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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3400

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 253018 TOSEC 160312

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UK, CY, GR, TU

SUBJECT: CALLAGHAN LETTER ON CYPRUS - BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

1. AMBASSADOR RAMSBOTHAM HAS FORWARDED TO THE DEPARTMENT THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER CALLAGHAN ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE. THE CALLAGHAN LETTER IS IN REPLY TO YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 17.

2. IT WOULD CLEARLY BE USEFUL TO CONTINUE THIS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH THE BRITISH. A FURTHER LETTER FROM YOU TO CALLAGHAN COULD LOGICALLY BE SENT JUST AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE A FULL REPLY FROM THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO THE PRESENTATION MADE TO THEM BY CHARGE STEARNS. WE WOULD INTEND TO PREPARE A DRAFT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION EARLY NEXT WEEK.

3. TEXT OF THE CALLAGHAN LETTER READS: DEAR HENRY: THANK YOU FOR THE VERY FULL ACCOUNT IN YOUR MESSAGE OF 17 OCTOBER OF YOUR OWN EFFORTS TO MOVE THE TURKS ON CYPRUS.

4. AS YOU ALREADY KNOW, THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA, HORACE PHILLIPS, SAW CASLAYANGIL ON 13 OCTOBER. I SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED OUR AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS, BROOKS RICHARDS, TO SEE BITSIOS ON 17 OCTOBER, TO TRY AND WORK OUT A FORMU-

LATION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS COULD BE RESUMED AND COULD ADDRESS

***** HHSR COMMENT *****

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State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *LR* NARA, Date *8/11/10*



THEMSELVES TO THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. I THINK THE GREEK SIDE ARE WILLING TO GO A LONG WAY TO MEET BASIC TURKISH PRECONDITIONS, BUT THE LATEST EXCHANGE WHICH HORACE PHILLIPS HAD WITH CAGLAYANGIL ON 19 OCTOBER SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT AT THIS STAGE, BEFORE DISCUSSIONS IN THE TURKISH CABINET AS WELL AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ARE COMPLETE, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ARE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE ANY REAL COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE. I HOPE WE ARE NOT IN FOR ANOTHER ROUND OF STALLING TACTICS, BUT I AM INSTRUCTING HORACE PHILLIPS TO GO IN AGAIN WITH CAGLAYANGIL FOLLOWING THE TURKISH CABINET MEETING TO SEE IF WE CAN CARRY THIS ANY FURTHER. I SHALL OF COURSE KEEP IN TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT HOW THINGS ARE GOING, WITH MY BEST REGARDS, JIM CALLAGHAN. END TEXT. INGERSOLL BT



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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #3019 2970031
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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3401

~~SECRET~~ STATE 253019 TOSEC 100313

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, SP

SUBJECT: FRANCO'S CONDITION WORSENS; TRANSITION MAY OCCUR
SOON. -- BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

REF: TOSEC 100297

1- EMBASSY MADRID AND WIRE SERVICE REPORTS INDICATE THAT FRANCO HAS SUFFERED NEW HEART ATTACK AND MAY HAVE LITTLE TIME TO LIVE. JUAN CARLOS SENT THE COUNT OF MOTRICO TO BRIEF STABLER ON THE ELABORATE SCENARIO DEVELOPED TO GET FRANCO TO TRANSFER HIS POWERS PERMANENTLY TO THE PRINCE (REPTEL). WIRE SERVICE REPORTS SEEM TO CONFIRM THAT THE SCENARIO IS BEGINNING TO UNFOLD.

2. THE TIMING WOULD BE, ACCORDING TO JUAN CARLOS' EMISSARY, THAT FRANCO WOULD SIGN THE DECREE BY OCT. 24. THE CORTES WOULD BE CONVOKED WITHIN 24 HOURS TO BE INFORMED, AND AS EARLY AS MONDAY JUAN CARLOS COULD BE SWORN IN AS KING OF SPAIN.

3. WHILE WE HAVE NO OTHER HARD INFORMATION AT THIS TIME, THE PRESENT STORY HAS RING OF TRUTH IN ITS ALLUSIONS TO BACKSTAGE ROLE BEING PLAYED BY FRANCO'S SON-IN-LAW, MARGUES OF VILLAVERDE, WHO AS ONE OF ATTENDING PHYSICIANS OUGHT TO KNOW DIRECTLY HOW FRANCO IS DOING.

4. IN PREPARATION FOR THIS COURSE OF EVENTS, WE WILL BE SENDING SEPARATELY DRAFT MESSAGES AND STATEMENTS FOR USE IF THE SUCCESSION INDEED TAKES PLACE AS A TRANSFER RATHER THAN AS THE RESULT OF FRANCO'S DEATH, INGERSOLL



***** WHSR COMMENT *****

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*
By *NR* NARA, Date *8/11/10*

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

UNCLAS STATE 253175 TOSEC 160314

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: 90PN (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: TRAVELLING PRESS REPORTAGE, EVENING, OCTOBER 23

FOR FUNSETH FROM S/PRS

NO. 24

NEWSPAPERS:

(1) CHITRIBUNE -- NO MENTION OF CHINA OR KISSINGER IN THURSDAY'S EDITION.

(2) LATIMES -- FRONT PAGE CARRIES AP STORY FROM PEKING. THAT'S ALL.

WIRES:

1. UPI (GROWALD) "CHINESE LEADERS SEE THE U.S. AS A WOUNDED TIGER THAT HAS LOST SOME OF ITS CLOUT," BUT ACCORDING TO A SENIOR OFFICIAL ON THE PLANE THEY WELCOME FORD'S VISIT BECAUSE IT WILL ENHANCE CHINESE PRESTIGE.

THE SAME OFFICIAL SAID CHINESE LEADERS RATE U.S. LOWER THAN A FEW YEARS AGO. REASONS: INDOCHINA COLLAPSE MADE U.S. LOOK "WEAK, INEFFECTUAL AND INCOMPETENT"; WATERGATE REMOVED NIXON AND MADE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP APPEAR UNSTABLE; DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTIES AND FRICTION WITH CONGRESS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS; CHINESE FEAR 1976 COULD BRING ANTI-CHINESE PRESIDENT.



THE OFFICIAL DISCOUNTED PEKING OPPOSITION TO U.S.-SOVIET

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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DETENTE BUT CHINESE WOULD BE GLAD IF DETENTE AND ARMS TALKS RAN INTO TROUBLE. MAO SEEMED ALERT, WELL-BRIEFED AND VERY MUCH IN CHARGE OF AFFAIRS.

IN TOKYO, KISSINGER "PLUNGED INTO" BRIEFINGS OF JAPANESE LEADERS. PM MIYAZAWA AND PM MIKI CONTACTS ARE DESCRIBED BY GROHARD, AS WELL AS THOSE WITH POSSIBLE FUTURE PM CANDIDATES FUKUDA AND OHIRA.

2. AP -- NO AFTERNOON FILING.

TELEVISION:

1. ABC (REASONER) -- (THIRD ITEM ON PROGRAM) "SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER IS IN TOKYO TONIGHT AFTER FLYING FROM PEKING. KISSINGER TOLD NEWSMEN IN TOKYO THAT COMMUNIST PARTY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG REMAINS IN COMPLETE CHARGE IN CHINA. THE COMMENT CONTRADICTED REPORTS THAT MAO HAS LOST POWER BECAUSE OF OLD AGE AND HAS NOW BECOME A FIGUREHEAD. KISSINGER SAID ALSO THAT THE CHINESE HAVE LOWERED THEIR ESTIMATE OF AMERICA'S POWER BECAUSE OF THE UPHEAVALS OF RECENT YEARS."

2. NBC (CHANCELLOR) -- "SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER SAID TODAY THAT CHINESE LEADERS PROBABLY SEE THE UNITED STATES AS WEAKER THAN IT WAS A FEW YEARS AGO BECAUSE OF WATERGATE AND THE FAILURE OF WASHINGTON'S INDOCHINA POLICY. KISSINGER SAID THAT IN TOKYO ON HIS WAY BACK FROM A VISIT TO CHINA, AS DON OLIVER REPORTS, THAT VISIT DID LITTLE TO CHANGE CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS:"

OLIVER: "SECRETARY KISSINGER SAID HE EXPECTED NOTHING SPECTACULAR FROM THE FOUR-DAY VISIT TO CHINA AND THAT'S WHAT HE GOT -- NOTHING SPECTACULAR. AT THE FINAL BANQUET THE TALK WAS NOT OF FRIENDSHIP BUT OF A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON THE PERCEPTION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS BY THE U.S. AND THE CHINESE. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE TONE OF TONIGHT'S BANQUET TOASTS THAT THE THREE DAYS OF NEGOTIATING IN PEKING HAVE NOT BEEN EASY, THAT PROGRESS IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL BE SLOW IN COMING. AS THEY WERE LEAVING PEKING, U.S. OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE TALKS HAD GONE AS EXPECTED, THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS STILL FUNDAMENTALLY SOUND, DESPITE CHINESE CRITICISM OF THE POLICY OF DETENTE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND AMERICA. A SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL ON THE PLANE BETWEEN PEKING AND TOKYO TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE CHINESE WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER



THAN TO SEE THE U.S. AND RUSSIA AT EACH OTHER'S THROATS AGAIN. THAT WOULD GIVE CHINA A FREE HAND TO PURSUE ITS OWN POLICY, WHILE THE OTHER TWO ARGUE. THE OFFICIAL SAID CHINA PERCEIVES WEAKNESS IN THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WATERGATE AND THE FALL OF VIET-NAM. THE CHINESE THINK THE TIME IS RIGHT TO FORCE THE U.S. TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. AFTER LANDING IN TOKYO, SECRETARY KISSINGER GAVE REPORTERS HIS VIEW OF THE TALKS WITH THE CHINESE."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: "THIS WAS MY 8TH VISIT TO CHINA IN FOUR YEARS. THESE ARE ALL PEOPLE I KNOW WELL. WE DON'T GO TO CHINA TO ASK APPROVAL FOR OUR OTHER POLICIES. THEY DON'T ASK APPROVAL FOR THEIR POLICIES. SO WE DISCUSSED MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, AND ON THE PERSONAL LEVEL THE RELATIONSHIP IS EXTREMELY GOOD."

OLIVER: "THERE ARE STILL SOME DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT ON PRESIDENT FORD'S TRIP TO CHINA NEXT MONTH. THE DATES WON'T BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL KISSINGER RETURNS TO WASHINGTON AND TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT."

