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TELEGRAM

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PFOR SY US EG

SUBJECT: FAHMY ON SYRIA
FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO
REF: CAIRO 10528



1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN HERMANN EILTS' REPORT (CAIRO 10528) ON FAHMY'S DISAPPOINTMENT THAT WE HAVE NOT AS YET TAKEN FIRM ACTION WITH KING HUSSEIN TO BREAK UP THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN COMMON FRONT THAT HAS DEVELOPED.

2. SUBSTANTIVELY, THREE POINTS STAND OUT IN MY MIND:

A. WE MADE A MAJOR EFFORT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HAWK EX-

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EO 12958, (as amended) SEC 9.3
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State Review
12/9/03

By *HR* NARA Date *8/6/10*

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CHANGES TO PERSUADE THE JORDANIANS TO MAKE A POSITIVE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE SINAI AGREEMENT. THEY SAID THEY COULD SPEAK POSITIVELY ABOUT THE U.S. ROLE BUT WOULD HAVE TO EXPRESS RESERVATIONS ABOUT SUBSTANCE OF AGREEMENT. THEY, LIKE SYRIA, ARE SUSPICIOUS THAT THEY WILL BE LEFT OUT OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND THEY ARE GENERALLY SUSPICIOUS OF EGYPT. THEY WOULD SAY THEIR OPPOSITION TO SINAI II WILL DIMINISH WHEN IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT A CONTINUATION OF THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS CAN BE BUILT ON THE FOUNDATION IT PROVIDES. JORDAN, MOREOVER, SEES ADVANTAGES IN THE CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA THAT GOES

BEYOND THE COMMON ATTITUDE TOWARD SINAI II, THOUGH THE LATTER IS CERTAINLY AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION. THUS IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT WE COULD DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN SYRIA AND JORDAN IF WE WANTED TO--CERTAINLY NOT WITHOUT A SHOW-DOWN.


8. WE ARE DOING WHAT WE CAN WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA TO EXPLAIN THAT SINAI II IS A BUILDING BLOCK AND NOT A STOPPING PLACE.

C. OUR MAIN EFFORT TO TURN SYRIA AROUND WILL HAVE TO COME IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR NEXT DIPLOMATIC MOVES. HUSSEIN HAS SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO URGE MODERATION.

3. IN SHORT, I THINK WE ARE IN A POSITION WHERE WE MUST WORK CAREFULLY TO KEEP SYRIA ON A MODERATE COURSE RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING A DIRECT EFFORT TO ISOLATE HER. IT IS ONE THING FOR EGYPT TO PURSUE THAT OBJECTIVE IN AN ARAB CONTEXT. IT IS ANOTHER FOR US TO ATTEMPT ACTIONS WHICH THE ARABS WOULD SEE AS "FURTHER" EFFORTS TO DIVIDE THEM. THERE IS A RISK, ALSO, OF OUR BECOMING CAUGHT UP IN THE DISPUTE BETWEEN SYRIA AND EGYPT, WHICH HAS SPREAD BEYOND ITS ORIGINS IN THE DIFFERENCE OVER SINAI II.

4. HERMANN IS TODAY ON HIS WAY BACK TO WASHINGTON FOR THE LAST FEW DAYS OF PREPARATION FOR THE SADAT VISIT. IN HIS ABSENCE, I RECOMMEND THAT WE LEAVE THIS ISSUE IN ABEYANCE UNTIL YOUR TALKS WITH FAHMY. YOU HAVE ALREADY SENT ONE MESSAGE ON THE SUBJECT. INGERSOLL

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INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3191

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EXDIS
E.O. 11652:NA

SUBJECT: FOREIGN PRISONERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

INFO FOR ASST. SEC. HABIB WITH SECRETARY

1. REF A REPORTS PRG ANNOUNCEMENT THAT AMERICANS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS WILL BE REPATRIATED FROM SOUTH VIETNAM "ACCORDING TO THEIR WISH, IN LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER." UNHCR HAS CONFIRMED THIS INFORMATION IN A PRESS RELEASE AND PRIVATELY TO THE DEPARTMENT.

2. WE DO NOT KNOW FOR CERTAIN WHICH PERSONS ARE COVERED BY THIS ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT ASSUME AS A MINIMUM IT APPLIES TO THE BAN ME THUOT PRISONERS.

3. SUGGEST YOU ADVISE PERMANENT SECRETARY RENOUE OF THIS INFORMATION SO THAT HE CAN TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. IT APPEARS TO US THAT IT WOULD STILL BE USEFUL FOR GOA TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS ON THIS SUBJECT UNTIL THIS SITUATION IS IN FACT RESOLVED. INGERBOLL
BT

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State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By LR NARA, Date 8/6/10



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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3192

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250582 TOSEC 160102

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) PFOR, EC
SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
MARCONA CASE
FOR SECRETARY FROM ROGERS

1. ON OCTOBER 16, PERUVIAN PUNMIN DE LA FLOR CALLED IN AMBASSADOR DEAN TO TELL HIM NEGOTIATIONS WITH MARCONA MINING ON EXPROPRIATION COMPENSATION WERE STALLED. SPEAKING FOR THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, HE URGED US TO BEGIN SEEKING SOLUTION ON A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT LEVEL. THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE GOP ISSUED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMPANY WERE QUOTE TERMINATED, UNQUOTE FORCING US TO CONCLUDE THAT ONLY PRACTICAL MEANS OF SETTLING COMPENSATION QUESTION NOW DICTATES DIRECT USG INVOLVEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOP.
2. ACCORDINGLY, DEPT IS SENDING ARA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC AL FISHLOW TO LIMA OCTOBER 22 FOR PROBE OF GOP'S INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES. HE WILL ALSO EXPLORE POSSIBLE VARIATIONS OF USG INVOLVEMENT (PERUVIANS SEEM TO FEEL WE SHOULD DESIGNATE PLENIPOTENTIARY TO WORK OUT SETTLEMENT AS WE DID IN THE SO-CALLED GREENE NEGOTIATIONS IN 1973-74), AND SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE AVENUES TO A SETTLEMENT.
- 3- NEED FOR PROMPT AND PALPABLE MOVEMENT TOWARD SOLUTION IS PARTICULARLY URGENT TO AVOID APPLICATION OF U.S. LEGISLATIVE SANCTIONS. MOST IMMINENT, IF THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS BY GOP TOWARD SETTLEMENT IN NEAR FUTURE, IS PRESIDENTIAL FINDING THAT PERU IS INELIGIBLE FOR GSP; NOT FAR BEHIND WOULD BE NECESSITY FOR US TO DELAY OR VOTE NO ON SOME \$150 MILLION IN IFI LENDING TO PERU.



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By *HR* NARA Date *8/6/10*

4. DIRECT USG INVOLVEMENT WITH GOP IN TALKS, AND PERHAPS LATER FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS, IS NOT IN ITSELF SUFFICIENT TO STAY APPLICATION OF GSP AND LENDING SANCTIONS, HENCE NEED TO DETERMINE QUICKLY IF GOP INTENDS SERIOUSLY TO NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT SATISFACTORY TO MARCONA AND USG.

5. ON BALANCE, AT MOMENT, WE BELIEVE PERUVIANS INTEND THIS AND HOPE FISHLOW SOUNDINGS WILL AFFIRM OUR JUDGMENT. WHILE WE DO NOT BELIEVE GOP HAS ADEQUATELY WEIGHED MARCONA'S GOOD FAITH PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT, VARIANTS OF WHICH WE WILL PUT FORWARD IN THIS WEEK'S TALKS, WE THINK GOP WILL BE SERIOUS IN DISCUSSIONS ON OFFICIAL PLANE.

6. AS HE TOLD YOU IN YOUR MEETING SEPTEMBER 24, DE LA FLOR REPEATED TO DEAN ASSERTION THAT GOVERNMENT'S TALKS WITH MARCONA HAVE GONE NO WHERE, LEAVING GOP SOLE ALTERNATIVE OF FINDING SETTLEMENT WITH USG OR DECIDING THAT DIGNITY OF STATE DEMANDS CESSATION OF ALL FURTHER EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT AND ACCEPTING THE CONSEQUENCES, WHATEVER. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT DE LA FLOR AND GOP FEEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH USG WILL INSULATE IT FROM POLITICAL ATTACK FROM THE LEFT (AS HE HINTED IN HIS TALK WITH YOU) AND THAT SOMEHOW WE WILL PUT PRESSURE ON THE COMPANY TO SETTLE FOR LESS THAN IT DEMANDS.

7. FOR ITS PART, MARCONA, AS IT HAS PERIODICALLY IN THE PAST THREE MONTHS SINCE ITS EXPROPRIATION, HAS AGAIN EXPRESSED ITS DESIRE FOR A MORE DIRECT USG ROLE IN FINDING A SETTLEMENT.

8. IN INITIATING DISCUSSIONS IN LIMA THIS WEEK, WE INTEND TO MAKE TWO THINGS CLEAR: (A) USG INVOLVEMENT DOES NOT MEAN MARCONA IS WILLING TO ACCEPT LESS THAN AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT AND WE DO NOT INTEND TO APPROVE MUCH LESS IMPOSE ONE THAT IS NOT FAIR TO THE

COMPANY, AND (B) UNLESS THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS VERY QUICKLY WE WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO APPLY PROVISIONS OF U.S. LEGISLATION, INCLUDING DENIAL OF GSP. INGERSOLL

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3193

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)


SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DAILY PRESS BRIEFING, OCTOBER 21,
 FOR FUNSETH FROM S/PRS

NO. 14

1. SPOKESMAN (TRATTNER) VOLUNTEERED STATEMENT ON ANNOUNCE-
 MENT OCTOBER 20 BY VIET-NAM NEWS AGENCY CONCERNING REPATRIA-
 TION OF AMERICANS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS IN VIET-NAM: "WE
 HAVE SEEN THE BROADCAST REPORT FROM HANOI, WHICH HAS BEEN
 CONFIRMED BY THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES. WE
 CERTAINLY WELCOME THIS ANNOUNCEMENT AND LOOK FORWARD TO THE
 EARLY REPATRIATION OF ALL AMERICANS WHO WISH TO LEAVE VIET-
 NAM. WE KNOW THAT THEIR FAMILIES WILL EAGERLY ANTICIPATE
 BEING REUNITED WITH THEIR LOVED ONES. WE ARE READY TO HELP
 IN RECEIVING THESE PEOPLE, AND WE WILL WORK CLOSELY ON IT
 WITH THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES."

