

**The original documents are located in Box 22, folder “October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic of China - TOHAK (3)” of Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031258

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram  
  
TITLE . . . . . TOHAK 30  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/21/1975  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900313  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP  
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY  
KISSINGER  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 22  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic  
of China - TOHAK (3)  
  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/08/2010  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #5978 2941716  
O 211620Z OCT 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK31//

TO BREMER/BARBIAN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH WH52807

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
By HR NARA, Date 8/3/10

TOHAK31

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: BREMER, BARBIAN, RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT COME TO WORK AGAIN TODAY. HE IS STILL IN BED IN THE RESIDENCE WITH A BAD COLD AND SINUS CONDITION.

2. I HAVE REVIEWED THE PERIOD DECEMBER 8-11 AS A POSSIBILITY FOR THE RABIN VISIT. I CONCUR WITH SISCO'S ANALYSIS OF THE WAY IN WHICH A MEETING COULD BE ARRANGED DURING THE PERIOD. IT IS NOT VERY SATISFACTORY. DEPENDING ON THE EXACT DATE OF RETURN FROM CHINA, YOU AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD AT BEST HAVE A DAY OR DAY-AND-A-HALF TO RECOVER FROM THAT TRIP. WITH YOU HAVING TO DEPART FOR THE NATO MINISTERIAL, I FEAR IT MIGHT LOOK TO SOME AS IF RABIN WERE NOT GETTING "FULL" ATTENTION. IF THE MEETING CANNOT BE PUT OFF UNTIL JANUARY-- AND I THINK AS A PRACTICAL MATTER IT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE AFTER THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS -- THIS MAY BE THE BEST WE CAN DO. BUT I THINK IT SHOULD BE A LAST RESORT OPTION ONLY.

3. THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM OTIS PIKE:

QUOTE

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT

THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE REQUESTS YOUR

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, SECFL



RECALLED  
PAGE 81

PSN:048155

TOR:294/17:16Z

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702

~~\*\*\*\*\* TOP SECRET \*\*\*\*\*~~ COPY

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #5977 2942033  
O 212104Z OCT 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 32//

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted  
AUTHORITY RAC NLS-CODEWORD-42-20-2-1  
BY Wk NARA, DATE 4/2/10 5/24/06

TO BREMER/BARBIAN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD VIA BLACK PATCH WH52006

TOHAK 32

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE  
CONTAINS CODEWORD

OCTOBER 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM  
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

SYRIAN-ISRAELI CLASH: A SYRIAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT SOME SYRIANS HAD CLASHED WITH AN ISRAELI PATROL IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE INCIDENT REPORTEDLY TOOK PLACE SEVEN MILES NORTHEAST OF AL QUNAYTIRAH, THE SAME AREA WHERE TWO SYRIAN SHEPHERDS WERE KILLED BY THE ISRAELIS LAST WEEK. TEL AVIV HAS PLAYED DOWN THE INCIDENT. ISRAELI MILITARY SOURCES ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SHOTS WERE FIRED ACROSS THE UN BUFFER LINE BUT SAID THE FIRE HAD NOT BEEN RETURNED. THE ISRAELIS SAID THEY WERE NOT EVEN CERTAIN WHO HAD FIRED THE SHOTS. THEY REPORTED NO CASUALTIES.

25X1

NSA has denied release



\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*


CONCROFT, SECPLC

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SNIP48150 PAGE 01 TOR:294/20:33Z DTG:212104Z OCT 75

~~\*\*\*\*\* TOP SECRET \*\*\*\*\*~~ COPY

NSA review completed

\*\*\*\*\* ~~TOP SECRET~~ \*\*\*\*\* COPY



25X1

ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY STRESSES ITS INDEPENDENCE; THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY LAST WEEK APPROVED A PLATFORM DESIGNED TO DISTINGUISH THE PARTY FROM BOTH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND THE COMMUNISTS AND TO REINFORCE ITS PIVOTAL POSITION BETWEEN THEM. THE PLATFORM WAS PUT TOGETHER IN PREPARATION FOR A PARTY CONGRESS NOW SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY. IN EXPLAINING THE NEW PLATFORM, SOCIALIST CHIEF DE MARTINO ALL BUT RULED OUT HIS PARTY'S RETURN TO FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. IN THE MEANTIME, THE SOCIALISTS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO GIVE PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT TO A GOVERNMENT LIKE PRIME MINISTER MORO'S PRESENT COALITION. THE NEW SOCIALIST PLATFORM ATTEMPTS TO APPLY THE LESSONS THE PARTY DREW FROM THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS LAST JUNE. THE SOCIALISTS ATTRIBUTE THEIR RELATIVE LACK OF SUCCESS TO THEIR LONG ASSOCIATION WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN THE GOVERNMENT, BY KEEPING THEIR DISTANCE FROM THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, THE SOCIALISTS HOPE TO COMPETE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE COMMUNISTS FOR THE VOTES OF DISSATISFIED ITALIANS IN THE NEXT ELECTION.



