

**The original documents are located in Box 23, folder “October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic of China - TOSEC (6)” of Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3116

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 249555 TOSEC 160121

LIMDIS  
FOLLOWING REPEAT BOGOTA 10073 ACTION SECSTATE INFO PANAMA 20 OCT 75  
QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BOGOTA 10073


LIMDIS  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, PN, CO  
SUBJECT: VISIT TO CUBA BY PANAMANIAN MILITARY MISSION  
FOR ARA ASST SEC ROGERS FROM AMBASSADOR  
REF: STATE 248406

1. I SAW PRESIDENT LOPEZ AT NOON TODAY (LOPEZ SPENT WEEKEND ON AN ISLAND OFF OF CARTAGENA AND DID NOT RETURN UNTIL THIS MORNING SO I COULD NOT GET TO HIM EARLIER), I EXPLAINED TO HIM THE BACKGROUND ON THE MILITARY MISSION AND GAVE HIM A SUMMARY OF THE PRENSA LATINA AND RADIO COMMENTARY (STATE 247097). LOPEZ HAD NOT HEARD OF THE MILITARY MISSION TO CUBA.
2. I SAID THAT REMEMBERING HIS OFFER TO BE OF HELP WITH THE PANAMANIAN, THE SECRETARY WANTED TO ASK HIS ASSISTANCE IN CONVEYING TO TORRIJOS THE SECRETARY'S VERY SERIOUS CONCERN AT WHAT WE BELIEVE WILL BE A MOST UNFORTUNATE PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL IMPACT. I STRESSED THAT THE VISIT AND PUBLICITY WERE MOST UNHELPFUL AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME, AND THAT WE HOPED THAT STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE.
3. PRESIDENT LOPEZ SHOOK HIS HEAD SADLY AND ASKED ME TO TELL THE SECRETARY THAT HE (LOPEZ) WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO TAKE THIS MATTER UP WITH TORRIJOS. HE SAID THAT BY A FORTUNATE COINCIDENCE A PERSONAL EMISSARY FROM TORRIJOS (AN AMBASSADOR JURADO) WAS COMING TO SEE HIM TOMORROW. HE WOULD USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY THE SECRETARY'S CONCERN TO TORRIJOS AS WELL AS TO

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By NAR NARA, Date 8/6/10

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TRY TO EXPLAIN AGAIN THE REALITIES OF THE US CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC SCENE.

4. PRESIDENT LOPEZ SAID THAT OBVIOUSLY TORRIJOS BELIEVES THAT IN SHOWING HIS TEETH MA PUTS MORE PRESSURE ON THE US. HE BELIEVES, LOPEZ SAID, THAT SINCE THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN RELATIVELY TOLERANT TOWARD HIS TACTICS THE US CONGRESS WILL BE EQUALLY TOLERANT. TORRIJOS THINKS MISTANKENLY, LOPEZ SAID, THAT THE US WOULD BE AFRAID TO CONFRONT HIM, NOR DOES HE UNDERSTAND THE BACKLASH OF SENTIMENT BUILDING UP IN THE US.

5. PRESIDENT LOPEZ REPEATED AGAIN THAT HE WOULD UTILIZE JURADO'S VISIT TO TAKE UP THIS MATTER AND ASSURED ME HE WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL.

6. PRESIDENT LOPEZ WAS MOST FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE AND, I THINK, UNDERSTANDING. HIS SEEING ME WITHIN TWO HOURS OF HIS RETURN FROM CARTAGENA DEMONSTRATES, I BELIEVE, THAT THE VISIT DID HAVE GOOD PAYOFF IN PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

VAKY  
UNQUOTE. INGERBOLL  
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031284

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Henry A. Kissinger

CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Secretary of State

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . USDEL Secretary

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Matter re: Italy

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900322

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP  
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY  
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 23

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic  
of China - TOSEC (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/10/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG

OP IMMED /PRIORITY  
 DE RUEHC #9557 2940241  
 O P 210225Z OCT 75 ZFFB  
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6131  
 INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3118

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 249557 TOSEC 160123  
 EXDIS  
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)

SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT--PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN EDITORS

1. AS YOU KNOW, TAHMIN BASHIR HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY NESSEN TO DISCUSS PROPOSED INTERVIEW WHICH PRESIDENT FORD WOULD GIVE THREE EGYPTIAN EDITORS AND ONE TELEVISION PERSONALITY ON CAMERA. SECRETARY HAS ENDORSED PROPOSAL AND THE WHITE HOUSE IS SEEKING CONVENIENT TIME FOR A TWENTY-MINUTE TO HALF-HOUR MEETING ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24 OR SATURDAY, OCTOBER 25. THE AIM IS TO BE ABLE TO HAVE MAXIMUM PRESS AND MEDIA PLAY TO COINCIDE WITH PRESIDENT SADAT'S WASHINGTON ARRIVAL OCTOBER 27. AT THIS POINT THE MEETING HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED AND WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE.

2. FOR PRACTICAL AND PLANNING PURPOSES, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD CONTACT BASHIR TO INFORM HIM OF THE POSSIBLE FRIDAY OR SATURDAY APPOINTMENT AND TO ARRANGE TO HAVE THE FOUR EGYPTIANS HERE BY THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23. BASHIR HAS SPOKEN OF THE THREE EDITORS BEING ALI AL-GAMMAL, MUSHIN MOHAMMED, AND ALI AMIN, IF HE IS PHYSICALLY FIT. (THE TV PERSONALITY REMAINED TO BE DECIDED.) IF CONFIRMATION OF THE EXACT TIMING OF THE INTERVIEW IS RECEIVED PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FROM CAIRO, WE SHALL



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By NR NARA, Date 8/6/10

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NOTIFY YOU BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM.

3. PLEASE ALSO ASK BASHIR TO INFORM THE FOUR WHO WILL BE DOING THE INTERVIEW THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO CONCENTRATE ON GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST-- NOT ON SPECIFIC DECISIONS ON MILITARY OR ECONOMIC AID, SINCE THE INTERVIEW WILL BE ON CAMERA, WE WOULD LIKE THESE GROUND RULES CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD IN ADVANCE.

4. FINALLY, BASHIR SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT STATE DEPARTMENT AND USIA WILL ARRANGE SUITABLE PROGRAM FOR EDITORS, WHETHER OR NOT APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT OCCURS. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WISH TO KNOW THEIR PREFERENCES IN THIS REGARD, RECOGNIZING THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICES, INCLUDING CONGRESS, WILL BE CLOSED DURING VETERAN'S DAY WEEKEND. INGERSOLL  
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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 249558 TOSEC 160124

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 249558 TOSEC 160124

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), OGEN

SUBJECT: ODDS AND ENDS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. ROBERT EVANS CALLED TODAY. I ASSURED HIM THAT YOU WANT TO ATTEND, GOT SOME OF THE DETAILS FROM HIM AND THE NAME OF A CONTACT WITH WHOM TO FOLLOW UP AND WILL TURN IT OVER TO SUZANNE MCFARLANE TOMORROW TO PURSUE. WE WILL MAKE SURE THAT JANE CARRIES IT ON THE SCHEDULE.

2. AS TO YOUR QUESTION RELAYED THROUGH BREMER ABOUT THE CADILLAC IN TOKYO, I HAVE SENT BACK FOR A REWRITE A TELEGRAM IN REPLY. IT WAS SO COMPLICATED THAT I CERTAINLY DIDN'T UNDERSTAND IT AND SUSPECT YOU WOULD NOT HAVE EITHER. WE WILL HAVE A MORE DETAILED CABLE FOR YOU IN THE MORNING. IN THE MEANTIME, SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT THE PROGRAM OF REPLACING LIMOUSINES WITH SMALLER AUTOMOBILES AS THE

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By NR JARA, Date 8/6/10



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PAGE 02 STATE 249558 TOSEC 160124

LIMOUSINES WEAR OUT HAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR SEVERAL YEARS. IT WAS TO A LARGE DEGREE IMPOSED UPON US BY GENERAL FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND IS AN ACTION TAKEN TO CONSERVE MONEY BOTH IN TERMS OF ORIGINAL PURCHASE COST AND IN TERMS OF UPKEEP AND GASOLINE. WE WILL GIVE YOU FIGURES IN TOMORROW'S CABLE. IN ADDITION, AND I THINK AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION,

IS THE GROWING VIEW THAT LARGE CHAUFFEUR-DRIVEN LIMOUSINES ARE EASY AND ATTRACTIVE TARGETS FOR TERRORISTS. THE EXPERTS VIEW IS THAT SMALLER CARS ARE LESS LIKELY TO ATTRACT ATTENTION, CONSEQUENTLY LESS LIKELY TO BE SUBJECTS OF ATTACK. MORE DETAIL ON THIS IN THE UPCOMING CABLE.

3. I HAD A LONG TALK WITH MR. Z TODAY. CARL MAW WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE OTHER FELLOW'S LAWYER TOMORROW. (MR. Z HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE OTHER FELLOW'S LAWYER, WHO IS NOW PREPARED TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE AND OPEN WITH US). IN ADDITION, I EXPRESSED MY DISTASTE FOR THE SAFIRE ARTICLE TODAY. MR. Z SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE NO IMPACT ON THE OTHER FELLOW AND WE SHOULDN'T WORRY ABOUT IT.

