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TELEGRAM

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TO USEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 250950 TOSEC 160201

NODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), OGEN

SUBJECT: PIKE COMMITTEE APPEARANCE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER


1. THE PIKE COMMITTEE VOTED EIGHT TO FIVE THIS MORNING TO HAVE YOU APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE PRIOR TO ANY DECISION ON THEIR PART AS TO HOW THEY WILL REACT TO OUR REFUSAL TO RELEASE THE BOYATT DISSENT MEMO. THE COMMITTEE HAS SUGGESTED THAT YOU APPEAR ON THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 31.

2. THOSE VOTING AGAINST YOUR APPEARANCE WERE: PIKE, GIAIMO, DELLUMS, HAYES AND STANTON; THOSE VOTING FOR: MURPHY, ASPIN, MILFORD, LEHMAN, MCCLORY, TREEN, JOHNSON AND KASTEN.

3. MCCLORY, FOR ONCE, CAME THROUGH. HE APPARENTLY RALLIED

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines
By LR NARA, Date 8/9/10



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PAGE 02 STATE 250950 TOSEC 160201

ALL THE REPUBLICANS (AND SEVERAL DEMOCRATS) TO THIS DELAYING TACTIC. I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS CLEAR THE COMMITTEE WILL NOT MAKE ANY DECISION ON HOW TO REACT TO YOUR LETTER UNTIL AFTER THEY TALK TO YOU. THE REQUEST TO HAVE YOU APPEAR IS NOT IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER REACTION. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT MCCLOSKEY AT LEAST BELIEVES THAT IN THE LONG RUN

WE MUST GIVE UP THE BOYATT MEMO AND PERMIT BOYATT TO TESTIFY. NEVERTHELESS SOME TIME HAS BEEN BOUGHT.

4. BOB MCCLOSKEY AND I TODAY SAW TIP O'NEILL, DOC MORGAN, AND JOHN BRADEMAS. CLEARLY MORGAN IS ON OUR SIDE; TIP O'NEILL SEEMED PERSUADED OF THE MERITS OF OUR CAUSE AND SAID HE WOULD TALK FURTHER TO OTIS PIKE; BRADEMAS ALSO CONCEDED THAT OUR ARGUMENTS WERE GOOD ONES (HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO HIS DISGUST IN THE EARLY 50'S THAT DULLES HAD NOT STOOD UP FOR THE DEPARTMENT), AND SEEMS PREPARED TO GIVE THE ISSUE CAREFUL AND SYMPATHETIC THOUGHT. I INTEND TO TALK TO WAYNE HAYS TOMORROW AS WELL AS KASTEN AND GREEN, WHO ARE REPUBLICANS ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE. I WILL GIVE YOU A READ-OUT ON HOW THEY SEE THE SITUATION AFTER I HAVE TALKED TO THEM.

5. HYLAND, MCCLOSKEY AND I ALL STRONGLY REPEAT STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO INFORM THE COMMITTEE TOMORROW THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO APPEAR AT 11:00 A.M. ON OCTOBER 31. A LOOK AT YOUR SCHEDULE TELLS ME THAT ANY OTHER TIME WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT; IN ADDITION, THERE IS MUCH MERIT IN AGREEING TO ACCEPT THE DATE THEY SUGGEST, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT DOES LOOK MANAGEABLE ON YOUR CALENDAR. I KNOW OF ALL YOUR OTHER PRESSING DEMANDS ON THE HILL BUT BELIEVE THIS TO BE THE FIRST PRIORITY OF ANY OF THEM (DON'T ACCUSE ME OF SPECIAL PLEADING).

6. THE COMMITTEE'S PRIMARY INTEREST WILL CERTAINLY BE TO DISCUSS THE GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED REGARDING TESTIMONY AS IT PERTAINS TO POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, YOUR SPECIFIC REFUSAL TO SUPPLY THE BOYATT MEMO, AND YOUR RECENT LETTER TO PIKE. CONCEIVABLY, OTHER SUBJECTS SUCH AS CYPRUS MAY BE RAISED; PIKE, OFF THE TOP OF HIS HEAD TO SAM GOLDBERG TODAY, INDICATED THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO HAVE PART

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 250950 TOSEC 160201

OF THE SESSION OPEN AND PART CLOSED, "DEPENDING ON THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUE." AT THE PRESENT MOMENT THIS APPEARS TO MEAN THAT THE GENERAL QUESTION OF WHAT WITNESSES MAY DISCUSS WHAT AND THE REFUSAL TO SUPPLY THE DISSENT MEMO WOULD BE AN OPEN SESSION WITH ANYTHING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF CYPRUS AND OTHER ISSUES IN CLOSED SESSION. PIKE PROMISED TO PROVIDE M WITH A BETTER FEEL FOR WHAT THEY WISH TO DISCUSS WIT; YOU TOMORROW. MY OWN VIEW, AND I HAVE TOLD GOLDBERG TO PUSH FOR THIS, IS THAT YOUR TESTIMONY OUGHT TO BE RESTRICTED TO THE ISSUE OF STATE DEPARTMENT WITNESSES, THE BOYATT DISSENT MEMO, AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CYPRUS ISSUE. I HOPE TO HAVE MORE FOR YOU ON THIS SOMETIME TOMORROW. IN THE MEANTIME WE HAVE NOT ACCEPTED THE COMMITTEE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN OCTOBER 31 APPEARANCE AND WILL NOT DO SO UNTIL WE HEAR FROM YOU.

7. IN ANTICIPATION OF AN OK FROM YOU, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOW WORKING ON BRIEFING BOOKS WHICH WILL BE READY FOR YOU ON YOUR RETURN. THEY WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH ALL OF THE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON "HOW I GOT YOU INTO THIS MESS," THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CRITICISMS OF OUR CYPRUS POLICY, ETC.

8. I AM AT THE PRESENT TIME AMBIVALENT AS TO WHETHER YOU SHOULD HAVE AN OPENING STATEMENT. WHILE I WOULD UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES RECOMMEND THAT YOU SIMPLY STAND ON YOUR LETTER AND LET THE COMMITTEE GO DIRECTLY TO QUESTIONS, I SUSPECT THERE IS SOME MERIT TO A VERY BRIEF STATEMENT THAT LAYS OUT YOUR POSITION IF, IN FACT, THE HEARING IS TO BE IN OPEN SESSION. OTHERWISE THE VIEWERS WILL NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT THE ISSUES ARE. CONSEQUENTLY WE WILL DRAFT A BRIEF STATEMENT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

9. RECOMMENDATION: THAT YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO INFORM THE COMMITTEE THAT YOU WILL APPEAR BEFORE IT AT 11:00 A.M., ON OCTOBER 31. APPROVE DISAPPROVE INGERSOLL

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 250951 TOSEC 160202

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), OGEN

SUBJECT: PIKE AND HELMS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER


1. PIKE HAS LEARNED THAT DICK HELMS IS BACK HERE TO TESTIFY BEFORE CHURCH ON MAIL OPENINGS AND HAS INSISTED THAT HELMS APPEAR ON THURSDAY MORNING FOR A DISCUSSION IN EXECUTIVE SESSION ON THE KURDISH OPERATION. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH SCOWCROFT AND MYLAND AND WE ALL THREE AGREE THERE IS NO REPEAT NO WAY TO KEEP HIM FROM GOING TO THE COMMITTEE. DICK FEELS HE CAN MANAGE THE TESTIMONY ADEQUATELY AND WITHOUT ANY LASTING DAMAGE TO ANYONE; MYLAND AND I BELIEVE, WITH YOUR OWN POTENTIAL APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE IN THE OFFING, WE OUGHT NOT GIVE THE COMMITTEE ANY AMMUNITION THAT IT CAN USE TO DEMONSTRATE STATE'S UNCOOPERATIVE ATTITUDE. AND FINALLY, THE WHITE HOUSE REMAINS, AS ALWAYS, AS TOUGH AS A WET NOODLE.

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By HR NUPA, Date 8/9/10



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PAGE 02 STATE 250951 TOSEC 160202

2. THUS, SINCE WE BELIEVE THERE IS NO WAY TO KEEP HELMS FROM THE COMMITTEE WITHOUT DOING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ALL INVOLVED, WE SHOULD AGREE TO PERMIT HIM TO APPEAR. WE WILL SO PROCEED UNLESS WE HEAR TO THE CONTRARY FROM YOU. INGERSOLL



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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3224

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250952 TOSEC 1002 J

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN

SUBJECT: KOREA AND THE UNGA

REF: SECTO 16047
FOR HABIB FROM BUFFUM

1. ALL APPROVED LETTERS ON KOREAN ITEM FROM SECRETARY HAVE BEEN SENT.
2. BELIEVE LETTER FROM SECRETARY USING SAME TEXT COULD USEFULLY BE SENT TO PRIME MINISTER OF THAILAND REQUESTING VOTE AGAINST THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION.
3. ALSO BELIEVE WE SHOULD ASK INDONESIA, AUSTRIA, GREECE AND MEXICO TO CAST A NEGATIVE VOTE IF THIS WERE NECESSARY TO DEFEAT ALGERIAN RESOLUTION AND SUGGESTING NECESSARY AUTHORITY BE GRANTED TO UN DELEGATION. TEXT OF FINAL PARA OF REQUEST IN THIS CASE WOULD READ:

BEGIN TEXT

ASKING THAT THE (GIVE NAME) GOVERNMENT RECONSIDER ITS POSITION AND, IF ITS VOTE SHOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEFEAT THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION, TO VOTE AGAINST IT. I SUGGEST

& CONFIDENTIAL

THAT OUR DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK MAINTAIN CLOSE COMMUNICATION DURING THE DEBATE ON KOREA AND THAT YOUR



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DELEGATION BE AUTHORIZED TO CAST A NEGATIVE VOTE IF THIS IS NECESSARY. YOUR SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE IS IMPORTANT TO ME AND I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR HELP. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER.

END TEXT.

4. IF YOU CONCUR, REQUEST YOU GET SECRETARY'S APPROVAL TO SEND LETTERS TO FOREIGN MINISTERS AND PRIME MINISTER AS OUTLINED ABOVE. INGERSOLL

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DE RUEHC #0961 2950456
O 220438Z OCT 75 ZPP4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3225

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250961 TOSEC 100204

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT TO SECSTATE INFO CAIRO TEL AVIV
MOSCOW BEIRUT AMMAN DAMASCUS LONDON PARIS JERUSALEM DTG 212015Z OCT 75

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FM USUN NEW YORK

QUOTE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 5206

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF, MARR
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON DRAFT RESOLUTION EXTENDING
UNEP
REF: USUN 5185

1. WITH SOVIETS CAVILING MILDLY FOR THE RECORD, SECURITY COUNCIL OCTOBER 21 AGREED ON THE ELEMENTS OF A RESOLUTION EXTENDING UNEP FOR ONE YEAR. MODEL WILL BE SIMPLEST RECENT EXTENSION RESOLUTION (RES 366) WITH TWO ADDITIONAL PREAMBULAR ELEMENTS AT SOVIET REQUEST: A) AN EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE FORCE WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY (CF RES 362), AND B) A REFERENCE TO SYGIS OBSERVATION IN PARA 28 OF HIS REPORT THAT "... ANY RELAXATION OF THE SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT COVERING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM COULD BE ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS IN THE MONTHS TO COME."

2. SC PRESIDENT OPENED CONSULTATIONS BY ANNOUNCING THAT EGYPTIAN AMB HAD INFORMED HIM EGYPT WAS PREPARED TO AGREE TO ONE YEAR EXTENSION. (EGYPTIANS HAD TOLD US - BUT NOT SOVIETS - OF THIS PRIOR TO CONSULTATIONS.)

3. ONLY DELEGATION TO SPEAK AT ANY LENGTH WAS USSR. (OVINNIKOV). AFTER USUAL RECITATION OF PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY, OVINNIKOV SAID USSR SAW NO NECESSITY OF INCREASING SIZE OF UNEP AND THUS NO NEED FOR LARGE ADDITIONAL EXPENSES. IN PARTICULAR, USSR WONDERED WHAT PRECISELY UN'S RATIONALE WAS FOR TROOP INCREASE OF

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By *NR* NARA, Date *8/9/10*

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750, PLUS SUPPORT PERSONNEL, CREWS FOR AIRCRAFT AND PATROL BOATS, ETC. OVINNIKOV SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO SEE SECRETARIAT'S ORIGINAL ESTIMATES AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS --A PEACEKEEPING PLOY DEFTLY TURNED ASIDE BY USGY URQUHART. OVINNIKOV ENDED BY PROPOSING THE TWO RESOLUTION ELEMENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE. HE MADE NO REFERENCE WHATSOEVER TO THE SINAI AGREEMENT OR TO AMERICAN TECHNICIANS.

4. SC PRESIDENT EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO INTRODUCE EXTENSION RESOLUTION HIMSELF, WITHOUT SPONSORS, AND COUNCIL AGREED. TIME OF FORMAL MEETING WILL DEPEND ON SPANISH SAHARA CONSULTATIONS, BUT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE AFTERNOON OCTOBER 22. WE EXPECT PRESIDENT TO CONSULT ON EXACT LANGUAGE OF RESOLUTION LATE TODAY OR EARLY TOMORROW.

