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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet


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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇList

TITLE Secretary's Visit to Tokyo - Peking
CREATION DATE 10/1975
VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900309
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER
BOX NUMBER 21
FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - HAKTO (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/07/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031231

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE HAKTO 1

CREATION DATE 10/17/1975

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900309

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 21

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - HAKTO (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/07/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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OO WTE
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O 172245Z OCT 75
FM MR BREMER

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT HAKTO 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HAKTO 2

1. THE SECRETARY IS CONSIDERING DOING A SPEECH IN EARLY NOVEMBER, PROBABLY ABOUT NOVEMBER 6, IN EITHER PITTSBURGH OR PHILADELPHIA. HE ASKS IF YOU WOULD PLEASE CHECK WITH THE PRESIDENT TO SEE IF HE HAS A PREFERENCE AS TO WHICH CITY THE SECRETARY SPEAKS IN.
2. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHAT REACTION YOU GET SO WE CAN GET GOING ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SPEECH.
3. THANKS AND WARM REGARDS,
GRNC



DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
 NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
 By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, RODMAN, SEC FILE

RECALLED
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FM JERRY BREMER ABOARD SAM 86970

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT HAKTO 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

REFERENCE TOHAK 1

1. THE SECRETARY'S ONLY COMMENT ON THE PROPOSED SCHEDULE WAS THAT HE FELT IT MADE NO SENSE TO PUSH THE SADATS INTO A DINNER SUNDAY NIGHT IF THEY DON'T WANT ONE. HE ASKED THAT YOU HAVE ATHERTON INSTRUCT EILTS TO DOUBLE-CHECK THIS POINT IN EGYPT. IF SADAT DOESN'T WANT A DINNER, HE FEELS IT SHOULD BE DROPPED.

2. HE THOUGHT THE REST OF THE SCHEDULE LOOK-D OKAY.

3. WARM REGARDS,
GRNC

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, ROOCHAN, SEC FILE

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FM HENRY A. KISSINGER//HAKTO 04//

TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 19, 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

REFERENCE: TOHAK 9

(1) ON THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP I SEE NO MERIT WHATSOEVER IN HIS VISITING TAIWAN. A VISIT THERE BY HIM WOULD PRESENT THE GOVERNMENT IN PEKING WITH A MASSIVE POLITICAL PROBLEM. THEY SIMPLY COULD NOT IGNORE HIS VISIT THERE. IF IT MAKES IT EASIER TO DROP TAIWAN THEN HE SHOULD DROP A FEW OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL, BUT I WOULD RATHER SEE HIM CANCEL HIS VISIT ENTIRELY THAN TRAVEL TO TAIWAN.

(2) YOUR ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT THAT HE SHOULD NOT VISIT JAPAN OR KOREA.

(3) WARM REGARDS.



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/21/10

***** *NH3R COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, RODMAN, SECPL, SDO

PSN:044958

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OF 01

TOR:292/01107Z

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FM HENRY A. KISSINGER//HAKTO 05//

TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 19, 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

(1) I AM APPALLED AND NOT IN THE LEAST AMUSED BY THE REPORT OF SCHLESINGER'S DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN. IT IS QUITE APPARENT THAT SCHLESINGER IS NOW DOING THE SAME THING WITH THE SOVIETS THAT HE HAS DONE WITH THE ISRAELIS -- INSERTING HIMSELF IN THE MIDDLE OF OUR DEALINGS WITH THEM AND POSITIONING HIMSELF AS THE SOLE PERSON ABLE TO PRODUCE RESULTS. THIS COMES ON THE HEELS OF THE ISRAELIS ALSO REACHING THE POINT WHERE THEY FEEL THAT THEY HAVE TO DEAL WITH SCHLESINGER.

(2) I WANT YOU TO DISCUSS THIS IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PRESIDENT SINCE AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED THERE CAN BE NO DISPUTE THAT DOBRYNIN DEALS WITH ME ON SALT AND NOT WITH SCHLESINGER. SCHLESINGER MUST BE PROHIBITED FROM DEALINGS WITH DOBRYNIN OF THIS NATURE. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE PRESIDENT THAT I FEEL VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THIS ISSUE AND THAT THERE CAN BE NO COMPROMISE OR EVASION AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED. IT IS AN ISSUE OVER WHICH I WOULD RESIGN.

(3) AFTER YOU HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH THE PRESIDENT YOU SHOULD CALL SCHLESINGER AND PROHIBIT HIM IN THE PRESIDENT'S NAME FROM DEALING WITH DOBRYNIN. YOU SHOULD ALSO CALL DOBRYNIN AND REMIND HIM I AM THE ONLY POINT OF CONTACT IN OUR GOVERNMENT ON THESE MATTERS.

(4) PLEASE REPORT ASAP ON YOUR DISCUSSIONS.



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, SECFL, SDO

RECALLED

PSN:844978

PAGE 01

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TOR:292/01:232

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FM BUD MCFARLANE

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

Hak to 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 19, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: BUD MCFARLANE

1. DURING TRIP OVER SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT HAD CONVEYED ANY THOUGHTS ON THE CHARACTER OF HIS VISIT TO CHINA -- EVENTS, TRAVEL, COVERAGE ETC.

2. I SUMMARIZED THE GUIDANCE YOU PROVIDED -- TO AVOID REPEATING THE GENRE OF EVENTS SCHEDULED FOR PRESIDENT NIXON, AND TO BUILD AN ESSENTIALLY PEOPLE-ORIENTED VISIT WITHOUT GREAT CONCERN FOR MEDIA COVERAGE.

3. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE KNEW THAT, AND SEEMED A LITTLE DISCONCERTED AT NOT HAVING A BETTER FEEL FOR WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS IN MIND.

4. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF, TODAY OR TOMORROW, YOU COULD PROVIDE YOUR VIEWS FIRSTHAND ADDING ANYTHING NEW THAT MAY HAVE ENTERED IN SINCE HIS DEPARTURE.

5. VERY RESPECTFULLY.



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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SECFL

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OF 01

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DTG:190140Z OCT 75

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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TITLE HAKTO 7

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VOLUME 1 page

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COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 21

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - HAKTO (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/07/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

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DE WTE34 #0005 2921005
O 191001Z OCT 75
FM HENRY KISSINGER//HAKTO 08//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 19, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: HENRY KISSINGER
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT.

1. I HAD A VERY PRODUCTIVE AND CORDIAL ONE HOUR FORTY MINUTE WORKING BREAKFAST WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA THIS MORNING. THE WARMTH AND CANDOR OF THE SESSION ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THAT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE IN EXCELLENT SHAPE, AS WELL AS REFLECTING GREATER SELF-ASSURANCE ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE AND MIYAZAWA PERSONALLY.

2. HE BEGAN WITH EFFUSIVE THANKS FOR THE AMERICAN RECEPTION OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPHASIZED THAT YOUR PERSONAL STYLE WAS A MAJOR FACTOR. I REPLIED THAT THE INTEREST AND RECEPTIVITY OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WAS DUE TO THEIR HIGH REGARD FOR JAPAN AND THE SOLID STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

3. I PREVIEWED YOUR TRIP AND MINE TO CHINA, REITERATING THEIR DESIRE TO RECEIVE YOU WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROGRESS ON TAIWAN. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD ADVANCED WITH THE CHINESE ON THEIR PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY NEGOTIATIONS; THE JAPANESE WERE NOW SEARCHING FOR LANGUAGE THAT WOULD OPPOSE HEGEMONY, AS THE CHINESE WANT, WITHOUT THIS BEING DIRECTED AGAINST PARTICULAR COUNTRIES OR IMPLYING JOINT ACTION. I EXPLAINED OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS AS I HAVE ALSO EXPLAINED IT TO THE CHINESE, NAMELY THAT WE MUST DEMONSTRATE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT ALL PEACEFUL ROUTES ARE BEING EXPLORED IN ORDER TO RALLY DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR RESISTANCE TO SOVIET PRESSURES WHEN REQUIRED.

4. ON KOREA, I ATTEMPTED TO COOL OFF JAPANESE URGING OF OUR ESTABLISHING BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA. I POINTED OUT THAT REPORTS TO THIS EFFECT (THE JAPANESE



***** *WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SDG, SECFLC

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***** ~~SECRET~~ *****5 COPY

PRESS HAS BEEN ALIVE WITH SPECULATION) COULD UNDERMINE OUR POSITION AT THE UNITED NATIONS. WE COMPARED VOTING ESTIMATES ON THE NEW YORK SITUATION, AGREEING THAT WE PROBABLY HAVE THE VOTES TO PASS OUR RESOLUTION BUT NOT TO DEFEAT THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION. I URGED INTENSIFIED JAPANESE EFFORTS ON THIS, AND WE ARE REDOUBLING OUR OWN. I SAID THAT AFTER THE UN VOTE WE WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBLE FORUMS ON THE KOREAN QUESTION AND WERE FLEXIBLE ON DETAILS EXCEPT THE REQUIREMENT THAT SOUTH KOREA BE PRESENT.

5. THE JAPANESE AGREED WITH US THAT CANADA SHOULD BE AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. I SAID WE WOULD GO BACK TO GISCARD ON THIS NOW THAT HE HAS LEFT MOSCOW.

6. MIYAZAWA WAS VERY RELAXED ABOUT OUR IMPENDING GRAIN DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS, FULLY UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE THAT WE CONTROL THE EXTREME YEARLY FLUCTUATIONS IN SOVIET DEMAND ON OUR MARKET. I REITERATED SECRETARY BUTZ' ASSURANCES TO THE JAPANESE ON MEETING THEIR TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

7. THE JAPANESE CONFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD BE INCREASING THEIR OIL IMPORTS FROM CHINA IN ORDER TO DIVERSIFY THEIR SOURCES. IT WOULD REMAIN A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THEIR REQUIREMENTS, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF ITS PARAFFIN CONTENT, IT WOULD CONSTITUTE ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF CHINA'S PRODUCTION AND THE BULK OF ITS EXPORTS.