KHMER ALLOW FOREIGN TRIP BY SIHANOUK: THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNIST APPARENTLY INTEND TO ALLOW PRINCE SIHANOUK TO VISIT ARAB, AFRICAN, AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BEGINNING IN NOVEMBER. THE PRINCE PROBABLY PREFERS THE FOREIGN BANQUET CIRCUIT TO THE

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DTG:212104Z OCT 75

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RESTRICTIONS THE KHMER COMMUNISTS PLACE ON HIM IN PHNOM PENH, BUT HE STILL MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY RECONCILED TO HIS REDUCED ROLE AS A GOOD-WILL AMBASSADOR.

HE WAS AGAIN CONSIDERING RESIGNATION, BUT THAT HIS WIFE WAS DETERMINED THAT HE REMAIN "CHIEF OF STATE." SIHANOUK MAY NOT YET HAVE MADE A FINAL DECISION TO RESIGN. HE IS DOUBTLESS AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT HIS CHANCES OF INFLUENCING THE DOMESTIC POLICIES OF THE KHMER COMMUNISTS ARE PRACTICALLY NIL AND THAT HE IS, IN EFFECT, AN ANACHRONISM.

SWITZERLAND ANNOUNCES LARGE-SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS: BERN HAS NOTIFIED THE SIGNERS OF THE CSCE THAT IT WILL CONDUCT A LARGE-SCALE MILITARY EXERCISE IN NOVEMBER. INVITATIONS TO FOREIGN OBSERVERS WILL BE LIMITED TO RESIDENT MILITARY ATTACHES. THE NOTIFICATION IS EVIDENCE OF BERN'S KEEN INTEREST IN SUPPORTING CSCE PROVISIONS. THE MANEUVER, SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE FROM NOVEMBER 10 TO 18 IN NORTHEASTERN SWITZERLAND, INVOLVES SOME 40,000 MEN AND 5,800 VEHICLES.

## THE WASHINGTON STAR

VERNON GUIDRY REPORTS THAT DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER, STUNG BY CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST REVELATIONS AND REPORTS OF MILLIONS IN QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS TO A DEFENSE CONTRACTOR, SAYS A NEW LOOK IS BEING TAKEN AT THE WHOLE ISSUE OF "GRATUITIES" FOR OFFICIALS, FROM THE FLOWING ALCOHOL OF HOSPITALITY SUITES TO THE MORE EXPENSIVE PLEASURES OF CORPORATE HUNTING LODGES. (A-1)

RED BARNES REPORTS THAT JUST TWO WEEKS AGO, PRESIDENT FORD GAVE AN AUDIENCE IN KNOXVILLE, TENN., ABOUT A POTENTIAL DEAL FOR SOVIET OIL THAT WOULD SERVE AS "GOOD INSURANCE AGAINST MIDDLE EAST OIL DECISIONS." THAT STATEMENT WAS PART OF A PRESIDENTIAL EFFORT TO BALLYHOO ADMINISTRATION EFFORTS TO LINK A PERMANENT GRAIN DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS TO THE ACQUISITION OF RUSSIAN OIL. BUT THE PRESIDENTIAL BUILDUP MAY HAVE BACKFIRED OR THE AMOUNT OF OIL THAT THE U.S. WILL GET FROM THE SOVIET UNION -- IF IT GETS ANY AT ALL -- IS MINIMAL. (A-1)

GEORGE GEDDA REPORTS THAT THE FORD ADMINISTRATION, SEEKING TO AVOID ADVERSE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO U.S. MILITARY AID PROGRAMS, WILL NOT RECOMMEND ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CHILE THIS YEAR, SOURCES SAY. (A-7)

STAR EDITORIAL SAYS THAT THE MEANDERINGS OF THE THIRD WORLD MAJORITY IN THE UN ARE OFTEN AS MEANINGLESS AS THEY ARE OUTRAGEOUS. THE ACTION OF THE SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN, AND CULTURAL COMMITTEE EQUATING ZIONISM WITH RACISM MIGHT BE DISMISSED AS ANOTHER RHETORICAL EXCESS, INSPIRED BY ARAB EXTREMISTS, WHICH

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PAGE 03

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\*\*\*\*\* ~~TOP SECRET~~ \*\*\*\*\* COPY



\*\*\*\*\* ~~TOP SECRET~~ \*\*\*\*\*S COPY

CHANGES NOTHING SO FAR AS THE FACTS OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN CONFLICT ARE CONCERNED. IN FACT, HOWEVER, IT IS FAR MORE SINISTER AND DANGEROUS THAN THAT. NO DOUBT THAT THE COMMITTEE VOTE WILL BE CONFIRMED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS A WHOLE. IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT THEY WILL FACE UP TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR VOTE AND CHANGE THEIR MINDS. THE RESULT IS LIKELY TO BE FAR MORE DESTRUCTIVE TO THE UN AND ITS LEGITIMATE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RACISM ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD THAN IT WILL BE TO ISRAEL. (A-14)

