for sending the LOA on PEACE HAWK V to Congress right away. State and Dod are both urging that this be done. If we wait even a week, we will be in a position of either having to wait until mid-January or leaving ourselves open to allegations of trying to slip a major FMS project past Congress during the recess which will most likely begin on December 19. Further delay with the LOA will lead to a delay in carrying out the project, which is due to begin in February.

Another argument for going ahead is the growing Saudi doubt as to the desire or the ability of the Administration to maintain a policy of close US-Saudi relations in the face of increasing Congressional and public criticism. This would be a good time to indicate our resolve by moving to make good on past commitments, even when it involves Congressional approval. On the other hand, these Saudi doubts and the undisputably greater Congressional criticism of Saudi Arabia make it incumbent upon us to take all feasible actions to ensure that the LOA is not disapproved when it is sent up for approval.

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Declassified
December 31, 1981

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652
EXEMPT FROM GDS
DATE 10/13/81 BY SP/1111

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This particular project does not involve lethal weapons, although the amount of money involved will invite debate on the Saudi visa and Arab boycott issues. We believe that this can be managed, given the far-reaching package of steps recently taken by the President and Secretary of Commerce Morton, although there will have to be close attention paid to key members of Congress as the LOA issue develops. It is the judgment of the NSC staff that we should move now, since Congressional attitudes are unlikely to become more favorable by next January in the midst of the debate on the Security Assistance Bill and the Middle East package. You may wish to check this with Secretary Kissinger before giving a final go-ahead, although State has given its okay.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we concur in notification to Congress of the PEACE HAWK V case.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Les Janka concurs. *LJ*



~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH52362

TOSCO 044

FROM: U. ALEXIS JOHNSON
US MISSION GENEVA (SALT) 060

TO: THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

REF: MY OCTOBER 21, 1975, MESSAGE ON EFFECTIVE DATE
OF 2,400 AGGREGATE

1. RE REFTTEL, YOU WILL NOTE THAT IN OUR NOVEMBER 5 PRIVATE MEETING (SALT II-839), SEMENOV AGAIN RAISED WITH ME THE QUESTION OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 2,400 AGGREGATE (ARTICLE XII). IN THE ABSENCE OF A REPLY TO REFTTEL, I REFRAINED FROM GOING BEYOND "THE FEW MONTHS" FORMULA, AS WELL AS THE ISSUE OF PUTTING DELIVERY VEHICLES IN CONDITION PRECLUDING THEIR OPERATIONAL USE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER OCTOBER 3, 1977.

2. IN VIEW OF THE PRESS OF OTHER MATTERS, I DID NOT RAISE THIS WITH YOU WHEN I WAS BACK IN WASHINGTON, BUT I BELIEVE THAT IF WASHINGTON APPROVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GET THIS MATTER OUT ON THE TABLE HERE PRIOR TO DECEMBER 18. I ALSO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GET A REFORMULATION OF ARTICLE XVIII ON WHICH THE BACKSTOPPING COMMITTEE IS WORKING OUT ON THE TABLE PRIOR TO DECEMBER 18; THEREFORE I HOPE THAT YOUR STAFF MIGHT GIVE SID GRAYBEAL A LITTLE HAND TO THIS END.

JOHNSON
0236
7016



~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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1980 Manual, GPO 33, Class. Excl. Guidelines
HR 10774 Date 2/1/11

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TOSCO 045

UPI-061

(SALT AGREEMENTS)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- ADM. ELMO ZUMWALT, FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, SAID TUESDAY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE TRIED TO MAINTAIN MILITARY EQUALITY WITH THE SOVIET UNION RATHER THAN SIGNING THE 1972 SALT AGREEMENT.

"THE COUNTRY IS WORSE OFF THAN HAD WE CONTINUED TO WORK TOWARDS PARITY," ZUMWALT TOLD THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

ZUMWALT ALSO ALLEGED THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN GUILTY OF "MASSIVE VIOLATIONS" OF THE SALT I AGREEMENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER HAD WITHHELD VITAL INFORMATION FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE DEFENSE SECRETARIES AND CONGRESS.

"IN MY JUDGMENT THERE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS OF THE SALT I AGREEMENT BY THE SOVIETS IN THEIR INTERFERENCE OF OUR NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION WHICH HAD PRODUCED A SERIOUS REDUCTION IN OUR ABILITY TO CHECK AGAINST SOVIET CHEATING," ZUMWALT SAID IN AN OPENING STATEMENT.

"THIS INTERFERENCE MAKES IT EASIER FOR THE SOVIETS TO CLAIM THEY ARE NOT CHEATING, HARDER FOR THE U.S. TO PROVE THEY ARE, AND IS IN AND OF ITSELF THE MOST POSITIVE INDICATOR AMONG MANY POSITIVE INDICATORS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE VIOLATING THE SALT I AGREEMENT."

ZUMWALT EXPANDED HIS CHARGE TO "MASSIVE VIOLATIONS" UNDER QUESTIONING.

HE SAID THERE WAS AT LEAST ONE SECRET AGREEMENT THAT KISSINGER DID NOT TELL ANYONE ABOUT AND WHICH DID NOT SURFACE UNTIL ELEVEN MONTHS LATER. IT INVOLVED A JUNE 1973 DEFINITION OF A MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE "DESIGNED TO PATCH UP SOME OF THE HASTY NEGOTIATED AND INEPTLY WORDED LANGUAGE IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT," ZUMWALT SAID.

"ON CHECKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT NO ONE KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE AGREEMENT. FINALLY,

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S FILE PRODUCED THE SECRET AGREEMENT
SIGNED 11 MONTHS EARLIER ... A SECRET COVENANT SO SECRETLY ARRIVED
AT THAT NOT EVEN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE KNEW ABOUT IT OR THE
CONGRESS."

UPI 12-02 12:42 PES

0377

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IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMM CENTER USE ONLY

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 50 //

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

DEX _____

(DAC) 036

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PAGES 2

TTY _____

CITE _____

INFO:

DTG: 022148Z

75 DEC 2 PM 5 09

SITUATION ROOM

RELEASED BY

[Signature]

TOR: 022158Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

OPENING OF BUSINESS

TOSCO _____

1975 DEC 2 21 45



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2 DEC 1975

Memo For WHITE HOUSE SITUATION
ROOM

Please pass the attached
message to General Scowcroft
with the Presidential party.

Chas J. Brooks
Colonel, USAF
Military Assistant



FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM GENERAL JONES.

I REGRET INFORMING YOU THAT GENERAL JOHN C. MEYER
DIED OF A HEART ATTACK THIS MORNING (2 DEC) IN
CALIFORNIA. SINCE THEY WERE CLOSE FRIENDS, YOU MAY
WISH TO INFORM THE PRESIDENT. FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS
ARE NOT YET COMPLETE BUT WE WILL ADVISE YOU WHEN THEY
ARE KNOWN. MRS MEYER'S ADDRESS IS: MARINA CITY CLUB
APT 420; 4314 MARINA CITY DR; MARINA DEL REY CALIF.