8. WE ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA WHERE OUR PERCEPTIONS WERE LARGELY SIMILAR.

9. ON MY WAY BACK FROM CHINA I WILL BE SEEING PRIME MINISTER MIKI AND MIYAZAWA, AS WELL AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA AND FINANCE MINISTER OHIRA.

10. WARM REGARDS.



PSN:045366 RECALLED PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:292/10:462 DTG:191001Z OCT 75

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O 191340Z OCT 75
FM MR. BREMER//HAKTO 09//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 19, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: MR. BREMER

1. FRIDAY MORNING THE SECRETARY HAD WITH HIM A MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE FISHERIES JURISDICTION WRITTEN BY CARL MAW. HE APPARENTLY DID NOT GIVE IT TO THE PRESIDENT SINCE HE HAS REWORKED A DRAFT COPY I HAD ALONG AND NOW WANTS THIS MEMO GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT.

2. I AM TRANSMITTING THE ENTIRE TEXT AS REWORKED. IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO SHOW MAW THIS MEMO AS HE HAS REWORKED IT JUST TO BE SURE IT IS STILL ACCURATE FROM A LEGAL STANDPOINT.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS CONCERNING THE BILLS TO UNILATERALLY EXTEND US FISHERIES JURISDICTION FROM 12 TO 200 MILES



I. THE PROBLEM

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, SDO, SECFLE

PSN:045671 PAGE 01 TOR:292/18:36Z DTG:191340Z OCT 75

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By 142 NARA Date 8/2/10

THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN CONGRESS TO UNILATERALLY EXTEND US FISHERIES JURISDICTION FROM THE PRESENT 12 MILE LIMIT TO 200 MILES. H.R. 200, THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE 200-MILE BILL, PASSED THE HOUSE ON OCTOBER 9 BY A VOTE OF 208 TO 101. PROPONENTS OF THE BILL URGE THAT FISH STOCKS OFF THE US COAST ARE BEING RAPIDLY DEPLETED BY HEAVY FOREIGN FISHING AND THAT WE CANNOT WAIT FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATION WHICH IS EXPECTED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM WHEN A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY IS CONCLUDED. PASSAGE OF THE BILL, HOWEVER, WOULD UNDERMINE THE CARDINAL TENET OF US OCEANS POLICY -- NO UNILATERAL ACTION -- WHICH WE DEFENDED IN THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT, WOULD UNDERCUT THE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS, AND WOULD EXACERBATE US BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER NATIONS.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION

THERE IS UNQUESTIONABLY STRONG SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR PASSAGE OF THE 200-MILE BILL. THE PRINCIPAL PROPONENTS OF THE BILL, SENATORS MAGNUSON (D-WASH.), STEVENS (R-ALAS.), AND MUSKIE (D-MAINE), AND CONGRESSMEN STUDDS (D-MASS.), PRITCHARD (R-WASH.), AND LEGGETT (D-CALIF.) ARE ACTIVE AND VOCAL. (THE SENATE BILL IS KNOWN AS THE "MAGNUSON BILL" AND THE HOUSE BILL AS THE "STUDDS BILL"). THESE CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORTERS OF THE BILL HAVE THE MAJORITY OF THE CONGRESS WITH THEM ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CERTAIN HOW MANY OF THESE SUPPORTERS HAVE FULLY ADDRESSED THE ISSUES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS A STRONG AND VOCAL OPPOSITION TO THE BILL INCLUDING SENATORS GOLDWATER (R-ARIZ.), AND GRAVEL (D-ALAS.) AND CONGRESSMEN BENNETT (D-FLA.), FRASER (D-MINN.), AND MCCLOSKEY (R-CALIF.). STATE GOVERNORS HAVE ALSO BECOME INVOLVED WITH GOVERNOR HAMMOND (D-ALAS.) IN SUPPORT OF THE BILL AND GOVERNOR REAGAN (R-CALIF.) ON RECORD LAST YEAR IN OPPOSITION TO A UNILATERAL EXTENSION.

WE DID NOT EXPECT TO WIN IN THE HOUSE AND THE NEARLY ONE-THIRD VOTE AGAINST THE BILL WAS BETTER THAN ANTICIPATED.

ON THE SENATE SIDE, THE COMMERCE COMMITTEE HAS REPORTED THE BILL AND IT HAS BEEN REFERRED TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WHICH PLANS HEARINGS DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 27. THE BILL MAY ALSO BE REFERRED TO THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. WE EXPECT A SENATE VOTE SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER.

LAST YEAR THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REPORTED THE BILL NEGATIVELY (7-6) AND THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE APPROVED THE BILL (9-8). ALTHOUGH THE FULL SENATE THEN



APPROVED THE BILL (68 TO 27 WITH FIVE NOT VOTING), IT WAS UNDERSTOOD AT THE TIME THAT THE HOUSE WOULD NOT ACT DURING THE SESSION AND AS A RESULT WE BELIEVE THE VOTE WAS NOT INDICATIVE. OUR INFORMATION IS THAT A NUMBER OF SENATORS WHO VOTED FOR THE BILL LAST YEAR NOW OPPOSE, INCLUDING SENATORS GRAVEL, HUMPHREY AND TAFT. (TAFT'S SHIFT GIVES US A GOOD CHANCE AT A NEGATIVE REPORT IN THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.) WE BELIEVE THAT WITH FIRM ADMINISTRATION OPPOSITION WE HAVE A FIGHTING CHANCE TO PREVENT PASSAGE IN THE SENATE AND THAT WE CAN SUSTAIN A VETO.

III. REASONS FOR STRONG OPPOSITION TO THE 200-MILE BILL

A UNILATERAL EXTENSION OF JURISDICTION BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS AND OCEANS INTERESTS. THE COSTS WOULD INCLUDE:

- AVOIDANCE OF UNILATERAL ACTION HAS BEEN A CARDINAL TENET OF US OCEANS POLICY. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY PROTESTED UNILATERAL OCEANS CLAIMS BY OTHER NATIONS. FOR THE US TO MAKE A MAJOR UNILATERAL CLAIM WOULD UNDERCUT OUR ABILITY TO PREVENT UNILATERAL CLAIMS BY OTHERS THUS HARMING OUR INTERESTS IN FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, AND OTHER IMPORTANT OCEANS INTERESTS;
- IN THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT THE UNITED STATES ACTED DECISIVELY AGAINST AN ILLEGAL UNILATERAL OCEANS CLAIM BY CAMBODIA. TO MAKE A MAJOR UNILATERAL CLAIM OF OUR OWN (AND IN DOING SO TO ARREST SOVIET VESSELS) COULD SUBJECT US TO SEVERE CRITICISM THAT WE ARE APPLYING A DOUBLE STANDARD;
- ENFORCEMENT OF A UNILATERAL 200-MILE US FISHERIES CLAIM AGAINST THE SOVIETS WOULD POSE A REAL RISK OF CONFRONTATION AND AT THE VERY LEAST DAMAGE US-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER HAS INFORMED US THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE A UNILATERAL US EXTENSION OF FISHERIES JURISDICTION TO 200 MILES;
- ENFORCEMENT AGAINST JAPAN WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE US-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND COULD LEAD TO RETALIATION AGAINST US INTERESTS. FISHING IS OF MAJOR ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO JAPAN AND EXTENSION OF US FISHERIES JURISDICTION



TO 200 MILES WOULD DIRECTLY AFFECT 20 PERCENT OF JAPAN'S TOTAL WORLDWIDE CATCH;

-- PASSAGE BY CONGRESS OF THE 200-MILE BILL WOULD REMOVE A MAJOR BARGAINING INCENTIVE FOR OTHER NATIONS TO REACH AGREEMENT AT THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE AND AS SUCH WOULD UNDERCUT OUR LOS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CHANCES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY. WE HAVE INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A 200-MIL

ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE LOS NEGOTIATION BUT ONLY AS CONDITIONED ON TREATY PROTECTION OF A VARIETY OF OTHER VITAL US INTERESTS INCLUDING UNIMPEDED TRANSIT OF STRAITS AND GUARANTEED ACCESS TO DEEP SEABED MINERALS;

-- UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE US COULD TRIGGER A WAVE OF UNILATERAL OCEANS CLAIMS LEADING TO INCREASED CONFLICT AND LESSENED US SECURITY. NORWAY AND CANADA HAVE RECENTLY MADE TOP LEVEL DECISIONS TO WAIT FOR THE LOS TREATY RATHER THAN EXTENDING FISHERIES JURISDICTION UNILATERALLY. (IN THIS CONNECTION, PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU RECENTLY MADE A STRONG AND COURAGEOUS STATEMENT IN DEFENSE OF CANADA'S POLICY TO WAIT FOR AN AGREED LOS TREATY.) MEXICO RECENTLY INDICATED AN INTENTION TO MAKE A UNILATERAL EXTENSION, PARTLY STIMULATED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY WITH THE 200-MILE BILL. SOUNDINGS FROM OUR EMBASSIES INDICATE A REAL DANGER OF A WAVE OF HARMFUL UNILATERAL CLAIMS IF THE US SHOULD MAKE A CLAIM;

-- A UNILATERAL EXTENSION OF FISHERIES JURISDICTION BY THE US WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INCLUDING THE IMPORTANT 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS AND THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON FISHING AND CONSERVATION OF THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE HIGH SEAS TO WHICH THE US IS PARTY. AS SUCH PASSAGE OF THE 200-MILE BILL WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW IN THE OCEANS. THE BEST INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SCHOLARS HAVE RECENTLY