4. I WILL TRY TO GIVE YOU AS PRECISE A READ-OUT OF WHERE WE STAND WITH THE PIKE COMMITTEE TOMORROW AS I CAN. THE RUMORS NOW ARE FLYING ALL OVER THE PLACE; SOME SAY PIKE IS ITCHING FOR A FIGHT AND THIS IS WHAT HE HAS BEEN LOOKING FOR; OTHERS SAY THAT ALTHOUGH PIKE MAY BE ABLE TO GENERATE SUPPORT WITHIN THE COMMITTEE FOR GOING TO THE FLOOR, HE HAS NO CHANCE TO GET A CONTEMPT CITATION. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT NOBODY AT THIS POINT SEEMS TO KNOW WHAT'S GOING ON. I HAD A LONG TALK WITH WAYNE HAYS ABOUT THE SUBJECT THIS WEEKEND. HE FEELS YOU HAVE NOTHING TO WORRY ABOUT EVEN IF THE ISSUE DOES GET TO THE FLOOR. I WILL BE TALKING TO HIM AND DOC MORGAN TOMORROW AND WILL SPEND A GOOD BIT OF TIME THE REST OF THE WEEK MAKING CALLS ON AS MANY CONGRESSMEN AS I CAN USEFULLY SEE. I WILL ASK MCCLOSKEY AND HIS PEOPLE TO HELP BUT MUST SAY THAT THEY TEND TO PANIC AND WAVER IN THE BREEZE AT THE FIRST SIGN OF TROUBLE. WE MAY BE IN FOR A ROUGH TIME BUT I DOUBT IT. INGERSOLL

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031285

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Henry A. Kissinger

CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Secretary of State

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . USDEL Secretary

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Matter re: Pike Committee

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900322

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP  
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY  
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 23

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic  
of China - TOSEC (6)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/10/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . CCG

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PAGE 01 STATE 249556 TOSEC 160125

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 249556 TOSEC 160125

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Presidential Library Review of NSC and State Equities is

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER)

SUBJECT: PIKE COMMITTEE  
FOR SECRETARY FROM HYLAND AND EAGLEBURGER

1. PIKE COMMITTEE PLANS TO TAKE UP

[REDACTED] THUS FAR, STATE ONLY HAS A REQUEST  
FOR DOCUMENTS [REDACTED]


2. ACCORDING TO COLBY, PIKE APPRECIATES SENSITIVITY OF  
ALL THREE AREAS AND WILL HOLD SUBJECT MATTER TIGHTLY.  
COLBY HAS ALREADY BRIEFED PIKE AND ONE COMMITTEE MEMBER  
ON ALL THREE SUBJECTS. WE CAN PARTIALLY MEET REQUEST FOR  
DOCUMENTS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LEAVING ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS, IF ANY, TO CIA AND  
WHITE HOUSE. IN OTHER WORDS, WE ARE NOT YET IN CONFRON-  
TATION.

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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY: RAC NLF-TB-HK-15-6-1-3 9/10/04  
State Review 12/9/03 NSC Guidelines  
NR NLF DATE 3/5/09



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PAGE 02 STATE 249556 TOSEC 160125

3. OVER THE WEEKEND, HOWEVER, THE COMMITTEE STAFF MADE EFFORT TO GET GRAHAM MARTIN FOR SWORN STATEMENT. MARTIN CURRENTLY IN NORTH CAROLINA BECAUSE OF FAMILY ILLNESS AND IS TAKING CONVALESCENT LEAVE. COMMITTEE MAY SUBPOENA HIM HOWEVER. I HAVE TALKED WITH BRENT SCOWCROFT, WHO DOUBTS THAT MARTIN CAN BE WITHHELD. BRENT WILL TALK

TO MARSH BUT BELIEVE THAT MAKING APPEAL TO PIKE WILL SIMPLY WHET HIS APPETITE. MEANWHILE, WE WILL TAKE POSITION THAT HE CANNOT BE RECALLED TO WASHINGTON.

4. COMMITTEE ALSO SEEKING HELMS FOR TESTIMONY [REDACTED] SINCE HE IS HERE FOR CHURCH COMMITTEE ON MAIL OPENINGS, BUT THEY MAY NOT PRESS IT.

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
5. LATEST RUMOR IS THAT THE PIKE COMMITTEE WILL USE ITS SESSION TOMORROW (TUESDAY) TO CONSIDER YOUR RESPONSE TO BOYATT PROBLEM. ACCORDING TO CIA, PIKE IS LIVID OVER PRESS TREATMENT AGAINST HIM.

6. APPEARANCE ON CYPRUS FOR EAGLEBURGER, HARTMAN AND SISCO NOW DEFERRED UNTIL EARLY NOVEMBER, PROBABLY TO ALLOW COMMITTEE TO DECIDE ON PROCEDURE ON BOYATT MEMORANDUM.

7. COMMENT: WE ARE SENDING YOU BY SEPTEL TEXT OF LETTER FROM A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE STAFF REQUESTING INFORMATION [REDACTED] AS YOU CAN SEE IT IS WILDLY SWEEPING BUT THAT OUGHT NOT CONCERN US MUCH SINCE IT IS FROM A LOW LEVEL STAFF MEMBER TO A LOW LEVEL STAFF MEMBER IN INR. WE BOTH BELIEVE WE CAN IGNORE IT IF WE SO CHOOSE. WE BOTH ALSO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE YOUR FLAT DIRECTIVE THAT THERE IS TO BE "ABSOLUTELY NO REPEAT NO TURNOVER OF DOCUMENTS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR US TO FIND A FEW INNOCUOUS DOCUMENTS ON THAT SUBJECT AND SEND THOSE TO THE COMMITTEE. IN THAT EVENT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE COMMITTEE TO SAY THAT WE HAVE BEEN TOTALLY UNCOOPERATIVE AND THE ISSUE WILL SIMPLY BE ONE OF HOW COOPERATIVE WE HAVE BEEN. CERTAINLY WE WOULD REFUSE TO PROVIDE CABLES TO AND FROM THE EMBASSY AND CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE

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
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8. AS TO THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE COMMITTEE TOMORROW ON YOUR RESPONSE RE THE BOYATT PROBLEM, WE WILL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS WE HAVE ANY INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT TRANSPIRED. AS OF NOW MCCLORY'S OFFICE (HE IS RANKING REPUBLICAN ON THE COMMITTEE) DOUBTS THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL VOTE TO GO

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TO THE FLOOR TO SEEK A CONTEMPT CITATION. MCCLORY'S PUSH IN THE DISCUSSION TOMORROW WILL BE TO TAKE YOU UP ON YOUR OFFER TO APPEAR TO DISCUSS [REDACTED] BOYATT PROBLEM IN EXECUTIVE SESSION. TO BE ON THE SAFE SIDE, HOWEVER, EAGLEBURGER IS BEGINNING TOMORROW A ROUND OF CALLS ON PEOPLE LIKE DOC MORGAN, ZABLOCKI, HAYS, BUCHANAN, FINDLEY, ETC., TO MAKE SURE THEY ARE TOTALLY AWARE OF THE COMPROMISE YOU HAVE OFFERED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO FIGHT ANY CONTEMPT CITATION SHOULD THE COMMITTEE. IN FACT, SEEK ONE. AT THIS POINT THIS MUST BE DONE IN VERY LOW KEY BECAUSE WE DON'T WANT THE PIKE PEOPLE TO THINK THEY HAVE US ON THE RUN. AT THIS POINT THEY ARE CLEARLY LOSING THE PUBLIC RELATIONS BATTLE (AS THE NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL OF YESTERDAY DEMONSTRATES) AND WE OUGHT TO LET THAT SINK IN WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WITH THE HOUSE AS A WHOLE. END COMMENT. INGERSOLL

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PAGE 1 OF STATE 249199 TOSEC 160126

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
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER)

SUBJECT: ;YLAND/MC NAMARA MEETING  
FOR SECRETARY FROM MYLAND.

1. MET WITH ROBERT MCNAMARA MONDAY AFTERNOON AND WENT OVER EVOLUTION OF BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILE PROBLEMS. I GAVE HIM WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL AS EXAMPLE OF CURRENT CAMPAIGN AND WENT INTO CONSEQUENCE FOR STRATEGIC BALANCE OF ALLOWING NEGOTIATIONS TO FAIL AND SOVIETS TO WIDEN GAP AGAIN. I EXPLAINED STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR DEFENSE'S MAXIMUM POSITION AND CONSEQUENCES IF SOVIETS DECIDED TO OPT FOR LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM.

2. HE TOOK NOTES THROUGHOUT. HE CRITICIZED DEFENSE POSITION, PARTICULARLY ATTACKING RATIONALE FOR USING CRUISE MISSILES IN LIMITED STRIKES, OR USING EXPENSIVE CRUISE MISSILES TO DELIVER CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES. HE SAID HE WOULD TALK TO SOME OF HIS CONTACTS, BUT WOULD FOCUS ON QUESTION OF WHY WE SHOULD ALLOW NEGOTIATIONS TO

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/6/10

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PAGE 02 STATE 249199 TOSEC 160126

FAIL OR BE PUT OVER, AND WHETHER PRICE FOR ACHIEVING SUCCESS WAS NOT WELL WORTH IT.

3. HE MENTIONED CY VANCE, PHIL GEYLIN, AND SULZBURGER AS PEOPLE HE WOULD TALK TO. HE SAID THERE WAS NO TIME TO

WORK UP DETAILED TECHNICAL CRITIQUE, BUT THAT DEFENSE POSITION WAS ABSURD. UNFORTUNATELY, HE DISMISSED ALL CRUISE MISSILES INCLUDING ALCMS AS PENETRATION AIDES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE BOMBER FORCE WAS PROBABLY NO GOOD ANYWAY. I SAID THAT IF DEADLOCK COULD BE BROKEN BY A REASONABLE AMERICAN PROPOSAL, THAT WE COULD PROBABLY PRESERVE A MODERATE RANGE FOR ALCMS.

