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CHINA TRIP

TOSEC



FLASH /PRIORITY
 DE RUEHC #7271/1 2902018
 Z P 172001Z OCT 75 ZFFA
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT FLASH 2958

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 247271/1 TOSEC 160001 ?

NODIS
 FOLLOWING REPEAT MOSCOW 14954 ACTION SECSTATE 17 OCT

QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 14954

NODIS

FROM ROBINSON

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ETRD, EEW, UR, US

SUBJECT: GRAIN/OIL NEGOTIATIONS

REFS: A. STATE 244346; B. MOSCOW 14888

1. SUMMARY: I MET WITH KUZ'MIN AND GORDEYEV AT 4:30 THIS AFTERNOON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17, ACCOMPANIED BY FSO NILES. (PATOLICHEV AND AMBASSADOR STOESEL WERE NOT PRESENT AS THEY WERE BOTH ATTENDING SOVIET RECEPTION FOR FRENCH PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING.) SUBSEQUENTLY, THE MATTERS DISCUSSED AT THIS MEETING WERE REFERRED BY KUZ'MIN TO PATOLICHEV, WHO HAS NOW APPROVED THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE FOR REVISION OF PRICE CLAUSE 6 IN OIL LETTER OF INTENT WHICH HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AT THE MEETING AS REPLACEMENT FOR SIDE LETTER. PATOLICHEV ALSO GAVE FORMAL APPROVAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE 30-DAY LIMITATION IN THE OIL LETTER OF INTENT AND SAID HE WOULD INFORM US AT A MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 1:00 P.M., SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE LIFTING OF THE MORATORIUM ON FURTHER GRAIN SALES TO THE USSR.

2. ACCORDINGLY, I URGE THAT YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO SIGN THE GRAIN AGREEMENT AND THE OIL LETTER OF INTENT TOMORROW, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, AT 08:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME (E.G., 24 HOURS FROM NOW) WITH THE FOLLOWING REVISIONS IN THE OIL LETTER OF INTENT:

A) DELETE FROM THE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH THE WORDS "WITHIN 30 DAYS" AND REPLACE WITH WORDS "TO COMMENCE NEGOTIATING PROMPTLY"

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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By NR NARA, Date 8/5/10



AS PROPOSED PARA 4 REF B.

B) MODIFY PRICE CLAUSE 6 OF OIL LETTER OF INTENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH TEXT IN PARA 5 BELOW. (THIS WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR A SIDE LETTER ON OIL PRICING WHICH APPEARS UNOBTAINABLE, AS EXPLAINED IN PARA 4 BELOW.) WE ANTICIPATE NO PROBLEM IN OBTAINING SOVIET ACQUIESCENCE IN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE LIFTING OF THE MORATORIUM ALONG THE LINES DISCUSSED PARA 4, REF B. END SUMMARY.

3. THIS MEETING LASTED ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS, DURING WHICH WE ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN ACCEPTANCE OF OUR SIDE LETTER ON OIL PRICING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL A, PARA 3. KUZ'MIN REPORTED THAT THEY HAD HAD THE LETTER TRANSLATED, AND THEIR REVIEW CONFIRMED THEIR SUSPICION THAT WE WANTED THE LETTER TO ESTABLISH PUBLICLY THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO A PRICE DISCOUNT. HE CITED DATA FROM PLATT'S "OILGRAM" ON 1974 OIL COSTS IN THE U.S. INDICATING AN AVERAGE OF \$7.53 PER BARREL, INCLUDING DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, WHILE THE SAUDI ARABIAN PRICE WAS \$10.835 PER BARREL. HE INTERPRETED OUR LETTER AS REFLECTING AN INTENT TO USE U.S. COSTS WELL BELOW WORLD MARKET AS A BASE AND THUS CONCLUDED THAT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH A DISCOUNT THROUGH THIS FORMULA.

4. I ASSURED KUZ'MIN THAT HE HAD MISINTERPRETED OUR LETTER, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS AND WILL REMAIN ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO ANY SIDE LETTER CONTAINING TERMS TO WHICH THEY WOULD BE EXPLICITLY COMMITTED. THEY INDICATED THAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER AN APPROACH WITH THE U.S. SUBMITTING A SIDE LETTER AND THE SOVIETS RESPONDING WITH A SIDE LETTER OF THEIR OWN TAKING A DIFFERENT POSITION. I REJECTED THIS SUGGESTION AS UNACCEPTABLE.

5. KUZ'MIN INDICATED AGAIN THAT THEY HAD PROVIDED US WITH SEVERAL FORMULATIONS FOR PRICE CLAUSE 6 OF THE OIL LETTER OF INTENT AND URGED THAT WE ACCEPT ONE OF THESE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. OUT OF THIS DISCUSSION EVOLVED THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMPROMISE ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED REFTEL B, PARA 7. HOWEVER, WE ENDED UP WITH WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE AN IMPROVEMENT OVER SUGGESTED NEW TEXT REFTEL B, PARA 7, BY ADDING TO THE PRESENLY APPROVED TEXT THE EARLIER FORMULATION. ON THIS BASIS IT WOULD NOW READ AS FOLLOWS:

"PRICES FOR CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS WILL BE MUTUALLY AGREED AT A LEVEL WHICH WILL ASSURE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS; SUCH PRICES TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CONTRACTS ON THE BASIS OF WORLD PRICES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE QUALITY OF THE CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS SUPPLIED AND TRANSPORTATION CONDITIONS". I EMPHASIZED THAT ALTHOUGH I WOULD



~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

SUBMIT THIS ALTERNATIVE TO WASHINGTON I HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT IT AS SUBSTITUTE FOR SIDE LETTER.