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, FOLLOWING REPLIES WERE GIVEN:

ANNOUNCEMENT BY TURKISH GOVERNMENT THAT IT IS WILLING TO
 OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON STATUS OF U.S. BASES -- WE CAN CONFIRM
 THAT THE U.S. AND TURKEY WILL RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON BI-
 LATERAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS NEXT WEEK IN ANKARA. PRECISE
 DATE AND TIME NOT YET SET. WE ARE PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THE
 TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HIS GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN
 DECISION TO SUPPORT DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS PROBLEM IN ALL
 ITS ASPECTS FOR PURPOSE OF REACHING A POLITICAL SOLUTION
 IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. WE SHARE DESIRE TO SEE NEGO-



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TIATIONS ON CYPRUS RESUME AT EARLY DATE. OUR POSITION HAS BEEN STATED OFTEN THAT ONLY THROUGH DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PARTIES THEMSELVES CAN A FINAL POLITICAL SOLUTION BE REACHED. WE ARE OF COURSE DOING ALL WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE THIS PROCESS.

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 E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, PFOR, US, VS, AEMR

SUBJECT: EXTRACTS FROM BRADSHER ARTICLES ON FALL OF SAIGON
 FOR SECRETARY AND ASST SECRETARY HABIB FROM S/PRS -ANDERSON
 NO. 17

FOLLOWING ARE KEY EXCERPTS FROM EXTENSIVE TWO-PART STORY BY
 HENRY BRADSHER CARRIED IN OCTOBER 19 AND 20 ISSUES OF WASH
 STAR.

"U.S. EMBASSY IN SAIGON CHOSE TO BELIEVE COMMUNIST ASSURANCES
 THAT A TRUCE WOULD BE ARRANGED LAST APRIL, RATHER THAN ITS
 OWN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENDED TO
 CAPTURE CITY, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL SOURCES.

"THIS ACCEPTANCE OF WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A DELIBERATE
 COMMUNIST DECEPTION WAS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN EMBASSY'S FAILURE
 TO MAKE ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS FOR EVACUATION. THOUSANDS OF
 VIETNAMESE WHO HAD BEEN PROMISED THAT THEY WOULD BE TAKEN
 OUT, AS WELL AS DOZENS OF AMERICANS, WERE LEFT BEHIND.

"ASSURANCES, WHICH SEEMED TO ORIGINATE IN HANOI, SAID THAT
 U.S. WOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE FOR AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL FROM
 VIETNAM DURING A HALT IN FIGHTING.

"MESSAGE CAME THROUGH HUNGARIAN AND POLISH DELEGATIONS TO
 ICCS, WHICH WAS CREATED BY INEFFECTIVE 1973 VIETNAM CEASE-
 FIRE AGREEMENT. ATTEMPTS TO CONFIRM IT THROUGH SOVIET
 UNION YIELDED AMBIGUOUS ANSWERS THAT WERE TAKEN BY MANY
 OFFICIALS AS CONFIRMATION.

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By HR NARA, Date 8/6/10



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"OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON MADE FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR A HELICOPTER EVACUATION OF SAIGON ON BASIS OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS. BUT THEY ALSO GAVE SOME CREDENCE TO ASSURANCES, IF NOT SO MUCH AS AMBASSADOR GRAHAM A. MARTIN IN SAIGON DID.

"SECSTATE HAK SAID WHEN EVACUATION ENDED THAT UNTIL 24 HRS BEFORE IT STARTED, IWE THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME CONSIDERABLE HOPE THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT SEEK A SOLUTION BY PURELY MILITARY MEANS... WE THOUGHT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN NEXT FEW DAYS WAS HIGHLY PROBABLE."

"BUT THEN, ITHE NORTH VIETNAMESE OBVIOUSLY CHANGED SIGNALS! HAK SAID.

"INTELLIGENCE REPORTS SHOWED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE OF SIGNALS. COMMUNISTS NEVER INTENDED TO MAKE ANY KIND OF DEAL. THOSE REPORTS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INDEPENDENT MEANS MORE THAN A WEEK BEFORE FINAL ATTACK ON SAIGON AND HAVE SINCE BEEN VERIFIED BY COMMUNIST STATEMENTS.

....."ROLE OF HUNGARIANS AND POLES IS UNCLEAR. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO LEARN WHETHER THEY WERE DECEIVED THEMSELVES BY VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS INTO THINKING A DEAL MIGHT BE ARRANGED, OR WERE INFORMED PARTIES TO A PLAN TO THROW U.S. OFFICIALS OFF BALANCE BY PUTTING OUT A FALSE STORY.

"SOME AMERICANS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGES DURING LAST FEW WEEKS OF APRIL BELIEVE THE TWO COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS WERE IN ON PLAN. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT SOVIET UNION WAS A PARTY TO DECEIT, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL SENIOR OFFICIALS REFUSE TO ACCEPT THIS.

....."NORTH VIETNAM'S DEFENSE MINISTER, VO NGUYEN GIAP, AND ITS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, VAN TIEN DUNG, PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE JOINTLY IN FOUR MAIN HANOI PUBLICATIONS ON JUNE 30 RECOUNTING HOW FINAL VICTORY WAS ACHIEVED. THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT COMMUNISTS HAD NEVER HAD ANY INTENTION OF MAKING A DEAL.

"BY LATE MARCH, WHEN HUE BATTLE WAS GOING TO END IN VICTORY, WE HAD ALREADY OFFICIALLY TAKEN DECISION TO LAUNCH A HISTORIC CAMPAIGN OF DECISIVE SIGNIFICANCE...BEARING THE NAME OF GREAT PRESIDENT O CHI MINH."

" WITHIN TWO WEEKS OF COMMUNIST DECISION, WORD ON IT HAD FILTERED THROUGH TO CIA'S OFFICES ON SIXTH FLOOR OF U.S. EMBASSY IN SAIGON.

"INFORMATION CAME FROM WHAT AMERICANS CALLED THE COMMUNISTS!"



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CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, OR COSVN. THIS WAS EXCLUSIVELY MOBILE MILITARY AND POLITICAL HEADQUARTERS FOR WAR IN SOUTHERN PART OF SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH U.S. TROOPS HAD TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO CAPTURE IN MAY 1970 INVASION OF CAMBODIA.

"COSVN WAS DIRECTED BY PHAM HUNG, A MEMBER OF POLITBURO OF LAO DONG PARTY--COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION BASED IN HANOI THAT RULES VIETNAM--WHO OUTRANKED EVEN GENERAL GIAP. SINCE FALL OF SAIGON, PHAM HUNG HAS EMERGED AS MAN IN CHARGE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, TAKING PRECEDENCE IN OFFICIAL LISTS OVER THO AND LEADERS OF APPARENTLY POWERLESS PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVT (PRG).

"CONTRARY TO RECENT CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY ABOUT A LACK OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS INSIDE VIET CONG APPARATUS, CIA RECEIVED OCCASIONAL REPORTS FROM WITHIN COSVN. OVER YEARS, THESE REPORTS HAD REPEATEDLY BEEN PROVEN ACCURATE.


"FIRST REPORT ON LATE-MARCH DECISION TO SMASH OVER SAIGON WAS BRIEF. COMING AT A TIME OF RAPID DEVELOPMENTS AND NUMEROUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF VARYING DEGREES OF RELIABILITY, IT SEEMS NOT TO HAVE GOTTEN MUCH ATTENTION IN EITHER THE SAIGON EMBASSY OR IN WASHINGTON.

"A FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS NEGLECT WAS MESSAGE WHICH HUNGARIANS AND POLES WERE BEGINNING TO WHISPER IN AMERICAN EARS.

"...STATE DEPARTMENT SENT A CABLE TO AMBASSADOR MARTIN WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TRIGGERED BY INTELLIGENCE, ALTHOUGH THIS CONNECTION CANNOT BE CONFIRMED. IT ASKED HIM ABOUT EVACUATION PLANS.

"...MARTIN'S ANSWER TO STATE DEPT'S QUERY WAS THAT HE HAD NO PLAN TO EVACUATE LOCAL VIETNAMESE EMPLOYEES BECAUSE THERE WERE TOO MANY OF THEM AND BESIDES AN EVACUATION WOULD INDUCE PANIC IN SAIGON, POSSIBLY CAUSING THIEU TO FALL. AT SAME TIME, MARTIN'S DEPUTY, W. J. LEHMANN, WAS TELLING EMBASSY DIVISION HEADS AT STAFF MEETINGS THAT PLANS WERE BEING MADE TO TAKE CARE OF THEIR HIGH RISK EMPLOYEES, FOR WHOM MANY OF OTHER DIPLOMATS FELT GREAT PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

"KISSINGER CABLED BACK AFTER GETTING MARTIN'S ANSWER, SAYING IT WAS INADEQUATE. UNDER PRESSURE FROM SFRG AND OTHER CONGRESSIONAL UNITS, SECSTATE ASKED MARTIN TO SPEED UP REDUCTION OF AIRPLANE EVACUATIONS SO NUMBER OF PERSONS WHO MIGHT NEED TO BE LIFTED OUT BY HELICOPTER WOULD



BE MANAGEABLE.