CROSBY NOYES WRITES THAT YOU HAVE GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS YOU CAN GO IN SATISFYING THE VORACIOUS CURIOSITY OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ABOUT THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS INSIDE THE STATE DEPARTMENT. IN THEORY, PIKE COULD GO TO THE HOUSE FOR SUPPORT FOR CONTEMPT CITATION AGAINST YOU EMPOWERING THE HOUSE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS TO GO OUT AND ARREST THE SECRETARY OF STATE. IN FACT, NOTHING OF THE SORT IS GOING TO HAPPEN. IF THE ISSUE IS FORCED TO A DECISION, THE DECIDING WILL HAVE TO BE DONE BY THE SUPREME COURT. AND ON THE QUESTION OF EXECUTIVE CONFIDENTIALITY, THERE IS VERY LITTLE DOUBT HOW THE COURT WILL RULE. (A-15)  
1439



PSN:048150

RECALLED  
PAGE 04

OF 04

TOR:294/20:332

OTG:212104Z OCT 75

\*\*\*\*\* ~~TOP SECRET~~ \*\*\*\*\*S COPY

Sent 14a

SECRET

TOHAK- 33

October 21, 1975

<sup>of</sup>  
~~FROM~~ BREMER/BARBIAN/RODMAN

TO: HAL SONNENFELDT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

a  
There follows/cable from Alex Johnson seeking guidance on the effective date of the 2,400 aggregate. I am inclined to think that he should not take any further initiative but will await word from you all.

[Send copy of PSN 047956, attached]

Warm regards.



SECRET

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031260

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Alexis Johnson

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Brent Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Attachment to TOHAK 33

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900313

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP  
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY  
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 22

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic  
of China - TOHAK (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/08/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG

*Declassified with portions exempted*

25X1

OP IMMED

O 211647Z OCT 75  
FM GENEVA

25X1

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 211647Z OCT 75

FROM: U. ALEXIS JOHNSON - USMISSION GENEVA (SALT)  
TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT - THE WHITE HOUSE  
DELIVER DURING BUSINESS HOURS

1. RE OUR PREVIOUS EXCHANGES ON EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2,400 AGGREGATE, YOU WILL NOTE THAT IN MY PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON OCTOBER 2 (MEMCON A-1031), SEMENOV TOOK INITIATIVE IN ASKING ME FOR "CLARIFICATION OF US APPROACH TO SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION" AND PRESSED ME ON SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF TIME WE HAD IN MIND; AND IN CONVERSATION WITH TOM GRAHAM (MEMCON A-1040) ON OCTOBER 10, SMOLIN SAID THAT SOVDEL WAS WAITING FOR A SPECIFIC COUNTERPROPOSAL FROM US.

2. IF IT IS DESIRED I SAY ANYTHING FURTHER OR TAKE ANY INITIATIVE ON MATTER HERE, WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING GUIDANCE. I STILL FEEL 50-50, AT THE MINIMUM, IN GIVING THEM A SPECIFIC TIME PERIOD, I SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT IF DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION IS NOT INITIATED PRIOR TO OCTOBER 3, 1977, IT SHOULD BE INITIATED SOONEST THEREAFTER, WITH OBJECTIVE OF PLACING EXCESS DELIVERY VEHICLES IN CONDITION PRECLUDING THEIR OPERATIONAL USE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, WITH REMAINDER OF DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN AGREED TIME PERIOD. XGDS-3

~~SECRET~~ BY

BT

25X1

*SECRET (S) portions exempted*

*AUTHORITY RAC NLF-TB-HK-15-5-1-4 9/10/07  
NSC/State Guidelines  
LIR NLF DATE 3/4/09*



\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

SN:047956 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:294/17:55Z DTG:211647Z OCT 75

\*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #5979 2942292  
O 212213Z OCT 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOMAK 033//

4b

TO BREMER/BARBAN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLACK PATCH WH52008

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/08, State Dept. Guidelines  
By NR NARA, Date 8/3/10

TOMAK 033

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: HAL SONNENFELDT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

THERE FOLLOWS A CABLE FROM ALEX JOHNSON SEEKING GUIDANCE ON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 2,400 AGGREGATE. I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT HE SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY FURTHER INITIATIVE BUT WILL AWAIT WORD FROM YOU ALL.

QUOTE:

FROM: U. ALEXIS JOHNSON - USMISSION GENEVA (SALT)  
TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT - THE WHITE HOUSE  
DELIVER DURING BUSINESS HOURS

1. RE OUR PREVIOUS EXCHANGES ON EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2,400 AGGREGATE, YOU WILL NOTE THAT IN MY PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON OCTOBER 2 (MEMCON A-1031), SEMENOV TOOK INITIATIVE IN ASKING ME FOR "CLARIFICATION OF US APPROACH TO SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION" AND PRESSED ME ON SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF TIME HE HAD IN MIND; AND IN CONVERSATION WITH TOM GRAHAM (MEMCON A-1040) ON OCTOBER 10, SHOLIN SAID THAT SOYDEL WAS WAITING FOR A SPECIFIC COUNTERPROPOSAL FROM US.



