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TELEGRAM

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
E.O. 11652: GDS

JAGS: JA, KS, OVIP

SUBJECT: T-39 FOR SEOUL

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB

AIR FORCE FAILED TO SEND AUTHORIZATION TO TOKYO FOR T-39 TRIP ON FRIDAY. ABRAMOWITZ ASSURES ALL CLEARANCES OBTAINED ON THIS END AND AUTHORIZATION TO TOKYO WILL BE SENT. IN MEANTIME, ABRAMOWITZ SUGGESTS YOU GIVE SHOESMITH INDICATION OF ARRANGEMENTS YOU DESIRE AND LEAVE IT TO HIM TO WORK OUT WITH 5TH AIR FORCE. INGERSOLL



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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC.3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By NR NARA, D:26 8/5/10

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3814

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 248476 TOSEC 160044

FOLLOWING REPEAT SINGAPORE 4517 ACTION SECSTATE INFO USUN
JAKARTA MANILA BANGKOK KUALA LUMPUR TOKYO 18 OCT 75
QUOTE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SINGAPORE 4517

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UNGA ASEAN KS KN SN

SUBJECT: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA: SINGAPORE POSITION

REF: A. SINGAPORE 4497 (NOTAL) B. SINGAPORE 4513 (NOTAL)

1. TO RECAPTSLATE GOS POSITION RE KOREAN ITEM ON BASIS REFTELS, AND ASSUMING GOS NO LONGER CONSIDERS ASEAN DRAFT RESOLUTION A VIABLE OPTION, EMBASSY ESTIMATES SITUATION PRESENTLY AS FOLLOWS:
2. PRIORITY. SINGAPORE WILL VOTE AGAINST PRIORITY FOR ALGERIAN RESOLUTION.
3. FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. SINGAPORE IS TENDING TOWARD VOTING FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND PROBABLY CAN BE PERSUADED TO DO SO, ESPECIALLY IF OTHER ASEAN NATIONS FOLLOW SUIT. GOS WOULD HOPE THAT IF FRIENDLY RESOLUTION CARRIES BY A SUFFICIENT MARGIN, HOSTILE RESOLUTION WOULD NEVER COME TO A VOTE.
4. HOSTILE RESOLUTION. GOS DOES NOT WANT HOSTILE RESOLUTION TO PASS, AND IN EXTREMIS COULD PROBABLY BE PERSUADED TO VOTE AGAINST IT. HOWEVER, IF IT APPEARED THAT A MAJORITY EXISTED AGAINST HOSTILE RESOLUTION WITHOUT SINGAPORE'S HELP, GOS WOULD ABSTAIN SO AS NOT TO COMPLICATE ITS STATUS AMONG NONALIGNED NATIONS. IN BORDERLINE CASE, STAND OF OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES, ABOVE ALL INDONESIA, WOULD BE A KEY FACTOR.
5. IT APPEARS THAT SINGAPORE IS KEEPING A CLOSE WATCH ON VOTING TRENDS IN NEW YORK. AT SAME TIME, IT HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE IN SOME DEGREE TO VARIOUS REPRESENTATIONS MADE HERE. TO DATE, SUCH REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY US, JAPAN, AND UK. NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS BEEN TOLD BY WELLINGTON THAT NZ LOBBYING

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By HR NARA, Date 8/5/10



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WILL BE ENTIRELY IN NEW YORK.
HOLDRIDGE
UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
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OCT 75Z 22 ⁵⁸Department of State 004758

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NSC: BSCOWCROFT

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 248482 TOSEC 180045

NOODS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ETRD, EEWT, UR, US

SUBJECT: GRAIN/OIL NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) STATE 248448
(B) MOSCOW 14981



1. REFTEL A CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY REQUESTED REFTEL B ,
UNLESS SECRETARY KISSINGER PERCEIVES OBJECTION, IN
WHICH CASE MATTER WILL HAVE TO BE PUT TO PRESIDENT.
2. ADVISE BY SHORT FLASH MESSAGE WHEN TIME OF SIGNATURE
IS SET AND CONFIRM BASIS THEREFOR. INGERSOLL

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State Dept Guidelines

By LR NARA, Date 8/15/10

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 9811

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3016

~~SECRET~~ STATE 248479 108EC 160046

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ETRD, EETH, UR, US

SUBJECT: GRAIN/OIL NEGOTIATIONS

FOR ROBINSON FROM HINTON

1. WE ASSUME THAT IN SIGNING ALTERNAT VERSIONS OF OIL LETTER OF INTENT YOU AND PATOLICHEV WILL DELETE DATES FROM OPENING PARAGRAPH WHICH WE EXPECT WILL THEN READ: "THIS IS TO CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING ARISING OUT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS INTEND TO COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS PROMPTLY TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT OF SOVIET OIL."

2. PLEASE CONFIRM THAT THIS IS CORRECT. INGERSOLL

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By LR NARA, Date 8/5/10



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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3017

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6099

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 248480 TOSEC 160047

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP, (SADAT, ANWAR)

SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT: MRS. KISSINGER'S LUNCHEON OR TEA FOR
MRS. SADAT
FOR SECRETARY FROM SAUNDERS

1. YOU HAD INDICATED THAT MRS. KISSINGER WISHES TO GIVE
A LUNCHEON OR TEA FOR MRS. SADAT DURING HER VISIT. IF
MRS. KISSINGER WOULD PREFER TO DO THIS IN WASHINGTON, THE
BEST TIME WOULD BE A TEA AT ABOUT 5:00 P.M. ON MONDAY,
OCTOBER 27. ALTERNATIVELY, MRS. KISSINGER COULD HOST A
LUNCHEON OR TEA DURING THE FLORIDA REST STOP. PLEASE LET
US KNOW MRS. KISSINGER'S PREFERENCES.

INGERSOLL
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By LR NARA, Date 8/5/10

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 248481 TOSEC 160048

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, BR, US, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA

REF: SECTO 16021

1. FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF LETTER TO YOU FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA WHICH WAS DELIVERED BY BRAZILIAN EMBASSY NIGHT OF OCTOBER 17.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

MY DEAR HENRY:

I NEED NOT TELL YOU OF THE PLEASURE WHICH OUR TWO MEETINGS IN NEW YORK GAVE ME. BILL ROGERS MUST HAVE ALREADY MADE YOU AWARE BY NOW OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WITH THE NEW DATES PROPOSED FOR YOUR VISIT TO BRASILIA. GENSCHER HAS AGREED TO BE HERE ON NOVEMBER 17 THROUGH 19. THUS, WE WILL BE READY TO WELCOME YOU ON THE 20TH, WHEN I SHALL HAVE THE PLEASURE OF HONORING YOU WITH A BANQUET SOON AFTER YOUR ARRIVAL. THE PRESIDENT WILL RECEIVE YOU ON THE 21ST; NEXT MORNING ON THE 22ND YOU WILL BE ABLE TO FLY DOWN TO RIO FOR THE WEEK-END WHICH HAS BEEN PROMISED TO NANCY. I ALSO AWAIT A WORD FROM YOU ON THE



SUGGESTION WHICH I CONVEYED THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON OUR JOINT INAUGURATION OF THE DIRECT DIALING

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines *12/9/03*

By NR NARA, Date 8/5/10

TELEPHONE SYSTEM BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE U.S.A. IT WOULD BE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY, FOR INSTANCE, TO MAKE YOUR VISIT KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC.

I SHALL NOW TAKE UP THE SUBJECT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS, A MATTER ON WHICH I PROMISED TO WRITE YOU. YOU TOLD ME THAT YOU ARE CONVINCED OF THE NEED OF SUCH A RELATIONSHIP, EVEN THOUGH YOU KNEW OF THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM MAKING A DISTINCTION SINGLING BRAZIL OUT FROM THE OTHER NATIONS ON THE HEMISPHERE. YOU ALSO ASKED ME TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS ON MEANS AND FORMULAS WHICH WOULD RENDER THAT RELATIONSHIP OPERATIONAL, SO THAT THERE WOULD BE SOMETHING WHICH COULD BE FORMALIZED ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR VISIT TO BRAZIL. I CONFESS THAT I FIND SOME DIFFICULTY IN REOPENING THE SUBJECT IN ITS SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT, BUT NOT IN ITS FORMAL ONE. FROM THE FORMAL VIEWPOINT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE U.S.A. IS AN ISSUE THAT COULD BE TAKEN CARE OF THROUGH THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE, AS I HAVE PROPOSED IN MY LETTER TO YOU DATED JUNE 6, 1974, TO WHICH YOU REPLIED ON THE 13TH OF THE SAME MONTH. SUCH A COMMITTEE AS CONTEMPLATED IN MY PROPOSAL WOULD PROVIDE THE ADEQUATE FRAMEWORK, BOTH AMPLE AND FLEXIBLE, FOR THE INSTITUTION OF AN OPERATIONAL MECHANISM AT HIGH LEVEL FOR MUTUAL CONSULTATION ON MATTERS OF EITHER INDIVIDUAL OR COMMON INTEREST OF THE PARTIES. SUCH A COMMITTEE WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THE TRADITIONAL JOINT COMMISSION AS IT WOULD BE CONCERNED BASICALLY WITH POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS.

IT IS IN ITS SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT THAT THE UNDERSTANDING AT WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MAY ARRIVE APPEARS TO ME TO BE LESS CLEAR. LIKE YOU, I BELIEVE THAT WHAT IS NECESSARY IS THAT THERE EXIST ON BOTH SIDES A CLEAR AWARENESS OF THIS "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" AS WELL AS STRAIGHTFORWARD IDEAS ABOUT WHAT IT REALLY SIGNIFIES. FROM BRAZIL'S VIEWPOINT THE TWO ASPECTS ARE INTERCONNECTED. EVIDENTLY, BOTH BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES CAN LIVE WITHOUT THE FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. IN THE MEASURE, HOWEVER, THAT ONE CAN BE USEFUL TO THE OTHER FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF CERTAIN COMMON OR PARTICULAR AIMS, THIS RELATIONSHIP CAN BE REALLY IMPORTANT. IMPORTANCE, THEREFORE, IS THE FUNCTION OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS RELATIONSHIP.