3. CBS (CRONKITE) -- "SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER SAID TODAY HIS TALKS THIS WEEK WITH CHINESE LEADERSHENT ABOUT AS HE EXPECTED THEM TO. HE MADE THEREMARKON HIS WAY BACK HOME VIA JAPAN. BERNARD KALB REPORTS ON KISSINGER'S IMPRESSIONS OF THE TRIP AND ON HIS VISIT YESTERDAY TO CHINA'S REPOSITORY OF HALF A MILLION YEARS OF CULTURE:"

KALB: "KISSINGER WAS INTRODUCED TO THESE CLAY FIGURES FROM THE MOST SPECTACULAR ARCHEOLOGICAL FINDIN RECENT HISTORY -- THESE PIECES EXCAVATED LAST YEARDATING BACK TO THE T'ING DYNASTY, ABOUT 200 BC. TODAY KISSINGER DEPARTED MAO'S CHINA, FROM PEKING AIRPORT. HE SAYSHE'S SATISFIED WITH HIS VISIT, CONVINCED THAT THE CLASHING VIEWS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PEKING ON DETENTE WITH RUSSIA DO NOT THREATEN WHAT HE FEELS IS A BASICALLY SOUND SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. REPORTERS ABOARD THE KISSINGER PLANE WERE TOLD THAT THE CHINESE WOULD LIKETO SEE THE U.S. IN A POSITION OF IRRECONCILABLE HOSTILITY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION BUT THAT U.S. PURSUES ITSPOLICY, CHINA PURSUES HER'S. LATER IN TOKYO HE SAID THAT A SERIES OF UPHEAVALS, PRESUMABLY MEANING VIET-NAM AND WATERGATE, HAD HAD A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CHINA'S VIEW OF THE U.S. AND HE GAVE HIS IMPRESSIONS OF MAO TSE-TUNG:

KISSINGER: "HELL, I CANNOT DETERMINE THE INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS IN CHINA, BUT MY IMPRESSIONWAS OF A MAN OF VERY POWERFUL INTELLIGENCE, VERY STRONG VIEWS; AND I SEE



NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT HE'S IN CHARGE OF EVENTS IN CHINA."

TED KOPPEL: "I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU CAN'T GO INTO DETAILS, BUT CAN YOU GIVE US A SENSE OF THE MOOD? HOW DID THESE MEETINGS GO WHEN YOU GO IN TO SEEMAO?"

SECRETARY KISSINGER: "THEY ARE IN A RATHER SPARSE ROOM, AND HE LIKES TO JOKE. AND I HAVE LEARNED THAT ALL OF HIS REMARKS ARE RATHER CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT. THE DISCUSSIONS ARE -- I THINK THEY WERE WELL DESCRIBED AS WIDE-RANGING. VERY ACUTE."

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TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0636

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3406

~~REF ID: A66666~~ STATE 253183 TOSEC 158316

EXD18
E.O. 11652: 603

TAGS: MASS, HARR, SA

SUBJECT: SAUDI ARMS DELIVERY SCHEDULES

REFS: JIDDA 7078; STATE 240894

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

1. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE POINTS MADE IN REFTEL AND I WANT TO REAFFIRM TO YOU THAT THE INFORMATION IN ATHERTON'S LETTER TO ELLSWORTH CONCERNING DELIVERY SCHEDULES IS CORRECT. I DO NOT KNOW JUST HOW THIS MISUNDERSTANDING COULD HAVE ARISEN, BUT THERE IS NO DISCREPANCY SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED BETWEEN INFO IN ATHERTON'S LETTER AND WHAT THE SECRETARY ACTUALLY CONVEYED TO THE SAG IN TAIF.

2. WE ARE CONSIDERING SENDING A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION WHICH COULD DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH SAG. MEANWHILE YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT TAKE UP WITH THE SAG EITHER THE DELIVERY SCHEDULE ISSUE OR THE QUESTION OF A MISSION UNTIL WE HAVE REVIEWED THIS MATTER FURTHER AND YOU HAVE RECEIVED OUR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. INGERSOLL
BT

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EO 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By HR NARA Date 8/11/10

***** AMHSR COMMENT *****

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: YOUR MEETINGS WITH SADAT AND
FAHMY (S/S 7522055)
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT IN OUR SCHEDULING OF PRESI-
DENT SADAT'S VISIT WHEN IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO BLOCK
OUT TIMES FOR YOUR MEETINGS WITH SADAT AND FAHMY. THIS
WOULD NOT COMMIT YOU RIGIDLY, BUT IT WOULD ASSURE THAT
THERE ARE TIMES WHEN YOU WOULD HAVE THE CHOICE OF MEETING
IF YOU WISHED TO DO SO.

2. IN GENERAL TERMS, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT PERHAPS YOUR MAIN
SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH SADAT ALONE WOULD BE BEST SCHEDULED
AT THE BEGINNING AND AT THE END OF THE VISIT. DURING THE
BUSY WASHINGTON PORTION OF THE VISIT YOU WILL HAVE A LOT
OF TIME WITH SADAT TOGETHER WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE
WASHINGTON SCHEDULE IS FAIRLY FULL, AND IT SEEMS TO ME
THERE WOULD BE MORE OPPORTUNITY FOR A REFLECTIVE TALK IN

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By *NR* NARA Date *8/11/10*





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FLORIDA. THIS WOULD ALSO HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF PERMITTING YOU TO CRYSTALLIZE THE ESSENCE OF THE TALKS HERE SO THAT SADAT WILL GO AWAY WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRATEGY THAT HAS BEEN AGREED.

3. SPECIFICALLY, THEN, YOUR OWN MEETINGS WITH SADAT AND FAHMY--APART FROM THE SOCIAL MEETINGS ALREADY ON THE SCHEDULE--COULD BE ARRANGED AS FOLLOWS:

-- SUNDAY, OCTOBER 26: I ASSUME THAT YOU WILL WANT TO FIND SOME TIME BEFORE YOU LEAVE WILLIAMSBURG TO SET THE STAGE WITH SADAT BRIEFLY. YOU MAY WANT TO TALK A BIT ABOUT SADAT'S FIRST MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT THE NEXT DAY AND ABOUT HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ALSO THE NEXT DAY. SADAT WILL, OF COURSE, BE TIRED AND THIS MEETING WOULD NOT HAVE TO LAST LONG.

-- MONDAY, OCTOBER 27: WE HAVE SAVED TIME ON THE SCHEDULE FOR YOU TO CALL ON SADAT AT BLAIR HOUSE AROUND 6:45 P.M. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL JUST HAVE CONCLUDED HIS CALL ON SADAT. AS I SEE IT, THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WOULD BE MAINLY FOR YOU TO ASSURE YOURSELF THAT SADAT IS COMFORTABLE AND DOES NOT HAVE ANY WISHES THAT HE WOULD WANT TO CONFIDE IN YOU OR ANY REFLECTIONS ON HIS FIRST TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO MAKE THE PRESIDENT AWARE OF BEFORE THEIR NEXT MEETING.

-- OCTOBER 27 AND/OR OCTOBER 28: YOU WILL HAVE THE OPTION OF MEETING WITH FAHMY DURING PRESIDENT SADAT'S REST PERIODS EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE AFTERNOONS. WE HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED TO YOU AS ONE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SIGNING CEREMONY FOR THE SEVERAL AGREEMENTS BE SCHEDULED AFTER YOUR LUNCH ON OCTOBER 28 FOLLOWING PRESIDENT SADAT'S RETURN TO BLAIR HOUSE. YOU WOULD HAVE TIME ON YOUR SCHEDULE TO TAKE FAHMY INTO YOUR OFFICE FOR A CHAT IF YOU WISH. THERE WOULD ALSO BE TIME FOR HIM TO SEE YOU AFTER PRESIDENT SADAT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ON MONDAY.

-- NOVEMBER 1-3: IF YOU WANT TO HAVE A RELAXED TALK ALONE WITH SADAT, FLORIDA WOULD BE THE BEST PLACE. YOU COULD EITHER GO TO FLORIDA SATURDAY AND SEE HIM BEFORE THE

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PRESIDENT COMES OR YOU COULD STAY OVERNIGHT SUNDAY AFTER THE PRESIDENT LEAVES SINCE PRESIDENT SADAT HAS THE ENTIRE DAY FREE MONDAY. THIS WOULD PRECEDE HIS TALK TO CONGRESS.

4. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REACTIONS TO THE ABOVE SO THAT WE CAN BUILD INTO THE SCHEDULE ADEQUATE TIME FOR YOU TO HOLD THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS YOU FEEL YOU NEED WHEN YOU WOULD MOST LIKE TO HOLD THEM. I RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE THE FOLLOWING:

A. THAT WE LET THE EGYPTIANS KNOW YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO CHAT BRIEFLY WITH SADAT IN WILLIAMSBURG RECOGNIZING THAT SADAT WILL NOT WANT TO TALK LONG AFTER THE FLIGHT.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE

B. THAT YOU PAY A BRIEF CALL ON SADAT AT BLAIR HOUSE OCTOBER 27 AT 6:45 P.M.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE

C. THAT YOU INVITE FAHMY FOR A MEETING IN YOUR OFFICE AT EITHER THE WHITE HOUSE OR STATE DEPARTMENT AT 2:30 OCTOBER 27. (THIS WOULD INTRUDE ON YOUR PERSONAL TIME.)
APPROVE DISAPPROVE

D. THAT WE ALLOW AN HOUR FOLLOWING YOUR LUNCH FOR YOU TO TAKE FAHMY INTO YOUR OFFICE.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE

E. THAT YOU STAY IN FLORIDA FOR A TALK WITH SADAT MONDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 3.
APPROVE PREFER GOING DOWN SATURDAY

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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S:AADAMS

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 253184 TOSEC 160319

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMO: NSSM 230: US-SINAI SUPPORT MISSION
S/S NO. Y7522173)

TO THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO, SCOWCROFT AND EAGLEBURGER

1. WE HAVE REVIEWED NSSM 230 IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR VIEWS. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE MOVE QUICKLY IF THE FEBRUARY DEPLOYMENT DEADLINE IS TO BE MET. A FURTHER DELAY WILL ALSO RISK INCREASING THE START-UP COSTS OF THE MISSION. SINCE YOU HAVE REVIEWED THE MANAGEMENT OPTIONS PRESENTED BY STATE, AID, ACDA, DEFENSE, OMB, THE DCI, AND THE NSC STAFF, WE WILL NOT PRESENT THESE AGAIN. INSTEAD WE PROPOSE YOU APPROVE THE FOLLOWING CONCEPTUAL APPROACH SO THAT WE MAY GET BUSY ORGANIZING AND LAUNCHING THE SINAI MISSION.


2. (A) WE BELIEVE THAT OUR EMPHASIS MUST BE ON CONTRACTING OUT TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY THE GREAT BULK OF THE WORK TO BE

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PERFORMED BY THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION. OUR PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR A SINGLE CONTRACTOR WHO WOULD THEN BE AUTHORIZED TO SUB-CONTRACT AS NECESSARY FOR INDIVIDUAL SERVICES. BUT A FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER TO USE A SINGLE CONTRACTOR OR A NUMBER OF CONTRACTORS FOR INDIVIDUAL PIECES OF THE EFFORT MUST AWAIT DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH POTENTIAL CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONS.

(B) WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE A THIN OVERLAY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO PROVIDE THE CONTRACTOR (OR CONTRACTORS) WITH POLITICAL GUIDANCE. WE RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, YOUR DESIRE THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOT BE DIRECTLY IDENTIFIED AS THE OVERLORD OF THE OPERATION, AND HAVE TAILORED OUR SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION ACCORDINGLY.

