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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #2252 2961744
O 231722Z OCT 75 ZFR4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3367

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 292888 708EC 100288

FOL REPEAT OF QUITO 7774 TO SECSTATE INFO USUN OCT 22
OTE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ QUITO 7774
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR UNGA KS EC
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO FONMIN AGUIRRE ON KOREA
REF: A) STATE 249547 B) USUN 5193

1. SECRETARY'S LETTER WAS DELIVERED TO OFFICE OF FONMIN AGUIRRE LATE AFTERNOON OCTOBER 21. (REF A)
2. WE UNDERSTAND FROM SOUTH KOREA CHARGE PARK IN QUITO THAT NORTH KOREA LOBBYING DELEGATION THAT WAS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE QUITO OCTOBER 21 IS STILL DELAYED BECAUSE OF AIRLINE DIFFICULTIES. PARK SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD MFA WOULD SEND INSTRUCTIONS OCTOBER 22 CONCERNING ECUADOR'S VOTE ON UNPRIENDLY RESOLUTION. THIS CORRESPONDS TO REPORT (REF B) THAT ECUADOREAN UN REP WILL SPEAK ON KOREAN ISSUE AT UNGA OCTOBER 23.
BREWSTER UNQTE INGERSOLL
BT

DECLASSIFIED

EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By NR NARA, Date 8/10/10

State Review
12/9/03



PSN:050672 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:296/17:50Z DTG:231722Z OCT 75

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #2269 2961831
O 231758Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3365

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 282269 TOSEC 100200

FOL REPEAT OF MADRID 7375 TO SECSTATE OCT 23
GTE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MADRID 7375

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PINT, SP

SUBJECT: PRESSURES FOR TRANSFER OF POWER TO JUAN CARLOS

REF: MADRID 7327

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO ONE WELL-INFORMED POLITICIAN, FRANCO'S FAMILY IS WITHHOLDING TRUTH ABOUT HIS REAL CONDITION FROM HIM IN EFFORT TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF POWER. ARIAS AND CABINET, SUPPORTED BY KEY MILITARY LEADERS, ARE DETERMINED, IN HIS VIEW, TO CONVINCE FRANCO TO RESIGN RATHER THAN SEEK HIS REMOVAL BY COMPLICATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE BY DECLARING HIM INCAPACITATED. GOVT LEADERS AND ESTABLISHMENT REPORTEDLY

BELIEVE THAT FRANCO'S CONDITION IS TERMINAL AND TRANSFER OF POWER MUST TAKE PLACE, PREFERABLY WITH FRANCO'S OWN BLESSING. END SUMMARY

1. FORMER MEMBER OF COUNCIL OF THE REALM AND CURRENT KEY PROMOTOR OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ASSOCIATION, ALFONSO OSORIO, TOLD EMBOFF OCT 22 THAT ONE OF FRANCO'S PHYSICIANS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT CAUDILLO HAD SUFFERED THREE HEART ATTACKS BETWEEN OCT 16 AND 21. IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT HE WOULD SUFFER OTHER INTERMITTENT ATTACKS, ONE OF WHICH WOULD BE FATAL. FRANCO, MEANWHILE, WAS UNAWARE OF HIS REAL CONDITION BECAUSE HIS FAMILY WAS WITHHOLDING MEDICAL REPORTS FROM HIM, LEAVING HIM WITH IMPRESSION THAT HE MERELY HAD SEVERE FLU ATTACK. FRANCO, THEREFORE, THOUGHT EVERYTHING WAS QUITE NORMAL. WHEN ARIAS SUGGESTED TO HIM A TEMPORARY TRANSFER OF POWER OCT 21, HE REACTED SHARPLY TO IDEA, SAYING THAT HE INTENDED TO CHAIR REGULAR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING OCT 24./

2. OSORIO, LIKE MANY OTHERS, BLAMED THE MARQUES DE



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *NR* NARA, Date *8/10/10*

PSN:050726

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TOR:296/18139Z

DTG:231758Z OCT 75

VILLAVERDE, THE DOCTOR SON-IN-LAW, FOR FAMILY'S ATTITUDE, THE MARQUESE'S INFLUENCE IN THE FAMILY AND WITH HIS FATHER-IN-LAW HAS INCREASED GREATLY SINCE HIS ILLNESS LAST SUMMER WHEN VILLAVERDE "TOOK CHARGE" OF THE SEARCH FOR SPECIALIST MEDICAL ATTENTION. FRANCO FEELS BEHOLDEN TO HIM. THE FAMILY THEREFORE, HAVE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF CONTROLLING ACCESS TO FRANCO AND, IN THE NAME OF "HUMANITARIAN CONCERN", KEEPING THE TRUTH FROM HIM.

3. ACCORDING TO OSORIO, THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO JUAN CARLOS WAS INEVITABLE, BUT IT WAS UNCLEAR HOW SOON THIS COULD BE DONE. JUAN CARLOS HAD ALREADY INDICATED HIS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT EITHER A TEMPORARY TRANSFER OF ALL POWERS OR DEFINITIVE TRANSFER OF SOME POWERS; HE WOULD ONLY ACCEPT AN UNLIMITED TRANSFER OF ALL POWERS. THE ROUTE OF DECLARING FRANCO INCAPACITATED WOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED; ALTHOUGH TWO-THIRDS OF THE CABINET AND THE COUNCIL OF THE REALITY APPROVE THE MEASURE TODAY, THE "CORTES" WHICH IS DOMINATED BY RIGHT-WING, WOULD BLOCK IT. MOREOVER, THIS PROCEDURE WOULD BE AN IGNOMINIOUS END FOR FRANCO WHICH WOULD NOT SERVE INTERESTS EVEN OF THOSE MOST INTERESTED IN EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE. IT WAS UP TO ARIAS AND THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO PERSUADE FRANCO IT WAS IN THE COUNTRY'S AND HIS OWN INTEREST TO RELINQUISH POWER. OSORIO BELIEVES THAT ARIAS, SUPPORTED BY KEY MILITARY LEADERS, WILL PRESS HARD IN COMING DAYS TO BRING FRANCO AROUND. ARIAS IS HANDICAPPED, HOWEVER, BY INCREASING PRESSURES FOR HIS OWN RESIGNATION FROM RIGHT-WING FORCES WHICH ARE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO ANY PREMATURE TRANSFER OF POWERS. THESE ELEMENTS HAVE ACCESS TO FRANCO THROUGH HIS FAMILY.

4. ARIAS HAS BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL THE PRINCIPALS. PRIOR TO HIS 40-MINUTE MEETING WITH FRANCO OCT 21 HE HAD LUNCHED WITH THE CAUTIOUS, CONSERVATIVE "CORTES" PRESIDENT VALCARCEL, AND TALKED WITH JUAN CARLOS. THE SAME DAY THE HIGH COUNCIL OF THE ARMY (ALL CAPTAIN GENERALS, CHIEF OF THE HIGH GENERAL STAFF, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL GUARD, ARMY WAR COLLEGE HEAD, AND SEC GEN IN MINISTRY OF ARMY) HELD A MEETING IN MADRID, COVERING THE SAHARAN ISSUE, AND FRANCO'S CONDITION.

STABLER UNGTE INGERSOLL

BT



OP IMMED
 DE RUEHC #2347 2961919
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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 252347 TOSEC 160267

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, BR

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: A BILATERAL MECHANISM WITH
 BRAZIL (S/S NO. 7522100)
 REF: SECTO 16021
 FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ARA, ROGERS

1. THE PROBLEM. YOU REQUESTED A REVISED PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTING YOUR AGREEMENT WITH SILVEIRA TO BEEF UP OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL.

2. BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA HAS LONG WANTED A U.S.-BRAZILIAN MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION. HE IS NOT MUCH INTERESTED IN TECHNICAL-LEVEL EFFORTS, SUCH AS THE ONE WE ARE NOW MOUNTING THROUGH THE U.S.-BRAZIL ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE GROUP, UNLESS THEY ARE PART OF A GRAND DESIGN IN WHICH YOU AND HEARE CALLING THE SHOTS AND ARE PUBLICLY SEEN TO BE PERSONALLY INVOLVED. IN PART, HE IS MOTIVATED BY BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN BRAZIL; HE HIGHLY PRIZES HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH YOU AS A WAY OF ENHANCING HIS PRESTIGE AND POWER. BUT THERE IS ALSO A MUCH LARGER POINT. SILVEIRA LOOKS UPON THE CONSULTATION MECHANISM AS A MEANS OF OBTAINING FROM THE USG, THROUGH YOUR CONTROL AND DIRECTION, THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC TREATMENT AND CONCESSIONS THAT BRAZIL WANTS FROM A "SPECIAL

RELATIONSHIP" AND THAT SILVEIRA BELIEVES ARE MADE IMPOSSIBLE BY THE CURRENT US "BUREAUCRATIC" SYSTEM FOR DEALING WITH US-BRAZILIAN ISSUES. THIS BASIC PURPOSE OF SILVEIRA'S IS MADE CLEAR IN HIS OCTOBER 17 LETTER TO YOU TRANSMITTED AS TOSEC 160046.

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By LJR NARA, Date 8/10/10



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*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~***** COPY

3. AS A FRAMEWORK, HERE ARE MY GENERAL THOUGHTS ON THE SUBJECT:

-- WE HAVE SOMETHING TO GAIN FROM THE RIGHT KIND OF HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM.

- AS BRAZIL REACHES FOR MIDDLE POWER STATUS, POINTS OF FRICTION BETWEEN US ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE.

- THESE WILL BE MOST FREQUENT IN THE FIELDS OF TRADE, ENERGY, CAPITAL FLOW AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.

- AS BRAZIL BECOMES MORE IMPORTANT IN THE WORLD COUNCILS, WE WILL FIND IT USEFUL AND NECESSARY TO REMAIN ATTUNED TO THEIR VIEWS AT THE POLICY LEVEL.

- THE RIGHT KIND OF CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM COULD HELP ATTENUATE CONFLICTS OR AT LEAST LIMIT THE DAMAGE -- PROVIDED THE MECHANISM PRODUCES SOME RESULTS.

- IT SHOULD BE ONE THAT EMBEDS TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS WITHIN AN OVERALL POLITICAL CONTEXT.

-- OUR PROBLEM WITH BRAZIL IS NOT ANALOGOUS TO BILATERAL PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

- IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE ARE TRYING TO MOBILIZE AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY, PRIVATE INVESTMENT, AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES. BRAZIL ALREADY HAS THESE. WHAT BRAZIL WANTS FROM US NOW IS PARTLY PSYCHOLOGICAL -- RECOGNITION OF ITS ACHIEVEMENTS -- AND MOSTLY VERY CONCRETE -- SPECIAL TREATMENT AND CONCESSIONS THAT WILL FACILITATE ITS UPWARD MOVEMENT.

- MOREOVER, THE BRAZILIANS, PARTICULARLY SILVEIRA, KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ACCOUTREMENTS OF A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" AND THE REAL THING. THEY HAVE BEEN AT THIS FOR TOO MANY YEARS WITH US. WE HAVE HAD U.S.-BRAZIL COMMISSIONS ON MORE THAN ONE

OCCASION BEFORE. THEY WANT TO GET AROUND BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES, NOT CREATE MORE.



-- THE WAY IN WHICH WE ORGANIZE WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND TO THE KINDS OF PROBLEMS WE WILL BE DISCUSSING IN ANY CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM WITH BRAZIL IS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS ENTERPRISE.

- IF WE CANNOT DELIVER AT LEAST ON SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WITH BRAZIL, THE EXISTENCE OF A SPECIAL BILATERAL MECHANISM, BY AROUSING UNFULFILLABLE EXPECTATIONS, WILL ONLY EXACERBATE THE CONFLICTS.