AFFIRMED THIS POSITION INCLUDING PROFESSORS MYRES MCDUGAL OF YALE AND LOUIS SOHN OF HARVARD AND PHILIP JESSUP, FORMERLY A JUDGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THERE IS NO CREDIBLE BODY OF EXPERT OPINION ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ISSUE;

- A UNILATERAL EXTENSION OF US FISHERIES JURISDICTION WOULD DIRECTLY UNDERCUT THE IMPORTANT US TUNA AND DISTANT WATER FISHING INTERESTS WHICH FISH WITHIN 200 MILES OF OTHER NATIONS. THE VALUE OF US FISH LANDINGS TAKEN WITHIN 200 MILES OF OTHER NATIONS BY THESE AND OTHER DISTANT WATER US FISHING INTERESTS WHICH OPPOSE THE BILL IS --- COMPARED WITH --- FOR US FISH LANDINGS TAKEN WITHIN 200 MILES OF THE US:
- EXPENDITURES FOR ENFORCEMENT ARE LIKELY TO BE HIGHER FOR ENFORCEMENT OF A 200-MILE ZONE AGAINST NON-CONSENTING NATIONS THAN IF THE 200-MILE LIMIT IS ADOPTED AS PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE LOS TREATY; AND
- UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE US WOULD UNDERMINE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE US IN DEVELOPING A STABLE REGIME FOR THE WORLD'S OCEANS.
- UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S. WOULD INVOLVE MAJOR ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS INCLUDING THE USE OF OUR NAVY AGAINST FISHING VESSELS FROM SUCH COUNTRIES AS THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN.

IN ADDITION TO THESE SUBSTANTIAL COSTS OF US UNILATERAL ACTION, THE 200-MILE BILL SHOULD BE OPPOSED BECAUSE THERE ARE MORE EFFECTIVE WAYS OF ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE BILL. THESE INCLUDE:

- FOR THE LONG RUN (1-3 YEARS) A COMPREHENSIVE LOS TREATY IS THE BEST WAY TO PROTECT OUR FISHING INTERESTS. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE ON A 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE (INCLUDING THE COASTAL FISHERIES JURISDICTION WE WANT) AS PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE LOS TREATY IN WHICH OUR OTHER OCEANS INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED. EVEN THE SOVIETS AND THE JAPANESE NOW ACCEPT THIS GENERAL CONSENSUS AS PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY;
- FOR THE SHORT RUN WE ARE CONTINUING TO PUSH HARD IN BILATERAL FISHING NEGOTIA-



TIONS WITH NATIONS FISHING OFF OUR COASTS (INCLUDING THE SOVIETS AND JAPANESE) AND IN LIMITED MULTILATERAL FISHERIES AGREEMENTS (SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC FISHERIES (ICNAF)). THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL ICNAF MEETING IN WHICH FISHING EFFORT WAS REDUCED 23 PERCENT FOR NEXT YEAR IN THE AREA FROM MAINE TO NORTH CAROLINA ILLUSTRATES THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS CAN SUCCEED;

-- WE HAVE PROPOSED A FISHERY INITIATIVE FOR YOU WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT WE PLAN WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO THREE YEARS TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF A 200-MILE FISHING ZONE OFF THE U.S. BY NEGOTIATION WITH THE AFFECTED STATES RATHER THAN THROUGH UNILATERAL CLAIMS. WE BELIEVE THAT AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE LOSS NEGOTIATIONS THIS IS ACHIEVABLE AND THAT IT IS LIKELY TO PROVIDE GREATER PROTECTION FASTER FOR STOCKS OFF OUR COAST THAN CONFRONTATION TACTICS WHICH MUST BE REJECTED BY OTHER NATIONS.

FINALLY, THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A SERIOUS PROBLEM CONCERNING FOREIGN OVERFISHING OFF THE US COASTS WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROPONENTS OF THE BILL SOMEWHAT BYPASS THE REAL ISSUE AND EXAGGERATE THE PRESENT PROBLEM. THE ISSUE IS NOT PAST OVERFISHING OR ALREADY DEPLETED STOCKS, BUT WHETHER CURRENT FOREIGN FISHING THREATENS SERIOUS DEPLETION OF STOCKS OFF THE US COAST IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS UNTIL WE ARE ABLE TO CONCLUDE A LAW OF THE SEA TREATY. WITHIN THE LAST YEAR WE HAVE MADE REAL STRIDES IN REDUCING FOREIGN OVERFISHING OFF OUR COAST AND THROUGH THE AVAILABLE DATA IS POOR, AT THE PRESENT TIME WE BELIEVE THAT FEW, IF ANY, STOCKS ARE THREATENED ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS BY FOREIGN FISHING PRESSURE AT PRESENT LEVELS WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS AS OPPOSED TO PAST FISHING PRESSURE WHICH CANNOT BE UNDONE BY ANY POLICY.

IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PROPONENTS OF THE BILL

THE CONGRESSIONAL PROPONENTS OF THE BILL HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE 200-MILE FISHING BILL. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT A NUMBER OF THESE ARGUMENTS WERE MADE TO YOU IN YOUR MEETING ON OCTOBER 8 WITH THE PROPONENTS OF THE BILL. THE ARGUMENTS AND THE ANSWERS, WHICH I BELIEVE ARE



PERSUASIVE, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE 200-MILE BILL IS NEEDED AS AN EMERGENCY MEASURE TO PROTECT FISH STOCKS OFF THE US COAST AGAINST HEAVY FOREIGN FISHING

STOCKS OFF THE US COAST HAVE BEEN SEVERELY DEPLETED BY FOREIGN OVERFISHING DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS. THE ISSUE, HOWEVER, IS NOT DEPLETION CAUSED BY PAST OVERFISHING BUT WHETHER THERE IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE STOCKS AT PRESENT REDUCED LEVELS OF FOREIGN FISHING WITHIN THE NEXT 1-3 YEARS WHEN WE ARE EXPECTED TO CONCLUDE AN LOS TREATY. THOUGH PROBLEMS REMAIN, RECENT BILATERAL AND LIMITED MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE IN THE PAST YEAR IN PROTECTING THE STOCKS OFF THE US COASTS AND IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT UNDER PRESENT AGREEMENTS WE HAVE A GENUINE EMERGENCY. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE THAT AN INTENSIFIED EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE BILATERAL FISHERIES AGREEMENTS WILL BE MORE PRODUCTIVE IN PROVIDING INTERIM PROTECTION THAN IF WE PURSUE UNILATERAL CONFRONTATION STRATEGIES.

(B) THE LOS CONFERENCE IS TAKING TOO LONG AND IS MAKING NO PROGRESS

THE LOS CONFERENCE IS TAKING LONGER THAN WE WOULD LIKE AND IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER A TREATY CAN BE COMPLETED DURING 1976. NEVERTHELESS, AS EVIDENCED BY THE PRODUCTION OF THE SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT AND AN EMERGING CONSENSUS ON THE MAJOR ISSUES (INCLUDING A 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE WITH PROTECTION FOR OUR COASTAL AND SALMON FISHING INTERESTS) THE CONFERENCE IS MAKING SOLID PROGRESS. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE ISSUES IT IS PROCEEDING MORE RAPIDLY THAN PAST EFFORTS AT OCEANS LAWMAKING. WHATEVER THE PACE, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES AT STAKE, INCLUDING VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AS LONG AS PROGRESS IS BEING MADE WE SHOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT THE CONFERENCE. MOREOVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT AN LOS TREATY WILL TAKE A NUMBER OF YEARS. AS SUCH WE ARE NOT RELYING ON THE TREATY TO RESOLVE OUR INTERIM FISHERIES PROBLEMS. RATHER WE HAVE WITHIN THE LAST YEAR GREATLY INTENSIFIED OUR EFFORTS AT BILATERAL AND LIMITED MULTILATERAL FISHING AGREEMENTS AND WE HAVE PROPOSED AN EVEN MORE INTENSIVE EFFORT FOR YOU TO ANNOUNCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(C) PASSAGE OF THE 200-MILE BILL WILL STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF OUR LOS NEGOTIATORS

ALTHOUGH THE THREAT OF PASSAGE OF THE 110MILE BILL MAY STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF OUR BILATERAL FISHERIES



NEGOTIATORS, EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE BILL IS HARMFUL TO THE BROADER LOS NEGOTIATIONS. THE REASONS WHY THE BILL UNDERCUTS RATHER THAN STRENGTHENS THE HANDS OF OUR LOS NEGOTIATORS INCLUDE:

- THE 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE IS A MAJOR LOS BARGAINING CHIP WHICH WE HAVE SAID WE COULD ACCEPT ONLY IF OUR VITAL STRAITS AND DEEP SEABED INTERESTS WERE PROTECTED BY A TREATY. FOR CONGRESS TO PUSH FOR A 200-MILE ZONE GIVES AWAY THE MAJOR CHIP WE HAVE WITH THE LDC'S WITHOUT EXTRACTING THE QUID PRO QUO;
- PASSAGE WOULD SERIOUSLY EXACERBATE OUR CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSWITH THE SOVIETS AND THE JAPANESE;
CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR THE 200-MILE BILL ENCOURAGES 200-MILE CONFERENCE EXTREMISTS SUCH AS PERU TO STALL THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WAIT UNTIL US UNILATERAL ACTION VALIDATES THEIR UNILATERAL CLAIMS;
THE PROVISIONS OF THE BILL ESTABLISHING FISH PRODUCT EMBARGOES AND DESIGNED TO PROTECT US TUNA INTERESTS WOULD EXACERBATE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE TUNA PROBLEM IN THE LOS TREATY;
- IF US UNILATERAL ACTION ENCOURAGES A WAVE OF UNILATERAL CLAIMS THE INCENTIVE FOR AGREEMENT MAY BE REMOVED AND THE CONFERENCE COULD COLLAPSE. AT THE LEAST SUCH CLAIMS WOULD HARDEN POSITIONS AND MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS MORE DIFFICULT.