(C) IT IS OUR STRONG FEELING THAT THE BEST WAY TO ACCOMPLISH OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES IS TO TAKE A LEAF FROM THE VIET-NAM REFUGEE TASK FORCE BOOK, STRUCTURING THE POLITICAL OVERLAY AS FOLLOWS:

(I) MISSION DIRECTOR: WE SHOULD APPOINT A REASONABLY WELL KNOWN MAN--PERHAPS FROM OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT--TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION AND SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE. HE, LIKE DEAN BROWN BEFORE HIM, WOULD BE IDENTIFIED IN THE PUBLIC MIND AS THE MAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISSION; HE WOULD TAKE HIS DIRECTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND YOU. THE MISSION DIRECTOR, WOULD IN ADDITION TO NORMAL MANAGERIAL DUTIES, BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST CONGRESSIONAL APPEARANCES, AND FOR DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS AND PUBLIC. HE WOULD THUS TAKE THE FOCUS OF COMMENT AND CRITICISM AWAY FROM ANY PARTICULAR AGENCY.

(II) INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD: AGAIN, AS IN THE CASE OF THE VIET-NAM TASK FORCE, WE WOULD ESTABLISH THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOARD OF DIRECTORS MADE UP OF SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL INTERESTED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (E.G., STATE, DOD, CIA, ACDA, ETC.). THE MANAGEMENT BOARD WOULD BE CHAIRED BY THE MISSION DIRECTOR WHO AS THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD, AT LEAST IN THE EARLY STAGES, BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION STRUCTURE. IT WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE,



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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BE A USEFUL TOOL IN EXAMINING THE QUALIFICATIONS OF POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS AND RECOMMENDING WHAT CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE HIRED. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT AFTER THE INITIAL ORGANIZATION STAGE OF THE SUPPORT MISSION HAS PASSED, THIS MANAGEMENT BOARD WOULD BE LESS IMPORTANT AND EVER LESS INVOLVED IN DAY-TO-DAY MISSION OPERATIONS. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BOTH IN THE INITIAL STAGES AND LATER ON, SERVE TO EMPHASIZE THE INTER-AGENCY NATURE OF THE EFFORT, THUS ALSO FOCUSING ATTENTION AWAY FROM ANY PARTICULAR AGENCY.

(III) PILOT PLANNING GROUP: THERE WILL BE AN ALMOST IMMEDIATE NEED FOR STAFF SUPPORT FOR BOTH THE PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD. IN FACT, EVEN BEFORE THESE TWO INSTITUTIONS ARE ESTABLISHED AND MANNED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE CREATED A SMALL STAFF TO BEGIN WORK ON THE DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION, METHODS OF CONTACTING CONTRACTORS, ETC. THUS WE RECOMMEND THE SETTING UP, UNDER STATE CHAIRMANSHIP, OF A SMALL INTER-AGENCY-STAFFED PILOT PLANNING GROUP. ITS FIRST TASK WOULD BE TO DESIGN A DETAILED CONCEPT AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION, WHICH WOULD COMPILE AND REVIEW A LIST OF CONTRACTORS, AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO PERFORM THE MYRIAD HOUSEKEEPING AND TECHNICAL SERVICES THAT WILL CERTAINLY BE NECESSARY IN THE EARLY STAGES AND MAY PROVE TO BE NECESSARY EVEN THEREAFTER.

(D) WE DO NOT HAVE A MISSION DIRECTOR IDENTIFIED YET. WE WILL SUBMIT TO YOU SHORTLY A LIST OF CANDIDATES. WE HAVE IN MIND SOMEONE NO LONGER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO KNOWS HOW TO DEAL WITH CONTRACTORS AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY AND WHO CAN DRAW TO HIMSELF AND BEAR UP UNDER CRITICISM FROM THE PARTIES, THE PRESS AND CONGRESS. WE WILL ALSO BE LOOKING FOR TWO OR THREE MEN TO SERVE IN THE SINAI. THEIR JOB WILL BE TO MAKE SURE THE FIELD PROGRAM IS WELL AND RESPONSIBLY RUN.


(E) THUS, THE REAL ISSUE BEFORE US NOW IS WHETHER THE ABOVE OUTLINE OF AN ORGANIZATION IS AN ACCEPTABLE FRAMEWORK ON WHICH TO BUILD. IT, IN OUR VIEW, MEETS THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT OF REMOVING THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION FROM CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH ANY SINGLE DEPARTMENT OF THE



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GOVERNMENT, WHILE PROVIDING THE FLEXIBILITY NECESSARY TO GO ABOUT THE CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION, RECOGNIZING THAT THERE WILL BE A HOST OF DETAILS AND PROBLEMS WE CANNOT NOW FORESEE. THE PARAGRAPHS THAT FOLLOW ARE AN ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE HOW THE SUPPORT MISSION MIGHT FUNCTION; THEY SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE READ AS PURELY ILLUSTRATIVE AND SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL MODIFICATION WITH TIME AND EXPERIENCE.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(A) THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION WILL BE AN AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION WHICH WILL DISCHARGE THE SURVEILLANCE RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO U.S. CIVILIANS UNDER THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AND THE RELATED U.S. PROPOSAL WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY CONGRESS. THE MISSION WILL HAVE A WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS, A FIELD TEAM IN THE SINAI PASSES AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SITES IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO AN INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD WHICH WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE, DEFENSE, THE DCI, ACDA AND AID. THE MISSION WILL WORK UNDER NSC SUPERVISION TO ENSURE FULL INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION. THE MANAGEMENT BOARD WILL BE CHAIRED BY THE MISSION DIRECTOR. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WILL PROVIDE IT WITH POLITICAL POLICY GUIDANCE. THE MISSION WILL BE HEADED BY A DIRECTOR AND A PERMANENT STAFF WHO WILL FURNISH THE FIELD ELEMENT WITH POLICY GUIDANCE, OVERALL ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTION AND FUNDING. THE HEADQUARTERS STAFF WILL DISSEMINATE THE FIELD MISSION'S REPORTING TO APPROPRIATE AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON.

(B) THE INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING LIAISON BETWEEN THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION AND THE FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SURE THAT TECHNICAL GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FROM THOSE AGENCIES WAS MADE AVAILABLE RAPIDLY. IN ORGANIZING THE SINAI MISSION, THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DCI AND DOD WOULD BE CALLED UPON IN PARTICULAR. THOSE AGENCIES ARE UNIQUELY CAPABLE OF DETERMINING THE TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS OF CONTRACTORS AND IDENTIFYING THOSE ADAPTED TO THE PURPOSES OF THE SINAI



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MISSION. IN SOME CASES THESE AGENCIES HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY SENSORS, WHICH ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE ON THE PRIVATE MARKET. THE SAME AGENCIES HAVE PERSONNEL WITH SKILLS NECESSARY TO HELP THE MISSION PLAN AND ORGANIZE ITS OPERATIONS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY GUIDANCE WOULD BE PROVIDED AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL THROUGH THE INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD IN WHICH IT WOULD HAVE A LEAD ROLE AS WELL AS THROUGH U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO OVERSEE THE SINAI FIELD OPERATION.

(C) IN THE SINAI A THREE-ELEMENT GROUP WILL BE DEPLOYED. THE FIRST ELEMENT WILL CONSIST OF A SMALL TOP-LEVEL, SUPERVISORY MANAGEMENT TEAM. WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE DIRECT-HIRE U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL. THEY WILL SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIELD GROUP WHO WOULD BE LARGELY CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. THE MANAGEMENT TEAM WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LIAISON WITH EGYPTIAN, ISRAELI AND UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITIES AND SHOULD HAVE THEREFORE POLITICAL SKILLS AND AREA EXPERIENCE REQUIRED FOR SUCH A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE FUNCTION. WERE THE MANAGEMENT GROUP TO BE MADE UP OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS, WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THE SAME KIND OF DISCIPLINE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF PERFORMANCE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL. SECOND, ABOUT 75 INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE RECRUITED TO MAN THE AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE SITES AND THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI POSITIONS. ABOUT 5 MEN WOULD MAN EACH SITE NIGHT AND DAY. THE INDIVIDUALS SELECTED FOR SURVEILLANCE ASSIGNMENTS WILL NEED BACKGROUND IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES, THOUGH NOT VERY EXTENSIVE. WHETHER THEY ARE MONITORS OF THE ISRAELI AND/OR EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC EARLY WARNING STATIONS, RESPECTIVELY, OR EARLY TACTICAL WARNING AMERICAN POSITIONS, THESE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD HAVE BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION, MAP READING AND ELEMENTARY REPAIR SKILLS. THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A TANK AND AN ARMORED CAR, OR A BATTALION AS OPPOSED TO A COMPANY ON THE MOVE. SINCE THE SENSOR SYSTEMS APPROPRIATE FOR THE SINAI MISSION ARE SIMPLE, PERSONNEL NEED NOT HAVE SOPHISTICATED TRAINING. THIRD, THE MAINTENANCE OF THE SINAI FORCE, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF FOOD SERVICES, HOUSING, TRANSPORTATION, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT REPAIR WOULD REQUIRE AN



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ELEMENT OF ABOUT 50 INDIVIDUALS. WE WOULD PLAN TO CONTRACT FOR THE RECRUITMENT OF BOTH SURVEILLANCE PERSONNEL AND THE MAINTENANCE CREW FROM A PRIVATE FIRM OR FIRMS, IF SUCH PROVES FEASIBLE AS WE HOPE.

(D) THE FIELD GROUP WOULD DEPEND ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE FOR AS FEW SERVICES AS POSSIBLE. THESE COULD INCLUDE COMMON FACILITIES LIKE WATER, AIRFIELDS AND ROADS. LOGISTICAL, COMMUNICATIONS, HOUSING AND MAINTENANCE SERVICES WOULD BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE SUPPORT MISSION. THE FIELD TEAM WOULD RECEIVE LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE FROM PERSONNEL WORKING WITH OUR EMBASSIES IN CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND A THIRD COUNTRY, PERHAPS GREECE OR ITALY. THE TEAM WOULD MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION LINKS WITH WASHINGTON DIRECTLY OR THROUGH OUR EMBASSIES IN CAIRO AND TEL AVIV. THE HEAD-QUARTERS AND BASE CAMP FOR U.S. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WILL BE LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AT A LOCATION TO BE AGREED UPON WITH EGYPTIAN, ISRAELI AND UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITIES.