"BUT MARTIN FELT NO GREAT URGENCY. ON BASIS OF HUNGARIAN AND POLISH MESSAGE, HE DID NOT THINK A HELICOPTER LIFT WOULD BE NECESSARY.

"EVALUATION IN WASHINGTON WAS COMPLEX. EVERY MORNING A NUMBER OF GROUPS MET AROUND TOWN TO REVIEW LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND LATE EVERY AFTERNOON A MEETING WAS CONVENED AT STATE DEPARTMENT. CHAIRED BY P. C. HABIB, ASST. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS, IT WAS ATTENDED MOST OF TIME BY KISSINGER'S NO. 2 MAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY R. S. INGERSOLL.

"REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE, NSC, PENTAGON, CIA AND OTHER BRANCHES OF GOVT MET WITH HABIB TO TRY TO MAKE PLANS. BUT THEY WERE ALMOST OVERWHELMED BY MASS OF SOMETIMES CONFLICTING AND OFTEN CONFUSING REPORTS, ACCORDING TO ONE PARTICIPANT IN MEETINGS.

"COMMENTING ON APRIL 17 REPORT FROM COSVN, THIS SOURCE SAID THAT CIA USUALLY FAILED TO INDICATE CLEARLY WHICH REPORTS OUT OF A MASS OF INTELLIGENCE DESERVED MORE CREDENCE THAN OTHERS. A DESIRE TO PROTECT CIA AGENTS OBSCURED FACT THAT THIS PARTICULAR REPORT CAME DIRECTLY FROM COSVN, SOURCE ADDED.

"APPARENTLY REFLECTING INTELLIGENCE, FORD SAID IN AN INTERVIEW APRIL 21 THAT HE HAD IMPRESSION IN PREVIOUS FEW DAYS THAT HANOI WAS SEEKING A QUICK MILITARY TAKEOVER, BUT THERE WAS 'NO WAY TO TELL WHAT NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL DO.' HE NOTED THAT A LULL IN FIGHTING HAD SET IN AROUND SAIGON EARLIER THAT DAY.

"THIS TURNED OUT TO BE A FIVE-DAY LULL, BEGINNING AS MARTIN POLGAR AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, MERILLON, FINALLY CONVINCED THIEU THAT HE SHOULD RESIGN FOR GOOD OF SOUTH VIETNAM. LULL SEEMED TO SUBSTANTIATE HUNGARIAN AND POLISH MESSAGE OF AN EVACUATION TRUCE, BUT EVACUATION WENT AHEAD ONLY FAIRLY SLOWLY WHILE HIGH-RISK VIETNAMESE REMAINED IN THEIR JOBS.

"OFFICIALS HERE DECIDED THAT, BECAUSE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND DIPLOMATIC REPORTS, POSSIBILITY OF AN ARRANGED END NEEDED TO BE CHECKED WITH NORTH VIETNAM. SOVIET UNION WAS ASKED TO INQUIRE IN HANOI."

"MOSCOW A PARTY TO DECEIT ON LAST SAYS OF SAIGON?"
(SECOND OF TWO ARTICLES).



... "NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITY WAS CLOSELY HELD IN WASHINGTON BY PRESIDENT FORD AND A HANDFUL OF OFFICIALS AROUND HAK. SECSTATE WAS, AS USUAL, PLAYING AN ALMOST LONE HAND IN TIGHTEST SECRECY IN APPARENT HOPE OF PULLING OFF A DIPLOMATIC MIRACLE OUT OF A HOPELESS LOOKING SITUATION.

"HE DECIDED TO ASK SOVIET UNION -- IN SPIRIT OF DETENTE -- TO SEE IF IT COULD LEARN FROM HANOI WHAT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WERE. THIS MIGHT RESOLVE CONFLICT IN AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

"ACCORDING TO SEVERAL SENIOR OFFICIALS, SOVIET REPLY WAS AMBIGUOUS.

"ASKED IF IT WERE TRUE THAT A TRUCE AND ORDERLY EVACUATION WERE POSSIBLE, MOSCOW CAME BACK -- OSTENSIBLY AFTER CONTACTING HANOI -- WITH A REPLY TO EFFECT THAT U.S. COULD PROCEED ON THAT ASSUMPTION. ONE OFFICIAL CALLED IT 'AMBIGUOUS,' AND ANOTHER SAID IT WAS 'VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN.'

... "SOME LOWER OFFICIALS FEEL THAT MOSCOW WAS A PARTY TO DECEIT OF GETTING U.S. TO BELIEVE IT COULD GET OUT OF VIETNAM SMOOTHLY AND RESPECTABLY. BUT OTHER OFFICIALS REFUSE TO ACCEPT THIS, SUGGESTING THAT SOVIETS WERE KEPT IN DARK BY VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP AND PUT OFF WITH A DELIBERATELY UNIFORMATIVE ANSWER WHEN THEY TRIED TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARIES FOR WASHINGTON.

... "SECSTATE ADDED THAT UNTIL SUNDAY NIGHT, APRIL 27, WASHINGTON TIME, WHICH WAS MONDAY MORNING, APRIL 28, IN SAIGON, 'WE THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME CONSIDERABLE HOPE THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT SEEK A SOLUTION BY PURELY MILITARY MEANS...' DUONG VAN MINH HAD THEN BECOME PRESIDENT AND 'WE THOUGHT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN NEXT FEW DAYS WAS HIGHLY PROBABLE.'

"SOMETIME SUNDAY NIGHT NORTH VIETNAMESE OBVIOUSLY CHANGED SIGNALS. WHY THAT IS, WE DO NOT YET KNOW... WHAT PRODUCED THIS SUDDEN SHIFT TO A MILITARY OPTION OR WHAT WOULD SEEM TO US TO BE A SUDDEN SHIFT TO A MILITARY OPTION, I HAVE NOT HAD SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO ANALYZE.'

"UNTIL SUNDAY, HAK SAID, 'THE BATTLEFIELD SITUATION SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS A STANDDOWN OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITY AND PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS WERE SUBSTANTIALLY IN DIRECTION THAT A NEGOTIATION WOULD START WITH GENERAL MINH. THERE WERE ALSO OTHER REASONS WHICH LED US TO BELIEVE THAT POSSIBILITY OF A NEGOTIATION REMAINED OPEN.'



"THERE WERE OTHER ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO HOPES FOR A TRUCE -- OR CREATION OF A DECEPTION.

"A PRESS REPORT FROM MOSCOW APRIL 18 SAID SOVIETS IN CONTACT WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG DID NOT EXPECT THEM TO TRY TO ACHIEVE ALL-OUT VICTORY BY CONQUEST. AND ON APRIL 19 PRG'S REPRESENTATIVE STATIONED AT TAN SON NHUT AIRBASE ON OUTSKIRTS OF SAIGON UNDER PARIS AGREEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, COL. VO DONG GIANG, HINTED AT A PEACEFUL ARRANGEMENT RATHER THAN AN ATTACK.

"ALL OF THESE REINFORCED HUNGARIAN-POLISH MESSAGE, CREATING A CONVICTION BY MARTIN AND SOME OTHERS IN SAIGON EMBASSY THAT A DEAL WAS BEING STRUCK. APPARENTLY AFTER SOME FURTHER DETAIL FROM ICCS COMMUNISTS, AND WITH RECEIPT OF A SOVIET REPLY, THE WORD WENT AROUND IN TOP EMBASSY CIRCLES THAT 'THE FIX IS IN'.

"ON THURSDAY, APRIL 24, MARTIN'S DEPUTY AMBASSADOR, W. J. LEHMANN, TELEPHONED HIS WIFE ODETTE IN BANGKOK, WHERE SHE HAD BEEN EVACUATED WITH OTHER EMBASSY DEPENDENTS. LEHMANN TOLD HER TO COME BACK AND BRING A LONG LIST OF PERSONAL SUPPLIES, BECAUSE A DEAL HAD BEEN MADE AND THEY WOULD BE IN SAIGON FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

"THIS WAS AT A TIME WHEN, WHITE HOUSE SAID, FORD HAD ORDERED AMERICAN PERSONNEL REDUCED TO LEVELS THAT COULD BE QUICKLY EVACUATED DURING AN EMERGENCY. MARTIN'S EMBASSY WAS OPERATING ON ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONS, WITH WHAT LOOKED IN RETROSPECT LIKE WISHFUL THINKING STRONGLY AFFECTING ANALYSIS OF SITUATION.

... "HAK'S BELIEF THAT SITUATION CHANGED ON MONDAY MORNING SAIGON TIME SHOWED A LAG IN AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS.

... "BIG AMERICAN-BUILT MILITARY LOGISTICAL COMPLEX AT BIEN HOA, 15 MILES NORTHEAST OF SAIGON, WAS ALSO UNDER ATTACK. ON SUNDAY A TEAM LED BY ERICH F. VON MARBOD, A PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASST SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN CHARGE OF MILITARY AID TO INDOCHINA, RECOVERED SOME VALUABLE AID EQUIPMENT FROM BIEN HOA WHILE UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.

... "AFTER BEING SHOT OUT OF BIEN HOA ON SUNDAY, VON MARBOD WENT TO SEE MARTIN ON MONDAY MORNING. MARTIN ADVISED HIM THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO TAKE CHANCES BECAUSE THERE WOULD SHORTLY BE A HALT IN FIGHTING DURING WHICH SUPPLIES AS WELL AS PERSONNEL COULD BE EVACUATED BY ARRANGEMENT WITH COMMUNISTS.