(D) THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN UNILATERAL ACTION BEFORE AND SUCH ACTION WAS NOT SERIOUSLY HARMFUL FOR THE US OCEANS INTERESTS

IN 1945 PRESIDENT TRUMAN PROCLAIMED US JURISDICTION OVER THE RESOURCES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND IN 1965 THE U.S. EXTENDED ITS FISHERIES JURISDICTION FROM 3 TO 12 MILES. MORE RECENTLY, IN 1973 THE US DECLARED LOBSTER A "CREATURE OF THE SHELF" UNDER THE CONTINENTAL SHELF CONVENTION AND THUS AS UNDER US JURISDICTION. THESE UNILATERAL US OCEANS ACTIONS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT THAN A UNILATERAL EXTENSION OF OUR FISHERIES JURISDICTION TO 200 MILES. THE DIFFERENCES INCLUDE:

- NONE OF THESE ACTIONS WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE LEAST IT CAN BE SAID THAT THERE WAS AN ABSENCE OF TREATY LAW OR PRECEDENT ON THE ISSUE;



-- NONE WAS MADE DURING THE COURSE OF ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MULTILATERAL CONFERENCES IN HISTORY; IN THE CASE OF THE EXTENSION OF OUR FISHING JURISDICTION TO 12 MILES THE SOVIETS CLAIMED A 12-MILE TERRITORIAL SEA AT THE TIME AND WERE IN NO POSITION TO PROTEST; IT WAS EVIDENT AT THE TIME THAT THERE WOULD BE NO, IF ANY, PROTESTS FROM THE US ACTION AND THIS WAS BORN OUT IN FACT; THE LATTER TWO US FISHERIES CLAIMS WERE OF MINOR SIGNIFICANCE COMPARED TO AN EXTENSION OF FISHERIES JURISDICTION FROM 12 TO 200 MILES.

MOREOVER, EVEN THESE MORE INNOCUOUS ACTIONS WERE NOT FREE FROM COSTS. MANY LATIN STATES USED THE TRUMAN PROCLAMATION TO JUSTIFY 200-MILE TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS WHICH STILL PLAGUE US, AND THE MORE RECENT CLAIM TO INCLUDE LOBSTER AS A "CREATURE OF THE SHELF" HAS GIVEN RISE TO A FISHERY DISPUTE WITH THE BAHAMAS IN WHICH FLORIDA

BASED SPINY LOBSTER FISHERMEN HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THEIR TRADITIONAL FISHING IN THE BAHAMAS. IN RECENT MONTHS THIS DISPUTE HAS ESCALATED TO BOMBINGS OF BAHAMIAN VESSELS IN FLORIDA PORTS.

(E) H.R. 200 AND S. 961 PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RENEGOTIATION OF THE MORE THAN 20 BILATERAL US FISHERIES AGREEMENTS AND AS SUCH WOULD NOT VIOLATE US TREATY OBLIGATIONS OR INTERNATIONAL LAW

THESE BILLS DO CONTAIN AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS CONCERNING RENEGOTIATION OF EXISTING BILATERAL FISHERY AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES. WHATEVER THE VERDICT ON THIS ISSUE, HOWEVER, THE BILLS ARE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT US OCEANS TREATY OBLIGATIONS, THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS AND A LESS IMPORTANT BUT STILL BINDING TREATY OBLIGATION, THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON FISHING AND CONSERVATION OF THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE HIGH SEAS. THE CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS IS THE BASIS FOR IMPORTANT OCEANS FREEDOMS INCLUDING THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. INDEED IT PROVIDES IN THE SAME ARTICLE (ARTICLE 2) FOR BOTH FREEDOM OF FISHING AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS. THE ISSUE IS SO CLEAR THAT JUDGE PHILIP JESSUP RECENTLY WROTE IN OPPOSITION TO THE BILL:

(INSERT JESSUP QUOTE USED ON THE HOUSE FLOOR TO THE EFFECT THAT NO REPUTABLE



INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SCHOLAR DISAGREES
THAT THE BILL IS ILLEGAL)

V. NEXT STEPS WITH RESPECT TO THE 200-MILE BILL
WITH YOUR STRONG SUPPORT WE CAN STOP THE 200-
MILE FISHING BILL DESPITE ITS STRENGTH ON THE HILL.
TO DO SO, HOWEVER, WE MUST BE VIGOROUS AND FIRM
IN OUR OPPOSITION AND YOU MUST BE PREPARED TO VETO
THE BILL IF NECESSARY (ALTHOUGH WE WOULD NOT WISH
TO SIGNAL A VETO AT THIS TIME). IF YOU AGREE
WITH THIS APPROACH I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD IMMEDIA
ATELY UNDERTAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

- ISSUANCE OF YOUR PROPOSED NEW FISHING
INITIATIVE CALLING FOR A TRANSITION TO
A 200-MILE FISHING ZONE OVER THE NEXT
TWO OR THREE YEARS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS
RATHER THAN UNILATERAL ACTION. THIS
WOULD PROVIDE US WITH A VISIBLE AFFIRMA--
TTI TIVE RESPONSE TO THE INTERIM FISHERIES
PROBLEM;
- AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN NEGATIVE REPORTS ON
THE BILL FROM THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES (THE PROS=
PECTS ARE GOOD);
- A SYSTEMATIC SENATE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
BILL COORDINATED AS YOU HAVE REQUESTED
BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NSC UNDER SECRETARIES
COMMITTEE;
- A STRONG WHITE HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT
IN OPPOSITION TO THE BILL;

ALTHOUGH I STRONGLY RECOMMEND ALL OUT OPPOSITION
TO THE BILL THERE ARE, OF COURSE, OTHER POSSIBILITIES.
THESE INCLUDE A NEUTRAL STANCE AND AN EFFORT TO
ACHIEVE A COMPROMISE BILL WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, A DE=
LAYED EFFECTIVE DATE.

FOR THE WHITE HOUSE TO REMAIN OUT OF THE FIGHT
WOULD ENSURE SENATE PASSAGE AND REQUIRE A VETO DECI=
SION.

ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS TO MAKE AN EARLY
EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A COMPROMISE WITH THE PRINCIPAL
PROponents OF THE BILL. ONE COMPROMISE WHICH HAS BEEN
HINTED BY SUPPORTERS OF THE BILL IS FOR THE BILL TO
HAVE A DELAYED EFFECTIVE DATE, POSSIBLY LATE 1976
OR EARLY 1977. THIS MIGHT BE COMBINED WITH AN UNDER=
STANDING THAT THE SUPPORTERS WOULD WORK WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE THE BILL MORE CLOSELY CONFORM
WITH THE SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT PRODUCED AT THE LOS
CONFERENCE.

THIS OPTION WAS THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED IN THE
INITIAL FULL INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM AND I



BELIEVE WISELY REJECTED BY YOU IN YOUR DECISION OF
SEPTEMBER TO STRONGLY OPPOSE THE BILL. A DELAYED
EFFECTIVE DATE WOULD ONLY SLIGHTLY LESSEN THE SERIOUS
IMPACT TO OUR OCEANS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS INTERESTS.
THE PROBLEM IS THE UNILATERAL NATURE OF THE ACTION
AND IT IS JUST AS UNILATERAL IF IT HAS A DELAYED
EFFECTIVE DATE AS IF IT TAKES EFFECT ON THE DATE OF
PASSAGE. IT IS HARD TO BE A LITTLE BIT UNILATERAL.

FINALLY, THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE BILL ALREADY
CONTAINS A DELAYED EFFECTIVE DATE OF JULY 1, 1976
SO THE PROPOSED COMPROMISE OFFERS LITTLE.



OP IMMED
ZCZCSAHH0400 WTE
DE WTE34 #0004 2921000
O 190959Z OCT 75
FM MR. BREMER//HAKTO 10//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 19, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: MR. BREMER

1. AMBASSADOR HODGSON HAS TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT HE THINKS IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO REFUEL NEAR TOKYO ON HIS WAY TO CHINA. IT WOULD PUT THE JAPANESE IN A VERY UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION, SINCE THEY DO NOT WANT A VISIT. HODGSON SUGGESTED REFUELING INSTEAD IN OKINAWA. THE SECRETARY NOTES THAT JUST LOOKING AT A MAP, SHANGHAI APPEARS ALMOST AS CLOSE AS OKINAWA AND HE ASKS YOU TO INFORM HIM QUICKLY WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S PLANE COULD MAKE IT TO SHANGHAI FOR REFUELING.

2. A THIRD POSSIBILITY WHICH BUD SUGGESTED WAS GUAM.

3. SECRETARY ASKS THAT YOU ASSESS ALL THREE ALTERNATIVES GIVING HIM FLIGHT TIMES AND TIME CHANGES.

4. WARM REGARDS.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SECPLF, 800

PSN:045339 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:292/10:18Z DTG:190959Z OCT 75

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OP IMMED
DE WTE34 #0007 2921609
O 191610Z OCT 75
FM SECRETARY KISSINGER//HAKTO 11//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 19, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT.