(E) THE U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION WOULD BE FUNDED UNDER THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (FAA) AS AMENDED. AMPLE FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE UNDER THE PRESENT FY 76 CONTINUING RESOLUTION TO FINANCE INITIAL COSTS OF THE MISSION. WE ESTIMATE THESE COSTS COULD RUN AS HIGH AS 17 MILLION DOLS FOR START-UP PAYMENTS AND AN ADDITIONAL 8 MILLION DOLS FOR RECURRING ANNUAL CHARGES. THE COSTS MAY INCREASE DEPENDING ON HOW MANY CONTRACT SERVICES WE PURCHASE. FUNDING FOR NEXT YEAR WOULD COME FROM THE MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE PACKAGE.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS


(A) THAT YOU APPROVE THE INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT CONCEPT OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 2, ABOVE.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

(B) THAT YOU AUTHORIZE US TO ESTABLISH AN INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD NOW, WHILE WE INSTITUTE OUR SEARCH FOR AN



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APPROPRIATE MISSION DIRECTOR AND SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

(C) THAT YOU AUTHORIZE US TO SET UP UNDER STATE'S DIRECTION A PILOT GROUP WHICH WILL PREPARE A LIST OF QUALIFIED CONTRACTORS AND DESIGN A DETAILED PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

(D) THAT YOU AGREE THE U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION DIRECTOR, WHEN NAMED, WILL CARRY THE TITLE OF PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THE TITLE SHOULD ENHANCE THE DIRECTOR'S ABILITY TO WORK WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE EGYPTIANS, ISRAELIS, AND UNEF.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

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 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMO: NSSM 230: US-SINAI SUPPORT MISSION
 S/S NO. Y7522173)

TO THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO, SCOWCROFT AND EAGLEBURGER

1. WE HAVE REVIEWED NSSM 230 IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR VIEWS. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE MOVE QUICKLY IF THE FEBRUARY DEPLOYMENT DEADLINE IS TO BE MET. A FURTHER DELAY WILL ALSO RISK INCREASING THE START-UP COSTS OF THE MISSION. SINCE YOU HAVE REVIEWED THE MANAGEMENT OPTIONS PRESENTED BY STATE, AID, ACDA, DEFENSE, OMB, THE DCI, AND THE NSC STAFF, WE WILL NOT PRESENT THESE AGAIN. INSTEAD WE PROPOSE YOU APPROVE THE FOLLOWING CONCEPTUAL APPROACH SO THAT WE MAY GET BUSY ORGANIZING AND LAUNCHING THE SINAI MISSION.

2. (A) WE BELIEVE THAT OUR EMPHASIS MUST BE ON CONTRACTING OUT TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY THE GREAT BULK OF THE WORK TO BE PERFORMED BY THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION. OUR PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR A SINGLE CONTRACTOR WHO WOULD THEN BE AUTHORIZED TO SUB-CONTRACT AS NECESSARY FOR INDIVIDUAL SERVICES. BUT A FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER TO USE A SINGLE CONTRACTOR OR A NUMBER OF CONTRACTORS FOR INDIVIDUAL PIECES OF THE EFFORT MUST AWAIT DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH POTENTIAL CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONS.

(B) WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE A THIN OVERLAY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO PROVIDE THE CONTRACTOR (OR CONTRACTORS) WITH POLITICAL GUIDANCE. WE RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, YOUR DESIRE THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
 State Dept Guidelines *12/1/03*

By *HR* NARA Date *8/1/10*

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NOT BE DIRECTLY IDENTIFIED AS THE OVERLORD OF THE OPERATION, AND HAVE TAILORED OUR SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION ACCORDINGLY.

(C) IT IS OUR STRONG FEELING THAT THE BEST WAY TO ACCOMPLISH OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES IS TO TAKE A LEAF FROM THE VIET-NAM REFUGEE TASK FORCE BOOK, STRUCTURING THE POLITICAL OVERLAY AS FOLLOWS:

(I) MISSION DIRECTOR: WE SHOULD APPOINT A REASONABLY WELL KNOWN MAN--PERHAPS FROM OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT--TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION AND SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE. HE, LIKE DEAN BROWN BEFORE HIM, WOULD BE IDENTIFIED IN THE PUBLIC MIND AS THE MAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISSION; HE WOULD TAKE HIS DIRECTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND YOU. THE MISSION DIRECTOR, WOULD IN ADDITION TO NORMAL MANAGERIAL DUTIES, BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST CONGRESSIONAL APPEARANCES, AND FOR DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS AND PUBLIC. HE WOULD THUS TAKE THE FOCUS OF COMMENT AND CRITICISM AWAY FROM ANY PARTICULAR AGENCY.

(II) INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD: AGAIN, AS IN THE CASE OF THE VIET-NAM TASK FORCE, WE WOULD ESTABLISH THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOARD OF DIRECTORS MADE UP OF SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL INTERESTED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (E.G., STATE, DOD, CIA, ACDA, ETC.). THE MANAGEMENT BOARD WOULD BE CHAIRED BY THE MISSION DIRECTOR WHO AS THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD, AT LEAST IN THE EARLY STAGES, BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION STRUCTURE. IT WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, BE A USEFUL TOOL IN EXAMINING THE QUALIFICATIONS OF POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS AND RECOMMENDING WHAT CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE HIRED. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT AFTER THE INITIAL ORGANIZATION STAGE OF THE SUPPORT MISSION HAS PASSED, THIS MANAGEMENT BOARD WOULD BE LESS IMPORTANT AND EVER LESS INVOLVED IN DAY-TO-DAY MISSION OPERATIONS. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BOTH IN THE INITIAL STAGES AND LATER ON, SERVE TO EMPHASIZE THE INTER-AGENCY NATURE OF THE EFFORT, THUS ALSO FOCUSING ATTENTION AWAY FROM ANY PARTICULAR AGENCY.

(III) PILOT PLANNING GROUP: THERE WILL BE AN ALMOST IMMEDIATE NEED FOR STAFF SUPPORT FOR BOTH THE PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD. IN FACT, EVEN BEFORE THESE TWO INSTITUTIONS ARE ESTABLISHED AND MANNED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE CREATED A SMALL STAFF TO BEGIN WORK ON THE DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION, METHODS OF CONTACTING CONTRACTORS, ETC. THUS WE RECOMMEND THE SETTING UP, UNDER STATE CHAIRMANSHIP, OF A SMALL INTER-AGENCY-STAFFED PILOT PLANNING GROUP, ITS FIRST TASK



WOULD BE TO DESIGN A DETAILED CONCEPT AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION, WHICH WOULD COMPILE AND REVIEW A LIST OF CONTRACTORS, AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO PERFORM THE MYRIAD HOUSEKEEPING AND TECHNICAL SERVICES THAT WILL CERTAINLY BE NECESSARY IN THE EARLY STAGES AND MAY PROVE TO BE NECESSARY EVEN THEREAFTER.

(D) WE DO NOT HAVE A MISSION DIRECTOR IDENTIFIED YET. WE WILL SUBMIT TO YOU SHORTLY A LIST OF CANDIDATES. WE HAVE IN MIND SOMEONE NO LONGER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO KNOWS HOW TO DEAL WITH CONTRACTORS AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY AND WHO CAN DRAW TO HIMSELF AND BEAR UP UNDER CRITICISM FROM THE PARTIES, THE PRESS AND CONGRESS. WE WILL ALSO BE LOOKING FOR TWO OR THREE MEN TO SERVE IN THE SINAI. THEIR JOB WILL BE TO MAKE SURE THE FIELD PROGRAM IS WELL AND RESPONSIBLY RUN.

(E) THUS, THE REAL ISSUE BEFORE US NOW IS WHETHER THE ABOVE OUTLINE OF AN ORGANIZATION IS AN ACCEPTABLE FRAMEWORK ON WHICH TO BUILD. IT, IN OUR VIEW, MEETS THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT OF REMOVING THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION FROM CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH ANY SINGLE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHILE PROVIDING THE FLEXIBILITY NECESSARY TO GO ABOUT THE CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION, RECOGNIZING THAT THERE WILL BE A HOST OF DETAILS AND PROBLEMS WE CANNOT NOW FORESEE. THE PARAGRAPHS THAT FOLLOW ARE AN ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE HOW THE SUPPORT MISSION MIGHT FUNCTION; THEY SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE READ AS PURELY ILLUSTRATIVE AND SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL MODIFICATION WITH TIME AND EXPERIENCE.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(A) THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION WILL BE AN AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION WHICH WILL DISCHARGE THE SURVEILLANCE RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO U.S. CIVILIANS UNDER THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AND THE RELATED U.S. PROPOSAL WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY CONGRESS. THE MISSION WILL HAVE A WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS, A FIELD TEAM IN THE SINAI PASSES AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SITES IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO AN INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD WHICH WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE, DEFENSE, THE DCI, ACDA AND AID. THE MISSION WILL WORK UNDER NSC SUPERVISION TO ENSURE FULL INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION. THE MANAGEMENT BOARD WILL BE CHAIRED BY THE MISSION DIRECTOR. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WILL PROVIDE IT WITH POLITICAL POLICY GUIDANCE. THE MISSION WILL BE HEADED BY A DIRECTOR AND A PERMANENT STAFF WHO WILL FURNISH THE FIELD ELEMENT



WITH POLICY GUIDANCE, OVERALL ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTION AND FUNDING. THE HEADQUARTERS STAFF WILL DISSEMINATE THE FIELD MISSION'S REPORTING TO APPROPRIATE AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON.

(B) THE INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING LIAISON BETWEEN THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION AND THE FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SURE THAT TECHNICAL GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FROM THOSE AGENCIES WAS MADE AVAILABLE RAPIDLY. IN ORGANIZING THE SINAI MISSION, THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DCI AND DOD WOULD BE CALLED UPON IN PARTICULAR. THOSE AGENCIES ARE UNIQUELY CAPABLE OF DETERMINING THE TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS OF CONTRACTORS AND IDENTIFYING THOSE ADAPTED TO THE PURPOSES OF THE SINAI MISSION. IN SOME CASES THESE AGENCIES HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY SENSORS, WHICH ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE ON THE PRIVATE MARKET. THE SAME AGENCIES HAVE PERSONNEL WITH SKILLS NECESSARY TO HELP THE MISSION PLAN AND ORGANIZE ITS OPERATIONS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY GUIDANCE WOULD BE PROVIDED AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL THROUGH THE INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD IN WHICH IT WOULD HAVE A LEAD ROLE AS WELL AS THROUGH U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO OVERSEE THE SINAI FIELD OPERATION.

(C) IN THE SINAI A THREE-ELEMENT GROUP WILL BE DEPLOYED. THE FIRST ELEMENT WILL CONSIST OF A SMALL TOP-LEVEL, SUPERVISORY MANAGEMENT TEAM. WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE DIRECT-HIRE U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL. THEY WILL SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIELD GROUP WHO WOULD BE LARGELY CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. THE MANAGEMENT TEAM WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LIAISON WITH EGYPTIAN, ISRAELI AND UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITIES AND SHOULD HAVE THEREFORE POLITICAL SKILLS AND AREA EXPERIENCE REQUIRED FOR SUCH A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE FUNCTION. WERE THE MANAGEMENT GROUP TO BE MADE UP OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS, WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THE SAME KIND OF DISCIPLINE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF PERFORMANCE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL. SECOND, ABOUT 75 INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE RECRUITED TO MAN THE AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE SITES AND THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI POSITIONS, ABOUT 5 MEN WOULD MAN EACH SITE NIGHT AND DAY. THE INDIVIDUALS SELECTED FOR SURVEILLANCE ASSIGNMENTS WILL NEED BACKGROUND IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES, THOUGH NOT VERY EXTENSIVE. WHETHER THEY ARE MONITORS OF THE ISRAELI AND/OR EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC EARLY WARNING STATIONS, RESPECTIVELY, OR EARLY TACTICAL WARNING AMERICAN POSITIONS, THESE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD HAVE BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION, MAP READING AND ELEMENTARY REPAIR SKILLS. THEY SHOULD BE ABLE



TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A TANK AND AN ARMORED CAR, OR A BATTALION AS OPPOSED TO A COMPANY ON THE MOVE. SINCE THE SENSOR SYSTEMS APPROPRIATE FOR THE SINAI MISSION ARE SIMPLE, PERSONNEL NEED NOT HAVE SOPHISTICATED TRAINING. THIRD, THE MAINTENANCE OF THE SINAI FORCE, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF FOOD SERVICES, HOUSING, TRANSPORTATION, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT REPAIR WOULD REQUIRE AN ELEMENT OF ABOUT 50 INDIVIDUALS. WE WOULD PLAN TO CONTRACT FOR THE RECRUITMENT OF BOTH SURVEILLANCE PERSONNEL AND THE MAINTENANCE CREW FROM A PRIVATE FIRM OR FIRMS, IF SUCH PROVES FEASIBLE AS WE HOPE.