IT IS NOT FOR ME TO PRESUME WHAT COULD BE THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH



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BRAZIL. I CAN STATE, HOWEVER, WHAT CAN BRAZIL'S INTERESTS BE. BASICALLY, IN OUR CASE, THE AIM WOULD BE TO OBTAIN FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THE RECOGNITION THAT AN ECONOMICALLY STRONG AND PROSPEROUS BRAZIL, AS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNITY OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE SURVIVAL OF THE VALUES OF THE WESTERN WORLD. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NO OBSTACLES BE RAISED AGAINST THE SWIFT ECONOMIC EXPANSION OF BRAZIL, THROUGH MEASURES WHICH MIGHT IMPEDE OR RETARD THAT DEVELOPMENT. MORE THAN THIS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS RAPID TRANSFORMATION BE HELPED BY THE CREATION OF FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR TRADE EXPANSION, FOR THE DIVERSIFICATION OF EXPORTS, FOR THE INCREASE OF BRAZIL'S COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN THE WORLD, FOR DOMESTIC INDUSTRIALIZATION AND, ABOVE ALL, FOR TECHNOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION UNDER CONDITIONS LEADING TO AUTONOMY AND CREATIVITY RATHER THAN PERPETUATE OR INCREASE DEPENDENCE.

A SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMISSION, AS I SEE IT, SHOULD SERVE TO REALIZE A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" OF THIS TYPE. A JOINT COMMISSION ALONG CLASSIC STANDARDS WOULD RUN THE RISK OF MERELY MAKING US STILL MORE DEPENDENT. AS I MENTIONED TO YOU IN NEW YORK, THE SYSTEMS OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN HIGHLY UNEQUAL COUNTRIES FREQUENTLY PRODUCE THE RESULT OF NOT ALTERING THE CONDUCT OF THE STRONGER AND MANACLE THE WEAKER ONES. WE HAVE SEEN EXAMPLES OF THIS IN OUR OWN BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS FREQUENTLY A MULTIPLICITY OF REASONS NOT TO ALTER ITS BEHAVIOR, BE IT FOR REASONS OF GLOBAL POLICY, BE FOR REASONS OF DOMESTIC POLICY. ON CERTAIN OCCASIONS, IT WOULD BE SAID THAT CERTAIN MEASURES ARE NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF "TRADE" OR OTHER MORE ARTICULATE GROUPS, WHETHER PROFESSIONAL OR UNDER THE PRESSURE OF PUBLIC OPINION. ON OTHER AND MORE FREQUENT INSTANCES, THE JUSTIFICATION PUT FORWARD IS THAT OF THE LACK OF SUPPORT BY CONGRESS. I CANNOT OMIT NOTING THAT ALLEGATIONS OF THE SAME ORDER, COMING FROM BRAZIL, ARE NEVER CONSIDERED AS CARRYING THE SAME WEIGHT OR VALIDITY.

IN SUM, MY DEAR HENRY, NEITHER MY GOVERNMENT NOR I LACK THE WILLINGNESS TO ATTEMPT TO ARTICULATE A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES, A RELATIONSHIP THAT WOULD BE REALLY MEANINGFUL FOR BOTH COUNTRIES. NATURALLY, I HAVE TAKEN IN FULL CONSIDERATION THE ARGUMENT THAT YOU PRESENTED ME IN NEW YORK IN THE SENSE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND YOU YOURSELF NEED A MECHANISM OF SPECIAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED



STATES AND BRAZIL WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO PREVENT SOME SECTORS OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION TAKE ABRUPT MEASURES, WITH A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON BRAZIL. I WOULD LIKE, NONETHELESS, TO BE SURE THAT BOTH OF US ARE THINKING OF THE SAME THING WHEN WE TALK ABOUT A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

AS AIDING MATERIAL FOR OUR FORTHCOMING CONVERSATION ON THE SUBJECT, I AM SENDING YOU HERewith A FEW PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS AIMING AT INDICATING ALONG GENERAL LINES THE FORMAT WHICH MIGHT BE ADOPTED FOR THE COMMISSION. I ENCLOSE ALSO A COPY OF THE "MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING" THAT I AM TO SIGN WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM NEXT WEEK, WHICH IN MY VIEW, ESTABLISHES AN EXTREMELY FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR CONSULTATIONS. WARMEST REGARDS FROM ANTONIO. END TEXT OF LETTER.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF ENCLOSURE ONE: IN REGARD TO THE POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A COMMITTEE MIGHT BE SET UP ALONG THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:
(A) THE COMMITTEE WOULD ENCOMPASS TWO SECTIONS, ONE LOCATED IN EACH OF THE COUNTRIES;
(B) THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE PRESIDED OVER IN BRAZIL BY THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND, IN THE USA, BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. ITS PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD BE CABINET MEMBERS - MINISTERS AND SECRETARIES - AND HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS OF THE DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ADVISING THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS ON MATTERS WITHIN THEIR SPECIFIC JURISDICTION;
(C) THE COMMITTEE WOULD CONVENE ONCE A YEAR IN EACH COUNTRY ON A ROTATING BASIS, AT A DATE AND PLACE TO BE DETERMINED FROM ONE MEETING TO THE NEXT. SHOULD THERE ARISE ANY URGENT MATTER TO DEAL WITH, ON REQUEST OF EITHER GOVERNMENT AND UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT, SPECIAL MEETINGS MIGHT BE CALLED, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE ABOVE MENTIONED ONE YEAR PERIOD HAS ELAPSED, AT AN AGREED DATE AND PLACE;
(D) THE COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE AS ITS PURPOSE TO REVIEW MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH COUNTRIES AND TO PROPOSE TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS MEASURES THAT IT MIGHT DEEM PERTINENT AND APPROPRIATE; AND
(E) THE COMMITTEE MIGHT REQUEST, UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT, THE PARTICIPATION OF ADVISORS IN ITS MEETINGS, AS IT MIGHT DEEM CONVENIENT FOR THE STUDY OF TOPICS AND MATTERS WHICH FALL WITHIN ITS SCOPE. END TEXT.



4. BEGIN TEXT OF ENCLOSURE TWO: MEMORANDUM OF UNDER-

STANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL CONCERNING CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL:

RECALLING THE TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES;

RECOGNIZING THE RESPONSIBILITIES THAT FALL UPON THEM AS THE GOVERNMENTS OF COUNTRIES WITH WIDE RANGING CONNECTIONS AND INTERESTS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY;

NOTING THEIR MUTUAL DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A FRUITFUL AND DYNAMIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP;

AWARE OF THE VALUE OF CONSULTING EACH OTHER ON QUESTIONS OF COMMON INTEREST; HAVE REACHED THE FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDING:

1) THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL HOLD CONSULTATIONS ON THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD. THESE CONSULTATIONS MAY FOR EXAMPLE INCLUDE SUCH SUBJECTS AS: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO EITHER GOVERNMENT, MATTERS UNDER DISCUSSION AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN OTHER MULTILATERAL BODIES, FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMODITIES AND RAW MATERIALS, ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION IN GENERAL, THE STRENGTHENING OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, FACILITATION OF INVESTMENT, BANKING, CREDIT AND SIMILAR SERVICES FOR THE PROMOTION OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, DEFENSE RELATIONS, TECHNOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES.

2) MEETINGS AT SENIOR OFFICIAL OR MINISTERIAL LEVEL WILL NORMALLY TAKE PLACE ALTERNATELY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IN BRAZIL AT TIMES ARRANGED BY MUTUAL CONSENT. THE AGENDA FOR SUCH MEETINGS WILL BE ARRANGED THROUGH THE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. BY JOINT DECISION OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS APPROPRIATE EXPERTS INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF NATIONAL AGENCIES AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR MAY PARTICIPATE IN THESE MEETINGS.

3) IN ADDITION TO THESE MEETINGS, CONSULTATIONS WILL BE CARRIED FORWARD ON A FLEXIBLE AND DAY TO DAY BASIS THROUGH THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OF EACH COUNTRY WHOSE MISSIONS



WILL BE AFFORDED READY (ACCESS?) TO THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES FOR THIS PURPOSE.

4) BY JOINT DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENTS, AD HOC STUDY GROUPS OR WORKING PARTIES MAY BE SET UP EITHER TO STUDY PARTICULAR QUESTIONS OF CURRENT POLITICAL INTEREST OR TO HELP CARRY FORWARD SPECIAL PROJECTS IN ONE COUNTRY OR THE OTHER OR IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

5) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL INTEND THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ESTABLISHED BY THIS MEMORANDUM WILL COMPLEMENT AND IN NO WAY REPLACE OR DETRACT FROM THE EXISTING MEANS OF TRANSACTING BUSINESS BETWEEN THEM.

6) THIS MEMORANDUM WILL COME INTO OPERATION UPON SIGNATURE. END TEXT.