2. THE CHINESE GREETED US ON ARRIVAL AT 4:00PM WITH THE SAME RITUAL AS PREVIOUS TRIPS AND THE ATMOSPHERE IF ANYTHING IS A BIT MORE CORDIAL THAN ON MY LAST TRIP. WE CANNOT, OF COURSE, GAUGE THEIR REAL MOOD UNTIL THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BEGIN TOMORROW.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, OTHER CHINESE DIGNITARIES, AND RESIDENT AMBASSADORS MET US AT THE AIRPORT IN WARM, LATE AFTERNOON SUNSHINE. WE DROVE THE FORTY MINUTES TO THE GUEST HOUSE WITH GOLDEN AUTUMN LEAVES FRAMING OUR ROUTE. AS USUAL THE WIDE STREETS AND HUGE TIENAMEN SQUARE WERE DOMINATED BY BICYCLES, AND THE CITY SEEMED EVEN MORE TRANQUIL THAN USUAL. AFTER A WELCOMING TEA AT THE GUEST HOUSE WE TOOK A BREAK UNTIL 7:00 PM. AT THE HUGE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE, VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING GREETED THE OFFICIAL PARTY BEFORE THE WELCOMING BANQUET. WE EXCHANGED SOME LIGHT BANTER, DURING WHICH HE NEEDLED US GENTLY ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF OUR RELATIONS, I DID THE SAME TO HIM ON THEIR RHETORIC IN THE UN, AND HE CONFIRMED THAT THEIR SOVIET RELATIONS HAD NOT IMPROVED.



4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S TOAST AT THE BANQUET OPENED WITH AN EXPLICIT WELCOMING OF YOUR FORTHCOMING TRIP, AN EVENT

***** *WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SDO, SECPLC

PSN:045625

PAGE 01

TOR:292/17:37Z

DTG:191610Z OCT 75

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10

THEY CLEARLY LOOK FORWARD TO. THE TOAST ENDED WITH A REFERENCE TO PROGRESS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS THAT WAS SOMEWHAT MORE UPRIGHT THAN LAST YEAR'S. IN THE MIDDLE OF HIS REMARKS, HOWEVER, HE USED VERY SHARP LANGUAGE AGAINST DETENTE LIFTED FROM HIS OWN SPEECH. HE SAID THEY DIDN'T BELIEVE IN LASTING PEACE; THAT HEGEMONY SHOULD BE RESISTED TIT FOR TAT RATHER THAN SUBSTITUTING WISH FOR REALITY; AND THAT THE CHINESE WERE GETTING PREPARED ON THEIR OWN FOR THE PROBABILITY OF WAR.

5. IN LIGHT OF THIS LINE, I ADDED A REJOINDER TO MY OWN PREPARED REMARKS. I SAID IN EFFECT THAT COUNTRY HAD TO PURSUE A POLICY MOST SUITED TO ITS OWN CIRCUMSTANCES; THAT WE WOULD RESIST HEGEMONY WHERE NECESSARY BUT WOULD ALSO AVOID NEEDLESS CONFRONTATIONS; AND THAT OUR FIRM ACTIONS WERE MORE MEANINGFUL THAN THEIR TOUGH WORDS.

6. I AM SURE THIS EXCHANGE ON DETENTE WILL BE THE FOCUS OF THE MEDIA, BUT IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN PERSPECTIVE. THE REST OF HIS TOAST AND THEIR OVERALL RECEPTION HAS BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING THAN LAST YEAR AND HIS SHARP RHETORIC WAS A VERBATIM EXCERPT FROM HIS NEW YORK SPEECH. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS A MAJOR THEME IN MY TALKS WITH HIM LAST MONTH, AND I WANTED TO LET THE CHINESE KNOW AGAIN THAT WHILE THEY MAY TALK A GOOD GAME AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSION, ONLY THE U.S. HAS BEEN ACTUALLY DOING SOMETHING ABOUT IT. I PLAN TO TAKE THIS LINE IN MY TALKS HERE. MY EXPERIENCE WITH THE CHINESE IS THAT THEY ONLY RESPECT STRENGTH. IF WE LET THEM PUSH US NOW WE WILL BE IN DIFFICULTIES DURING YOUR VISIT.

7. MY MEETINGS WITH VICE PREMIER TENG AND FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO BEGIN AT 10:00 TOMORROW MORNING. AFTER OUR INITIAL EXCHANGES I MAY TABLE LATER TOMORROW A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE FOR YOUR VISIT ALONG THE GENERAL LINES HE DISCUSSED. THIS WILL BE THE ONLY WAY TO REALLY SMOKE OUT THEIR INTENTIONS. I FULLY EXPECT THAT, AS USUAL, THE GREAT BULK OF OUR TALKS WILL CENTER ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION RATHER THAN BILATERAL RELATIONS. IN ADDITION TO WORKING OUT AGENDA AND LOGISTICS FOR YOUR TRIP, AND PROBING FOR ANY CHANGES IN CHINESE POSITIONS, THESE FOUR DAYS WILL GIVE US A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO SIZE UP TENG. HE WILL BE YOUR PRIMARY INTER-LOCUTOR, ASIDE FROM ANY MEETING WITH MAO, SINCE CHOU IS CLEARLY GRAVELY ILL. THEY SAID CHOU IS TOO SICK TO RECEIVE VISITORS, INCLUDING EVEN CHINESE. TENG IS EFFECTIVELY RUNNING BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAVING MADE A REMARKABLE



14

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COMEBACK THE PAST TWO YEARS AFTER HIS DISGRACE DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION A DECADE AGO. HE IS A TOUGH, SHORT, STOCKY MAN WHO CONTINUES TO GAIN IN SELF-ASSURANCE, THOUGH HE WILL NEVER HAVE THE FLAIR, ELEGANCE, OR VISION OF CHOU.

8. THE ONLY NOTEWORTHY SUBSTANTIVE NOTE DURING THE BANQUET CONVERSATIONS WAS THE EXTREME CHINESE ANNOYANCE AT THE FRENCH FOR THEIR HAVING JOINED THE SOVIET CALL FOR A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, WHICH IS ANATHEMA HERE.

9. WARM REGARDS.



DP IHMED
DE WTE34 #0008 2921615
O 191612Z OCT 75
FM ROBERT OAKLEY//HAKTO 12//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 19, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: ROBERT OAKLEY
SUBJECT: C-130'S FOR EGYPT

1. THE SECRETARY ATTACHES THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO FINDING SOME MEANS OF MAKING A DEFINITE COMMITMENT TO SADAT DURING THE VISIT FOR EARLY DELIVERY OF SIX C-130'S. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO PROMISE SADAT OTHER NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD NOT REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL IF WE CAN FIND ANYTHING WHICH WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT WITH SADAT. ON THE LONGER-TERM PROBLEM, HE INTENDS TO PROPOSE TO SADAT THAT WE ENTER INTO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF EGYPT'S MILITARY NEEDS ONCE THE AID BILL IS APPROVED, WITH AN EYE TO OBTAINING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL AND BEGINNING SALES BY THE SUMMER OF 1976.

2. CONCERNING THE C-130'S, THE SECRETARY HAS READ BRIEFLY A MEMO DONE BY HAL SAUNDERS DATED OCTOBER 16 AND IS AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING THEM, PARTICULARLY IF WE TRY TO GET THEM FROM USAF. NEVERTHELESS HE IS DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD FIND SOME WAY OF MAKING GOOD ON THIS COMMITMENT AND ASKS THAT YOU SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE. THE SAUNDERS MEMO ASSUMES NO PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION IS NEEDED FOR C-130'S. ALSO, IN MY JUDGMENT, THE LIBYAN OPTION DISCUSSED IN SAUNDERS MEMO IS VERY SHAKEY, GIVEN LIBYA'S BAD RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE US AND EGYPT AND THE HISTORY OF THEIR C-130'S. SAUNDERS' MEMO HAS A TABLE WITH THE LOCKHEED C-130 PRODUCTION SCHEDULE, WITH SAUDI ARABIA SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE DELIVERY OF 3 IN NOVEMBER. PERHAPS THEY WOULD STAND ASIDE FOR EGYPT BUT THIS IS, IN MY JUDGMENT, FAR FROM CERTAIN. IF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES DO NOT MATERIALIZE, THERE WOULD BE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO TO DOD WITH ALL THAT WOULD MEAN. IS THERE ANY

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, 800, SECFLC

PSN:845615 RECALLED PAGE 81 TOR:292/17128Z DTG:191612Z OCT 75

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 6.3 State Review

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines 12/9/03

By NR NARA, Date 8/2/10



POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING C-130'S FOR LOAN TO EGYPT,
PENDING THE SUPPLY OF NEW ONES, AS A LESS UNPALATABLE
ALTERNATIVE FOR OOD?

3. IN ANY EVENT, THE SECRETARY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR
RECOMMENDATION ON WHERE AND WHEN WE CAN GET THE SIX
C-130'S FOR EGYPT AS WELL AS ANY IDEAS YOU HAVE ON OTHER
NON-LETHAL MATERIAL. HE WOULD LIKE A REPLY AS SOON
AS YOU CAN GET ANSWERS. TUESDAY MORNING HERE IS A
REASONABLE DEADLINE TO AIM FOR.

4. ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, YOU MIGHT WANT TO BRING THE
SECRETARY UP TO DATE BY TUESDAY MORNING HERE ON WHAT
POSITION OMB WILL RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE
MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE PACKAGE, WITH ANY SUGGESTIONS
FOR ACTION BY THE SECRETARY IF THAT SEEMS NECESSARY.

5. WARM REGARDS.



PSN1845615 RECALLED PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:292/17:28Z DTG:191612Z OCT 75

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WITHDRAWAL ID 031233

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

TITLE HAKTO 13

CREATION DATE 10/20/1975

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900309

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 21

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - HAKTO (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/07/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

OP IMMED
DE WTE34 #0010 2930510
O 200505Z OCT 75
FM PETER RODMAN//HAKTO 14//

TO SITUATION ROOM

U N C L A S E F T O V I A B L A C K P A T C H

OCTOBER 20, 1975

TO: TO SITUATION ROOM
FROM: PETER RODMAN

14

- 1. COULD WE HAVE SUNDAY FOOTBALL SCORES?
- 2. WARM REGARDS,
0010

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SDO,SECFLE -- ACTION TAKEN BY SITROOM

RECALLED
PSN:046069 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:293/05:50Z DTG:200505Z OCT 75

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OP IMMED
DE WTE34 #0011 2930924
O 200920Z OCT 75
FM SECRETARY KISSINGER//HAKTO 15//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 20, 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

I THINK IT IS TIME TO SEND A FURTHER MESSAGE TO GISCARD, UNLESS, OF COURSE, WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT HE MAY TRY TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE PRESIDENT AS SCHMIDT INDICATED IN HIS LAST MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT WITH TRUDEAU COOKING, WE OUGHT TO GET OFF A MESSAGE TO WILSON, THOUGH I REALIZE THERE IS LITTLE VALUE IN GETTING HIM TO APPROACH THE FRENCH.