- WHAT HAS PLAGUED US IN LATIN AMERICA HAS NOT BEEN A VACUUM OF GLOBAL DECISIONS BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON ISSUES LIKE COMMODITY PROBLEMS. WHAT HAS HURT IS THAT WITHIN THOSE GLOBAL SCHEMES THERE IS PRECIOUS LITTLE ROOM FOR "SPECIAL" TREATMENT TO KEY COUNTRIES LIKE BRAZIL. WE NEED TO DEVISE WAYS OF GETTING AT THE INTRACTABILITY OF OUR OWN GOVERNMENT -- AND OUR OWN LAWS -- WHEN KEY PROBLEMS ARISE.

-- WE SHOULD ALSO CREATE SPECIAL (BUT NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL) BILATERAL MECHANISMS WITH OTHER MAJOR COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA, NOTABLY ARGENTINA, MEXICO, AND VENEZUELA. WE ARE ALREADY COMMITTED TO DO SO IN THE CASE OF ARGENTINA.

4. THE PROPOSALS. WE NEED TWO TYPES OF DECISIONS. THE FIRST CONCERNS THE STRUCTURE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL. THE SECOND IS THE NATURE OF OUR ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE BACK-UP.

I. MECHANISM FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS. YOU AND SILVEIRA WOULD AGREE TO HOLD FORMAL CONSULTATIONS ONCE A YEAR IN EACH COUNTRY ON A ROTATING BASIS TO PROVIDE THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS. YOU AND HE WOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVES. THE DELEGATIONS WOULD CONSIST OF SUCH OTHER MEMBERS, INCLUDING CABINET OFFICERS, AS MIGHT BE WARRANTED BY THE AGENDA. THE MEMBERS OF THE EXISTING ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON EACH SIDE MIGHT COMPRISE A SECTOR OF THE TWO SUPPORTING SECTIONS - ONE IN EACH COUNTRY - AND WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY SUCH OTHER GROUPS AS THE TWO CHAIRMEN WOULD DIRECT. THE ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE FORMALIZED BY A DOCUMENT SIGNED BY YOU AND SILVEIRA. (SEE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WHICH IS LAST PORTION OF THIS MESSAGE.)
PROS.



- WOULD MEET SILVEIRA'S NEEDS FOR A PROCEDURE WITH HIGH VISIBILITY YET AVOIDS A TRADITIONAL JOINT COMMISSION ABOUT WHICH SILVEIRA HIMSELF HAS MAJOR RESERVATIONS.
- WOULD TEND TO LIMIT FEARS AMONG OTHER LATINOS OF A U.S.-BRAZIL CONDOMINIUM THAT A JOINT COMMISSION WOULD AROUSE.
- WOULD HELP TO PRESERVE THE HIGH LEVEL POLICY DIRECTION WHICH OUR TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH BRAZIL WILL REQUIRE.
- BUILDS ON STRUCTURES NOW IN PLACE THAT PROMISE TO DEAL WITH TECHNICAL ISSUES EFFICIENTLY.

CONS

- WOULD REQUIRE THAT YOU COMMIT YOURSELF TO MEET WITH SILVEIRA TWICE A YEAR IN ADDITION TO SUCH BILATERALS AS MAY TAKE PLACE IN CONNECTION WITH UNGA, FOR EXAMPLE.

II. INTERNAL USG IMPLEMENTATION

AD HOC CABINET COMMITTEE

WE WOULD ASK THE PRESIDENT TO ESTABLISH AN AD HOC CABINET COMMITTEE, CHAIRED BY YOU AS SECRETARY OF STATE, TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUES ARISING IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL AND OTHER KEY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

PROS

- WOULD PROVIDE A FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY SIMON AND OTHER CABINET OFFICERS.
- WOULD CONCENTRATE USG ATTENTION AT THE TOP POLICY LEVEL TO BILATERAL LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES WHEN NEEDED.
- THESE LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES HAVE SUFFICIENTLY DIFFERENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTENT TO WARRANT A DISTINCT STRUCTURE.

CONS

- DOES LATIN AMERICA MERIT SUCH HIGH-LEVEL FOCUS?



-- OTHER DEPARTMENTS MIGHT VIEW IT AS A STATE DEPARTMENT BID FOR AUTHORITY OVER TRADE AND MONETARY POLICY.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

-- THAT WE PROPOSE TO SILVEIRA AN AGREEMENT TO HOLD SEMI-ANNUAL MEETINGS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, TO GIVE POLICY DIRECTION TO ONGOING TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS. THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE ANNOUNCED DURING YOUR VISIT TO BRAZIL.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

-- THAT THE ARRANGEMENT BE MADE FORMAL BY A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE US AND BRAZIL. (MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING IS LAST PORTION OF THIS MESSAGE.)

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

-- AND, THAT YOU PROPOSE TO THE PRESIDENT ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD HOC CABINET COMMITTEE, WITH YOU AS CHAIRMAN, TO DEAL WITH BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH KEY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE.

BEGIN TEXT OF ATTACHED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING:

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL:

- NOTING THE LONG AND TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES;

- RECOGNIZING THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THEIR TWO COUNTRIES WHOSE GOVERNMENTS MAINTAIN GLOBAL CONNECTIONS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC;

- ALERT TO THE VALUE OF CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST;

- EXPRESSING THEIR MUTUAL DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AN OPEN AND ACTIVE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION AT THE CABINET



LEVEL, HAVE ARRIVED AT THE FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDING:

- 1) THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL HOLD CONSULTATIONS SEMI-ANNUALLY ON THE FULL RANGE OF THEIR RELATIONS. THIS MAY INCLUDE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SECURITY, CULTURAL, LEGAL, EDUCATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL, RELATIONS, WHETHER BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL.
- 2) THESE CONSULTATIONS WILL NORMALLY BE HELD ALTERNATELY IN BRAZIL AND THE U.S. ON DATES TO BE MUTUALLY ARRANGED. SPECIAL MEETINGS MAY BE CALLED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT.
- 3) THE CONSULTATIONS WILL BE HEADED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE PART OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL. THE MEETING WILL BE HELD UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE CHIEF OF THE DELEGATION IN WHOSE COUNTRY IT IS HELD.
- 4) EACH DELEGATION WILL BE COMPOSED OF SUCH OTHER HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS, INCLUDING OTHER CABINET MEMBERS, AS THE HEAD OF THE RESPECTIVE DELEGATION DESIRES AND ARE APPROPRIATE TO THE AGENDA TO BE DISCUSSED.
- 5) THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD REVIEW MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST AND PROPOSE TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MEASURES THAT IT MIGHT DEEM PERTINENT AND APPROPRIATE.
- 6) BY JOINT DECISION, AD HOC STUDY GROUPS OR WORKING GROUPS MAY BE ESTABLISHED TO STUDY PARTICULAR QUESTIONS OF CURRENT INTEREST OR TO HELP CARRY FORWARD SPECIAL PROJECTS.
- 7) EACH PARTY WILL ESTABLISH SUCH INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS AS IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE TO PREPARE FOR AND FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS.
- 8) IN ADDITION TO THE MEETINGS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, CONSULTATIONS WILL BE CARRIED FORWARD ON AN ONGOING BASIS THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.
- 9) THE FOREGOING ARRANGEMENTS WILL COMPLEMENT AND IN NO WAY REPLACE OR DETRACT FROM THE EXISTING CHANNELS FOR TRANSACTING BUSINESS.
- 10) THIS MEMORANDUM WILL COME INTO OPERATION UPON



SIGNATURE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL.

END TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

6. UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR REACTION WE SHALL PROCEED URGENTLY TO COMPLETE OUR DRAFT OF A SUGGESTED REPLY TO SILVEIRA'S LETTER.

CLEARANCES: S/P-LEWIS, L/AR-KOZAK, S-ADAMS INGERSOLL
BT





Department of State

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SUNDAY, OCTOBER 26

3:00 AIRBORNE FOR NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA
 4:00 ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT
 TIME? RETURN TO WASHINGTON

MONDAY, OCTOBER 27 (HOLIDAY)

8:00 BREAKFAST WITH MR. INGERSOLL - 8TH FLR.
 9:30 PRESS SPOKESMAN - WH
 9:45 THE PRESIDENT
 11:00 ARRIVAL CEREMONY AT WH FOR PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT
 11:30-
 1:00 THE PRESIDENT/PRESIDENT SADAT
 1:15 LUNCHEON WITH SENATOR HUMPHREY - 8TH FLR.
 3:00 PERSONAL TIME
 4:00 SECRETARY SIMON, AMBASSADOR DENT ET AL.
 RE PROTECTIONISM STRATEGY
 5:00 SPEECHWRITERS
 6-7:00 BLAIR HOUSE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT
 (NOTE: YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED THE LATEST CABLE
 FROM NEA ABOUT THIS MEETING. I GATHER IT MAY
 STILL BE THAT THE SECRETARY WILL ATTEND WITH
 THE VICE PRESIDENT AND STAY ON A BIT AFTERWARDS.
 THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN OK'D FINALLY BY THE SECRETARY
 TO MY KNOWLEDGE.)
 8:00 WHITE HOUSE DINNER FOR PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT
 DARK BUSINESS SUIT FOR MEN/LONG DRESSES FOR LADIES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28

7:45 BREAKFAST - DEPARTMENT
 8:00 PRINCIPALS/REGIONAL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES
 9:30 PRESS SPOKESMAN-WH
 9:45 THE PRESIDENT
 10:30- THE PRESIDENT/PRESIDENT SADAT
 12:00 (NOTE: THE WHITE HOUSE TOLD ME TO BLOCK AT LEAST
 60 MINUTES AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE FOR THIS MEETING.
 I DID NOTE CATO TELEGRAM ON SADAT SCHEDULE AND
 HIS EDITORS MEETING BUT I AM SURE IT IS POSSIBLE
 THAT MAY SLIP ALSO A BIT.)

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Department of State

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TELETYPE

PAGE 03 STATE 252346 TOSEC 180268

1:00 LUNCHEON BY THE SECRETARY AND MRS. KISSINGER FOR
 -- PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT - 8TH FLR.
 FOLLOWING LUNCHEON - SIGNING CEREMONY WITH FOREIGN
 MINISTER FAHMY - SECRETARY'S RECEPTION AREA - 7TH FLR.
 3:00 PERSONAL TIME

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28 CONTINUED

4:00 MR. RON ZIEGLER
 4:30 AMBASSADOR SHIRLEY TEMPLE BLACK YES -NO-
 5:00 SECRETARY SIMON, SEIDMAN ET AL. YES -NO-
 -- RE ECONOMIC SUMMIT
 8:30 DINNER BY PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT - ANDERSON
 -- HOUSE - DARK BUSINESS SUIT FOR MEN/LONG DRESSES
 -- FOR LADIES

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29

7:45 BREAKFAST - DEPARTMENT
 8:00 PRINCIPALS/REGIONAL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES
 9:30 PRESS SPOKESMAN - DEPARTMENT
 11:00 RICHARD VALERIANI FILMED INTERVIEW - 8TH FLR.
 12:30 MR. DAN DAVIDSON YES -NO- (15 MINUTES)
 1:00 LUNCHEON WITH PROFESSOR HANS MORGENTHAU - 8TH FLR.
 3:00 PERSONAL TIME
 4:00 MR. EDWARD SHEEHAN
 5:00 DRINKS WITH CONGRESSMAN JACK BROOKS (TO BE CONF
 -- FIRMED
 -- (NOTE: SECRETARY WILL DECIDE WHETHER HE WISHES
 -- TO GO TO POCANTICO HILLS ON WEDNESDAY EVENING OR
 -- THURSDAY MORNING.)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30

-- POCANTICO HILLS
 12:00 PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT ARRIVE AT POCANTICO HILLS
 1:00 LUNCHEON BY THE VICE PRESIDENT AND MRS. ROCKEFELLER
 2:30 DEPART FOR KENNEDY AIRPORT VIA CAR WITH PRESIDENT
 -- AND MRS. SADAT AND MRS. KISSINGER (45 MINUTES)
 -- YES -NO-
 5:00 DEAN HENRY ROZOVSKY - PIERRE HOTEL

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PAGE 04 STATE 252346 TOSEC 150288

6:00 RECEPTION BY ROBERT EVANS - AMERICANA HOTEL
-- FOLLOWED BY TESTIMONIAL DINNER AND SHOW
-- POSSIBLY RETURN TO WASHINGTON

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31

7:45 BREAKFAST - DEPARTMENT
8:00 PRINCIPALS/REGIONAL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES
9:30 THE PRESIDENT
10:30 PRESS SPOKESMAN - WH

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31

11:00 HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (PIKE)
1:15 LUNCHEON WITH MESSRS. GARDNER AND HASKINS - 8TH FLR.
3:00 PERSONAL TIME
4:00 GREET EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS - DEPARTMENT
5:00 MESSRS. SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN ET AL
-- RE ROMANIA
6:00 SPEECH WRITERS YES-NO.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 1
NO APPOINTMENTS SCHEDULED.