Approved by G/S

DEC 2 '73

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

WHA041
OO WTE12
DE WTE 7027 3362203
O 022209Z DEC 75
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 051//
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
WH52367

TOSCO 051

DECEMBER 2, 1975

EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM G. HYLAND

SUBJECT: HAK MOSCOW TRIP

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN CALLED WITH THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR HAK. HE HAS CHECKED WITH MOSCOW ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HAK'S TRIP, AND THEY WANT TO PUBLISH AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON DECEMBER 9, 1100 WASHINGTON TIME.

TEXT WILL BE: QUOTE AS AGREED, THE UNITED STATE SECRETARY OF STATE, HENRY A. KISSINGER, WILL VISIT THE SOVIET UNION ON DECEMBER 18-19 TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. UNQUOTE.

DOBRYNIN SAID THAT HAK HAD ASKED ABOUT THIS BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. I ASSUME YOU WILL PASS TO HAK. UNLESS I HEAR OTHERWISE, I WILL ASSUME THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 10450 (repealed) SEC 03
NSA Memo, OASD/C, Dist Dept, Guidelines
By HR Date 2/1/11

NNNN

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY



~~FOR~~ / 02/2300Z
21

WHA042

OO WTE 12

DE WTE 7028 336225Z

O 022259Z DEC 75

FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 052//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

ZEM

UNCLAS WH52368

TOSCO 052

STATE 283645

TAGS:PFOR, MASS, BR, US

SUBJECT:FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BILL FOR FY 76.

1. HOUSE COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, IN MARKING UP FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BILL FOR FY 76 DELETED MORNING OF DECEMBER 2 BY VOTE OF 11-10 GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF \$1.1 FOR BRAZIL. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED FOR VOTE AGAINST GRANT TRAINING WERE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN BRAZIL AND BRAZIL'S VOTE IN UN ON ZIONISM. SESSION WAS PUBLIC.

2. SENATE VERSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BILL DOES NOT CONTAIN DELETION. PREDICTIONS ARE THAT HOUSE WILL SUPPORT ITS COMMITTEE DECISION, WITH MATTER GOING TO CONFERENCE COMMITTEE FOR RESOLUTION. INGERSOLL

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NSA review completed

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~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

EYES ONLY

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WHA045
OO WIE12
DE WIE 7031 3362143
O 030345Z DEC 75
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 53//
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~
WH52371

TOSCO 53

DECEMBER 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: INFORMATION. ITEMS

KUWAIT TAKING OVER OPERATION OF BP, GULF OIL: THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT SIGNED AN AGREEMENT ON MONDAY TO TAKE OVER GULF AND BRITISH PETROLEUM. THE GOVERNMENT GOT 100 PERCENT OWNERSHIP OF COMPANY PROPERTIES, RETROACTIVE TO MARCH 5, THE DATE ITS INTENTION TO NATIONALIZE WAS FIRST ANNOUNCED. TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT INCLUDE:

- PAYMENT BY KUWAIT OF \$64.4 MILLION AS COMPENSATION FOR PHYSICAL ASSETS;
- AGREEMENT BY THE COMPANIES TO LIFT A TOTAL OF 950,000 BARRELS PER DAY FROM KUWAIT DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, ROUGHLY HALF OF EXPECTED KUWAITI OUTPUT;
- A DISCOUNT TO THE COMPANIES OF 15 CENTS PER BARREL UNDER WHAT OTHER BUYERS PAY;
- A 60 DAY CREDIT ON PAYMENTS; AND
- ELIMINATION OF ALL EXISTING CLAIMS BY BOTH PARTIES.

OTHER DETAILS, SUCH AS THE COST OF OIL BEYOND 950,000 BARRELS PER DAY AND COMPANY SERVICE CONTRACTS, PROBABLY WILL BE WORKED OUT AFTER THE KUWAITI PARLIAMENT RATIFIES THE AGREEMENT ABOUT A MONTH FROM NOW.

DECLASSIFIED w/permissions exempted

AUTHORITY RAC n/c Code word-46-2-H-5
BY n/c/stg/mb/nd
NARA, DATE 5/3/10 9/21/15



Presidential Library

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL

THE WASHINGTON STAR

DAN KURZMAN REPORTS THAT OFFICIALS IN JERUSALEM PRIVATELY CHARGE THAT THE U.S. HAS "DOUBLECROSSED" ISRAEL BY AGREEING TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT OPENS THE WAY FOR DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST WITH PARTICIPATION OF THE PLO. AMERICAN CREDIBILITY IN ISRAEL, SOME OFFICIALS SAY, IS SO LOW NOW THAT FURTHER EFFECTIVE U.S. MEDIATION FOR PEACE MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE. MEANWHILE, ISRAELI JETS ATTACKED PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON WITH BOMBS AND ROCKETS, REPORTEDLY KILLING AT LEAST 75. (A-1)

HENRY BRADSHAW WRITES ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MAO THAT THERE WERE NO SPECIFICS, BUT DETENTE WAS THE THEME. CHINA-WATCHERS DESCRIBE THE CHINESE STATEMENT OF "EARNEST AND SIGNIFICANT DISCUSSIONS" AS INDICATING A CORDIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FORD VISIT. (A-1)

HARRY ASHMORE, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PACEM IN TERRIS IV CONVOCATION, WAS INTERVIEWED BY JEREMIAH O'LEARY. HE SAID THAT "THERE'S GOT TO BE A GREAT DEAL MORE OPENNESS IN DEALING WITH FOREIGN POLICY. I THINK WE'VE GOT TO STRIP A LOT OF RESTRICTIONS OFF OF INFORMATION IN THIS AREA -- IT ALL GETS LEAKED OUT ANYWAY." WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT HENRY KISSINGER WAS TOO MUCH POWER AS SECRETARY OF STATE, HE REPLIED THAT THE COMBINATION OF OFFICES THAT THE SECRETARY HELD UNTIL THEY WERE SPLIT APART WAS A VERY BAD CONCENTRATION OF POWER. CONCERNING DETENTE, HE FEELS OBVIOUSLY THERE IS A SHIFTING AMERICAN OPINION, A COOLING TOWARD DETENTE. CONCERNING OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA AND DETENTE, HE SAYS, TO BUILD A WHOLE FOREIGN POLICY AROUND SUCH A PRECARIOUS PROCEDURE SEEMS TO BE HAZARDOUS INDEED. FOR EXAMPLE, NOBODY SEEMS TO KNOW WHETHER THIS POLICY WILL SURVIVE THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD IN CHINA, WHICH IS IMMINENT. IF WE PLAY THE CARDS WRONG WE MIGHT CREATE A SHIFT OF OPINION IN THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WOULD BE VERY ADVERSE TO US. (A-1)