... "AFTER DAWN HE WENT OUT TO SEE FOR HIMSELF WHERE SHELLS HAD LANDED, KILLING TWO U.S. MARINE GUARDS AND OTHERS. BACK AT HIS EMBASSY, MARTIN TOLD STAFFERS THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND IT. HE STILL REFUSED TO BELIEVE THAT COMMUNISTS WOULD PERSIST IN MILITARY TAKEOVER, BUT INSTEAD THOUGHT THERE COULD OR WOULD BE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

"WASHINGTON NEVER SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND, MUCH LESS ACCEPT, DEGREE OF CERTAINTY WHICH HAD GRIPPED MARTIN AND SOME OTHERS IN HIS EMBASSY. BARRAGE AT TAN SON NHUT LED TO FORD ORDERING FINAL HELICOPTER EVACUATION. MARTIN STRUNG IT OUT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, GETTING MAXIMUM POSSIBLE NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE REMOVED AT LAST MINUTE AFTER HAVING FAILED TO PROVIDE FOR THEM EARLIER.

... "IT WAS NOT JUST CONGRESS WHICH WAS EXASPERATED WITH HIM DURING DELAY IN REDUCING EMBASSY STAFF TO EASILY EVACUATED LIMITS. PERSONS WHO ATTENDED CRISIS MEETINGS CHAIRED BY HABIB REPORTED VERY CRITICAL COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN BY HABIB AND OTHERS, AT LEAST IN PART REFLECTING DISTRESS OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN SAIGON ABOUT LAG IN ARRANGING FOR SAFETY OF VIETNAMESE FOR WHOM THEY FELT RESPONSIBLE.

"BUT DEGREE TO WHICH MARTIN WAS BEING LED ASTRAY BY HUNGARIANS AND POLES AS WELL AS HIS OWN WISHFUL THINKING WAS NEVER PROPERLY APPRECIATED HERE. WHILE HAK AND OTHERS ALLOWED THEIR HOPES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO RISE ABOUT APRIL 21, OFFICIALS HERE KEPT IN SIGHT NEED TO PREPARE FOR A FINAL COLLAPSE. MARTIN APPARENTLY DID NOT.

... "TWO CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE SUBMITTED LETTERS TO STATE DEPARTMENT ASKING THAT MARTIN TESTIFY ABOUT THOSE LAST DAYS. THEY ARE LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE GOVT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE AND HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE'S SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS.

"MARTIN HAD BEEN IN U.S. FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT LATE LAST WINTER AND HAS BEEN SICK AGAIN SINCE HE WAS TAKEN BY HELICOPTER OFF HIS EMBASSY'S ROOF. SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BEEN TOLD ORALLY THAT HE COULD NOT APPEAR BECAUSE OF ILLNESS. "HE WAS DISCHARGED FROM A HOSPITAL ALMOST TWO WEEKS AGO AND NOW, WHILE ON LEAVE, IS HAUNTING STATE DEPARTMENT ASKING WHEN HE WILL BE GIVEN A NEW AMBASSADORIAL POSTING.

"WHITE HOUSE HAS NOT DECIDED WHAT TO DO WITH HIM. SENIOR OFFICIALS WANT TO AVOID ANY REOPENING OF SAIGON SORE



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AND THEREFORE DOUBT THAT MARTIN'S NAME WILL EVER BE PUT
BEFORE SFRC FOR ANOTHER APPOINTMENT TO AMBASSADOR."
INGERSOLL
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PRIORITY
 DE RUEHC #0694 2950049
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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3206

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 250694 TOSEC 100100

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, PO

SUBJECT: EUR BRIEFING MEMORANDUM - PORTUGAL SITREP

REF: SECTO 10003

FOR SONNENFELDT FROM HARTMAN

1. POLITICAL TENSIONS CONTINUE UNABATED IN PORTUGAL AS THE SIXTH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT PURSUES ITS POLICY OF "TAKING SMALL STEPS" TOWARD REESTABLISHING AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRY. THE TWO LATEST MOVES WERE:

-- A GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WOULD SUE THE LEFT-IST NEWSPAPER REPUBLICA FOR A BLANDEROUS ATTACK AGAINST THE COMMANDER OF THE NEWLY-FORMED MILITARY INTERVENTION GROUP (AMI). THE GROUP IS COMPOSED MAINLY OF COMMANDOS AND IS LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT.

-- RELEASE OF A POLICE REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSES OF THE MARCH 7 POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SETUBAL. THE REPORT CLEARLY BLAMES COMMUNISTS AND ULTRA-LEFTISTS, DESCRIBING THEM AS FORCES INTENT UPON DESTROYING THE REVOLUTION.

2. LAST WEEK-END, A PEACEFUL RALLY BY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CDS PARTY DREW 35,000 SUPPORTERS IN OPORTO ,

THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS (PPD) STAGED SIMILAR PRO-GOVERNMENT RALLIES IN TWO SOUTHERN PORTUGUESE TOJNS AND THE COMMUNISTS HELD A PARTY MEETING IN THE CITY OF TORRES NOVAS. NORTHERN MILITARY REGION COMMANDER, PIRES VELOSE AGAIN CAME UNDER FIRE FROM THE LEFT, THIS TIME FOR HIS DECISION TO FREE THE ASSETS OF SEVERAL OPORTO FIRMS WHICH HAD

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
 State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By LR NARA, Date 8/6/10



BEEN FROZEN BY THE GONCALVES GOVERNMENT ON VAGUE CHARGES OF ECONOMIC SABOTAGE. PIRES VELOSO IS ALSO CONTINUING TO PURGE LEFTIST OFFICERS IN UNITS UNDER HIS COMMAND AND IS SAID TO BE ATTEMPTING TO FRUSTRATE LEFTIST PLANS FOR A MASS PLENARY MEETING ON OCTOBER 24, THE DAY THE HEAVY ARTILLERY REGIMENT IS SCHEDULED TO COMPLETE ITS INQUIRY INTO RECENT INCIDENTS IN WHICH THE REGIMENT DENIED PIRES VELOSO'S AUTHORITY.

3. IN ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT RESTORING ORDER TO PORTUGAL, PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES (ACTING IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES) ORDERED SECURITY FORCES TO SHOOT ANYONE WHO USES WEAPONS AGAINST MILITARY OR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. HIS OCTOBER 17 DECREE ALSO DIRECTED ALL PORTUGUESE CITIZENS TO TURN IN ALL ILLEGAL WEAPONS TO DESIGNATED COLLECTION POINTS WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. PENALTIES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE INCLUDE 2 TO 8 YEARS IN PRISON AND FINES OF UP TO 1 MILLION ESCUDOS (US\$40,000). WHILE THE "TOUGHNESS" OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IS A WELCOME RELIEF FROM HIS ACCUSTOMED FENCE SITTING ON DIFFICULT OR CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, WE ASSUME THAT THE PINHEIRO AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE AS MUCH SUCCESS WITH FORCING THE ULTRA-LEFT TO DISARM AS IT HAS HAD IN IMPOSING MILITARY DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMED FORCES.

4. FINALLY, THE EC-9 IS FOLLOWING UP ON ITS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PLEDGE OF TWO WEEKS AGO. AN EC-9 TECHNICAL TEAM VISITED LISBON OCTOBER 20-21 TO DISCUSS THE EC AID PROGRAM AND THE CREATION OF A JOINT EC-PORTUGUESE ECONOMIC COMMISSION. AS FOR THE JOINT US-PORTUGUESE ECONOMIC COMMISSION PROPOSED BY ANTUNES TO THE SECRETARY ON OCTOBER 10, AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI HAS ADVISED ANTUNES HE IS READY TO DISCUSS ITS FORMATION BUT A MEETING HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF ANTUNES' SCHEDULE. INGERSOLL
BT



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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 250761 TOSEC 160190

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS:30PN (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT:TRAVELING PRESS REPORTAGE, EVENING, TUESDAY,
OCTOBER 21

FOR FUNSETH FROM S/PRS
NO. 15

NEWSPAPERS:

1. CHITRIBUNE - NO KISSINGER STORY IN TUESDAY EDITION.

2. LA TIMES (TIMES WIRE SERVICES): FIRST DAY'S DISCUSSIONS
BETWEEN KISSINGER AND TENG WERE DESCRIBED BY AN
AMERICAN OFFICIAL AS "FRANK AND CORDIAL,"

TENG SAYS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN QUITE A FEW CHANGES IN PAST
ELEVEN MONTHS AND IT DID NOT MATTER IF "HE QUARREL A BIT."
BOTH SIDES HAVE STRESSED PRIVATELY THAT IT IS IN THEIR
INTEREST TO IMPROVE RELATIONS.

DIPLOMATS DOUBT THAT MAO WILL SEE KISSINGER THIS TIME, MAO
IS BEING SAVED FOR PRESIDENT FORD.

KISSINGER WAS SEEN DOZING DURING EVENING OPERA.

WIRES:

1. AP (FREED) IN TWO AFTERNOON FILINGS FREED REPORTS
"SURPRISE MEETING" WITH MAO. INVITATION TO THE SESSION

*****WHHR COMMENT*****

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CAME WITHOUT WARNING AND CAUSED KISSINGER TO MISS BUSH'S PLANNED RECEPTION AND A PRIVATE DINNER.

"A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WOULD NOT PROVIDE ANY MEANINGFUL INFORMATION ON THE SESSION, SAYING ONLY THAT 'THE SECRETARY FOUND THE MEETING VERY USEFUL.'" IN LATER FILING, FREED AMENDS HIS REPORT: "BOTH AMERICAN AND CHINESE SPOKESMEN DECLINED TO GIVE ANY DETAILS..."

"KISSINGER'S MAJOR OBJECT ... HAS BEEN TO CONVINEE THE CHINESE OF AMERICAN STRENGTH ... AND THAT U.S. HAS NOT BEEN FOOLED INTO COMPLACENCY BY THE SOVIET UNION."

KISSINGER CALLED OFF A PROMISED BACKGROUNDER, "PRESUMABLY BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THE MAO MEETING."

2. UPI (GROWALD) HAD "CALLED IN" KISSINGER TODAY AND WARNED AGAINST DANGERS OF SOVIET DETENTE, ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC SOURCES. MAO SUMMONED KISSINGER IN A "SURPRISE MOVE," WHILE KISSINGER WAS TALKING WITH TENG AND CHIAO.