NOTE: THE ONLY FIRM COMMITMENT THE SECRETARY HAS ON THE HILL AT THE PRESENT TIME IS FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31 AT 11 AM WITH THE PIKE COMMITTEE. THIS WE HAVE CHECKED AND DOUBLECHECKED WITH MC CLOSKEY WHO WILL BE CABLING YOU SEPARATELY RE WHICH APPEARANCE THEY WILL SEEK FOR NOVEMBER 6. INGERSOLL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #2472 2961959
O 231954Z OCT 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3374

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 252472 TOSEC 160291

FOR HABIB
FOLLOWING REPEAT KINGSTON 4163 ACTION SECSTATE INFO SEOUL
LUSUN 22 OCT
QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KINGSTON 4163

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PPDR UNGA KS JM
SUBJECT: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA
REF: STATE 249545

1. I DELIVERED THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MANLEY THIS MORNING (OCTOBER 22). HE READ IT CAREFULLY IN MY PRESENCE.
2. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS A FORCEFUL AND WELL-REASONED LETTER, AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE IT THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CAREFULLY REVIEW THE U.S. POSITION AND THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERN. HE SAID THAT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS THE JAMAICAN POSITION FURTHER WITH SENATOR DUDLEY THOMPSON, AMBASSADOR MILLS AND OTHERS AND WOULD DO SO AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY.
3. A DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENTS OF THE TWO RESOLUTIONS FOLLOWED, AND I MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR SUPPORT OR AT THE VERY LEAST ABSTENTION. HE SEEMED TO HAVE A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE TO US AND OF ALL THE PARAMETERS OF BOTH RESOLUTIONS. HIS STATED CONCERN CENTERED AROUND THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES. I POINTED OUT THAT NORTH KOREA HAD TREATIES WITH BOTH PRC AND USSR AND PROXIMATE FORCES OF BOTH, WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT SAID THERE WERE "NO SUCH TROOPS ON THE GROUND". AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION IT BECAME APPARENT THAT HE WAS NOT WILLING TO MAKE ANY IMMEDIATE COMMITMENT, AND WE WENT ON TO OTHER SUBJECTS.
4. COMMENT: MANLEY'S ATTITUDE WAS NOT AS ENCOURAGING AS

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

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12/9/03

By NA NARA, DoI 8/10/10

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TOR:296/20:02Z

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I THOUGHT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT
BILATERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND IN VIEW OF THOMPSON'S
PREVIOUS PROTESTATIONS OF AN "EVEN-HANDED" APPROACH.
HOWEVER, HE BY NO MEANS CLOSED THE DOOR, AND I AM STILL
INCLINED TO THINK WE CAN EXPECT AN ABSTENTION. GERARD
UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031291

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram
CREATOR'S NAME Henry A. Kissinger
CREATOR'S TITLE Secretary of State
RECEIVER'S NAME USDEL Secretary
TITLE Kidnapping of Gallagher and Dykes
CREATION DATE 10/23/1975
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900328
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER
BOX NUMBER 23
FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - TOSEC (12)
DATE WITHDRAWN 09/10/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #2471 2962009
O 231953Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3375
AMEMBASSY RABAT NIACT IMMEDIATE 2882

SECRET STATE 252471 TOSEC 160292

USDEL PARTY FOR OAKLEY
RABAT FOR ATHERTON; DELIVER OPEN OF BUSINESS
FOLLOWING REPEAT BEIRUT 13185 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ALGIERS
AMMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS JIDDA KUWAIT PARIS 23 OCT

QUOTE
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 13185

NOFORN
E.O. 11652: XDS-2
TAGS: ASEC, PINS LE
SUBJECT: KIDNAPPING OF GALLAGHER AND DYKES
REF: BEIRUT 13178

1. [REDACTED]
GALLAGHER AND DYKES IN GOOD HEALTH AS OF 1600 HOURS LOCAL THIS
AFTERNOON. THEY ARE HELD BY SMALL GROUP WHICH IS UNDER THE CONTROL
OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE. THIS
GOLDBERG DESCRIPTION REMINDS US OF MORGAN SITUATION. INFORMAT
MENTIONED DYKES' MILD HYPERTENSION AND FACT HE REQUIRES OCCASIONAL
MEDICATION [REDACTED]

25X1

2. [REDACTED] STATES THOSE HOLDING GALLAGHER AND DYKES WISH
KNOW WITHIN 24 HOURS WHETHER USG PREPARED DISCUSS RANSOM, OTHER
WISE THEY WILL "WASH THEIR HANDS OF THE MATTER".

25X1

[REDACTED] ADVISED [REDACTED] THAT AS IN MORGAN CASE
USG WILL NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDER PAYING ANY RANSOM. [REDACTED]
EXPRESSED [REDACTED] HIS PERSONAL DISGUST WITH PFLP FOR TAKING
SUCH A TACK, WHICH THEY, MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE, MUST KNOW IS
A NON-STARTER.

25X1 25X1
25X1 25X1

[REDACTED]
25X1

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
AUTHORITY: RAC NLF-TB-HK-16-3-1-5 9/10/04
NSC/State Guidelines
HR NLF DATE 3/5/09

PSN: 1050809

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TOR: 296/20:132

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4. TRUST ALL RECIPIENTS REALIZE THAT UNDER NO REPEAT NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD FOREGOING BE REVEALED TO ANY FOREIGNER, LEST GALLAGHER AND DYKE'S LIVES BE JEOPARDIZED.

5. BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE NO REPEAT NO FURTHER ACTION BEIRUT OVER NIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE IF LEBANESE, OTHER PALESTINIANS OR ALGERIANS GET THE SCENT.
GODLEY UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT

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PAGE 02

OF 02

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DE RUEHC #2527 2962046
O 232033Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3377

~~SECRET~~ STATE 2527 TOSEC 100294

EXDIS
FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 10726 SENT SECSTATE DATED OCT 23.
QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 10726

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: TECH EG
SUBJECT: PROPOSED NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT
REF A, CAIRO 10570; B, CAIRO 9895

1. WHILE TALKING TO FAHMY ON OTHER MATTERS OVER THE TELEPHONE, HE OFF-HANDEDLY STATED THAT I SHOULD TELL THE SECRETARY THAT PRESIDENT SADAT WILL WANT TO SIGN A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT DURING HIS US VISIT. HAVING IN MIND REFTELS, I WAS SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK, AND RESPONDED THAT I HAD GRAVE DOUBTS THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE, NOTING THAT WE HAD JUST RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE RESUMPTION OF TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS BY GOE TEAM CURRENTLY IN US (REFTEL A).

2. I DECIDED NOT TO PURSUE THE MATTER ANY FURTHER OVER THE TELEPHONE, NOR DID FAHMY WISH TO DO SO, SO I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT THIS TO THE SECRETARY.

3. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER I SHOULD PROBE FURTHER INTO THIS MATTER. PREVIOUS REPORTING FROM THIS EMBASSY HAS SUGGESTED VERY STRONGLY THAT SADAT WOULD RAISE THE SUBJECT OF A NUCLEAR ACCORD AND PRESUMABLY WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF ONE COULD BE SIGNED DURING HIS VISIT. HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR HAS CONSISTENTLY OUTLINED PROBLEMS OF CONCLUDING SUCH AN AGREEMENT AT THIS STAGE.

MAESTRONE UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines


By HA JARA, Date 8/10/10

State Review
12/8/13

PSN:050841 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:296/20:49Z DTG:232033Z OCT 75

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 252563 TOSEC 160295

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN (KISSINGER, H. A.)

SUBJECT: TRAVELLING PRESS REPORTAGE, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23

FOR FUNSETH FROM S/PRS
NO. 22

ATMOSPHERE REPORTED "COOL" (WASHPOST, WSJOURNAL) OR "CHILLY"
(NYTIMES) AS HAK LEAVES PRC, STOP IN TOKYO DEBRIEF
UNEVENTFUL.

1. WIRES

UPI - NO REPORT AS OF NOON.

AP - FREED FROM TOKYO SAYS PRC ATTACKED US SOVIET POLICY
PUBLICLY "PARTLY TO ENCOURAGE FORCES IN U.S. OPPOSED TO
DETENTE, A SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL SAID TODAY." CONCERN
OVER DETENTE "REFLECTS A NEED OF CURRENT LEADERS IN PEKING
TO CEMENT THEIR POSITION BY ACTING FIRMLY TOWARD BOTH
MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON." OFFICIAL INSISTED, DURING BRIEFING
WHILE PLYING TO TOKYO, "THAT KISSINGER'S TALKS WITH CHAIRMAN
MAO AND DEPUTY PREMIER TENGWERE SATISFACTORY AND ACHIEVED
NOTHING MORE NOR LESS THAN WAS ORIGINALLY EXPECTED." IN
SEPARATE ITEM, WITHOUT BYLINE FROM TOKYO, SENIOR OFFICIAL

CITED SAYING MAO IS "STILL EXTRAORDINARILY PERCEPTIVE DESPITE
HIS AGE AND HAS EVEN LEARNED A FEW WORDS OF ENGLISH...KEEPS
ABREAST OF ALL MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS...HAK, WHO SPENT AN HOUR
AND 40 MINUTES WITH MAO, WAS IMPRESSED BY FACT THAT OLD
MAN KNEW EVERY DETAIL OF HAK'S TALKS IN PEKING. MAO COULD
NOT HAVE GAINED SUCH EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM A BRIEFING

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

VANDERHYE

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OFFICIAL SAID, HE HAD TO HAVE READ A TRANSCRIPT OF TALKS."

2. NEWSPAPERS

1

NYTIMES - GELB ON FRONT PAGE SAYS VISIT "ENDED LAST NIGHT AS IT BEGAN, WITH DISAGREEMENT OVER WASHINGTON'S POLICY OF DETENTE, BUT WITH RELATIONS BETWEEN U. S. AND PRC INTACT." TOASTS EXCHANGED "IN A SOMEWHAT CHILLY ATMOSPHERE... BOTH MEN USED WORDS THAT RANK NEAR BOTTOM OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC VOCABULARY; CHIAO REFERRED TO 'FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE' OF TALK BETWEEN MAO AND HAK, BUT CHARACTERIZED OTHER CONVERSATIONS AS 'FRANK' AND 'USEFUL.'" DIPLOMATS SAID DATE FOR FORD VISIT SET. CHINESE "PERSISTED IN THEME THAT U.S. HAS BEEN APPEASING USSR AND WAS THUS RISKING ANOTHER WORLD WAR. HAK WAS SAID TO HAVE RESPONDED THAT DETENTE WAS NOT VIEWED AS SUBSTITUTE FOR STRONG DEFENSE AND THAT DETENTE SERVED AS A LEVER TO RESTRAIN SOVIET EXPANSION."