ACCORDING TO AN AP RELEASE, THE SECRETARY, IRKED BY CUBAN "MEDDLING" IN ANGOLA AND PUERTO RICO, HAS VETOED A PLAN TO IMPROVE U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS THROUGH SPORTS DIPLOMACY. (A-5)

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORTS THAT THE NUMBER OF U.S. FIRMS CITED BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR FAILING TO REPORT ARAB REQUESTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A BOYCOTT AGAINST ISRAEL HAS RISEN TO 218, ACCORDING TO COMMERCE SECRETARY MORTON. (A-6)



END OF PAGE 02

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~CONTAINS~~

ACCORDING TO HENRY BRADSHER, THE OPENING OF PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA HAS BEEN NOTABLE AS MUCH FOR WHAT WAS NOT SAID AND FOR WHO DID NOT APPEAR, AS FOR THE FIRST DAY'S SPEECHES AND THE TURNOUT OF CHINA'S SENIOR GOVERNMENT FIGURE. ON BOTH COUNTS, THE PRESIDENT'S HOSTS APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO EMPHASIZE A DESIRE FOR CONTINUED FRIENDLY RELATIONS, RATHER THAN ANY INTENTION OF SCORING POINTS BY RAISING THE VERY REAL ISSUES WHICH CONTINUE TO EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. BRADSHER NOTES THAT DEPUTY PREMIER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO WAS MISSING FROM THE ARRIVAL CEREMONY. HIS ABSENCE SEEMED SIGNIFICANT. THE RADICAL LEFTISTS HAVE BEEN CRITICIZING TIES WITH THE U.S. WHICH THEY CONSIDER TOO CLOSE. (A-8)

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032845

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE TOSCO 54

CREATION DATE 1975

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000004

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER 1

FOLDER TITLE November-December 1975 - People's
Republic of China - TOSCO (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

OR

1802L 03 Dec 75

HA047
O WTE12
E WTE 7032 3362235.
O30946Z DEC 75
M THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 55//
O GENERAL SCOWCROFT
EM

CONTAINS CODEWORD

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ CONTAINS CODEWORD EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
H52372

OSCO 55

DECEMBER 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS


WANT TO CUT ARMS BUDGET EVEN FURTHER: OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON BELIEVES THAT FURTHER CUTS IN BRITISH DEFENSE SPENDING ARE IN THE OFFING. BRITISH NEWSMEN REPORT THAT AN ADDITIONAL 1.2 TO \$1.6 BILLION MAY BE SLASHED FROM THE NEW TEN-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM. DEFENSE MINISTRY SOURCES SAY THESE FIGURES ARE PURELY SPECULATIVE BUT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE WILL PROBABLY BE SOME CUTS. THE DETAILS OF WHERE THE AX WILL FALL ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL THE ANNUAL DEFENSE WHITE PAPER IS PUBLISHED NEXT FEBRUARY. THE UK'S NEW DEFENSE PROGRAM ADOPTED EARLIER THIS YEAR ALREADY CALLS FOR PHASED REDUCTIONS AMOUNTING TO SOME \$10.3 BILLION OVER THE DECADE. ADDITIONAL CUTS WOULD MOST LIKELY COME OUT OF THE WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT SECTOR OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET, [REDACTED] TO ACHIEVE SAVINGS AUTHORIZED EARLIER THIS YEAR, BRITISH CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE BEING REDUCED TO THE POINT THAT THEY WILL HAVE TROUBLE FULFILLING THEIR MINIMUM NATO RESPONSIBILITIES.

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

AUTHORITY 24C DLF CODEWORD-46-2-5-4
BY NSC/State/Brinkley 5/24/06
DATE 5/3/10

25X1

PHILIPPINE CONSTRUCTION IN SPRATLY ISLANDS: CONSTRUCTION OF A PHILIPPINE AIRFIELD ON THITU ISLAND IN THE NORTHERN SPRATLY ISLANDS WILL BE UNDER WAY.



OF PAGE 01
Residential Library Review of NSC/DOC Equities is Required
GA Review completed.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

[REDACTED] ACCORDING TO DIA, MANILA IS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT ITS LIMITED ABILITY TO DEFEND ITS INTERESTS IN THE SPRATLYS. FEARS OF A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE VIETNAMESE LED TO A WITHDRAWAL FROM NORTHEAST CAY -- THE NORTHERNMOST ISLAND -- FOLLOWING THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF NEARBY SOUTHEAST CAY EARLIER THIS YEAR. PRESIDENT MARCOS ORDERED NORTHEAST CAY REOCCUPIED IN SEPTEMBER AND STATED THAT A RUNWAY WOULD BE BUILT ON A NEARBY ISLAND TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE. AN AIRFIELD WAS PLANNED FOR THITU THREE YEARS AGO, BUT CONSTRUCTION WAS DELAYED BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES IN BEACHING HEAVY EQUIPMENT. THE PHILIPPINES CURRENTLY OCCUPIES FIVE OF THE SPRATLYS WITH A MILITARY FORCE OF 150 TO 200 MARINES. MARCOS' DECISION TO INCREASE THE ARMED PRESENCE IN SUPPORT OF MANILA'S CLAIMS IS DUE TO A POTENTIAL LARGE OIL RESERVE IN THE AREA.

SCHEDULE FOR BULGARIAN AIRLIFT TO WEST AFRICA: BALKAN BULGARIAN AIRLINES IS SCHEDULED TO OPERATE FIVE CHARTER IL-18 TRANSPORTS FROM SOFIA PROBABLY TO BRAZZAVILLE, CONGO THIS WEEK. THE CARGO, HANDLED THROUGH THE BULGARIAN RED CROSS AND REPORTED TO BE 65 TONS OF MEDICINES, FOOD, TEXTILES, AND OTHER MATERIALS, IS PROBABLY DESTINED FOR USE BY THE MPLA. THE AIRLIFT WOULD BE THE FIRST BY A WARSAW PACT COUNTRY, OTHER THAN THE USSR, IN SUPPORT OF THE MPLA.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

HOLD TILL A.M. PER
MR. RODMAN + SIT ROOM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

WHA049
*****ZZ WTE12
DE WTE 7036 3371457
Z 031437Z DEC 75
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 56//
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ZEM
~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WH52373

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 2.3
1980 Manual, OADR, 50 USC 3025
HR 1030, Date 2/1/11

TOSCO 56

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

DECEMBER 3, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: WILLIAM G. HYLAND

1. SONNENFELDT AND I SEE NO PROBLEM IN DELAYING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HAK VISIT. MY GUESS IS THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED IT ANNOUNCED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HAK'S RETURN, TO OFFSET THE CHINA TRIP. SINCE PROBABILITY OF HAK TRIP IS WIDELY SPECULATED ABOUT HERE, ANNOUNCEMENT ON 9TH WOULD BE NO SURPRISE. ON THE OTHER HAND, ANNOUNCING ON 12TH GIVES HAK TIME TO INFORM NATO ALLIES PERSONALLY. DELAY ALSO GIVES A LITTLE MORE TIME TO PREPARE PRESS, PARTICULARLY SINCE PRESS WILL LINK DEFINITE ANNOUNCEMENT WITH SPECULATION OF BREAKTHROUGH THAT MADE TRIP POSSIBLE. ALSO BETTER TO ANNOUNCE AFTER MEETING WITH RUMSFELD AND BROWN, SO I WOULD BE FOR SLIGHT DELAY. DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CARE.