4. HE SAID THAT HE HAD WONDERED WHY NO ANSWER HAD BEEN GIVEN TO DEFENSE CLAIMS, BUT SAID REAL PROBLEM WAS WHEN ADMINISTRATION WOULD MAKE DECISION AND THAT OUTSIDERS COULD NOT DO TOO MUCH. HE UNDERSTOOD, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS A PUBLIC POLITICAL DIMENSION AND HE WOULD HELP.  
INGERSOLL



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OP IMMED  
 DE RUEHC #9560 2940339  
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 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3122

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 249560 TOSEC 16612

EXDIS  
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN, NO

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO  
 FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND ON KOREA (S/S NO. 7520988)  
 FYI: REST OF APPROVED KOREA LETTERS NOW SENT

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTO 16007 DEPARTMENT REQUESTS  
 APPROVAL OF FOLLOWING DRAFT CABLE TO EMBASSY OSLO.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

AFTER CAREFUL REVIEW OF THE VOTING SITUATION IN NEW YORK  
 DEPARTMENT HAS CONCLUDED THAT DEFEAT OF ALGERIAN  
 RESOLUTION IS POSSIBLE IF OUR FRIENDS CURRENTLY PLANNING  
 TO ABSTAIN WILL VOTE AGAINST THIS RESOLUTION. THE  
 SECRETARY HAS AUTHORIZED AN APPROACH TO A NUMBER OF  
 COUNTRIES WHERE THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS IT APPROPRIATE TO  
 MAKE SUCH A REQUEST. DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THAT STRONG  
 REPRESENTATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE TO GON BUT CONSIDERS  
 THAT IN VIEW OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS VOTE TO U.S.  
 INTEREST IN NE ASIA THE FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD BE ASKED TO  
 INSTRUCT THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION AT NEW YORK TO VOTE  
 AGAINST THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION. ACCORDINGLY, THE  
 EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE  
 SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER:

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR KNUT

I ENJOYED THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU IN NEW YORK  
 AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. ONE OF THE SUBJECTS WE DISCUSSED  
 WAS THE COMING DEBATE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By NR NARA, Date 8/6/10

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PAGE 01

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KOREAN ITEM. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE TO THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE IT AFFECTS THE SECURITY OF AN AREA WHERE THE UNITED STATES HAS TROOPS AND MAJOR DEFENSE COMMITMENTS. WHEN WE TALKED IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT YOU WISHED TO ABSTAIN ON THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION. SINCE WE TALKED THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS CONDUCTED A CAREFUL REVIEW AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGIN OF SUPPORT FOR THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION IS SUFFICIENTLY NARROW THAT IT CAN BE DEFEATED IF SEVERAL FRIENDLY STATES NOW PLANNING TO ABSTAIN WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION.

BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS MATTER TO US I AM ASKING THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT RECONSIDER ITS POSITION AND, IF ITS VOTE SHOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEFEAT THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION, TO VOTE AGAINST IT. I SUGGEST THAT OUR DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK MAINTAIN CLOSE COMMUNICATION DURING THE DEBATE ON KOREA AND THAT YOUR DELEGATION BE AUTHORIZED TO CAST A NEGATIVE VOTE IF THIS IS NECESSARY. YOUR SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE IS IMPORTANT TO ME AND I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR HELP. WARM REGARDS, HENRY.

END TEXT.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS: THAT YOU APPROVE THE SUGGESTED TEXT.


APPROVE

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4. APPROVED BY IO ROBERT O. BLAKE AND CLEARED BY EUR/NE MR. J.J. CROWLEY.

INGERSOLL

BT





PRIORITY

DE RUEHC #9570 2940725

P 210716Z OCT 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3125

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 249570 TOSEC 160130

EXDIS

FOL CAIRO 16035 SENT ACTION SECSTATE OCT. 20/ REPEATED TO YOU

QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 10542

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR, KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT: PROGRAM FOR MRS. SADAT

REF: STATE 248503 (SECTO 16035)

HAVE INFORMED MRS. SADAT THAT MRS. KISSINGER

WILL ACCOMPANY HER THROUGHOUT HER TRAVELS

IN US. SHE WAS VERY PLEASED. EILTS UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/6/10

PSN:047412

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TOR:294/07:29Z

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

## EYES ONLY - DIRECT

~~SECRET~~ NOD124

PAGE 01 STATE 249662 TOSEC 160131

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY P:JJSISCO:DP  
APPROVED BY P:JJSISCO  
S/S MR. ORTIZ

\*\*\*\*\* 056091

Z 211408Z OCT 73 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO FLASH  
USDEL SECRETARY FLASH

~~SECRET~~ STATE 249662 TOSEC 160131

EXDYS HANDLE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: PFOR IS EG

SUBJECT: QUERY FROM AMBASSADOR DINITZ

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO



1. YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO RABIN IMMEDIATELY THE CATEGORIC ASSURANCE GIVEN TO US BY FAHMI AS REPORTED IN CAIRO 10550. BASED ON THIS ASSURANCE, I WISH YOU TO GET IMMEDIATE CONFIRMATION FROM RABIN THAT HE WILL SUBSTITUTE ANOTHER VESSEL. PLEASE HAVE HIM PROVIDE YOU FULL INFORMATION ABOUT SUCH OTHER VESSEL SO THAT WE CAN BE SURE THAT THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS WITH IT. I AM CONVEYING THE ABOVE ALSO TO DINITZ. YOU SHOULD STRESS OUR VIEW THIS IS NOT A PLOY ON THE PART OF FAHMI. PLEASE INFORM DEPARTMENT AND FAHMI. INGERSOLL

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
State Dept Guidelines

~~SECRET~~

By NR NARA, Date: 8/6/10

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Department of State  
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PAGE 1 STATE 249768 T08EC 160133

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 150-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY P:JJSISCORP  
APPROVED BY P:JJSISCO  
S/S - MR. ORTIZ

007425

Z O 211553Z OCT 75 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO FLASH  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 249768 T08EC 160133

NODIS

E.O. 11652/6DS

TAGS:PFOR, IS, EG

SUBJECT: ISRAELI CARGO THROUGH US CANAL  
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BISCO



1. FYI. DINITZ HAS JUST HAD A TELCON WITH PM RABIN WHICH HE REPORTED TO ME. ISRAELIS CONTEND THAT EGYPTIANS FOLLOW THE PRACTICE OF ALLOWING PASSAGE OF SOUTH AFRICAN CARGO THROUGH THE CANAL. DINITZ SAYS THAT EGYPTIAN PRACTICE IS NOT TO EXAMINE CARGOS FROM NON-SOUTH AFRICAN SHIPS. IN SHORT DINITZ SAID THAT WHEN EGYPTIANS SAY THAT ANY SOUTH AFRICAN CARGO TRANSITING SUEZ CANAL "IF DISCOVERED" WOULD BE CONFISCATED, THE FACT IS CARGO IS NOT EXAMINED, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT NORMALLY DISCOVERED. END FYI.

2. RABIN THEREFORE HAS ASKED THAT WE GO BACK TO RAHMI AND URGE GOE TO PERMIT NETA TO TRANSIT WITHOUT IMPEDIMENT. MY RESPONSE TO DINITZ WAS THAT IF WE GO BACK TO THE EGYPTIANS

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/6/10



# Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 240763 T0660 150133

ON THIS BASIS ONCE AGAIN, WE WILL BE TURNED DOWN AND THIS WILL CAUSE A DETERIORATION IN MOOD WHICH WOULD PROBABLY DELAY TRANSIT OF ISRAELI CARGO INDEFINITELY.

3. DINITZ RAISED THE POSSIBILITY, WHICH WE MENTIONED AS A POSSIBILITY IN OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY, OF NETA

OFF-LOADING SOUTH AFRICAN CARGO IN ELATH TAKING ON A NON-SOUTH AFRICAN CARGO AND THEN TRANSITING THROUGH THE CANAL ON PRESENT COURSE. AFTER CHECKING WITH RABIN, ISRAELIS AGREED TO HAVE US TRY THIS OUT AS AN AMERICAN SUGGESTION TO THE EGYPTIANS AS A WAY OUT. IF THIS PROCEDURE FOLLOWED, THERE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE SOME DELAY IN TRANSIT.

4. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE CALL FAHMI IMMEDIATELY AND IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO GET FAHMI TO AGREE TO PERMITTING NETA TO PROCEED AS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED, YOU MAY SUGGEST AS OUR OWN IDEA THE ABOVE POSSIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO OFF-LOADING PROCEDURE AT ELATH.

5. FYI. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT NETA'S DESTINATION, AS WE PREVIOUSLY INFORMED YOU, IS ASHDOD. WE WOULD HOPE FAHMI WOULD NOT RAISE THE PROBLEM THAT NEW CARGO WOULD BE MOVING FROM ONE ISRAELI PORT TO ANOTHER. OBVIOUSLY YOU SHOULD NOT RAISE THIS QUESTION, BUT I WANT YOU TO BE AWARE OF IT. END FYI.

6. FINALLY, DENITZ HAS JUST RECEIVED ANOTHER TELCON FROM RABIN WHO SAYS THAT REPORTS COMING OUT OF CAIRO INDICATING DELAY OF TRANSIT OF CARGO FOR 10 DAYS IS CAUSING RABIN DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER ABOVE REPORT CORRECT. IN ANY EVENT, PLEASE TELL FAHMI HE SHOULD KEEP A LID ON MEDIA ON THIS MATTER IN ORDER TO ALLOW TIME TO WORK IT OUT. END FYI. INGERSOLL

~~SECRET~~



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OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #9769 2941603  
O 211557Z OCT 75  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3129

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 249769 TOSEC 160134

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, EGY

SUBJECT: MRS. KISSINGER'S TEA FOR MRS. SADAT

REF: SECTO 16067

1. DECATUR HOUSE HAS BEEN RESERVED FOR MRS. KISSINGER'S  
TEA FOR MRS. SADAT.

2. STATUS REPORT ON ACCEPTANCES AND REGRETS WILL FOLLOW  
SEPTEL AS REQUESTED. INGERSOLL  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/6/10



PSN:047847

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TOR:294/16:03Z

DTG:211557Z OCT 75

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9989

PAGE 01 STATE 249772 TOSEC 160136

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY S/S-O:MTANNER  
APPROVED BY S/S-O:MTANNER

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O 211600Z OCT 75 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 249772 TOSEC 160136

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT LONDON 16101 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DTD 21 OCT  
QUOTE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 16101

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 1219103  
State Dept Guidelines  
By HR NARA, Date 8/6/10

EXDIS

STATE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY), UK, EC, PFOR  
SUBJECT: CALLAGHAN REPLY TO SECRETARY'S MESSAGE



REF: (A) USDEL SECTO 16018, (B) LONDON 16056

FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN'S PRIVATE SECRETARY HAS ASKED  
US TO PASS TO SECRETARY KISSINGER THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE  
FROM CALLAGHAN TO MESSAGE CONTAINED REF A:

BEGIN TEXT

- 1) THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OF COURSE NEVER SUPPOSED THAT DR. KISSINGER HAD SPOKEN ON THIS MATTER IN THE WAY REPORTED BY THE LONDON TIMES.
- 2) THE EC MEETING AT LUCCA THIS PAST WEEKEND HAS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 249772 T0SEC 160136

NOT CHANGED THE SITUATION.