5. DEPT. PASS SECRETARY IF DESIRED.
MOYNIHAN
UNQUOTE
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DE RUEHC #0965 2951010
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY NIACT IMMEDIATE 3226

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 250965 TOSEC 160205
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM BEIRUT DATED OCTOBER 22, 1975 SENT
SECSTATE WASHDC USIA, I-FO CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA,
AMMAN, TEL AVIV, ATHENS ANK
RA, TEHRAN IS REPEATED TO YOU:

QUOTE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 13087
E.O. 116521 N/A
TAGSCV ASEC, PINS, LE
SUBJECT: KIDNAPPING OF TWO USIU OFFICERS

1. REGRET REPORT THAT APPROXIMATELY 0645 THIS MORNING
CHARLES D. GALLAGHER, DIRECTOR USIA REGIONAL SERVICE
CENTER AND WILLIAM R. DYKES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR RSC WERE
KIDNAPPED ENROUTE TO WORK BY AS YET UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS.
GALLAGHER AND DYKES WERE PROCEEDING TO RSC UP CORNICHE MAZRA
AT BASTA ROAD WHEN THEY CAME UPON A GROUP OF ARMED INDIVIDUALS
IN FATIGUE UNIFORMS BLOCKING THE ROAD. VEHICLE
OBLIGED TO STOP AND TWO INDIVIDUALS ENTERED VEHICLE
AND DROVE UP RUE BASTA. TWO LOCAL FEMALE EMPLOYEES
OF RSC ALSO IN VEHICLE SUBSEQUENTLY APPEARED AT RSC. WE HAVE
RECEIVED FOREGOING PRELIMINARY INFORMATION FROM RSC BUT
SINCE THEN, TELEPHONE LINES OUT AND WE HAVE SENT OFFICER
TO RSC TO INTERVIEW FEMALE EMPLOYEES BUT LILL PROBABLY
NOT HAVE FURTHER INFO FOR ANOTHER TWO HOURS.

2. IN THE MEANTIME WE HAVE NOTIFIED NATIONAL GENDARMERIE,
SURETE GENERAL, PRIMIN KARAME AND SAEB SALAAM AND LEBANESE ARMY G-2.
ALSO ENDEAVORING CONTACT ABBAS KHALAF, JUMBLATT'S DEPUTY, IMMAN MUSA
SADR, SAEB SALAAM AND, IN A ROUTINE MANNER, THE FOREIGN OFFICE.
ALL AVAILABLE EMBASSY ASSETS BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR
ON THIS PROBLEM.
GODLEY UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT

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State Dept Guidelines 1219/03

By HR NARA, Date 8/9/10



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TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 4870

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 2748
 USDEL SECRETARY NIACT IMMEDIATE 3228

~~SECRET~~ STATE 250969 FOOSEC 100207

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PINS

SUBJECT: KIDNAPPING OF USIA OFFICERS IN BEIRUT

REF: BEIRUT 13087

1. YOU SHOULD SEE SHIHABI (OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL) URGENTLY ABOUT KIDNAPPING. TELL HIM WHAT LITTLE WE KNOW ABOUT INCIDENT (REFTEL). EMBASSY HAS TOLD US IN ADDITION THAT AREA IN WHICH KIDNAPPING OCCURRED IS NORMALLY CONTROLLED BY PALESTINIANS (THOUGH THEY HAVE NOT SPECIFIED PARTICULAR GROUP). AREA IS ALSO MOSLEM ONE IN WHICH JUMBLATT (AND OTHERS) PRESUMABLY HAVE SOME INFLUENCE.

2. YOU SHOULD TELL SHIHABI THAT WE ARE KEENLY AWARE OF HELPFUL ROLE SARG HAS BEEN ABLE TO PLAY TOWARD MODERATING PRESENT GENERAL DIFFICULT SITUATION IN LEBANON. WE ALSO RECALL WITH APPRECIATION SARG'S HELPFULNESS AT TIME OF COLONEL MORGAN'S ABDUCTION LAST JULY. IT OCCURS TO US THAT SARG COULD NOW AGAIN PLAY KEY PART IN HELPING OBTAIN EARLIEST POSSIBLE RELEASE OF THE TWO USIA OFFICERS ABDUCTED IN BEIRUT THIS MORNING. IN THIS REGARD, WE UNDERSTAND THAT BOTH JUMBLATT AND ARAFAT HAPPEN NOW TO BE IN DAMASCUS.

3. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WE BELIEVE IT PARTICULARLY IM-

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PORTANT THAT EFFECTIVE STEPS TO OBTAIN RELEASE BE TAKEN BEFORE POINT AT WHICH ONE GROUP OR ANOTHER OF ABDUCTORS MIGHT SEEK TO MAKE RANSOM DEMANDS. SHIHABI WILL RECALL THAT PUBLICATION OF DEMANDS AFTER MORGAN'S ABDUCTION SEVERELY COMPLICATED THE PROBLEMS OF OBTAINING HIS RELEASE.

4. SHIHABI WILL UNDERSTAND THAT TODAY'S ABDUCTION CAN ADD ADDITIONAL SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AS ALL FRIENDS OF LEBANON DO THEIR BEST TO SEEK TO MODERATE UNFORTUNATE SITUATION IN THAT COUNTRY.

5. REPORT PROMPTLY RESULT OF YOUR DEMARCHE. INGERSOLL
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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3230

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250973 TOSEC 160209

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, LE

SUBJ: ABDUCTION OF DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE
USIS REGIONAL SERVICE CENTER BEIRUT

1. FOLLOWING IS SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 1 AS OF 0730 HOURS
EDT, OCTOBER 22 CONCERNING SUBJECT ABDUCTIONS.

2. QUOTE: EMBASSY BEIRUT REPORTED THAT AT 0645 LOCAL
(0045 WASHINGTON TIME) OCTOBER 22 TWO USIA OFFICERS--
CHARLES D. GALLAGHER AND WILLIAM R. DYKES, THE DIRECTOR
AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE REGIONAL SERVICE CENTER--WERE
KIDNAPPED ON THEIR WAY TO WORK BY A GROUP OF UNIDENTIFIED
ARMED INDIVIDUALS

IN KPATIGUE UNIFORMS. THE EMBASSY HAD
NOTIFIED LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AND WAS ENDEAVORING TO
CONTACT THE DEPUTY OF JUMBLATT, LEFTWING LEADER (JUMBLATT
HIMSELF IS IN DAMASCUS).

3. WHILE THE MEDIA ARE AWARE OF THE KIDNAPPING THE
EMBASSY AND THE DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN WITHHOLDING THE NAMES
UNTIL WE WERE ABLE TO INFORM THE FAMILIES IN THE U.S.

4. BY PHONE FROM DCM LAMBRAKIS AT 7:15 WE WERE TOLD THAT
ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT TALK FREELY ON THE OPEN LINE, THE
EMBASSY HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA OF WHO HAD SEIZED
GALLAGHER AND DYKES AND WAS "PRETTY OPTIMISTIC, HOPING
THAT THE TWO MIGHT BE RELEASED IN FAIRLY SHORT ORDER."
AT THAT TIME, HOWEVER, THE EMBASSY DID NOT KNOW IF THE
ABDUCTION WAS PREMEDITATED OR NOT. THEY SAID THE AREA
IN WHICH THE KIDNAPPING OCCURRED, WHICH WAS IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD OF A NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS, WAS
NORMALLY CONTROLLED BY PALESTINIANS, WHILE IT WAS NOT
CERTAIN, THE PRESUMPTION WAS THAT A PALESTINIAN GROUP IS
RESPONSIBLE.

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5. LAMBRAKIS SAID THAT THE TWO LOCAL EMPLOYEES SEIZED WITH GALLAGHER AND DYKES HAD BEEN INYRTBIRKED. WE ASKED THE EMBASSY TO KEEP ON CONTINUOUSLY INFORMED.

6. THE FAMILIES IN THE U.S. HAVE NOW BEEN NOTIPIED AND THE EMBASSY SO INFORMED. IT WAS NOW RELEASE THE NAMES INGERSOLL
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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3238

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250998 TOSEC 160216

LFOR SONNENFELDT FROM HARTMAN
FOLLOWING REPEAT ROME 15091, SENT SECSTATE OCTOBER 21:
QUOTE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROME 15291
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN FROM AMBASSADOR VOLPE
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IT, US
SUBJECT: ITALIAN PARLIAMENTARY VISIT

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, A GROUP OF ITALIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES FROM NOVEMBER 2-9 AS GUESTS OF ITS AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS. AS WE HAVE NOTED IN OUR EARLIER MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT, (ROME 14971), REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI) AS WELL AS OF ALL THE OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES INCLUDING THE MOVIMENTO SOCIALE ITALIANO (MSI) ARE INCLUDED IN THE ITALIAN DELEGATION. I WISH TO STRESS TO YOU HOW DAMAGING I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE FOR OUR INTERESTS HERE IN ITALY IF WE WERE TO DECIDE NOT TO ISSUE VISAS TO THE PCI REPRESENTATIVES, SINCE I AM VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT IT WOULD FORCE ALL THE OTHER PARTIES, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE MSI, TO CANCEL OUT ON THE EXCHANGE WITH THE RESULTANT NEGATIVE PUBLICITY FOR US AND EMBARRASSMENT FOR BOTH MINISTER GIULIO ANDREOTTI, THE DELEGATION'S LEADER, AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN GENERAL. AT THE SAME TIME I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD MAKE THE DECISION ON THE VISA ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SINCE WE EXPECT TO BE RECEIVING A NOTE VERBALE FOR THE DELEGATION FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE PASSPORTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARIANS SHORTLY.

2. AT LUNCHEON ON OCTOBER 20 MINISTER ANDREOTTI TOLD ME HOW MUCH HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. AT THE SAME TIME HE REITERATED HIS STRONGLY HELD POSITION THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING A GRAVE MISTAKE IF WE SHOULD HAPPEN TO DECIDE AGAINST ISSUING VISAS TO CALAMANDREI AND SEGRE, THE TWO PCI REPRESENTATIVES.

3. LATER THE SAME DAY I MET WITH HON. FLAMINIO PICCOLI, CHAIR-

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State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *NR* NARA, Date *8/9/10*



MAN OF THE DC GROUP IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES AND A LEADER OF THE DOROTEO CURRENT OF THE PARTY. PICCOLI SAID HE HAD JUST SPOKEN TO MINISTER ANDREOTTI AND IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT HE, TOGETHER WITH DOTT. FRANCESCO COSENTINO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES STAFF, WOULD BE JOINING THE ITALIAN DELEGATION. SUBSEQUENTLY WE SPOKE TO DR. RICCIUTI OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES WHO IS HANDLING THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRIP. HE STATED THAT THE PRESS REPORTS ON THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE WHICH APPEARED IN THE NEWSPAPERS OVER THE WEEKEND EVOKED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INTEREST AMONG PARLIAMENTARIANS, AND HE IS AWARE THAT SEVERAL, INCLUDING PICCOLI, ARE INTERESTED IN MAKING THE TRIP. HE ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ENLARGE THE SIZE OF THE ITALIAN DELEGATION BY TEN. HE INFORMED HIM THAT LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING CAPACITY OF THE AIRCRAFT WHICH WILL TAKE THE DELEGATION AROUND THE COUNTRY, MIGHT PRECLUDE THIS BUT PROMISED TO PASS THE REQUEST TO WASHINGTON FOR TRANSMISSION TO REPRESENTATIVE JARMAN.

4. WHILE PICCOLI MIGHT BE ABLE TO SLIDE INTO THE DELEGATION IF A REPRESENTATIVE OF ONE OF THE PARTIES FALLS BY THE WAYSIDE, THIS IS RATHER UNLIKELY. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL FOR PICCOLI TO BE EXPOSED TO THE UNITED STATES AT THIS JUNCTURE AND THEREFORE HOPE THAT THE DEPARTMENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO INDUCE THE CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZERS TO ACCEDE TO THE ITALIAN DESIRE. A FURTHER ADVANTAGE OF INCREASING THE SIZE OF THE DELEGATION IS THAT IT WOULD MAKE THE DC CONTINGENT LARGER THAN THAT OF THE PCI.

5. I KNOW THAT I CAN COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT IN MAKING THIS EXCHANGE THE SUCCESS WHICH IT SHOULD BE. I AM SURE YOU RECOGNIZE ANDREOTTI'S PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPORTANCE AND HOPE YOU, HAL SONNENFELDT AND, PERHAPS, JOE SISCO CAN SEE HIM. VOLPE UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL
BT



OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #0999 2951620
O 221600Z OCT 75 ZFFA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3239

~~SECRET~~ STATE 250999 TOSEC 160217

EXDIS
FOL REPEAT OF JIDDA 7078 TO SECSTATE OCT 21

QTE:

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 7078

EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TO USMTM DHAHRAN
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MARR, SA
SUBJECT: DISCREPANCIES IN SAUDI ARMS DELIVERY SCHEDULES
REF: A, STATE 245094
B, JIDDA 6512

SUMMARY: BEFORE WE TAKE UP MATTERS OUTLINED IN REF A WITH
MINDEF PRINCE SULTAN AND GIVE HIM THE WELCOME NEW CONCERNING
DRAGON, VULCAN AND 155 HOWITZERS, EMBASSY SUGGESTS THAT WIDE
DISCREPANCIES IN WEAPONS DELIVERY SCHEDULES BE RESOLVED.
THE VARIANCES IN DELIVERY TIMES ARE LIKELY TO BE SEEN BY SAG
AS EVIDENCE THAT THE USG IS NOT RPT NOT KEEPING ITS WORD AND
COULD SEVERELY DAMAGE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS ACROSS THE BOARD.
AT ISSUE, AS WE SEE IT, ARE DIFFERENCES IN WHAT SECRETARY
KISSINGER SAID TO CROWN PRINCE FAHD DURI

G HIS TALKS ON
2 SEPTEMBER 1975 IN TAIF AND DEPARTMENT'S IMPRESSION OF
WHAT SECRETARY SAID. THE SAUDI VIEW IS THAT KISSINGER'S
STATEMENTS OF 2 SEPTEMBER WERE USG POSITION AND PROMISE
TO PERFORM. END SUMMARY.

1. FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON'S LETTER OF
22 SEPTEMBER 1975 TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY ELLSWORTH (ISA)
AND REF A WE NOTE WIDE DISCREPANCIES IN DELIVERY SCHEDULES
FOR URGENT SAUDI ARMS REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO
HAVE DAMAGING EFFECT ON U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS IF THERE IS
ANY LENGTHENING OF DELIVERY TIME. SOME OF THE SPECIFIC
DISCREPANCIES ARE:

(1) ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS:
A. ATHERTON LETTER SAYS "464 TO BE PROVIDED, WITH

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept. Guidelines *12/9/03*

By NR NARA, Date 8/9/10



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DELIVERIES PROGRAMMED TO BEGIN IN JUNE 1977 (AS OUTLINED IN THE ENCLOSED PAPER); THE REMAINING 430 TO BE PROVIDED, WITH DELIVERY TIMES TO BE DISCUSSED WITH SAG".

B. SECRETARY KISSINGER TOLD CROWN PRINCE FAHD 2 SEPTEMBER THAT WE HAVE APPROVED THE FULL 894 APC'S ORDERED BY SAUDI ARABIA AND WILL ENSURE DELIVERY WITHIN A TWO-YEAR PERIOD. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE EARLIER DELIVERY TIMES FOR THESE APC'S WAS BETWEEN FIVE AND SIX YEARS.

C. REF A CLARIFIES DIFFERENCES OVER NUMBERS BUT DOES NOT RPT NOT SOLVE TIME DIFFERENCES.

(2) M-60 A1 TANKS WITH 105MM CANNON:

A. ATHERTON LETTER SAYS "150 TO BE PROVIDED WITH DELIVERIES PROGRAMMED TO BEGIN IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1978 (AS OUTLINED IN THE ENCLOSED PAPER)".

B. SECRETARY TOLD FAHD TAHT HE WILL APPROVE A SALE OF 150 OF THE TANKS WITHIN A TWO-YEAR PERIOD. HE NOTED THAT THE EARLIER HEAD TIME QUOTED FOR THESE TANKS WAS SIX YEARS.

C. REF A MAKES NO MENTION OF M-60 A1 TANKS.

(3) TOW MISSILES:

A. ATHERTON LETTER AND PARA 6 REF A SAY THE REMAINING 102 LAUNCHERS AND 2540 MISSILES WITH DELIVERIES TO BEGIN IN "DECEMBER 1978".

B. SECRETARY TOLD FAHD THAT AMBASSADOR AKINS HAD TOLD PRINCE SULTAN IN MID-JULY THAT WE WOULD APPROVE THE SALE OF 50 LAUNCHERS AND 500 MISSILES TO BE DELIVERED BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR AND THAT WE ARE NOW ALSO PREPARED TO SELL TO SAUDI ARABIA 16 MISSILES LAUNCHERS AND 50 TO 150 MISSILES EACH MONTH STARTING IN JANUARY 1976, UNTIL THE TOTAL SAUDI REQUEST OF 152 LAUNCHERS AND 3,000 MISSILES IS REACHED. HE SAID THAT THE DELIVERIES WILL BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1976.

SAG HAD TWO NOTETAKERS PRESENT AT 2 SEPTEMBER TAIF MEETING, WHOSE ENGLISH IS EXCELLENT. SAUDI RECORD ALSO MATCHES EMBASSY RECOLLECTION OF WHAT SECRETARY TOLD CORWN PRINCE FAHD.

2. THE ISSUE OF USG RESOLVE TO MEET ITS COMMITMENTS TO SAG ARMED FORCES MODERNIZATION PROGRAM GOES TO THE HEART OF THE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP. EVEN SECRETARY KISSINGER'S STATED DELIVERY SCHEDULES WERE VIEWED AS TOO SLOW BY MINDEF PRINCE SULTAN WHO ASKED LEAD TIMES BE SHORTENED TO ONE YEAR IN ALL CASES (REF B). WE ARE CONCERNED THAT IF WE HAVE TO INFORM MINDEF PRINCE SULTAN THAT USG IS NOT NOW PREPARED TO MEET THE DELIVERY SCHEDULES HE IS CONVINCED THE SECRETARY PROMISED THAT HE WILL BE PERSONALLY EMBARRASSED AND MAY REACT ANGRILY. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT SULTAN IS ALREADY IN AN UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION OVER PUBLICITY OVER AGENTS FEES, NORTHROP, LOCKHEED, ETC. AND LONGER-THAN-PROMISED



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DELIVERY TIMES WILL COMPOUND THESE DIFFICULTIES TO DETRIMENT OF U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS. WE URGE IMMEDIATE CLARIFICATION OF THESE DIFFERENCES BEFORE SUBJECT OF JOINT COMMISSION MEETING IS RAISED WITH MODA.

3. WE WILL
ADDRESS SEPARATELY OTHER POINTS REF A.
AKINS
UNQTE INGERSOLL
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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3240

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250578 TOSEC 160218

EXDIS
FOL REPEAT OF STATE 250578 TO USUN
INFO SANTIAGO BRASILIA OCT 21
QTE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250578

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PPOR, CI, BR

SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN-CHILEAN VOTE ON ZIONISM

FOR USUN AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ROGERS

1. I HAVE HAD THE MEXICAN UNDER SECRETARY AND THE
CHILEAN AND BRAZILIAN AMBASSADORS IN TODAY, AND DISCUSSED
FRIDAY'S VOTE IN THE THIRD COMMITTEE WITH EACH. ALL
EXPRESSED PERSONAL SURPRISE AT THEIR DELEGATION'S
STAND. ALL PROFESSED TO BE UNINFORMED ON REASONS
THEREFOR.

2. BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD NO EXPLANATION
WHATSOEVER FOR THE VOTE.

3. THE CHILEAN STATED THAT THIS VOTE WAS CONTRARY TO
THE GOC MIDEAST POLICY AS SET FORTH BY HIS FOREIGN
MINISTER IN THE UN GENERAL DEBATE. GOC MINISTER OF
JUSTICE SCHWEITZER, WHO ARRIVED FROM SANTIAGO ON SATURDAY
AND WHO ACCOMPANIED AMBASSADOR TRUCCO TODAY STATED THAT
THE CABINET HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED OR INFORMED OF VOTE.
HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE ANY CHANGE



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/9/10

State Review
12/9/03

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IN THE GOC POSITION. TRUCCO ALSO TOLD ME THAT CONSULTATION WITH HIS UN COLLEAGUE, HUERTA, HAD PRODUCED ONLY THE EXCUSE THAT, BECAUSE OF LATENESS OF MEETING, THE CHILEAN CHAIR HAD BEEN LEFT TO A SINGLE MINOR FUNCTIONARY WHO PRESUMABLY ACTED WITHOUT FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS. THE MINISTER AND THE AMBASSADOR INDICATED THEY HAVE JOINTLY REQUESTED CLARIFICATION FROM THEIR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN SANTIAGO AND THEY HAVE PROMISED TO SHARE IT WITH ME -- AND I WILL WITH YOU.

4. THE MEXICAN UNDER SECRETARY DEMURRED THAT MULTI-LATERAL ISSUES ARE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY RABASA, AND HE ONLY RETURNED TO MEXICO ON FRIDAY.

5. THE ONLY OTHER NEGATIVE VOTES IN THE HEMISPHERE WERE GUYANA AND CUBA -- BOTH LOST CAUSES. I CONCLUDE FROM MY MEETINGS TODAY THAT THE THREE SIGNIFICANT LATIN VOTES, AT LEAST, WERE NOT A MANIFESTATION OF POSITIONS FIRMLY HELD AND COHERENTLY CONSIDERED WITHIN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE THREE COUNTRIES.

6. BY THE SAME TOKEN, I AM BOUND TO SAY THAT WE TOO WERE CAUGHT SOMEWHAT UNAWARE. THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE VOTE AND THE NEED FOR LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT HAD NOT GOTTEN THROUGH TO ME BEFOREHAND. WE HAD, AS YOU KNOW, BEEN WORKING OVER A NUMBER OF LATIN DELEGATIONS ON THE UN KOREAN VOTE, AND COULD HAVE COUPLED WITH THAT SOMETHING ON ZIONISM. BUT, SO FAR AS I RECALL, NO REQUEST FOR HELP HAD COME TO HAND ON AN ISSUE WHICH NOW HAS TURNED OUT TO HAVE HEROIC AND THEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATION.



7. WE ALSO FEEL THAT THE PRESS PLAY FROM "SPECIAL"

US SOURCES SUGGESTING THAT THE VOTES ARE A MANIFESTATION OF CHILEAN AND BRAZILIAN "FASCISM" WILL NOT BE HELPFUL. WE HAVE A NUMBER OF THINGS GOING WITH THESE COUNTRIES JUST NOW, NOT THE LEAST SENSITIVE OF WHICH IS THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. ON THE MULTILATERAL AGENDA, ALSO, WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO SEEK THEIR SUPPORT ON KOREA. WHEN WE CONDEMN OTHERS FOR VERBAL TERRORISM, WE HAVE, IT SEEMS TO ME, SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR MODERATION OURSELVES. AND ON THE SUBSTANTIVE POINT, WHILE THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CHILEAN AND POSSIBLY THE BRAZILIAN REGIMES AS "FASCIST" CAN BE DEFENDED AS A REASONABLY PRECISE USE OF LANGUAGE, THE CLAIM THAT THEIR VOTE ON

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THE RESOLUTION REFLECTS INTERNAL STRUCTURE IS PALPABLY UNTENABLE. WHILE THESE ARE RIGHT-WING, AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS, WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE, AS WELL, RACIST. INDEED, AT LEAST AS FAR AS ANTI-SEMITISM IS CONCERNED, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. INGERSOLL UNQTE INGERSOLL
BT



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031289

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Henry A. Kissinger

CREATOR'S TITLE Secretary of State

RECEIVER'S NAME USDEL Secretary

DESCRIPTION Matter re: Pike Committee

CREATION DATE 10/22/1975

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900325

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 23

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - TOSEC (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/10/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0800

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251054 TOSEC 160225

EXDIS
FOLLOWX REPEAT ~~ANKARA 7917~~, SENT SECSTATE, INFO ATHENS,
NICOSIA, OCTOBER 221
QUOTE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 7917

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, CY, TU
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FR
M PRIMIN DEMIREL TO PRESIDENT FORD
REF: STATE 244266

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*
By *JR* NARA, Date *8/9/10*

1. ON THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 22, MFA SECCEN ELEKDAG CALLED ME TO HIS OFFICE IN ORDER TO GIVE ME THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM PRIMIN DEMIREL TO PRESIDENT FORD. ELEKDAG APOLOGIZED FOR DELAY IN PREPARATION OF THIS RESPONSE BUT SAID THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE THE PRIMIN HAD WORKED ON IT PERSONALLY.

2. AFTER HANDING ME PRIMIN'S MESSAGE, ELEKDAG TURNED CONVERSATION TO FORTHCOMING US-TURK NEGOTIATIONS OF REVISED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. (HIS REMARKS BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.) DEMIREL'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FORD FOLLOWS:
BEGIN MESSAGE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AMBASSADOR MACOMBER HAS CONVEYED TO ME YOUR MESSAGES OF OCTOBER 3RD AND OCTOBER 15TH, 1975.
I AGREE WITH YOU ON THE NEED TO WORK TO REVITALIZE OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS TOWARD A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT.
NO DOUBT THE RECENT DECISION OF THE CONGRESS ON ARMS SUPPLY
(S)
A POSITIVE FIRST STEP TOWARD THE RESTORATION OF OUR MUTUAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, BUT I WOULD BE LESS THAN FRANK IF I DID NOT EMPHASIZE HERE THE DISAPPOINTMENT FELT IN TURKEY OVER THE SERIOUS LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THIS RESOLUTION UNDER WHICH TURKEY



***** W H S R COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, RODMAN, MCFARLANE

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STILL CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECT OF DISCRIMINATION NOT ONLS AMONG THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES BUT ALSO AMONG SOME COUNTRIES WITH WHOM YOUR COUNTRY HAS NO ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT, IN ANY WAY, AFFECT OUR FEELINGS OF APPRECIATION FOR THE VALUABLE EFFORTS THAT YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, YOUR ADMINISTRATION AND THOSE WHO SUPPORTED OUR CASE IN THE CONGRESS HAVE DEPLOYED TO REMEDY THE UNFORTUNATE SITUATION CREATED BY THE CONGRESS DICISION OF FEBRUARY 5TH, 1975. YOU ARE AWARE OF THE GREAT VALUE WE ATTACH TO OUR FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE SOOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OF OUR VERY SINCERE DESIRE TO REVITALIZE THEM. I KNOW THAT THIS FEELING IS RECIPROCATED BY THE UNITED STATES. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THAT THE TASK AHEAD OF US IS TO WORK OUT FOR OUR BILATERAL DEFENCE COOPERATION A STABLE CONCEPT WHICH WILL REFLECT A SOUND BALANCE BETWEEN OUR MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND WHICH WILL BE IMMUNE FROM ANY INTERVENTION INCONSISTENT WITH OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND THE FRIENDLY FEELINGS THAT BOTH NATIONS HAVE FOR EACH OTHER. IT IS WITH THIS SINCERE BELIEF THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, DESIPTS THE SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS OF THE RECENT DECISION OF THE CONGRESS, HAS DECIDED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OUR FUTURE BILATERAL DEFENCE COOPERATIONS. OUR DETERMINED AIM WOULD BE TO COME TO A RAPID AGREEMENT SO THAT OUR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATIONS COULD BE RESUMED WITHOUT DELAY. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR RESUMED COOPERATION WIL

-BE MORE STABLE AND DURABLE IF BEFOREHAND UNCERTAINTIES AND DOUBTS COULD BE REMOVED AND A SOUND CONCEPT COULD BE WORKED OUT. AN EARLY RESUMPTION ON AN UNSTABLE BASIS WILL, IN MY BIFW, BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR A MORE STABLE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WHICH WE ALL SINCERELY DESIRE TO ACHIEVE. MR. PRESIDENT, YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT DURING THE MEETINGS WHICH WE HAD IN BRUSSELS AND IN HELSINKI, I HAD STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM INJECTING INTO OUR RELATIONS THE COMPLEXITY AND THE MALAISE OF ISSUES SUCH AS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM OR THE TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTE AND THAT THE REGRETTABLE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS TO LINK THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS WITH THE TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS A WHOLE WOULD NOT ONLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, AS IT WOULD RENDER MORE DIFFICULT THE ENDEAVOURS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, BUT ALSO CAUSE UNDUE HARM TO OUR RELATIONS. I AM CONVINCED TODAY MORE THAN EVER THAT FIRST TO REVITALIZE OUR RELATIONS AND THEN TO MAINTAIN THEM INTACT, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY SHOULD DISPLAY UTMOST CARE NOT TO IMHIX IN THESE RELATIONS ISSUES ALIEN TO THEIR REAL CONTEXT. THIS BEING OUR STAND, NOW I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE VIEWS OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN THE CYPRUS QUESTION FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS TOWARDS ITS SETTLEMENT.