2. DELAYING THE TRIP ITSELF IS MORE SERIOUS. SONNENFELDT AND I COME DOWN ON THE SIDE OF PROCEEDING AS PLANNED. ARGUMENT FOR DELAY IS THAT IT PERMITS MORE ORDERLY DECISION PROCESS. SINCE HAK WILL BE TRAVELLING, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT CIEC LOOKS LIKE IT WILL OCCUR, HE WILL HAVE NO OPPORTUNITY TO BE IN WASHINGTON PRIOR TO TRIP. THIS RISKS SOME CONFUSION, AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CONTROL OVER ISSUES. ON THE OTHER HAND, NONE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT FROM POSTPONEMENT. SOME MOMENTUM HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN VP MEETINGS, AND MAIN ISSUE IS STILL WHETHER DEFENSE WILL COME OFF COUNTING BACKFIRE, WHICH CAN BE DISCUSSED WITH BROWN AND RUMSFLED. ALSO SOVIETS MAY NOT BE VERY ACCOMMODATING TO SHIFTING OF DATES. PRESIDENT'S LETTER SUGGESTED DECEMBER 13-14 OR DECEMBER 18-19, AND BREZHNEV ANSWERED THAT 18-19 WOULD BE " MOST CONVENIENT TIME". BOTH SONNENFELDT AND I BELIEVE THAT THIS TRIP SHOULD NOT BE BILLED AS DECISIVE IN ANY CASE, AND THAT YOU SHOULD ALLOW FOR A POSSIBLE SECOND TRIP IN JANUARY AND PREPARE PRESS. UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO GO QUITE FAR IN DECEMBER, DOUBTFUL THAT BREZHNEV WILL BREAK ALL DEADLOCKS ON



~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

HOLD TILL A.M. PER
MR. RODMAN + SIT ROOM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

THE SPOT. HAVING SECOND TRIP AS POSSIBILITY WOULD BE A SAFETY VALVE IN ANY CASE -- THOUGH IT ALSO BUILDS EXPECTATION OF FINAL AND COMPLETE SETTLEMENT. FINALLY, I DOUBT THAT CHRISTMAS PERIOD, WITH BOTH HAK AND PRESIDENT OUT OF TOWN, WILL NECESSARILY BE ALL THAT USEFUL IN PREPARING FOR AN EARLY JANUARY MEETING. SO, WE CONCLUDE THAT HAK SHOULD GO, SHOULD TAKE POSITION IN WASHINGTON THAT PURPOSE IS TO PUT OUR CASE TO BREZHNEV PERSONALLY, WITH A POSSIBLE SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IF RESULTS ARE PROMISING.

3. VERIFICATION: I WILL BEGIN PUTTING TOGETHER MATERIAL HAK REQUESTED. ZUMWALT TESTIMONY WAS A DUD (PAGE 19 OF NY TIMES): HE HAD SAID IT BEFORE, AND SECOND HE GOT SOME HOSTILE QUESTIONING (FROM TREEN AND ASPIN), AND HANDLED HIMSELF VERY POORLY. MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT WERE OBVIOUS EVEN TO FRIENDLY CONGRESSMEN. IF YOU AGREE, I WILL TALK TO MURRAY MARDER AND BOB KLEIMAN AND POINT OUT ABSURDITIES IN WHOLE SALT VERIFICATION DEBATE.

4. LET ME KNOW IIF I AM TO CALL DOBRYNIN WITH PROPOSAL FOR ANNOUNCEMENT ON DECEMBER 12.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032846

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE TOSCO 57

CREATION DATE 12/03/1975

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000004

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER 1

FOLDER TITLE November-December 1975 - People's
Republic of China - TOSCO (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

25

WHA05900 WTE12
DE WIE 7049 3371621
O 031812Z DEC 75
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 058//
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ZEM
UNCLAS DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH52383

24

TOSCO 058

DECEMBER 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM
SUBJECT: MORNING NEWS SUMMARY

THE WASHINGTON POST

LOU CANNON WRITES THAT PRESIDENT FORD AND CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG MET FOR AN HOUR AND 50 MINUTES YESTERDAY IN TALKS DESCRIBED BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AS "EARNEST AND SIGNIFICANT DISCUSSIONS...ON WIDE-RANGING ISSUES IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE." WHILE WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS AGREED PUBLICLY WITH THIS DESCRIPTION OF THE SESSION, THEY SAID PRIVATELY THAT NEITHER THE FORD-MAO MEETING NOR AN EARLIER TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING PRODUCED ANYTHING UNEXPECTED. (A-1)

MARILYN BERGER REPORTS THAT U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UN DANIEL MOYNIHAN SAID YESTERDAY THAT RECENT SOVIET ACTIONS INDICATE MOSCOW INTENDS "TO COLONIZE AFRICA." AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER HIS SPEECH, MOYNIHAN CALLED HIS REMARKS SOMEWHAT HYPERBOLIC, BUT SAID THAT THE ERA OF COLONIALIZATION IN AFRICA BEGAN THROUGH A PROCESS SIMILAR TO PRESENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES. (A-1)

MURREY MARDER REPORTS THAT HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN OTIS PIKE SAID YESTERDAY THAT HIS COMMITTEE HAS OBTAINED "SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE" THAT RESOLVES TWO CONTEMPT CITATIONS AIMED AT SECRETARY KISSINGER, BUT THAT HE WILL PURSUE A THIRD CHARGE. KISSINGER WAS THE TARGET OF A BROADSIDE OF ADDITIONAL ACCUSATIONS YESTERDAY FROM THE COMMITTEE'S WITNESS, ELMO ZUMWALT. (A-1)

PETER OSNOS REPORTS THAT SOVIET ECONOMIC EXPANSION WAS SUBSTANTIALLY SLOWED BY THIS YEAR'S DISASTROUS GRAIN HARVEST, AND THE EFFECTS WILL BE FELT INTO NEXT YEAR -- WHICH WILL PROBABLY SEE THE LOWEST GROWTH RATES SINCE WORLD WAR II.