2. IF IT IS DESIRED I SAY ANYTHING FURTHER OR TAKE ANY INITIATIVE ON MATTER HERE, WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING GUIDANCE. I STILL FEEL 5#-5, AT THE MINIMUM, IN GIVING THEM A SPECIFIC TIME PERIOD, I SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT IF DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION IS NO INITIATED PRIOR TO OCTOBER 3, 1977, IT SHOULD BE INITIATED SOONEST THEREAFTER, WITH OBJECTIVE OF PLACING EXCESS DELIVERY VEHICLES

\* \* \* \* \* W H S R C O M M E N T \* \* \* \* \*

SCOWCROFT, SECPL

RECALLED  
PSN:548225 PAGE 01 TOR:294/22102Z DTG:212213Z OCT 75

\*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*5 COPY

45

IN CONDITION PRECLUDING THEIR OPERATIONAL USE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, WITH REMAINDER OF DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN AGREED TIME PERIOD. XGDS-3

45

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS,

0306

NR

BH



PSN:048225    RECALLED    PAGE 02    OF 02    TOR:294/22:02Z    OTG:212213Z OCT 75

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~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*5 COPY

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031261

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

TITLE . . . . . TOHAK 34

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900313

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP  
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY  
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 22

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic  
of China - TOHAK (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/08/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031262

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

TITLE . . . . . TOHAK 34

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900313

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP  
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY  
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 22

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic  
of China - TOHAK (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/08/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . CCG




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 21, 1975

TOHAK 35

TO: PETER W. RODMAN  
FROM: KATHLEEN TROIA *KT*  
REF: HAKTO 20

RECEIVED  
OCT 23 1975  
HR  
8/3/10



1. State Protocol called today to invite you to Secretary's luncheon for Sadat Tuesday, October 28, 1:00 p.m. in Adams Room. I have already accepted for you.
2. Since Arthur Houghton's parents have regretted for the Sadat luncheon, Arthur wants to make it up to you by inviting you to a dinner at his house Tuesday, October 28, 7:30 p.m., to include about twenty Egyptians accompanying Sadat and from the Egyptian Embassy as well as an equal number of Americans. Please accept because I need a ride.
3. Instead of brooch please get a rice patterned (white with blue border) covered tea cup set and tea pot and/or demitasse cups and saucers. You could have the Friendship Store pack these to facilitate handling. Please spend all the dough.
4. For McFarlane from Wilderotter: The Morning Group voted unanimously today to wish you a safe return; but only seven to five to wish you a speedy return. (Bud, I was one of the seven, John)
5. With regard to the Cannon for Marilyn, hold off for the time being.
6. Hot regards.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

797

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

PRIORITY  
DE WTE #5985 2950218  
P 220041Z OCT 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK35//

TO BREMER/BARBAN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLACK PATCH WH52014

TOHAK35

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
By HR NARA, Date 8/3/10



TO: PETER W. RODMAN

FROM: KATHLEEN TROIA

REF: HAKTO 20

1. STATE PROTOCOL CALLED TODAY TO INVITE YOU TO SECRETARY'S LUNCHEON FOR SADAT TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1:00 P.M. IN ADAMS ROOM. I HAVE ALREADY ACCEPTED FOR YOU.

2. SINCE ARTHUR HOUGHTON'S PARENTS HAVE REGRETTED FOR THE SADAT LUNCHEON, ARTHUR WANTS TO MAKE IT UP TO YOU BY INVITING YOU TO A DINNER AT HIS HOUSE TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 7:30 P.M., TO INCLUDE ABOUT TWENTY EGYPTIANS ACCOMPANYING SADAT AND FROM THE EGYTIAN EMBASSY AS WELL AS AN EQUAL NUMBER OF AMERICANS. PLEASE ACCEPT BECAUSE I NEED A RIDE.

3. INSTEAD OF BROOCH PLEASE GET A RICE PATTERNED (WHITE WITH BLUE BORDER) COVERED TEA CUP SET AND TEA POT AND/OR DEMITASSE CUPS AND SAUCERS. YOU COULD HAVE THE FRIENDSHIP STORE PACK THESE TO FACILITATE HANDLING. PLEASE SPEND ALL THE DOUGH.

4. FOR MCFARLANE FROM WILDEROTTER: THE MORNING GROUP VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TODAY TO WISH YOU A SAFE RETURN; BUT ONLY SEVEN TO FIVE TO WISH YOU A SPEEDY RETURN. (BUD, I WAS ONE OF THE SEVEN, JOHN)

\*\*\*\*\*HHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SEC FLE

PSN:048536

PAGE 01

TOR:295/02:18Z

DTG:220041Z OCT 75

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

~~\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*~~ COPY

5. WITH REGARD TO THE CANNON FOR MARILYN, HOLD OFF FOR THE TIME BEING.

6. HOT REGARDS.  
0228



PSN:048536 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:295/02:18Z DTG:220041Z OCT 75

~~\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*~~ COPY

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TO HAK 36

October 21, 1975

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. C-130's for Egypt -- The memo by Hal Saunders on this subject does not overestimate the problems involved. In fact, there is no good way to provide the aircraft.