"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. DEPARTMENT IS DEVELOPING COMMENTS ON SILVEIRA'S PROPOSALS AND WILL SUBMIT NEW ACTION MEMORANDUM (REPTL) AND SUGGESTED RESPONSE FOR YOUR APPROVAL. INGERSOLL
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DE RUEHC #8492 2920043
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TO USDEL SECRETARY NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 248492 TOSEC 160050

FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 10461 ACTION SECSTATE INFO AMMAN BEIRUT
DAMASCUS JIDDA TRIPOLI MOSCOW TEL AVIV DATED 18 OCT 75
QUOTE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ CAIRO 10461

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PINT EG

SUBJECT: SADAT SPEECH TO PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY - OCTOBER 18
SUMMARY: SPEAKING TO PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OCT 18, SADAT REVIEWED
GOE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY. IN CONTRAST TO HIS SEPTEMBER
SPEECHES, TONE WAS RELATIVELY MILD AND TREATMENT OF HIS VARIOUS
SUBJECTS RELATIVELY NON-CONTROVERSIAL. SYRIANS AND PALEUTINIANS
WERE NOT ATTACKED FOR THEIR ANTI-EGYPTIAN VIEWS AND SOVIETS
ESCAPED INVECTIVE WHICH HAD CHARACTERIZED SADAT'S SEPT 28 REMARKS.
GOE POLICY, PRESIDENT SAID, IS BASED ON FRIENDSHIP FOR BOTH US AND
USSR. HE WARNED AGAINST CONSEQUENCES OF SRAEL RECEIVING SPECIAL
WEAPONDRY. ON INTERNAL MATTERS, SADAT STRESSED NECESSITY OF MAKING
OPEN DOOR WORK, BUT GAVE NO INDICATION OF REAL UCHLYE SRING#OF
EXISTING IMPEDIMENTS TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. PRESIDENT SADAT ADDRESSED INAUGURAL MEETING OF SPECIAL AND FINAL
SESSION OF PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OCT 18. SPEECH WAS RELATIVELY SHORT
(50 MINUTES) AND WAS DELIVERED IN CALM, FORMAL MANNER. FOLLOWING
ARE HIGHLIGHTS:

2. BEFORE PROCEEDING TO HIS MAIN THEME, WHICH WAS ACHIEVEMENTS
AND TASKS OF PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, SADAT GAVE RESUME OF STATUS OF
EGYPT'S FOREIGN RELATIONS:

- A. GOE/USG. PRESIDENT DID NOT DIRECTLY MENTION HIS FORTHCOMING
TRIP TO US. HE EMPHASIZED SINAI II HAD NOT BEEN NEGOTIATED FOR
EGYPT ALONE, BUT ALSO FOR SYRIA AND PALESTINE. "HE OBTAINED PLEDGES
FROM PRESIDENT FORD, NOT IN HIS NAME, BUT IN NAME OF USG,
TO BRING ABOUT A SIMILAR DISENGAGEMENT ON SYRIAN FRONT AND A
STEP TOWARD RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE."
- B. ARMS FOR ISRAEL. PRESIDENT RECORDED HIS "CONCERN ABOUT AND
OBJECTION TO EVERY ESCALATION BY US IN ARMING ISRAEL, ESPECIALLY



***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

By NR NARA, Date 8/5/10

WHERE TYPE OF WEAPON IS CONCERNED. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT CONFORM TO ROLE US NOW PLAYING IN AREA. THIS ESCALATION ON ONE SIDE MUST BE MET BY ESCALATION ON OUR PART AND THE CONSEQUENCES ARE CLEAR TO ALL."

C. GOE/USSR, SOVIETS, WHO HAD BEEN LAMBASTED BY SADAT IN THREE SEPT SPEECHES, GOT OFF LIGHTLY THIS TIME. PRESIDENT MADE INVIDIOUS MENTION OF "IMPORTED" SOCIALISM AND CALLED EXPULSION OF SOVIET EXPERTS ONE OF HIS AND ASSEMBLY'S CHIEF ACHIEVEMENTS (45 SECONDS OF APPLAUSE GREETED THIS REFERENCE TO EXPULSION OF EXPERTS).

D. SUPER POWERS. WESTERN AMBASSADORS WERE STRUCK BY PRESIDENT'S THANKS TO PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY FOR SUPPORTING HIS POLICY OF MOVING FROM RELATIONSHIP TO SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP WITH USSR AND SPECIAL HOSTILITY TO US TO THE POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH BOTH.

E. LEBANON. WARNING THAT ANY INTERVENTION IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, PRESIDENT SAID IT IS HIS DUTY TO STRESS THAT UNDERMINING OF LEBANESE ENTITY

THREATENS TO DRAG REGION INTO DARKNESS AND TO PROVIDE POLITICAL, PROPAGANDA, AND MILITARY OPPORTUNITIES TO ISRAEL. HE URGED ALL CONCERNED PARTIES TO FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, SINCE TRAGEDY IN LEBANON NOW COULD BE GREATER THAN 1948 PALESTINIAN TRAGEDY. HE, CRADLE OF EARLY RELIGION, MUST REMAIN RELIGIOUSLY TOLERANT, IN SHORT, "HANDS OFF LEBANON."

F. SYRIA. PRESIDENT, IN CONTRAST TO SEPT SPEECHES, DID NOT ATTACK HIS SYRIAN CRITICS AND, IN FACT, DID NOT MENTION SYRIA OR ASSAD BY NAME. HE STRESSED MERELY THAT GOE'S POLICY IS BASED ON RESTORATION PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY. COMPLETE LIBERATION IS IMPOSSIBLE IN ONE FELL SWOOP; CONSTANT MOVEMENT IS PRACTICAL SOLUTION.

3. TURNING TO INTERNAL AFFAIRS, PRESIDENT PAID TRIBUTE TO ARMED FORCES AND SAID SOCIALISM IS EGYPT'S PATH. HE STRESSED DOMESTIC ENERGIES MUST BE CHANNLED TOWARD PRODUCTION; TO IMPEDE PRODUCTION IS CRIME REPRESENTING SQUANDERING OF PROSPERITY ACHIEVED BY OTHERS. DUTY HAS PRIORITY OVER RIGHTS AND PRODUCTION OVER CONSUMPTION. (COMMENT: IN OTHER WORDS, STUDENTS SHOULD STICK TO THEIR BOOKS AND CARPENTERS TO THEIR LATHES).

4. PRESIDENT MADE STRONG PITCH FOR PROMPT AND CLEAR STATUTORY CHANGES TO "DESTROY" IMPEDIMENTS TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT. PUBLIC SECTOR, TOGETHER WITH PRIVATE SECTOR, WILL CONTINUE TO REPRESENT ONE OF TWIN PILLARS OF EGYPTIAN ECONOMY. HOWEVER, HE SAID, PUBLIC SECTOR EFFICIENCY MUST BE DRASTICALLY IMPROVED IMMEDIATELY.

5. PRESIDENT OFFERED THREE SOPS TO HIS PEOPLE: TAX LAWS MUST BE SIMPLIFIED AND EQUITABLY APPLIED, SOCIAL INSURANCE MUST IMMEDIATELY BE EXTENDED TO EVERY EGYPTIAN, AND STATE EXPENDITURES ON LUXURIES MUST BE REDUCED. PRESIDENCY BUDGET, SADAT SAID, HAS



ALREADY BEEN DIMINISHED BY ONE THIRD AND THIS SUM WILL BE SHIFTED TO INSURANCE FUND.

6. COMMENT: SPEECH CONTRASTED IN TONE AND SUBSTANCE WITH OTHER PUBLIC ADDRESSES DELIVERED BY SADAT SINCE SINAI II. THIS TIME, PRESIDENT'S TONE WAS MILD AND HIS TREATMENT OF VARIOUS SUBJECTS WAS RELATIVELY NON-CONTROVERSIAL. IN ARAB CONTEXT, HE SEEMED TO WISH TO LOWER THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE BY ABSTAINING FROM ATTACKING HIS SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN CRITICS. HE DID HIS DUTY AS EGYPTIAN LEADER BY DECLARING "HANDSOFF LEBANON". WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS PREVAILED UPON BY HIS ADVISORS TO AVOID GRATUITOUS ATTACKS ON ARAB AND SOVIET CRITICS AND ON THIS OCCASION HE ACCEPTED SUCH ADVICE. SOVIETS MUST BE RELIEVED THAT THEY WERE NOT SINGLED OUT, AS OCCURRED IN SEPT SPEECHES, FOR LENGTHY AND VIRULENT ATTACKS, THOUGH SOVIET AMBASSADOR WAS CLEARLY UNHAPPY ABOUT APPLAUSE GIVEN TO PRESIDENT'S COMMENT ON EXPELLING SOVIET EXPERTS. PRESIDENT'S EMPHASIS ON NECESSITY FOR PROMPT DECISIVE ACTION BY ASSEMBLY TO PROVIDE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC OPEN DOOR WAS INTERESTING, BUT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE UNDERSTANDS WHAT IS INVOLVED IN MAKING THIS POLICY WORK. SPEECH SHOWED LITTLE CLEARCUT COMPREHENSION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN CONCEPTS OF (A) MAKING OPEN DOOR WORK BY EXPEDITIOUS ENCOURAGEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTOR AND (B) PROTECTING THE PUBLIC SECTOR.

7. IN SHORT, SPEECH WAS STATESMANLIKE RESUME OF EGYPT'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES. INVECTIVE AND POLEMICS WERE LACKING.

EILTS
UNQUOTE
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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #8493 2920056
O 190028Z OCT 75 ZKPA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3024

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 248493 TOSEC 160051

EXDIS
FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 10378 ACTIONSECSTATE 17 OCT 75
QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 10378

EXDIS
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)
SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT
REF STATE 246950

1. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH FAHMY THE TWO POINTS RAISED
IN REPTEL. HIS REPLIES FOLLOW:

2. AS WE KNEW, SADAT SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT THE STATE
DINNERS BE DARK BUSINESS SUIT RATHER THAN BLACK TIE,
IF WE INSIST UPON BLACK TIE, THE PRESIDENT MIGHT RE-
CONSIDER, BUT WE SHOULD KNOW THAT HE NEVER
WEARS BLACK TIE AND BEING REQUIRED TO DO SO WOULD MAKE HIM
MOST UNCOMFORTABLE. IT WOULD IMPAIR SADAT'S ENJOYMENT
OF THE OCCASION. FAHMY SEES NO REASON WHY IT COULD
NOT BE EXPLAINED, IF NECESSARY, THAT THE PRESIDENT
PREFERS DARK BUSINESS SUIT RATHER THAN BLACK TIE.