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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3255

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251076 TOSEC 160228

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), OGEN

SUBJECT: PIKE COMMITTEE APPEARANCE

REFERENCE: SECTO 16099

FOR BREMER FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. PIKE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN TOLD SECRETARY WILL APPEAR ON OCTOBER 31 AT 11:00 A.M.

2. MATERIALS REQUESTED BY YOU IN PARA 3 OF REPTEL WILL BE ON THE WIRES THIS EVENING.

3. WE ARE NOW DRAFTING A "BRIEF CONCILIATORY OPENING STATEMENT" (PER PARA 4 REPTEL) WHICH WILL BE ON THE WIRES TO YOU HOPEFULLY BY THURSDAY EVENING WASHINGTON TIME AND CERTAINLY BY NO LATER THAN NOON FRIDAY WASHINGTON TIME. INGERSOLL
BT

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By *LR* NARA, Date *8/9/10*



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PAGE 01 STATE 251233 TOSEC 160230

COPY 1 OF 15

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DRAFTED BY EB:JLKATZ:EMM
APPROVED BY EB:TOENDERS
EUR:MR. VINE
S/S - MR. ORTIZ

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251233 TOSEC 160232

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, CA

SUBJECT: INFO MEMO: ACCELERATED CUTBACK OF CANADIAN OIL EXPORTS, FROM EB - ENDERS

1. THE CANADIANS HAVE GIVEN US ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS A COPY OF A NEW REPORT BY THEIR NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD (NEB) INDICATING A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THEIR OIL SUPPLY PROSPECTS. AS A RESULT, THE SCHEDULE ANNOUNCED LAST YEAR TO PHASE OUT CANADA'S OIL EXPORTS TO THE U.S. WILL BE COMPRESSED FROM 1983 TO 1982. EXPORTS IN 1976, WHICH HAD BEEN SCHEDULED AT A LEVEL OF 560,000 BARRELS PER DAY, WILL NOW BE LIMITED TO 460,000 BARRELS PER DAY (510,000 B/D IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS AND 365,000 B/D IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR.) EXPORT

LEVELS IN THE REMAINING YEARS 1977-80 ARE NOT INDICATED.

2. ON THE BASIS OF OUR ANALYSIS EARLIER THIS YEAR, WE ESTIMATED THAT U.S. REFINERIES IN THE NORTHERN TIER

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 State Review
State Dept Guidelines 12/9/03

By IJR NARA Date 8/9/10



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE



Department of State

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PAGE 02 STATE 251233 TOSEC 160230

STATES DEPENDENT ON CANADIAN OIL (FOR LOGISTIC REASONS) REQUIRE SOME 250,000 BARRELS PER DAY. THE SHORTENED PHASE-OUT SCHEDULE, AS WELL AS THE ABSENCE OF INFORMATION ON SHIPMENT LEVELS AFTER 1976, MEANS THAT THE CURTAILMENT OF CANADIAN EXPORTS WILL BEGIN TO CAUSE

SUPPLY PROBLEMS EARLIER THAN ANTICIPATED. BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR LEAD TIME TO MAKE ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS THE NEW PHASE-OUT TIMETABLE COULD BEGIN TO CAUSE HARDSHIPS IN SOME OF THE NORTHERN TIER STATES BY LATE 1976.

3. THERE ARE TWO BASIC COURSES OPEN TO US. ONE IS TO GO BACK TO THE CANADIANS AND SEEK AN EXTENSION OF THE PHASE OUT SCHEDULE. THE CANADIANS COULD ACCOMMODATE US BY DELAYING THE USE OF THE SARNIA-MONTREAL PIPELINE. THIS PIPELINE IS INTENDED TO IMPROVE CANADIAN SECURITY BY TRANSPORTING CANADIAN DOMESTIC OIL TO EASTERN CANADA. (BEFORE THE ARAB EMBARGO CANADA PREFERRED TO USE IMPORTED OIL IN EASTERN CANADA BECAUSE IT WAS CHEAPER THAN THEIR OWN OIL, THUS PROVIDING A SUBSIDY TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED EASTERN PROVINCES.) A DELAY IN SHIPPING WESTERN OIL TO MONTREAL FOR ANOTHER YEAR OR TWO WILL HARDLY IMPINGE ON CANADIAN SECURITY AND WOULD ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEMS OF U.S. REFINERIES DEPENDENT ON CANADA.

4. A SECOND COURSE, NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE WITH THE FIRST, IS TO ACCELERATE ARRANGEMENTS TO SWAP OIL WITH CANADA. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD PERMIT CONTINUED DELIVERIES OF CANADIAN OIL TO DEPENDENT REFINERIES IN THE U.S. REPLACED BY U.S. OIL SHIPPED TO CANADA. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD SHORTEN SUPPLY LINES AND REDUCE THE NEED FOR COSTLY NEW TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES IN THE U.S. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH US TO FACILITATE SUCH EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AFTER DISCUSSIONS EARLIER THIS YEAR. WITH ACCELERATION OF THE PHASE-OUT SCHEDULE, IT WILL BE MORE URGENT FOR U.S. REFINERS TO STEP UP THEIR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT SUCH SWITCHING ARRANGEMENTS.

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PAGE 33 STATE 251233 TOSEC 160230

5. THE NEB REPORT WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC UNTIL NOVEMBER 5. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO RESPECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE REPORT UNTIL THAT DATE. CANADA'S NEW ENERGY MINISTER, ALASTAIR GILLESPIE (REPLACING DONALD MACDONALD), INTENDS TO VISIT WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 5 WHEN HE EXPECTS TO SEE CHUCK ROBINSON, FRANK ZARB AND ROGERS MORTON.

6. WE ARE GOING BACK TO THE CANADIANS TO SEEK A DELAY IN USE OF THE NEW SARNIA-MONTREAL PIPELINE TO BUY MORE TIME FOR DEPENDENT U.S. REFINERS. SHOULD

THIS REQUEST, OR SOME VARIANT, BE OF INTEREST TO THE CANADIANS WE COULD WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS WITH GILLESPIE DURING HIS NOVEMBER VISIT. INGERSOLL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 251279 TOSEC 168231

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, IS, PORG, UN

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNEF
- (S/S NO. 7521090)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM IO WILLIAM B. BUFPUM

1. THE PROBLEM

THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI AGREEMENT INVOLVES AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR UNEF; MORE DUTIES IN A LARGER GEOGRAPHIC AREA AS WELL AS THE FORWARD MOVEMENT OF A LARGE PART OF THE FORCE. THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF UNEF WILL BE A CRITICAL FACTOR IN THE MAINTENANCE OF THE AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL BELIEVES HE CAN MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NECESSARY ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL, BUT AS I INFORMED YOU AT A RECENT STAFF MEETING, HE HAS REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE WITH TRANSPORTATION AND EQUIPMENT. YOU TOLD WALDHEIM IN SEPTEMBER THAT WE WOULD BE HELPFUL. THE QUESTION IS HOW MUCH SHOULD THE UNITED STATES VOLUNTARILY CONTRIBUTE IN EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES.

2. BACKGROUND

PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNEF

COSTS FOR UNEF HAVE BEEN EXCEEDING THE BUDGET SINCE ITS INCEPTION IN OCTOBER, 1973, AND THE ADDED EXPENSES OF THE NEW ROLE WILL PLACE A FURTHER STRAIN UPON THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNEF/UNDOP (BOTH FORCES ARE FINANCED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE SAME PACKAGE).

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
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By NR NARA, Date 8/9/10



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THE SECRETARIAT IS THEREFORE SEEKING FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES AS MUCH VOLUNTARY SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE IN GOODS AND SERVICES FOR THE EXPANSION.

WHEN UNEF WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED THE UK, USSR, AND THE U.S. ENGAGED IN AIRLIFT OPERATIONS FOR THE CONTINGENTS AND THEIR EQUIPMENT WITHOUT CHARGE TO THE UN. SEVENTY-SIX MISSIONS BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE WERE INVOLVED, FROM INDONESIA AND PERU TO CAIRO AND TEL AVIV, AT A TOTAL NON-REIMBURSABLE COST OF APPROXIMATELY \$4 MILLION.

THE U.S. DECIDED THAT REIMBURSEMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR ALL OTHER SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FURNISHED, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE UN THAT THIS CAN BE DONE IN PART ON A DEFERRED BASIS.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS PROVIDED ABOUT \$4 MILLION IN REIMBURSABLE EQUIPMENT, SERVICES, AND SUPPLIES TO THE UNEF AND UNDOF SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THESE OPERATIONS. THESE ITEMS INCLUDE: TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION, AND MAJOR COMBAT EQUIPMENT; PRE-FABRICATED BUILDINGS; MAPS, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES; AND OTHER EXPENDABLE MATERIALS. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THESE ITEMS, E.G., VEHICLE SPARE PARTS, ARE STILL IN THE "PIPELINE", THE U.S. MILITARY SERVICES HAVE TO DATE BILLED THE UN FOR \$2.2 MILLION WHICH THE UN HAS REIMBURSED IN FULL.

ON THE BASIS OF THE ASSESSMENT LEVIED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP WE HAVE BEEN PAYING 28.9 OF UNEF'S COSTS DURING THE TWO YEARS OF ITS OPERATION, WITH A PAYMENT OF ABOUT \$23 MILLION EACH YEAR.

3. CURRENT UN NEEDS

THE UN HAS RECENTLY SUBMITTED A LIST TO THE UNITED STATES OF ITS ESTIMATED TOTAL NEEDS FOR NEW EQUIPMENT AND FOR THE AIRLIFT, ASKING WHAT PART WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE ON A NON-REIMBURSABLE BASIS. THE AUGMENTATIONS OF UNEF PERSONNEL IN THE FIRST STAGE OF EXPANSION WILL BE MINIMAL AND FURTHER PERSONNEL INCREASES WILL PROBABLY BE MODEST ADDITIONS TO EXISTING CONTINGENTS. THE MAIN ADDITIONAL COST OF THE EXPANDED OPERATION, THEREFORE, WILL BE FOR EQUIPMENT NEEDS, INCLUDING PATROL BOATS, MORE

VEHICLES FOR GREATER MOBILITY, AND AIRCRAFT. THESE ARE ROUGHLY ESTIMATED TO TOTAL \$50 MILLION.

THE UN EXPECTS TO GET SOME MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, SUCH AS PATROL BOATS (\$12.6 MILLION) HOPEFULLY FROM IRAN. BUT THE MAJORITY OF THE EQUIPMENT WILL HAVE TO COME FROM THE U.S., BOTH FOR REASONS OF COMPATIBILITY WITH EXISTING UNEF AND UNTSO EQUIPMENT AND FOR REASONS OF EARLY AVAILABILITY.

WE NEED TO DECIDE SOON HOW MUCH THE U.S. WILL CONTRIBUTE VOLUNTARILY SO THE UN CAN PRESENT COST ESTIMATES TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. OBVIOUSLY THE LESS ADDITIONAL COST ASSIGNED TO THE MEMBERSHIP AS A WHOLE, THE LESS EFFECTIVE WILL BE THE ANTICIPATED SOVIET COMPLAINTS AND OPPOSITION TO THE INCREASED BILL.

4. SOVIET ATTITUDE

A COMPLICATING FACTOR IS THE NEGATIVE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SINAI AGREEMENT AND ITS BEHAVIOR ON CURRENT UNEF FINANCING. THE USSR HAS ALREADY REFUSED TO PERMIT ANY OF ITS MOST RECENT PAYMENT OF SOME \$6 MILLION TO BE CREDITED TOWARD ITS ASSESSED SHARE OF THE \$19.8 MILLION COST OVERRUN IN UNEF'S FIRST YEAR OF OPERATION (OCTOBER 25, 1973 TO OCTOBER 24, 1974). RATHER, THE SOVIETS INSIST THAT THIS MONEY BE USED TO PAY FOR THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF UNEF'S SECOND YEAR. WE CAN EXPECT STRONG SOVIET RESISTANCE TO STILL FURTHER INCREASES IN THE UNEF BUDGET WHICH COULD SPREAD TO OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL.