(D) THE FIELD GROUP WOULD DEPEND ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE FOR AS FEW SERVICES AS POSSIBLE. THESE COULD INCLUDE COMMON FACILITIES LIKE WATER, AIRFIELDS AND ROADS. LOGISTICAL, COMMUNICATIONS, HOUSING AND MAINTENANCE SERVICES WOULD BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE SUPPORT MISSION. THE FIELD TEAM WOULD RECEIVE LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE FROM PERSONNEL WORKING WITH OUR EMBASSIES IN CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND A THIRD COUNTRY, PERHAPS GREECE OR ITALY. THE TEAM WOULD MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION LINKS WITH WASHINGTON DIRECTLY OR THROUGH OUR EMBASSIES IN CAIRO AND TEL AVIV. THE HEAD-QUARTERS AND BASE CAMP FOR U.S. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WILL BE LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AT A LOCATION TO BE AGREED UPON WITH EGYPTIAN, ISRAELI AND UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITIES.

(E) THE U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION WOULD BE FUNDED UNDER THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (FAA) AS AMENDED. AMPLE FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE UNDER THE PRESENT FY 76 CONTINUING RESOLUTION TO FINANCE INITIAL COSTS OF THE MISSION. WE ESTIMATE THESE COSTS COULD RUN AS HIGH AS 10 MILLION DOLS FOR START-UP PAYMENTS AND AN ADDITIONAL 8 MILLION DOLS FOR RECURRING ANNUAL CHARGES. THE COSTS MAY INCREASE DEPENDING ON HOW MANY CONTRACT SERVICES WE PURCHASE. FUNDING FOR NEXT YEAR WOULD COME FROM THE MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE PACKAGE.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

(A) THAT YOU APPROVE THE INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT CONCEPT OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 2, ABOVE.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

(B) THAT YOU AUTHORIZE US TO ESTABLISH AN INTER-AGENCY MANAGEMENT BOARD NOW, WHILE WE INSTITUTE OUR SEARCH FOR AN



APPROPRIATE MISSION DIRECTOR AND SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

APPROVE: DISAPPROVE:

(C) THAT YOU AUTHORIZE US TO SET UP UNDER STATE'S DIRECTION A PILOT GROUP WHICH WILL PREPARE A LIST OF QUALIFIED CONTRACTORS AND DESIGN A DETAILED PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

APPROVE: DISAPPROVE:

(D) THAT YOU AGREE THE U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION DIRECTOR, WHEN NAMED, WILL CARRY THE TITLE OF PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THE TITLE SHOULD ENHANCE THE DIRECTOR'S ABILITY TO WORK WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE EGYPTIANS, ISRAELIS, AND UNEF.

APPROVE: DISAPPROVE:

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), OGEN

SUBJECT: PIKE COMMITTEE OPENING STATEMENT

FOR BREMER FROM EAGLEBURGER




1. I HAVE REVIEWED A FIRST DRAFT OF THE KISSINGER STATEMENT BEFORE THE PIKE COMMITTEE AND AM VERY UNHAPPY WITH IT. IT NEEDS A GREAT DEAL OF WORK AND IT IS THEREFORE USELESS TO SEND YOU WHAT WE NOW HAVE. I HOPE TO HAVE A DRAFT TO GIVE TO THE SECRETARY WHEN HE GETS OFF THE PLANE TOMORROW NIGHT. IN ANY EVENT I WILL CERTAINLY HAVE SOMETHING FOR HIM BY SATURDAY MORNING.

2. I WILL SEND YOU TONIGHT AN ANALYSIS OF WHERE I THINK WE NOW STAND WITH THE PIKE COMMITTEE; I RECOMMEND YOU HAVE THE SECRETARY READ IT SOMETIME TOMORROW ON THE RETURN FLIGHT. INGERSOLL

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E.O. 12958 (as amended), SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*
By *NR* NARA Date *8/11/10*

WH



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 7609

PAGE 01 STATE 253189 TOSEC 160323

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/WE:MLDURKEE:MJK
APPROVED BY EUR - MR. HARTMAN
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O 240043Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 253189 TOSEC 160323

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, SP


SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY MESSAGES FOR TRANSFER OF POWER IN SPAIN

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

State Review
1219103

By HR NARA, Date 8/11/10



FOLLOWING DRAFT MESSAGES ARE PROPOSED FOR USE IN THE EVENT FRANCO TRANSFERS POWER TO JUAN CARLOS. NSC INFORMED BUT HAS NOT SEEN TEXTS.

1. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES

A. "DEAR GENERAL FRANCO: I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I UNDERSTAND HOW DIFFICULT IT MUST HAVE BEEN FOR YOU TO DECIDE TO HAND OVER RESPONSIBILITY TO THE NEW LEADERSHIP. I HOPE THIS ACT OF STATESMANSHIP WILL SPEE YOUR RECOVERY.

I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT MY GOVERNMENT WILL DO ITS UTMOST TO WORK TOGETHER WITH SPAIN'S NEW LEADERS IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD. WITH BEST WISHES", SIGNED: GERALD R. FORD
"R HIGHNESS: I KNOW I CAN SPEAK FOR ALL AMERICANS IN OFFERING OUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AS YOU ASSUME YOUR NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 253189 TOSEC 160323

YOU ARE AWARE OF OUR SINCERE DESIRE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU TO BUILD ON THE ALREADY-STRONG BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO EXPAND IT AND

MAKE IT EVEN STRONGER AND MORE ENDURING. YOU ALSO CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DO ALL IT CAN TO HELP STRENGTHEN SPAIN'S ROLE IN THE WESTERN COMMUNITY. WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS AND BEST WISHES. SIGNED: GERALD R. FORD."

C-THIS MESSAGE TO ARIAS MAY BE SUPERFLUOUS IF HE RESIGNS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT ITS OMISSION WOULD BE NOTICED.)

"DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT MY GOVERNMENT AND INDEED ALL AMERICANS WISH NOTHING MORE THAN THAT SPAIN WILL TRANSCEND THE PRESENT DIFFICULT PERIOD AND MOVE SMOOTHLY TOWARD ITS PROMISING FUTURE. SPAIN'S NEW GOVERNMENT CAN RELY ON OUR SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING IN THIS SITUATION. WITH BEST WISHES. SIGNED: GERALD R. FORD"

II. MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER:

"DEAR MR. MINISTER: PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT YOU CAN COUNT ON OUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT IN THIS DELICATE MOMENT. WE STAND READY TO DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO HELP STRENGTHEN OUR BIL TERAL RELATIONS AND SPAIN'S ROLE IN THE WESTERN COMMUNITY. -WITH WARM REGARDS. SIGNED: HENRY A. KISSINGER."

III. PUBLIC STATEMENTS


A. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

THE PRESIDENT HAS LEARNED THAT GENERAL FRANCO HAS TRANSFERRED HIS POWERS AS CHIEF OF STATE TO PRINCE JUAN CARLOS. THE PRESIDENT HOPES GENERAL FRANCO WILL RECOVER HIS HEALTH NOW THAT THIS DIFFICULT DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN. THE PRESIDENT HAS SENT PRINCE JUAN CARLOS A PERSONAL



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 STATE 253189 TOSEC 160323

MESSAGE EXPRESSING HIS CONFIDENCE, OFFERING BEST WISHES FOR THE FUTURE, AND LOOKING FORWARD TO FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

B. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY

THE SECRETARY HAS LEARNED THAT GENERAL FRANCO'S WEAKENED CONDITION HAS LED TO THE TRANSFER OF POWERS OF CHIEF OF STATE TO PRINCE JUAN CARLOS. THIS ORDERLY CHANG OF LEADERSHIP WILL

OBVIOUSLY NOT AFFECT THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE U.S. THE SECRETARY IS CONFIDENT THAT SPAIN, UNDER ITS NEW LEADERSHIP, FACES A PROMISING FUTURE AND THAT OUR CLOSE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WILL BE EVEN FURTHER STRENGTHENED. INGERSOLL



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 DE RUEHC #3189 2970153
 O 240043Z OCT 75 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3417

~~SECRET~~ STATE 253189 TOSEC 160323

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, SP

SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY MESSAGES FOR TRANSFER OF POWER IN
 SPAIN

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
 State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *HR* NARA, Date *8/11/10*

PSN:051166

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DTG:240043Z OCT 75

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C-THIS MESSAGE TO ARIAS MAY BE SUPERFLUOUS IF HE RESIGNS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT ITS OMISSION WOULD BE NOTICED.)

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3418

~~SECRET~~ STATE 253305 TOSEC 100324

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, EG

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMO: STATUS OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION ISSUE
(S/S NO. 7522203)
REF: CAIRO 10726

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. I AM REPEATING TO YOU CAIRO 10726 IN WHICH FAHMY HAS SAID TO OUR CHARGE THAT HE EXPECTS A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SADAT VISIT. HE SAID THIS EVEN THOUGH HERMAN HAS INDICATED TO HIM IN RECENT DAYS THAT THIS IS PROBABLY UNLIKELY. YOU RECALL HE ASKED US TO TRY OUT THE FAHMY FORMULA ON THE ISRAELIS. WE HAVE DONE SO, AND IN FACT HAVE PRESSED THEM TO ACCEPT IT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT WOULD BE A DISASTER TO GO ON THE HILL WITH ONLY AN EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT. DINITZ HAS INFORMED ME THAT RABIN IS CONVENING A MEETING OF HIS EXPERTS TODAY, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24. I WILL FOLLOW UP WITH DINITZ AGAIN TODAY TO PRESS FOR AN IMMEDIATE REPLY. NEVERTHELESS, YOU WILL RECALL OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT EVEN IF WE GET AGREEMENT ON COMPARABILITY BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE ISRAELIS, WHICH IS UNLIKELY, THE MOOD ON THE HILL IS

SUCH THAT WITHOUT THE FULLEST KIND OF INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS TO PREPARE THE GROUNDWORK COMING UP WITH A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT COULD SOUR THE ENTIRE SADAT VISIT AND OPEN THE ADMINISTRATION TO THE CHARGE THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WAS HURRIED THROUGH BECAUSE OF THE HIGH LEVEL VISIT. AS UNJUSTIFIED AND



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *HR* NARA, Date *8/11/10*

MENT. PUTTING ASIDE THE DIMONA ISSUE, WHICH MAY NOT BE RESOLVABLE IMMEDIATELY, WE WOULD HOPE TO RESOLVE THE OTHER REMAINING ISSUES THROUGH DISCUSSIONS ON A TECHNICAL LEVEL AND LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE WITH THE EGYPTIAN TECHNICAL TEAM IN SHINGTON.