3. SADAT SHOULD NOT MEET WITH RABBI MILLER AND
OTHER JEWISH LEADERS WHILE HE IS IN NEW YORK. IT
WOULD CAUSE UNNECESSARY EMBARRASMENT FOR THE
PRESIDENT IN THE ME AREA. HE COULD ASSURE ME
EVEN WITHOUT SPEAKING TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THIS
IS SADAT'S VIEW.

4. AS A FINAL NO. 1, I HAVE BEEN PRESSING FAHMY
AND EVERYONE ELSE ON ALMOST DAILY BASIS
TO GET ME A LIST OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS
OF THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY. THUS FAR I HAVE HAD



***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

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By HR NARA, Date 8/5/10

NO SUCCESS, ALTHOUGH SOME 60 OR 70 PEOPLE HAVE APPLIED FOR VISAS CLAIMING THEY ARE GOING ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP. WE ARE TRYING TO SORT OUT VISA LIST TO SEE WHO MIGHT BE OFFICIAL AND WHO MIGHT BE UNOFFICIAL. I AGAIN PRESSED FAHMY THIS MORNING TO GET ME A LIST ASAP, NOTING THAT TIME IS RUNNING SHORT. HE EXPECTS TO SEE THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW NIGHT, WHEN ADAT GIVES ANOTHER MAJOR SPEECH TO THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, AND PROMISED AT THAT TIME TO TRY TO GET THE PRESIDENT TO FOCUS ON PREPARING SUCH LISTS. I WILL CONTINUE TO DO WHAT I CAN TO GET A LIST, BUT RETTABLY THINGS MOVE AT A SNAIL-LIKE PACE

HERE.
EILTS
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INGERSOLL
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OP IMMED
 DE RUEHC #8494 2920104
 O 190036Z OCT 75 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6101

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3025

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 248494 TOSEC 160052

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)

SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT: MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
 REF: STATE 248371

1. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT SENATOR SPARKMAN AND CHAIRMAN MORGAN HAVE INVITED PRESIDENT SADAT TO MEET WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE JOINTLY, PREFERABLY ON THE MORNING OF TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28. THIS INVITATION CAME TO OUR ATTENTION AFTER THE SESSION OCTOBER 16 WITH HASSAN KAMEL AND THE ADVANCE TEAM. DURING THAT SESSION, THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 28 WAS FILLED AS FOLLOWS: 10:30 A.M. SECOND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FORD (TENTATIVE); 11:30 OFF-THE-RECORD MEETING WITH SELECTED EDITORS AND COLUMNISTS AT BLAIR HOUSE; 12:15 BRIEF MEETING WITH ARAB AMBASSADORS AT BLAIR HOUSE; 1:00 P.M. LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SECRETARY AND MRS. KISSINGER.

2. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY TO THIS CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVE, BUT IT WILL REQUIRE ADJUSTING THE SCHEDULE. BOTH WE AND THE EGYPTIAN ADVANCE TEAM FELT THE MEETING WITH EDITORS AND COLUMNISTS COULD BE VERY USEFUL AND THE EGYPTIANS ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE BRIEF MEETING WITH THE ARAB AMBASSADORS;

CANCELLATION OF THE LATTER WOULD IN ANY CASE NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR SADAT TO MEET WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
 State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/5/10



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COMMITTEES.

3. THE SECRETARY BELIEVES THAT THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE RETAINED ON THE SCHEDULE. THE QUESTION OF HOW TO FIT IN A MEETING WITH THE COMMITTEES IS PRIMARILY UP TO THE EGYPTIANS, BUT OUR SUGGESTION WOULD BE THAT WE TRY TO MOVE THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FORD UP TO 10:00 A.M., SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH THE COMMITTEES FOR 1115 AT THE CAPITOL, HOLD THE BRIEF MEETING WITH ARAB AMBASSADORS AT 12:30 AT BLAIR HOUSE, AND SHIFT THE MEETING WITH EDITORS AND COLUMNISTS TO 6:30 P.M.

4. PLEASE LET US KNOW FAHMY'S REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS USUAL, WE WILL BE GUIDED BY EGYPTIAN VIEWS. ABOVE ARE SIMPLY OUR SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW THIS MIGHT BE HANDLED. INGERSOILL
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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 248495 TOSEC 160053

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EUR/WE:RBARBOUR
IO:AMB.BUFFUM
S: COVEY (PHONE)
S/S-O: P.K. JOHNSON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 248495 TOSEC 160053

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: PFOR, MO, US, UN, SP, SS

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - APPROACHES TO SPAIN, MOROCCO,
AND UN SEC GEN ON SPANISH SAHARA (S/S NO. 7520897)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. THE PROBLEM.

DURING YOUR MEETING ON OCTOBER 17 WITH MOROCCAN AMBAS-
SADOR BOUTALEB, YOU TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD MAKE A DEMARCHE
TO THE SPANIARDS ON THE SAHARA PROBLEM. FOLLOWING
BOUTALEB'S -ALL, IN MEETING WITH MESSRS. SISCO, ATHERTON
AND HARTMAN, YOU DECIDED TO INSTRUCT OUR EMBASSIES IN
RABAT AND MADRID TO APPROACH THEIR RESPECTIVE HOST GOVERN-
MENTS URGING THEM TO AVOID HASTY ACTION WHICH MIGHT
EXACERBATE THE SITUATION AND INSTEAD TO EXPLORE ALL OPPOR-

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 State Review
State Dept Guidelines 12/9/03

By NR NARA, Date 8/5/10



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 248495 TOSEC 160053

TUNITIES FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. YOU ALSO DECIDED TO INSTRUCT USUN TO TALK WITH SECGEN WALDHEIM AND SUGGEST THAT HE TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES OF INITIATING DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE UN UMBRELLA. SINCE YOUR MEETINGS YESTERDAY, SPANISH UN PERMREP SUBMITTED LETTER OCTOBER 18 REQUESTING URGENT MEETING SECURITY COUNCIL ON SPANISH SAHARA. MEETING HAS BEEN SET FOR 11:00 A.M. OCTOBER 20. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR APPROVAL ARE SUGGESTED TEXTS OF INSTRUCTIONS TO BE CABLED TO RABAT, MADRID & USUN.
2. BEGIN TEXT TO RABAT

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ACTION IMMEDIATE RABAT

INFO IMMEDIATE USUN, MADRID, TUNIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: PFOR, MO, US, UN, SP, SS

SUBJECT: SPANISH SAHARA

TUNIS EYES ONLY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON

1. IN LIGHT OF ICJ ADVISORY OPINION, REPORT OF UN COMMISSION, AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS, NOTABLY KING HASSAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF PLANNED CIVILIAN MARCH ON SAHARA AND SPANISH REQUEST FOR UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, WHICH HAS BEEN SET FOR 11:00 A.M. OCTOBER 20, DEPARTMENT HAS DECIDED TO MAKE SIMULTANEOUS APPROACHES TO KING HASSAN, FOREIGN MINISTER CORTINA, AND UN SECGEN WALDHEIM URGING THAT PRECIPITOUS ACTION BE AVOIDED AND DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES BE EXPLORED WITH VIEW TO ATTAINING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN SAHARA. SEE SEPTELS FOR MESSAGES TO MADRID AND USUN.

2. EMBASSY REQUESTED DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO KING HASSAN: BEGIN TEXT: YOUR MAJESTY: HIS EXCELLENCY, AMBASSADOR BOUTALEB, CALLED ON ME OCTOBER 17 TO PERSONALLY DELIVER YOUR RESPONSE TO MY MES-

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 248495 T0SEC 160053

SAGE OF OCTOBER 4 EXPRESSING MY CONCERN OVER THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SAHARA. I WAS GRATIFIED BY YOUR FRANK EXPOSITION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE ISSUE AND BY YOUR REASSURANCES THAT MOROCCO IS NOT CONTEMPLATING MILITARY ACTION.

3. I AM AWARE OF YOUR MAJESTY'S SPEECH AND I HAVE NOTED YOUR INTENTION TO ORGANIZE A CIVILIAN MARCH INTO THE SAHARA. PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE ICJ OPINION AND THE UN FACT-FINDING MISSION REPORT, I WISH TO RESTATE MY CONVICTION THAT THIS IS A PROBLEM WHICH LENDS ITSELF TO RESOLUTION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEANS. TO REITERATE WHAT I SAID TO AMBASSADOR BOUTALEB ON OCTOBER 17, AS YOU CONSIDER FURTHER YOUR PLANS FOR A MARCH, I HOPE YOU WILL ALLOW A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME TO EXPLORE ALL OPPORTUNITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL AVOID MILITARY OR POLITICAL CONFRONTATION.

4. AS I INFORMED AMBASSADOR BOUTALEB, WE ARE MAKING A SIMILAR APPROACH TO MADRID. MY PERSONAL EMISSARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON, WILL BE IN MOROCCO ON OCTOBER 23-24, AT WHICH TIME I HOPE HE WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH YOUR MAJESTY IN A FRANK AND CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. WARM REGARDS. HENRY A. KISSINGER. END TEXT.

3. BEGIN TEXT TO MADRID

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ACTION IMMEDIATE MADRID

INFO IMMEDIATE USUN, RABAT, TUNIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: PFOR, MO, US, UN, SP, SS

SUBJECT: SPANISH SAHARA

TUNIS EYES ONLY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 STATE 248495 TOSEC 160053

1. IN LIGHT OF ICJ ADVISORY OPINION, REPORT OF UN COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS, NOTABLY KING HASSAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF PLANNED CIVILIAN MARCH ON SAHARA AND SPANISH REQUEST FOR UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, DEPARTMENT HAS DECIDED TO MAKE SIMULTANEOUS APPROACHES TO KING HASSAN, FOREIGN MINISTER CORTINA AND UN SEC GEN WALDHEIM URGING THAT PRECIPITOUS ACTION BE AVOIDED AND DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES BE EXPLORED WITH VIEW TO ATTAINING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN SAHARA. SEE SEPTELS FOR MESSAGES TO RABAT AND USUN.