2. For starters, the Libyan solution appears to me to be a non-starter. For the next option, I see no one in the production schedule whom we could bump except perhaps the three aircraft due for delivery to Saudi Arabia next month. It is conceivable that the Saudis would go along, in light of the significance of what we are doing for Egypt. The only other option is to take them from the Air Force, either from inventory or from production. I have not raised this with Defense, but I have little doubt that they would complain. The key question is whether they would be sufficiently upset to complain to pro-Israeli congressmen, in an attempt to stymie the deal.

3. In this latter regard there is one element which does not appear in the Saunders memo. That element is the requirement for Congressional involvement. We would get it two ways in this deal.

HR 8/3/10



First, the sale would require a Presidential determination.

Second, since it involves more than \$25 million, we would have to notify the Congress, a la ~~the~~ Hawk missiles for Jordan, ~~deal~~, and conceivably with similar consequences,

4. I would think that it may be worthwhile to make a low key approach to the Saudis to see whether they would be willing to give up their three aircraft to Egypt. If we could get three from the Saudis, we might be able to squeeze three <sup>more</sup> from Defense without raising an unmanageable furor. If you wish, I could test the water with Defense ~~to try~~ to get <sup>at least a general</sup> an idea how serious the opposition would be. <sup>5.</sup> In sum, there simply is no easy way to do it. With respect to providing them non-lethal equipment, it can be done if we have any idea at all what it is they might want. I will check with Sisco and Saunders in this regard but would appreciate any <sup>suggestions</sup> ~~insights~~ you may have picked up in your discussions with Sadat.

Warm regards.



OP IMMED  
DE WTE #5982 2950136  
P 220042Z OCT 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 36//

TO BREMER/BARBAN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH WH52011

TOHAK 36

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
By HR NARA, Date 8/3/10

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. C-130's FOR EGYPT -- THE MEMO BY HAL SAUNDERS ON THIS SUBJECT DOES NOT OVERESTIMATE THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED. IN FACT, THERE IS NO GOOD WAY TO PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT.

2. FOR STARTERS, THE LIBYAN SOLUTION APPEARS TO ME TO BE A NON-STARTER. FOR THE NEXT OPTION, I SEE NO ONE IN THE PRODUCTION SCHEDULE WHOM WE COULD BUMP EXCEPT PERHAPS THE THREE AIRCRAFT DUE FOR DELIVERY TO SAUDI ARABIA NEXT MONTH. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD GO ALONG, IN LIGHT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT WE ARE DOING FOR EGYPT. THE ONLY OTHER OPTION IS TO TAKE THEM FROM THE AIR FORCE, EITHER FROM INVENTORY OR FROM PRODUCTION. I HAVE NOT RAISED THIS WITH DEFENSE, BUT I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD COMPLAIN. THE KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY UPSET TO COMPLAIN TO PRO-ISRAELI CONGRESSMEN, IN AN ATTEMPT TO STYMIE THE DEAL.

3. IN THIS LATTER REGARD THERE IS ONE ELEMENT WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE SAUNDERS MEMO. THAT ELEMENT IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT. WE WOULD GET IT TWO WAYS IN THIS DEAL. FIRST, THE SALE WOULD REQUIRE A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION. SECOND, SINCE IT INVOLVES MORE THAN \$25 MILLION, WE WOULD HAVE TO NOTIFY THE CONGRESS, A LA HAWK



\*\*\*\*\* W H S R C O M M E N T \*\*\*\*\*

SEC FLE

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MISSILES FOR JORDAN, AND CONCEIVABLY WITH SIMILAR CONSEQUENCES.

4. I WOULD THINK THAT IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE TO MAKE A LOW KEY APPROACH TO THE SAUDIS TO SEE WHETHER THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE UP THEIR THREE AIRCRAFT TO EGYPT. IF WE COULD GET THREE FROM THE SAUDIS, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SQUEEZE THREE MORE FROM DEFENSE WITHOUT RAISING AN UNMANAGEABLE PURDR. IF YOU WISH, I COULD TEST THE WATER WITH DEFENSE TO GET AT LEAST A GENERAL IDEA HOW SERIOUS THE OPPOSITION WOULD BE.

5. IN SUM, THERE SIMPLY IS NO EASY WAY TO DO IT. WITH RESPECT TO PROVIDING THEM NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT, IT CAN BE DONE IF WE HAVE ANY IDEA AT ALL WHAT IT IS THEY MIGHT WANT. I WILL CHECK WITH SISCO AND SAUNDERS IN THIS REGARD BUT WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE PICKED UP IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SADAT.

WARM REGARDS.

0406



PSN:048525

PAGE 02

OF 02

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DTG:220042Z OCT 75

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~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY  
October 21, 1975

TO HAK 37

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

1. Arrangements for the Economic Summit are proceeding along the lines of the cable from Cavaney. Housing *for your brand* will be in a new hotel in Paris which is immediately adjacent to the helo pad, thus facilitating transportation. There is, in addition, some sort of pension ~~right~~ *immediately* outside the chateau which we are trying to acquire for general logistic and other purposes. *I gather it is fairly primitive.*

2. As you know, Franco apparently is about to expire. In the event we have a funeral, I assume you would want the Vice President to head the delegation. If you think otherwise, please let me know.