3) THE UK STILL CLAIMS SEPARATE REPRESENTATION AT THE PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE.

4) THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WANTS DR. KISSINGER TO BE AWARE OF THIS. END TEXT.

RICHARDSON UNQUOTE  
INGERSOLL



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OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #9772 2941608  
O 211600Z OCT 75 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3131

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 249772 TOSEC 160136

EXDIS  
FOLLOWING REPEAT LONDON 16101 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DTD 21 OCT  
QUOTE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 16101

EXDIS  
STATE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY), UK, EC, PFOR  
SUBJECT: CALLAGHAN REPLY TO SECRETARY'S MESSAGE

REF: (A) USDEL SECTO 16010, (B) LONDON 16056

FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN'S PRIVATE SECRETARY HAS ASKED  
US TO PASS TO SECRETARY KISSINGER THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE  
FROM CALLAGHAN TO MESSAGE CONTAINED REF A:

BEGIN TEXT

1) THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OF COURSE NEVER SUPPOSED  
THAT DR. KISSINGER HAD SPOKEN ON THIS MATTER IN THE WAY  
REPORTED BY THE LONDON TIMES.

2) THE EC MEETING AT LUCCA THIS PAST WEEKEND HAS  
NOT CHANGED THE SITUATION.

3) THE UK STILL CLAIMS SEPARATE REPRESENTATION AT  
THE PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE.

4) THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WANTS DR. KISSINGER TO BE  
AWARE OF THIS. END TEXT.

RICHARDSON UNQUOTE

INGERSOLL

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*  
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By NR NARA, Date 8/6/10



FLASH  
DE RUEHC #9859 2941801  
Z 211758Z OCT 75 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH 3136

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 249859 TOSEC 160141

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:SP

SUBJECT: DEATH OF CHIEF OF STATE FRANCISCO FRANCO

DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED CRITIC MESSAGE FROM EMBASSY  
MADRID REPORTING FRANCO DIED 1805 HOURS MADRID TIME.  
AS YET NO PUBLIC CONFIRMATION OR ANNOUNCEMENT.

INGERSOLL  
BT

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/6/10



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DTG:211758Z OCT 75

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OP IMMED  
 DE RUEHC #9848 2941809  
 O 211740Z OCT 75 ZFF4  
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3137  
 INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 5394

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 249848 ~~70528 100142~~  
 E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SCUL, JA

SUBJECT: JAPAN-US FRIENDSHIP ACT

1. THE PRESIDENT SIGNED ON OCTOBER 20 THE JAPAN-US FRIENDSHIP ACT, PROVIDING FOR THE USE OF CERTAIN FUNDS TO PROMOTE SCHOLARLY, CULTURAL, AND ARTISTIC ACTIVITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE US.

2. THE NEW ACT CREATES A DOLS 36 MILLION TRUST FUND AND THE JAPAN-US FRIENDSHIP COMMISSION, THUS FULFILLING A 13-YEAR OLD COMMITMENT TO JAPAN (GARIOA) AND RECIPROCATING THE 1973 GOJ GIFT TO TEN US UNIVERSITIES.

3. SENATOR JAVITS' BILL, WHICH PASSED THE SENATE, CONTAINED SEVERAL PROVISIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. CONGRESSMAN HAYS PILOTTED A COMPROMISE BILL THROUGH THE HOUSE, AND THE ADMINISTRATION ACCEPTED THE CONFERENCE VERSION OF THE TWO BILLS.

4. THE TRUST FUND TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE US TREASURY WILL BE MADE UP OF 7 1/2 PERCENT OF THE OKINAWA REVERSION MONIES (ABOUT DOLS 24 MILLION), PLUS THE GARIOA BALANCE (ABOUT DOLS 12 MILLION IN YEN). AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO ANY INCOME OF THE FUND PLUS NO MORE THAN 5 PERCENT OF THE

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

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By NR NARA, Date 8/6/10



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PRINCIPAL MAY BE SPENT IN ANY GIVEN FISCAL YEAR. INTEREST FROM THE PRINCIPAL IS SUBJECT TO THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS, BUT ANY FUTURE GIFTS ARE NOT. ANY MONIES DRAWN FROM THE GARIOA PORTION OF THE FUND MUST BE SPENT IN JAPAN.

5. THE COMMISSION WILL BE COMPOSED OF: THE US PANEL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON US-JAPAN CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION (CULCON); TWO MEMBERS OF EACH HOUSE, APPOINTED BY THE SPEAKER AND PRESIDENT PRO TEM RESPECTIVELY TO SERVE AS NON-VOTING, ADVISORY MEMBERS; AND THE CHAIRMEN OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENTS FOR THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES. THE COMMISSION WILL DEVELOP PROGRAMS, MAKE GRANTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE PROGRAMS, MANAGE THE FUND, AND RECEIVE GIFTS TO THE FUND. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE US PANEL OF CULCON, NOW JOHN HALL OF YALE, WILL BE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION .

6. THE NEXT STEP WILL BE FOR THE CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS, THUS MAKING THE COMMISSION OPERATIONAL, AND THEN FOR THE COMMISSION TO APPOINT AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR.

7. UNTIL THE APPROPRIATION HAS BEEN MADE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS DECIDED UPON, ANY PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES MAY BE REFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT (CU).

8. TEXT OF THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT AND PRESS GUIDANCE WILL FOLLOW.

9. ABOVE INFORMATION MAY BE USEFUL TO SECRETARY FOR MIYAZAKI DINNER. INGERBOLL  
BT



PRIORITY  
 DE RUEHC #9850 2950232  
 P 211741Z OCT 75 ZFF4  
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 249850 TOSEC 160143

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TIME MAGAZINE INTERVIEW

FOR BREMER AND FUNSETH FROM S/PRS

NO. 10

HEREWITH IS FULL TEXT AS PUBLISHED SECRETARY'S INTERVIEW IN  
 TIME MAGAZINE, MONDAY, OCTOBER 20. ITEMS IN DOUBLE  
 BRACKETS ARE FROM AGREED TEXT BUT NOT PUBLISHED.

TITLE: KISSINGER SPEAKS OUT ON FOREIGN POLICY

QUOTE: HENRY KISSINGER IS ON THE MOVE AGAIN. LAST WEEK,  
 AFTER MAKING HIS FIRST VISIT TO CANADA, HE FLEW TO TOKYO  
 AND THEN ON TO PEKING. BEFORE GOING TO OTTAWA, THE SEC-  
 RETARY OF STATE SAT DOWN FOR TWO HOURS WITH TIME DIPLOMATIC  
 EDITOR JERROLD SCHECTER AND STATE DEPARTMENT CORRESPONDENT  
 STROBE TALBOT FOR A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF HIS FOREIGN  
 POLICY. EXCERPTS FROM THE CONVERSATION:

Q: WILL THE CONTINUING TENSION BETWEEN YOU AND CONGRESS  
 AFFECT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY?

A: ((FIRST OF ALL)) I DON'T THINK THAT THERE IS TENSION  
 BETWEEN ME AND THE CONGRESS ON A PERSONAL BASIS. I HAVE,  
 I THINK, EXTREMELY GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH MOST  
 MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS. BUT PERSONAL RELATIONS ARE NOT THE  
 ISSUE. WE ARE GOING THROUGH A PERIOD RIGHT NOW WHERE, IN THE  
 AFTERMATH OF VIET NAM AND WATERGATE, THE CONGRESS IS  
 ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT THE BALANCE BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND  
 CONGRESSIONAL POWER. THERE IS (ALSO) A PROFOUND FEELING



OF DISTRUST IN THE CONGRESS OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION, WHICH CAUSES THEM TO INSIST ON A KIND OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH NO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE EVER ASKED FOR BEFORE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMITTEES HAS DISINTEGRATED TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE BECOMES PUBLIC, CREATING NEW FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS.

TO SOME EXTENT, I FAVOR (THE TENSION). I THINK THE BALANCE SWUNG TOO FAR TOWARD EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE '60S, BUT THERE IS A DANGER THAT IT MAY SWING TOO FAR TOWARD CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE '70S. AND THIS WILL TEND TO PARALYZE FOREIGN POLICY.

((Q: DO WE FACE A NEW ERA IN WHICH THERE CAN NO LONGER BE A BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY?

((A: I THINK IT IS ABSOLUTELY IMPERATIVE THAT WE HAVE A BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S., AS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY, DEPENDS ON AUTHORITY. AUTHORITY DOESN'T MEAN THE DECISION OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL, BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT WHAT IS DONE AND SAID REFLECTS SUPPORT FOR ACTIONS THAT ARE PROMISED. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS DIVIDED, FOR WHATEVER REASON, IT MEANS THAT THE CAPABILITY OF THE U.S. TO MAKE ITS VIEWS PREVAIL IS DIMINISHED.))

A: /CONTINUING FROM ABOVE/ CAN THIS PROBLEM BE SOLVED BY TAKING CONGRESSMEN INTO NEGOTIATIONS? I DON'T WANT TO EXCLUDE THIS TOTALLY. ((BUT THE PROBLEM IS IN A SYSTEM OF SEPARATION OF POWERS THERE MUST BE SOME THINGS THAT THE EXECUTIVE DOES PECULIARLY AND SOME THINGS THE LEGISLATIVE DOES PECULIARLY.)) BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH; FOR EXAMPLE, TO HAVE SOMEBODY IN ON A NEGOTIATION UNLESS HE KNOWS ALL OF THE STRATEGY THAT WENT INTO IT. AND IT RAISES THE ISSUE OF WHAT HAPPENS IF THERE IS NOT COMPLETE AGREEMENT AS TO TACTICS.

((I AGREE THAT THE CONGRESS MUST BE GIVEN A GREATER PARTICIPATION, BUT THIS PARTICIPATION HAS TO STOP SHORT OF THE CONGRESS GETTING INTO EVERY TACTICAL DECISION, BECAUSE THE CONGRESS IS NOT ORGANIZED TO MAKE TACTICAL DECISIONS.))