2. YOU SHOULD SEEK IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH CORTINA OR ROVIRA, AS YOU JUDGE BEST, TO CONVEY FOLLOWING POINTS:
A. ADVISORY OPINION BY ICJ, FOLLOWED BY HASSAN'S CALL FOR PEACEFUL MARCH INTO SAHARA, HAS INTRODUCED NEW ELEMENTS IN SAHARAN QUESTION.

B. USG BELIEVES, DESPITE MOROCCAN ACTIONS, THAT DIPLOMATIC APPROACH HAS NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED AND POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION REMAINS OPEN. INDEED, THE ACTIONS BY THE UN BODIES MAY HAVE CREATED NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCH SOLUTION.

C. WE HAVE SUPPORTED SPAIN'S REQUEST FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AND HOPE IT WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE OTHER DIPLOMATIC ALTERNATIVES WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH EVERYONE DESIRES AND

WE HOPE YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE OPEN MINDED ABOUT THE PRECISE MEANS OF ADVANCING THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

D. OUR HOPE IS THAT UN MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE, BUT THIS POSSIBILITY WOULD NOT BE HELPED BY ANGRY PUBLIC DEBATES WHICH WOULD HARDEN THE ATTITUDES OF THE PARTICIPANTS. END TEXT.

4. BEGIN TEXT TO USUN

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

ACTION IMMEDIATE USUN

INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT, MADRID, TUNIS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 05 STATE 248495 T0SEC 160053

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MO, US, UN, SP, SS

SUBJECT: SPANISH SAHARA

TUNIS EYES ONLY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON

1. WE REGRET SPANIARDS HAVE INSISTED ON IMMEDIATE MEETING OF SC ON THIS SUBJECT SINCE WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED MORE TIME TO EXHAUST ALL POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC AVENUES FOR DEFUSING THE SITUATION PRIOR TO OPEN DEBATE IN COUNCIL, WHICH IS CERTAIN TO SET OFF AN ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

2. WE ASSUME THAT WALDHEIM IS ALREADY URGING THE PARTIES TO DEMONSTRATE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT AND TAKE NO ACTION LIKELY TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE WALDHEIM PLAYING AS ACTIVE A ROLE AS POSSIBLE IN PROMOTING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT PROCESS IN CONJUNCTION WITH WHATEVER ACTION INITIATED BY SC. FYI: ATHERTON WILL BE VISITING RABAT AS SECRETARY'S EMISSARY. VISIT ALREADY SCHEDULED IN CONTEXT OF LONG PLANNED N. AFRICAN TRIP. HE WILL BE SEEING KING ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, AND WILL URGE THAT EVERY POSSIBILITY BE EXPLORED TO AVOID A SITUATION OF DIPLOMATIC OR MILITARY CONFRONTATION. END FYI.

3. WHILE WE ARE PREPARED TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE BEHIND THE SCENES, OUR BASIC POSITION IS ONE OF NEUTRALITY. WE OF COURSE PREFER TO AVOID, IF POSSIBLE, BEING FORCED TO TAKE PUBLIC POSITIONS ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE.

4. AT OCTOBER 20 SC MEETING, YOU SHOULD SUPPORT ADOPTION OF AGENDA IN KEEPING WITH OUR LIBERAL TRADITION OF ACCEPTING DEBATE ON ANY RELEVANT SUBJECT WITHIN SC COMPETENCE. YOU SHOULD ALSO QUIETLY ENCOURAGE IDEA THAT PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF CONSULTATION SHOULD BE ON THE PARTIES IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, TO SEE WHETHER A CONSENSUS BETWEEN THEM CAN BE ACHIEVED.



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PAGE 06 STATE 248495 TOSEC 160053

5. AS FIRST AND MOST URGENT STEP IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF SC PRES WERE TO BE AUTHORIZED BY SC MEMBERS TO ISSUE IMMEDIATE APPEAL TO ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND DO NOTHING WHICH WOULD IMPEDE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

6. IN SECOND PHASE, CREATION BY SC OF VISITING MISSION, AS DEPINIES ADVOCATES, WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH WHETHER A THREAT TO PEACE EXISTS IN THE AREA STRIKES US AS ATTRACTIVE POSSIBILITY. IT IMMEDIATELY ENGAGES UN IN A DIPLOMATIC TIME-BUYING EFFORT AND OPENS THE DOOR TO FOLLOW-UP ACTION BY SYG OR SC. NATURALLY WE WOULD NOT WISH TO BE COMMITTED TO ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSITION UNTIL SEEING THE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION, BUT YOU MAY INDICATE IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT, WITHOUT TAKING A LEAD, THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A MISSION WOULD APPEAR TO US TO BE A REASONABLE PROPOSITION DEPENDING ON TERMS OF REFERENCE AND COMPOSITION.

7. FOREGOING PROPOSAL COULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY SC REQUEST TO SYG TO USE HIS BEST OFFICES WITH THE PARTIES TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

8. YOU SHOULD SEE WALDHEIM AND URGE THAT IN ADDITION TO COUNSELING RESTRAINT HE CONSIDER LENDING HIS GOOD OFFICES TO THE PARTIES TO ENCOURAGE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM PEACEFULLY, WHETHER OR NOT SC FORMALLY ASKS HIM TO DO SO. END TEXT.

5. RECOMMENDATION: THAT YOU APPROVE SUGGESTED TEXTS.

APPROVE AS AMENDED

6. APPROVED BY SISCO AND CLEARED BY NEA: SAUNDERS; IO: BUFFUM; EUR/WE: BARBOUR; AND S: J. COVEY. INGERSOLL

~~SECRET~~



FLASH
DE RUEHC #8501 2920531
Z 190537Z OCT 75 ZFK4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT FLASH 3028

UNCLAS STATE 248501 TOSEC 160054

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM PEKING OCT 19:
QUOTE UNCLAS PEKING 2005
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY'S AIRCRAFT FOR FUNSETH AND
MORAN

E.O. 11152
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: SECVISIT: PEKING ARRIVAL ARRANGEMENTS
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH

1. MFA REQUESTS THAT ON ARRIVAL AT PEKING AIRPORT THE PRESS
PARTY DISEMBARK FIRST, THROUGH REAR DOOR, TO OBSERVE WELCOMING OF
SECRETARY AND OTHERS IN OFFICIAL PARTY WHO WILL BE DISEMBARKING
THROUGH FRONT DOOR.

2. PLEASE COLLECT ALL PASSENGERS' PASSPORTS AND HAVE THEM READY
FOR HANDING OVER TO USLO OFFICERS AS FOLLOWS:

- PRESS PARTY: TO PASCOE
- ALL OTHERS: TO MCCRORY. BUSH UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #8582 2928545
O 198542Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3829

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 248502 TOSEC 166855

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM USUN OCT 19:
QUOTE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 5157

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF

SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE RETURNEES

UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL GUYER TELEPHONED ANB BENNETT 10:30 PM TO
PASS ON MESSAGE FROM SYG WALDHEIM, SYG HAD CALL FROM VIETNAMESE,
PRESUMABLY SOUTH VIETNAMESE, THIS EVENING TO SAY THEY REJECTED
COMPLETELY PLAN FOR VIETNAMESE SHIP TO ARRIVE IN VIETNAMESE WATERS
WITH RETURNEES FROM GUAM. VIETNAMESE TOLD SYG THEY WOULD NOT REPEAT
NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAPPEN, DESPITE REPEATED
EFFORTS FOR SYG TO OBTAIN FURTHER INFORMATION VIETNAMESE DECLINED
TO OFFER OPINION ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN, MERELY REPEATING AGAIN AND
AGAIN THEY WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE IF SHIP ARRIVED IN VIETNAMESE
WATERS WITH RETURNEES FROM GUAM. MOYNIHAN UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By NR NARA, Date 8/5/10



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCONCROFT, LL, QUINN

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PAGE 81 OF 81

TOR:292/85:49Z

DTG:198542Z OCT 75

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PRIORITY
 DE RUEHC #8509 2921711
 P 191657Z OCT 75 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3030

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 248500 TOSEC 100050

FOLLOWING REPEAT USUN NY SENT ACTION SECSTATE 18 OCT
 QUOTE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 5150

DEPT PASS ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UNGA, SHUM, PKOR

SUBJ: WHEREIN THE UNITED NATIONS COMMENCES TO SELF DESTRUCT;
 THE BLACK AFRICANS STAND UP FOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS
 AND BREAK WITH THE ARABS; THE FACISTS IN CHILE AND
 ASSORTED LIKE-MINDED FOLK IN LATIN AMERICA LINE UP
 WITH THE ANTISEMITES OF OTHER EQUALLY PROGRESSIVE
 PARTS OF THE WORLD; AND WHEREIN WHAT IS MORE THE
 UNITED STATES FOR ONCE ENDS UP IN PIT AND SUFFICIENT
 COMPANY

1. JOYCE HIT UPON THE TERM EPIPHANY FOR SUCH MOMENTS OF
 SHOWING THROUGH, "ITS SOUL," HE WROTE, "ITS WHATNESS LEAPS
 TO US FROM THE VESTMENT OF ITS APPEARANCE...THE OBJECT
 ACHIEVES ITS EPIPHANY." IT HAPPENED YESTERDAY TO THE UNITED
 NATIONS.