"DIPLOMATS SAID MAO BESTOWED THE RARE GESTURE OF AN AUDIENCE," IN PART, TO "DRAMATIZE UNHAPPINESS OVER AMERICA'S DETENTE POLICY."

"THE SUMMONS CAME WITH SUCH SUDDENNESS THAT KISSINGER WAS UNABLE TO ATTEND A DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION HE WAS GIVING FOR 2,000 PERSONS," INCLUDING SOVIETS,

AN "AMERICAN SOURCE" SAID KISSINGER AND TENG HAD FAILED TO REACH ANY UNDERSTANDING ON DETENTE, EUROPE AND ASIA, BUT A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THE SECRETARY FOUND THE MAO MEETING VERY USEFUL.

NO AGREEMENT COULD BE FOUND ON KOREA, VIETNAM AND THE HELSINKI SUMMIT.

CHINESE HAVE REPORTED "A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS" WERE DISCUSSED "IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE" WHILE MAO SENT HIS REGARDS TO FORD.

NETWORKS:

1. ABC EVENING NEWS: (SECOND ITEM)
REASONER: MAO TODAY SENT HIS REGARDS TO PRESIDENT FORD)



THAT'S ALL SEEN AS A SIGN THAT THE CHINESE ARE HAPPY WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT SO FAR. A U.S. SPOKESMAN CALLED THE TALKS VERY USEFUL.

WHEN KISSINGER WAS SUMMONED TO THE MEETING AT MAO'S PEKING HOME, HE WAS IN THE MIDST OF HIS THIRD MEETING WITH DEPUTY PREMIER HSIAO-PING TENG. THE DEPUTY PREMIER ALSO WENT TO THE MEETING. NOT MUCH IS KNOWN ABOUT TENG, BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT HE HAS GROWING POWER IN CHINA.

KOPPEL: HE IS PRACTICALLY UNKNOWN IN THE WEST, EXCEPT TO CHINA SPECIALISTS. BUT TENG IS TODAY CERTAINLY ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL MEN IN CHINA AND TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, HE APPEARS TO BE THE MAN WHO IS PRESENTLY RUNNING THE SHOW. MAO TSE-TUNG IS IN HIS LATE 80S, AND IN POOR HEALTH; CHOU EN-LAI HAS BEEN HOSPITALIZED FOR MONTHS. ALTHOUGH TENG HAS BEEN A PART OF THE COMMUNIST CHINESE POWER STRUCTURE SINCE ITS EARLIEST DAYS OF STRUGGLE, HIS IS PERHAPS THE MOST UNUSUAL COMEBACK STORY SINCE RICHARD NIXON WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1968.

IN APRIL OF 1967 TENG HSIAO-PING FELL VICTIM TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. CHAIRMAN MAO COMPLAINED THAT HSIAO NEVER BOTHERED TO CONSULT WITH HIM. MEMBERS OF THE RED GUARD WHO WERE THEN SWEEPING THROUGH CHINA LIKE AN ANGRY SCOURGE, ACCUSED TENG OF BEING A BRIDGE ADDICT, THAT IN FACT HE SET UP CARD CLUBS IN PEKING TO PLAY BRIDGE WITH OTHER LEADING CADRE. TENG DISAPPEARED AND DIDN'T REEMERGE UNTIL APRIL 1973; APPARENTLY HIS SKILL AS A BUREAUCRAT AND HIS REPUTATION AS A PRAGMATIC MODERATE ACCOUNTED FOR HIS RETURN TO FAVOR. AS A PROTEGE OF CHOU EN-LAI, TENG WAS REHABILITATED, AND WITHIN TWO YEARS HE HAS ATTAINED MORE POWER AND PRESTIGE THAN EVER BEFORE.

2. NBC NIGHTLY NEWS: (FOURTH ITEM)

CHANCELLOR: THERE WAS SOME INTERESTING NEWS FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WORLD TODAY. IN PEKING MAO TSE-TUNG AND SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER MET FOR AN HOUR AND FORTY MINUTES. IT WAS A SURPRISE MEETING AND KEPT KISSINGER FROM ATTENDING A COCKTAIL PARTY HE THREW FOR THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. KISSINGER HAD INVITED SOVIET DIPLOMATS AND THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THE

MEETING WITH MAO WAS TIMED TO KEEP KISSINGER FROM RAISING A GLASS WITH THE RUSSIANS.



3. CBS EVENING NEWS:

DUE TO TECHNICAL FAILURE, VERBATIM OF SHORT CRONKITE PIECE NOT AVAILABLE, SUMMARY FOLLOWS:

SECRETARY KISSINGER HELD A RECEPTION FOR 2,000 MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY INCLUDING SOVIET EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES, BUT KISSINGER HIMSELF WAS NOT ABLE TO ATTEND BECAUSE AT THE LAST MOMENT HE WAS SUMMONED TO A SURPRISE MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG AND WAS WHISKED AWAY TO MAO'S HOME. AFTER THE MEETING, KISSINGER SAID THAT MAO APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH BUT DECLINED TO FURNISH ANY DETAILS OF THEIR DISCUSSION.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR: SELECTIONS OF BACKPAGE EDITORIAL FROM TUESDAY'S EDITION FOLLOW:

"IT IS IRONIC THAT THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS -- TAIWAN -- IS NOT SPARKING ANY HEADLINES DURING THE KISSINGER VISIT TO PEKING. THERE CANNOT BE A FULL NORMALIZATION OF THOSE RELATIONS UNTIL THAT ISSUE IS SETTLED.

YET THE CHINESE LEADERS HAVE NOT BEEN PRESSING THE MATTER....

AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE AMERICAN EFFORT IN VIET-NAM, CHINA, NO LESS THAN THE U.S., WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DESTABILIZATION OF ASIA IF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES BEGAN WITHDRAWING FROM THE REGION. IT DIDN'T WANT TO CREATE ANY VACUUMS INTO WHICH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT MOVE. HENCE THE CONSTANT THEME IN PEKING THAT THE U.S. MUST REMAIN MILITARILY STRONG -- IN ASIA AND EUROPE ...

BUT THERE IS PERHAPS ANOTHER CALCULATION IN CHINESE THINKING. THAT CONCERN IS ABOUT THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SITUATION....

NOT ONLY RIGHT-WING CONSERVATIVES NOW OPPOSE ANY MOVE ON TAIWAN. LEFT-WING LIBERALS LIKEWISE SAY THE U.S. MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO PREJUDICE ITS INTERESTS THERE.

GIVEN THIS MOOD, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE PRESIDENT TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION WHICH

HE COULD SELL POLITICALLY. IN FACT, ANY AGREEMENT,



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
ALONG WITH SUCH ISSUES AS THE PANAMA CANAL, COULD CAUSE HIM ACUTE TROUBLE IN CONGRESS.

SOME VOICES IN WASHINGTON ARGUE THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GRAPPLE WITH THE PROBLEM WHILE CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER CHOU ARE STILL ON THE SCENE, SINCE THEY ARE COMMITTED TO A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH WASHINGTON ...

WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT ITS COUNTERBALANCING TIE WITH PEKING MAKES THE RUSSIANS BEHAVE LESS AGGRESSIVELY, JUST AS MOSCOW BELIEVES DETENTE WITH THE WEST HELPS KEEP CHINA OFF BALANCE.....

.. THE NAME OF THE AMERICAN GAME: AN EVENHANDED POSTURE TOWARD BOTH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION. THAT IS WHY IT IS IMPORTANT FOR PRESIDENT TO JOURNEY TO PEKING."

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3209

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 250702 TOSEC 160191

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMO: SADAT VISIT: SECRETARY'S LUNCHEON
FOR SADAT (7521065)

FOR BREMER FROM CATTO

1. GERALD L. PARSKY CALLED PROTOCOL OFFICE OCTOBER 21.
HE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO BE INCLUDED AS GUEST AT
SECRETARY'S LUNCHEON FOR SADAT.

2. RECOMMENDATION: THAT MR. PARSKY BE ADDED TO THE GUEST
LIST.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

FROM S/CPR-CATTO, CLEARED BY NEA/EGY-BROWN, AND S-COVEY,
INGERSOLL
BT

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

State Review
12/9/03

By LLR NARA, Date 8/6/10



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PRIORITY

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3210

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PPOR, TU, CY

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO
CAGLAYANGIL RE CYPRUS AND CDI'S (S/S NO. 7520164)

REF: ANKARA 7857

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN THRU SISCO

1. THE PROBLEM:

FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 20 TURKISH NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, CAGLAYANGIL GAVE MACOMBER THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITIONS RE CYPRUS AND THE US FACILITIES IN TURKEY (REPTEL). WE HAVE PREPARED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION THE FOLLOWING DRAFT TELEGRAM TO ANKARA ASKING MACOMBER TO CONVEY YOUR ORAL MESSAGE ON THESE SUBJECTS TO CAGLAYANGIL.