IN ANY EVENT, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF EGYPT AND THE US NOT TO HIGHLIGHT OUR NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE VISIT OR IN THE COMMUNIQUE THAT WE ISSUE AT THE END OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT. GIVEN THE STRONG SENSITIVITY THAT EXISTS IN THE CONGRESS ABOUT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND THE UNFORTUNATE PAST REACTIONS TO OUR PROPOSED NEW AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL, WE NEED TO CONSULT CAREFULLY WITH CONGRESS AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THERE.

ABOVE WAS DRAFTED PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF REFTEL. NEED TO SET FAHMY STRAIGHT ON U.S. THINKING IS NOW ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE.

END TEXT.

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TELEGRAM

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 253352 TOSEC 160325

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), OGEN

SUBJECT: THE PIKE COMMITTEE -- AN INTERIM ANALYSIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN ATTEMPT ON MY PART TO ANALYZE FOR YOU WHERE I THINK WE STAND WITH REGARD TO THE PIKE COMMITTEE AT THE PRESENT MOMENT. THIS IS A MOVING TARGET AND WILL REMAIN SO UNTIL AFTER YOUR OCTOBER 31 APPEARANCE. IT IS BASED ON A SERIES OF CONVERSATIONS WITH SOME OUTSIDE THE PIKE COMMITTEE (TIP O'NEILL, DOC MORGAN, DANTE FASCELL, WAYNE HAYS, CLEM ZABLOCKI AND PAUL FINDLEY) AND SOME ON THE COMMITTEE (REPUBLICANS KASTEN (HE FLEW WITH YOU TO MILWAUKEE) AND TREEN). I HAVE THUS FAR LIMITED MY CONVERSATION WITH PIKE COMMITTEE MEMBERS BECAUSE FIRST OF ALL I DID NOT WANT TO BE ACCUSED OF LOBBYING THEM IN ADVANCE OF THE TUESDAY VOTE ON HOW TO RESPOND TO YOUR LETTER AND SECONDLY BECAUSE AT LEAST WITH SOME OF THEM I AM ABOUT AS POPULAR AS

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By NR NARA, Date 8/11/10

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 253352 TOSEC 160325

A BAD CASE OF THE SEVEN-YEAR ITCH. I DO THINK WE SHOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ALMOST ALL OF THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE MEMBERS NEXT WEEK, IN ADVANCE OF YOUR APPEARANCE, BUT WILL TALK TO YOU ABOUT THAT IN MORE DETAIL WHEN YOU RETURN. CERTAINLY MCCLORY (THE RANKING REPUBLICAN) NEEDS TO BE TALKED TO.

2. ATTITUDES ON THE PIKE COMMITTEE: THE OCTOBER 21 EIGHT TO FIVE VOTE IN FAVOR OF INVITING YOU TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE CAME AS THE RESULT OF A COMBINATION OF FACTORS. THE INFORMATION I HAVE INDICATES THAT SOME LIKE MCCLORY, KASTEN, TREEN AND MILFORD (A DEMOCRAT) VOTED AS THEY DID BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE YOU ARE CORRECT ON THE BASIC ISSUE. OTHERS SUCH AS ASPIN, MURPHY, LEHMAN, AND JOHNSON (A REPUBLICAN) VOTED AS THEY DID BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE PIKE HAS PICKED THE WRONG ISSUE AND WOULD LOSE ON IT IF HE TOOK IT TO THE FLOOR. ASPIN, I AM TOLD, IS AS ANXIOUS AS PIKE (I'LL GET TO HIM IN A MOMENT) FOR A CONFRONTATION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION BUT THINKS THE BOYATT MEMO IS A LOSER. MURPHY AND LEHMAN -- AND PARTICULARLY MURPHY -- MAY YET BE CONVINCED THAT YOU ARE RIGHT ON THE MERITS. FINALLY, PIKE AND DELLUMS WERE AT THE CENTER OF THOSE WHO WANT TO GO TO THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE ON THE ISSUE OF THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT; AS KASTEN SAID TO ME, "PIKE WANTS PUBLICITY SO BAD HE CAN TASTE IT."

3. THUS MY INTERIM READING OF THE COMMITTEE ITSELF INDICATES THAT WE ARE PROBABLY IN REASONABLY GOOD SHAPE AND THAT MUCH WILL DEPEND ON HOW YOU COME OUT OF THE OCTOBER 31 APPEARANCE. PIKE WILL CLEARLY TRY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT YOU AND THE DEPARTMENT ARE INTRANSIGENT FAR BEYOND THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE BOYATT DISSENT MEMO AND THE ISSUE OF WHAT JUNIOR AND MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICERS MAY TESTIFY ABOUT. THE WAVERERS WILL BE MUCH IMPACTED UPON BY PIKE'S ABILITY TO MAKE THIS CASE.

4. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHAT PIKE'S TACTICS WITH THE COMMITTEE WILL BE FOLLOWING YOUR APPEARANCE. THE EXTREME WOULD BE FOR HIM TO ASK THE COMMITTEE TO REQUEST THE FULL HOUSE TO VOTE A CONTEMPT CITATION AGAINST YOU. THERE ARE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES OF THIS EXTREME SUCH AS A "RESOLUTION

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Department of State

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
OF INQUIRY" WHICH WOULD ASK THE FULL HOUSE SPECIFICALLY TO VOTE A REQUEST OF YOU FOR THE BOYATT MEMO (IN SUCH A CASE THE RESOLUTION WOULD PROBABLY BE REFERRED TO DOC MORGAN'S COMMITTEE SINCE THE PIKE COMMITTEE HAS NO LEGISLATIVE WRIT). ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE FOR PIKE TO GO TO THE FLOOR AND REQUEST A HOUSE RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING ITS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMMITTEE AND ITS WORK AND CALLING UPON YOU TO COOPERATE WITH THE COMMITTEE. IN SUM, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ANTICIPATE HOW THE RULES COMMITTEE WOULD TREAT A REQUEST FROM PIKE UNTIL WE KNOW THE EXACT TEXT OF THAT REQUEST.

5. THE SITUATION IN THE HOUSE: TO OVERSIMPLIFY, THE GENERAL VIEW OF THOSE I HAVE TALKED TO OUTSIDE THE COMMITTEE IS THAT THE CHANCES OF FULL HOUSE PASSAGE OF ANY CONTEMPT

CITATION IS MINIMAL. THE ODDS BEGIN TO CHANGE A BIT, I AM TOLD, TO THE DEGREE THAT PIKE WATERS DOWN WHATEVER RESOLUTION IT IS HE PUTS TO THE HOUSE. WAYNE HAYS AND CLEM ZABLOCKI WILL FIGHT HARD FOR YOU ON ALMOST ANY RESOLUTION. DOC MORGAN WILL PROBABLY DO THE SAME AS WOULD DANTE FASCELL. TIP O'NEILL WAS NONCOMMITTAL WHILE JOHN BRADEMAS SOUNDED MODERATELY SYMPATHETIC. AGAIN, IN SOME OF THESE CASES A GREAT DEAL WOULD DEPEND ON THE CHARACTER OF THE PIKE REQUEST TO THE FULL HOUSE. ZABLOCKI SAID THAT ANY REALLY TOUGH RESOLUTION, CERTAINLY INCLUDING A REQUEST FOR A FINDING OF CONTEMPT, WOULD PROBABLY GO "ABOUT AS THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE FOR NEDZI WENT." YOU WILL RECALL THAT ON JUNE 16 THE SPEAKER ASKED THE HOUSE WHETHER THE LETTER OF RESIGNATION OF NEDZI FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OUGHT TO BE ACCEPTED. THE VOTE WAS NO 290, YES 64, AND "PRESENT" 44.

6. IN SUM, EVEN SHOULD THE PIKE COMMITTEE VOTE SOME FORM OF RESOLUTION THE CHANCES NOW, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY VERY HEAVY LOBBYING, ARE THAT IT WOULD NOT PASS THE FULL HOUSE. DOC MORGAN POINTED OUT IN BOB MCCLOSKEY'S AND MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM THAT THE CHANCES OF PASSAGE WOULD BE REDUCED THE LONGER THE DEBATE ON ANY SUCH RESOLUTION. HE AND SEVERAL OTHERS DID SAY THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME "ANTI KISSINGER" FEELING AND THAT THIS WOULD AFFECT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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
SOME VOTES BUT THE GENERAL CONSENSUS WAS THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A MAJOR FACTOR.

7. YOUR APPEARANCE ON OCTOBER 31: IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT PIKE AT LEAST WILL TRY TO COME AT YOU WITH A SHOTGUN APPROACH. THE OPEN PORTION OF YOUR APPEARANCE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF THE BOYATT MEMORANDUM AND THE RULES WE HAVE ESTABLISHED ON TESTIMONY FROM JUNIOR AND MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICERS. BUT WHEN THE COMMITTEE MOVES INTO EXECUTIVE SESSION, I THINK YOU MUST EXPECT A SUBSTANTIAL ATTEMPT ON PIKE'S PART TO DRAG IN THE KURDISH ISSUE, ANGOLA, ITALY AND ANYTHING ELSE HE CAN TRY TO EMBARRASS YOU WITH. I DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT THERE WILL BE ANY GREAT INTEREST IN CYPRUS (KASTEN HAS ALREADY SAID THE COMMITTEE HAS MORE THAN ENOUGH INFORMATION ON CYPRUS). ONE OF THE THINGS WE WILL WANT TO DO NEXT WEEK IS WORK AS HARD AS WE CAN WITH YOUR SUPPORTERS ON THE COMMITTEE TO SEE THAT THEY AT LEAST DIRECT THEIR QUESTIONS TO ISSUES SUCH AS CYPRUS, THE BOYATT MEMORANDUM, AND THE GENERAL WITNESS RULE. BILL HYLAND AND I HAVE ALREADY TALKED ABOUT THE NEED TO KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THE TIME RUNNING UP TO OCTOBER 31 ON EXACTLY WHAT THE PIKE COMMITTEE HAS RECEIVED IN THE WAY OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON

THE WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES WHICH MAY BE PUT TO YOU. SINCE THE COMMITTEE WILL BE HOLDING HEARINGS IN ADVANCE OF YOUR APPEARANCE, THIS ALSO WILL BE A MOVING TARGET.