2. SELF DESTRUCTION IS THE FIRST THING THAT SHOWED THROUGH.
 NOT PERHAPS INAPPROPRIATELY, IT WAS THE IRISH AMBASSADOR,
 STANDING IN THE BACK OF COMMITTEE ROOM THREE AS THE FINAL
 VOTE APPROACHED IN WHICH THE WORLD ORGANIZATION WOULD PUT
 ITSELF ON THE POINT OF OFFICIALLY ENDORSING ANTI-SEMITISM,
 WHO SAID "THE UNITED NATIONS IS DESTROYING ITSELF: THIS
 NIGHT: IN THIS ROOM."

3. AND YET STRONG THINGS SHOWED THROUGH ALSO. THE
 MOST STRIKING WAS THAT THE BLACK AFRICANS BROKE WITH
 THE ARABS WHO PROPOSED TO USE THEM IN THE MOST CYNICAL
 AND SELF SERVING WAY, NOT, ONE MIGHT ADD, FOR THE FIRST
 TIME RECORDED IN HISTORY. IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED
 STATES TOOK THE INITIATIVE ON OCTOBER THREE BY MAKING



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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/5/10

PSN1045604

PAGE 01

TOR:292/17:18Z

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UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR THAT TO EQUATE ZIONISM WITH RACISM WAS AN OBSCENE ACT THAT COULD ONLY END BY ABORTING THE PROPOSED DECADE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AN EFFORT WHICH THE AFRICANS HAD PROPOSED, AND FOR WHICH, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PLO-ARAB-SOVIET BLOCK DEMARCHE, WOULD HAVE WON UNANIMOUS SUPPORT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE WEST EUROPEANS WERE PERSUADED TO JOIN US IN THE POSITION THAT WE WOULD VOTE IN COMMITTEE FOR EACH OF THE TWO RESOLUTIONS ESTABLISHING THE DECADE TO COMBAT RACISM, AND AGAINST THE RESOLUTION EQUATING ZIONISM WITH RACISM, WITH PRIOR UNDERSTANDING THAT IF THE LATTER RESOLUTION PAUSED, WE WOULD THEREFORE VOTE AGAINST ALL THREE RESOLUTIONS WHEN THEY CAME TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE AFRICAN STATES, WHICH ARE PERFECTLY CAPABLE OF SEEING THEIR TRUE INTERESTS IN SUCH MATTERS, SAW THAT THE ARABS WERE TAKING SOMETHING OF VALUE FROM THEM AND GIVING NOTHING IN RETURN. IN THE KEY VOTE ON A RESOLUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, SECONDED BY ZAMBIA, TO PUT OFF CONSIDERATION OF THE ANTISEMITIC RESOLUTION UNTIL 1976, ONLY 42 PERCENT OF THE BLACK AFRICAN STATES VOTED WITH THE ARABS. IN THE FINAL VOTE, ON THE ANTISEMITIC RESOLUTION ITSELF, ONLY ABOUT HALF THE AFRICANS VOTED WITH THE ARABS. AS THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTS THIS MORNING, "A YEAR AGO, THE ARABS HAD AN 'AUTOMATIC MAJORITY' OF COMMUNIST, AFRICAN AND ASIAN NATIONS AND THE NERVOUS ABSTENTIONS OF MOST WEST EUROPEANS." WELL, THIS TIME THE WEST EUROPEANS GOT HOLD OF THEIR NERVE, AND AS THE POST REPORT CONTINUES, "THE AFRICANS REBELLED."

4. APART FROM THIS, THE MOST STRIKING SHOWING THROUGH WAS THAT OF LATIN AMERICA, WHICH OVERWHELMINGLY SIDED WITH THE COMMUNIST AND ANTISEMITIC SIDE. ONLY THE TINY STATES OF COSTA RICA (GOD LOVE THEM) THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, HAITI, NICARAGUA, AND URUGUAY DARED TO VOTE WITH THE DEMOCRACIES ON THIS ISSUE. ALL THE OTHERS COLLAPSED, NAY GROVELLED IN THE FACE OF COMMUNIST THREAT, ARAB MONEY, AND THE NO DOUBT IRRESISTIBLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE VICIOUS.

5. THE MOST EPIPHANIC ACT OF THE EVENING WAS THE VOTE BY CHILE IN FAVOR OF THE COMMUNISTS AND THE ARABS. WE HAVE NO RELIABLE INFORMATION AS TO WHY THEY DID THIS. OPINION IN THE US MISSION IS ABOUT EQUALLY DIVIDED. ONE GROUP HOLDS THAT FASCISTS ARE NATURALLY ANTISEMITIC, AND THAT THE GENERALS WERE ONLY DOING WHAT CAME NATURALLY. ANOTHER, LESS HISTORICAL, MORE CYNICAL GROUP, HOLDS THAT OPINION IN THE UN CORRIDORS IS CORRECT, NAMELY THAT THE CHILEANS SOLD THEIR VOTE TO THE ARABS IN RETURN FOR AGREEMENT NOT TO PRESS THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, PUBLISHED THIS WEEK, THAT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT IS OPERATING "TORTURE CENTERS"



THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH AND SUCH BREADTH AS THERE IS OF THAT UNHAPPY COUNTRY. A FRACTION OF EMBASSY OPINION NOT NOTED FOR ACCURACY, BUT NONETHELESS DIFFICULT TO DISMISS, CLAIMS THAT THROUGH A COMPLEX CIPHER IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT PINOCHET IS ACTUALLY ALLENDE IN DISGUISE AND THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE.

6. LASTLY THERE SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE ONLY TWENTY NINE NATIONS VOTED AGAINST THE ANTISEMITIC RESOLUTION, THE UNITED STATES CAN BE PROUD OF THE COMPANY IT WAS IN. AN ISSUE OF HONOR, OF MORALITY WAS PUT BEFORE US, AND NOT ALL OF US RAN. MOYNIHAN UNQUOTE
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PRIORITY
 DE RUEHC #8510 2921726
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 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 0000

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FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 10438 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DTD 18 OCT
 QUOTE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 10438

E.O. 116521 GDS

TAGS: OREP (SOLARZ, STEPHEN J.)

SUBJECT: CODEL SOLARZ MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMY

SUMMARY: IN WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION WITH CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ, FAHMY DISMISSED ARAB CRITICISM OF SINAI II AS EGYPT'S PROBLEM, NOT USG'S, CLAIMED ARAFAT IS MODERATE AND US SHOULD TALK TO HIM, AND STRESSED URGENT NECESSITY FOR MOVEMENT ON GOLAN DISENGAGEMENT TO PREPARE FOR GENEVA PEACE TALKS. ON ARMS FOR EGYPT, FAHMY SAID US MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN COMMUNIST OR WESTERN INFLUENCE IN ME; SALE OF US ARMS WOULD ESTABLISH AREA POWER BALANCE NECESSARY FOR REAL PEACE. GOE WANTS PEACE, BUT, IF AFTER 3 YEARS PEACE IS NOT CLOSER, THEN THERE WILL BE WAR. FINAL SETTLEMENT WOULD INCLUDE PEACE TREATY AND NON-BELLIGERANCY, BUT NOT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
 END SUMMARY.

1. DURING HOUR-LONG MEETING OCT 14 BETWEEN CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ AND FOMIN FAHMY FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE WERE MADE:

2. IN RESPONSE TO SOLARZ'S QUESTION ABOUT SYRAIN AND PALESTINIAN REACTION TO SINAI II, FAHMY SAID IT IS BECAUSE BOTH WANT SIMILAR POSITIVE STEPS FOR THEMSELVES. REACTION IS NOT ANTI-AMERICAN BUT THEY FEEL US IS PLAYING ONLY WITH EGYPT AND IGNORING PALESTINIANS WHO ARE ESSENCE OF PROBLEM. IN ANY CASE IT IS NOT US PROBLEM, FAHMY SAID, "OUR PROBLEM IS TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE ON PALESTINE ISSUE." SOLARZ RESPONDED THAT WHILE THERE IS STRONG DISPOSITION IN ISRAEL TO RESOLVE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, THERE IS STRONG INDISPOSITION TO DEAL WITH PLO. IN LENGTHY DEFENSE OF ARAFAT AS MODERATE LEADER IF TREATED PROPERLY, FAHMY CHIDED US AS SUPERPOWER FOR NOT AT LEAST HAVING CONTACT WITH ALL PARTIES NECESSARY TO REACH FINAL PEACE.

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State Dept Guidelines

By UR NARA, Date 8/5/10



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PAGE 01

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3. SOLARZ SAID IF PLO WOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE, IT MIGHT OPEN THE WAY. FAHMY INTERJECTED SAYING THIS WOULD COME WITH FINAL PEACE BUT IF PLO RECOGNIZED ISRAEL NOW, IT WOULD HAVE NOTHING LEFT TO NEGOTIATE. BESIDES, WHERE ARE THE FRONTIERS OF PRESENT-DAY ISRAEL? NOBODY KNOWS. ISRAEL MUST, FAHMY SAID, COEXIST WITH PALESTINIANS AS A MIDDLE EASTERN STATE - NOT AS MANHATTAN OR A PART OF FLORIDA.

4. SOLARZ ASKED IF PALESTINIAN STATE ON WEST BANK AND GAZA WOULD 3 18-713. FAHMY SAID IT WOULD BE AS VIABLE AS ISRAEL BECAUSE ISRAEL IS ONLY VIABLE BECAUSE OF MONEY PAID BY EVERY AMERICAN TAXPAYER FOR ITS SUPPORT. ARABS HAVE PLENTY OF MONEY TO MAKE PALESTINE STATE VIABLE AS WELL.

5. SOLARZ ASKED WHAT PROSPECT FAHMY SAW FOR MOVEMENT ON GOLAN. FAHMY RESPONDED THAT IT IS AN ABSOLUTE MUST TO HAVE MOVEMENT ON GOLAN SO THAT PARTIES CAN GO TO GENEVA AND BEGIN TALKING SERIOUSLY ABOUT PEACE. AS TO SHAPE OF GOLAN AGREEMENT, WITHDRAWAL MUST BE PART OF IT AND SITUATION AROUND KUNEITRA WITH ISRAELIS LOOKING DOWN FROM THE HILLS MUST BE CHANGE, THROUGH UNEF FORCES OR SOME OTHER ARRANGEMENT.