6. ALTHOUGH KUZ'MIN AND GORDEYEV APPEARED TO VIEW THIS AS A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION ON THEIR PART, IN THE INTERESTS OF RESOLVING THIS ISSUE THEY AGREED TO SEEK APPROVAL OF THIS FORMULATION FROM PATOLICHEV AS SOON AS HE COULD BE CONTACTED AND PROMISED A RESPONSE BY 8:00 P.M. THIS EVENING, MOSCOW TIME. AT 7:30P.M. WE RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE CONFIRMATION OF PATOLICHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF THIS FORMULATION.

7. I BELIEVE THAT WE FACE TWO BASIC ALTERNATIVES AS FOLLOWS:
A) CONTINUE TO DEMAND A SLIDE LETTER. (IT APPEARS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT WE CAN OBTAIN SUCH A LETTER EVEN WITH FURTHER MODIFICATIONS WHICH KUZ'MIN SAID HE SAW NO POINT IN DISCUSSING.)
B) ACCEPT THE REVISED PRICE CLAUSE 6 OF THE OIL LETTER OF INTENT (PARA 5 ABOVE). (THIS, COMBINED WITH CLAUSE 4 OF THE OIL LETTER
BT



~~SECRET~~

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FLASH /PRIORITY
 DE RUEHC #7271/2 2902020
 Z P 172001Z OCT 75 ZFR4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT FLASH 2959

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 247271/2 TOSEC 160001

NODIS
 OF INTENT ESTABLISHING A MUTUAL AGREEMENT TO SHIP SOME PORTION OF
 THE OIL TO THE U.S. IN TANKERS USED FOR GRAIN TRANSPORTATION,
 SATISFIES THE BASIC CONDITIONS IN THE PROPOSED SIDE LETTER -
 EXCEPT FOR PAYMENT TERMS WHICH ARE IMPLIED IN THE PROPOSED
 REVISION OF PRICE CLAUSE 6.)

8. WE RECOMMEND ALTERNATE B. IN OUR JUDGMENT, WE FACE CONTINUING
 DELAY IN ANY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE ALTERNATE A, WITH FURTHER STRAIN
 IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP AND LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF ULTIMATE
 SUCCESS.

9. ACCORDINGLY I RECOMMEND THAT I BE GRANTED PROMPTLY AUTHORIZA-
 TION TO CONCLUDE THE GRAIN/OIL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF
 A) A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD IN LIFTING THE GRAIN MORATORIUM
 ALONG THE LINES OF REPTEL B, PARA 3.
 B) ELIMINATION OF THE NEGOTIATING LIMIT OF "WITHIN 30 DAYS" IN
 THE OIL LETTER OF INTENT (REPTEL B, PARA 4).
 C) REVISION OF PRICE CLAUSE 6 OF THE OIL LETTER OF INTENT IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH TEXT OF PARA 5 ABOVE IN LIEU OF A SIDE LETTER
 AGREEMENT.

10. IF AUTHORITY REQUESTED IN PARA 9 ABOVE IS GRANTED WE ASSUME
 TIME CLOCK WILL BEGIN TO RUN IMMEDIATELY, THUS PERMITTING
 SIGNATURE OF BOTH DOCUMENTS AT APPROXIMATELY 8:00 P.M. MOSCOW
 TIME SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, FOLLOWING 24 HOUR PERIOD FOR WASHINGTON
 CONSULTATIONS.

11. IF BOTH DOCUMENTS ARE SIGNED AS PROPOSED ABOVE, IT WILL BE
 IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO LEAVE MOSCOW WITHOUT MEETING RESIDENT U.S. PRESS
 CROPS. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE WASHINGTON CAN PROVIDE ON
 HOW I SHOULD HANDLE C
 ONTACTS WITH PRESS. IT IS UNCLEAR AT THIS



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POINT WHETHER SOVIETS PLAN ANY PUBLICITY AT TIME OF SIGNING.
STOESSEL UNQUOTE INGERSOLL
BT



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OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #7256/1 2902024
O 171947Z OCT 75 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 2960

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 247256/1 T0SEC 160002

EXDIS
FOLLOWING REPEAT DAMASCUS 4043 SENT SECSTATE INFO BEIRUT
DATED OCT 17.

QUOTE
~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 4043

EXDIS
FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, SY, US, LE
SUBJECT: DIALOG WITH SYRIA ON LEBANESE SITUATION
REF: STATE 243490

1. SUMMARY: MET SEPARATELY WITH ASAD AND KHADDAM
OCTOBER 16 TO BEGIN DIALOG WITH SYRIA ON LEBANESE
SITUATION (REFTEL). BOTH PRESIDENT AND FONMIN
REACTED FAVORABLY TO OUR INITIATIVE. ASAD SAID HE
WOULD WELCOME FURTHER CONTACTS ON THIS SUBJECT. HE
ALLUDED TO US INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANESE CRISIS IN
CONNECTION OUR SUPPORT OF SINAI AGREEMENT. NEITHER
HAD SUGGESTIONS FOR WHAT WE MIGHT USEFULLY DO BEYOND
COUNSELLING LEBANESE TO STOP FIGHTING AND WORK FOR
POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. END SUMMARY

2. PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS WERE CONSIDERABLY MORE EXTENDED
THAN THOSE OF KHADDAM. IN COURSE TWO HOUR MEETING ASAD
DISCOURSED AT LENGTH ON THEME THAT LEBANESE PROBLEM WAS
BASICALLY ONE FOR ARAB NATION TO ASSIST IN SOLVING.
LEBANESE CRISIS IS POLITICAL NOT RELIGIOUS IN ORIGIN.
THE VARIOUS POLITICAL FACTIONS, HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY
PPS AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST FRONT, CONTAINED REPRESENTA-
TIVES OF ALL SECTS. RE OUR IMPRESSION THAT SYRIANS MIGHT
FEEL US SUPPORTS HARD LINE CHRISTIAN POSITION, PRESIDENT
SAID THIS WAS NOT IN FACT THE VIEW OF ANY RESPONSIBLE



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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*

State Dept Guidelines

12/9/03

By NR NARA, Date 8/5/10

SYRIAN.