2. BEGIN TEXT OF TELEGRAM TO ANKARA, INFO ATHENS, NICOSIA, FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR, "PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL: BEGIN MESSAGE. I HAVE READ WITH CARE AMBASSADOR MACOMBER'S REPORT TO ME ON HIS MEETING WITH YOU OCTOBER 20 AFTER THE TURKISH NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. I AM ENCOURAGED BY YOUR CONCLUSION THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO

MOVE TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS ISSUE, AS YOU HAVE REQUESTED, I HAVE ASKED OUR EMBASSY IN ATHENS TO CONVEY THE TURKISH POSITION TO FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS AND WILL LET YOU KNOW THE GREEK REACTION AS SOON AS WE HAVE IT. I

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State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By HR NARA, Date 8/6/10



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AM GRATIFIED BY YOUR RECOGNITION THAT THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. IT WILL REMAIN TO BE SEEN WHAT FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED TO GET THOSE TALKS UNDERWAY AGAIN.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE TURKISH-US SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND THE STATUS OF OUR COMMON DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY, I AM DISAPPOINTED AND FRANKLY SURPRISED THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DID NOT FIND A WAY FOR THESE INSTALLATIONS TO BE REACTIVATED ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS WHILE NEW ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING NEGOTIATED. YOU WILL RECALL THAT, IN HIS LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL, PRESIDENT FORD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS COULD BE DONE. INDEED, IT WAS THE EXPECTATION OF THE CONGRESS, SHARED BY THE ADMINISTRATION, THAT AFTER THE IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD LIFTING THE EMBARGO TAKEN BY THE CONGRESS, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO TAKE A RECIPROCAL STEP IN CONNECTION WITH THE REACTIVATION OF THESE INSTALLATIONS.

4. AMBASSADOR MACOMBER HAS, ON MY INSTRUCTIONS, SPOKEN TO YOU IN SOME DETAIL REGARDING THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT THE CONTINUED INACTIVITY OF THE INSTALLATIONS CAUSES WITH RESPECT TO THE IDLE PERSONNEL AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, TO THE SECURITY INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE. I HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF YOUR EXPRESSED HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIC ASPECTS OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP CAN BE CONCLUDED WITHIN FORTY-FIVE DAYS, AFTER WHICH THE BASES COULD BE REACTIVATED. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS THE TURKISH SIDE IS READY, AND WOULD WANT THEM TO BE COMPLETED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, FOR THESE TALKS TO SUCCEED, IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE PREVAIL DURING THE COMING WEEKS WHILE THE CONGRESS IS CONSIDERING FURTHER POSITIVE ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT WITH THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS THERE CAN BE A RESUMPTION OF AT LEAST PART OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT THE COMMON DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS. THIS WOULD HELP CREATE THE DESIRED ATMOSPHERE IN THIS COUNTRY AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF OUR BILATERAL TALKS.

THING POSSIBLE TO CREATE NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION AND
THING POSSIBLE TO CREATE NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION AND
STRENGTHEN OUR DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP FOR THE BENEFIT OF
BOTH COUNTRIES AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. END
MESSAGE. END TEXT OF DRAFT TELEGRAM.



6. RECOMMENDATION. THAT YOU APPROVE THE ABOVE DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

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TELEGRAM.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250764 TOSEC 160195

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY SCHEDULE FOR STATE VISIT OF PRESIDENT AND
 MRS. SADAT TO THE U.S., OCT, 26-NOV, 5, 1975

REF: SECTO 16080

FOR BREMER FROM CATTO

FOLLOWING IS SCHEDULE FOR PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT. WE ARE
 ASSUMING THAT MRS. KISSINGER WILL WANT TO BE WITH MRS. SADAT
 FOR MOST EVENTS. PLEASE ASK HER IF THERE ARE ITEMS WHICH
 SHE WISHES TO OMIT.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1975

4:00PM PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT ARRIVE PATRICK HENRY
 INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA.

4:05PM DEPART AIRFIELD ENROUTE COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG.

4:30PM ARRIVE COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG

8:00PM DINNER AT CARTER'S GROVE PLANTATION.
 OVERNIGHT: COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG

MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1975

9:50AM DEPART COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG VIA U.S. PRESI-
 DENTIAL HELICOPTERS.

10:55AM ARRIVE PRESIDENT'S PARK (ELLIPSE).

11:00AM WHITE HOUSE ARRIVAL CEREMONY.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
 State Dept Guidelines

State Review
12/1/03

By NR NARA, Date 8/6/10



11:30AM MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FORD AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

-----11:30AM MRS. FORD ESCORTS MRS. SADAT AND
-----CHILDREN AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE,

-----OR MRS. SADAT AND CHILDREN DEPART FOR
-----BLAIR HOUSE.

1:00PM PRESIDENT SADAT ADDRESSES NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
LUNCHEON.

-----1:00PM MRS. SADAT ATTENDS LUNCHEON GIVEN BY
-----MRS. GHORBAL AT THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY.

-----3:00PM MRS. SADAT ATTENDS MEETING OF BOARD
-----OF FAITH AND HOPE SOCIETY AT EMBASSY.

-----5:00PM MRS. SADAT ATTENDS TEA GIVEN BY
-----MRS. KISSINGER.

5:30 - PRESIDENT SADAT VISITS THE ISLAMIC CENTER.
6:00PM

6:15- PRESIDENT SADAT RECEIVES VISITORS AT BLAIR HOUSE.
7:00PM

8:00PM WHITE HOUSE STATE DINNER (DRESS: DARK BUSINESS
SUIT FOR MEN/LONG DRESS FOR LADIES)

OVERNIGHT: BLAIR HOUSE

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1975

9:30AM MRS. SADAT VISITS NIH.

10:30AM PRESIDENT SADAT MEETS WITH PRESIDENT FORD AT
(TENT.) WHITE HOUSE.

11:00AM MRS. SADAT VISITS CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL.

11:30AM PRESIDENT SADAT MEETS WITH EDITORS AND COLUMNISTS
AT BLAIR HOUSE.

1:00PM LUNCHEON GIVEN BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

-----4:30PM MRS. SADAT RECEIVES AWARD FROM
-----REHABILITATION INTERNATIONAL OF USA



-----AT BLAIR HOUSE.

5:00PM PRESIDENT SADAT HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE AT BLAIR HOUSE.

6:00PM PRESIDENT SADAT MEETS WITH DISTINGUISHED AMERICANS OF ARAB DESCENT AT BLAIR HOUSE.

8:30PM DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT AT ANDERSON HOUSE. (DRESS: DARK BUSINESS SUIT/ LONG DRESS FOR LADIES OVERNIGHT BLAIR HOUSE)

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1975

10:00AM PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT DEPART BLAIR HOUSE ENROUTE ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE.

10:30AM PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT DEPART WASHINGTON, D.C. VIA U.S. PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT ENROUTE JFK INTERNATIONAL (PORT AUTHORITY BUILDING).

11:35AM PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT ARRIVE JFK. MOTORCADE DIRECTLY TO UNITED NATIONS.

12:15PM ARRIVE UNITED NATIONS. BRIEF MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM.

12:30PM PRESIDENT SADAT ADDRESSES UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

1:30PM LUNCHEON HOSTED BY UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM.

1:30PM MRS. SADAT ATTENDS LADIES LUNCHEON GIVEN BY MRS. WALDHEIM AT THE UN. MRS. KISSINGER INVITED.

3:00PM PRESIDENT SADAT DEPARTS UN ENROUTE WALDORF TOWERS.

3:00PM MRS. SADAT DEPARTS UN ENROUTE THE HOWARD RUSK INSTITUTE.

5:00PM MRS. SADAT DEPARTS ENROUTE THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (TEMPLE OF DENDUR).

-----AT CONCLUSION, RETURN TO WALDORF TOWERS.



6:30PM RECEPTION HOSTED BY TIME=LIFE AT THE WALDORF
TOWERS HOTEL. (MEN ONLY)

7:30PM RECEPTION HOSTED BY THE NEW YORK CITY ECONOMIC
CLUB AT THE WALDORF TOWERS HOTEL. (MEN ONLY)

8:00PM DINNER HOSTED BY THE NEW YORK CITY ECONOMIC
CLUB AT THE WALDORF TOWERS HOTEL. (MEN ONLY)

8:00PM MRS. SADAT ATTENDS DINNER HOSTED BY
-----MRS. MEGUID, WIFE OF EGYPTIAN AMB.
TO UN.
OVERNIGHT: WALDORF TOWERS

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1975

10:15AM PRESENTATION OF KEY TO CITY BY MAYOR BEAME
AT WALDORF TOWERS, PRESIDENT SADAT'S SUITE,

10:45AM PRESIDENT SADAT MEETS WITH GOVERNOR CAREY
IN HIS SUITE.

11:00AM DEPART WALDORF TOWERS ENROUTE POCANTICO HILLS.

12:00N ARRIVE POCANTICO HILLS.

1:00PM LUNCHEON HOSTED BY VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER
AT POCANTICO HILLS.

2:30PM PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT DEPART POCANTICO HILLS
ENROUTE JFK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

3:00PM DEPART NEW YORK VIA U.S. PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT
ENROUTE O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, CHICAGO.

4:00PM ARRIVE CHICAGO.

4:10PM ARRIVE DRAKE HOTEL.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1975 (CONT'D)

5:00PM MRS. SADAT VISITS ORIENTAL INSTITUTE
----- (TENT. ---OF UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

8:00PM DINNER GIVEN BY MAYOR AND MRS. DALEY AT
CONRAD HILTON HOTEL.

OVERNIGHT: DRAKE HOTEL



FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1975

10:00AM MRS. SADAT VISITS REHABILITATION CENTER AT NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

10:30AM PRESIDENT SADAT HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE AT DRAKE HOTEL.

12:00N DEPART DRAKE HOTEL ENROUTE O'HARE INTERNATIONAL.

12:30PM DEPART CHICAGO VIA U.S. PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT ENROUTE HOUSTON.

3:00PM ARRIVE ELLINGTON AIR FORCE BASE, HOUSTON.

3:05PM DEPART AIRFIELD ENROUTE NASA SPACE CENTER.

3:20PM ARRIVE NASA SPACE CENTER.

4:20PM DEPART NASA SPACE CENTER ENROUTE HOUSTON OAKS HOTEL.

8:30PM RECEPTION HOSTED BY HOUSTON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND ARAB AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AT THE HOUSTON OAKS HOTEL.

9:00PM DINNER HOSTED BY HOUSTON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND ARAB AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AT THE HOUSTON OAKS HOTEL.