/CONTINUING/ IN FOREIGN POLICY, UNLESS YOU HAVE AN OVER-ALL DESIGN, YOUR BEHAVIOR GROWS RANDOM. IT IS AS IF, WHEN YOU ARE PLAYING CHESS, A GROUP OF KIBITZERS KEEPS MAKING MOVES FOR YOU. THEY MAY BE BETTER CHESS PLAYERS THAN



YOU ARE, BUT THEY CANNOT POSSIBLY GET A COHERENT GAME DEVELOPED. ESPECIALLY IF, AT THE SAME TIME, YOU HAVE TO EXPLAIN EACH OF YOUR MOVES PUBLICLY SO THAT YOUR OPPONENT CAN HEAR IT.

I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE SOLUTION IS. I KNOW I AM SPENDING OVER HALF MY TIME NOW BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. AND THAT, TOO, IS GETTING TO BE A PROBLEM IN POLICYMAKING. I SPENT 42 HOURS IN TESTIMONY AND IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH CONGRESSMEN IN A THREE-WEEK PERIOD ON THE SINAI ACCORD. THAT IS A LOT OF TIME, AND IT IS IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS.

Q: YOU TALK ABOUT KIBITZERS. ISN'T THAT PART OF THE PROCESS OF AN OPEN DEMOCRACY?

A: THERE IS NO PARLIAMENT IN THE WORLD THAT HAS THE ACCESS TO POLICYMAKING THAT THE CONGRESS OF THE U.S. HAS - NOT IN BRITAIN, NOT IN FRANCE, NOT IN ANY OF THE DEMOCRACIES ((OF THE WORLD)). THE KEY DECISIONS HAVE TO BE SUBJECTED TO CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. ((BUT WHICH OF THE DAY-TO-DAY TACTICS HAS TO BE CLEARED AHEAD OF TIME, THAT IS A QUESTION WHICH HAS TO BE DECIDED.)) THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS INVOLVES AN APPROVAL (BY CONGRESS) OF THE GENERAL DIRECTION IN WHICH A COUNTRY IS GOING, AS WELL AS OF SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL STEPS. BUT TO ATTEMPT TO SUBJECT EVERY SINGLE DECISION TO INDIVIDUAL APPROVAL WILL LEAD TO THE FRAGMENTATION OF ALL EFFORT AND WILL FINALLY LEAD TO CHAOS AND NO NATIONAL POLICY.

Q: IN AN ARTICLE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, U.N. AMBASSADOR DANIEL MOYNIHAN WROTE THAT "LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ON THE AMERICAN MODEL TENDS TO THE CONDITION OF MONARCHY IN THE 19TH CENTURY; A HOLDOVER FORM OF GOVERNMENT, ONE WHICH PERSISTS IN ISOLATED OR PECULIAR PLACES HERE AND THERE, BUT WHICH HAS SIMPLY NO RELEVANCE TO THE FUTURE. IT IS WHERE THE WORLD WAS, NOT WHERE IT IS GOING."

A: I DON'T AGREE AT ALL. WHERE THE WORLD IS GOING DEPENDS IMPORTANTLY ON THE U.S.

IN THE 1950S EVERY NEW COUNTRY WANTED TO BE DEMOCRATIC BECAUSE WE WERE IMPRESSIVE OR LOOKED IMPRESSIVE, POWERFUL

AND PURPOSEFUL. IN THE 1970S, AFTER ALL WE HAVE GONE THROUGH, THAT CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THIS IS NOT AN INEVITABLE RESULT. IT MAY WELL BE THAT DEMOCRACY IS NOT GOING TO MAKE IT. BUT IF DEMOCRACY ISN'T GOING TO MAKE IT, THIS IS GOING TO MEAN SUCH A MONUMENTAL

CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD AND OF IT-  
SELF THAT IT WILL HAVE THE PROFOUNDDEST CONSEQUENCES WITH-  
IN AMERICA OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

(Q: DO YOU THINK THAT DEMOCRACY IS CHANGING?

(A: DEMOCRACY IS FACING MASSIVE PROBLEMS AROUND THE  
WORLD FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS.))

A: /CONTINUING FROM ABOVE/ DEMOCRACY IN THE 19TH CENTURY  
WAS AN ESSENTIALLY ARISTOCRATIC PHENOMENON. YOU HAD  
LIMITED ROLING GROUPS IN MOST COUNTRIES. THIS WAS NOT  
TRUE OF THE U.S., ALTHOUGH WE DID HAVE RESTRICTED  
FRANCHISES. AND YOU HAD, ABOVE ALL, A DOCTRINE OF LIMITED  
GOVERNMENT AND RELATIVELY SIMPLE ISSUES. NOW THE GOVERN-  
MENT IS INVOLVED IN EVERY ASPECT OF LIFE. THE ISSUES  
BECOME UNBELIEVEABLY COMPLEX.

((IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE AVERAGE PERSON TO UNDER-  
STAND THE COMPLEXITIES OF EVEN ONE OR TWO PIECES OF  
LEGISLATION, MUCH LESS ALL OF THEM. AND THEREFORE AT A  
TIME WHEN LIFE IS EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND THE DEMANDS FOR  
LEADERSHIP ARE GREATEST, LEADERSHIP OFTEN TENDS TO BE  
PARALYZED.))

A: /CONTINUING FROM ABOVE/ ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT IN  
ALMOST EVERY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY SO MUCH ENERGY IS  
ABSORBED IN GETTING INTO OFFICE, THAT LEADERS ARE NOT  
ALWAYS AS WELL PREPARED AS THEY COULD ((SHOULD)) BE AND  
HAVE TO LEARN THEIR JOB BY DOING IT.

ALL OF THIS HAS CREATED A CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP IN MANY  
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. BUT IT IS A CRISIS THAT WE MUST  
SOLVE.

Q: DO YOU THINK WE ARE BETTER OFF THAN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES?

A: FAR BETTER. ((I THINK THAT)) THE AMERICAN BODY  
POLITIC IS BASICALLY HEALTHY. OUR PEOPLE ARE CONFIDENT.  
THEY WANT TO BELIEVE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT. THERE IS NOT  
THE FUNDAMENTAL DIVISION YOU HAVE IN MANY FOREIGN  
COUNTRIES. TOO OFTEN, THE COMMUNIST VOTE REFLECTS THE  
FACT THAT A SIGNIFICANT SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION HAS  
OPTED OUT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND HAS LOST CON-  
FIDENCE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT.

Q: DO THE TOTALITARIAN COUNTRIES HAVE AN ADVANTAGE OVER  
US?

Q: THEY ((THE TOTALITARIAN COUNTRIES)) ARE AT AN



ADVANTAGE OVER US WITH RESPECT TO ANY ONE DECISION THEY MAY WANT TO MAKE. HOWEVER, THEY FACE A PROBLEM OF INITIATIVE AND CREATIVITY. MOREOVER, THE QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP IN MOST TOTALITARIAN COUNTRIES IS WORSE, BECAUSE THEY HAVE A PROBLEM OF HOW TO REPLACE LEADERS AT THE VERY TOP, AND HOW TO ROTATE LEADERS AT MIDDLE LEVELS.

THE COMMUNISTS APPEAL IN THE THIRD WORLD IS NOT DUE TO THEIR OWN MERIT. ((I THINK)) NONDEMOCRATIC FORMS ARE GAINING. MUCH OF THE WORLD HAS ITS ORIGIN IN SOME FORM OF REVOLUTION. ON THE WHOLE, REVOLUTIONARIES DON'T MAKE REVOLUTION IN ORDER TO GIVE UP POWER AFTER THEY HAVE SEIZED IT. THEREFORE, IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD, THERE IS A TENDENCY TOWARD TOTALITARIANISM SIMPLY BECAUSE THE GENERATION THAT SEIZED POWER DID NOT GO THROUGH ALL THAT SUFFERING IN ORDER TO YIELD IT ((EASILY)). OUR REVOLUTION WAS VERY PECULIAR, (SINCE) IT WAS MADE BY PEOPLE WHO KNEW WHO THEY WERE TO BEGIN WITH, AND WHO THOUGHT THEY WERE CARRYING OUT AN EXISTING TRADITION.

Q: COULD WE TOLERATE COMMUNISTS IN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ITALY OR IN FRANCE?

A: IF YOU DEAL WITH A MODERN COMPLICATED DEMOCRATIC STATE, LIKE ITALY AND FRANCE, IT IS NOT DIRECTLY IN OUR POWER TO PREVENT IT. IT MUST BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO PREVENT IT. THE ALIENATION FROM GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE REMEDIED PRIMARILY BY THE U.S.

AT THE SAME TIME, INSOFAR AS WE CAN, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES TO RECAPTURE THE SENSE THAT THEY CAN ((THE GOVERNMENTS ARE IN)) CONTROL THEIR OWN DESTINY -- THAT THEY ARE NOT SUBJECT TO BLIND ECONOMIC FORCES THAT SHEEP ACROSS, THAT PRODUCE UNEMPLOYMENT, THAT PRODUCE INFLATION ((AND THAT WE WANT TO MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO BRING OUR ECONOMIC POLICIES, OUR POLITICAL POLICIES AND OUR NATIONAL PURPOSES INTO SOME SORT OF COHESIVE PATTERN)). THIS IS THE REASONING BEHIND THE PLANNED SUMMIT MEETING IN NOVEMBER.

Q: HOW DO YOU THINK DETENTE IS PERCEIVED BY THE AMERICAN PUBLIC?

" " - - HE SUFFERS FROM A NUMBER OF MIS-

A: THE DETENTE DEBATE SUFFERS FROM A NUMBER OF MIS- CONCEPTIONS AND OVERSIMPLIFICATIONS. ONE IS THAT DETENTE

IS A FAVOR WE GRANT TO THE SOVIET UNION, OR THAT WE CAN WITHHOLD IT AS A PUNISHMENT. THE FACT IS THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO CARRY OUT A FOREIGN POLICY GEARED TO THE





REALITIES OF THE PERIOD. ((WHAT IS OUR PERCEPTION OF REALITIES?)) ONE, THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS A NUCLEAR SUPERPOWER, WHOSE MILITARY POTENTIAL CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY WIPED OUT IN A SURPRISE ATTACK, ANY MORE THAN OURS CAN. THIS BEING THE CASE, ANY WAR BETWEEN US WILL INVOLVE COLOSSAL, INDEED CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE.