END OF PAGE 01

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(A-1)

VARIOUS NEWS DISPATCHES REPORT THAT ISRAELI JETS, DODGING HEAT-SEEKING MISSILES, ATTACKED PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS AND GUERRILLA BASES TUESDAY IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN LEBANON. THERE WERE CONFLICTING CASUALTY REPORTS. LEBANESE POLICE SAID THE RAIDS LEFT 91 DEAD AND 150 WOUNDED BUT THE GUERRILLAS LISTED 59 KILLED AND 140 WOUNDED. (A-1)

GEORGE C. WILSON WRITES THAT THE PENTAGON WILL HAVE TO CLOSE DOWN SOME BASES AND CUT ITS CIVILIAN WORK FORCE TO FIT UNDER THE BUDGET CEILING NOW "CONTEMPLATED" FOR THE NEW FISCAL YEAR, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM CLEMENTS JR. SAID IN AN INTERVIEW YESTERDAY. (A-3)

SARI GILBERT REPORTS THAT, YIELDING TO THE EIGHT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, BRITAIN YESTERDAY DROPPED ITS DEMAND FOR A SEPARATE SEAT AT THE FORTHCOMING NORTH-SOUTH ENERGY CONFERENCE, THUS ENDING A DEADLOCK WHICH HAD THREATENED TO DELAY THE MEETING. (A-10)

BERNARD D. NOSSITER WRITES THAT PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO IS TRYING TO DECIDE WHETHER TO KEEP COMMUNISTS IN HIS GOVERNMENT OR EXPEL THEM IN THE WAKE OF LAST WEEK'S ABORTIVE LEFTIST MILITARY UPRISING. ACCORDING TO THOSE FAMILIAR WITH HIS THINKING, AZEVEDO LEANS TOWARD THROWING THE COMMUNISTS OUT, HOLDING THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PARATROOPS' COUP THAT FAILED. BUT THE EXPECTATION IS THAT HE WILL YIELD TO MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVISERS WHO ARE ARGUING THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE SAFER INSIDE GOVERNMENT THAN OUT OF IT. (A-12)

DAVID B. OTTAWAY WRITES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS LOSING OUT TO CHINA IN THE INTRA-COMMUNIST RIVALRY FOR INFLUENCE IN RECENTLY INDEPENDENT MOZAMBIQUE. THIS STANDS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO ANGOLA, WHERE THE SOVIET UNION MAY GAIN CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE AND A Foothold BECAUSE OF ITS MASSIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE LEFTIST MPLA. (A-13)

AN EDITORIAL STATES THAT THE SECOND VISIT BY AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT TO CHINA IS NEITHER SO MOMENTOUS AS RICHARD NIXON'S TRIP OF 1972, NOR SO THEATRICAL. THE BIG CHANGE IN U.S. CHINA POLICY, ENDING OUR LARGELY SELF-INFLICTED ISOLATION FROM PEKING AND OPENING AN IMPLICIT PARTNERSHIP OF CONTAINMENT OF MOSCOW, WAS ENGINEERED BY MR. NIXON. MR. FORD, WITH A PURPOSE MORE THAN JUSTIFYING A TRIP OF HIS OWN, IS CONTINUING THAT POLICY. THE CHIEF INTEREST OF HIS TRIP, NONE-THELESS, WILL LIE IN WHAT MR. FORD CAN DO TO CONVINCHE HIS HOSTS THAT THE U.S. REMAINS A RELIABLE COLLABORATOR FOR THE LONG HAUL. GIVEN THE REAGAN PRESSURE, IT IS PROBABLY TOO MUCH TO EXPECT MORE THAN, AT MOST, SOME NEW NUANCES ON THE



TAIWAN QUESTION. ONE HOPES THE CHINESE HAVE LEARNED HOW AMERICAN POLITICS RESTRICTS MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. IT NEEDS TO BE TACKLED FIRST BY MORE DEBATE AT HOME. BUT THERE IS A RANGE OF STEPS, MOSTLY AFFECTING TRADE, WHICH MR. FORD COULD TAKE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. REALIZES THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF DEEPENING ITS STILL TENUOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. (A-14)

JOSEPH KRAFT WRITES THAT BEHIND THE UNEASY TONE OF PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT LIES AN INSTRUCTIVE PARADOX. THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE REGISTERED FAIR PROGRESS TOWARD THE GOAL OF NORMALIZING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS SET BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OF 1972. ONLY NORMALIZATION WITH PEKING TURNS OUT TO BE MORE OF A HEADACHE THAN A TEA PARTY, AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TURN OUT TO BE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, NOT JACK LEMMON AND CARY GRANT. THE HIGH HOPES WHICH HAVE BEEN DASHED, IN OTHER WORDS, RESTED ON AN ILLUSION -- AN ILLUSION FOSTERED IN A UNIQUE, GOLDEN MOMENT. THE GOLDEN MOMENT WAS THE ASCENDANCY OF PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI BETWEEN 1971 AND 1974. HE HAD THE BACKING OF CHAIRMAN MAO, AND THE TURBULENCE OF THE PAST YEARS HAD FLATTENED ALL OTHER POWER CENTERS. THE POINT OF ALL THIS IS NOT TO CONDEMN PEKING. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE ONLY DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY. THE PRESENT RELATION WITH WASHINGTON IS NORMAL, AND IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR THE U.S. -- BECAUSE CERTAIN ILLUSIONS HAD BEEN SHATTERED -- TO LOSE PATIENCE AND PUT DOWN THE CHINESE IN A WAY THAT MADE PEKING LOOK MORE KINDLY ON MOSCOW. (A-15)

EVANS AND NOVAK WRITE THAT THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE'S VEILED CHARGE THAT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER PERSONALLY AUTHORIZED THE ASSASSINATION OF THE CONGO'S PATRICE LUMUMBA IN 1960 HAS TRIGGERED A BACKLASH AGAINST THE COMMITTEE, RAISING THE FIRST SERIOUS DOUBT AMONG OUTSIDERS OF ITS OBJECTIVITY. ODDLY, THE BACKLASH DOES NOT COME FROM THE COMMITTEE'S REPUBLICAN MINORITY. RATHER, EISENHOWER'S HIGHEST WHITE HOUSE AIDES BELIEVE HE WAS UNIQUELY SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL BLAME ON THE BASIS OF ONE MIDDLE-RANK WITNESS WHOSE TESTIMONY WAS TOTALLY AND FLATLY REPUDIATED BY HIS SUPERIORS. WHETHER PRIVATE RECRIMINATIONS FROM EISENHOWER LOYALISTS TO THE DEMOCRATIC-CONTROLLED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE WILL CHANGE THE WORDING OF THE POISONOUS "INTERIM" REPORT WHEN THE COMMITTEE ADOPTS A FINAL REPORT NEXT YEAR IS NOT KNOWN. THE BITTER PROTEST COULD LEAD TO EMOTIONAL DEMANDS FROM REPUBLICANS FOR EVEN-HANDED TREATMENT FOR ALL PRESIDENTS; OR, REPELLED BY THE NOXIOUS ASSASSINATION PUBLICITY ALREADY DAMAGING THIS NATION'S REPUTATION, THE REPUBLICANS COULD DECIDE TO LET THE MATTER DIE. (A-15)