ON WESTERN EUROPE, SALT, "CHINESE WERE SAID TO HAVE CRITICIZED AMERICAN POLICY WITHOUT OFFERING ALTERNATIVES. HAK DID NOT ASK FOR ALTERNATIVES, AND CHINESE INDICATED THAT THEIR ROLE WAS SIMPLY TO ALERT AND NOT TO SUGGEST POLICY FOR ANOTHER NATION." ON KOREA, PRC REPEATED POSITION THAT U.S. SHOULD WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM ROK AND TALK DIRECTLY WITH DPRK. "HAK WAS SAID TO HAVE ANSWERED THAT U.S. WOULD REMOVE ITS TROOPS ONLY AFTER PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURITY IN KOREA HAD BEEN WORKED OUT AND THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED ONLY ALONG WITH SOUTH KOREA." TOASTS CITED, EXPLAINED. "THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES ON HOW TO DEAL WITH MOSCOW IN CERTAIN AREAS, BUT THEY SAID THESE WERE WELL KNOWN BEFOREHAND. CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS HAVE COME A LONG WAY AND ARE GOOD, BUT ARE NOW MARKING TIME, THEY SAID, STRESSING POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF HAK'S MEETING WITH MAO YESTERDAY."

WASH POST - GREENWAY ON PAGE 18 SAYS HAK'S "FAREWELL BANQUET WERE ENDED ON A COOL NOTE WEDNESDAY NIGHT WITH TOASTS INDICATING THAT AMERICANS AND CHINESE HAVE AGREED TO DISAGREE ON MANY OF ISSUES THAT DIVIDE THEM. PRESIDENT FORD'S SCHEDULED VISIT HAS CHINA'S BLESSING AND BASIC SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP IS STILL INTACT... BUT JUDGING

FROM REMARKS AT BANQUET THERE CANNOT HAVE BEEN MUCH AGREEMENT DURING WORKING SESSIONS WITH VICE PREMIER TENG." SOME SOURCES DESCRIBED CHIAO'S TOAST AS "UNUSUALLY CURT." HAK DID NOT EXPECT BIG BREAKTHROUGH, PRC EXPECTED NO GREAT

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PROGRESS BUT "THEY WELCOME MR. FORD REGARDLESS."

DESPITE INDICATED PRC PATIENCE ON TAIWAN ISSUE, THEY ARE "DISAPPOINTED THAT RELATIONSHIP HAS NOT PROGRESSED FURTHER."

HAK DID NOT TRY HIS CHINESE AGAIN, SOME AIDES SUGGESTED IT SOUNDED LIKE KARL MARX WOULD HAVE. POSING NEXT TO CLAY STATUE, HAK PREDICTED TROUBLE TELLING "WHICH ONE IS FOR REAL."

WSJOURNAL - KEATLEY ON PAGE 12 SAYS COOL FINALE "WON'T JEOPARDIZE LIMITED U.S./PRC DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP." DISAGREEMENTS REMAIN ON MAJOR ISSUES: TAIWAN, DETENTE. HAK CONTENDED THAT FRAGILE TIES WILL BE STRENGTHENED BECAUSE EACH SIDE WANTS IT. CHIAO TOAST "MORE CIVIL THAN FRIENDLY... RATHER BRUSQUE... ALMOST RUDE." BUT MEETING WITH MAO, "UNUSUALLY LONG... GAVE HIGHEST POSSIBLE BLESSING" TO U.S./PRC RELATIONS. ALSO, FORD VISIT ON TRACKS, BELIEVED PLANNED FOR ABOUT DECEMBER 1.

IN GENERAL, NO PLAN TO STRENGTHEN TIES, DISAGREEMENTS REMAIN, BUT THIN RELATIONSHIP STILL VALUABLE.

(CHITRIB, LATIMES NOT IN.)

3. NETWORKS

B. KALB, CBS RADIO, FIRST LINE REPORT - HAK TRIP TO PEKING HAS ENDED -- FOUR DAYS OF NEGOTIATIONS PLUS A BIT OF SIGHT-SEEING, AND BIG BIT OF BANQUETS, DESIGNED TO NOURISH RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND CHINA. THESE RELATIONS, ARE, IN A SENSE, ANEMIC. NO SURPRISE THAT, SINCE THEY WERE BLOODLESS JUST THREE AND A HALF YEARS AGO. IT WAS PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO PEKING IN FEB 1972 THAT PUMPED STIRRINGS OF LIFE INTO A RELATIONSHIP THAT HAD BEEN DEAD FOR YEARS. IN FACT, NOT DEAD AS MUCH AS HOSTILE, ANTAGONISTIC, VIRULENT. THAT JOURNEY TO PEKING WAS A DIPLOMATIC SPECTACULAR. THAT VISIT SET UP AN EXTRAVAGANT BUT UNOFFICIAL SENSE OF EXPECTANCY ABOUT FUTURE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. BUT FACT IS THAT NO AMOUNT OF PEKING DUCK, BRAISED SHARK FINS, AND CHINESE CABBAGE WITH MUSHROOMS -- ROUTINE MENU WITH STATE BANQUETS HERE -- CAN COVER UP OBVIOUS, THAT TWO COUNTRIES ARE IDEOLOGICAL ADVERSARIES DISAGREEING ON A WIDE VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES BUT BROUGHT TOGETHER BY THEIR MUTUAL POWER.

IT WAS PRICE OF NAIVETE TO EXPECT THAT HAK'S LATEST VISIT TO PEKING WOULD SUDDENLY PRODUCE ANY MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THERE IS TRADE BETWEEN CHINA

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AND U.S., EXCHANGES OF SCIENTISTS, SCHOLARS AND PING PONG PLAYERS; BUT THERE IS ALSO CONTINUING DISAGREEMENT ON IDEOLOGY, KOREA, AND DETENTE WITH SOVIET UNION, TO LIST JUST A FEW ITEMS.

INDEED, ON DETENTE THERE IS AN IRRECONCILABLE GAP AND A REPORTER IN PEKING LISTENING TO WHAT SOME OF HIS CHINESE HOSTS WERE SAYING COULD NOT RESIST CONCLUSION THAT CHINESE FEEL THAT U.S. IS BEING NAIVE TO PLACE EVEN SLIGHTEST FAITH IN ANYTHING RUSSIANS SAY OR SIGN. INDEED, THAT CHINESE FEEL THAT U.S. IS, IN A SENSE, APPEASING RUSSIANS. IN FACT, IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY SOME ANALYSTS THAT SECRET DREAM OF CHINESE IS FOR U.S. TO RETURN TO DAYS OF COLD WAR WITH RUSSIANS. THAT WOULD LEAVE WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW PREOCCUPIED WITH EACH OTHER, AND LEAVE CHINA, MORE OR LESS, FREE TO PURSUE HER OWN REVOLUTIONARY POLICIES AROUND WORLD.

BUT HAK HAS SOUGHT TO TRIANGULATE DETENTE AND HIS VISIT HERE WAS AIMED AT FIRING UP SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WITHOUT IN ANY WAY JEOPARDIZING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. GIVEN THAT BACKGROUND, FACT THAT TOASTS EXCHANGED BY HAK AND HIS CHINESE COUNTERPART AT LAST NIGHT'S FAREWELL BANQUET, FACT THAT TOASTS WERE LOW KEY, MUTED WAS NO REAL SURPRISE, BUT RATHER A FAIRLY ACCURATE INDICATOR TO STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES.

BUT THERE ARE TWO OBVIOUS AND POSITIVE ELEMENTS RIGHT NOW WITH WAY THINGS ARE GOING BETWEEN PEKING AND WASHINGTON. FOR ONE THING THERE WAS MEETING BETWEEN CHAIRMAN MAO AND HAK TUESDAY NIGHT. A MEETING WITH 81-YEAR OLD CHINESE LEADER IS NOT AN INVITATION TO A TEA PARTY. IT IS A CALCULATED ACT OF POLICY WITH AN IMMENSE SIGNIFICANCE. AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT CHAIRMAN HAS ONCE AGAIN PUT HIS PUBLIC STAMP OF APPROVAL ON SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROACHMENT. FOR ANOTHER, THERE IS UPCOMING VISIT BY PRESIDENT FORD, EXPECTED SHORTLY AFTER THANKSGIVING. ALL TOGETHER, SINO-AMERICAN CONNECTION MAY BE LIMITED, BUT FACT THAT IT SERVES NATIONAL INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES MAKES IT A FACT WITH A FUTURE.

TED KOPPEL, ABC TV - ON BALANCE, COLOR HAK SATISFIED. YES, THERE ARE SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND CHINA OVER U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE. IDEALLY, HAK BELIEVES, PEKING'S LEADERSHIP WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TOTAL, IRRECONCILABLE HOSTILITY BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. IT WOULD, AFTER ALL, NEUTRALIZE CHINA'S TWO MOST POWERFUL ADVERSARIES. BUT HAK IS EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT ISSUE OF DETENTE IS NOT GOING TO CAUSE A RIFT IN SINO-AMERICAN



RELATIONS. CHINESE WANT THERE TO BE NO DOUBT OVER CONTINUING POSITIVE TREND IN THAT RELATIONSHIP. THAT TO THEM IS SYMBOLIC VALUE IN HAVING PRESIDENT FORD COME TO PEKING LATE NEXT MONTH. IN SHORT, EACH SIDE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THOSE POLICIES THAT IT SEES AS BEING IN ITS OWN BEST INTERESTS. AND FOR MOMENT, AT LEAST, BOTH PEKING AND WASHINGTON SEE A POSITIVE SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP IN THAT LIGHT.

MELINDA KNICKS, CBS RADIO, TOKYO - AFTER A REPORTEDLY COLD RECEPTION IN CHINA, HAK IS BACK IN A COUNTRY WHERE AMERICANS ARE ENJOYING UNPRECEDENTED POPULARITY. THIS RESULTS FROM LAST YEAR'S VISIT HERE BY PRESIDENT FORD AND RECENT SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO U.S. BY EMPEROR HIROHITO AND EMPRESS NAGAKO.

NO STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS WERE CALLED ON OCCASION OF HAK VISIT, AND THAT IS AS GOOD A SIGN AS ANY OF WARM WELCOME, FOR THERE HAS BEEN A CONSTANT REFRAIN TO GESTURES OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP.

HAK IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH JAPANESE FM MIYAZAMA AND FINANCE MINISTER OHIRA LATER TODAY. FRIDAY, HE WILL SEE PM TAKEO MIKI TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST RESULTING FROM HIS TRIP TO CHINA.

NO OLIVER ON NBC. INGERSOLL
BT



OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #2697 2982225
O 232201Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3382

~~SECRET~~ STATE 252697 TDSEC 160297

EXDIS
FOLLOWING REPEAT MADRID 7409 SENT SECSTATE DATED OCT 23,
QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ MADRID 7409

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, SP
SUBJECT: URGENT EFFORTS TO PERSUADE FRANCO TO RETIRE
REF: MADRID 7368

1. PRINCE JUAN CARLOS HAS JUST SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ME THROUGH THE COUNT OF MOTRICO (ONE OF JUAN CARLOS' CLOSEST ADVISERS).

2. REFERRING TO OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY (REFTEL) AND HIS PROMISE TO KEEP ME INFORMED, THE PRINCE WANTED ME IMMEDIATELY TO KNOW OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

3. FRANCO HAD SUFFERED ANOTHER HEART ATTACK EARLY THIS MORNING. AT 1400 HOURS LOCAL THIS AFTERNOON, FRANCO'S SON-IN-LAW (CRISTOBAL VALLVERDE, WHO IS ALSO A DOCTOR AND WHO SUPERVISES FRANCO'S MEDICAL CARE) HAD COME TO SEE THE PRINCE TO INFORM HIM OF FRANCO'S LATEST ATTACK AND OF THE MEDICAL CONCLUSION THAT SERIOUS DAMAGE WAS NOW IRREVERSIBLE AND THAT FRANCO WOULD PROBABLY ONLY LAST A SHORT WHILE LONGER. VILLAVERDE ALSO TOLD THE PRINCE OF THE FAMILY'S DETERMINATION THAT FRANCO SHOULD NOW BE INDUCED TO RETIRE AND HAND OVER HIS POWERS TO JUAN CARLOS AS KING OF SPAIN.