6. SOLARZ ASKED WHAT KIND OF ARMS EGYPT WAS GOING TO BE ASKING FOR IN US. FAHMY SAID HE PERSONALLY WOULD NOT BE ASKING FOR ARMS SINCE HE WAS CONVINCED HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET THEM BECAUSE OF THE ZIONIST INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF MASSIVE ISRAELI ARMS REQUESTS WHICH ARE BEING MET THROUGH BLACKMAIL OF US, EGYPT MUST GET COMPARABLE ARMS AND ARMS RACE WILL ACCELERATE. IF USG SINCERELY WANTS PEACE, IT WILL STOP POURING ARMS INTO ISRAEL. FAHMY THEN ASKED THAT IF AND WHEN EGYPT SUBMITTED ARMS REQUEST, WOULD CONGRESS BE PREPARED TO SELL THEM? HE SAID IT IS QUESTION OF COMMUNIST VS WESTERN INFLUENCE IN MIDDLE EAST AND IT IS UP TO US TO DECIDE. SOLARZ RESPONDED THAT HE FAVORED WHATEVER CAN BE DONE TO STRENGTHEN FORCES OF MODERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. FAHMY SAID EGYPT IS ALREADY BEING CRITICIZED BY NUMEROUS PERSONS FOR CUTTING ITS RELATIONS WITH USSR WITHOUT HAVING ANY GUARANTEE THAT UU WILL COME THROUGH. SOLARZ ASKED IF SELLING ARMS TO EGYPT WOULD HELP TOWARD PEACE. FAHMY STRESSED THAT EGYPT IS NOT ACTING IN MANNER IT DOES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN US FAVORS. IT HAS DONE MUCH WITHOUT GETTING ANYTHING FROM US; EXPULSION OF RUSSIANS, FIRST DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. IF US PROVIDES ARMS TO EGYPT, FAHMY SAID, IT WOULD DEEPEN RELATIONSHIP AND ESTABLISH A BALANCE OF POWER IN THE AREA WHICH MUST EXIST IF REAL PEACE IS TO BE POSSIBLE. IF THERE IS A GREAT GAP IN MILITARY STRENGTH, THE TEMPTATION BY EITHER SIDE WOULD BE TO STRIKE THE OTHER.

7. FAHMY THEN STRESSED GOE'S DESIRE FOR PEACE, CITING OPEN DOOR ECONOMIC POLICY TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CURRENT MEETING OF JOINT BUSINESS COUNCIL. EGYPT'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS HAD BEEN



CLEAR FOR SOME TIME, HE CLAIMED.

8. SOLARZ ASKED WHY ISRAELIS AGREED IN SEPT AND OT IN MARCH TO SECOND DISENGAGEMENT. FAHMY RESPONDED THAT ISRAELIS WERE TESTING US AFTER TRAUMAS OF WATERGATE AND VIETNAM AND APPLYING EXTENSIVE PRESSURE, BRIBES AND BLACKMAIL. AS RESULT, US PAID VERY HIGH PRICE FOR RETURN OF TERRITORY THAT IN NO WAY BELONGED TO ISRAEL.

9. SOLARZ SAID HE UNDESTOOD THAT HAVING UN RATHER THAN US PERSONNEL AT MONITORING STATION AT UMM KHUSHAIB WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO EGYPT. FAHMY SAID THIS WAS NOT TRUE, BUT FELT IT NOT USEFUL TO GO INTO DETAILS OF CORRECT VERSION. HE THOUGHT PRESENCE OF US TECHNICIANS WAS IN NO WAY COMPARABLE TO VIETNAM. IMPORTANT THING IS THAT EGYPT DOES NOT FEAR THE US PRESENCE.

10. SOLARZ ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF AFTER THREE YEARS THERE WERE NO NEW AGREEMENT IN VIEW OF WORDING IN AGREEMENT THAT IT REMAINS IN EFFECT UNTIL SUPERSEDED. FAHMY SAID THIS CLAUSE IS "MEANINGLESS" AND IF THERE IS NO SERIOUS MOVE TOWARDS PEACE WITHIN THREE YEARS OR LESS, THERE WILL BE A NEW WAR.

11. SOLARZ ASKED HOW ISRAELIS ARE IMPLEMENTING SINAI II. ISRAEL, FAHMY SAID, HAD NOT BEEN COOPERATIVE AT ALL IN NEGOTIATIONS, NIT-PICKING OVER THE MOST TRIVIAL POINTS, COMMAS, SEMI-COLONS, ETC. IT WAS DIFFICULT THEREFORE TO BELIEVE ISRAELIS HAVE SERIOUS INTENT OF ACHIEVING REAL PEACE. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THEY IMPLEMENT SINAI II AS THEY DID THE FIRST ACCORD, THEY COULD BE TERMED "COOPERATIVE".

12. SOLARZ ASKED WHAT EGYPT WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO AS PART OF FINAL SETTLEMENT. FAHMY SAID A PEACE AGREEMENT AND NON-BELLIGERENCY BUT PROBABLY NOT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS NOR TRADE; THESE CAN COME BUT NOT AS CONDITIONS. NO STATE CAN DEMAND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF ANOTHER. AS FOR TRADE, EGYPTIANS HAD LEARNED LESSONS FROM WATCHING US BLOCKADE CHINA AND CUBA FOR LONG PERIOD. FAHMY ALSO SAID ANY DEMILITARIZATION IN SINAI SHOULD BE RECIPROCAL AND THAT UN COULD STAY AS PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

13. IN RESPONSE TO SOLARZ' QUESTION A975 34805 43-1589, 81 2-4 743-(975 735233, 648-- ,s 84-3), FAHMY PRECLUDED A SYRIAN ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL BECAUSE IT IS IN WEAKER POSITION. HE WENT ON T

O SAY THAT IF WAR DOES TAKE PLACE AND SYRIA IS IN DESPARATE STRAITS, EGYPT WOULD HAVE TO FIGHT. SOLARZ ASKED WHAT SYRIANS WOULD DO IF THERE IS NO NEW ACCORD ON GOLAN. WOULD THEY RENEW UNEF MANDATE? FAHMY SAID THERE WAS GOOD POSSIBILITY FOR RENEWAL IF US MOVES IN A HURRY.

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #8513 2921746
O 191736Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3033

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 248513 TOSEC 100050

EXDIS
FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 10463 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DTD 19 OCT
QUOTE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 10463

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)
SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT; MRS. SADAT'S SCHEDULE AND THAT OF THE CHILDREN
REF: STATE 248369; STATE 248370

1. I HAD AN HOUR'S MEETING WITH MRS. SADAT TODAY TO GO OVER HER DRAFT SCHEDULE AND THAT OF THE CHILDREN. SHE WAS PLEASED WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS WE ARE WORKING OUT. SHE STRESSED THAT, WHILE THE PRESIDENT NEEDS HIS AFTERNOON REST, SHE WANTS TO BE BUSY ALL THE TIME.
2. WE DISCUSSED THE REHABILITATION AWARD AND SHE IS CLEARLY VERY PLEASED TO HAVE BEEN OFFERED IT. A 4:30 PM PRESENTATION ON OCT 28 IS AGREEABLE OR ANY OTHER TIME THAT WE AND MRS. WALSH MAY WISH.
3. RE OCT 30, MRS. SADAT (AND EARLIER HASSAN KAMEL) ASKED THAT THERE BE NO RPT NO REFERENCE TO SHOPPING ON HER SCHEDULE OR ON THAT OF THE CHILDREN. SHE PREFERS EITHER TO SIGHTSEE OR TO VISIT HOSPITALS.
4. MRS. SADAT NOTED THAT SHE WILL HAVE TWO DAYS IN FLORIDAY, ONE OF WHICH WILL PRESUMABLY BE SPENT IN ORLANDO. SHE WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT THE OTHER DAY? IF MRS. FORD DOES NOT COME TO FLORIDAY, WHICH SHE FULLY UNDERTANDS, SHE WONDERS IF ON THE SECOND DAY SHE MIGHT BE TAKEN TO SOME CHILDREN'S



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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines
By NR NARA Date 8/5/10

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HOSPITALS OR HOMES FOR THE AGED IN THE AREA. SHE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE SOME VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTERS, SINCE SHE IS INVOLVED IN SPONSORING SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS HERE, THESE WOULD BE FOR NORMAL CHILDREN, WHO DO NOT GO ON TO UNIVERSITIES. IN ANY CASE, HER PRINCIPLE CONCERN IS THAT SHE BE KEPT BUSY ALL THE TIME. (SHE IS A HUMAN DYNAMO.)

5. ON THE CHILDREN'S SCHEDULE, SHE NOTED THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO AVOID AS MANY FORMAL AFFAIRS AS POSSIBLE. THEY WILL REMAIN TOGETHER, AS WE SUGGESTED, AND WILL DO WHAT WE SUGGEST. SHE RECALLED HER DAUGHTER, LUBNA, HAD TOLD MY WIFE THAT THE CHILDREN WANTED TO GO TO A NIGHTCLUB EVERY NIGHT (CAIRO 10178) AND MY LATER CONVERSATION WITH HER THAT THIS WAS NOT A PARTICULARLY GOOD IDEA IMAGE-WISE. SHE FULLY AGREED AND HAD TOLD THE CHILDREN THAT THEY COULD NOT DO THIS. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, LIKE TO SEE AT LEAST ONE OR TWO AMERICAN NIGHTCLUBS IF THIS CAN BE ARRANGED. THEY WOULD ENJOY ANY EVENING ENTERTAINMENT SUCH AS PLAYS OR SYMPHONIES OR THE LIKE. SHE THOUGHT OUR DRAFT SCHEDULE FOR THEM IS VERY GOOD, BUT SUGGESTED THAT RATHER THAN MAKE THE DECISION HERSELF ON SOME OF THE ITEMS LISTED THEREIN, SHE WILL SHOW IT TO THE CHILDREN FOR THEIR VIEWS. SHE WILL LET ME HAVE THEIR COMMENTS TOMORROW, MONDAY, WHICH I WILL FORWARD AT THAT TIME.