SECOND, THE U.S. IS NO LONGER PREDOMINANT, THOUGH IT IS STILL PROBABLY THE STRONGEST NATION ((IN THE W&RLD)).

THIRD, THE PREVENTION OF SOVIET EXPANSION, WHICH REMAINS A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN POLICY, HAS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN A ((MUCH)) MORE COMPLICATED WAY THAN IN THE 1940S AND 1950S ((BECAUSE IT DEPENDS NOW ON POLITICAL FACTORS, AND ON MILITARY FACTORS, OF INFINITELY GREATER COMPLEXITY)).

FOURTH, THE WORLD IS NO LONGER NONOLITHIC. IT IS NOT ONE IN WHICH WE CAN GIVE ORDERS, OR IN WHICH WE CAN DOMINATE A WESTERN GROUP AND THE SOVIETS DOMINATE AN EASTERN GROUP.

AND FIFTH, WE HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT THIS COUNTRY HAS GONE THROUGH WITH VIETNAM, WATERGATE, AND THE ATTENDANT CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS. FOR US TO RUN THE RISKS OF A CONFRONTATION THAT WILL BE CONSIDERED BY OUR PEOPLE AS UNNECESSARY IS TO INVITE MASSIVE FOREIGN POLICY DEFEATS.

I BELIEVE THAT THE POLICY WE ARE CARRYING OUT WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAS PUT US IN THE BEST POSITION TO RESIST SOVIET PRESSURES AND IN THE BEST POSITION TO EXPLOIT POSSIBILITIES OF ((FOR)) POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET POLICIES. NOW, HOWEVER, THE DEBATE GETS CARRIED ON AS IF WE ARE GIVING AWAY THINGS TO THE SOVIET UNION, ((WHAT SPECIFIC THINGS HAVE WE GIVEN TO THE SOVIET UNION?)) WHERE HAS THE SOVIET UNION MADE A UNILATERAL GAIN? ((THIS IS THE ISSUE IN WHICH THE OVER-SIMPLIFICATION OF OUR DEBATE IS DANGEROUS, AND I DO BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN VAST OVER-SIMPLIFICATION.))

Q: IT HAS BEEN CHARGED THAT BECAUSE OF DETENTE WE GAVE THE RUSSIANS TOO GENEROUS TERMS IN THE 1972 WHEAT DEAL, AND THAT AT HELSINKI WE ALLOWED THE SOVIET UNION TO RATIFY ITS DOMINATE POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE. ((WHAT IS YOUR ANSWER?))

A: THE WHEAT DEAL IS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED TODAY AS A BUREAUCRATIC MISTAKE. IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH DETENTE. IN 1972 THE DECISION ((ARGUMENT)) WAS MADE TO SELL

THEM WHEAT BECAUSE IT WAS CONSIDERED A GOOD THING FOR OUR FARMERS. AND FOR THAT REASON, IT WASN'T WATCHED SUFFICIENTLY AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. THAT WAS MISTAKE, BUT IT WAS NOT A MISTAKE OF DETENTE.

THE SO-CALLED HELSINKI ISSUE HAS TO BE SEEN IN THE ((ENTIRE)) CONTEXT OF THE EVOLUTION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIPS. WE USED IT AS AN INCENTIVE TO GET A BERLIN AGREEMENT AND THE START OF ((TALKS ON)) MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE BY REFUSING TO AGREE TO A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE UNTIL AFTER A BERLIN AGREEMENT. AND THAT IN TURN QUIETED DOWN AN ((VERY)) EXPLOSIVE SITUATION, WE HOPE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

WITH RESPECT TO THE FRONTIERS, HELSINKI RATIFIED NOTHING THAT HAD NOT BEEN RATIFIED BEFORE AT YALTA, POTSDAM AND IN THE PEACE TREATIES. THE SOVIET POLITICAL POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE DEPENDS ON MILITARY PREDOMINANCE, AND ON HISTORY SINCE 1950, WHICH HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT TOLERATE A BREAK-AWAY FROM ITS FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND THE WEST WOULD NOT INTERVENE IF THE SOVIET UNION ASSERTED ITSELF MILITARILY.

Q: IF WE DON'T HAVE A SALT AGREEMENT THIS YEAR OR EARLY NEXT YEAR, WOULD THAT BASICALLY CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR?

A: I DON'T WANT TO GIVE A SPECIFIC DEADLINE FOR THE SALT AGREEMENT. BUT IF THE SALT NEGOTIATION SHOULD FAIL, BOTH SIDES WILL BE FORCED TO BUILD THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES IN ANTICIPATION OF WHAT THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT DO.

IN OUR CASE IT WOULD MEAN THAT RATHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION REDUCING THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES FROM THE APPROXIMATELY 2,000 UNITS THEY HAVE NOW TO 2,400, WE WOULD HAVE TO CALCULATE THAT THEY WILL STAY AT 2,000 -- OR MAYBE GO BEYOND THAT. TO MATCH THIS WOULD INVOLVE A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN OUR STRATEGIC DEFENSE BUDGET. THAT, IN TURN, CAN ONLY BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF AN INCREASED DANGER. SO THE RHETORIC OF BOTH SIDES WILL BECOME MORE CONFRONTATIONAL, AND I WOULD THINK THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIAL CHILLING IN THE RELATIONSHIP -- IF NOT A RETURN OF THE COLD WAR.

Q: ISN'T THERE A BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PENTAGON AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON OUR SALT NEGOTIATING POSITION?

A: IF THERE IS A BASIC DIFFERENCE, I KNOW ABOUT IT



ONLY FROM THE NEWSPAPERS. THE LAST POSITION THAT WAS GIVEN TO FOREIGN MINISTER (ANDREI) GROMYKO WAS JOINTLY WORKED OUT BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND MYSELF ((IN THE PRESENCE OF TWO ASSOCIATES)), IT WAS THEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT. ((THEREFORE, IT REPRESENTED A JOINT POSITION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT -- THE PROPOSAL THAT IS NOW BEFORE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT)), ((AND)) IF THERE SHOULD BE A DISAGREEMENT -- AND THE DISAGREEMENT IS ALWAYS MUCH MORE IN THE PRESS THAN IN REALITY -- THEN IT WILL BE SETTLED BY THE PRESIDENT.

Q: DO YOU EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE AN AGREEMENT THIS YEAR?

A: IT'S NOW GETTING RATHER LATE IN THE YEAR. IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS, EVEN AFTER AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, TO WORK OUT ALL THE TECHNICAL DETAILS. SO IT MAY SLIP BEYOND THE END OF THIS YEAR.

Q: WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR (SOVIET PARTY CHIEF LEONID) BREZHNEV TO COME TO THE U.S. BEFORE A SALT AGREEMENT IS WORKED OUT?

A: I WOULD THINK IT'S UNLIKELY. I THINK HIS VISIT WOULD BE TIED TO A SALT AGREEMENT.

Q: DO YOU AGREE -- AS THE CHINESE HAVE CHARGED -- THAT THE DANGER OF WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. IS INCREASING?

A: I DO NOT SEE THE DANGER OF WAR INCREASING ((IN OUR RELATIONS)) WITH THE SOVIET UNION. I THINK THAT IN THE NEXT DECADE, AS SOVIET POWER GROWS -- AND IT WILL GROW NOT AS A RESULT OF DETENTE BUT AS A RESULT OF TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -- THE TEMPTATION TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL POSITIONS COMMENSURATE WITH THAT POWER MAY ALSO GROW. AND IN THAT SENSE THERE COULD BE A DANGER OF INCREASED CONFLICTS, IF WE DO NOT, PRIOR TO THAT EVENT, REGULATE OUR RELATIONSHIPS IN SOME MANNER, AND IF WE FAIL TO KEEP UP OUR DEFENSES.

Q: WOULD IT BE IN OUR STRATEGIC INTEREST IF THERE WAS WAR BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA.

A: NO. WE ARE NOT STIMULATING THE RIVALRY; WE ARE DOING NOTHING TO ENCOURAGE THAT CONFLICT. IT EXISTS; IT IS A FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE. IT IS NOT ANYTHING IN WHICH WE CAN OURSELVES GET INVOLVED. BUT A WAR BETWEEN THOSE TWO



COUNTRIES WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE. WE'RE TRYING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH BOTH (COUNTRIES). OF COURSE, EACH MIGHT PREFER IT IF WE DID NOT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER. FOR OUR PURPOSES, IT IS BETTER TO HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH BOTH.

Q: ((THERE HAVE BEEN QUESTIONS ABOUT)) WHY SHOULD THE PRESIDENT GO TO CHINA THIS YEAR? ((WHAT IS YOUR ANSWER?))

A: THE PRESIDENT IS GOING ((TO PEKING)) BECAUSE THE ESSENCE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA DEPENDS ON A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE WORLD, THAT REQUIRES A PERIODIC EXCHANGE (OF VIEWS) AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THERE HASN'T BEEN A MEETING BETWEEN THE TOP CHINESE LEADERS AND AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT FOR NEARLY FOUR YEARS. IN A RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH SO MUCH DEPENDS ON INTANGIBLES, AN OCCASIONAL MEETING IS QUITE IMPORTANT. (THE TRIP) WILL CERTAINLY NOT BE JUST CEREMONIAL.

Q: DO YOU EXPECT THE QUESTION OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS --SHORT OF OUR ((COMPLETE)) BREAKING OF RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN -- TO BE RESOLVED?

A: THE ISSUE WILL CERTAINLY COME UP, AND WE'LL DISCUSS IT IN THE SPIRIT OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE PURPOSE OF OUR CONTACTS IS TO ACHIEVE FULL NORMALIZATION. WE DON'T HAVE A TIMETABLE RIGHT NOW. (AS FOR THE CHINESE) WELL, THEY'VE STATED PUBLICLY THAT THEY'RE PATIENT.