3. As of now, the Vice President is scheduled to meet Sadat in Chicago and stay with him through Houston. In view of the Connally involvement in Houston, however, I get the distinct impression from Jon Howe that the Vice President is not at all enthusiastic about his assignment. Indeed, I think he would like out.

4. John McLukas has just been appointed to head FAA. It is my guess that the President will want to offer the Air Force job to

HR 8/3/10





Bob Ellsworth. Would that give you any problem?

5. The President has sent word that he will not be able to go to the opera with Trudeau this Thursday. I have passed the word to Ivan Head and my guess is that Trudeau will decide not to come *down*.

6. Would you please look at NSC Action Item 6101--Cooperation with South Africa on Ocean Surveillance. Ingersoll has already replied to Clements rejecting the proposal. There is substantial pressure being applied on the White House, however, apparently by former Senator Cotton on behalf of New Hampshire firms who would get the contract. We may get some flak if we turn it down, but there is no doubt that a turndown is in line with our *current* policy. I could go either way. If you wish, in view of the political heat involved, we can send it to the President for a decision. I will await your guidance.

Warm regards.



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DE WTE #5984 2950256  
O 220232Z OCT 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 37//

TO BREMER/BARBAN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY VIA BLACK PATCH WH52013

DECLASSIFIED

TOHAK 37

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
By LR NARA, Date 8/3/10

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT ARE PROCEEDING ALONG THE LINES OF THE CABLE FROM CAVANEY. HOUSING FOR YOU WILL BE IN A BRAND NEW HOTEL IN PARIS WHICH IS IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE HELD PAD, THUS FACILITATING TRANSPORTATION. THERE IS, IN ADDITION, SOME SORT OF PENSION IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE THE CHATEAU WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO ACQUIRE FOR GENERAL LOGISTIC AND OTHER PURPOSES. I GATHER IT IS FAIRLY PRIMITIVE.

2. AS YOU KNOW FRANCO APPARENTLY IS ABOUT TO EXPIRE. IN THE EVENT WE HAVE A FUNERAL, I ASSUME YOU WOULD WANT THE VICE PRESIDENT TO HEAD THE DELEGATION. IF YOU THINK OTHERWISE, PLEASE LET ME KNOW.

3. AS OF NOW, THE VICE PRESIDENT IS SCHEDULED TO MEET SADAT IN CHICAGO AND STAY WITH HIM THROUGH HOUSTON. IN VIEW OF THE CONNALLY INVOLVEMENT IN HOUSTON, HOWEVER, I GET THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION FROM JON HOWE THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT IS NOT AT ALL ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT HIS ASSIGNMENT. INDEED, I THINK HE WOULD LIKE OUT.

4. JOHN MCLUKAS HAS JUST BEEN APPOINTED TO HEAD FAA. IT IS MY GUESS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL WANT TO OFFER THE AIR FORCE JOB TO BOB ELLSWORTH. WOULD THAT GIVE YOU ANY PROBLEM?



\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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5. THE PRESIDENT HAS SENT WORD THAT HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GO TO THE OPERA WITH TRUDEAU THIS THURSDAY. I HAVE PASSED THE WORD TO IVAN HEAD AND MY GUESS IS THAT TRUDEAU WILL DECIDE NOT TO COME DOWN.

6. WOULD YOU PLEASE LOOK AT NSC ACTION ITEM 6101--COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON OCEAN SURVEILLANCE. INGERSOLL HAS ALREADY REPLIED TO CLEMENTS REJECTING THE PROPOSAL. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL PRESSURE BEING APPLIED ON THE WHITE HOUSE, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY BY FORMER SENATOR COTTON ON BEHALF OF NEW HAMPSHIRE FIRMS WHO WOULD GET THE CONTRACT. WE MAY GET SOME FLAK IF WE TURN IT DOWN, BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT A TURNDOWN IS IN LINE WITH OUR CURRENT POLICY. I COULD GO EITHER WAY. IF YOU WISH, IN VIEW OF THE POLITICAL HEAT INVOLVED, WE CAN SEND IT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR A DECISION. I WILL AWAIT YOUR GUIDANCE.

WARM REGARDS,

0403



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PAGE 02

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SECRET/EYES ONLY

TO HAK 38

October 21, 1975

TO: BREMER/BARBIAN/RODMAN  
FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED  
By *HR* 8/3/10

1. Schlesinger gave a news conference yesterday and I have just received the transcript.

2. The bulk of the news conference, and virtually the entirety of the press accounts of it, dealt with Schlesinger's objections to cuts in the Defense budget. He took on the Congress quite strongly, calling the cuts "deep, savage and arbitrary." I suspect this was in response to the chewing out he got from the President.



3. He did answer several questions dealing with other issues. On the Pershing missile, he said that the subject would be jointly studied and that ~~was~~ the only indication that had been made to the Israeli Government.

4. In answer to a question about differences between Pentagon and State on SALT, Schlesinger said "the United States Government has presented a position to the Soviet Union. It is an agreed upon position. So I think that the flamboyant descriptions of differences should be taken with that particular perspective in mind. On the Backfire, he said it was ultimately a question of "the image of equality and a political issue." He pointed out that the Backfire was probably designed and intended for a peripheral role but that it did have the capability of reaching the U.S. on

certain flight missions. It therefore would have to be treated in some way in a discussion of central strategic systems.