6. STATE 248503 (SECTO 16035) AND 248504 (SECTO 16041) JUST RECEIVED AND AFTER MY MEETING WITH MRS. SADAT, MRS. KISSINGER MAY BE SURE A 5:00 PM TEA ON MONDAY, OCT 27, WILL BE AGREEABLE TO MRS. SADAT, WHO DOES NOT USUALLY REST IN THE AFTERNOONS. I WILL CONFIRM THIS WHEN I AM IN TOUCH WITH MRS. SADAT AGAIN TOMORROW AND SUGGEST MRS. KISSINGER PLAN ACCORDINGLY. EILTS UNQUOTE
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PRIORITY
 DE RUEHC #8514 2921755
 P 191744Z OCT 75 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY 3034

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 248514 TOSEC 160659

EXDIS
 FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 10465 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DTD 19 OCT
 QUOTE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 10465

EXDIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: OVIP (SADAT, ANWAR)
 SUBJECT: SADAT VISIT: PROGRAM FOR MRS. SADAT
 REF: PARA 3 STATE 248584 (SECTO 16041)

1. I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NOBODY IS PRESSING THE EGYPTIANS ON THE MATTER OF DRESS FOR THE DINNER. THE SUBJECT HAD ALREADY BEEN SETTLED WHEN STATE 246950 WAS RECEIVED, SUGGESTING THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT THOUGHT THIS THROUGH AND STATING THAT THE SECRETARY WISHED ME TO RAISE IT AGAIN. AGAINST MY BETTER JUDGMENT, I DID SO IN LOW KEY FASHION AND GOT THE PREDICTABLE REPLY REPORTED CAIRO 10378. I AM WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SECRETARY WISHED ME TO RAISE IT AGAIN. AGAINST MY BETTER JUDGEMENT, I DID SO IN LOW KEY FASHION AND GOT THE PREDICTABLE REPLY REPORTED CAIRO 10378. I AM WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE MATTER IS NOW CLOSED AND THAT WE CAN GET ON WITH MORE IMPORTANT MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE VISIT. I AM GLAD TO HAVE CONFIRMATION PROVIDED REPTEL.

2. AS A MATTER OF INTEREST, MRS. SADAT RAISED WITH ME THIS AFTERNOON THE MATTER OF MEN'S ATTIRE AT THE STATE DINNERS. SHE HOPED IT WOULD BE DARK BUSINESS SUIT RATHER THAN BLACK TIE, SINCE THE PRESIDENT NEVER WEARS BLACK TIE AND DOES NOT HAVE ANY SUCH ATTIRE. I ASSURED HER IT WAS DARK BUSINESS SUIT. SHE WAS PLEASED AND RELIEVED AND COMPARED OUR UNDERSTANDING WITH THAT OF THE BRITISH WHO ARE TRYING TO GET SADAT TO WEAR MORNING CLOTHES FOR HIS MEETING WITH THE QUEEN. THE PRESIDENT IS RESISTING AND IN ANY CASE DOESN'T HAVE ANY.

3. I TOLD MRS. SADAT SHE COULD BE SURE HIS AMERICAN HOSTS ARE

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/5/10



PSN:045645

PAGE 01

TOR:292/18:01Z

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PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S COMFORT AND ENJOYMENT AND NO ONE WOULD EVEN DREAM OF ASKING HIM TO CONSIDER ATTIRE IN WHICH WE ALL KNOW HE FEELS UNCOMFORTABLE. SHE WAS VERY PLEASED.

4. SUGGEST DEPT FORWARD THIS MESSAGE TO BARBIAN.
EILTS UNQUOTE
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PSN:045645 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:292/18:01Z DTG:191744Z OCT 75

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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #8516 2921939
O 191754Z OCT 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 3035

~~SECRET~~ STATE 248516 T0SEC 160000

EXDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN NUMBER 248516 VICE 248511)
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN, SN
SUBJ: ACTION MEMORANDUM: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA=SINGAPORE
(8/8 NO. 7520898)
REFS: A. SECTO 16007 B. SINGAPORE 4517

1. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO PM LEE KUAN YEW INSTEAD OF TO FONMIN PER REPTEL A.

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR PRIME MINISTER
I VERY MUCH ENJOYED MY RECENT TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER RAJARATNAM IN NEW YORK LAST MONTH. IT WAS A PRODUCTIVE EXCHANGE ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS PROBABLY TOLD YOU OF OUR DISCUSSION ON KOREA, AND I WOULD LIKE PERSONALLY TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS ISSUE.
AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE NOW TWO COMPETING RESOLUTION BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WITH DEBATE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN OCTOBER 21. OUR RESOLUTION PROPOSES THAT THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED ENTER INTO NEW ARRANGEMENTS TO REPLACE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND ENSURE PEACE ON THE PENINSULA. WE PROPOSE AS A FIRST STEP THAT WE, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, NORTH KOREA AND THE CHINESE BEGIN TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN PROCEED WITH DISSOLUTION OF THE UNCOMMAND THE CONCURRENT ESTABLISHMENT OF OTHER ARRANGEMENT FOR MAINTAINING THE ARMISTICE. IN MY SEPTEMBER 22 SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY I ALSO STRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS AND THAT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO SIT DOWN WITH THE OTHER SIDE TO EXPLORE ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA.
THE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS FROM THE OTHER SIDE HAS BEEN ENTIRELY NEGATIVE. THE NORTH KOREANS AND CHINESE



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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

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PAGE 01

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 248516

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APPROVED BY AMB. BUFFUM
EA-MR MILLER
S: JCOVEY
S/S-O: LMATTESON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 248516 TOSEC 160060

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN NUMBER VICE 248511)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR, UNGA, KS, KN, SN
SUBJ: ACTION MEMORANDUM: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA-SINGAPORE
(S/S NO. 7520898)

REFS: A. SECTO 16007 B. SINGAPORE 4517

1. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO PM LEE
KUAN YEW INSTEAD OF TO FONMIN PER REFTEL A.

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I VERY MUCH ENJOYED MY RECENT TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
RAJARATNAM IN NEW YORK LAST MONTH. IT WAS A PRODUCTIVE
EXCHANGE ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER
HAS PROBABLY TOLD YOU OF OUR DISCUSSION ON KOREA, AND
I WOULD LIKE PERSONALLY TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE WE
ATTACH TO THIS ISSUE.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
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By WR NARA, Date 8/5/10



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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 248516

AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE NOW TWO COMPETING RESOLUTION BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WITH DEBATE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN OCTOBER 21. OUR RESOLUTION PROPOSES THAT THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED ENTER INTO NEW ARRANGEMENTS TO REPLACE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND ENSURE PEACE ON THE PENINSULA. WE PROPOSE AS A FIRST STEP THAT WE, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, NORTH KOREA AND THE CHINESE BEGIN TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN PROCEED WITH DISSOLUTION OF THE UNCOMMAND THE CONCURRENT ESTABLISHMENT OF OTHER ARRANGEMENT FOR MAINTAINING THE ARMISTICE. IN MY SEPTEMBER 22 SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY I ALSO STRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS AND THAT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO SIT DOWN WITH THE OTHER SIDE TO EXPLORE ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA.

THE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS FROM THE OTHER SIDE HAS BEEN ENTIRELY NEGATIVE. THE NORTH KOREANS AND CHINESE REMAIN TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF EXCLUDING THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA COMPLETELY FROM PARTICIPATION IN ANY DIALOGUE ON KOREA'S FUTURE. THIS IS AN OBVIOUS THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF THE PENINSULA AND SOMETHING THAT WE SIMPLY CANNOT ACCEPT.

AT THIS POINT, I THINK THE ONLY PRACTICAL WAY WE CAN SEEK TO DRAW THE OTHER SIDE INTO A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE IS FIRST TO SHOW THEM THEIR RESOLUTION CANNOT WIN IN NEW YORK. WHILE THEIR RESOLUTION MAY SEEM TO HAVE ATTRACTIVE FEATURES ON THE SURFACE, CLOSER ANALYSIS-- ESPECIALLY WHEN TAKEN WITH THE PUBLIC COMMENTS OF ITS SUPPORTERS--REVEALS IT AS AN INFLEXIBLE, PARTISAN APPROACH THAT CAN ONLY FRUSTRATE CHANCES FOR STAB)856 8, 5#3 03, 8, 7)-. FOR US (WITH OUR 42,000 TROOPS IN KOREA), THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE TO COME BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS YEAR. THAT IS WHY I FEEL IT NECESSARY TO APPROACH YOU DIRECTLY TO URGE SINGAPORE'S PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE SUPPORT FOR OUR RESOLUTION AS WELL AS SINGAPORE'S VOTE AGAINST THE ALGERIAN-SPONSORED RESOLUTION ON KOREA SHOULD IT COME TO A VOTE.



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 33 STATE 248516

IT HAS BEEN SOME TIME SINCE OUR MEETING IN WASHINGTON
LAST MAY, AND I HOPE WE WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO GET TO-
GETHER AGAIN BEFORE TOO LONG, WITH BEST REGARDS
AND ALL GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT YOU APPROVE THE SUGGESTED TEXT.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

APPROVED BY BUFFUM AND CLEARED BY EA- MILLER AND S:
EDVED.
INGERSOLL



~~SECRET~~

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