((Q: WOULD A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFEX ASSAD HELP BREAK THE STALEMATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

((A: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THOUGH IT WOULD BE HELPFUL. NOR DO I ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT THERE'S A STALEMATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I THINK IT IS OBVIOUS THAT AFTER AN EVENT OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SINAI AGREEMENT THAT ALL PARTIES HAVE TO CONSIDER THEIR POSITIONS. IF THE TWO SHOULD MEET AT SOME POINT, IT SHOULD NOT BE CONCEIVED AS AN EMERGENCY MEETING THAT MUST LEAD TO AN IMMEDIATE RESULT. BUT IT WOULD LEAD TO A VERY USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.))

Q: THERE HAS BEEN REPORTS THAT YOU WILL MAKE A VISIT TO ISRAEL AND SYRIA IN DECEMBER. IS THAT CORRECT?

A: ABSOLUTELY NOT. ((AND)) SHORT OF SOME CRISIS THAT I



NOW DON'T SEE, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT I WILL VISIT ISRAEL AND SYRIA AT THAT TIME.

Q: DO YOU FEEL THAT THERE WILL BE A MAJOR REASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL -- AND AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN GENERAL -- WHEN THE AID APPROPRIATIONS ARE PRESENTED TO CONGRESS?

A: THE AID DISCUSSIONS TAKE ON A VERY CURIOUS FORM. THE IMPRESSION HAS BEEN CREATED THAT THE AID REQUESTS FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPT ARE CAUSED BY THE SINAI AGREEMENT. INDEED, I SAW IT IN YOUR MAGAZINE (TIME, SEPT. 15) THAT "KISSINGER PROMISED THEM CERTAIN THINGS." THE FACT IS THAT BEFORE THE AGREEMENT THE ISRAELIS ASKED FOR \$2.6 BILLION AND WERE CONFIDENT ENOUGH OF GETTING IT THAT THEY PUT IT INTO THEIR BUDGET AS A PUBLIC FIGURE. SEVENTY-SIX SENATORS URGED US TO MEET THAT REQUEST.

LAST YEAR ISRAEL RECEIVED \$5 BILLION OF ((TOTAL)) EMERGENCY AND REGULAR AID, AND A SUBSTANTIAL SUM FOR ISRAEL HAS BEEN IN EVERY BUDGET FOR THE LAST 15 YEARS. SIMILARLY, WE HAD ALLOCATED A CERTAIN AMOUNT FOR EGYPT PRIOR TO THE AGREEMENT. AID LEVELS WERE NEVER DISCUSSED WITH EGYPT DURING THE AGREEMENT. WE SET THE ((AID)) LEVELS UNILATERALLY AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS COMPLETED. AID TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT REFLECTS OUR OWN ((NATIONAL)) INTERESTS; IT IS NOT A PAYMENT FOR THE AGREEMENT.

Q: WHAT ABOUT A REASSESSMENT IN TERMS OF OUR OWN DOMESTIC PRIORITIES -- FOR EXAMPLE, THE PROBLEMS IN NEW YORK ((PROBLEMS OF THE RECESSION AND UNEMPLOYMENT))?

A: ((YOU CAN'T COMPARE THE PROBLEM OF NEW YORK TO THE PROBLEM OF ISRAEL,)) ((AND I DON'T THINK)) THIS IS A FAIR CHOICE BECAUSE IF YOU SACRIFICE AN ((ANY)) ALLY ABROAD, EVEN IF IT HAS NO IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES, THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES IN TERMS OF YOUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION ARE VERY SEVERE. WE MUST OVERCOME THE IDEA THAT WHEN WE DEAL WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IT IS A FAVOR WE DO THEM, THAT WE CAN WITHDRAW WITHOUT PENALTY TO OURSELVES. IF WE HAVE A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, IT MUST BE BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE PERMANENT INTERESTS. IF WE DON'T ((HAVE PERMANENT INTERESTS)) THEN THAT RELATIONSHIP IS IN TROUBLE. BUT IF WE DO HAVE PERMANENT INTERESTS, THEN WE CANNOT CHOOSE BETWEEN NEW YORK AND SAY, ISRAEL. ((THAT IS A CHOICE WE CANNOT MAKE)).



Q: THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE QUESTIONING AND CRITICISM...

A: IF IT'S CRITICISM, IT WAS UNFAIR. (LAUGHTER)

Q: ... ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE U.S. TO SPEAK OUT FOR TRIAL BY JURY ((TRIAL BY JURY NOT IN AGREED TEXT)) FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CASE OF THE SUMMARY EXECUTION OF BASQUES AND LEFTIST TERRORISTS IN SPAIN. WHY WAS THAT?

A: I DON'T HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT TRIAL BY JURY IS PART OF THE SPANISH LEGAL TRADITION. TRIAL BY JURY ISN'T THE CASE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY. IT'S NOT THE CASE IN ANY COUNTRY THAT HAS THE NAPOLEONIC CODE OR THE ROMAN LAW. TRIAL BY JURY IS AN ANGLO-SAXON CONCEPT THAT EXISTS ONLY IN COUNTRIES WITHIN THE ANGLO-SAXON JURISPRUDENCE.

WE DID NOT TAKE THE OFFICIAL POSITION ON THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE CARRIED OUT IN SPAIN, AND I DON'T THINK THAT WAS THE OBJECTION OF MANY OF THE EUROPEANS. RATHER IT WAS ((I THINK THE OBJECTION WAS)) A RALLYING POINT FOR A HISTORICAL RESENTMENT OF FRANCO SPAIN, WHICH IS ROOTED IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. ((I THINK)) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE WEST -- BRINGING SPAIN BACK TO THE WEST -- IS ONE OF THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE NEXT FIVE TO TEN YEARS.

Q: WHAT ((DO YOU CONSIDER AS)) ARE YOUR TOP PRIORITY ITEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY?

A: IN FOREIGN POLICY THERE ARE ALWAYS PERIODS OF INNOVATION AND THEN THERE ARE PERIODS OF CONSOLIDATION. WE WENT THROUGH A PERIOD OF INNOVATION WITH RESPECT TO THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES BETWEEN 171 AND 173. WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATING THIS. WE THEN WENT THROUGH A PERIOD OF INNOVATION IN OUR RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN IN THE PERIOD 173 AND 175. THIS IS STILL ((IN THE PROCESS OF))

GOING ON. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN, IN MY VIEW, ADEQUATELY NOTED, I THINK OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES IS BETTER AND MORE CREATIVE THAN IT HAS BEEN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE LAST 1940'S. THE THINGS THAT WERE CONSIDERED VERY ADVANCED IN 173, WHEN I PUT FORWARD THE YEAR OF EUROPE, ARE NOW ACCEPTED AS A MATTER OF COURSE. AT THAT TIME WHEN WE PROPOSED THAT ECONOMIC POLICIES SHOULD BE COORDINATED THIS WAS REJECTED. TODAY IT IS MADE AS A DEMAND. THIS



IS A PERIOD I WOULD PUT IN THE MIDDLE OF ITS CREATIVE PHASE.

THEN WE HAVE THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW COUNTRIES IN WHICH WE HAVE JUST BEGUN THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION WITH THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION.

THOSE ARE THE THREE AREAS WHICH ARE IN VARIOUS STATES OF EVOLUTION. OF COURSE, YOU HAVE CRITICAL PROBLEMS LIKE THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH MUST, IN MY VIEW, IN THE NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCE TOWARDS PEACE -- OR MAYBE ACHIEVE PEACE.

ONE OF THE THINGS WE'VE OFTEN DISCUSSED IS THE VITALITY OF WESTERN INSTITUTIONS IN THE PERIOD OF CHANGE. THIS IS PERHAPS OUR DEEPEST PROBLEM, TO WHICH A FOREIGN POLICY-MAKER CAN CONTRIBUTE BY PERFORMANCE BUT NOT DIRECTLY.

Q: LAST WEEK YOU MET WITH THE PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER (MELO ANTUNES) AND THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PUT FORWARD TO CONGRESS THE PROPOSAL FOR \$85 MILLION IN AID. HOW DO YOU NOW FEEL ABOUT THE SURVIVAL OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN PORTUGAL?

A: MY POSITION HAS BEEN THAT WITHOUT A SYSTEMATIC EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE THE PLURALISTIC FORCES IN PORTUGAL THEY WOULD BE DEFEATED. FOR A WHILE THERE WAS A DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND THE WESTEUROPEANS, WHO THOUGHT THAT THE FORCES OF THE GOVERNMENT THAT WAS IN OFFICE EARLIER THIS YEAR WOULD OVER A PERIOD OF TIME PRODUCE PLURALISM. I WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THIS. DURING THE SUMMER THE WEST EUROPEANS CAME TO THE SAME CONCLUSIONS WE HAD EARLIER REACHED; NAMELY, THAT PLURALISM HAD TO BE ACTIVELY ENCOURAGED. AND THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN MY POSITION. I THINK IT IS STILL A VERY PRECARIOUS SITUATION IN PORTUGAL, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH IS NOT CLEAR. RECENT TRENDS ((HAVE BEEN)) ARE MORE ENCOURAGING.

Q: IN YOUR U.N. SPEECH YOU SUGGESTED A CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE CONCERNED POWERS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA. THAT WAS REJECTED BY THE CHINESE AND THE NORTH KOREANS.

A: YES, BUT I'M NOT SURE THAT IS ABSOLUTELY THEIR LAST WORD ON THE SUBJECT. EVEN IF THERE IS NO FORMAL CONFERENCE, WE CAN HAVE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS. WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO NORTH KOREA AS SUCH. WHAT WE DON'T WANT TO DO IS HAVE BILATERAL TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA TO THE EXCLUSION OF SOUTH KOREA. WE DON'T WANT TO HAVE SOUTH KOREA



MANEUVERED INTO THE POSITION OF AN INTERNATIONAL PARIAS WHILE WE SETTLE THE FUTURE OF NORTH KOREA IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS OR IN ANY CONFERENCE WHOSE COMPOSITION

WAS REASONABLY BALANCED THAT INCLUDE SOUTH KOREA. SIMILARLY, IF THE SOVIET UNION OR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC WERE PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE SOUTH KOREA, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREA.