THE BALTIMORE SUN

END OF PAGE 03



ERNEST B. FURGURSON COVERS THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MAO. (A-1)

HAL PIPER WRITES THAT THE 1976 SOVIET GROWTH RATE WILL BE THE LOWEST SINCE 1945. NIKOLAI BAIBAKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMITTEE, SAID INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION WOULD INCREASE IN 1976 BY 4.3 PER CENT; THIS IS LOWER THAN ANY PLAN DRAFTED SINCE WORLD WAR II. BAIBAKOV BLAMED A SHORT-AGE OF AGRICULTURAL RAW MATERIALS CAUSED BY THIS YEAR'S HARVEST FAILURE AND A LAG IN OPENING UP NEW INDUSTRIAL PLANTS. (A-1)

ACCORDING TO A REUTER REPORT, JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIFIED YESTERDAY THAT FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON ORDERED RECORDS OF HIS WIRETAPPING OF 17 REPORTERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO BE DESTROYED TO KEEP THE LATE J. EDGAR HOOVER FROM BLACKMAILING HIM. (A-6)

MATTHEW SEIDEN WRITES THAT MOST CHINESE HAVE LITTLE APPARENT CONCERN FOR THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE STORY OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT DOMINATED THE FRONT PAGE OF THE PEOPLES DAILY YESTERDAY, AND MOST PEOPLE QUESTIONED SAID THEY KNEW OF MR. FORD'S PRESENCE, FEW WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS IT WITH AN AMERICAN NEWSMAN. (A-8)

HENRY TREWHITT REPORTS THAT THE U.S. REJECTED YESTERDAY A PROPOSAL BY THE SOVIET UNION TO REOPEN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE PLO SITTING IN. (A-10) AN EDITORIAL OBSERVES THAT THE ACCESSION OF KING JUAN CARLOS I GAVE THE SPANISH REGIME A FRESH START IN RESPECTABILITY IN THE EYES OF ITS NEIGHBORS. THE SYMBOLIC ISOLATION IMPOSED ON SPAIN BY THE VICTORS OF WORLD WAR II, LONG UNDERMINED, IS OVER. THIS WILL HELP JUAN CARLOS, BUT IN THE END IT IS THE SPANISH BODY POLITIC THAT WILL DECIDE HIS LEGITIMACY AND DURATION. (A-16)

MARY MCGRORY DECRIES THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS REGARDING NEW YORK CITY AND CONTRASTS IT WITH THE ADMINISTRATIONS' LACK OF CONCERN WITH FISCAL IRRESPONSIBILITY AT THE PENTAGON. (A-17)

THE NEW YORK TIMES

CHRISTOPHER WREN REPORTS FROM MOSCOW THE SOVIET DISCLOSURE YESTERDAY THAT THE POOR GRAIN HARVEST THIS YEAR HAD FORCED THE KREMLIN TO SCALE DOWN ECONOMIC GOALS FOR 1976. IT WAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S PUBLISHED DEFENSE BUDGET WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED NEXT YEAR COMPARED WITH 1975.



(1)

IN TERENCE SMITH'S OPINION, RARELY HAVE ISRAELIS FELT MORE FRUSTRATED AND ALONE. THE DECISION OF THE UNSC ON SUNDAY TO INVITE THE PALESTINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN A FULL-DRESS MIDDLE EAST DEBATE NEXT MONTH -- AND THE AMERICAN DECISION NOT TO VETO THE RESOLUTION -- DEEPENED THE ISRAELI FEELING OF POLITICAL ISOLATION MORE THAN ANY EVENT IN RECENT MEMORY. WHAT MOST FRUSTRATED THE ISRAELIS, JUDGING FROM A NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONS YESTERDAY, WAS NOT SO MUCH THAT THE U.S. DID NOT AGREE WITH ISRAEL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SYRIAN MOVE, AS THE FACT THAT ISRAEL WAS POWERLESS TO AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE DEBATE. (2)

A SPECIAL TO THE TIMES FROM MANILA REPORTS THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY CARLOS ROMULO, WHO IS SPEARHEADING AN EFFORT TO REVIEW THE UN CHARTER, SAID YESTERDAY THAT AMERICANS MUST REALIZE "THEY CAN NO LONGER RUN" THE UN "AS THEY USED TO." WHAT EXISTS IN THE UN NOW, MR. ROMULO SAID, IS "A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN A MAJORITY THAT HAS THE VOTES, AND A MINORITY THAT HAS THE REAL POWER AND WEALTH." (4)

PAUL HOFMANN WRITES THAT ISRAEL TOLD THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY IT WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST "AT ANY MOMENT WITHOUT ANY PRECONDITIONS WHATSOEVER." WHEN MR. HERZOG WAS ASKED LAST NIGHT TO ELABORATE ON HIS ADDRESS, HE DECLARED THAT IT REFLECTED NO SHIFT IN ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PLO. (5)

ACCORDING TO BERNARD GWERTZMAN, DANIEL MOYNIHAN SAID YESTERDAY THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT A WHOLESALE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS WITH THE USSR. "ANY LESSENED EXPENDITURE OF ENERGY ON MILITARY TECHNOLOGY WILL LEAD TO AN INCREASED EXPENDITURE ON WHAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL SEE AS THE EQUALLY INVITING, EQUALLY PRODUCTIVE AREA OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT," HE SAID. (10)

PETER HAWTHORNE REPORTS THAT SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CIVIL WAR IN NEIGHBORING ANGOLA IS BEING MADE INCREASINGLY CLEAR IN OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL STATEMENTS, AND THAT SITUATION HAS BECOME A FOCUS OF NATIONAL DISCUSSION. PRIME MINISTER JOHN VORSTER IS SAYING THAT THE VAST FORMER PORTUGUESE TERRITORY COULD BECOME A MAJOR CRISIS FOR SOUTH AFRICA UNLESS THE WESTERN POWERS WERE PREPARED TO AID IN DEFUSING IT QUICKLY. THE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, AS WELL AS AUTHORITATIVE LEAKS, ARE CLEARLY AIMED AT TRYING TO PERSUADE THE WESTERN WORLD, PARTICULARLY THE U.S., TO FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO BACK DOWN. (11)



A SPECIAL TO THE TIMES FROM MADRID SAYS SPAIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEGUN A MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SPANISH SAHARA TERRITORY IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN POSSIBLE FIGHTING BETWEEN MOROCCAN TROOPS AND ALGERIAN-BACKED FORCES. THE ALGERIAN ANGER AGAINST SPAIN HAS NOW TAKEN THE FORM OF THREATS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. BUSINESS INTERESTS IN SPAIN ARE SENSITIVE TO THE DANGERS OF AN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT BY ALGERIA BECAUSE OF THE SAHARA PROBLEM, BUT WHAT IS REFERRED TO AS THE "MOROCCAN LOBBY" HAS WON OUT FOR THE MOMENT. (12)