WOULD YOU PLEASE CHECK WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THEN TRANSMIT THE TEXTS TO GISCARD AND WILSON RESPECTIVELY THAT FOLLOW BELOW.

TO: PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING
FROM: PRESIDENT FORD

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE REFLECTED FURTHER ON OUR RECENT EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES CONCERNING THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT AND, PARTICULARLY, THE QUESTION OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION. FROM THE CONTACTS THAT I OR MY ASSOCIATES HAVE HAD WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SENTIMENT AMONG THEM FAVORING CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE KIND OF SUMMIT THAT HAS NOW EMERGED FROM THE PREPARATORY WORK AND THE DECISIONS OF THE ORIGINAL GROUP. I CONTINUE TO FEEL STRONGLY THAT CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IS JUSTIFIED GIVEN

***** WMSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, 800, SECFLC

RECALLED
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~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10



CANADA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD. AS I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT TO YOU, CANADA IS OUR LARGEST TRADING PARTNER; OUR ECONOMIES ARE INTIMATELY CONNECTED. ITS ABSENCE FROM OUR DELIBERATIONS WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN THIS COUNTRY. THE CANADIANS, TO THEIR CREDIT, HAVE NOT SO FAR MADE A PUBLIC ISSUE OF THIS PROBLEM; IT IS CLEAR FROM OUR CONTACTS WITH THEM THAT THEY WOULD WISH THE SUMMIT TO BE PRODUCTIVE, IN PRECISELY THE SPIRIT YOU AND I HAVE AGREED IN THE PAST. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU WILL BE VISITING WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 23 IN CONNECTION WITH OUR BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATIONS AND WE WILL BE MEETING ON THAT OCCASION. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE PURPOSES YOU AND I WOULD LIKE TO SEE SERVED BY THE SUMMIT WOULD BE ADVANCED IF THE CANADIAN ISSUE WERE SOLVED IN A POSITIVE SENSE SO THAT IT WILL NOT BECOME A MATTER OF PUBLIC DEBATE AND CLOUD THE VERY PROMISING PROSPECTS OF THE SUMMIT ENTERPRISE.

I HAVE FOLLOWED THE REPORTS OF YOUR SOVIET VISIT WITH GREAT ATTENTION AND WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN YOUR PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET SCENE.

YOURS SINCERELY,

END TEXT

TO: PRIME MINISTER (WILSON)

FROM: PRESIDENT FORD

BEGIN TEXT OF MESSAGE TO WILSON

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I WANTED TO CONVEY TO YOU MY SATISFACTION WITH THE PROSPECT OF THE SUMMIT MEETING NEXT MONTH. I GREATLY LOOK FORWARD TO A FULL AND CANDID REVIEW OF THE GREAT PROBLEMS WE ALL FACE TOGETHER. THE SPIRIT OF THE PREPARATORY WORK SINCE HELSINKI SUGGESTS THAT WE WILL HAVE A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE IMPULSE TO COOPERATIVE APPROACHES AMONG THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES AND THUS TO DEMONSTRATE OUR POLITICAL RESOLVE TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUES BEFORE US.

I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, WITH ONE ASPECT OF THE SUMMIT: THE CONTINUED RESISTANCE OF OUR FRENCH COLLEAGUE TO THE INCLUSION OF CANADA. I AM SURE ALL OF US WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE MORE LIMITED MEETING OF FIVE LEADERS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZED THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVES THAT REQUIRED THE INCLUSION OF ITALY, BUT IT WAS ALWAYS CLEAR THAT ONCE THIS OCCURRED THE CANADIANS HAD A MOST LEGITIMATE CLAIM TO COME AS WELL. INDEED, FOR US IN THE

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UNITED STATES THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION THAT A COUNTRY WHICH IS OUR LARGEST TRADING PARTNER, WHOSE ECONOMY IS SO INTIMATELY INTERTWINED WITH OURS AND WHICH CLEARLY RANKS AS A LEADING ECONOMIC POWER IN THE WORLD WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT ONCE IT WAS ENLARGED BEYOND THE ORIGINAL FIVE.

AS A MATTER OF PROCEDURE, I FIND IT QUITE DISMAYING THAT ONE MEMBER OF A GROUP SHOULD CLAIM A VETO IN A MATTER OF SUCH OBVIOUS CONCERN TO THE OTHERS. I CONSIDERED HOLDING UP THE SUMMIT ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL THE CANADIAN ISSUE WAS SETTLED BUT DECIDED AGAINST SUCH TACTICS BECAUSE I FELT THEY WERE UNWORTHY AMONG FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND I COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR FRENCH COLLEAGUE WOULD PERSIST IN A POSITION THAT COULD ONLY DETRACT FROM THE PROMISE OF THE ENTERPRISE ON WHICH WE ARE EMBARKED AND WHICH HE HIMSELF HAD SO STRONGLY ADVOCATED.

I AM NOT CERTAIN WHAT STEPS YOU MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE TO HELP BRING THIS ISSUE TO A CONCLUSION. I HAVE HAD A SO FAR FRUITLESS EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES WITH GISCARD AND I HAVE ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WHO HAS EXCHANGED MESSAGES WITH GISCARD AND ALSO SPOKE TO HIM ON THE PHONE BUT SO FAR WITHOUT RESULT. THE JAPANESE HAVE STRONGLY INDICATED THEIR SUPPORT OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION TO SECRETARY KISSINGER WHEN HE PASSED THROUGH TOKYO. I PROPOSE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH GISCARD AGAIN SHORTLY.

MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, I DID WANT YOU TO KNOW MY OWN VIEWS ON THIS MATTER AND TO BE AWARE OF MY CONCERN THAT THIS UNFORTUNATE AND, IN MY VIEW, UNNECESSARY EPISODE COULD CLOUD THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT.

YOURS SINCERELY,

END TEXT OF MESSAGE TO WILSON

2. WARM REGARDS,

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OO WTE
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O 201430Z OCT 75
FM PETER RODMAN//HAKTO 16//

TO SITROOM

U N C L A S EFTO VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 20 1975

TO: SITROOM
FROM: PETER RODMAN

1. YOHAK 17 WAS MUCH APPRECIATED. SECRETARY WOULD ALSO LIKE SATURDAY'S MAJOR COLLEGE SCORES.
2. SOME WERE CLAIM THAT REDSKINS-DILERS AND PATRIOTS-COLTS SCORES ARE OBVIOUS GARBLES. PLEASE RECONFIRM.
3. WARM REGARDS.

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

SCOWCROFT
SDO, SECYLE

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OO WTE
DE WTE34 #0013 2940226
O 210222Z OCT 75
FM JERRY BREMER//HAKTO 17//

TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JERRY BREMER
REF: TOHAK 20

1. THE SECRETARY AGREES THAT YOU SHOULD GO AHEAD AND TALK TO SCHLESINGER. HE ALSO WANTS YOU TO SPEAK IN SIMILAR TERMS TO DOBRYNIN AND ASKS THAT YOU KEEP THE PRESIDENT INFORMED TO GUARD AGAINST END RUNS.

2. HE ALSO SUGGESTED YOU DRAW THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION TO THE NEWSWEEK ARTICLE ON "RUBBING SALT IN DETENTE" (TOSEC 90) AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT WE ARE UP AGAINST. NOTE THAT NEWSWEEK ALLEGED THE PRESIDENT IS NOT TAKING SIDES IN THE SALT DEBATE, AN ALLEGATION WHICH SIMPLY MUST BE STOPPED. ALSO POINT OUT DOMESTIC DEBATE ON DETENTE, AND THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA WERE BEST PRECISELY WHEN DETENTE WAS THE MOST ACTIVE. MY REPORT TO HIM TODAY OF OUR TALKS YESTERDAY MAKES THIS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR.

3. WARM REGARDS.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 2.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/05, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE

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 DE WTE34 #0012 2940225
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 FM SECRETARY KISSINGER//HAKTO 18//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
 FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

2. I MET WITH VICE PREMIER TENG AND OTHERS FOR ONE AND THREE QUARTERS HOURS IN THE MORNING AND TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS IN THE AFTERNOON ON MONDAY IN THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE. MY FIRST DAY OF SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE WAS SOMEWHAT PUZZLING AND AMBIVALENT. THEY CLEARLY WELCOME YOUR VISIT BUT AT THE SAME TIME ARE EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF OUR ALLEGED STRATEGIC PASSIVITY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.