4. VILLAVERDE AND THE PRINCE AGREED THAT THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO WOULD BE CARRIED OUT TONIGHT. AT 2000 HOURS LOCAL, THERE WOULD BE A FURTHER MEDICAL CONSULTATION WITH REGARD TO FRANCO'S CONDITION. FOLLOWING THAT VILLAVERDE AND TWO OTHER DOCTORS WOULD INFORM FRANCO THAT HIS CONDITION REQUIRED THAT HE RETIRE AS CHIEF OF

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SDO

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 33 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *HR* NARA, Date *8/10/10*



STATE. AFTER THIS VISIT, FRANCO'S DAUGHTER (CARMEN VILLAVERDE) WOULD THEN TALK TO HER FATHER AND RECALLING HER UNFLAGGING SUPPORT FOR HIM, URGE HIM IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED THAT HE SHOULD RETIRE. FOLLOWING THIS VISIT, SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 2030 AND 2100, PRIME MINISTER ARIAS, PRESIDENT OF THE CORTES AND OF THE COUNCIL OF THE REALM, RODRIGUEZ DE VALCARCEL, AND THE THREE MILITARY MINISTERS WOULD THEN GO IN TO SEE FRANCO AND PRESS HIM TO SIGN A DOCUMENT RETIRING AND TRANSFERRING THE POWERS OF CHIEF OF STATE TO JUAN CARLOS.

5. THE PRINCE ASKED VILLAVERDE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF FRANCO THEN REFUSED TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT AND VILLAVERDE SAID THAT IN THIS EVENT THE DOCTORS WOULD ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF INCAPACITY WHICH WOULD THEN BRING INTO PLAY THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION WITH RESPECT TO SUCCESSION, INVOLVING THE GOVERNMENT, THE COUNCIL OF THE REALM AND THE CORTES.

6. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, AND AS EXPECTED, FRANCO SIGNS THE DECREE RENOUNCING HIS POSITION AND TRANSFERRING THE POWERS TO THE PRINCE, THE THREE-MAN COUNCIL OF REGENCY WOULD IMMEDIATELY ASSUME THE HEADSHIP OF STATE. WITHIN 24 HOURS OR SO, THE CORTES WOULD BE CONVOKED TO BE INFORMED OF FRANCO'S RENUNCIATION OF POWER. WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 48 HOURS AND POSSIBLY AS EARLY AS MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, JUAN CARLOS WOULD APPEAR BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE REALM AND THE CORTES TO TAKE THE OATH AS KING OF SPAIN.

7. UNDER THIS SCHEDULE, JUAN CARLOS WOULD MAKE A NATION-WIDE TELEVISION ADDRESS ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, SETTING FORTH A GENERAL STATEMENT ON HIS ASSUMPTION OF THE OFFICE OF HEAD OF STATE. HE WOULD HOPE TO INCLUDE IN IT A GENERAL ORIENTATION OF A MORE OPEN AND PARTICIPATORY SPAIN.

8. IN ALL PROBABILITY, JUAN CARLOS WOULD ACCEPT THE RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER ARIAS AND SEEK TO APPOINT AN ENTIRELY NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD BE AS BROADLY BASED AS POSSIBLE. WHILE IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO BRING IN ANY ELEMENTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION, INCLUDING THE SPANISH SOCIALIST PARTY (PSOE), HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO APPOINT PEOPLE WHO HAD CONTACTS WITH THAT OPPOSITION SO THAT A DIALOGUE COULD BE STARTED. HE HAD NO DEFINITE CHOICE AS YET AS TO A PRIME MINISTER, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT BE A MILITARY MAN OR ANYBODY WHO WAS AT THE MOMENT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN HEADING AN ASSOCIATION. (IN THIS REGARD, THE COUNT OF MOTRICO INDICATED HE WAS AMONGST THOSE BEING CONSIDERED.)



~~SECRET~~

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9. JUAN CARLOS PROMISED THAT HE WOULD KEEP ME INFORMED
ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR TONIGHT.
STABLER
UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT

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PAGE 03

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DE RUEHC #2712 2962227
O 232210Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3383

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 252712 TOSEC 160298
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SADAT LUNCHEON

1. ADDITIONAL ACCEPTANCES FOR SADAT LUNCHEON (10/23 -
4:00 PM)

CONGRESSMAN AND MRS. JAMES SCHEUER
MR. AND MRS. GABRIEL HAUGE
MR. GERALD PARSKY
CONGRESSMAN AND MRS. JOHN JARMAN
SENATOR AND MRS. HARRY BYRD
MAYOR AND MRS. WASHINGTON
MR. AND MRS. JACK VALENTI

2. ADDITIONAL REGRETS:

MR. RUMSFELD
CONGRESSMAN AND MRS. JOHN SLACK
MR. AND MRS. CHARLES OLCOTT
MR. AND MRS. DAVID SCOTT

3. PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED BUT NOW MUST REGRET:

MR. WILLIAM PALEY
SENATOR AND MRS. BROCK
SENATOR AND MRS. MARK HATFIELD

4. AMBASSADOR CATTO SUGGESTS SUBSTITUTION OF CONSOMME

*****HHSR COMMENT*****

SDO

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PAGE 01

TOR:296/22:32Z

DTG:232210Z OCT 75

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *HA* JARY, Date *8/10/10*




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IMPERIAL FOR PUMPKIN SOUP IF FISH COURSE IS APPROVED
OR GUESTS WILL EXPLODE.

INGERSOLL
BT

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3364

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 252711 TOSEC 160299
 E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: MRS. KISSINGER'S TEA FOR MRS. SADAT

1. ADDITIONAL ACCEPTANCES (10/23 - 4:00 PM)

MRS. ASHRAF A. GHORBALI
 MRS. MOSTAFA RATES ABDEL-WAHAB
 MRS. WARREN BURGER
 MRS. JAMES T. LYNN
 MRS. NELSON ROCKEFELLER

2. ADDITIONAL REGRETS

MRS. ROBERT HARTMANN
 MRS. JOHN J. RHODES
 MRS. GARY HART
 MRS. WILLIAM V. ROTH
 MRS. HUBERT HUMPHREY
 MRS. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
 MRS. WILLIAM E. SIMON
 MRS. EARL L. BUTZ

3. PLEASE FURTHER IDENTIFY MRS. FAIRLEE ARENDT,

INGERSOLL
 BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
 State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *HR* NARA, Date *8/10/10*

PSN:050932 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:296/22:29Z DTG:232210Z OCT 75

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #2747 2962248
O 232239Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3388

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 252747 TOSEC 160303
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, H. A.)

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PRESS CONFERENCE

FOR SECRETARY FROM MCCLOSKEY AND ANDERSON

PRESS HERE HAS ALREADY BEEN ASKING WHEN YOU MIGHT BE PLAN-
NING A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON. WE HESITATED BOTHER-
ING YOU WITH THIS BEFORE YOUR RETURN, BUT DECIDED IT BETTER
TO RAISE IT NOW FOR FEAR NEW COMMITMENTS ON YOUR ALREADY
HEAVY SCHEDULE FOR NEXT WEEK WOULD RULE OUT CHANCE FOR YOUR
EVEN CONSIDERING IT. WE SUGGEST WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29 AS
A POSSIBILITY. PRESIDENT SADAT WILL HAVE LEFT TOWN THAT
MORNING AFTER HAVING ADDRESSED THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB,
TALKED TO EDITORS AND COLUMNISTS AND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE
HIMSELF DURING THE TWO PREVIOUS DAYS. INGERSOLL
BT

DECLASSIFIED

EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *LR* NARA Date *8/10/10*

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SDO, VANDERHYE

PSN:050951 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:296/22:55Z DTG:232239Z OCT 75

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PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #2748 2962249
P 232239Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3389

UNCLAS STATE 252748 TOSEC 160304

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS: SOPN (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF PRESS BRIEFING, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23

FOR FUNSETH FROM S/PRS
NO. 23

1. SPOKESMAN (TRATTNER) SAID SECRETARY PLANNING RETURN TO WASHINGTON OCTOBER 24 AT THE END OF THE DAY. ASKED REASON FOR EARLIER RETURN THAN ORIGINALLY ANNOUNCED, SPOKESMAN SAID HE BELIEVED LAST DAY OF TOYKO SCHEDULE HAD ALWAYS BEEN A BIT FLEXIBLE, AND THAT SECRETARY WOULD BE HAVING VERY FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER AND FINANCE MINISTER.

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, SPOKESMAN HAD FOLLOWING REPLIES:

A. AMERICANS KIDNAPPED OCTOBER 22 IN BEIRUT: NO WORD RECEIVED FROM KIDNAPPERS. WE HAVE SEEN A REPORT THAT THE TWO AMERICANS ARE ALIVE AND IN HANDS OF THE PFLP, BUT CANNOT CONFIRM ITS ACCURACY. WE REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. A THIRD AMERICAN, WILLIAM BUCHER LYONS, WAS DETAINED AT NOON OCTOBER 22 BY ARMED, UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENTS AT A ROADBLOCK WHILE DRIVING IN BEIRUT. HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED UNHARMED ON SAMEAY, AND LATER SAW OUR CONSUL AT BEIRUT EMBASSY.

B. ECONOMIC SUMMIT: THIS SUBJECT IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE AMONG THOSE DISCUSSED IN SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH JAPANESE FINANCE MINISTER IN TOYKO.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SDO, VANDERHYE

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C. STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SPANISH BASES: AMBASSADOR MCCLOSKEY LAST WEEK IN MADRID PRESENTED FOR SPANISH REVIEW AND COMMENT A NUMBER OF DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS, OF WHICH THERE WILL BE FIVE OR SIX IN DIFFERENT FIELDS, MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY. WE ARE AWAITING SPANISH REVIEW AND COMMENTS. NO NEW MEETING IS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED. WE WILL BE SEEKING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE FULL AGREEMENT, BUT DO NOT YET KNOW WHAT FORM THIS WILL TAKE. THAT WILL BE WORKED OUT IN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONGRESS.

D. RELEASE OF AMERICANS IN VIETNAM: WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING BEYOND HANOI ANNOUNCEMENT EARLIER IN THE WEEK. REGARDING PRESS REPORT TODAY THAT SOME AMERICANS WOULD BE LEAVING AT THE END OF THE MONTH ; WE ARE AWAITING FURTHER INFORMATION AND DO NOT KNOW WHO IS GOING TO BE RELEASED.

E. NEGOTIATIONS WITH TURKEY: IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN IN ANKARA OCTOBER 26. AMBASSADOR MACOMBER WILL REPRESENT THE U.S.

INGERSOLL
BT



OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #2820 2962339
O 232315Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3390

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 252820 TOSEC 160305

FOLLOWING REPEAT MADRID 7410 SENT SECSTATE DATED OCT 23.
QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MADRID 7410

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SP

SUBJECT: FRANCO--PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF WORSENING CONDITION
SPANISH MEDIA HAS JUST CARRIED OFFICIAL GOS BULLETIN
ANNOUNCING THAT FRANCO'S CONDITION HAS SIGNIFICANTLY
WORSENER, GIVING PUBLIC CONFIRMATION OF INFORMATION
SENT OUR EARLIER FLASH MESSAGE. THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID
THIS MEDICAL BULLETIN AND BEEN SIGNED BY EIGHT DOCTORS,
WHICH SUGGESTS THAT FRANCO MAY HAVE REFUSED TO SIGN THE
PAPERS AUTHORIZING THE SUCCESSION AND THAT THE COMPLICATED
PROCESS OF DECLARING HIM INCAPACITATED TO RULE PERHAPS
HAS BEGUN. WE CAUTION THAT THIS IS ONLY SPECULATION,
AND THAT IT COULD ALSO SIMPLY BE PRELIMINARIES TO A
SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT FRANCO HAS AUTHORIZED THE
SUCCESSION.

STABLER UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *129103*

By HR JARA, Date 8/10/10

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SDO

PSN:050995 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:296/23:45Z DTG:232315Z OCT 75

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PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #2821 2962345
P 232316Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3391

UNCLAS STATE 252821 TOSEC 160306

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, US, EG, PFOR

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT EVANS AND NOVAK COLUMN, WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 23, HEADED "THE FORD-SADAT SPLIT."