3. HOWEVER, ASAD CONTINUED, "MOST ARABS" HAVE IMPRESSION THAT US IN PLAYING ROLE IN LEBANESE CRISIS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SINAI AGREEMENT. (HE DID NOT REPEAT ALLEGATION IN SYRIAN PRESS THAT WE WERE MEDDLING IN LEBANON TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM SINAI AGREEMENT.) HE DID NOT PURSUE THIS POINT NOR DID HE CHALLENGE MY ASSURANCES THAT OUR EFFORTS IN LEBANESE CRISIS WERE SOLELY DEDICATED TO ENCOURAGING ALL PARTIES TO WORK OUT A JUST POLITICAL SOLUTION. (INTERESTING Y, KHADDAM WHO NORMALLY IS THE MORE OVERTLY SUSPICIOUS OF US MOTIVES, DID NOT AIR THIS ACCUSATION.) ASAD SAID HE WOULD NOT DWELL ON THE SINAI AGREEMENT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED IT HAD RAISED PROBLEMS IN OUR OWN DIALOG BUT HE SAW NO REASON TO LET THIS INTERFERE WITH OUR BILATERAL REALTIONS. HE TWICE STRESSED THAT HE FOUND OUR EXCHANGES USEFUL. WE DISCUSSED PROPOSITION THAT MUCH OF LEBANON'S PRESENT DILEMMA HAD BEEN SELF-CREATED BY GOL'S NEGLECT OF COUNTRY'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS DURING PAST GENERATION. HE SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS BUT AT LATER POINT IN CONVERSATION NOTED "THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT CERTAIN OUTSIDE FACTORS ARE ALSO INVOLVED." HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

4. PRESIDENT PROBED FOR BACKGROUND OF OUR COMMENT RE ISRAELI REACTION TO INTERVENTION OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN LEBANON (REFTEL PARA 3). ASSURED HIM THIS WAS MERELY OUR BEST INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT AND REPRESENTED NO US COLLUSION WITH ISRAELIS. HE APPEARED TO ACCEPT THIS. ASAD THEN EMPHASIZED THAT SYRIAN POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION WHAT ISRAEL MAY OR MAY NOT DO. SYRIA WOULD FULFILL ITS DUTY TOWARDS LEBANON NO MATTER WHAT. IF LEBANON WANTED THE HELP OF SYRIAN ARMED FORCES, THESE FORCES WOULD BE PUT AT LEBANON'S DISPOSITION TO BE PLACED ANYWHERE IN LEBANON, FROM THE EXTREME SOUTH TO NORTH. HE WAXED RHETORICAL WITH FURTHER COMMENT, "ANYTIME ISRAEL SEEKS TO CONFRONT US, WE WILL FEEL NO RESTRAINT. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO FACE ISRAEL NOT ONLY IN SYRIA BUT ANYWHERE IN THE ARAB HOMELAND." THE PRESIDENT THEN PAUSED AND ADDED WITH A QUIET SMILE, "HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ASKED TO SEND OUR FORCES INTO LEBANON UP TO NOW."

5. ASAD ASKED IF WE HAD ANY SPECIFIC IDEAS TO PROPOSE CONCERNING OUR ROLE. I SAID WE HAD NOT; ONE POINT OF THIS MEETING WAS TO ELICIT SYRIAN IDEAS. THIS CLEARLY PLEASED HIM AND HE EXPOUNDED ON THEME THAT SYRIA HAD PURSUED POLICY THROUGHOUT THE RECENT MONTHS OF MAIN-



TAINING CONTACT WITH ALL FACTIONS. IT REFUSED SUPPORT THE VIEWS OF ANY SINGLE CLIQUE. I SAID THIS CLEARLY WAS OUR POSITION AS WELL AND SHOWED THERE WAS INDEED IMPORTANT COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US. ASAD SAID KHADDAM HAD ATTENDED FIRST SESSION OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE ONLY BECAUSE LEBANESE HAD INSISTED UPON THIS IN ORDER TO GIVE HIM MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION FOR SYRIAN ROLE. AFTER NOTING THERE WERE STILL A FEW TROUBLE SPOTS AND EXCHANGES OF FIRE IN BEIRUT, ASAD COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS THESE HAD BEEN STIMULATED BY THE CAIRO MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS. CAIRO CONFEREES HAD BEEN WRONG TO MEET WITHOUT FIRST ASCERTAINING VIEWPOINTS OF THE LEBANESE PARTIES.

6. ASKED IF HE WERE MORE OR LESS OPTIMISTIC THAN HE HAD BEEN A MONTH AGO, ASAD REPLIED HE FELT SITUATION HAD STABILIZED AND RETURNED AGAIN TO THEME OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN SAYING, "BUT THE ISSUE DOES NOT RELATE SOLELY TO LEBANON; IF IT DID, I WOULD BE COMPLETELY OPTIMISTIC." HE CONCLUDED THAT NO LEBANESE HAD ANYTHING O GAIN BY CONTINUING THE CONFLICT. TO MY COMMENT THAT I HAD THOUGHT LAST SPRING LEBANESE HAD LEARNED THAT LESSON AFTER FIRST ROUND, ASAD REPLIED THAT SOME STUDENTS HAD TO PAY A HIGHER PRICE THAN OTHERS FOR THEIR LESSONS. ISRAEL, FOR INSTANCE, BT



OP IMMED
 DE RUEHC #7256/2 2902025
 O 171947Z OCT 75 ZFF6
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 2961

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 247256/2 TOSEC 160002

EXDIS
 DID NOT LEARN ENOUGH FROM THE OCTOBER WAR.