5. UN PRIORITIES

IN ORDER TO ANALYZE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM, WE HAVE OBTAINED FROM THE UN A BREAKDOWN OF ITS PRIORITY NEEDS. THIS BREAKDOWN IS IN TIME INCREMENTS; THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS, THE NEEDS WITHIN THREE MONTHS, AND THE NEEDS WITHIN FIVE MONTHS (FULL STRENGTH).

THE MOST IMPORTANT AND COSTLY ITEMS IN THE FIRST PRIORITY LIST ARE: 1) PREFABRICATED UNITS FOR 6 BASE CAMPS AND 90 OBSERVATION POSTS WITH A U.S. COST ESTIMATE OF \$5 MILLION DOLLARS; 2) FOUR HUEY HELICOPTERS, AT ROUGHLY \$2 MILLION; 3) 52 1/4 TON TRUCKS AND TEN 3/4 TON TRUCKS WITH A U.S. COST ESTIMATE OF \$400,000 PLUS SOME MINE REMOVAL AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

THE TOTAL COST OF THE FIRST PRIORITY LIST OF AVAILABLE U.S. ITEMS, INCLUDING AIRLIFT, SHOULD BE BETWEEN \$5 MILLION AND \$10 MILLION DEPENDING ON HOW MUCH IS



CONTRIBUTED BY OTHERS.

6. YOUR AUTHORITY

THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS AUTHORITY TO COMMIT THE UNITED STATES FOR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS IN EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES TO THE UN. UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT (22 U.S.C. 287D-1), THE UNITED STATES MAY RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY TO A REQUEST BY THE UNITED NATIONS FOR SERVICES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN CONNECTION WITH A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. THE PRESIDENT, IN 1951, IN DELEGATION OF HIS AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH RESPONSE, HAS BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 10206 (16 F.R. 529) AUTHORIZED THE SECRETARY OF STATE "TO THE EXTENT HE FINDS THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE NATIONAL INTEREST" TO REQUEST THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE "TO DETAIL PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO FURNISH FACILITIES, SERVICES, OR OTHER ASSISTANCE AND TO LOAN SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN AGREED FAIR SHARE OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER SUCH TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SHALL JOINTLY DETERMINE..." THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS FURTHER AUTHORIZED TO REQUIRE REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE UNITED NATIONS FOR EXPENSES INCURRED, EXCEPT THAT IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, OR WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FINDS IT TO BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST, HE MAY, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WAIVE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH REIMBURSEMENT.

7. PROCESS FOR OBTAINING THE MONEY

SHOULD YOU DECIDE TO PROVIDE ANY OR ALL OF THE ITEMS REQUESTED BY THE UN ON A NON-REIMBURSABLE BASIS, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CAN SEEK SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, AS NECESSARY, TO COVER THE COST INVOLVED.

8. OPTIONS

BELOW WE HAVE LISTED OPTIONS SEPARATELY ON WHAT THE U.S. MIGHT APPROPRIATELY DO FOR THE AIRLIFT AND MATERIAL SUPPLY:

1. AIRLIFT

PROVIDE ON A NON-REIMBURSABLE BASIS ALL NECESSARY AIR-



LIFT SERVICES EXCEPT THOSE SUPPLIED BY OTHER COUNTRIES OR THOSE THAT CAN BE SHIPPED BY SEA (ESTIMATED AT \$2 MILLION) TO BRING UNEF UP TO FULL STRENGTH.

PROS:

--WOULD ENSURE PROMPT DELIVERY TO ENABLE UNEF TO ASSUME ITS NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

--EASE BUDGET PROBLEMS FOR THE UN AND REDUCE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIET TROUBLE MAKING.

--GIVE HIGH VISIBILITY TO U.S. COOPERATION WITH THE UN.

--FOLLOWS 1973 PRECEDENT.

CONS:

--WOULD ADD TO TOTAL U.S. SHARE OF COST OF SINAI AGREEMENT.

--COULD GIVE APPEARANCE U.S. IS WILLING TO DO MORE THAN A FAIR SHARE.

IO, NEA AND L RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

2. EQUIPMENT

OPTION 1

SUPPLY ALL THE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES REQUESTED OF US BY THE UN ONLY ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS.

PROS:

--THIS PRACTICE CONTINUES OUR POLICY FOR UNEF SUPPLY ESTABLISHED IN NOVEMBER 1973.

--WOULD MINIMIZE U.S. SHARE OF TOTAL SINAI AGREEMENT.

--WOULD BE EASIER FOR DOD AND CONGRESS.

CONS:

--MIGHT RESULT IN UNEF NOT GETTING WHAT IT NEEDS TO CARRY



OUT ITS NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

--COULD CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR FINANCING REGULAR UNEF BUDGET AND GIVE SOVIETS MORE AMMUNITION FOR CRITICIZING THE NEW AGREEMENT.

OPTION 2:

OFFER PART OF THE MATERIAL REQUIRED ON A NON-REIMBURSABLE BASIS, SUCH AS THOSE ON THE FIRST PRIORITY LIST, SETTING A DOLLAR CEILING, EG), \$10 MILLION.

PROS:

--DEMONSTRATES U.S. WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST UN IN INITIAL STAGES OF EXPANDING UNEF, BUT WITHOUT ASSUMING TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY;

--IS ONLY MODERATELY MORE COSTLY TO U.S. AND TO THAT EXTENT EASIER TO JUSTIFY TO CONGRESS;

--EASES DIFFICULTIES FOR UNEF BUDGET AND MAKES IT MORE LIKELY THAT UNEF WILL HAVE ALL IT NEEDS TO OPERATE.

CONS:

--MAY ENCOURAGE COUNTRIES IN THE UN WHO WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES PAY A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF ASSESSED PEACEKEEPING COSTS THAN UNDER PRESENT UNEF/ UNDOF FORMULA;

--COULD SET IN MOTION EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS THAT THE U.S. WILL FINANCE ALL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

IO, NEA, AND L RECOMMEND OPTION 2, THAT WE SHOULD PROVIDE ON A NON-REIMBURSABLE BASIS THOSE ITEMS ON THE FIRST PRIORITY LIST NOT COVERED BY OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS, LEAVING THE UN TO FINANCE THE ITEMS NEEDED IN SUCCESSIVE STAGES FROM THE REGULAR BUDGET.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

9. CLEARED BY: BUFFUM, SAUNDERS, SCHNEBEL (L), KIMBALL (PM), ADAMS, AND NSC (HAUGHTON AND HORAN); DOD WILL BE CONSULTED FOLLOWING SECRETARY'S DECISION.

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B.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, CA

SUBJECT: INFO MEMO: ACCELERATED CUTBACK OF CANADIAN OIL EXPORTS, FROM EB - ENDERS

1. THE CANADIANS HAVE GIVEN US ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS A COPY OF A NEW REPORT BY THEIR NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD (NEB) INDICATING A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THEIR OIL SUPPLY PROSPECTS. AS A RESULT, THE SCHEDULE ANNOUNCED LAST YEAR TO PHASE OUT CANADA'S OIL EXPORTS TO THE U.S. WILL BE COMPRESSED FROM 1983 TO 1980. EXPORTS IN 1976, WHICH HAD BEEN SCHEDULED AT A LEVEL OF 500,000 BARRELS PER DAY, WILL NOW BE LIMITED TO 460,000 BARRELS PER DAY (510,000 R/D IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS AND 385,000 B/D IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR.) EXPORT LEVELS IN THE REMAINING YEARS 1977-80 ARE NOT INDICATED.

2. ON THE BASIS OF OUR ANALYSIS EARLIER THIS YEAR, WE ESTIMATED THAT U.S. REFINERIES IN THE NORTHERN TIER

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STATES DEPENDENT ON CANADIAN OIL (FOR LOGISTIC REASONS) REQUIRE SOME 250,000 BARRELS PER DAY. THE SHORTENED PHASE-OUT SCHEDULE, AS WELL AS THE ABSENCE OF INFORMATION ON SHIPMENT LEVELS AFTER 1976, MEANS THAT THE CURTAILMENT OF CANADIAN EXPORTS WILL BEGIN TO CAUSE

SUPPLY PROBLEMS EARLIER THAN ANTICIPATED. BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR LEAD TIME TO MAKE ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS THE NEW PHASE-OUT TIMETABLE WOULD BEGIN TO CAUSE HARDSHIPS IN SOME OF THE NORTHERN TIER STATES BY LATE 1976.

3. THERE ARE TWO BASIC COURSES OPEN TO US. ONE IS TO GO BACK TO THE CANADIANS AND SEEK AN EXTENSION OF THE PHASE OUT SCHEDULE. THE CANADIANS COULD ACCOMMODATE US BY DELAYING THE USE OF THE SARNIA-MONTREAL PIPELINE. THIS PIPELINE IS INTENDED TO IMPROVE CANADIAN SECURITY BY TRANSPORTING CANADIAN DOMESTIC OIL TO EASTERN CANADA. (BEFORE THE ARAB EMBARGO CANADA PREFERRED TO USE IMPORTED OIL IN EASTERN CANADA BECAUSE IT WAS CHEAPER THAN THEIR OWN OIL, THUS PROVIDING A SUBSIDY TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED EASTERN PROVINCES.) A DELAY IN SHIPPING WESTERN OIL TO MONTREAL FOR ANOTHER YEAR OR TWO WILL HARDLY IMPINGE ON CANADIAN SECURITY AND WOULD ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEMS OF U.S. REFINERIES DEPENDENT ON CANADA.

4. A SECOND COURSE, NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE WITH THE FIRST, IS TO ACCELERATE ARRANGEMENTS TO SWAP OIL WITH CANADA. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD PERMIT CONTINUED DELIVERIES OF CANADIAN OIL TO DEPENDENT REFINERIES IN THE U.S. REPLACED BY U.S. OIL SHIPPED TO CANADA. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD SHORTEN SUPPLY LINES AND REDUCE THE NEED FOR COSTLY NEW TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES IN THE U.S. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH US TO FACILITATE SUCH EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AFTER DISCUSSIONS EARLIER THIS YEAR. WITH ACCELERATION OF THE PHASE-OUT SCHEDULE, IT WILL BE MORE URGENT FOR U.S. REFINERS TO STEP UP THEIR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT SUCH SWITCHING ARRANGEMENTS.

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ROBINSON

5. THE NEB REPORT WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC UNTIL NOVEMBER 3. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO RESPECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE REPORT UNTIL THAT DATE. CANADA'S NEW ENERGY MINISTER, ALASTAIR GILLESPIE (REPLACING DONALD MACDONALD), INTENDS TO VISIT WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 5 WHEN HE EXPECTS TO SEE CHUCK ROBINSON, FRANK ZARB AND ROGERS MORTON.

6. WE ARE GOING BACK TO THE CANADIANS TO SEEK A DELAY IN USE OF THE NEW SARNIA-MONTREAL PIPELINE TO BUY MORE TIME FOR DEPENDENT U.S. REFINERS. SHOULD

THIS REQUEST, OR SOME VARIANT, BE OF INTEREST TO THE CANADIANS WE COULD WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS WITH GILLESPIE DURING HIS NOVEMBER VISIT. INGERSOLL

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3264

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, US, UR, PFOR, EAGR, ETRD

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL


1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT WALL STREET JOURNAL LEAD EDITORIAL, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, HEADED "A NOT-BAD GRAIN DEAL."

2. OUR FONDNESS FOR HAVING THE STATE DEPARTMENT NEGOTIATE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS IS MINIMAL, BUT AN EXCEPTION CAN BE MADE FOR THE GRAIN DEAL UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON HAS JUST STRUCK WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

3. THE DEAL PROMISES A QUIETING OF THE POLITICAL HYPROCRISY THAT HAS TANGLED SHIPMENTS OF U.S. GRAIN. AT THE SAME TIME AND CONTRARY TO COMPLAINTS ISSUING FORTH FROM SOME FARM LEADERS, IT DOES NO SERIOUS DAMAGE TO MARKET PRINCIPLES THAT MUST REMAIN IN PLAY IF WORLD COMMERCE IN BASIC COMMODITIES IS TO CONTINUE TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE BROAD PUBLIC INTEREST.

4. IN ESSENCE, THE U.S. IS GOING TO RESUME SHIPMENTS OF CORN AND WHEAT TO RUSSIA--UP TO SEVEN MILLION METRIC TONS WORTH BETWEEN NOW AND NEXT SEPT. 30. AFTER THAT, THE RUSSIANS AGREE TO BUY A MINIMUM OF SIX MILLION TONS ANNUALLY FOR FIVE YEARS. THE PURCHASES WOULD BE FOR CASH,

AT MARKET PRICES WITH NO U.S. SUBSIDIES. PRESIDENT FORD THINKS THE DEAL WILL ADD ABOUT \$1 BILLION ANNUALLY TO U.S. FOREIGN SALES.



5. IN A SENSE, THIS KIND OF AGREEMENT IS A CONCESSION TO THE RUSSIANS. THEY LIKE TO DO BUSINESS GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT, USUALLY ON A FIVE-YEAR BASIS. THEY ALSO ARE IN NEED OF THE GRAIN BECAUSE OF CROP FAILURES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

6. BUT IT IS NOT AS GENEROUS A CONCESSION AS THE SOVIETS HAVE SOMETIMES OBTAINED. THERE ARE NO LONG-TERM CREDITS INVOLVED, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A U.S. PURCHASE OF SOVIET OIL STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION THAT IS SEEMINGLY LINKED TO THE GRAIN DEAL. WE WOULD WANT TO SEE MORE DETAILS OF THAT AGREEMENT AND ITS LINKS BEFORE GIVING MR. ROBINSON HIS FINAL MARKS.