8. COMMENT: AS MUCH AS ANY APPEARANCE YOU HAVE YET MADE BEFORE A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, THE OUTCOME WILL DEPEND VERY MUCH ON YOUR PERFORMANCE. PIKE WILL TRY TO GET YOU TO EXPAND THE LIMITATIONS ON INFORMATION WHICH CAN BE TURNED OVER TO THE COMMITTEE BY PUSHING YOU ON TURNING OVER DOCUMENTS, NODIS TELEGRAMS, ETC. HE WILL ALSO PROBABLY TRY TO GET YOU TO SUPPORT: 1) THE DELETIONS WE HAVE MADE IN DOCUMENTS WE HAVE ALREADY TURNED OVER TO THE COMMITTEE AND 2) THE REFUSAL OF JUNIOR AND MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICERS, IN INTERVIEWS WITH THE STAFF, TO ANSWER CERTAIN QUESTIONS. WE WILL REVIEW WITH YOU WHAT INFORMATION HAS BEEN DELETED AND WHAT QUESTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ANSWERED

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Department of State

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PAGE 05 STATE 253352 T0SEC 160325

AFTER YOU RETURN. THIS IS NOT A MAJOR ISSUE, SINCE IN FACT YOU CAN APPEAR TO BE SWEET REASONABLENESS ITSELF BY PERHAPS AGREEING TO EXPAND THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION "YOUR SUBORDINATES" HAVE THUS FAR TURNED OVER. ADDITIONALLY, I THINK THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION THAT YOU WILL HAVE TO SAY THAT I WAS EXCESSIVELY HARSH AND RIGID IN MY APPEARANCE BEFORE THE PIKE COMMITTEE. THAT ALSO MAY PROVE TACTICALLY USEFUL TO YOU (BECAUSE OF THIS IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT I NOT ACCOMPANY YOU TO THE COMMITTEE HEARING).

9. WE SHOULD SPEND A GOOD BIT OF TIME NEXT WEEK CONTACTING VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE TO ASSURE THEM OF YOUR WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE (ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD, AS WELL, REAFFIRM YOUR DECISION NOT TO TURN OVER THE BOYATT MEMORANDUM AND TO LIMIT THE KINDS OF TESTIMONY THAT JUNIOR AND MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICERS MAY GIVE). WE OUGHT ALSO TO SPEND A GOOD BIT OF TIME EDUCATING AS MANY FRIENDLY REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS OUTSIDE THE PIKE COMMITTEE AS WE CAN. THIS IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE I AM CONVINCED, ON THE BASIS OF MY CONVERSATIONS THUS FAR, THAT OTIS PIKE IS EXTREMELY UNPOPULAR AND THAT THE MCCARTHYISM PLOY, CAREFULLY USED, IS STRIKING A RESPONSIVE CHORD.

10. IN THAT REGARD I UNDERSTAND THAT PIKE HAS BEEN VERY EXERCISED OVER THE STRONG SUPPORT YOU HAVE RECEIVED IN THE PRESS. WHILE THIS REPORTEDLY HAS MADE HIM MAD AS A HORNET, IT HAS ALSO MADE HIM NERVOUS. I UNDERSTAND AS WELL THAT IT HAS HAD A MAJOR, AND USEFUL, IMPACT ON MOST MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. INGERSOLL



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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #3359 2970500
O 240433Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3423

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 253359 TOSEC 160328

FOLLOWING USUN 5287 SENT ACTION SECSTATE OCT 23; REPEATED
TO YOU QUOTE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ USUN 5287

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF

SUBJECT: LETTER TO SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY GENERAL REQUESTING
URGENT US ASSISTANCE IN MEETING ADDITIONAL UNEF EXPENSES.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM
SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM WHICH WAS RECEIVED FOLLOWING
SC ADOPTION OF UNEF EXTENSION RESOLUTION: QUOTE:

DEAR HENRY,

AS YOU KNOW, THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS NOW DEALT WITH
THE QUESTION OF THE EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WE ARE
THEREFORE IN A POSITION TO GO FORWARD FORMALLY WITH THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AS FAR AS UNEF IS
CONCERNED.

YOU MAY RECALL THAT DURING OUR TALK ON 5 SEPTEMBER JUST
AFTER YOU HAD RETURNED FROM YOUR SUCCESSFUL MISSION TO THE
MIDDLE EAST, I INQUIRED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING
SUBSTANTIAL EXTRA ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER
TO MEET SOME OF THE ADDITIONAL EXPENSES WHICH UNAVOIDABLY ARISE
FROM THE EXTENDED MANDATE OF UNEF, AT THAT TIME YOU KINDLY
UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO THIS QUESTION AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY.
SINCE THEN, MY COLLEAGUES HERE HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF TALKS

THE SUBJECT WITH THE UNITED STATES MISSION AND WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PENTAGON.

THIS MATTER IS NOW OF CONSIDERABLE URGENCY, IN PARTICULAR
THE REQUIREMENT FOR HELICOPTERS, STOL AIRCRAFT AND A SMALL
NAVAL UNIT SHOULD BE FULFILLED IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IF THE
AGREEMENT IS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DETAILED
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE PROTOCOL. IN ADDITION TO ASKING THE
UNITED STATES FOR HELP, I HAVE MADE APPROACHES TO A NUMBER OF
OTHER GOVERNMENTS FOR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE, AND HAVE ALSO

DECLASSIFIED

EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

State Review
12/9/03

By HR NARA, Date 8/11/10



PSN:051289

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TOR:297/05:04Z

DTG:240433Z OCT 75

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~***** COPY

ASKED THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IF IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A NAVAL UNIT. I DO NOT HAVE ANY DEFINITE ANSWERS TO THESE APPROACHES AS YET, BUT I AM HOPING THAT NOW THAT THE UNEF MANDATE HAS BEEN EXTENDED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, POSITIVE RESPONSES WILL BE FORTHCOMING AT LEAST TO SOME OF MY REQUESTS.

I SHOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO TO EXPEDITE A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN RELATION AT LEAST TO SOME OF THE ITEMS ON THE LIST WHICH HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES MISSION BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, AS I MENTIONED BEFORE, HELICOPTERS AND LIGHT AIRCRAFT ARE A MATTER OF PARTICULAR URGENCY, BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER ITEMS BESIDES.

I SHOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS IMPORTANT MATTER.

WITH WARM REGARDS,
YOURS SINCERELY,

KURT WALDHEIM

UNQUOTE
MOYNIHAN UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT



OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #3361 2970831
O 240813Z OCT 75 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 3424

INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 2892
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5415
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0451

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 253361 TOSEC 160329

NODIS
FOL REPEAT MADRID 7413 SENT ACTION SECSTATE OCT 24, 1975

QUOTE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MADRID 7413

NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR: PBOR: MO, SP, SS
SUBJECT: SAHARA
REF: RABAT 5115, RABAT 5114

1. I SAW CORTINA THIS EVENING AS A RESULT OF A REQUEST I HAD MADE YESTERDAY TO OBTAIN AN UPDATING ON THE SAHARA SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF SOLIS' VISIT.
2. I SAID I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SPANISH POLICY ON THE SAHARA HAD PERHAPS CHANGED. CORTINA SAID NO, THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE. FROM THE BEGINNING SPAIN HAD ALWAYS SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF THERE WAS A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY (THIS IS CORRECT). HASSAN'S MARCH IS JUST THAT CORTINA SAID A THREAT TO THE PEACE.
3. CORTINA WENT ON TO SAY THAT WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD NOT TAKE FIRM ACTION TO END THE THREAT TO THE PEACE, SPAIN WAS FACED WITH THE NEED, IN THE ABSENCE OF U.N. ACTION, TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS IN LINE WITH ITS DETERMINATION TO GET OUT OF THE SAHARA PEACEFULLY AND THUS HAD MOVED TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOROCCO. INDEED, CORTINA SAID, THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION JUST PASSED MADE REFERENCE TO THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.
4. CORTINA SAID THE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WERE A RESULT OF



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
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By HR NARA, Date 8/11/10

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DTG:240813Z OCT 75

*****~~CONFIDENTIAL~~***** COPY

THE FAILURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE ADEQUATE ACTION. HE RECOGNIZED THE ALGERIAN INTEREST AND THE FACT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT IMPOSED ON THE SAHARAN PEOPLE BUT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF THE EXERCISE NOW, ACCORDING TO CORTINA, HAD TO BE TO PPND SOME WAY TO GET OUT OF THE DANGEROUS IMPASSE WITH THE MOROCCANS. HE ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT IF SPAIN AND MOROCCO SHOULD REACH AGREEMENT, ALGERIA MIGHT WELL BE DISCOMFITTED. HE ADDED THAT SPAIN HAD NEVER, EXCEPT IN ONE STATEMENT IN 1974, REFERRED TO INDEPENDENCE OF SAHARA. SUSQUENTLY REFERENCE HAD BEEN MADE TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITH INDEPENDENCE AS AN OPTION. SPAIN HAS ALSO NEVER REFERRED TO ALGERIA AS AN QTE INTERESTED PARTY UNQTE BUT ONLY AS A QTE BORDERING STATE WITH INTERESTS UNQTE. CORTINA COULD NOT PREDICT HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD COME OUT. HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT SPANISH POLICS WAS TO GET OUT PEACEFULLY AND HONORABLY FROM THE SAHARA. IT WAS THE INABILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE MEANINGFUL ACTION THAT HAD IMPELLED SPAIN TO ATTEMPT THIS SET OF NEGOTIATIONS.

5. WE HEAR FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT LARAKI WILL BE COMING ON SATURDAY AND THAT SOLIS DID ACHIEVE A DELAY IN HASSAN'S BEGINNING THE MARCH. STABLER UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL
BT



OP IMMED
 DE RUEHC #3362 2970839
 O 240829Z OCT 75 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 3425

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 253362 TOSEC 160330

EXDIS
 FOR S/S-8 FROM S/S-0: THIS MADRID SUGGESTION SHOULD BE
 READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH TOSEC 160323.

THIS TELEGRAM FROM MADRID DATED OCTOBER 24, 1975 SENT
 SECSTATE WASHDC IS REPEATED TO YOU: QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MADRID 7414

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINR, SP

SUBJ: A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR JUAN CARLOS' SWEARING-IN

REF: SECTO 16089

1. WE ARE IN PLACE WITH THE APPROVED TEXTS AGAINST THE
 CONTINGENCY OF FRANCO'S DEATH SENT REP, BUT WHETHER FRANCO DIES OR
 NOT, THE SUCCESSION APPEARS IRREVERSIBLE. I RECOMMEND A SEPARATE
 PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR JUAN CARLOS ON HIS SWEARING-IN.
 I BELIEVE IT IS GENERALLY AGREED THAT U.S. INTERESTS
 WOULD BE BEST SERVED BY AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS THAT
 MOVES SPAIN CLOSER TO EUROPE. THE EUROPEANS WILL NOT
 ACCEPT FRANCOISM WITHOUT FRANCO INTO THEIR MIDST.
 ACCORDINGLY, I THINK WE SHOULD TAILOR SUCH A MESSAGE TO
 INDICATE THE U.S. HOPE THAT SPAIN WILL MOVE IN A PLURALIST
 DIRECTION, A MESSAGE WHICH JUAN CARLOS WILL BE MOST HAPPY
 TO GET. I WOULD ASSUME SUCH A MESSAGE WOULD BE HELPFUL
 ON OUR CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEMS ALSO.