5. Regarding the cruise missile, Schlesinger said that it was not initially considered by the U. S. to be a subject for negotiation in the SALT negotiations but was raised by the Soviet Union subsequent to Vladivostok. He added that cruise missile development was desirable from the standpoint of the military posture of the U. S. He termed it essential in connection with the capacity of bombers to penetrate a formidable air defense system in the mid-1980s and stressed that a "major role for the cruise missile continues to be <sup>in</sup> the augmentation of our <sup>conventional</sup> force posture rather than the strategic arms element that has received so much stress in public discourse." Asked how it was possible to distinguish between a strategic cruise missile and a general purpose cruise missile, Schlesinger replied that there would ~~also~~ <sup>always</sup> be a degree of ambiguity regarding verification of all types of pilotless vehicles. That would continue to be true irrespective of the precise outcome of the agreement which we hope to achieve.

6. Warm regards.



OP IMMED  
DE WTE #5986 2950303  
O 220235Z OCT 75  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOMAK 38//

TO BREMER/BARBAIN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA BLACK PATCH WH52015

TOMAK 38  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
By UR NARA, Date 8/3/10

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: BREMER/BARBAIN/RODMAN  
FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. SCHLESINGER GAVE A NEWS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY AND I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE TRANSCRIPT.

2. THE BULK OF THE NEWS CONFERENCE, AND VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRETY OF THE PRESS ACCOUNTS OF IT, DEALT WITH SCHLESINGER'S OBJECTIONS TO CUTS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET. HE TOOK ON THE CONGRESS QUITE STRONGLY, CALLING THE CUTS "DEEP, SAVAGE AND ARBITRARY." I SUSPECT THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO THE CHEWING OUT HE GOT FROM THE PRESIDENT.

3. HE DID ANSWER SEVERAL QUESTIONS DEALING WITH OTHER ISSUES. ON THE PERSHING MISSILE, HE SAID THAT THE SUBJECT WOULD BE JOINTLY STUDIED AND THAT WAS THE ONLY INDICATION THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.



4. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PENTAGON AND STATE ON SALT, SCHLESINGER SAID "THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS PRESENTED A POSITION TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS AN AGREED UPON POSITION. SO I THINK THAT THE FLAMBOYANT DESCRIPTIONS OF DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH THAT PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVE IN MIND." ON THE BACKFIRE, HE SAID IT WAS ULTIMATELY A QUESTION OF "THE IMAGE OF EQUALITY AND A POLITICAL ISSUE." HE POINTED OUT THAT THE BACKFIRE WAS PROBABLY DESIGNED AND INTENDED FOR A PERIPHERAL ROLE

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

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BUT THAT IT DID HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF REACHING THE U.S. ON CERTAIN FLIGHT MISSIONS. IT THEREFORE WOULD HAVE TO BE TREATED IN SOME WAY IN A DISCUSSION OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

5. REGARDING THE CRUISE MISSILE, SCHLESINGER SAID THAT IT WAS NOT INITIALLY CONSIDERED BY THE U.S. TO BE A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS BUT WAS RAISED BY THE SOVIET UNION SUBSEQUENT TO VLADIVOSTOK. HE ADDED THAT CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT WAS DESIRABLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE MILITARY POSTURE OF THE U.S.. HE TERMED IT ESSENTIAL IN CONNECTION WITH THE CAPACITY OF BOMBERS TO PENETRATE A FORMIDABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE MID-1980'S AND STRESSED THAT A "MAJOR ROLE FOR THE CRUISE MISSILE CONTINUES TO BE IN THE AUGMENTATION OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCE POSTURE RATHER THAN THE STRATEGIC ARMS ELEMENT THAT HAS RECEIVED SO MUCH STRESS IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE." ASKED HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE AND A GENERAL PURPOSE CRUISE MISSILE, SCHLESINGER REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD ALWAYS BE A DEGREE OF AMBIGUITY REGARDING VERIFICATION OF ALL TYPES OF PILOTLESS VEHICLES, THAT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE TRUE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE PRECISE OUTCOME OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE.

6. WARM REGARDS.

0490



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031263

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

TITLE . . . . . TOHAK 39

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900313

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP  
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY  
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 22

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic  
of China - TOHAK (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/08/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . CCG

*Open w/ portions Exempt*



SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO HAK 39

October 21, 1975

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

1. I met with Dinitz on the arms issues.
2. I have several pages of notes on the various items, but I will cover with you only the more significant ~~issues~~ <sup>items.</sup>
3. F-15 -- he complained about Defense's proposed delivery schedule and showed me a paper from Defense providing "tentatively and for generalized planning purposes only" a delivery schedule beginning in July, 1976. He says he would settle now for January, 1977. Wickham has already indicated to me that it may be possible to provide ~~them with~~ a few R & D aircraft if the Israelis will accept "used" equipment. There are only 6 R&D birds, however. I intend to raise this issue with Wickham tomorrow.
4. On Laser-guided bombs, he said they had been promised five designators and 125 bombs before the reassessment. I will see about getting at least that much released.
5. Recovery and bridging tanks -- Receipt of these items from production will not begin until 1979. The Israelis are requesting 25 of each type from stocks. Dinitz says the Germans are willing to provide them if we will approve. Schlesinger did not repeat not