2. A DANGEROUS CHASM IS WIDENING BETWEEN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT'S PRIVATE CLAIM THAT VAST AMERICAN ARMS HAVE BEEN PROMISED TO EGYPT AND THE FORD ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC ASSERTION THAT EGYPT WILL RECEIVE VIRTUALLY NO ARMS AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE 1976 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

3. ALTHOUGH OFFICIALS HERE DOWNGRADE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARMS-FOR-EGYPT ISSUE, IT COULD UNDERMINE SADAT'S HISTORIC STATE VISIT HERE NEXT WEEK, THE FIRST BY AN EGYPTIAN LEADER TO THE US SINCE THE NASSER REVOLUTION 23 YEARS AGO.

4. SADAT HAS MADE NO SECRET WITHIN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT OF HIS CLAIM THAT THE \$5 BILLION ARMS SHOPPING-LIST HE IS BRINGING HERE WILL BE GIVEN MORE THAN JUST CURSORY STUDY BY SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES SCHLESINGER. INDEED, SADAT--NOW FAR OUT ON A LIMB

INSIDE THE ARAB WORLD AND UNDER INCREASING ATTACK FOR MAKING A SEPARATE SINAI DEAL WITH ISRAEL--HAS TOLD HIS MILITARY COMMANDERS THAT IMPORTANT PARTS OF HIS SHOPPING LIST WILL BE FULFILLED IN WASHINGTON.

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

SDO

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5. IN FACT, HOWEVER, KISSINGER WENT PUBLIC IN AN OBVIOUSLY INTENTIONAL WAY ON "MEET THE PRESS" OCT. 12 TO UNDERCUT SADAT'S SHOPPING LIST EVEN BEFORE IT IS HANDED TO HIM. THE US, HE SAID, WOULD NOT BE PREPARED "AT THIS MOMENT TO MAKE ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS OF MILITARY AID.,

6. ONLY SADAT AND KISSINGER KNOW WHAT ASSURANCES, IF ANY, THE SECRETARY GAVE THE EGYPTIAN LEADER ABOUT US ARMS DELIVERIES BUT THE FACT THAT SADAT IS USING THE ARMS ISSUE INSIDE HIS OWN GOVERNMENT AS POLITICAL UNDERPINNING TO SHORE UP HIS CONTROVERSIAL SINAI AGREEMENT SHOWS HOW WORRIED HE REALLY IS ABOUT RESENTMENT AGAINST HIM WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD SHARED BY SOME POWER CENTERS IN HIS OWN COUNTRY.

7. SADAT'S POLITICAL DANGER WILL BECOME INSTANTLY CLEAR WHEN THE FORD ADMINISTRATION SENDS ITS LONG-DELAYED MIDDLE EAST AID PACKAGE TO CONGRESS, NOW SCHEDULED FOR SUBMISSION DURING THE VERY WEEK THAT SADAT WILL BE PRESIDENT FORD'S GUEST. THAT PACKAGE WILL ASK ABOUT \$2.3 BILLION FOR ISRAEL (WHICH CONTINUES TO OCCUPY LARGE ARAB TERRITORIES SEIZED IN 1967) AND AROUND \$500 MILLION FOR EGYPT.

8. THE HUGE DISPARITY BETWEEN THOSE TWO FIGURES (EVEN THOUGH THE AMOUNT FOR EGYPT IS FAR HIGHER THAN EVER BEFORE) WILL FEED ARAB CRITICS NOW ACCUSING SADAT OF SELLING OUT SYRIA AND THE PALESTINIANS TO GET A SEPARATE SINAI AGREEMENT OF HIS OWN.

9. BUT EVEN HARSHER TROUBLES AWAIT SADAT WHEN CONGRESS STARTS HACKING AWAY AT THE PRESIDENT'S AID REQUEST. WITH CONGRESS TAKING AN EXTRAORDINARILY CRITICAL LOOK EVEN AT KISSINGER'S PLEDGES OF MILITARY AID FOR ISRAEL, THE ADMINISTRATION'S HALF-A-LOAF FOR EGYPT IS CERTAIN TO BE WHITTLED DOWN.

10. THAT UNDERLINES SADAT'S POLITICAL DANGER AND EXPOSURE INSIDE THE ARAB WORLD. FOR YEARS, THE US LOBBIED HIM TO BREAK HIS ONCE-INTIMATE MOSCOW CONNECTION, WHICH HE DID IN 1972. THAT VIRTUALLY CUT HIM OFF FROM SOVIET MILITARY AID, WHILE ISRAEL WENT ON RECEIVING HUGE AMOUNTS OF AMERICAN MILITARY AID.



PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #2823 2962348
P 232318Z OCT 75 ZPF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 252823 TOSEC 160307

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, US, CH, PFOR

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT VICTOR ZORZA COLUMN, OP-ED PAGE, WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 23, HEADED "KISSINGER IN PEKING: DOES TENG SPEAK FOR CHAIRMAN MAO?"

2. THE KISSINGER VISIT TO PEKING COINCIDES WITH A NEW TWIST IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO MAO, AMID SIGNS CALCULATED TO SUGGEST THAT HE IS BEING EDGED OUT OF POWER BY TENG HSIAD-PING, THE 70-YEAR-OLD DEPUTY PREMIER, WHO HAS MANAGED CHINA'S AFFAIRS DURING PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI'S ILLNESS.

3. A POLICY ISSUE WHICH HAS LAIN DORMANT FOR SOME TIME IS BEGINNING TO REEMERGE BETWEEN THE LINES OF THE CHINESE PRESS. THE PACE OF THE MECHANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IS TO BE GREATLY SPEEDED UP, BUT THOSE LEADERS WHO ARGUE THAT THIS COULD BE DONE ONLY THROUGH THE RAPID CONSTRUCTION OF LARGE STEEL AND ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES ARE BEING DENOUNCED AS "REVISIONISTS". INSTEAD, THE OFFICIAL DIRECTIVES DEMAND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THOUSANDS OF SMALL ENGINEERING PLANTS, SOMEWHAT IN THE MANNER OF THE BACKYARD STEEL FURNACES WHICH WERE THE HALLMARK OF THE "GREAT LEAPFORWARD" IN THE LATE 50'S.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. KISSINGER'S FIRST SECRET VISITS TO PEKING WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A SUCCESSION STRUGGLE WHICH BECAME EN-

*****HHSR COMMENT*****

VANDERHYE

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TANGLED WITH A FIERCE LEADERSHIP CONFLICT OVER THE WHOLE DIRECTION OF CHINA'S FUTURE POLICY. MAO'S THEN HEIR APPARENT, LIN BIAO, LOST HIS POST--AND HIS LIFE--AND PEKING OPENED ITS GATES TO MR. NIXON. NOW IT IS DEPUTY PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING WHO WANTS TO WELCOME MR. FORD TO CHINA, EVIDENTLY IN THE FACE OF OBJECTIONS BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP.

5. PEKING SIGNALS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT TENG WANTS THE FORD TRIP TO GO AHEAD EVEN IF WASHINGTON FAILS TO LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISES, AS THEY ARE UNDERSTOOD IN PEKING, TO PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF TAIWAN'S RETURN TO THE MAINLAND. BUT PEKING'S OFFICIAL COMPLAINT ON THE EVE OF KISSINGER'S VISIT ABOUT THE "FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE" BY THE UNITED STATES IS A SIGNAL OF A DIFFERENT KIND. TRUE, THE MESSAGE OSTENSIBLY CONCERNED TIBET, BUT ITS RELEVANCE TO TAIWAN IS UNMISTAKABLE.

6. ON THE SURFACE, IT MAY SEEM THAT THE MESSAGE IS SIMPLY INTENDED TO CONVEY TO KISSINGER THAT HE SHOULD NOT TAKE PEKING FOR GRANTED. BUT, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PEKING STRUGGLE, IT IS MORE LIKELY TO MEAN THAT THE SIGNALS COMING FROM TENG SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS AN AUTHORITATIVE EXPRESSION OF AGREED POLICY. CERTAINLY ITS APPEARANCE AT THIS TIME SEEMS CALCULATED TO UNDERMINE THE APPEARANCE OF HIS OWN AUTHORITY HE HAS SOUGHT TO CONVEY.

7. THIS INTERPRETATION WOULD SEEM TO BE MORE IN KEEPING WITH THE VEILED CRITICISM OF TENG WHICH IS NOW APPEARING IN THE CHINESE PRESS. THE ATTACKS ON HIM FOLLOW A PERIOD DURING WHICH HE APPEARED TO BE VERY MUCH IN THE ASCENDANT, AFTER BEING RESCUED BY CHOU EN-LAI FROM THE STATUS OF "TRAITOR" TO WHICH HE HAS BEEN CONSIGNED DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. INDEED, TENG'S MANAGEMENT OF THE COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS DURING ITS RECOVERY FROM THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION EARNED HIM THE HOSTILITY OF THE LEFT. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE GOVERNING BUREAUCRACY--MANY OF WHOSE MEMBERS HE RESTORED TO FAVOR--AND THE MASS OF THE PEOPLE, TO WHOM THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS AN UNWELCOME DISTURBANCE, HAVE INCREASINGLY COME TO REGARD TENG AS THE COUNTRY'S SAVIOUR. MAO'S INCREASINGLY LONG AND FREQUENT ABSENCES FROM PUBLIC LIFE, AT A TIME WHEN CHOU WAS ALSO ILL, SEEMED CALCULATED TO FOCUS THE SPOTLIGHT ON TENG AS THE COUNTRY'S REAL RULER AND MAO'S SUCCESSOR.

8. BUT THE CAMPAIGN NOW BEING WAGED IN THE CHINESE PRESS



BY MEANS OF LITERARY AND HISTORICAL ALLUSIONS SUGGESTS

THAT ALL THIS WAS BEING DONE AGAINST MAO'S WISHES. THE PRESS CAMPAIGN CENTERS ON TWO THIRTEENTH-CENTURY LITERARY-HISTORICAL CHARACTERS, ONE OF WHOM, THE LEADER OF A PEASANT UPRISING, IS CLEARLY MEANT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH MAO, WHILE THE OTHER, A "TRAITOR" AND SCHEMER, IS MEANT TO REPRESENT THE OPPOSITION TO MAO.

9. THE TRAITOR SUNG CHIANG WHO WANTED TO GRAB THE COMMAND OF THE UPRISING IS DEPICTED AS TRYING TO KEEP THE TRUE REVOLUTIONARY LEADER, CHAO KAI, OUT OF THE LIMELIGHT IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT MAO HAS BEEN KEPT OUT OF IT. SUNG (I.E. TENG HSIAO-PING) KEPT TRYING TO PERSUADE CHAO (I.E. MAO) TO PRESERVE HIMSELF BECAUSE "YOU ARE THE MASTER," INSTEAD OF "CARELESSLY" LEAVING THE MOUNTAIN FASTNESS OF LIANGSHANG.

10. BUT READERS OF THE CHINESE PRESS ARE BEING URGED TO SEE THROUGH SUNG (TENG), WHO WAS ONLY "PRETENDING" TO RESPECT CHAO (MAO). IN FACT, HE WANTED CHAO TO BE THE TOP LEADER "IN NAME ONLY" WHILE SEEKING TO CARRY OUT HIMSELF THE PUBLIC FUNCTIONS IN CHAO'S ABSENCE, THUS "INCREASING HIS OWN PRESTIGE TO THE DETRIMENT OF CHAO'S.

11. IN THE CHINESE POLITICAL JARGON, "ORGANISATIONAL" EXPOSURE MEANS EXPULSION FROM OFFICE--HARDLY A MEASURE THAT CAN BE TAKEN AGAINST A THIRTEENTH-CENTURY POLITICIAN, BUT IT COULD BE TAKEN AGAINST TENG HSIAO-PING, AND THAT IS WHAT HIS ENEMIES ARE URGING.