ACCORDING TO MARVINE HOWE, PRESIDENT FRANCISCO DA COSTA GOMES LIFTED THE STATE OF SIEGE IN THE LISBON MILITARY REGION YESTERDAY AFTER IT WAS CLEAR THAT AN ATTEMPTED LEFTIST COUP HAD BEEN SMASHED. (17)

IN A LENGTHY ARTICLE, JOHN FINNEY DISCUSSES THE BUREAUCRATIC DEBATE OVER WHETHER THE BACKFIRE BOMBER AND CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD BE COUNTED AS STRATEGIC VEHICLES IN SALT NEGOTIATIONS. WITH THE DEPARTURE OF MR. SCHLESINGER THERE MAY BE SOME LATITUDE FOR MOVEMENT AND COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUES WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. AT LEAST THAT IS THE HOPE OF MR. KISSINGER'S VIEW, IS WHETHER DONALD RUMSFELD, WHOSE VIEWS ARE NOT KNOWN, CAN AND WILL TURN AROUND THE PENTAGON'S POSITION BEFORE HE BECOMES LOCKED IN BY THE VIEWS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. AT THE SAME TIME, MR. KISSINGER IS HOPING FOR A MORE POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION THAN ITS REJECTION OF A PROPOSAL IN SEPTEMBER PERMITTING A CERTAIN NUMBER OF BACKFIRE BOMBERS OVER THE 2,400 CEILING IN RETURN FOR A CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF AMERICAN PLANES CARRYING CRUISE MISSILES. (18)

DAVID BINDER REPORTS AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER'S STATEMENT YESTERDAY THAT THE U.S. WOULD RETAIN "PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY" FOR THE OPERATION AND DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL FOR THE LIFETIME OF THE NEW TREATY IT IS NEGOTIATING WITH THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT. MR. BUNKER SAID THAT PANAMA HAD AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE" TO THIS FORMULA. HOWEVER, NO AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE DURATION OF THE NEW TREATY. (20)

IN ITS LEAD EDITORIAL, THE TIMES ARGUES THAT THE FIRST AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO PEKING IN THREE AND A HALF YEARS NATURALLY HAS OPENED WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE COUNTRY THAT, INADVERTENTLY, BROUGHT THE U.S. AND COMMUNIST CHINA TOGETHER IN THE FIRST PLACE -- THE SOVIET UNION. BUT THE CURRENT MEETING HAS AN INESCAPABLE TRANSITIONAL CHARACTER. WASHINGTON, PEKING, AND MOSCOW ARE ALL EXPERIENCING SUCCESSION CRISES. NONE OF THE THREE CAN BE SURE WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE A YEAR OR TWO FROM NOW. NO ONE CAN BE CERTAIN



THAT THE BITTER SINO-SOVIET FEUD, WHICH GIVES THE TRI-
ANGULAR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. ITS SPECIAL CHARACTER,
WILL CONTINUE AFTER THE MAO AND BREZHNEV SUCCESSIONS,
ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS TO BE LONG-LASTING. IN THESE CIRCUM-
STANCES, APART FROM PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGES, SHORT-TERM MAT-
TERS UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE IN PRESIDENT
FORD'S CHINA VISIT. DISAGREEMENT ABOUT UN ACTION ON KOREA
AND THE VOCAL SUPPORT OF CHINA FOR THE NORTH AND THE U.S.
FOR THE SOUTH ARE UNLIKELY TO CONCEAL THE FIRM INTENTION OF
BOTH WASHINGTON AND PEKING TO RESTRAIN THEIR CLIENTS, AND
TO AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF AN ARMED CLASH. THE TAIWAN
ISSUE REMAINS ON THE SHELF, AS IT HAS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF
THE NEW CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. TRADE COULD EXPAND
MORE RAPIDLY BUT IS IMPEDED MORE BY CHINA'S EMPHASIS ON
SELF-RELIANCE AND LIMITED ABILITY TO PAY WITH EXPORTS THAN
BY POLITICAL FACTORS. BUT ALL THESE MATTERS ARE SECONDARY
TO THE TRIANGULAR BALANCE OF POWER THAT CONTINUES IN
CHINESE-AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. WHILE THE TRIANGLE MAY
NOT BE ETERNAL -- AND DEPENDS ON THE OUTCOME OF SUCCESSION
CRISES IN EACH OF THE THREE CAPITALS -- THE FORD VISIT TO
PEKING IS INTENDED BY BOTH SIDES TO LET THE WORLD KNOW THAT
THE TRANSITIONAL AMERICAN AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO
BASIC CHANGES IN MIND IN THE POLICY OF RAPPROACHEMENT THEY
INITIATED IN 1971-72. (40)

IN ANOTHER EDITORIAL THE TIMES CONTENDS THAT BY CHOOSING THIS
MOMENT TO AUTHORIZE ESTABLISHMENT OF SEVERAL MORE SETTLEMENTS
IN OCCUPIED SYRIAN TERRITORY, ISRAEL'S COALITION LEADERSHIP
HAS TAKEN A STEP THAT CAN ONLY COMPOUND THE COUNTRY'S PROB-
LEMS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. WITH 55 SETTLEMENTS ALREADY IN
PLACE AND DOZENS MORE CONTEMPLATED, THIS PRACTICE IS COM-
ING TO RESEMBLE DELIBERATE TERRITORIAL EXPANSIONISM. IN-
STEAD OF HELPING DEFEND CEASE-FIRE LINES, CIVILIAN SETTLE-
MENTS ONLY CREATE NEW POSITIONS WHICH HAVE TO BE DEFENDED.
THAT IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION ARE NOT
IN FAVOR OF SO RIGID A STANCE AS THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING,
AT LEAST ON THE NEGOTIATION ISSUE, IS INDICATED BY THE
REPORTED OPPOSITION OF FIVE CABINET-MINISTERS, ALONG WITH
OTHER INFLUENTIAL PUBLIC FIGURES INSIDE ISRAEL, TO THE
GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO BOYCOTT THE COMING SECURITY
COUNCIL DEBATE BECAUSE THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANI-
ZATION WILL PARTICIPATE IN IT. BUT AT THE TOP, THE
COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE STILL NOT SUMMONED UP
THE SELF-CONFIDENCE TO PRESENT CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS FOR
ADDRESSING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION SQUARELY. (40)

IN HIS COLUMN, JAMES RESTON SAYS THAT THE MOST HOPEFUL SIGN
IN THE POLITICAL WORLD THESE DAYS IS THAT THE COMMUNIQUE
FROM ALL FRONTS ARE SO MODEST. ALMOST EVERYBODY IS PIPING
DOWN. PRICES, UNEMPLOYMENT, INFLATION, AND INTEREST RATES