Q: IN 1968 ((DATE SUPPLIED BY TIME)) IN A WORLD RESTORED, YOU WROTE THAT "STATESMEN OFTEN SHARE THE FATE OF PROPHETS" -- THAT THEY'RE WITHOUT HONOR IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY. DO YOU FEEL YOU'RE SUFFERING THIS FATE?

A: WELL, THE LEAD TIME FOR PROPHECY HAS SHORTENED. I THINK IN THE COUNTRY THERE'S A GENERAL FEELING THAT OUR FOREIGN POLICY IS REASONABLY EFFECTIVE. SOME OF THE CRITICISM IS THE NATURAL RESULT OF AN ELECTION YEAR. SOME OF IT IS THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF HAVING BEEN IN OFFICE FOR SEVEN YEARS, IN WHICH YOU ACCUMULATE A LOT OF MORTGAGES ON YOURSELF ((ON YOURSELF ADDED FROM CROSSED OUT SECTION OF AGREED TEXT)).

INEVITABLY, AFTER ONE IS OUT OF OFFICE, ONE'S ((ROLE)) POLICIES WILL BE SEEN IN CLEARER PERSPECTIVE, BECAUSE THEN THE ALTERNATIVES WILL HAVE TO BE TRIED OR REJECTED BY SOMEBODY ELSE. BUT, ON THE WHOLE I BELIEVE THAT THE CRITICISM DOES NOT GO TO THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE POLICY AND, THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE POLICY WILL BE CARRIED ON AFTER I LEAVE OFFICE -- EVEN IF ANOTHER ADMINISTRATION SUCCEEDS US.

Q: IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU'LL STAY, IF THE PRESIDENT'S ((RE-)) (3)3:53s.

A: DON'T SCARE ME LIKE THAT. I'D LOSE AT LEAST MY DOG, AND PROBABLY MY WIFE. (LAUGHTER)  
WND QUDZE

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EXDIS  
E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PPOR, PGOV, SP

SUBJECT:BRIEFING MEMO: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR DEATH OF  
FRANCO

FOR THE SECRETARY THROUGH SISCO FROM HARTMAN

1. YOU HAVE SEEN THE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF FRANCO'S DEATH. IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT WE ARE FULLY PREPARED FOR THIS EVENT, WE ARE REVIEWING AND UP-DATING THE APPROVED CONTINGENCY PLANS. AS OF TRANSMISSION TIME, NEWS IS STILL UNCONFIRMED.

2. THE PLANNED COURSE OF EVENTS-- WHICH WE EXPECT TO TAKE PLACE WITHOUT MAJOR CHANGE -- IS THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING FRANCO'S DEATH OR INCAPACITATION THE THREE-MAN REGENCY COUNCIL, HEADED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE CORTES, WOULD TAKE POWER IN THE NAME OF THE PRINCE. WITHIN EIGHT DAYS, THE FUNERAL WOULD BE HELD AND JUAN CARLOS WOULD BE SWORN IN AS CHIEF OF STATE. WE ASSUME THAT THE FUNERAL, RATHER THAN THE SWEARING IN, WOULD BE THE MAJOR CEREMONIAL EVENT, WITH A CORONATION CEREMONY DEFERRED AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE PERIOD OF MOURNING.

3. ALTHOUGH THE TEMPORARY TRANSFER OF POWER TO JUAN CARLOS LAST SUMMER WAS A REHEARSAL, THE SUCCESSION MECHANISM HAS NOT REALLY BEEN TESTED AND THE OUTCOME IS UNCERTAIN. WE



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SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS; CORTINA SAID HE WOULD NEED SOME MORE TIME TO COMPLETE THE NECESSARY WORK ON HIS SIDE.

AND COULD EVEN LEAD TO PROTRACTED DISCUSSIONS OF ISSUES AND COULD EVEN LEAD TO PROTRACTED DISCUSSIONS OF ISSUES YET UNRESOLVED. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO PRESENT REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD DISAVOW THE FRAMEWORK AGREED BY YOU AND CORTINA. THERE COULD EVEN BE ADVANTAGES IF THERE WERE A NEW GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME THE PACKAGE WAS BEING ACTED UPON BY CONGRESS. NO SPECIAL CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS SEEM REQUIRED AT PRESENT.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT (TAB 1)

I HAVE JUST LEARNED WITH SORROW OF THE DEATH OF GENERALISIMO FRANCISCO FRANCO, WHO LED HIS COUNTRY FOR OVER THREE DECADES DURING A SIGNIFICANT ERA IN SPANISH HISTORY. ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, I WISH TO EXPRESS THE DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO THE WIDOW OF GENERALISIMO FRANCO, DONA CARMEN POLO DE FRANCO, TO PRINCE JUAN CARLOS, MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY AND TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF SPAIN. I KNOW THAT GENERALISIMO FRANCO'S LOSS WILL BE DEEPLY FELT THROUGHOUT SPAIN. WE WISH THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WELL IN THE PERIOD AHEAD. THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS PART WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WHICH HAS FORMED THE TOUCHSTONE FOR THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY (TAB 2)

THE DEATH OF GENERALISIMO FRANCISCO FRANCO BRINGS TO AN END A MOMENTOUS PERIOD IN SPANISH HISTORY. SPAIN HAS LOST A LEADER WHOSE DEATH WILL BE DEEPLY MOURNED BY HIS COUNTRYMEN. I OFFER MY SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE WIDOW AND FAMILY OF THE CHIEF OF STATE, TO PRINCE JUAN CARLOS AND TO THE SPANISH PEOPLE, INGERSOLL  
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APPROVED BY EUR - ARTHUR A. HARTMAN  
S/S - MR. ORTIZ

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, SP

SUBJECT: CONDOLENCE MESSAGES ON DEATH OF FRANCO

FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF PREPARED CONDOLENCE MESSAGES FOR USE  
ON DEATH OF FRANCO:

1. MESSAGE TO SENORA DE FRANCO:

"PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO  
SENORA DE FRANCO: "DEAR SENORA DE FRANCO: I WISH TO  
EXPRESS TO YOU MY GREAT SORROW ON LEARNING OF THE DEATH  
OF YOUR HUSBAND, THE LEADER OF HIS COUNTRY THROUGH SO MANY  
YEARS. GENERAL FRANCO WILL BE REMEMBERED AS A LEADER OF  
DISTINCTION AND AN OUTSTANDING FIGURE OF SPANISH HISTORY  
DURING AN ERA OF PROFOUND WORLD CHANGES. PLEASE ACCEPT  
MY DEEPEST CONDOLENCES AND THOSE OF MY WIFE. GERALD  
R. FORD."

2. MESSAGE TO PRINCE JUAN CARLOS:

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By NR NARA/Date 8/6/10



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"PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS, PRINCE JUAN CARLOS: "MAY I EXPRESS TO YOU MY DEEP CONDOLENCES AND THOSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE DEATH OF THE CHIEF OF STATE, GENERALISIMO FRANCISCO FRANCO. HE SERVED SPAIN WITH GREAT DISTINCTION THROUGH YEARS OF PROFOUND CHANGES AND I KNOW HOW HIS LOSS WILL BE MOURNED BY THE SPANISH PEOPLE. WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, GERALD R. FORD."

3. MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER ARIAS:

"PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER ARIAS NAVARRO: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU AND TO THE MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT MY DEEPEST SYMPATHY ON THE DEATH OF GENERALISIMO FRANCISCO FRANCO BAHAMONDE. I KNOW WELL HOW HIS LOSS WILL BE DEEPLY FELT THROUGHOUT SPAIN. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONDOLENCES. GERALD R. FORD."

4. MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER CORTINA:

"PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER CORTINA: DEAR MR. MINISTER: I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY DEEP CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF THE CHIEF OF STATE, GENERALISIMO FRANCISCO FRANCO, WHO LED HIS COUNTRY WITH GREAT DISTINCTION THROUGH SO MANY YEARS. I HOPE THAT THIS GREAT LOSS WILL BE TEMPERED IN SOME MEASURE BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT GENERAL FRANCO WILL LONG BE REMEMBERED AS A MAJOR FIGURE OF SPANISH HISTORY. WARM REGARDS. HENRY KISSINGER."

5. IN ALL CASES OF ABOVE MESSAGES DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE TO NOT PLAN RELEASE BUT HAVE NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENTS WISH TO DO SO.

6. FOR MADRID; THESE TEXTS FYI ONLY. TAKE NO ACTION PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. INGERSOLL



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 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, SP

SUBJECT: CONDOLENCE MESSAGES ON DEATH OF FRANCO

FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF PREPARED CONDOLENCE MESSAGES FOR USE  
 ON DEATH OF FRANCO:

1. MESSAGE TO SENORA DE FRANCO:

"PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO  
 SENORA DE FRANCO: "DEAR SENDRA DE FRANCO: I WISH TO  
 EXPRESS TO YOU MY GREAT SORROW ON LEARNING OF THE DEATH  
 OF YOUR HUSBAND, THE LEADER OF HIS COUNTRY THROUGH SO MANY  
 YEARS. GENERAL FRANCO WILL BE REMEMBERED AS A LEADER OF  
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 DURING AN ERA OF PROFOUND WORLD CHANGES. PLEASE ACCEPT  
 MY DEEPEST CONDOLENCES AND THOSE OF MY WIFE, GERALD  
 R. FORD."


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 THROUGH YEARS OF PROFOUND CHANGES AND I KNOW HOW HIS LOSS  
 WILL BE MOURNED BY THE SPANISH PEOPLE. WITH WARM

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PERSONAL REGARDS, GERALD R. FORD."

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"PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER ARIAS NAVARRO: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU AND TO THE MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT MY DEEPEST SYMPATHY ON THE DEATH OF GENERALISIMO FRANCISCO FRANCO BAHAMONDE. I KNOW WELL HOW HIS LOSS WILL BE DEEPLY FELT THROUGHOUT SPAIN. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONDOLENCES. GERALD R. FORD."

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