7. KHADDAM WAS MORE RETICENT THAN ASAD. AFTER LISTENING CAREFULLY, HIS FIRST COMMENT WAS THAT SYRIA MADE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS IN DEALING WITH THE LEBANESE CONFLICT. IT HAD GOOD TIES WITH ALL SIDES; IT WAS CONCERNED WITH AND FOR ALL OF THEM. IT WORKED FOR THE SAFETY AND UNITY OF LEBANON. ITS EFFORTS WERE TO TRY TO STOP THE FIGHTING SO THAT THE VOICE OF REASON WOULD PREVAIL. HE FELT THE SITUATION WAS CONTINUING TO STABILIZE. SYRIA WAS FOR ITS PART CONTINUING TO EXERT EFFORTS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO ELIMINATE ARMED CONFLICT.

8. RE WHAT SYRIA CONSIDERS WE MIGHT USEFULLY DO, KHADDAM COMMENTED THE BEST US ROLE WOULD BE TO DO AS SYRIA, I.E., TO ENCOURAGE VARIOUS PARTIES TO WORK FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND AGAINST ARMED CONFLICT. I SAID THIS WAS, OF COURSE, OUR BASIC AIM AND REFLECTED IN EVERY CONVERSATION OUR AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT HAD WITH THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP. WE KNOW IT WAS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS TO BE IDENTIFIED AS THE SUPPORTER OF ANY SINGLE CLIQUE IN LEBANON. KHADDAM AGREED, SAYING SYRIANS TRIED TO AVOID THIS AS WELL BECAUSE IT WILL NEVER HELP ATTAIN A SOLUTION. ASKED IF HE HAD ANY MORE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS, KHADDAM SAID HE HAD NONE AT PRESENT BUT WOULD GIVE IT FURTHER THOUGHT.

9. COMMENT:
 BOTH MEN HEARD MY PRESENTATION THROUGH WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. ASAD, AS IS HIS HABIT WHEN CONCENTRATING AND PERHAPS ALSO WHEN HE IS ON EDGE, CLICKED HIS PRAYER BEADS LOUDLY. KHADDAM WAS EXHAUSTED FROM HIS MOSCOW TRIP AND A



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DAY-LONG SERIES OF MEETINGS

IN HIS FIRST DAY BACK

IN DAMASCUS. BOTH MEN GAVE EVERY SIGN OF APPRECIATING AND WELCOMING OUR INITIATIVE TO DISCUSS SUBJECT OF LEBANON WITH THEM. THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY PLEASED AT OUR DESCRIPTION OF SYRIAN EFFORTS IN LEBANON AS CONSTRUCTIVE. OUR WORDS OF CAUTION ABOUT AN ISRAELI REACTION WERE ABSORBED AND DID NOT STRIKE THEM AS A THREAT.

10. IT IS SIGNIFICANT OF PRESENT ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING SYRO-US CONTACTS THAT THIS WAS MY FIRST MEETING WITH ASAD WHICH PRESIDENCY DID NOT SUBSEQUENTLY ANNOUNCE TO MEDIA.

MURPHY
UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

BT



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OP IMMED /PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #7517 2902209
O P 172156Z OCT 75 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 2962

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 247517 TOSEC 160003

NODIS
CHEROKEE
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), OGEN

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH MR. Z

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. AS I TOLD YOU HE WOULD, MR. Z CAME IN TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON TO REPORT ON HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS FRIEND. THE HIGHLIGHTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE MOOD OUT THERE IS EXCELLENT AND THE FRIEND EXPRESSED NOTHING BUT THE WARMEST OF FEELINGS FOR YOU. HE APPRECIATED YOUR PHONE CALL AND "THERE IS NO PROBLEM."

(B) AS TO THE OTHER MATTER, EVERYTHING IS IN TRAIN. HE WILL STICK TO HIS LETTER, SAYING THAT HE ORDERED THE PROGRAM AND THE CATEGORIES AND THAT YOUR PARTICIPATION WAS TO SUPPLY NAMES WITHIN THOSE CATEGORIES. MR. Z DID COME BACK, HOWEVER, TO THE POINT ABOUT THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS THAT YOU HAD IF THE LEAKING PROCESS CONTINUED. I CANNOT SAY THAT I AM TOTALLY COMFORTABLE WITH THIS, BUT THINK THAT WILL BE PLAYED IN LOW KEY.

(C) MR. Z INDICATED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT A PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION BEGIN BETWEEN MAN AND THE OTHER FELLOW'S

LAWYER. HE WILL BE PURSUING THIS OVER THE WEEKEND AND WILL BE GETTING BACK TO ME ON MONDAY. THEN DEPENDING ON



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

By NR NARA, Date 8/5/10

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DE RUEHC #7864 2902355
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 2963

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 24786 TOSEC 160004
FOLLOWING REPEAT DUBLIN 1898 ACTION SECSTATE INFO LONDON 17 OCT 75

QUOTE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DUBLIN 1898

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT PFOR ENRG EI

SUBJ: FONMIN FITZGERALD DENIES LONDON TIMES REPORT; ASKS
THAT SECRETARY BE INFORMED OF MISQUOTE

1. EAMONN GALLAGHER, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF IRISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CALLED OCM FRIDAY EVENING OCT. 17 TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE LEAD ARTICLE IN THE TIMES OF LONDON SAME DATE. HEADLINE READS QUOTE IRISH MINISTER AND EEC PARLIAMENT CONDEMN BRITISH STAND ON ENERGY END QUOTE. THE ARTICLE CONTAINS QUOTATIONS FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH FONMIN FITZGERALD (WHICH GALLAGHER CLAIMED INCLUDED HALF TRUTHS AND SOME INACCURACIES).