7. AND, OF COURSE, THE U.S. HAS SCRAPPED THE EXPORT SUBSIDY THAT PROVED SO EMBARRASSING WHEN DETAILS OF THE 1972 SOVIET GRAIN DEAL CAME TO LIGHT. A LOT OF THE FURORE THAT HAS SURROUNDED RECENT TRADING WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAS STEMMED FROM CHARGES THAT THE 1972 DEAL WAS A U.S. "GIVEAWAY."

8. THERE ARE SOME BENEFITS FOR THE U.S. AS WELL. IT HAS BECOME OBVIOUS THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF TRADING WITH THE RUSSIANS. AS EAST-WEST TRADE EXPERT SAMUEL PISAR HAS POINTED OUT, THE RUSSIANS, BECAUSE OF THEIR SYSTEM OF CENTRALIZED STATE MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY, DON'T SO MUCH CONDUCT TRADE AS ENGAGE IN MASSIVE PROCUREMENT WHICH CAN AFFECT MARKET PRICES IN COMMODITIES DRASTICALLY. THE HERE RUMOR OF CROP FAILURES IN THE SOVIET UNION CAN MAKE WESTERN COMMODITY MARKETS SKITTISH. THE GRAIN DEAL WOULD SEEM TO BE A STEP TOWARDS REGULARIZING THE SOVIET PROCUREMENT SO AS TO AVOID THE DISRUPTIONS CAUSED BY A BIG IN-AND-OUTER. COMMODITY MARKETS ARE NEVER COMPLETELY SHOCKPROOF BUT AT LEAST U.S. FARMERS HAVE LESS UNCERTAINTY TO FACE THAN BEFORE.

9. THE AGREEMENT MAY ALSO REDUCE YET ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNCERTAINTY, SPECIFICALLY POLITICAL IN NATURE. THE PRESIDENT'S TEMPORARY BAN ON GRAIN SHIPMENTS TO RUSSIA THIS FALL WAS FORCED MAINLY BY ORGANIZED LABOR. AND AT THE ROOT OF LABOR'S REFUSAL TO LOAD SOVIET-BOUND SHIPS WAS AN EFFORT TO GET A BIGGER PIECE OF THE GRAIN TRADE. THIS AND OTHER SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURES HELPED FAN FEARS



THAT THE GRAIN SALES WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE FOOD COSTS OF AMERICAN CONSUMERS.

10. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE GRAIN DEAL WILL BRING AN END TO THE POLITICS OF SOVIET TRADE, AND THERE IS NO PARTICULAR REASON WHY IT SHOULD WHERE THERE ARE GENUINE U.S. INTERESTS INVOLVED. BUT IT MAY REDUCE SOME OF THE PRESSURES FROM NARROW INTERESTS THAT MERELY EXPLOIT PUBLIC FEARS ABOUT THE GENERAL COURSE OF THE BROADER U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. IF THAT HAPPENS, IT WILL BE ALL TO THE GOOD.

11. THE RELATED OIL DEAL IS NOT LIKELY TO BE A MAJOR COMMITMENT--ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE ADMITTED THAT IT IS LARGELY POLITICAL WINDOW DRESSING TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE ARE GETTING SOMETHING TANGIBLE BESIDES DOLLARS IN RETURN FOR SHIPPING GRAIN. WE WILL RESERVE JUDGMENT UNTIL WE SEE IT. FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEEM THAT STATE HASN'T DONE BADLY WITH A STICKY SITUATION.
(END TEXT) INGERSOLL
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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

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EXDIS
FOLLOWING REPEAT MADRID 7368 ACTION SECSTATE 22 OCT 75

QUOTE

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PFOR, SP

SUBJECT: FRANCO'S HEALTH--CONVERSATION WITH PRINCE JUAN CARLOS

1. I SAW PRINCE JUAN CARLOS ALONE FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES AFTER-NOON OCTOBER 22 AT ZARZUELA PALACE, HIS PRIVATE RESIDENCE. HE SET FORTH THE SITUATION WITH HIS USUAL CANDOR.
2. JUAN CARLOS SAID THAT FRANCO HAD, INDEED, IN THE LAST FIVE DAYS HAD TWO HEART ATTACKS (WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "INFARCTION") WHICH HAD CAUSED CLEARLY DEFINED HEART DAMAGE. THE GROUP OF DOCTORS WHO HAD EXAMINED HIM AND HAD SIGNED THE MEDICAL REPORT WERE OF THE OPINION THAT HIS LIFE WAS SERIOUSLY IN DANGER AND THAT HE SHOULD GIVE UP ALL ACTIVITY AND REMAIN COMPLETELY QUIET. THEY ALSO ADVISED THAT HE SHOULD NOT EVEN WATCH TELEVISION.
3. JUAN CARLOS TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SEEN FRANCO'S SON-IN-LAW (CRISTOBAL VILLAVERDE) AT A SHOOT LAST SUNDAY FOLLOWING THE FIRST ATTACK AND THAT VILLAVERDE COMMENTED TO HIM THAT HE WAS ALREADY MAKING PLANS TO LEAVE SPAIN AND TO WRITE A BOOK ABOUT FRANCO, OFF THE PROCEEDS OF WHICH HE WOULD LIVE. JUAN CARLOS COMMENTED THAT THE FRANCO FAMILY WAS OF THE VIEW THAT FRANCO SHOULD RETIRE AND HAND OVER FULL POWERS TO THE PRINCE.
4. FOLLOWING FRANCO'S SECOND HEART ATTACK THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 21, THERE HAD BEEN CONSTANT SERIES OF CONSULTA-

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12/9/03

By HR NARA Date 8/9/10



TIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND WITH HIM. THE MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE, SYNDICATES, ARMY, AND NAVY HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY FAVORED IMMEDIATE STEPPING DOWN OF FRANCO AND JUAN CARLOS' SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE. THEY SAID THEY INTENDED TO SUPPORT THIS VIEW WITHIN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. JUAN CARLOS SAID HE HAD MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HE BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A TEMPORARY TRANSFER OF POWERS AS IN JULY 1974 SINCE THIS WOULD BE DAMAGING NOT ONLY TO HIS FUTURE POSITION, BUT ALSO WOULD, IN HIS VIEW, BE AGAINST THE BEST INTERESTS OF SPAIN. JUAN CARLOS INDICATED THAT ARIAS HAD NOT TAKEN ANY FIRM POSITION, BUT THAT HE HAD MET WITH FRANCO AT THE PARDO PALACE LAST EVENING. TO EVERYBODY'S AMAZEMENT, FRANCO HAD INSISTED IN MEETING ARIAS IN THE OFFICE AND HAD WALKED THERE UNASSISTED. ARIAS HAD SET FORTH TO FRANCO THE CONCERNS OF THE DOCTORS AND THE VIEW THAT IT MIGHT BE WELL FOR FRANCO TO STEP DOWN. TO THIS, FRANCO HAD REPLIED THAT THE DOCTORS DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING AND THAT NOTHING WAS GOING TO HAPPEN. JUAN CARLOS TOLD HE THAT FRANCO HAD ATTACHED TO HIM A MONITORING DEVICE SO THAT HIS HEART BEAT COULD BE CHECKED. ARIAS SAID HE HAD SEEN THE PRINT-OUT OF THE ELECTROVARDIOGRAM REGISTERED DURING HIS CONVERSATION WITH FRANCO AND IT SHOWED ALMOST NO ABNORMALITY. THE DOCTORS WERE ALL ASTOUNDED WHEN TOLD THAT FRANCO HAD MET WITH ARIAS AND CONTINUED TO HOLD THE VIEW THAT FRANCO WAS A VERY ILL MAN WHO COULD DIE AT ANY MINUTE.

5. JUAN CARLOS SAID THAT IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE A FIRM DECISION THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DRIFT ON WHERE SPAIN WOULD VIRTUALLY BE WITHOUT A CHIEF OF STATE. FRANCO IS A SICK MAN AND IN MOST NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES A PERSON IN FRANCO'S CONDITION WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE RETIRED. HE BELIEVED IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT AT THE FRIDAY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' MEETING (AND JUAN CARLOS BELIEVED THAT FRANCO WOULD MAKE A SUPERHUMAN EFFORT TO PRESIDE OVER IT), THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD IN A DETERMINED FASHION SEEK FRANCO'S RETIREMENT SO THAT JUAN CARLOS COULD SUCCEED TO THE THRONE. JUAN CARLOS POINTED OUT THAT UNDER THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION THERE WAS NO SUCH THING AS RESIGNATION, BUT UNDER THE SPECIAL POWERS THAT FRANCO HAS, HE WOULD HIMSELF BE ABLE TO DECREE HIS RETIREMENT IN FAVOR OF JUAN CARLOS. JUAN CARLOS ADDED THAT, OF COURSE, THE BEST AND CLEANEST SOLUTION FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW WOULD BE FRANCO'S DEATH.

6. JUAN CARLOS WENT ON THAT MANY MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY SUPPORT FRANCO'S RETIREMENT AND THAT HE HAD TODAY TALKED



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TO THE CAPTAIN GENERAL OF THE CANARIES (THE BROTHER OF THE AIR MINISTER) WHO EXPRESSED THIS SENTIMENT. JUAN VARLOS ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE WAS EXPECTING A VISIT LATER THIS AFTERNOON FROM FRANCO'S SON-IN-LAW AND HE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO SEE WHETHER HE WAS COMING TO PROPOSE SOME SORT OF A DEAL FOR THE FAMILY SHOULD FRANCO RETIRE.

7. JUAN CARLOS SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED ENCOURAGING INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO THE ATTITUDE OF A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN SPAIN TOWARD HIS SUCCESSION TO POWER. HE HAD RECENTLY HAD INFORMATION THAT THE BASQUES AND THE CATALANS WOULD SUPPORT HIM AND WOULD DO THEIR BEST TO MAINTAIN MODERATE ATTITUDES TO GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO MOVE SPAIN IN A NEW POLITICAL DIRECTION, INCLUDING REGIONAL MATTERS. HE HAD ALSO BEEN RECENTLY ENCOURAGED TO RECEIVE WORD INDIRECTLY FROM FELIPE GONZALEZ, THE LEADER OF THE SPANISH SOCIALIST PARTY (PSE) THAT THE SOCIALISTS WOULD NOT INSIST ON A REFERENDUM ON THE MONARCHY AND WOULD KEEP AN OPEN-MINDED ATTITUDE TOWARD JUAN CARLOS. (THIS INFORMATION WE HAVE ALSO RECEIVED DIRECTLY FROM FELIPE GONZALEZ.) JUAN CARLOS SAID HE RECOGNIZED IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE HIS OWN SUPPORT FOR A MORE LIBERALIZED SYSTEM. THIS COULD NOT BE DONE OVERNIGHT AND HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT WOULD BE TOLERABLE TO THE MILITARY WHO WOULD BE HIS MAIN SUPPORT. HE DOUBTED WHETHER HE WOULD KEEP ARIAS AS HIS PRIME MINISTER, BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION WHO HE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND.

8. FINALLY, JUAN CARLOS SAID HE WOULD LET ME KNOW AT ONCE WITH REGARD TO ANY FURTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION AND ASKED ME TO CALL HIM AT ANY TIME I WISHED.

STABLER
UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL
BT



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TO USDEL SECRETARY NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 251412 **TOSSEC 100237**
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN

SUBJECT: KOREA IN THE 30TH UNGA: US SPEECH
FOR HAGIB FROM BUFFUM

1. US WILL SPEAK ON KOREAN ITEM AFTERNOON
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23. DRAFT TEXT FOLLOWS FYI
AND ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE.

BEGIN TEXT

THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THIS DEBATE IS THE PEACE
AND SECURITY OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IT IS
AN ISSUE WHICH HAS REQUIRED THE ATTENTION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS - BOTH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL - FOR 27 YEARS. I
REMINO THE COMMITTEE THAT THIS ORGANIZATION
HAS SOUGHT DURING THE LAST FEW YEARS TO
CONTRIBUTE TO THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS ON
THE PENINSULA BY ENCOURAGING DISCUSSION AND
CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAN GOVERNMENTS.
MY GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED
IN THIS EFFORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS BECAUSE
WE RECOGNIZE THAT ANY RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES

ON THE PENINSULA COULD HAVE IMMEDIATE AND
SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PEACE OF THE
ENTIRE WORLD. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ROLE
WHICH OUR ORGANIZATION CAN AND SHOULD PLAY



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By *NR* NARA, Date *8/9/10*

CHANGES WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND THE RISE OF NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. WE ARE THEREFORE PREPARED TO EXAMINE SUGGESTIONS WHICH MEMBERS BELIEVE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

ANY MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM MUST BEGIN WITH THE CONSENSUS RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1973. THIS RESOLUTION CONTAINS THE PRINCIPLES WHICH THE TWO PARTS OF KOREA DECIDED SHOULD GOVERN THEIR RELATIONSHIP AND CONTAINS THE GOAL WHICH THIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECIDED SHOULD GOVERN ITS OWN RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA. FOR ITS PART THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY STATED THE HOPE THAT THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH OF KOREA WOULD BE URGED TO CONTINUE THEIR DIALOGUE AND WIDEN THEIR MANY-SIDED EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION SO AS TO EXPEDITE THE INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY.

LAST YEAR, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSENSUS I HAVE DESCRIBED, THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED A RESOLUTION WHICH ENDORSED THE CONSENSUS CALL FOR DIALOGUE AND MOVED TO THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP; AN EXAMINATION OF THOSE ASPECTS OF THE KOREAN QUESTION WHICH INVOLVE THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE PENINSULA, INCLUDING THE FUTURE OF THE UN COMMAND. THE RESOLUTION WHICH WAS ADOPTED PROPERLY POINTS OUT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS A CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE CHARTER REGARDING THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THE RESOLUTION MADE CLEAR

THE WILLINGNESS OF MY GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UN COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF JULY 7, 1950 TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO THE UN COMMAND, PROVIDED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WAS MAINTAINED.