OVERNIGHT: HOUSTON OAKS HOTEL.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1975

10:00AM PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT DEPART HOUSTON OAKS HOTEL ENROUTE DOUG MARSHALL'S GLEANN LOCHS FARM.

10:40AM ARRIVE FARM.

11:55AM DEPART FARM ENROUTE ELLINGTON AIR FORCE BASE.

12:15PM ARRIVE ELLINGTON AIR FORCE BASE.

12:20PM DEPART HOUSTON VIA U.S. PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT ENROUTE JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA.

3:30PM ARRIVE JACKSONVILLE NAVAL AIR STATION.



3:35PM DEPART AIRFIELD VIA PRIVATE LAUNCH ENROUTE
EPPING FOREST.

PRIVATE AFTERNOON AND EVENING.

OVERNIGHT: EPPING FOREST

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1975

11:30AM PRESIDENT SADAT HAS PRIVATE MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT FORD.

-----TENT.----- MRS. SADAT AND CHILDREN VISIT
-----DISNEYLAND. (THIS IS NOT YET FIRM.)

PRIVATE AFTERNOON AND EVENING.

OVERNIGHT: EPPING FOREST

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1975 (CONT'D)

-----TENT.----- DISNEYWORLD AGAIN POSSIBILITY FOR
-----MRS. SADAT AND CHILDREN.

-----MRS. SADAT ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN
-----VISITING REHABILITATION CENTERS OR
-----VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTERS IN AREA.
-----SHE MAY ALSO WANT TO VISIT J.E. HANGER
-----COMPANY.

PRIVATE AFTERNOON AND EVENING.

OVERNIGHT: EPPING FOREST

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1975

10:45AM PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT DEPART EPPING FOREST
-----VIA PRIVATE LAUNCH ENROUTE JACKSON-
VILLE NAVAL AIR STATION.

10:55AM ARRIVE JACKSONVILLE NAVAL AIR STATION.

11:00AM DEPART JACKSONVILLE NAVAL AIR STATION VIA U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT ENROUTE ANDREWS AIR FORCE
BASE.

12:40PM ARRIVE ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE.
(APPROX.)



12:45PM DEPART ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE VIA U.S. PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER ENROUTE CAMP DAVID.

1:15PM ARRIVE CAMP DAVID.

----- NOTE: REMAINDER OF PARTY WILL STAY IN JACKSONVILLE OVERNIGHT.

OVERNIGHT: CAMP DAVID

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1975

10:25PM DEPART CAMP DAVID VIA U.S. PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTERS ENROUTE PRESIDENT'S PARK (ELLIPSE).

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1975 (CONT'D)

10:55AM ARRIVE ELLIPSE.

11:00AM (TENT.) PRESIDENT SADAT DEPARTS ELLIPSE VIA MOTORCADE ENROUTE WHITE HOUSE FOR PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FORD.

(TENT) PRESIDENT SADAT DEPARTS WHITE HOUSE ENROUTE CAPITOL HILL.

PRESIDENT SADAT MEETS WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AT CAPITOL.

11:55AM MRS. SADAT JOINS PRESIDENT SADAT.

12:00N (TENT.) PRESIDENT SADAT ADDRESSES JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS.

PM (TENT.) MRS. SADAT VISITS KENNEDY CENTER. PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT DEPART CAPITOL HILL ENROUTE BLAIR HOUSE.

7:30PM (APPROX.) PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT DEPART BLAIR HOUSE ENROUTE ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE.

8:00PM PRESIDENT AND MRS. SADAT DEPART THE UNITED STATES ENROUTE LONDON.

2. RE ROCKEFELLER PARTICIPATION, THE VICE PRESIDENT EXPECTS TO JOIN US IN CHICAGO OCTOBER 31 FOR TRIP TO HOUSTON AND HOUSTON EVENTS. I THINK HIS SCHEDULE IS SURE ON THIS BUT A CALL FROM CAPTAIN HOWE EVENING OCTOBER 20 URGED WE DOWNPLAY HIS GOING ALONG.

3. RE MRS. KISSINGER'S TRANSPORTATION AND HOUSING, MRS.



~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~ COPY

KISSINGER WILL BE RIDING IN CAR WITH MRS. SADAT ON ALL
EVENTS IN WHICH SHE PARTICIPATES. AT OTHER TIMES, CAR
WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR MRS. KISSINGER'S USE. MRS. KISSINGER
WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ONE-BEDROOM SUITE AT THE WALDORF
TOWERS IN NEW YORK, DRAKE HOTEL IN CHICAGO, HOUSTON OAKS
HOTEL IN HOUSTON, AND A PRIVATE HOUSE ON BEACH IN PONTE
VEDRA. INGERSOLL
BT



PSN:048436 PAGE 08 OF 08 TOR:295/01:23Z DTG:220035Z OCT 75

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~ COPY

OP IMMED
 DE RUEHC #0766 2950109
 O 220038Z OCT 75 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3215

~~SECRET~~ STATE 250766 TDSEC 100194

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: TU, CY, GR, PFOR

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO BITSIOS
 RE: CAGLAYANGIL'S POSITION ON CYPRUS (S/S NO. 7521070)
 REF: ANKARA 7857
 FOR TE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN THROUGH SISCO

1. THE PROBLEM. CAGLAYANGIL HAS GIVEN MACOMBER THE TURKISH POSITION ON CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS AS DEVELOPED IN OCTOBER 20 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING (REFTEL) AND ASKED THAT IT BE CONVEYED TO GOVERNMENT OF GREECE. ALTHOUGH TURKEY'S OPENERS WILL PROBABLY NOT IN THEMSELVES BRING GREEK SIDE BACK TO INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, THEY PROVIDE BASIS FOR OBTAINING A GREEK REACTION WHICH CAN BE DISCUSSED WITH THE TURKS.

2. WE HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO ATHENS CONVEYING AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM YOU TO BITSIOS. (RECOMMENDED MESSAGE TO CAGLAYANGIL BY SEPTTEL.)

3. BEGIN DRAFT CABLE TO ATHENS, INFO ANKARA, NICOSIA FOR THE CHARGE. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO BITSIOS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BEGIN MESSAGE: I HAVE RECEIVED FROM OUR AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA A FULL REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 20 MEETING OF THE TURKISH NATIONAL

SECURITY COUNCIL. CAGLAYANGIL HAS ASKED US TO TRANSMIT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE THE TURKISH POSITION REGARDING CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
 State Dept Guidelines *1219103*

By *NR* NARA Date *8/6/10*



4. CAGLAYANGIL SAID THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD CONCLUDED THAT THIS IS THE MOST OPPORTUNE TIME TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION AND TO SEARCH FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WILL NOW STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THE TURKISH COMMUNITY ON CYPRUS TO ENGAGE IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS.

5. CAGLAYANGIL ADVISED US THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT NOW INDICATE EXACTLY WHAT PERCENTAGE OF TERRITORY THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO RELINQUISH. THEY DID HOWEVER WISH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO KNOW THAT THEY WERE NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF TERRITORY.

6. CAGLAYANGIL OBSERVED THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS AWARE OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO A BIZONAL FEDERATED STATE WITH A WEAK CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND GREEK-TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THAT GOVERNMENT ON AN EQUAL BASIS. HE TOLD OUR AMBASSADOR THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS NOW READY TO DISCUSS TERRITORY AND THESE OTHER ISSUES IN ONE PACKAGE. HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT WILL SIMILARLY URGE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO ENGAGE IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS A POSITIVE RESULT WILL BE OBTAINED.

7. CAGLAYANGIL SUGGESTED THAT ONCE THE TWO COMMUNITIES HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC ISSUES, THEN GREECE AND TURKEY COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON GUARANTEES WITH RESPECT TO THIS AGREEMENT. THUS, HE SAID, THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY ENVISAGED A TWO-STEP PROCESS: FIRST, UNDER THE TUTELAGE OF GREECE AND TURKEY AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED BY THE COMMUNITIES IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS; AND SECOND, GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD WORK OUT GUARANTEES OF THAT AGREEMENT.

8. I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE GENERAL TONE OF CAGLAYANGIL'S MESSAGE AND BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S CONCLUSION THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO MOVE FORWARD TO A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD HAVE HOPED FOR A MORE SPECIFIC TURKISH POSITION REGARDING TERRITORIAL CHANGES. HOWEVER, THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO GET TALKS ON TERRITORY AND OTHER ISSUES UNDERWAY SO THAT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS CAN BE DEVELOPED. I WOULD WELCOME HAVING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS OPENING TURKISH POSITION AND ANY COMMENTS YOU MIGHT WISH US TO TRANSMIT TO ANKARA.



~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

9. I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO
ACHIEVE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARD A CYPRUS SOLUTION AND PLEDGE
OUR BEST EFFORTS, AS THE PARTIES DESIRE, TO HELP BRING
THIS ABOUT. END MESSAGE. END DRAFT CABLE.

10. RECOMMENDATION, THAT YOU APPROVE THE ABOVE DRAFT
TELEGRAM FOR TRANSMISSION BY THE DEPARTMENT.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

INGERSOLL
BT



~~SECRET~~

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #0946 2950133
O 220119Z OCT 75 ZPP4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3218

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 250946 TOSEC 100197

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 7865 ACTION SECSTATE INFO SECDEF USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR CINCUSAFE ADANA ISTANBUL IZMIR 21 OCT
QUOTE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ANKARA 7865

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PFOR, TU
SUBJ: COMMENTS TO TURKISH REPS IN WASHINGTON ON GOT
FAILURE TO LIFT SUSPENSION OF US MILITARY ACTIVITIES

1. THE CONCERN I EXPRESSED TO HIGH GOT OFFICIALS DURING THE PAST WEEK REGARDING THE SERIOUS ADVERSE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF GOT FAILURE TO ALTER IN ANY WAY THE PRESENT SUSPENSION RULES AT THE CDII'S WAS CONVEYED, OF COURSE, IN PART FOR TACTICAL REASONS--IN AN EFFORT TO GET AT LEAST PARTIAL MOVEMENT FROM THE TURKS ON THIS FRONT. I WISH TO BE CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT THE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY A TACTIC, THAT THIS IS IN FACT A MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR US. THE MORALE AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN SUSTAINING AN EXPENSIVE AND NOW INDEFINITELY IDLE OPERATION ARE SERIOUS INDEED. WHILE THE EMBARGO WAS ON, AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN TURKEY HAD SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE REASONS FOR THE ACTION GOT HAD TAKEN, AND THE IDLENESS A D SEEMINGLY PUNITIVE CUSTOMS AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE INCONVENIENCES WERE VIEWED BY MOST IN THIS LIGHT. THAT WILL NOT RPT NOT BE THE CASE NOW.