2. ONE PARAGRAPH OF THE ARTICLE PARTICULARLY IRRITATED FITZGERALD. IT READS QUOTE DR FITZGERALD EXPRESSED THE STRONG FEELINGS OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE BRITISH STAND TO DR KISSINGER, THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE, WHEN HE VISITED WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. HE HINTED YESTERDAY THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD SOON BE MAKING THEIR OWN ANNOYANCE KNOWN TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. "IT WOULD BE REALLY TRAGIC IF THIS KIND OF DEVELOPMENT COULD PREVENT THE CONFERENCE GOING AHEAD, AND DR KISSINGER WAS AS CONCERNED AS I WAS ABOUT THAT", HE SAID. UNQUOTE

3. GALLAGHER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY ASKED BY FITZGERALD TO CONVEY TO THE DEPARTMENT THAT HE HAD NOT SAID OR EVEN HINTED THAT USG WOULD BE "MAKING THEIR OWN ANNOYANCE KNOWN TO THE BRITISH". FITZGERALD HAD BEEN ASKED IF THE AMERICANS WERE GOING TO TALK TO HMG ABOUT THE BRITISH STAND.



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EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/5/10

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
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FITZGERALD REPLIED THAT THE REPORTER WAS ASKING THE WRONG PERSON... DR. KISSINGER IS IN A PERFECTLY GOOD POSITION TO TALK TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IF HE WISHES TO. FITZGERALD ADDED THAT HE ASSUMED ALL THE PARTIES WERE CONCERNED THAT THE CONFERENCE GO AHEAD AND BE A SUCCESS. CURLE UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL BT



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031282

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Henry A. Kissinger

CREATOR'S TITLE Secretary of State

RECEIVER'S NAME USDEL Secretary Aircraft

DESCRIPTION INR Afternoon Summary

CREATION DATE 10/17/1975

VOLUME 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900315

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 22

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - SECTO (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/10/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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 DE RUEHC #7919 2910005
 O P 172348Z OCT 75 ZFF6
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 2966

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 247919 TDSEC 160006

STADIS
 EXDIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: DAILY ACTIVITIES REPORTS FROM THE PRINCIPALS,
 FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1975

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ROBERT S. INGERSOLL

ITALIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE DE MITA REHEARSED FOR
 ME IN EXQUISITE DETAIL THE EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN
 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM SINCE WORLD WAR II.
 DE MITA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE COMMUNISTS WILL COME TO
 POWER. SHOULD THE COUNTRY FALL APART, THE ULTIMATE
 VICTOR IN HIS OPINION WOULD BE THE FAR RIGHT.

I TALKED WITH SISCO AND LATER EAGLEBURGER ABOUT ORGANIZA-
 TIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SINAI MISSION. JOE IS WORKING UP
 A MEMORANDUM FOR YOU ON HOW WE PROPOSE TO PROCEED.

I SPOKE AT THE DEPARTMENT'S PUBLIC MEETING ON HABITAT
 (THE UN CONFERENCE ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS TO BE HELD IN
 VANCOUVER NEXT SPRING.)

ALSO DURING THE DAY: SRG MEETING, LUNCHEON WITH THE
 SWISS AMBASSADOR, AND HOSTED RECEPTION FOR THE HABITAT
 CONFERENCE.

P - JOSEPH J. SISCO

IN FOLLOW-UP TO ICELANDIC AMBASSADOR KROYER'S CALL ON ME

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
 State Dept Guidelines
 By HR NARA Date 8/5/10



~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

ON WEDNESDAY, I MET WITH OUR AMBASSADOR FRED IRVING, JACK CROWLEY (EUR/NE), THE ICELANDIC DESK OFFICER, AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM DOD. WE DISCUSSED ICELAND'S REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED FINANCING FOR AN AIR CONTROL TOWER. I HAVE ASKED THE GROUP TO OUTLINE FORMALLY THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS AND TO MEET AGAIN WITH ME IN ONE WEEK.

I CALLED A MEETING OF ROY ATHERTON AND HENRY CATTO TO DISCUSS FURTHER DETAILS OF THE SADAT VISIT.

AMBASSADOR DINITZ MET WITH ME AND I OUTLINED TO HIM OUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS, DRAWING ON YOUR GUIDANCE FROM YESTERDAY.

I SUBSEQUENTLY MET WITH YOU PRIOR TO YOUR DEPARTURE FOR PEKING.

IN THE AFTERNOON, I HELD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH HENRY CATTO AND NEA ABOUT THE SADAT TRIP. I ALSO MET WITH BILL BUFFUM AND ROY ATHERTON ABOUT THE SPANISH SAHARA PROBLEM. THEY WILL BE COORDINATING WITH ART HARTMAN CABLES TO USUN, MOROCCO AND SPAIN.

FROM T - CARL MAW

LUNCHEON CONFERENCE WITH NORWEGIAN MINISTER JENS EVENSEN IN NEW YORK ALONG WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UN SECRETARIAT DEALING WITH LOS MATTERS. AS YOU KNOW, EVENSEN IS CHAIRING AN IMPORTANT INTERSESSIONAL GROUP DESIGNED TO REACH INFORMAL AGREEMENT ON LOS MATTERS PRIOR TO THE NEXT SESSION IN NEW YORK IN MARCH.

FROM EAGLEBURGER

I HAVE APPROVED A 'CONSUMER REPRESENTATION' PLAN FOR SUBMISSION TO THE WHITE HOUSE. ELEMENTS OF THE PLAN INCLUDE A REQUIREMENT FOR A 'CONSUMER INTEREST STATEMENT' IN SELECTED DECISION-MAKING PAPERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DISCREET CONSUMER INTEREST CHANNEL IN COMMUNICATIONS. I WILL BE PERSONALLY APPROVING THE DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PLAN.