12. WHO ARE THEY? THE ISSUES ON WHICH THEY HAVE CHOSEN TO CHALLENGE HIM SHOWS THAT THEY ARE THEMEN OF THE LEFT IN THE LEADERSHIP. BECAUSE THE PRESS CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN BASED ON A STATEMENT ON THE 13TH CENTURY NOVEL, "WATER MARGIN," MADE BY MAO HIMSELF, IT MAY SEEM THAT THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST TENG HSIAO-PING HAS BEEN LAUNCHED ON HIS ORDERS. BUT THE ARTICLES ALSO WARN MAO AGAINST BEING TAKEN IN BY TENG, WHO IS REPEATEDLY REPRESENTED AS ONLY WAITING FOR THE DEATH OF HIS MASTER TO TAKE FULL POWER, AND TO TURN HIS POLICIES UPSIDE DOWN.

13. THE LATEST OF THESE ARTICLES URGES MAO TO ACT WHILE THERE IS STILL TIME. "AS CHAO (I.E. MAO) LAY DYING," IT RECALLS, "HIS LAST WORDS BELIED SUNG'S (I.E. TENG HSIAO-



PING'S) ELIGIBILITY TO BECOME THE NATURAL MASTER OF LIANG-SHAN. ALAS, IT WAS TOO LATE. FOR BY THIS TIME SUNG HAD GRABBED ALL THE POWER."

14. MAO IS BEING TOLD BY THE MEN OF THE LEFT THAT HE OUGHT TO HELP THEM TO PRESERVE HIS LIFE'S WORK WHILE THERE IS STILL TIME. THE WAY IN WHICH THE CAMPAIGN IS DEVELOPING SUGGESTS THAT HE IS MORE INCLINED TO LISTEN TO THEM, EVEN THOUGH TENG HSIAD-PING MAY CLAIM TO SPEAK TO KISSINGER IN MAO'S NAME. (END TEXT) INGERSOLL
BT



PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #2824 2962350
P 232319Z OCT 75 ZFF4
PM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3394

UNCLAS STATE 252824 TOSEC 160308

E.O. 11652: N/A

AGS: SOPN, US, UR, PFOR, EAGR, ETRD

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, HEADED "SENSIBLE GRAIN DEAL."

2. ATTACKS LAUNCHED BY SEVERAL MAJOR FARM ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST THE FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT ON GRAIN PURCHASES BETWEEN THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND MOSCOW CAN READILY BE DISMISSED AS A SELF-SERVING EFFORT TO REAP GREATER PROFITS. DESPITE THE FARMER'S IDEOLOGICAL POSE AS DEFENDERS OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE MARKET, THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF THEIR DISCONTENT IS FEAR THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL PREVENT GRAIN PRICES FROM GOING AS HIGH AS THEY MIGHT WITHOUT SUCH GOVERNMENTAL BARGAINING.

3. THE NEW AGREEMENT HEEDS THE LESSONS LEARNED EARLIER IN THIS DECADE ABOUT THE ROLLER-COASTER PRICE PATTERN THAT CAN RESULT FROM INTERMITTENT MASSIVE SOVIET PURCHASES. MOSCOW HAS NOW AGREED TO BUY A MINIMUM OF SIX TO EIGHT MILLION TONS OF AMERICAN GRAIN ANNUALLY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, AND TO CONSULT WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IF, AT ANY TIME, IT NEEDS MORE.

4. THUS, INSTEAD OF CONCENTRATING THEIR PURCHASES IN YEARS OF CROP FAILURE, WHILE BUYING LITTLE OR NOTHING IN OTHER YEARS, SOVIET PURCHASING AGENTS WILL IMPORT A STEADY MINIMUM AMOUNT, CARRYING UNNEEDED RESERVES FROM ONE YEAR

*****NHSR COMMENT*****


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
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TO THE NEXT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL GET A CHANCE TO DETERMINE IN ADVANCE WHETHER ADDITIONAL PURCHASES SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED IN THE LIGHT OF ANTICIPATED HARVESTS, DOMESTIC NEEDS AND COMMITMENTS TO OTHER BUYERS.

5. SUCH A SENSIBLE ARRANGEMENT SHOULD HELP ASSURE FARMERS OF AN EXPANDED BUT STEADY MARKET, WHILE SAFEGUARDING CONSUMERS AGAINST A REPETITION OF THE UPSURGE IN FOOD PRICES THAT RESULTED FROM THE SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASE IN 1972-73. MOREOVER, AN ESCAPE CLAUSE RELIEVES THE UNITED STATES OF ITS EXPORT OBLIGATIONS SHOULD A NATURAL DISASTER REDUCE GRAIN PRODUCTION BELOW A PREDESIGNATED FIGURE.

6. THROUGH AN OIL APPENDIX TO THE GRAIN DEAL WASHINGTON HOPES TO GET MOSCOW TO AGREE TO THE SALE OF UP TO 200,000 BARRELS OF PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS DAILY--A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE NATIONAL CONSUMPTION--AT A PRICE BELOW THE OPEC CARTEL'S QUOTATION. MOSCOW, FOR BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REASONS, CONTINUES TO RESIST THAT PART OF THE BARGAIN. BUT BY LINKING GRAIN AND OIL, WASHINGTON HAS IMPLICITLY GIVEN NOTICE THAT NO LAW OF NATURE REQUIRES GRAIN PRICES TO BE SET IN A FREELY COMPETITIVE MARKET WHILE OIL PRICES ARE FIXED BY A SMALL CLIQUE OF PRODUCING NATIONS. (END TEXT) INGERSOLL
BT



PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #2625 2962356
P 232320Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 0600

UNCLAS STATE 252625 TOSEC 160309

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, PFOR, PINR

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT WILLIAM BEECHER COLUMN, BOSTON
GLOBE, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, HEADED "U.S. TAKES BRITISH
FILES 'ON LOAN' (THE TROUBLED CIA-2)"

2. IN ORDER TO CONVINCE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IT CAN HAND
OVER TOP-SECRET DOCUMENTS WITHOUT FEAR OF THEIR BECOMING
PUBLIC, THE UNITED STATES NOW TREATS SUCH MATERIAL AS
"ON LOAN."

3. BY THAT SEMANTIC SLEIGHT OF HAND, SUCH FILES WOULD NOT
BE CONSIDERED THE "PROPERTY" OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THEREFORE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SUBPOENA BY CONGRESS OR
THE COURTS.

4. ALSO, WHILE THE FORD ADMINISTRATION WANTED VERY MUCH
TO MOUNT A MAJOR COVERT EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL
MODERATES IN PORTUGAL, BECAUSE OF WIDESPREAD CRITICISM
OVER A SIMILAR EFFORT IN CHILE NO ACTION WAS TAKEN UNTIL
VERY LATE IN THE GAME.

5. WHAT FINALLY WAS DONE WAS NOT ONLY VERY LATE, BUT VERY
LITTLE. CONTRARY TO PUBLISHED REPORTS SPECULATING ABOUT
TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF COVERT AID, THE TOTAL EFFORT

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

VANDERHYE

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TO DATE, ACCORDING TO UNIMPEACHABLE SOURCES, HAS BEEN JUST OVER \$1 MILLION.

6. THESE TWO INCIDENTS ARE IN ONE SENSE CLOSELY RELATED. FOR THEY REPRESENT WAYS THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO ADJUST, IN THE AFTERMATH OF MONTHS OF REVELATIONS ABOUT THE CIA ON CAPITAL HILL AND IN THE PRESS, TO THE NEW REALITY OF NERVOUS ALLIES AND A CRITICAL CONGRESS.

7. FOR, WHATEVER REFORMS MAY EVENTUALLY BE DECIDED UPON TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, THE UNITED STATES CANNOT CALL "TIME" TO MINISTER TO A KEY INJURED PLAYER.

8. THE US-BRITISH INTELLIGENCE CONNECTION HAS BEEN VERY CLOSE SINCE THE DAYS OF WORLD WAR II WHEN THE OSS (OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES), THE PREDECESSOR OF CIA, WAS ESTABLISHED IN PART BECAUSE OF BRITAIN'S DESIRE TO HAVE A SINGLE AGENCY WITH WHICH IT COULD SHARE INFORMATION AND COORDINATE CLAND-ESTINE OPERATIONS TO MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

9. THE RELATIONSHIP FLOWERED AS CIA GREW FROM A BAND OF A FEW HUNDRED EX-OSS HANDS IN 1947 TO A 15,000-MAN ESTAB-LISHMENT, WITH ACCESS TO INFORMATION FROM THE MOST SOPHIS-TICATED SPY SATELLITES AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING EQUIPMENT IN THE WORLD.

10. BUT THE BRITISH, OF LATE, HAVE BECOME QUITE ALARMED AT THE TREND IN THE UNITED STATES TO SHINE A PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT INTO SOME OF THE MORE SHADY CUPBOARDS OF AMERICAN INTEL-LIGENCE. IN BRITAIN THAT COULD NOT OCCUR BECAUSE OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT.

11. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THEIR SECRET REPORTS AND ANALYSES MIGHT BE PRIED OUT OF THE FILES OF THE CIA BY SUBPOENA FROM A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE OR BY COURT SUIT UNDER THE NEWLY STRENGTHENED FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS MIGHT BE COMP-ROMISED. AND SO THEY HELD BACK A LOT, AND PASSED CERTAIN INFORMATION WITH SO MANY RESTRICTIONS AS TO MAKE THE INFOR-MATION DIFFICULT TO DISSEMINATE TO ANALYSTS, ACCORDING TO QUALIFIED US SOURCES.



12. THUS AMERICAN OFFICIALS CAME UP WITH THE IMAGINATIVE LEGALISM OF TREATING BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AS PROPERTY, NOT OWNED BUT MERELY ON LOAN TO THE UNITED STATES.

13. BUT OFFICIALS CONCEDE THIS HAS NOT TOTALLY OVERCOME BRITISH APPREHENSION AND THE EARLIER, CLOSE RELATIONSHIP HAS NOT BEEN FULLY RESTORED.

14. IN THE CASE OF PORTUGAL, OFFICIALS SAY THAT SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER WAS PARTICULARLY WORRIED THAT UNLESS LISBON'S DRIFT TOWARD INCLUDING COMMUNISTS IN TOP GOVERNMENT POSTS COULD BE REVERSED, IT MIGHT WELL GIVE AN AURA OF RESPECTABILITY TO COALITION GOVERNMENTS WITH COMMUNIST MEMBERS THAT MIGHT BE REPEATED IN ITALY AND ELECTIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE.

15. IF SUCH A TREND DEVELOPED, HE FELT, THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED. FOR NATO, AN ALLIANCE DESIGNED TO STAND AGAINST SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE, COULD NOT FUNCTION WITHOUT EXCHANGING GREAT QUANTITIES OF CLASSIFIED FACTS AND PLANS. AND WITH COMMUNISTS SITTING IN ITS INNER COUNCILS, SUCH INFORMATION COULD NOT BE KEPT FROM MOSCOW, IN HIS VIEW.

16. KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES SAY WILLIAM E. COLBY, CIA DIRECTOR, IN SPRING AND EARLY SUMMER STOUTLY RESISTED PRESSURES TO MOUNT A COVERT POLITICAL-ACTION PROGRAM IN

PORTUGAL, ARGUING THAT WORD WOULD GET OUT AND CONGRESS AND THE PRESS WOULD HAVE A FIT OVER INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER NATION, SIMILAR TO THE REACTION TO REVELATIONS OF CIA ACTIVITIES IN CHILE.

17. AS LATE AS JULY, A NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICIALS WERE BACKING COLBY IN THE ARGUMENT THAT AMERICAN HANDS WERE TIED IN PORTUGAL BY THE HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE IN CONGRESS. INSTEAD, THEY INSISTED THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO SIT BACK AND DEPEND ON A NUMBER OF WEST EUROPEAN SOCIALIST PARTIES LED BY THOSE IN WEST GERMANY AND SWEDEN, TO HELP THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN PORTUGAL.