MAY BE UP, BUT BIG POLITICAL PROMISES AND DREAMS ARE OUT OF STYLE. THE NEWS AND TELEVISION SHOWS OF PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA THIS WEEK ILLUSTRATE THE CHANGE. ON THE WHOLE THIS IS NOT A BAD THING. IT USED TO BE EXPECTED THAT SPECTACULAR MEETINGS OF THIS SORT BETWEEN LEADERS ACROSS THE WORLD HAD TO "SETTLE THINGS" OR THEIR RELATIONS WOULD BE WORSE, MAYBE EVEN DANGEROUS; IN THE AGE OF TELEVISION, NOBODY CONFUSES POLICY WITH PROPAGANDA THE WAY THEY USED TO DO IN THE DAYS OF NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN. WORLD LEADERS CAN MEET ONE ANOTHER NOW FOR THEIR OWN INTERNAL

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FINAL OF TWO PARTS

POLITICAL REASONS WITHOUT THEIR PEOPLE EXPECTING VERY MUCH, BECAUSE THERE ISN'T MUCH TO EXPECT. MAYBE THIS DOUBT AND MODESTY ON ALL SIDES IN ALL NATIONS IS NOT A BAD THING, FOR THEY ALL HAVE REASON TO BE MODEST. FACED WITH THE HARD INTRACTABLE FACTS, THEIR AMBIGUOUS THEORIES AND IDEOLOGIES HAVE NOT BEEN WORKING, SO THEY ARE BEGINNING TO PROMISE LESS AND CLAIM LESS, AND THIS MAY ADD TO THE GENERAL CONFUSION OF LIFE, BUT MAY ALSO HELP BRING US DOWN TO REALITY. (41)

C. L. SULZBERGER DISCUSSES THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRAZILAND SAYS THAT THE GOVERNMENT FINDS AS IT EDGES TOWARD THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY THAT, ALTHOUGH IT IS USEFUL ECONOMICALLY, SOCIALLY, AND POLITICALLY, IT BRINGS ITS OWN DIFFICULTIES ALONG BECAUSE IT OBVIOUSLY UNDERMINES DISCIPLINE AND AUTHORITY. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO BOOST POLITICAL LIFE TO THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ADVANCES BECAUSE IT SEES THE DANGER OF SCHIZOPHRENIA IF BRAZIL MOVES FORWARD ON SOME FRONTS AND BACKWARD ON OTHERS. THIS IS GENERAL GEISEL'S DILEMMA. HE KNOWS A FROZEN SOCIETY IS STATIC AND ALL BRAZILIANS WANT TO BE DYNAMIC, MOVING AHEAD. THE PRESIDENT TRIES TO MANEUVER OUT OF THE IMPASSE BY SHORT-TERM AND TACTICAL ALLIANCES ON DIFFERENT ISSUES WITH DIFFERENT GROUPS AND FOR DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES. BUT IN THE LONG TERM WHERE WILL HE GO? SULZBERGER WOULD NOT BE FLABBERGASTED IF GEISEL IS SUCCEEDED IN 1979 BY ANOTHER GENERAL.

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TEL AVIV 7623 FOLLOWS:

TAGS: PFOR,PINT,IS,SY

SUBJECT: MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE APPROVES FOUR NEW GOLAN SETTLEMENTS

REF: TEL AVIV 7503

1. MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON SETTLEMENTS HAVE FORMAL APPROVAL DECEMBER 2 TO CREATION OF FOUR NEW SETTLEMENTS ON GOLAN HEIGHTS. ACCORDING TO SOME PRESS REPORTS, THE SETTLEMENTS MAY BE READY FOR INITIAL OCCUPANCY WITHIN TWO WEEKS. THE SETTLERS WILL REPORTEDLY OCCUPY TEMPORARY SITES, PRESUMABLY IN EXISTING SETTLEMENTS, UNTIL PERMANENT QUARTERS ARE READY.

2. ACTION BY MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOLLOWS REFERRAL OF ISSUE TO COMMITTEE BY CABINET DECEMBER 1. GENERAL FEELING HERE IS THAT APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENTS CONSTITUTES CONCRETE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION EXTENDING UNDOF MANDATE.

3. PREVALENT ATTITUDE APPARENTLY MOTIVATING MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE WAS EXPRESSED BY MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO HAUSNER (INDEPENDENT LIBERAL) WHO IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH IN PAST HAD DICTATED SELF-RESTRAINT IN THE CREATION OF NEW GOLAN SETTLEMENTS, NOW DICTATED APPROVAL OF THESE FOUR SETTLEMENTS AS "ZIONIST REACTION" TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. MINISTER OF SOCIAL WELFARE HAMMER (NRP YOUNG GUARD) WAS REPORTEDLY VOTED DOWN IN SEPARATE ATTEMPT TO HAVE SETTLEMENTS ON WEST BANK AUTHORIZED AS WELL.

4. HAARETZ LISTS NAMES OF FOUR SETTLEMENTS AS FOLLOWS (SPELLING PHONETIC): BAZOK, TANURIYA, MORDOT AND KFAR TA'ASSIYA B. (INDUSTRIAL ZONE) EXACT LOCATIONS ARE AS YET UNREPORTED.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 3, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM G. HYLAND

~~SUBJECT: VERIFICATION PANEL MEETING -- TUESDAY AFTERNOON~~

ACCORDING TO STATE, HAK WISHES VERIFICATION PANEL WITH REGULARS STILL IN WASHINGTON SCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9. THIS WILL MEAN THAT RUMSFELD, BROWN AND IKLE WILL BE ABSENT. FRANKLY, I WONDER WHAT THE IMPACT OF SUCH A PREEMPTIVE MEETING WILL BE ON THOSE ABSENTEES, AND WHAT CAN ACTUALLY BE ACCOMPLISHED. IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO USE HAK'S TIME TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS WITH CLEMENTS ALONE, OR, IF A MEETING HAS TO BE HELD, TO DEVOTE MOST OF IT TO VERIFICATION ISSUES, INCLUDING KAMCHATKA RADAR, AND ANY OTHER THAT MAY STILL BE HANGING OVER FROM LAST VP -- INCLUDING MINUTEMAN SILOS. WE HAVE INFORMED AGENCIES OF POSSIBLE VP ON TUESDAY, BUT WILL HOLD UP FINAL CONFIRMATION UNTIL YOU HAVE CHANCE TO POINT OUT TO HAK THAT HE WILL BE MEETING WITH ENTIRE SECOND TEAM.

I AM SENDIN A LAGER CABLE ON SALT THIS EVENING, AND WILL BEGIN TRANSMITTING VP STUDY LATE TONIGHT.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 10850 (as amended) SEC 9.3

NSC Memo, 08000, State Dept. Guidelines

HR 1000, Date 2/1/11



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