3. AS IS CUSTOMARY, WE SPENT ALMOST THE ENTIRE TIME ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, MOST OF IT CENTERING ABOUT OUR RESPECTIVE POLICIES FOR DEALING WITH SOVIET HEGEMONY. IN THE MORNING I GAVE A TOUR D'HORIZON, INCLUDING AN EXPLANATION OF HOW WE MUST COMBINE FLEXIBILITY WITH FIRMNESS VERSUS MOSCOW IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR FOREIGN POLICY. IN THE AFTERNOON TENG MADE A LONG PRESENTATION ON THE SOVIET "POLAR BEAR" WHICH WAS VERY SIMILAR TO WHAT HE SAID LAST YEAR WITH RESPECT TO MOSCOW'S GLOBAL AGGRESSIVENESS, BUT MUCH MORE CRITICAL OF OUR POLICY IN RESPONSE. WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY THE CHINESE SUSPECTED COLLUSION BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS, NOW THEY ARE CHARGING US WITH APPEASEMENT IN THE FACE OF GROWING

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 5/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NADA, Date 8/2/10



SOVIET POWER - AN INDICATION THAT THEY CONSIDER US WEAKER THAN BEFORE. THE ANALOGY IS TO WESTERN EUROPE'S MUNICH POLICY OF APPEASEMENT IN THE WEST AND TRYING TO DRIVE THE AGGRESSOR TOWARD THE EAST. I REBUTTED TENG'S PRESENTATION AT LENGTH, POINTING OUT THAT WE HAVE RESISTED SOVIET PRESSURES WHENEVER NECESSARY WHILE THE CHINESE DO LITTLE MORE THAN DISH OUT TOUGH RHETORIC WHILE CARPING FROM THE SIDELINES.

4. AS USUAL, TENG INVITED ME TO OPEN UP THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS IN THE MORNING. I LISTED PREPARATIONS FOR YOUR TRIP, THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS AS THE AGENDA FOR MY VISIT. THEY READILY AGREED TO EVERY SUGGESTION I MADE CONCERNING YOUR TRIP, IN EFFECT LEAVING ITS PARAMETERS UP TO US. THUS THEY ACCEPTED A VISIT FROM MONDAY, DECEMBER 1 TO SATURDAY, DECEMBER 6 WITH THE SIZE OF THE PARTY, INCLUDING PRESS, MORE OR LESS WHAT WE WANT. THEY ALSO AGREED TO AN ADVANCE TECHNICAL TEAM COMING TO CHINA IN EARLY NOVEMBER. I SAID THAT YOU WOULD BE MAKING NO OTHER STOPS IN ASIA BECAUSE OF THE PRESS OF DOMESTIC BUSINESS. TENG ONCE AGAIN SAID YOU ARE WELCOME WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A MEETING OF THE MINDS ON VARIOUS ISSUES. I EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS IN NEITHER SIDE'S INTEREST TO HAVE THE IMPRESSION CREATED DURING YOUR VISIT THAT OUR RELATIONS WERE COOLING. HE SEEMED TO AGREE.

5. IN MY INTERNATIONAL REVIEW I GAVE A DETAILED RATIONALE FOR OUR SOVIET POLICY. I SAID THAT IT DID NOT MATTER IF THE INITIAL SOVIET PRESSURES WERE IN THE EAST OR THE WEST, THE STRATEGIC THREAT REMAINED THE SAME. ON TACTICS I ACKNOWLEDGED OUR DIFFERENCES, BUT POINTEDLY UNDERLINED THAT WHILE WE ARE MORE FLEXIBLE THAN THE CHINESE, WE ACTUALLY TAKE MORE FIRM ACTIONS IN SUCH AREAS AS THE MIDDLE EAST, ANGOLA AND PORTUGAL WHILE THE CHINESE CONFRONTATIONS ARE CONFINED TO RHETORIC. I EXPLAINED WHY WE HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE TO OUR PUBLIC THAT ALL REASONABLE CHANCES FOR PEACE ARE BEING EXPLORED IF WE ARE TO RESIST WHEN NECESSARY, AND THEN TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON KEY AREAS. I POINTED TO THE CONTRADICTORY TRENDS IN EUROPE, WITH OUR STRONG RELATIONS WITH THE MAJOR COUNTRIES BUT DIFFICULTIES ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, I EXPLAINED THAT THE MORE EVEN HANDED PUBLIC ATTITUDE IN AMERICA HAS INCREASED THE CHANCES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT STARTING IN 1977. AND ON KOREA I SAID THAT WE WERE NOT OPPOSED TO REUNIFICATION BUT THAT SOUTH KOREA HAD TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY DISCUSSIONS; AND I WARNED AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE.

6. FINALLY, ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, I REITERATED OUR COMMITMENT TO NORMALIZATION AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. I SAID THAT WE WOULD SUGGEST SOME FORMULAS IN THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

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FOR YOUR VISIT WHICH SHOW SOME PROGRESS, THOUGH IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT WE CANNOT GO ALL THE WAY AT THIS TIME. I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF SHOWING SOME VITALITY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR CHINA POLICY. I CLOSED BY SAYING THAT WHILE WE HAVE DIFFERENT IDEOLOGIES AND POLICIES TOWARDS CERTAIN COUNTRIES WE ALSO HAVE SOME COMMON STRATEGIC INTERESTS.

7. TENG CONFINED HIMSELF TO A FEW POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR DEALINGS WITH MOSCOW WITH RESPECT TO THE GRAIN DEAL, THE SALE OF TECHNOLOGY, AND THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE. I POINTED OUT THAT THE GRAIN DEAL GIVES US GREATER LEVERAGE; OUR TECHNOLOGY SALES ARE LIMITED; AND THAT HELSINKI WAS A MINOR EVENT IN WHICH WE GAVE AWAY NOTHING WHILE GAINING SOME PRESSURE POINTS ON MOSCOW. AT THE END OF THE MEETING I GAVE THEM A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE FOR YOUR VISIT WHICH CONTAINS SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF HEGEMONY AND THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, AND EXTENSIVE ACTIVITY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. I EXPLAINED THIS WAS A MAXIMUM DRAFT.

COMMENT: I EXPECT THEM TO WHITTLE DOWN SUBSTANTIALLY THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND TO INSERT SOME UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE ON HEGMONY.

8. TENG LED OFF THE AFTERNOON SESSION WITH A VERY SHARP AND DETAILED CRITICISM OF OUR SOVIET POLICY. IT SEEMS CLEAR TO ME THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HAD DIRECTED THE OUTLINE OF HIS PRESENTATION. HIS MAIN THEMES WERE THAT THE "POLAR BEAR" IS GAINING STRATEGICALLY; THAT THE U.S. AND THE WEST ARE DEMORALIZED; THAT WE ARE WISHFULLY APPEASING MOSCOW WHILE HOPING ITS AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS WOULD CENTER ON CHINA; AND THAT CHINA WOULD RELY ON ITS OWN MEANS TO DEFEND ITSELF. HE SAID THAT OUR TACTICS VERSUS MOSCOW WERE SO FLEXIBLE THAT THEY BETRAYED A FAULTY STRATEGIC PERCEPTION. HE CONTINUALLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRIMARY DANGER WAS TO THE WEST AND NOT TO THE EAST. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ACHIEVED NUCLEAR PARITY WHILE GREATLY OUTSTRIPPING THE WEST IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. MOSCOW'S ONLY WEAK POINTS WERE IN AGRICULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND RATHER THAN PRESSURING IT ON ITS ECONOMY WE WERE BAILING IT OUT WITH OUR COMMERCIAL DEALS. HE REITERATED CHAIRMAN MAO'S WARNING ABOUT SOVIET DESIGNS AND THE NEED FOR US TO WORK CLOSELY WITH EUROPE AND JAPAN AND TO COUNTER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SUCH AREAS AS THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF. HE POINTED TO GROWING ISOLATIONISM IN OUR PUBLIC OPINION. HE SAID THAT EUROPEAN VISITORS QUESTIONED THE U.S. WILLINGNESS TO COME TO EUROPE'S AID IF MOSCOW ATTACKED. HE THEN DREW A VERY SHARP ANALOGY TO CHAMBERLAIN'S APPEASEMENT POLICY AT MUNICH WHICH LED TO WAR. HE CITED THE "EUROPEAN INSECURITY CONFERENCE" AS AN EXAMPLE OF PULLING THE WOOL OVER

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THE EYES OF PUBLIC OPINION AND SAID THAT THE DANGER OF AN HISTORICAL TRAGEDY LIKE WORLD WAR II IS INCREASING. HE CLOSED BY SAYING THAT CHAIRMAN MAO WAS URGING EVERYONE IN THE WEST TO REEPARE THEMSELVES FOR CONFLICT RATHER THAN RELYING ON APPEASING DOCUMENTS. AS FOR CHINA, IT FEARED NO ONE, ASKED FAVORS FROM NO ONE, AND WOULD PREPARE BY DIGGING TUNNELS, STORING MILLET AND RIFLES, AND RESISTING HEGEMONY.

9. I DECIDED TO MAKE A LENGTHY AND SHARP REBUTTAL TO TENG'S RATHER DISTURBING PRESENTATION. SINCE HE MADE SEVERAL POSITIVE REFERENCES TO NIXON'S POLICY, I EXPLAINED THAT YOUR STRATEGIC APPROACH WAS QUITE SIMILAR, AND IF ANYTHING A LITTLE TOUGHER ON THE SOVIET UNION. IN ANY EVENT BOTH PRESIDENTS, I EMPHASIZED, HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS AND HAD DEMONSTRATED A CONSISTENT WILLINGNESS TO RESIST PRESSURES WHEN NECESSARY, WHILE MAINTAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT WITH THE KIND OF FLEXIBLE POLICY THAT WAS REQUIRED FOR OUR PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WAKE OF VIETNAM AND WATERGATE. I POINTEDLY QUESTIONED THE BASIS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH PEKING IF IT GENUINELY THOUGHT THAT WE WERE APPEASING MOSCOW OR TRYING TO PUSH IT TOWARD THE EAST. I SAID THAT I HAD LISTENED TO HIS REMARKS WITH SOME SADNESS SINCE THEY SUGGESTED DIFFERENT STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS AND NOT MERELY TACTICAL DIVERGENCES. ONCE AGAIN I REITERATED THAT IT MADE NO DIFFERENCE WHETHER AN INITIAL SOVIET ATTACK WAS IN THE EAST OR WEST; THE OBJECTIVE DANGER WOULD BE THE SAME, AND WE WOULD REACT OUT OF OUR OWN SELF INTEREST. I RECALLED THE 1971 SOUTH ASIAN SUB-CONTINENT CRISIS WHERE WE MADE SOME SYMBOLIC MILITARY MOVES IN SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN WHILE CHINA DID NOTHING. THIS WAS TO REMIND TENG THAT WHILE THE CHINESE WERE STRONG ON RHETORIC, WE ALONE HAVE BEEN TAKING CONCRETE ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. I ALSO RECALLED THE VARIOUS TIMES WE HAD RESISTED SOVIET PRESSURE, SUCH AS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH BELIED THE MUNICH ANALOGY. AS FOR EUROPE, WE WOULD BE THERE IN A CRISIS; THE REAL PROBLEM WAS THE POSSIBLE DEMORALIZATION OF THE EUROPEANS. I MADE CLEAR THAT IT WAS THE EUROPEANS THAT WERE FOR THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE AND THAT WE HAD TO DEMONSTRATE A REASONABLE POLICY OR THE LEFTISTS IN EUROPE WOULD SPLIT US OFF FROM OUR ALLIES.

10. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE TOUGH RHETORICAL POSTURING BY SOME IN OUR COUNTRY WAS NOT A REAL POLICY, SINCE SUCH INTRANSIGENCE WOULD LOSE ALL PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR A LONG TERM STEADY COURSE OF RESISTANCE. I SAID THAT YOU WERE PURSUING THE SAME STRATEGY AGAINST MOSCOW AS I HAD EXPLAINED TO CHAIRMAN MAO TWO YEARS AGO; THAT WE WOULD RESIST MOSCOW WHETHER IN THE EAST OR WEST; AND THAT THE TACTICS FOR DOING SO WERE OUR OWN BUSINESS. I DOCUMENTED HOW WE WERE MAINTAINING A STRONG STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POSITION AGAINST

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MOSCOW. I URGED TENG TO GIVE A PEP TALK ON RESISTING HEGEMONY TO THE EUROPEANS WHO NEEDED IT AND NOT TO US, AND I ADVISED THE CHINESE THAT WHILE THEY SHOULD HIGHLIGHT DANGERS, THEY SHOULD NOT ATTACK US WHILE DOING LITTLE THEMSELVES, FOR THAT WOULD ONLY SERVE TO DISCOURAGE OUR PUBLIC AND SPUR ISOLATIONISM. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WE ATTACH GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH PEKING AND WERE PREPARED TO WORK IN PARALLEL WITH CHINA. OUR POLICIES, HOWEVER, MUST BE BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST. EACH SIDE HAD TO TAKE THE OTHER SERIOUSLY. YOUR VISIT COULD BE VERY USEFUL TO THIS END. THE TALKS THEN ADJOURNED UNTIL TUESDAY.

11. COMMENT: WE WILL SEE IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS WHETHER MY PRESENTATION HAS ANY IMPACT ON THE CHINESE PERCEPTIONS. I FELT THERE WAS A CLEAR NEED TO COUNTER SHARPLY THE CHINESE CRITIQUE OF OUR SOVIET POLICY, WHICH WAS REFERRED TO IN THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S TOAST SUNDAY NIGHT AND THEN STARKLY PRESENTED BY THE VICE PREMIER MONDAY IN HIS MUNICH ANALOGY.

12. I FRANKLY DOUBT WHETHER MY EXPLANATIONS WILL MAKE MUCH HEADWAY FOR NOW. TENG IS UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTING MAO'S VIEWPOINT; AND ONLY ACTIONS NOT WORDS, WILL IMPRESS THE CHINESE. PEKING'S VIEW HAS UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN SHAPED BY THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: THE DEMORALIZATION IN EUROPE AND TO A LESSER EXTENT IN THE US; CONGRESSIONAL HOBBLING OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY, INCLUDING THE TURKISH AID CUTOFF, WIDESPREAD INVESTIGATIONS, ETC; AND THE RHETORIC POSTURING OF SOME OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S CRITICS ON DETENTE INDEED BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS TOO. A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE CHINESE BELIEF THAT DETENTE IS IN TROUBLE IN THE US. THEY HAVE SHIFTED THEIR THEME FROM COLLUSION TO APPEASEMENT. THIS REFLECTS OUR TROUBLES AT HOME. WE WERE IN OUR BEST SHAPE WITH THE CHINESE IN 1972-1973, PRECISELY WHEN DETENTE WAS MOST ACTIVE. THE CHINESE EMPHASIS ON THE DANGERS OF APPEASEMENT AND WAR SERVE SEVERAL PURPOSES FOR THEM: THEY WISH TO RALLY THE WEST; THEY PROBABLY ARE GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE WAKE OF HELSINKI AND INDOCHINA; AND THEY WOULD LOVE TO PUSH US INTO A CONFRONTATION WITH MOSCOW, IF NOT TO SEE THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WEAKEN EACH OTHER, THEN AT LEAST TO EASE THE PRESSURES ON THEIR OWN FLANK. FINALLY, THERE WAS INCREASED EMPHASIS ON CHINESE SELF-RELIANCE, REFLECTING EITHER SUSPICION OF OUR MOTIVES, OR OF OUR CAPABILITIES, OR BOTH.

13. I DO NOT WISH TO LEAVE TOO GLOOMY AN IMPRESSION, THE VERY CHINESE CONCERN ABOUT MOSCOW GIVES US LEVERAGE. AFTER

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ALL, DESPITE ALL THE PROTESTATIONS ABOUT SELF RELIANCE, THEY FEEL EXPOSED AND NO ONE BUT THE US CAN HELP PROVIDE THE BALANCE. AND THEN TOP LEADERSHIP IS SPENDING THREE DAYS NEARLY FULL TIME WITH US. SO TENG'S LECTURE CAN BE SEEN AS A PEP TALK AS WELL AS SKEPTICISM ABOUT OUR STAYING POWER. IN ANY EVENT THEY CLEARLY LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT AND KNOW THAT IT IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST TO JETTISON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE MAJOR QUESTION REMAINS, HOWEVER, WHETHER THEY UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO SHOW CONCRETE PROGRESS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND TO EASE UP ON THEIR ATTACKS ON US IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN OUR PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR CHINA POLICY SO AS TO SERVE THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. I HAVE REPORTED TODAY'S TALKS AT SOME LENGTH BECAUSE I SUSPECT THEY ARE A PREVIEW OF SOME OF THE THEMES THAT YOU WILL BE HEARING IN EARLY DECEMBER. END TEXT.

14. WARM REGARDS.

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FM JERRY BREMER//HAKTO 19//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: GERNERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: JERRY BREMER

1. THE SECRETARY HAS REACTED TO A NUMBER OF YOUR MESSAGES.
2. ON TOHAK 24, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, THE SECRETARY'S FEELING IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT ARGUE TOO MUCH ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS THE FRENCH WANT. HIS INSTINCT IS TO DO IT HOWEVER THEY WANT. HE DOES NOT WANT ANY JOINT CUMMUNIQUE TO COME OUT OF THE MEETINGS.
3. ON THE PRESIDENT'S CHINA SCHEDULE (TOHAK 26) HE HAD TWO COMMENTS. FIRST, HIS JUDGMENT IS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LEAVE CHINA BEFORE SATURDAY. BUT SECONDLY, HE DOES NOT WANT YOU TO MAKE ANY FINAL TRIP ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE HE GETS BACK TO WASHINGTON.
4. THE SECRETARY WOULD LIKE YOU TO ASSURE ASKEW THAT THERE WILL BE NO ANNOUNCEMENT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE OR ANY OTHER DAMAGING ANNOUNCEMENT FROM FLORIDA. HE URGES ASKEW TO GIVE THE DINNER IF HE CAN AND HOPES ASKEW WILL AGREE TO HOST IT.
5. HE ALSO ASKED WHERE WE STAND ON THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PLANS TO TRAVEL WITH THE SADATS FOR PART OF THEIR NON-WASHINGTON SCHEDULE.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SEC FLE

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10



6. HE AGREES TO SIGN OFF ON THE SRG PAPER WITH OPTION THREE AS IS (TOHAK 27).

7. SISCO SENT THE SECRETARY A CABLE ON RABIN'S SCHEDULE (TOSEC 113). THE ISRAELIS HAVE SUGGESTED DECEMBER 8-11 FOR THE VISIT. KNOWING WHAT HE DOES ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S AND HIS OWN SCHEDULE, HE DOES NOT SEE HOW WE CAN DO THIS, BUT HE ASKS YOU TO LOOK IT OVER TO SEE WHAT YOU THINK. I HAVE CABLED SISCO TO THIS EFFECT AND TOLD HIM AT THE SECRETARY'S REQUEST TO BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU.

8. WARM REGARDS.



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FM PETER RODMAN//HAKTO 20//

TO KATHLEEN TROIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLACK PATCH

OCTOBER 21, 1975

TO: KATHLEEN TROIA
FROM: PETER RODMAN
(1) STATE 249295 (TOSEC 160103, DTG 2202253Z)
GIVES GUEST LIST FOR SECRETARY'S LUNCHEON FOR SADAT.
IT LISTS ME AS ONE OF THOSE " TO BE HEARD FROM." I
NEVER SAW AN INVITATION. IF I AM INVITED, I ACCEPT.
EVEN THOUGH JOHN WAYNE AND ARTHUR HOUGHTON'S PARENTS
HAVE REGRETTEED. PLEASE TAKE CARE OF THIS.
(2) NOTHING LIKE YOUR BROOCH IS AVAILABLE. I WILL
PICK OUT SOMETHING.
(3) FOR BEIRY: CANNON AVAILABLE - WITH LIGHT
ATTACHMENT - S120. PLEASE ADVISE.
(4) HOT REGARDS.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 8/2/10

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, SECFLE, TROIA

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