IN THE INTERVENING PERIOD THERE WAS NO RESPONSE FROM THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED WHICH WOULD PERMIT CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSALS SET FORTH IN THAT RESOLUTION.



MY GOVERNMENT, THEREFORE, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND WITH OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS, JOINED IN SPONSORING THE RESOLUTION SUBMITTED ON JUNE 27, 1975 WHICH IS NOW BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE. THAT RESOLUTION EXPLICITLY REAFFIRMS OUR WILLINGNESS TO TERMINATE THE UN COMMAND PROVIDED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS MAINTAINED.

THE UN COMMAND TODAY IS COMPRISED OF THOSE MILITARY PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE PERFORMANCE BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OF ITS ARMISTICE AGREEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND TOTALS LESS THAN 300 NON-KOREAN PERSONNEL. MOST OF THESE ARE US MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AS STAFF PERSONNEL TO THE COMMAND ITSELF AND THE REMAINDER ARE PART OF THE CEREMONIAL HONOR GUARD OF THE COMMAND. AMERICAN FORCES SERVING IN KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE US-ROK MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF 1954 ARE NOT PART OF THE UN COMMAND. IN ORDER TO HELP MAKE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UN COMMAND AND THESE AMERICAN FORCES, THE USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FLAG IN KOREA HAS BEEN LIMITED TO THOSE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH MAINTAINING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. MY GOVERNMENT FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THIS IN MY LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 22.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF TERMINATION OF THE UN COMMAND, THE CHIEF CONCERN OF MY GOVERNMENT IS THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN THE BASIS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA FOR OVER 20 YEARS BE MAINTAINED IN THE ABSENCE OF ALTERNATE LASTING ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH. I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS NOT MERELY A CEASEFIRE BUT A CAREFULLY DESIGNED STRUCTURE FOR MONITORING AND POLICING THE ARMISTICE ITSELF. IT REMAINS THE ONLY LEGAL BASIS FOR THE PRESENT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.



THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION WHICH IS COMPOSED OF ALL PARTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS THE ONLY ACCEPTED FORUM FOR REGULAR MEETINGS OF ALL THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO CONSIDER THE ARMISTICE EITHER A RELIC OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE OR A FRAGILE INSTRUMENT OF LITTLE AUTHORITY. WHATEVER MAY BE ITS SHORTCOMINGS, IT CONTINUES TO BE OBSERVED AND TO FUNCTION.

THE OPPOSING RESOLUTION CALLS FOR TERMINATION OF THE UN COMMAND AND REPLACEMENT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BY A PEACE AGREEMENT. NOTHING IS SAID OF HOW THE MECHANISMS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT ARE TO FUNCTION AND WHAT IS TO ACT AS A RESTRAINT ON THE PARTIES IN THE INTERVAL WHILE THE PEACE AGREEMENT IS BEING DISCUSSED. THIS COULD TAKE A GOOD LONG TIME, WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THAT THE OTHER RESOLUTION CALLS FOR A "PEACE AGREEMENT" WITH THE US RATHER THAN WITH THE ROK. THE US WOULD NOT CONSIDER SITTING DOWN TO SUCH A NEGOTIATION WITHOUT THE ROK PRESENT. WHOEVER IS FAMILIAR WITH THE KOREAN PROBLEM KNOWS THAT A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT MACHINERY IS NOT FUNCTIONING AND

WHERE THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT ANY OTHER AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE ITS PLACE IS A HIGHLY UNSTABLE ONE.

WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THE TERMINATION OF THE UN COMMAND WITHOUT PROVISION FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMISTICE WOULD HAVE LITTLE CONSEQUENCE FOR THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE PENINSULA, AND THAT THE GOOD WILL OF THE TWO SIDES WOULD BE SUFFICIENT UNTIL A PEACE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED. TO THE CONTRARY, THE ARMISTICE PROVIDES AN AGREED STARTING POINT FOR ANY DISCUSSION OF A MORE LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN ISSUE.

OUR RESOLUTION, A/C.1/L.708/REV.1, REFLECTS THE HELPFUL AMENDMENTS OFFERED BY THE DELEGATION OF FRANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH DELEGATIONS OF BELGIUM, IRELAND, ITALY, LIBERIA, THE GAMBIA AND LUXEMBOURG AND NOW PROPOSES NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE



ON THE ISSUE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND,
REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND ASSURANCE OF
LASTING PEACE IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

SECRETARY KISSINGER IN HIS ADDRESS ON
SEPTEMBER 22 CALLED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE
CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
DIRECTLY CONCERNED: THE TWO KOREAN GOVERNMENTS,
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA. HE MADE CLEAR
THAT HE WAS PROPOSING A CONFERENCE WHICH
WOULD NOT ONLY DISCUSS MEANS FOR PRESERVING
THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHILE TERMINATING
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND BUT WHICH ALSO
COULD EXPLORE "OTHER MEASURES TO REDUCE
TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA INCLUDING
THE POSSIBILITY OF A LARGER CONFERENCE TO
NEGOTIATE A MORE FUNDAMENTAL ARRANGEMENT."

IF THERE WERE TO BE A BROADER CONFERENCE ON
MORE PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS OUR VIEW IS
THAT THE COMPOSITION OF SUCH A BROADER
CONFERENCE SHOULD BE THE TOPIC OF DISCUSSION
OF THE SMALLER CONFERENCE PROPOSED BY THE
SECRETARY OF THE FOUR PARTIES CONCERNED WITH
THE ARMISTICE. WE OURSELVES WOULD HAVE AN
OPEN MIND AS TO WHO MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN
ANY SUCH BROADER CONFERENCE.

THUS, THE CONFERENCE OF THE FOUR PARTIES
CONCERNED WITH THE ARMISTICE SHOULD BE
VIEWED NOT AS AN END-POINT BUT AS THE
BEGINNING OF A PROCESS WHICH CAN LEAD TO
A MORE LASTING SETTLEMENT AND WILL BE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THIS ORGANIZATION AND THE VIEWS IT HAS
EXPRESSED ON THE KOREAN QUESTION. THE
NEGOTIATIONS CALLED FOR BY OUR RESOLUTION
ARE, I MIGHT ADD, THE ONLY PROPOSAL NOW
BEFORE THIS BODY THAT RECOGNIZES THAT IN
MATTERS RELATING TO THE FUTURE OF KOREA
AND TO SECURITY IN THE PENINSULA BOTH
KOREAN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED. I
SUBMIT, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THIS RESOLUTION,
BY CALLING FOR NEGOTIATION OF THIS KIND,
PROVIDES A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND ACTION
WHICH WILL ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA WHILE
PRESERVING THE PRESENT ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENT
WHICH REMAINS SO IMPORTANT.



IT MAY APPEAR THAT THE OTHER RESOLUTION BEFORE US HAS SOME SIMILAR PROVISIONS BUT THIS APPEARANCE IS NOT BORNE OUT ON EXAMINATION. THE OTHER RESOLUTION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAST RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SINCE IT DOES NOT ENCOURAGE DISCUSSIONS BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE PENINSULA. INDEED IT HAS THE CLEAR INTENTION TO EXCLUDE ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES, THE REPUBLIC

OF KOREA, FROM ANY SUCH DISCUSSIONS. I WONDER HOW MANY MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE WOULD SUPPORT A RESOLUTION WHICH DENIED THEM THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE.

FUNDAMENTAL TO ALL I HAVE SAID AND TO ALL THAT THIS ORGANIZATION HAS RECOMMENDED IS THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA BE ENCOURAGED TO RESUME. IT IS ONLY IN THAT CONTEXT THAT STEP BY STEP PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH THE MAJOR ISSUES DIVIDING THE TWO SIDES CAN BE MADE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME TURN NOW TO A THIRD QUESTION - ONE WHICH IS NOT DEALT WITH IN OUR RESOLUTION AND SHOULD NOT BE BEFORE THIS BODY - THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA PURSUANT TO THE UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OF 1954 AND AT THE INVITATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. THE OTHER RESOLUTION AND THE LETTER WHICH INTRODUCES IT MAKE CLEAR THAT THESE FORCES ARE THE FORCES WHICH IT WISHES WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA. IT PRESUMES TO MAKE THIS A MATTER OF UNITED NATIONS BUSINESS BY REFERRING TO THEM AS FORCES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FLAG. THE FACT IS THAT, AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE LESS THAN 300 PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, THESE TROOPS ARE NOT UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FLAG AND ARE NOT A MATTER OF UNITED NATIONS BUSINESS.



THE PRESENCE OF US TROOPS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MATTER BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA UNDER OUR MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY. THEY WILL REMAIN THERE AS LONG AS THEY ARE NEEDED AND AS LONG AS THEIR PRESENCE IS MUTUALLY DESIRED BY THE ROK AND THE US. MY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OUR MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA A

STABILIZING INFLUENCE IN THE PENINSULA. WE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAVE PERIODICALLY REAFFIRMED OUR COMMITMENT TO ITS PRINCIPLES. WE ASSUME THAT NORTH KOREA TAKES A SIMILAR VIEW OF ITS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BUT THESE WERE NOT MENTIONED BY THE NORTH KOREANS IN THEIR SPEECH TO THE FIRST COMMITTEE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SPOKEN AT SOME LENGTH ON THE MATTER BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE. I HAVE DONE THIS BOTH TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR OUR VIEWS ON THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. I TURN FINALLY TO THE PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. FUNDAMENTAL TO ALL I HAVE SAID AND TO ALL THAT THIS ORGANIZATION HAS RECOMMENDED IS THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA BE ENCOURAGED TO RESUME. IT IS ONLY IN THAT CONTEXT THAT STEP BY STEP PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH THE MAJOR ISSUES DIVIDING THE TWO SIDES CAN BE MADE. NO ONE WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH THESE PROBLEMS CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT THAT THEY CAN BE SOLVED QUICKLY OR EASILY. THERE IS A NEED FOR CAUTION BUT THERE IS NEED TO BREAK CONTINUED STALEMATE. IT APPEARS TO MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO REINITIATION OF MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS BY ENSURING THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH WOULD CALL INTO DOUBT THE CONTINUING COMMITMENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

THERE ARE POSITIVE STEPS WHICH CAN BE TAKEN. SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER SAID IN HIS SEPTEMBER 22 ADDRESS THAT IF NORTH KOREA AND



ITS ALLIES WOULD MOVE TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE SIMILAR RECIPROCAL ACTIONS. MY GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSION WITH ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO TERMINATE THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND WHILE PRESERVING THE ARMISTICE AND TO DISCUSS OTHER STEPS TO EASE TENSIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH WILL ENJOY THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF MOST MEMBERS OF THIS ASSEMBLY. HOWEVER, WE WILL NOT PLACE IN JEOPARDY THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE PENINSULA BY AGREEING TO ACTIONS WHICH HAVE AS THEIR INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE AN INCREASE IN MILITARY TENSIONS AND UNCERTAINTY. THAT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE AND DANGEROUS TO THE OBJECTIVES WHICH WE ALL ESPOUSE. I THEREFORE ASK THAT EACH MEMBER OF THIS COMMITTEE CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS VOTE ON THE KOREAN ITEM.

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3272

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 251415 TOSEC 160258

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652:GDS TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: SADAT VISIT (SS 7522038)

SUGGESTED MENU-REQUEST APPROVAL:

1. CREAM OF PUMPKIN SOUP
 MEDALLIONS OF VEAL...STERLING CABERNET SAUVIGNON 1969
 BROCCOLI TIMBALE WITH BELGIAN CARROTS
 SALAD MIMOSE
 PORT SALUT CHEESE AND FRESH FRUIT
 CHESTNUT SOUFFLE WITH MARRON GLACEE...KORBEL NATUREL
 COFFEE, TEA

APPROVE:
 DISAPPROVE:

2. MOST RECENT ACCEPTANCES:
 SENATOR AND MRS. MARK HATFIELD
 SENATOR AND MRS. CHARLES MATHIAS
 T.H. JOHN BUCHANAN AND MRS. BUCHANAN, HOUSE OF REPS.
 T.H. CHARLES ROBINSON AND MRS. ROBINSON
 MR. AND MRS. LANDON K. THORNE, JR., AMERICAN UNIV. IN CAIRO
 DR. AND MRS. A. J. MEYER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
 MR. AND MRS. ROWLAND EVANS
 T.H. RAYMOND A. HARE AND MRS. HARE, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR
 TO EGYPT - PS SADOR
 SENATOR AND MRS. GEORGE MCGOVERN
 T.H. PARKER HART AND MRS. HART, BECHTEL CORPORATION
 MR. AND MRS. JAMES ROBINSON, AMERICAN EXPRESS

REGRETS:
 SENATOR AND MRS. LEE METCALF
 T.H. GARNER E. SHRIVER AND MRS. SHRIVER, HOUSE OF REPS.
 SENATOR AND MRS. HUGH SCOTT

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By NR NARA, Date 8/9/10



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MR. AND MRS. PAUL MELLON
MISS SAMANTHA EGGAR
MISS MARLO THOMAS.