WORKING IN CONSULTATION WITH THE BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, I HAVE APPROVED THE NEW FSI COURSE ON ENERGY ECONOMICS. INGERSOLL
BT



~~SECRET~~

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OP IMMED /PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #8026/1 2910027
O P 180013Z OCT 75 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 2967

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 248026/1 T0SEC 160007

STADIS
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: DAILY ACTIVITIES REPORTS FROM THE BUREAUS,
-- FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17

FOLLOWING ARE DAILY ACTIVITIES REPORTS FROM THE BUREAUS
FOR FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17. AF, H, NEA, PM, AND EB DID NOT
SUBMIT A REPORT.

EA - ROBERT H. MILLER, ACTING
EA - ROBERT H. MILLER, ACTING

HABIB'S DEPARTURE. UPON PHIL HABIB'S DEPARTURE WITH
YOU THIS AFTERNOON, I HAVE ASSUMED CHARGE OF EA.

INDOCHINA REFUGEE PROBLEMS. I MET THIS AFTERNOON
WITH JIM WILSON, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR HUMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS, TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR HANDLING RESIDUAL
INDOCHINA REFUGEE PROBLEMS AFTER JULIA TAFT'S TASK
FORCE PHASES OUT AT THE END OF THE YEAR.

EUR - ARTHUR A. HARTMAN:

U.S.-CZECH ECONOMIC RELATIONS: JACK ARMITAGE AND I
ATTENDED A CEREMONY AT THE US CHAMBER OF COMMERCE FOR THE
INAUGURATION OF THE US-CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMIC COUNCIL.
PRESIDENT CERNY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK CHAMBER, A FORMER
ASSOCIATE OF DUBCEK'S, REITERATED THE INTENT WHICH HE HAD
EXPRESSED TO ME IN PRAGUE TO MOVE OUR TRADE RELATIONS



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FORWARD NOTWITHSTANDING THE CLAIMS AND MFN PROBLEMS.

SOVIETS EXPRESS URGENCY ON EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION:
SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER COUNSELOR VASEV CALLED ON
ARMITAGE TO ASK ABOUT THEIR CHANCERY PROJECT. HE SAID
DOBRYNIN HAD RECEIVED "FRESH INSTRUCTIONS" TO PURSUE THE
MATTER AT THE "HIGHEST LEVEL."

ROMANIAN INTEREST IN NUCLEAR COOPERATION:
ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR BOGDAN CALLED ON ARMITAGE WHO REASSUR-
ED HIM THAT WE WERE INDEED INTERESTED IN WORKING OUT
COOPERATION WITH ROMANIA IN THE NUCLEAR ENERGY FIELD,
BRIEFED HIM ON THE OUTCOME OF INTENSE INTRA-AGENCY CON-
SULTATIONS AND ASKED THAT THE ROMANIANS NOT INTERPRET
THE COMPLEX PROCEDURES AND CHECKS INVOLVED AS INDICATING
ANY LESSENING OF OUR INTEREST IN MOVING FORWARD.

SPANISH SAHARA: SPANISH AMBASSADOR ALBA CALLED AT
HIS URGENT REQUEST ON JIM LOWENSTEIN TO SAY ON INSTRU-
CTIONS THAT THE GOS VIEWS THE ICJ OPINION ON SPANISH
SAHARA AS AN INSTRUCTION TO CARRY OUT THE UNGA RESOLUTION
CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION. LOWENSTEIN SAID WE HOPED
COURT DECISION WOULD FACILITATE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE
DISPUTE.

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~~SECRET~~

IO - BUFFUM.

CALLED IN PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR TO EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE
FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS OF SATISFACTORY POSITION
BY PAKISTAN ON KOREAN ISSUE IN U.N.

ARA - ROGERS

OAS/GA -- AMBASSADOR SILVA CALLED. COSTA RICA IS
THINKING ABOUT SUGGESTING THAT A GUATEMALA OAS MEETING
NOW SCHEDULED TO CONSIDER AMENDMENTS TO THE CHARTER,
ALSO INCLUDE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SILVA WANTS ME TO
CALL FACIO AND COMMENT ON THIS PROPOSAL NEXT WEEK. THIS
WOULD BE ONE WAY TO FINESSE THE ANKWARD QUESTION OF
CHILE'S INVITATION TO THE GA.

CHILE ARMS SALES -- WE HAD ANOTHER COORDINATION
MEETING WITH DEFENSE. DOD HAS NOW DEFINED WITH
EXQUISITE PRECISION THE MATERIEL CHILE WANTS TO BUY.
THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL SOUNDINGS DO NOT SUGGEST THAT
THE PROPOSAL TO SELL THE STUFF IS UNWINNABLE. BOB
ELLSWORTH RETURNS ON MONDAY. WE WILL BOTH BE TALKING



OP IMMED /PRIORITY
 DE RUEHC #8026/2 2910028
 O P 180013Z OCT 75 ZFF6
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TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 2968

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 248026/2 TOSEC 160007

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-- LEIGH AND ALDRICH REVISED AND APPROVED A PROPOSED LEGAL MEMORANDUM TO BE GIVEN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY IN SUPPORT OF OUR PROPOSITION THAT OUR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH TURKEY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO REMAIN IN EFFECT. SUCH A MEMORANDUM CLEARLY MUST STATE OUR BEST LEGAL CASE IN TERMS THAT CANNOT EASILY BE REBUTTED, EVEN IF THAT REQUIRES THE MAKING OF ARGUMENTS THE TURKS WILL FIND UNPALATABLE.