2. AS AN APPROACH, I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN QUOTE:

YOUR MAJESTY:

MAY I EXPRESS TO YOU THE BEST WISHES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
 AND GOVERNMENT UPON THE COMMENCEMENT OF YOUR REIGN. THE
 TIES OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE
 UNITED STATES ARE IMPORTANT TO THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF
 BOTH OUR PEOPLES. AT THE PROFOUND, HUMAN LEVEL, MY
 COUNTRY OWES A GREAT DEAL TO ITS SPANISH HERITAGE, A



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
 State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *HR* NARA Date *8/11/10*

PSN:051437

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TOR:297/08:39Z

DTG:240829Z OCT 75

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

HERITAGE THAT IS VIBRANT IN OUR OWN CULTURE TODAY. THE
PROFOUND WISH OF THE PEOPLE OF TH U.S. AND ITS GOVERNMENT
IS THAT THE SPANISH PEOPLE AND NATION UNDER YOUR REIGN
MOVE FORWARD ALONG THE PATHS OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
ECONOMIC PROGRESS, DEEPENING ITS TIES WITH THE DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETIES OF THE WEST. WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,
GERALD R. FORD. END QUOTE:
STABLER UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT



OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #3367 2971017
O 241014Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 3426

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 253307 TOSK 100331
FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO TOKYO, HONG KONG FROM
PEKING OCT 24:
QUOTE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PEKING 2036
DEPT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S AIRCRAFT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUSH
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S RETURN BANQUET SPEECH
IF ANY CORRESPONDENTS ON BOARD YOUR AIRCRAFT WERE LED
ASTRAY BY LOCAL PEKING JOURNALISTS' CLAIM THAT THE BREVITY
OF CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S RETURN BANQUET SPEECH WAS SOMEHOW
SIGNIFICANT, YOU MIGHT WISH TO TELL THEM THAT CHIAO'S SPEECH
THIS YEAR WAS FOUR WORDS LONGER THAN THE ONE HE MADE LAST
YEAR AND THE OPERATIVE PORTIONS OF BOTH SPEECHES WERE
VIRTUAL IDENTICAL. I AM APRAID SOME OF THE JOURNALISTS WERE
TAKEN IN BY THE CHINESE USE OF A WELL-WORN BUREAUCRATIC
PROCEDURE--CHIAO PULLED LAST YEAR'S LANGUAGE OFF THE SHELF,
SLIGHTLY REPHRASED IT, AND PASSED IT OFF AS A NEW SPEECH.
BUSH UNQUOTE: INGERSOLL
BT



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 State Review
State Dept Guidelines 1219103
By LR NARA, Date 8/11/10

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031292

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Henry A. Kissinger

CREATOR'S TITLE Secretary of State

RECEIVER'S NAME USDEL Secretary

DESCRIPTION Matter re: General Franco

CREATION DATE 10/24/1975

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900329

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 23

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - TOSEC (13)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/10/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031293

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Henry A. Kissinger

CREATOR'S TITLE Secretary of State

RECEIVER'S NAME USDEL Secretary

DESCRIPTION Matter re: Meeting with King Hassan

CREATION DATE 10/24/1975

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900329

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 23

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - TOSEC (13)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/10/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #3369 2971430
O 241315Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 3429

~~SECRET~~ STATE 253369 TOSEC 160334

EXDIS
FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ALGIERS, MADRID,
RABAT, USUN FROM NOUAKCHOTT OCT 23:
QUOTE ~~SECRET~~ NOUAKCHOTT 2179

EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PBOR UN MR MO SP AG SS
SUBJECT: SAHARA WATCH: PARTITION VS ANNEXATION
REF: RABAT 5115; USUN 5264

1. IF WE ARE GOING TO BACK AWAY FROM ELOQUENT RE-STATE-
MENT OF U.S. DEDICATION TO SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH AMBASSADOR
WHITE MADE A FEW DAYS AGO IN NEW YORK AND BEGIN, FOR PRAGMA-
TIC GEOPOLITICAL REASONS, TO SUPPORT TAKEOVER OF SAHARA BY
INTERESTED PARTIES, WE HAD BETTER EMBARK ON MAJOR EFFORT TO
MAKE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT TAKEOVER IS IN FACT A MAURITANIAN-
MOROCCAN PARTITION AND NOT A UNILATERAL MOROCCAN ANNEXATION.
ALL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MOROCCAN STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF
RABAT, NEW YORK, AND MARRAKESH THIS PAST WEEK SUGGEST
VERY STRONGLY THAT MOROCCANS HAVE NO INTENTION OF HONORING
AGREEMENT THEY MADE WITH MAURITANIANS TO DIVVY UP SAHARA.

2. A MORE OR LESS EQUAL PARTITION OF SAHARA HAS SIGNI-
FICANTLY BETTER CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE, ALBEIT GRUDGING, BY
ALL EXPONENTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN AFRICA AND AROUND
WORLD, AND, IT WOULD SEEM FROM HERE, ABOVE ALL BY ALGE-
RIA, THAN OUTRIGHT ANNEXATION BY HASSAN'S MOROCCO. THIS
WOULD APPEAR TO BE PARTICULARLY TRUE IF WE OR INTERNATION-
AL COMMUNITY CAN INSURE THAT PARTITION FORMULA INCLUDES
SOME POLLING OF SAHARA RESIDENTS ON FINAL LOCATION OF PARTI-
TION LINE AND ON THEIR DESIRES ABOUT BECOMING EITHER MOROC-
CANS OR MAURITANIANS.

3. MORE PRACTICALLY AND MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, IF MAURITANIAN

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By 1JR NARA, Date 8/11/10

State Review
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PSN:051770

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TOR:297/14:43Z

DTG:241315Z OCT 75

~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

ASZIGATIONS ARE FRUSTRATED BY A GREEDY MOROCCO, IT IS VIRTUAL CERTAINTY THAT GIRM, GIVEN MAURITANIAN DISTRUST AND DISLIKE OF MOROCCANS (SEE NOUAKCHOTT 1479), WILL MAKE DETERMINED EFFORT TO FORESTALL ESTABLISHMENT OF MOROCCAN AUTHORITY IN SOUTHERN TWO-THIRDS OF SAHARA OR TO OUST IT ONCE IMPOSED, SEEKING SUPPORT OF AND PERHAPS JOINING FORCES WITH POLISARI

AND ALGERIA (AND CONCEIVABLY EVEN LIBYA) TO THIS END. WHILE EACH MEMBER OF SUCH AN ANTI-MOROCCAN ALLIANCE WOULD CLEARLY HAVE QUITE DIFFERENT REASONS FOR PARTICIPATION, THEY WOULD HAVE SAME OBJECTIVE: CONTAINING MOROCCO AND KEEPING PRESSURE ON KING HASSAN.

4. MAURITANIANS HAVE BEEN OPENLY, VIGOROUSLY, AND REGULARLY CALLING FOR DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN OCCUPIER FROM AND ASSERTING THEIR CLAIM TO ALL OF WESTERN SAHARA UP TO THE WADI DRAA (SOME 240 KILOMETERS NORTHWARD UP COAST FROM PRESENT MOROCCO-SAHARA FRONTIER) FOR 18 YEARS. THEY CAN BE COUNTED ON TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS (WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THEIR ADMITTEDLY MODEST CAPABILITIES)--ALONE OR WITH OUTSIDE HELP--TO ESTABLISH THE GREATER MAURITANIA OF THEIR DREAMS FOR THE NEXT 18 YEARS OR FOR HOWEVER LONG IT TAKES TO OUST THE NEW FOREIGN COLONIZER FROM THEIR HOMELAND. FACT THAT NEW COLONIZER MAY BE THEIR MOROCCAN "BROTHERS" WILL NOT ALTER THE QUESTION.

5. THAT BEING THE CASE, IF THE USG DECIDES THAT THE DEVELOPING SAHARA SITUATION NOW REQUIRES US TO ABANDON OUR PREVIOUS STANCE OF STRICT NEUTRALITY AMONG PARTIES AND TO BEGIN, IN ORDER TO INSURE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM, TO SUPPORT ACTIVELY ONE OF THE PROTAGONISTS-- MOROCCO, WE SHOULD IN RETURN INSIST THAT KING HASSAN PURSUE A RESOLUTION OF SAHARA PROBLEM WHICH MAXIMIZES CHANCES OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE AND MINIMIZES POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REGIONAL INSTABILITY AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT. PARTITION, YES; ANNEXATION, NO. HANDYSIDE UNQUOTE INGERSON
BT



OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #3423 2971521
O 241519Z OCT 75 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6246

INFO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 3430

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 253485 T082C 100330

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (SADAT ANWAR)

SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT

FYI: THE FOLLOWING ARE APPROVED DECISIONS REGARDING THE PRESIDENT'S AND VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTICIPATION IN THE SADAT VISIT. YOU MAY INFORM HASSAN KAMEL OF THE DECISIONS.

1. PRESIDENT FORD WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT SADAT IN THE OVAL OFFICE ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 27 AT 11:30 A.M.
2. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL PAY A COURTESY CALL ON PRESIDENT SADAT AT BLAIR HOUSE ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 27 AT 6:15 P.M. FOR APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES.
3. PRESIDENT FORD WILL MEET AGAIN WITH PRESIDENT SADAT ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28 IN THE OVAL OFFICE AT 10:30 A.M. (APPROXIMATELY 60 MINUTES).
4. PRESIDENT AND MRS. FORD WILL ATTEND THE RETURN EGYPTIAN DINNER ON TUESDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 28.
5. VICE PRESIDENT AND MRS. ROCKEFELLER WILL HOST A LUNCHEON IN HONOR OF PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT AND FAMILY AT POCANTICO HILLS ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30 AT 1 P.M.



***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

SCOWCROFT, LL

PSN:051817

PAGE 01

TOR:297/15:25Z

DTG:241519Z OCT 75

***** ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ***** COPY

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*

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12/10/03

By *NR* NARA, Date *8/11/10*

ACCOMMODATING A TOTAL PARTY OF 22 AT THE MAIN DINING TABLE. ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR ADDITIONAL GUESTS ELSEWHERE ON THE ESTATE.

6. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL JOIN PRESIDENT SADAT AND HIS PARTY AT THE AIRPORT IN CHICAGO ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31, TRAVELLING WITH HIM TO HOUSTON, IN HOUSTON AND REMAINING THROUGH DINNER IN HOUSTON. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL RETURN TO NEW YORK FOLLOWING THE DINNER IN HOUSTON, ON THE EVENING OF FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31.

7. PRESIDENT FORD WILL ARRIVE IN FLORIDA AT 11:00 A.M. SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 2 FOR MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AND WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON LATE THAT EVENING.

8. PRESIDENT FORD WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT SADAT IN THE OVAL OFFICE ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5 AT 11:00 A.M. (APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES) FOR A FINAL FAREWELL MEETING.

9. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL GREET PRESIDENT SADAT AT THE CAPITOL THEREAFTER AND WILL REMAIN FOR PRESIDENT SADAT'S SPEECH TO THE JOINT SESSION.

10. SECRETARY KISSINGER WILL ESCORT PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT AND FAMILY TO ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE ON THE EVENING OF WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5 FOR A DEPARTURE CEREMONY PRIOR TO THE FLIGHT TO LONDON.

INGERSOLL
BT



OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #3605 2971838
O 241831Z OCT 75 ZPP4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 3435

~~SECRET~~ STATE 253605 T08EC 100337

NODIS
FOLLOWING IS REPEAT 10750, SENT SECSTATE OCT 24:
QUOTE SECRET CAIRO 10750
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG US
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN ARMS
REF: SECTO 10140

1. I CONVEYED MESSAGE CONTAINED REPTTEL OCT 24 TO FAHMY, WHO EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS.
2. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USDEL SECRETARY. MAESTRONE UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL
BT

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines 12/10/03
By HR NARA, Date 8/11/10