FURTHER ACCEPTANCES:

MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. POWELL
MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. STEWART
SENATOR AND MRS. MCCLURE
SENATOR AND MRS. STAFFORD
MR. AND MRS. HENRY FORD II
MR. AND MRS. PAUL MILLER, PRESIDENT, EATON CORPORATION
MR. AND MRS. ERNEST ROBERT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,
CHEMICAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
MR. AND MRS. DWAYNE ANDREAS, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,
ARCHER-DANIELS MIDLAND CO.
MRS. JOSEPH CHARYK, COMSAT
MR. AND MRS. FRANK CONSIDINE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL CAN
COMPANY
MR. PETER RODMAN, NSC
PROFESSOR AND MRS. F. C. HURWITZ, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

FURTHER REGRETS:

MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. MARSHALL
SENATOR AND MRS. BROOKE
SENATOR AND MRS. CASE
SENATOR AND MRS. BAYH
CONGRESSMAN AND MRS. DERWINSKI
CONGRESSWOMAN AND MR. MEYNER
SENATOR AND MRS. FANNIN
MR. AND MRS. WILLIAM A. MARQUARD, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
STANDARD
MR. AND MRS. W. F. MARTIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY
MR. AND MRS. CLAUDE I. CARTER, PRESIDENT, CONAGRA INC.

ACCEPTED BUT NOW MUST REGRET:

DR. AND MRS. A. F. MEYER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
PROFESSOR AND MRS. PAUL DOTY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN (KISSINGER, H. A.)

SUBJECT: EXTRACTS FROM SECRETARY SCHLESINGER OCTOBER 20
PRESS CONFERENCE

FOR SECRETARY FROM S/PRS - ANDERSON
NO. 16

FOLLOWING ARE ALL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON SALT FROM TRANS-
SCRIPT OF ONE HOUR PRESS CONFERENCE BY SCHLESINGER AT
PENTAGON ON OCTOBER 20.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, THIS THING ABOUT SOVIET UNION, EVER SINCE
ORIGINAL SALT TALKS BEGAN, THERE HAVE BEEN STORIES ALLEGING
MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN PENTAGON AND STATE
DEPT OVER MAJOR ISSUES IN SALT TALKS. I WONDER IF YOU
COULD DISCUSS DIFFERENCES. AND IF NOT, COULD YOU GIVE US
YOUR VIEWS ON WHERE BACKFIRE BOMBER AND CRUISE MISSILE STAND
IN SALT NEGOTIATIONS?

SCHLESINGER: I WILL NOT GET INTO ANY DETAIL WITH REGARD TO
SPECIFIC ITEMS INVOLVED IN SALT NEGOTIATION. LET ME SAY
THESE ALLEGATIONS OF DIFFERENCES WHICH I HAVE READ IN NEWS-
PAPERS ARE A CONTINUAL SOURCE OF TITILLATION AROUND TOWN.

THE DIFFERENCE, OF COURSE, THERE WILL BE DIFFERENCES IN
VIEW FROM TIME TO TIME, BUT DIFFERENCES AS REPORTED WIDELY
ARE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED.

WITH REGARD TO BACKFIRE ISSUE, I THINK THAT IN SOME RESPECTS
THAT CONTINUES TO BE FUNDAMENTALLY AND ULTIMATELY A QUESTION
OF THE IMAGE OF EQUALITY, AND POLITICAL ISSUE. I THINK



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By WR NARA, Date 8/9/10

THAT IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT BACKFIRE IN ALL PROBABILITY WAS INTENDED TO BE USED IN A PERIPHERAL ROLE. AND IT WAS SO DESIGNED. IT, HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, DOES APPARENTLY HAVE CAPABILITY OF REACHING U. S. ON CERTAIN FLIGHTS MISSIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TREATED IN SOME WAY IN A DISCUSSION OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

I SHOULD EMPHASIZE FACT THAT U.S.G. HAS PRESENTED A POSITION TO SOVIET UNION. IT IS AN AGREED UPON POSITION. SO I THINK THAT FLAMBOYANT DESCRIPTIONS OF DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH THAT PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVE IN MIND.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, THE SALT TALKS AT AN IMPASSE?

SCHLESSINGER: NO, SIR.

Q: HAVE THERE BEEN ANY REPLIES SINCE, ANY MOVEMENT SINCE SECRETARY GROMYKO WAS HERE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO?

SCHLESINGER: THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY SUBSTANTIAL MOVEMENT, BUT WE ARE WAITING A REPLY FROM SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

Q: IN THAT CONNECTION, MR. SECRETARY, BOTH BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILE WERE CONSIDERED RELATIVELY MINOR ISSUES LAST NOVEMBER. SINCE THEN THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT PENTAGON HAS DELIBERATELY EXAGGERATED THEIR IMPORTANCE IN EFFECT TO UNDERMINE NEGOTIATIONS, AND PERHAPS POLICY OF DETENTE. IS THAT CASE. AND DOES PENTAGON REALLY WANT A NEW ARMS AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS?

SCHLESINGER: I THINK THAT THOSE REPORTS ARE MALICIOUS AND ABSOLUTELY FALSE. PENTAGON OF COURSE WANTS A NEW AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION. THERE IS NO PURPOSE IN BOTH SIDES PILING UP STRATEGIC ARMS.

ONCE AGAIN, WAY THAT WE MUST ACHIEVE THIS IS THROUGH NEGOTIATION OF AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT. WE CANNOT ACCEPT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS NOT EQUITABLE. AND SIMPLE PILING UP OF STRATEGIC ARMS ON BOTH SIDES SERVES NO PURPOSE AT ALL. BUT WE CANNOT UNILATERALLY REFRAIN FROM IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR OWN ARMS IF SOVIET UNION IS FORGING AHEAD WITH ITS PROGRAM.

THE PURPOSE OF ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IS TO ESTABLISH CONSTRAINTS THAT ARE EQUITABLE AND ADEQUATE ON BOTH SIDES. WE CERTAINLY WOULD WHOLLY ENDORSE PURPOSE -- THAT PURPOSE. IN FACT, NATIONAL SECURITY IS PROMOTED BY EQUITABLE ARMS AGREEMENTS WHICH SERVE PURPOSE OF STABILIZATION.



NOW YOU RAISED A QUESTION OF BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILE. CRUISE MISSILE WAS NOT INITIALLY CONSIDERED BY U.S.G. TO BE A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. CRUISE MISSILE INDEED HAS BEEN A SUBJECT THAT WAS RAISED BY SOVIET UNION SUBSEQUENT TO VLADIVOSTOK. SO I DO NOT THINK THAT ANY JUST SURVEY OF RECORD WOULD SUGGEST THAT PENTAGON HAS RAISED THAT ISSUE. IT HAS RESPONDED IN INTERESTS OF LONG TERM DEFENSE POSTURE OF THE U.S. TO THAT ISSUE THAT WAS OTHERWISE RAISED.

WITH REGARD TO BACKFIRE BOMBER, I HAVE INDICATED PREVIOUSLY WHAT PROBLEM IS. THAT A WEAPON SYSTEM WHICH APPARENTLY WAS INTENDED TO PERIPHERAL USE DOES HAVE CAPABILITY, AS WE READ IT NOW, AT PRESENT TIME, REFLECTING INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, AGAINST U.S. AND THEREFORE, IT PLAYS A ROLE IN ANY NEGOTIATION OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IT MUST BE DEALT WITH.

Q: AND THIS EMERGED SINCE VLADIVOSTOK. SIMPLY ON BACK-FIRE OR WAS IT....

SCHLESINGER: NO, NO, NO. BACKFIRE ESTIMATES I THINK HAVE BEEN CONCURRED IN AND REFINED BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SINCE VLADIVOSTOK, BUT IT HAS NOT EMERGED SINCE VLADIVOSTOK.

Q: IS THERE A NEW BACKFIRE SINCE THAT TIME? I MEAN, AN IMPROVED ENGINE?

SCHLESINGER: NO, SIR.

Q: IT IS AIR REFUELING YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT?

SCHLESINGER: NO, SIR. IT IS NOT AIR REFUELING.

Q: WHY DOES IT SUDDENLY HAVE LONGER RANGE UNDER INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES?

SCHLESINGER: IT DOES NOT HAVE LONGER RANGE. AS I SAY, ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN REFINED. DIVERGENCES IN ESTIMATES HAVE NOW BEEN CONCURRED IN ON THE PART OF VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Q: CAN IT GET TO U.S. AND BACK TO SOVIET UNION?

SCHLESINGER: IT CANNOT.

Q: CAN IT LAND IN CUBA? IT CANNOT, YOU SAY?

SCHLESINGER: IT CANNOT GO A TWO-WAY TRIP. WELL, IT COULD



REACH CERTAIN PARTS OF THE U.S., YES, INDEED. OR PERHAPS NORTHWESTERN PART OF U.S. BUT FOR GENERAL MISSION IT WOULD NOT BE A FULL TWO-WAY TRIP COVERING ALL PARTS OF U.S.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, YOU SAID THAT CRUISE MISSILE WAS RAISED AS AN ISSUE AFTER VLADIVOSTOK. AS I RECALL, DR. KISSINGER RETURNED AFTER VLADIVOSTOK AND SAID THAT QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED, AND THAT A 600 KILOMETER LIMIT WAS SET BY THEIR UNDERSTANDING.

SCHLESINGER: I THINK THAT AFTER VLADIVOSTOK THERE WAS SOME DEGREE OF OBSCURITY WHETHER INDEED AID MEMOIRE APPLIED TO BALLISTIC MISSILES OR INCLUDED MISSILES IN GENERAL.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, YOUR STATEMENT THAT BACKFIRE CANNOT REACH U.S. -- I'D LIKE TO CLARIFY THAT BECAUSE I THINK IT CONFLICTS WITH INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS THAT IS BEING PRESENTED BY YOUR OFFICE.

SCHLESINGER: I HOPE NOT. WHAT I SAID NOW -- LET ME REPEAT -- IT CAN REACH PARTS OF U.S. ON A TWO-WAY MISSION. IT CANNOT COVER ENTIRE U. S. ON A TYPICAL TWO-WAY MISSION.

Q: WITH REFUELING?

SCHLESINGER: WITH REFUELING YOU COULD DO THAT, SURE. NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT.

Q: THERE IS NO INDICATION THEY ARE DEVELOPING TANKERS, IS THERE?

SCHLESINGER: THERE IS NO INDICATION AT THIS TIME THAT THERE IS A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN TANKER AREA. SUCH AN INDICATION, OF COURSE, WOULD ALTER PRESENT ASSESSMENT REGARDING INTENDED USE OF BACKFIRE FOR PERIPHERAL MISSION.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, YOU COMMENTED BEFORE THAT YOU DID NOT CARE TO COMMENT ON PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT BECAUSE OF DELICACY AND A DEARTH OF INFORMATION. ARE WE IN SAME SITUATION AS DEFENSE DEPT WAS NOT INFORMED OF PERSHING DEAL, THAT WE ARE NOT NOW INFORMED....

SCHLESINGER: NO SIR. I JUST, I HAVE NOT INFORMED MYSELF ON THAT SUBJECT. THERE IS NO REASON I COULD NOT INQUIRE WHETHER THERE HAVE BEEN REQUESTS AND WHAT THOSE PRECISE REQUESTS ARE AND IF I HAD, I SHOULD NOT RESPOND.

Q: BUT YOU DON'T FEEL DEFENSE DEPT HAS BEEN KEPT IN DARK ON ANY



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SCHLESINGER: NO, SIR. ABSOLUTELY NOT.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, IN CONNECTION WITH STATEMENT YOU MADE ABOUT SALT AND TWO ITEMS, BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILE, IS IT YOUR VIEW, OR VIEW OF DEPARTMENT THAT AN ALL-OUT DEVELOPMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE IS AN UNAVOIDABLE NECESSITY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY OF U.S. IN SPITE OF FACT THAT THEY ARE UNVERIFIABLE AND COULD VERY WELL DAMAGE FUTURE SALT NEGOTIATIONS?

SCHLESINGER: I THINK THAT ANSWER TO THAT IS, I WOULD CHOOSE OTHER WORDS THAN ONES YOU HAVE USED IN PHRASING OF YOUR QUESTION. I THINK THAT DEVELOPMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE IS DESIRABLE FROM STANDPOINT OF MILITARY POSTURE OF U.S. AND INsofar AS IT DEALS WITH CAPACITY OF BOMBERS TO PENETRATE AGAINST A VERY FORMIDABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM DEPLOYED BY SOVIET UNION IN MIDDLE 1980'S, THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THAT FUNCTION.

BUT I SHOULD STRESS THAT A MAJOR ROLE FOR CRUISE MISSILE CONTINUES TO BE IN AUGMENTATION OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCE POSTURE RATHER THAN STRATEGIC ARMS ELEMENT THAT HAS RECEIVED SO MUCH STRESS IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE. INGERSOLL
BT



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DATE 10/23/75

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 251413 TOSEC 160240

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)

SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT: PROPOSED GIFT FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO PRESIDENT SADAT

FOR BREMER FROM AMB CATTO

1. WE PROPOSE PRESIDENT FORD GIVE PRESIDENT SADAT AN EKTASOUND 160 EIGHT-MILLIMETER CAMERA AND A KODAK EKTASOUND 245 PROJECTER WITH ZOOM LENS AS WELL AS A PORTABLE 40 X 40-INCH SCREEN.

2. I HAVE RUN THE IDEA BY THE ADVANCE GROUP, AND THEY BELIEVE PRESIDENT SADAT WILL BE PLEASED.

3. WOULD YOU PLEASE CHECK WITH THE SECRETARY AND MRS. KISSINGER TO SEE IF THEY HAVE ANY COMMENT BEFORE WE PROCEED. INGERSOLL



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 State Review
State Dept Guidelines 12/9/03

By HR NARA, Date 8/9/10

PSN: 049668

TOR: 296/00:03Z

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