-- ALDRICH CHAIRED A MEETING OF STATE, DEFENSE AND ACDA REPRESENTATIVES TO EXAMINE VARIOUS POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF INCENDIARY MUNITIONS. PROGRESS WAS MADE BUT SEVERAL MONTHS OF WORK LIE AHEAD ON THIS SUBJECT.

-- FELDMAN CONFERRED WITH AMBASSADOR HINTON ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE WORDING OF THE PRICE PARAGRAPH IN THE PROPOSED LETTER OF INTENT WITH THE USSR ON OIL.

-- FELDMAN MET WITH EUR AND OES TO PLAN CONTINENTAL SHELF AND FISHERIES JURISDICTION BOUNDARY NEGOTIATIONS WITH CANADA.

-- SCHNEBEL REVISED THE PROPOSED U.S. NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ILO IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE U.S. OPTIONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF NOT EFFECTING WITHDRAWAL TWO YEARS HENCE. THE NOTICE DRAFTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR HAS THE EFFECT OF LOCKING THE U.S. INTO DEMANDS FOR ILO REFORM WHICH ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ATTAINED IN TWO YEARS AND WHICH CONSEQUENTLY COULD IMPEL ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.S.

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TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT PRIORITY 2969

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 248027 TOSEC 160008

LIMDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OVIP

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: GISCARD VISIT TO USSR
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

1. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE GISCARD VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OF THE COMMUNIQUE SIGNED OCTOBER 17:
2. THE PRINCIPAL NEW ELEMENTS IN THE COMMUNIQUE WERE ONE SUBSTANTIVE POINT (A SOVIET PROPOSAL) - AGREEMENT TO CALL FOR A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN WHICH ALL NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD PARTICIPATE, BOTH IN THE PREPARATIONS AND IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF - AND ONE PROCEDURAL ELEMENT SOUGHT BY FRANCE - AGREEMENT TO HOLD PERIODIC FRANCO-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS, BUT WITHOUT SPECIFICATION OF THE PERIODICITY, NOR EVEN OF THE DATE OF BREZHNEV'S RETURN VISIT TO FRANCE.
3. ON CSCE, THE COMMUNIQUE HAD ONLY ANODYNE LANGUAGE ON MUTUAL AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE ON IMPLEMENTATION AND READINESS TO CARRY OUT ALL PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.
4. THE COMMUNIQUE MERELY RECORDED AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR BANNING MANUFACTURE OF ARMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND THAT FUTURE-EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT



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WOULD TAKE PLACE.

5. ON NON-PROLIFERATION, THE COMMUNIQUE CALLED ONLY FOR UNILATERAL ASSUMPTION OF APPROPRIATE RESPONSIBILITIES, WITH INCLUSION OF THE FRENCH POINT ABOUT CONSIDERATION FOR LDC'S FOR WHOM "ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CONSTITUTES A KEY TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT."

6. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE COMMUNIQUE REITERATED LANGUAGE IN THE MARCH, 1975 BILATERAL COMMUNIQUE (WHEN PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC VISITED MOSCOW) CONCERNING THE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" OF THE PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING THAT TO A HOMELAND, AS WELL AS MENTION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SURE AND RECOGNIZED FRONTIERS, ETC.

7. ON CYPRUS, THERE WERE NO NEW ELEMENTS, BUT REPETITION OF CALLS IN PREVIOUS BILATERAL COMMUNIQUE FOR "WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS", RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS, ETC.

8. BREZHNEV AND GISCARD ALSO SIGNED THREE AGREEMENTS ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ENERGY, TOURISM, AND CIVIL AVIATION AND AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION (WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THESE TEXTS).

9. FOR GISCARD THE VISIT WAS PROBABLY A DISAPPOINTMENT, MARRED IRRECUPERABLY BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING BREZHNEV'S DRAMATIC CURTAILMENT OF THE TALKS. THOUGH BREZHNEV EMPHASIZED TO THE PRESS TODAY THAT THE RESCHEDULING AND SHORTENING WERE DUE TO A BAD COLD HE HAD TAKEN, THERE REMAINS MUCH SPECULATION - PARTICULARLY IN THE FRENCH PRESS - THAT GISCARD RECEIVED PEREMPTORY TREATMENT BECAUSE BREZHNEV HAD FOUND GISCARD'S VIEWS UNCONGENIAL, E.G., THE PART OF GISCARD'S TOAST CALLING FOR EXTENSION OF DETENTE SO AS TO CURB IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION.

10. AT ANY RATE, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE VISIT DID NOT FULLY SERVE GISCARD'S MAIN PURPOSE - TO PROVE HIMSELF THE WORTHY SUCCESSOR OF DE GAULLE AND POMPIDOU AS A WORLD STATESMAN DEALING WITH BREZHNEV AS A RESPECTED EQUAL. INGERSOLL
BT



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 DE RUEHC #8235 2910120
 O 180053Z OCT 75 ZFF6
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 9775

INFO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFTSECRETARY PRIORITY IMMEDIATE 2970

~~SECRET~~ STATE 248235 TOSEC 160009

NODIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ETRD, EEWT, US, UR

SUBJECT: GRAIN - OIL NEGOTIATIONS

REFS: (A) MOSCOW'S 14888 (B) STATE'S 244346

(C) STATE'S 245190 (D) STATE'S 247128

(E) MOSCOW'S 14954
 FOR UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON

1. WE THINK YOU MUST SLOW DOWN TIMETABLE AT LEAST AS FAR AS ANNOUNCEMENT IS CONCERNED. THUS, FOR COMPLICATED REASONS INVOLVING PUBLIC RELATIONS, CONSULTATION HERE WITH CONGRESSMEN AND OTHERS, AND CONSIDERATIONS OF EFFECT ON MARKETS, WE PROPOSE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BE MADE FROM WHITE HOUSE AT 4:00 P.M. MONDAY, OCTOBER 20 AND SOVIET AGREEMENT NOT TO MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT PRIOR TO 11:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME OCTOBER 20. ON ASSUMPTION THIS AGREEABLE AND THAT REMAINING POINTS AT ISSUE ARE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED YOU COULD SIGN WHENEVER MUTUALLY CONVENIENT. IN THIS CASE, IF YOU LEFT MOSCOW YOU WOULD MAKE STATEMENT AT AIRPORT THAT YOU HAVE COMPLETED YOUR TALKS AND THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE IN WASHINGTON ;SOON." WE UNDERSTAND THIS MAY INCONVENIENCE YOU AND REGRET THAT FACT.