2. IN ORDER THAT GOT OFFICIALS MAY HAVE NO RPT NO DOUBT AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM THAT THEIR INACTION HAS NOW CREATED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT STATE AND DEFENSE OFFICIALS, WHILE CAREFULLY ESCHEWING LANGUAGE WHICH SOUNDS LIKE A THREAT, NEVERTHELESS UNDERSCORE TO ALL TURKISH CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON THE CONCERN WHICH THIS GOT DECISION AUSES US.

MACOMBER
UNQUOTE INGERBOLL

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By PR NARA, Date 8/6/10



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PAGE 01

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PSN:048446 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:295/01:35Z DTG:220119Z OCT 75

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 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3219

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 250759 TOSEC 168198

FOLLOWING REPEAT BRASILIA 9174 ACTION SECSTATE INFO
 USUN SEOUL DTD 21 OCT

QTE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BRASILIA 9174

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN, BR

SUBJECT: KOREA QUESTION AT 30TH UNGA

REF: BRASILIA 9075, 9153, STATE 249105

1. SUMMARY: ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY INFORMED CHARGE THAT, EARLIER SUGGESTIONS TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, BRAZIL HAD DECIDED TO ABSTAIN ON PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION ON KOREA AS WELL AS ALGERIAN RESOLUTION, DESPITE ARGUMENTS IN SECRETARY'S LETTER AND OTHERS ADVANCED BY CHARGE ON BASIS LATEST WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT, GUERREIRO SAW NO LIKELIHOOD OF CHANGE, WHILE PROSPECTS BLEAK, DEPARTMENT MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER APPROACH TO BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR STRESSING SHOCK WITH WHICH THIS KNEWS RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

2. IN DELIVERING SECRETARY'S LETTER TO AMBASSADOR SOUTO MAIOR MORNING OCTOBER 21, CHARGE RE-EMPHASIZED STRONG US OBJECTIONS TO ALGERIAN RESOLUTION AND OUR HOPE THAT BRAZILIAN VOTE WOULD SHIFT FROM ABSTENTION TO OPPOSITION.

3. ON RECEIPT REFERENCED DEPTTEL, CHARGE ARRANGED AFTERNOON APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY GENERAL (ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER) GUERREIRO TO FOLLOW UP ON LAST WEEK'S DISCUSSION, CONVEYING LATEST WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT.

4. GUERREIRO OPENED CONVERSATION BY REFERRING TO SECRETARY'S LETTER, WHICH HE SAID HE HAD STUDIED CAREFULLY.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12858 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By WR NARA, Date 8/6/10



HE NOTED THAT THIRD SENTENCE FROM END REFERS TO BRAZILIAN "PROMISE" OF SUPPORT ON PROCEDURAL VOTE, AND POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD NOT MADE ANY SUCH COMMITMENTS. HIS OPTIMISTIC REMARKS ON OCTOBER 15 WERE BASED ONLY ON LOGIC OF SITUATION AND (AS REPORTED FIRST REFTEL) WERE SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION. AS IT HAPPENED, HE SAID, DECISION WAS MADE SUBSEQUENTLY AT LEVEL OF PRESIDENT TO ABSTAIN ON PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION AS WELL AS ALGERIAN RESOLUTION. THROUGH LAPSE IN COMMUNICATIONS IN ITAMARATY, DECISION HAD NOT YET BEEN CONVEYED TO EMBASSY.

5. GUERREIRO SAID BRAZILIAN MISSION NEW YORK SEES FOUR-PART SCENARIO IN VOTING: (1) ALGERIANS INTRODUCE PROCEDURAL MOTION FOR PRIORITY FOR THEIR RESOLUTION WHICH WILL MOST LIKELY CARRY, BRAZIL ABSTAINING; (2) ALGERIAN RESOLUTION COMES TO VOTE AND MOST LIKELY WINS, BRAZIL ABSTAINING; (3) SECOND PROCEDURAL MOTION IS INTRODUCED TO BRING FRIENDLY RESOLUTION TO VOTE DESPITE FACT THAT TWO RESOLUTIONS ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE, BRAZIL VOTES IN FAVOR; (4) FRIENDLY RESOLUTION IS VOTED ON, BRAZIL IN FAVOR. GUERREIRO SAW LITTLE CHANCE OF POSITIVE OUTCOME OF LATTER VOTE IF ALGERIAN RESOLUTION ALREADY PASSED.

6. CHARGE THEN MADE POINTS IN DEPARTMENT'S REPTEL, STRESSING AGAIN IMPORTANCE OF DEFEATING ONE-SIDED ALGERIAN RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF ISOLATING SOUTH KOREA, INTRODUCING INSTABILITY IN AREA, AND STRIKING AT IMPORTANT US SECURITY INTERESTS IN AREA. HE ASKED THAT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THESE NEW POINTS AND ARGUMENTS IN SECRETARY'S LETTER. GUERREIRO HELD OUT NO HOPE OF CHANGE IN BRAZILIAN POSITION, STATING HE HAD ALREADY SENT COPY OF SECRETARY'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT AND DECISION MADE NOT TO RECONSIDER. "WE THINK IT'S BEST FOR US TO VOTE FOR YOUR RESOLUTION AND ABSTAIN ON EVERYTHING ELSE," HE SAID.

7. COMMENT: WHILE FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA'S REACTION TO SECRETARY'S LETTER IS STILL UNKNOWN, PROSPECTS FOR REVERSAL SEEM BLEAK INDEED. DEPARTMENT MIGHT NONETHELESS WISH TO CONSIDER DESIRABILITY OF APPROACH TO BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR STRESSING SHOCK WITH WHICH GOB POSITION RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON COMMUNITY.

MHNSON UNGTE
INGERSOLL
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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #0949 2950309
O 220152Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3221

UNCLAS STATE 250949 TOSEC 160200

E.O. 11652:1N/A

SUBJECT: CADILLACS

REF: SECTO 16029

FOR BREMER FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. THE CHIEF OF MISSION LIMOUSINE IN TOKYO, PURCHASED IN JUNE 1970 IS DUE FOR REPLACEMENT THIS FISCAL YEAR. THE BASIC REASON FOR REPLACEMENT OF ANY VEHICLE IS AGE, CONDITION, MILEAGE AND THE RESULTANT MAINTENANCE COSTS NOT JUST THE ECONOMY OF PURCHASING A REPLACEMENT. AS A RESULT OF THE ENERGY CRISIS GSA PROMULGATED REGULATIONS (FEDERAL MANAGEMENT CIRCULAR 74-1) APPLYING TO ALL FEDERAL AGENCIES. TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM OF ENERGY CONSERVATION THESE REGULATIONS PERMIT PROCUREMENT OF COMPACTS (CHEVROLET NOVA, DODGE DART, FORD MAVERICK, FORD GRANADA, MERCURY MONARCH AND PLYMOUTH VALIANT) AND SUBCOMPACTS (FORD PINTO AND CHEVROLET VEGA) ONLY. THE DEPARTMENT OBTAINED AN EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE FOR SECURITY REASONS. THE EXCEPTION PERMITS PROCUREMENT OF LARGER VEHICLES (SUCH AS THE CHRYSLER NEW YORKER, OLDSMOBILE 98, BUICK ELECTRA, MERCURY MARQUIS AND CHECKER) BUT NOT, REPEAT NOT, LIMOUSINES. THE COST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIMOUSINES AND THE VEHICLES PERMITTED IS 7000 DOLLARS PER VEHICLE.

2. THE EMBASSY IN TOKYO WAS ADVISED OF THE PROHIBITION ON LIMOUSINES AND WAS CONSULTED ON REPLACEMENT COM VEHICLE LAST FISCAL YEAR. THE DEPARTMENT OFFERED A CHOICE OF THE VEHICLES MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE. THE EMBASSY ELECTED TO RETAIN THEIR LIMOUSINE FOR AN ADDITIONAL YEAR.



3. OUR OVERSEAS LIMOUSINE FLEET HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM 21 IN 1972 TO 14. THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS WERE IN BRUSSELS, USNATO-BRUSSELS, CARACAS, LONDON, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA AND ROME. IN THE DEPARTMENT THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S LIMOUSINE HAS BEEN REPLACED BY A CHRYSLER NEWPORT.

4. A SIMILAR ISSUE MAY ARISE IN PEKING. THE CURRENT COM CHRYSLER IS DUE FOR REPLACEMENT IN FY 77; HOWEVER, USLO REQUESTED THAT IT BE REPLACED IN FY 76 BY A LIMOUSINE TO INCREASE THE SEATING CAPACITY. WE ADVISED USLO THAT FMC 74-1 PROHIBITED THE ACQUISITION OF LIMOUSINES AND THEY ELECTED TO RECEIVE AN 8 PASSENGER CHECKER. DELIVERY OF THE CHECKER IS SCHEDULED FOR EARLY CY 76. WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT USLO MAY NOT BE PLEASED WITH THE PROSPECT OF RECEIVING A CHECKER AND MAY WELL MAKE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS FOR A CADILLAC LIMOUSINE.

INGERSOLL
BT