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 AUTHORITY *RAC NLF-TB-HK-15-5-3-2 5/24/06*  
*State Review 12/8/03*  
 BY *HR* DATE *8/3/10*



raise this issue with the Germans on his recent trip. Wickham says you told him not to. *If we are to provide them from stocks,* ~~That is the only way we will be able~~ *the Germans are the only feasible source.* ~~to get anything done on this item.~~

6. Improved Hawk -- Dinitz claims that negotiations were concluded before the reassessment to exchange four batteries, which the Israelis now have, for improved Hawk *batteries.*



8. According to Dinitz there are also about 35 items on which they have not yet received a release from munitions control. I will check with State on those items.

9. I have separately learned from Wickham that Defense has begun to move on some items. For example, they have released 200 Maverick missiles, 600 *Strike* ~~Strike~~ missiles, 2 OV-1 Recce aircraft, and over two million rounds of various types of ammunition. I will

10. I will keep you posted on developments. ~~in this area.~~

Warm regards.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031264

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

TITLE . . . . . TOHAK 39

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/21/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900313

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP  
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY  
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 22

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic  
of China - TOHAK (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/08/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . CCG

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FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOMAK 39//

*DECLASSIFIED W/ portions exempted*  
*RAC/NLE-TB-HK-15-53-2-5124106*  
*State Review 12/8/03 NSC Guidelines*  
*HR NLF DATE 3/4/09*

TO BREMER/BARBAN/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH WH52016

TOMAK 39

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO HENRY A. KISSINGER  
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. I MET WITH DINITZ ON THE ARMS ISSUES.
2. I HAVE SEVERAL PAGES OF NOTES ON THE VARIOUS ITEMS, BUT I WILL COVER WITH YOU ONLY THE MORE SIGNIFICANT ITEMS.
3. F-15 -- HE COMPLAINED ABOUT DEFENSE'S PROPOSED DELIVERY SCHEDULE AND SHOWED ME A PAPER FROM DEFENSE PROVIDING "TENTATIVELY AND FOR GENERALIZED PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY" A DELIVERY SCHEDULE BEGINNING IN JULY, 1976. HE SAYS HE WOULD SETTLE NOW FOR JANUARY, 1977. WICKHAM HAS ALREADY INDICATED TO ME THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE A FEW R&D AIRCRAFT IF THE ISRAELIS WILL ACCEPT "USED" EQUIPMENT. THERE ARE ONLY 6 R&D BIRDS, HOWEVER, I INTEND TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH WICKHAM TOMORROW.
4. ON LASER-GUIDED BOMBS, HE SAID THEY HAD BEEN PROMISED FIVE DESIGNATORS AND 125 BOMBS BEFORE THE REASSESSMENT. I WILL SEE ABOUT GETTING AT LEAST THAT MUCH RELEASED.
5. RECOVERY AND BRIDGING TANKS-- RECEIPT OF THESE ITEMS FROM PRODUCTION WILL NOT BEGIN UNTIL 1979. THE ISRAELIS ARE REQUESTING 25 OF EACH TYPE FROM STOCKS. DINITZ SAYS THE GERMANS ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE THEM IF WE WILL APPROVE. ICHLESINGER DID NOT REPEAT NOT RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH THE GERMANS ON HIS RECENT TRIP. WICKHAM SAYS YOU TOLD HIM NOT TO. IF WE



\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

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SD REVIEW COMPLETED

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
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ARE TO PROVIDE THEM FROM STOCKS, THE GERMANS ARE THE ONLY FEASIBLE SOURCE.

8. IMPROVED HAWK. DINITZ CLAIMS THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCLUDED BEFORE THE REASSESSMENT TO EXCHANGE FOUR BATTERIES, WHICH THE ISRAELIS NOW HAVE, FOR IMPROVED HAWK BATTERIES.



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
9. ACCORDINT TO DINITZ THERE ARE ALSO ABOUT 35 ITEMS ON WHICH THEY HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED A RELEASE FROM MUNITIONS CONTROL, I WILL CHECK WITH STATE ON THOSE ITEMS.

9. I HAVE SEPARATELY LEARNED FROM WICKHAM THAT DEFENSE HAS BEGUN TO MOVE ON SOME ITEMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAVE RELEASED 200 MAVERICK MISSILES, 600 SHRIKE MISSILES, 2 OV-1 RECCE AIRCRAFT, AND OVER TWO MILLION ROUND OF VARIOUS TYPES OF AMMUNITION.

10. I WILL KEEP YOU POSTED ON DEVELOPMENTS.

WARM REGARDS,

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031265

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

TITLE . . . . . TOHAK 40

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/22/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900313

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP  
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY  
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 22

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic  
of China - TOHAK (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/08/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . CCG