2. WE HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEM WITH YOUR FORMULATION IN PARAGRAPH THREE REFTEL (A). POINT OF PARAGRAPH STATE'S

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
245190 WAS TO AVOID PUTTING PRESIDENT IN POSITION WHERE HE HAD "ASKED" FOR LIMITATIONS. THIS COULD BE SIGNIFICANT IN TERMS FARMER REACTION HERE. SINCE YOU NOW HAVE AUTHORITY TO AGREE TO SEVEN MILLION TONS YOU HAVE NEGOTIATING CARD TO MOVE SOVIETS TO ACQUIESCE IN U.S. STATEMENT THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED US THAT THEIR PURCHASING PLANS FROM THE 1975 CROP DO NOT ENVISAGE PURCHASING MORE THAN SEVEN MILLION ADDITIONAL TONS OF U.S. GRAIN WITHOUT CONSULTATION.

3. WITH RESPECT OIL LETTER OF INTENT WE COULD ACCEPT SOME OF YOUR PROPOSAL FOR NEW PARAGRAPH SIX IF, AS YOU ANTICIPATE, YOU ARE UNABLE TO DO MUCH BETTER. WE INSIST, HOWEVER, THAT THERE BE NO MENTION OF WORLD PRICES WHICH, IN FACT, DON'T EXIST.

4. THE PHRASE "PRICES ... WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CONTRACTS" ALSO GIVES US PROBLEMS. CONCEPT IS DESIRABLE INSOFAR AS PRIVATE COMPANIES ARE CONCERNED, BUT MEANINGFUL OIL AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING OPTION FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT TO PURCHASE, SHOULD AT LEAST CONTAIN PRICE FORMULA FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT PURCHASES. AT MINIMUM WE DO NOT WISH TO PRECLUDE THAT POSSIBILITY FROM FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. THUS, PARAGRAPH SIX OF THE OIL LETTER OF INTENT COULD READ: "PRICES FOR CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS WILL BE MUTUALLY AGREED AT A LEVEL WHICH WILL ASSURE THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SUCH PRICES WILL BE ESTABLISHED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE QUALITY OF THE CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION CONDITIONS, BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE CASE OF PURCHASES FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND IN COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRIVATE U.S. FIRMS AND SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CASE OF PURCHASES NOT FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

6. /TO COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS PROMPTLY" IS ACCEPTABLE AS REPLACEMENT FOR "WITHIN THIRTY DAYS" WITH ORAL AGREEMENT ON LOCUS AND THAT THIS MEANS THIS MONTH, OCTOBER 1975. INGERSOLL
BT



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DE RUEHC #8268 2910128
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TO USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 2971

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 248268 TOSEC 160010
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSENGER, HENRY A), PFOR

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - VISIT OF KNESSET DELEGATION
TO WASHINGTON (S/S NO. 7520800)

FOR SECRETARY FROM MC CLOSKEY AND ATHER ON

1. AT THE INVITATION OF SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, CARL ALBERT, THE SPEAKER OF THE KNESSET, ISRAEL YESHAYAHU, WILL LEAD A DELEGATION OF APPROXIMATELY TEN KNESSET MEMBERS AND STAFF TO THE UNITED STATES. PRELIMINARY PLANS HAVE THE GROUP IN WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 10 AND 11. THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP HAS ALREADY PLANNED LUNCHEONS FOR THE GROUP ON CAPITOL HILL FOR THE TWO DAYS THEY WILL BE HERE. MEETINGS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES ARE ALSO BEING PLANNED. BEFORE THE REMAINDER OF THE SCHEDULE IS FINALIZED, THE SPEAKER WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT ACTIVITIES WE WOULD LIKE TO PLAN. HE HAS ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER YOU WOULD WANT TO HOST A RECEPTION FOR THE GROUP WHILE THEY ARE IN WASHINGTON.

2. YOU MIGHT WANT THE DEPARTMENT'S ACTIVITIES TO PARALLEL THOSE OFFERED TO THE EGYPTIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION WHICH VISITED THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT, A MEETING WITH YOU IN YOUR CONFERENCE ROOM, AND A LUNCHEON HOSTED BY MR. SISCO.

3. SINCE THE KNESSET DELEGATION WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR LUNCH AND SINCE MR. SISCO WILL BE OUT OF TOWN DURING THIS



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PERIOD, WE COULD SUBSTITUTE A SMALL RECEPTION HERE, HOSTED BY MR. ATHERTON.

4. H WILL NOTIFY THE SPEAKER OF YOUR DECISIONS.

5. RECOMMENDATION:

A. THAT YOU AUTHORIZE NEA TO SEEK MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT,

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

B. THAT YOU AGREE TO MEET WITH THE KNESSET DELEGATION IN YOUR CONFERENCE ROOM.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

NOVEMBER 10

NOVEMBER 11

TIME

C. THAT YOU AUTHORIZE MR. ATHERTON TO HOST A SMALL RECEPTION FOR THE DELEGATION.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

INGERSOLL

BT