18. MEANWHILE, WHILE NO ONE KNEW THE HARD NUMBERS, REPORTS WERE CIRCULATING THROUGH THE BUREAUCRACY THAT THE SOVIET



UNION WAS SPENDING ABOUT \$50 MILLION IN PORTUGAL.

19. IN EARLY AUGUST, PRESIDENT FORD COMPLAINED IN AN INTERVIEW WITH U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT OF THE VIRTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN PORTUGAL BECAUSE OF THE NEGATIVE CLIMATE ON CAPITOL HILL. BUT A MONTH LATER, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, THE PRESIDENT HINTED OF SOME INVOLVEMENT WHEN HE DECLARED: "I DON'T THINK THE SITUATION (IN PORTUGAL) REQUIRED US TO HAVE A MAJOR CIA INVOLVEMENT, WHICH WE HAVE NOT HAD."

20. SOURCES SAY THAT BETWEEN THESE TWO STATEMENTS BY FORD, THE ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSED THE DANGER OF TRENDS IN PORTUGAL WITH SOME KEY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND A SMALL-SCALE CIA EFFORT WAS APPROVED AND LAUNCHED.

21. OBSERVERS IN AND OUT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BELIEVE THE CIA HAS BEEN GIVEN A BUM RAP OVER COVERT ACTION IN PLACES LIKE CHILE AND LAOS. AS IN THE CASE OF PORTUGAL, THEY POINT OUT, THE DECISION TO GO IN AND THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE EFFORT, WERE DECIDED UPON BY THE PRESIDENT AND SUPERVISED BY HIS ADVISERS.

22. RAY S. CLINE, WHO CAPPED A 20-YEAR CAREER WITH CIA BY SERVING FROM 1962 TO 1966, AS ITS DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY HEADED THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S INTELLIGENCE BRANCH FROM 1969 TO 1973, SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT THE LAOS OPERATION STARTED AS A STANDARD CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE MISSION TO GATHER INFORMATION ON NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY MOVEMENTS ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL.

23. BUT A SERIES OF WHITE HOUSE DECISIONS, STARTING IN THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, TURNED THE EFFORT FROM THAT OF A SMALL NUMBER OF MEO TRIBESMEN COLLECTING TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE INTO A COVERT, UNDECLARED WAR, RUN IN THE FIELD BY A SUCCESSION OF AMERICAN AMBASSADORS IN VIENTIENE.

24. A SENIOR CONGRESSIONAL SOURCE AGREES. BOTH NORTH VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES ACTED OUT A CHARADE IN WHICH NEITHER ADMITTED ITS PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LAOS. IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES, HE SAYS, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN FORCED BY THE LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT TO PULL



OUT IF IT ADMITTED ITS ROLE PUBLICLY, THEREBY INCREASING THE JEOPARDY TO AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

25. "IT GREW TO A \$20 MILLION TO \$30 MILLION A YEAR OPERATION, FUNDED OUT OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S BUDGET," THE CONGRESSIONAL SOURCE SAID. "BUT IT WAS NOT AN ASSIGNMENT THE CIA PARTICULARLY RELISHED, AND IT CERTAINLY CANNOT BE BLAMED IN THAT INSTANCE FOR RUNNING AMOK."

26. IN THE CASE OF CHILE, CLINE SAYS, "KISSINGER PUSHED THE CIA IN, PRESUMABLY IN BEHALF OF NIXON." THE OPERATION, HE SAID, WAS RUN FROM THE WHITE HOUSE.

27. BUT HE AND OTHERS DO BLAME THE CIA FOR KNUCKLING UNDER TO PRESSURES FROM PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND NIXON TO INFILTRATE AND REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF ANTIWAR GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES.

28. CLINE MAKES THIS DISTINCTION: IF CIA HAD PENETRATED DOMESTIC GROUPS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A COVER TO SEND AGENTS ABROAD ON CLANDENSTINE MISSIONS, THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PERMISSIBLE, IN HIS VIEW. BUT CIA PROVIDED EXTENSIVE REPORTS TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE FBI ON THE PLANS AND ACTIVITIES OF SUCH DOMESTIC GROUPS, AND THAT CLEARLY WAS IMPROPER.

29. "I CAN ONLY BLAME HELMS FOR NOT DIGGING IN HIS HEELS HARDER," CLINE SAYS, REFERRING TO RICHARD HELMS, WHO AT THE TIME HEADED CIA AND NOW IS AMBASSADOR TO IRAN. MANY OTHERS VOICED THE SAME SENTIMENT, SAYING THAT HELMS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO SAY NO TO THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT SUGGESTING THAT HE SAW THAT THE AGENCY "DRAGGED ITS HEELS" AND DID THE LEAST POSSIBLE IN QUESTIONABLE OPERATIONS.

30. A NUMBER OF SPECIALISTS BELIEVE RECENT REVELATIONS MAY BE USEFUL IN OPENING THE WAY TO NEEDED REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, BUT THEY ARGUE THAT THE FOCUS ON COVERT OPERATIONS WHICH REPRESENT ONLY ABOUT TWO PERCENT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY, IS MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES.



31. IN THEIR VIEW, THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS ARE:
1) A PAUCITY OF CONSISTENTLY WELL THOUGHT-OUT, WELL
ARTICULATED AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, AND 2) A
PENCHANT FOR OVERSECRECY OVERTHE LAST SIX YEARS WHICH
WITHHOLDS FROM TOP INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS INFORMATION, FOR
INSTANCE, ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. SUCH INFORMATION WOULD
ENABLE THE ANALYSTS TO BETTER KNOW WHAT TO LOOK FOR IN
STUDYING THE REAMS OF DATA CULLED FROM RECONNAISSANCE
SATELLITES, AGENT REPORTS AND TRANSLATIONS OF SOVIET AND
CHINESE BROADCASTS AND NEWSPAPERS.

32. SAYS ONE OFFICIAL OF THE POOR QUALITY, OVERALL, OF
ANALYSIS FROM CIA AND DIA (DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY):
"THEY KNOW THE SINGLE STONES OF THE MOSAIC. THEY KNOW
THE COLOR AND SHAPE AND SIZE OF MANY OF THEM. BUT THEY
CAN'T PUT THE MOSAIC TOGETHER CONSISTENTLY."

33. TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF ANALYSIS REQUIRES THE
RECRUITMENT OF BETTER ANALYSTS, PROVISION OF WELL THOUGHT-
OUT PROGRAMS OF SPECIALIZED ADVANCED EDUCATION AND TRAIN-
ING, AND INCENTIVES TO GET OUT ON A LIMB AND WARN OF
IMPENDING CRISES WHEN FACTS AND INTUITION WARRANT, THE
EXPERTS AGREE.

34. BUT THEY FEEL THE PRESENT CLIMATE MAKES IT ESPECIALLY
DIFFICULT TO RECRUIT MANY OF THE KIND OF YOUNG PEOPLE
NECESSARY FOR AN UPGRADING EFFORT.

35. ON THE MATTER OF OVER-SECRECY, CLINE RECENTLY TOLD
THE PIKE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE: "IN ALL MY YEARS IN
THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, I NEVER SAW
ANY RECORD OF ANY OF THE MANY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN WHITE
HOUSE OFFICIALS AND SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS. IF THESE
HAD BEEN AVAILABLE FOR SYSTEMATIC STUDY BY SOVIET
EXPERTS, SOME OF THE RATHER NAIVE STEPS TAKEN IN
PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED."

36. AND PENTAGON SOURCES SAY THE DECISION TO INVADE
CAMBODIA IN 1970 WAS SO CLOSELY HELD BY THE NIXON ADMINIS-
TRATION THAT EVEN THE THEN DIA DIRECTOR, LT. GEN. DONALD
BENNETT, WAS IN THE DARK. ACCORDING TO THIS ACCOUNT, ON
THE MORNING OF THE INVASION BENNETT WAS ASKED HOW THE
RUSSIANS AND CHINESE WERE REACTING?



37. "IF YOU'D HAVE TOLD ME A FEW DAYS AGO, I WOULD HAVE GOTTEN SOME SPECIAL ASSETS INTO PLACE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU A DECENT ANSWER," HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SNAPPED.

38. THE POINT, OF COURSE, IS THAT IF A HANDFUL OF TOP OFFICIALS ARE SO HORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS THAT THEY DON'T EVEN CONFIDE IN THE HEADS OF STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE, THIS SEVERELY CONSTRAINS THE ABILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO SERVE THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS EFFECTIVELY.

39. NEXT: DIFFERENT VIEWS ON HOW THE CIA SHOULD BE REFORMED. (END TEXT) INGERSOLL
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TAGS: SOPN, US, CH, PFOR

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT BALTSUN EDITORIAL, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, TITLED "100 MINUTES WITH MAO."

2. SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S 100 MINUTES WITH CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG PROVE THAT CHINA'S LEADER IS ALIVE AND ALERT, THAT PEKING STILL WANTS WORKING RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AND THAT PRESIDENT FORD'S PLAN TO VISIT CHINA IS STILL ON. BUT UNLESS AN EXTRAORDINARY VOLUME OF INFORMATION SOON BECOMES PUBLIC, ANY MORE DETAILED CONCLUSIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO THE PUREST SPECULATION. NEITHER THE MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN MAO NOR ANY OTHER PUBLICIZED EVENT OF MR. KISSINGER'S TRIP TO PEKING GIVES ANY CLUES TO, FOR EXAMPLE, EFFORTS TOWARD FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. FIRM-ER, AND GLOOMIER, CONCLUSIONS MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN ORDER JAD THE 81-YEAR-OLD CHAIRMAN FAILED TO SHOW MR. KISSINGER HOSPITALITY COMPARABLE TO THAT EXTENDED ON EARLIER VISITS.

3. THE TRIP HAS BOLDLY UNDERSCORED THE REALITY THAT CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONSHINGE LESS ON THE TWO COUNTRIES' BILATERAL AFFAIRS THAN ON THEIR RESPECTIVE STANCES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. PEKING-WASHINGTON RELATIONSWILL BE

MUTUALLY CONVENIENT AT LEAST SO LONG AS CHINA HAS A LEADERSHIP AS SUSPICIOUSOF MOSCOW AS CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER CHOU ARE TODAY. EVEN THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN MILITARY MEN STILL ON TAIWAN, THREE YEARS AFTER THE



*****NHRSR COMMENT*****

VANDERHYE

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NIXON-CHOU SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE PROMISED THEIR ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL, PROVOKED NO PUBLIC COMMENTS. INSTEAD, FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA REASSURED THE AMERICANS THAT, "ON THE WHOLE, CHINESE-UNITED STATES RELATIONS HAVE MOVED FORWARD IN THE LAST FEW YEARS." HIS MAJOR CRITICISM WAS OF THE FLIRTATION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON THAT PEKING INEVITABLY SEES IN DETENTE. THE CHINESE, WHO REGULARLY DENOUNCE THE "COLLUDING AND CONTENDING" BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN SUPERPOWERS, APPEAR TO BE MORE CONCERNED RIGHT NOW WITH COLLUDING THAN WITH CONTENDING.

4. WHAT IS LESS CLEAR IS WHETHER FUTURE CHINESE LEADERS WILL BE EQUALLY HOSTILE TO MOSCOW--AND HENCE EQUALLY EAGER TO COOPERATE WITH WASHINGTON. THE CURRENT CHINESE LEADERSHIP'S ATTITUDE TOWARD MOSCOW REPRESENTS THE MOST RELIABLE OPPORTUNITY LIKELY FOR SOME TIME TO COMPLETE FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA. WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION WILL TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THAT CHANCE WILL NOT BECOME CLEAR AT LEAST UNTIL THE PRESIDENT GOES TO PEKING. AND GIVEN MR. FORD'S CONCERN FOR HIS RIGHT FLANK WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, WHERE THE TAIWAN LOBBY STILL HAS SOME CLOUT, AMERICANS MAY NOT FIND OUT WHAT IS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED UNTIL AFTER THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION, AND MAYBE NOT UNTIL AFTER NEXT YEAR'S ELECTION. (END TEXT) INGERSOLL
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