

The original documents are located in Box 21, folder “October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic of China - Briefing Book for China - Third Country Issues (1)” of Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.


Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER
TO PEKING
October 19-23, 1975
THIRD COUNTRY ISSUES BOOK

NSC - Mr. Rodman

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
XGDS-2,3





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER TO PEKING

October 19-23, 1975

THIRD COUNTRY ISSUES BOOK

EUROPE

- Tab 1 - US and USSR Relations
- Tab 2 - The Chinese and Europe

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

- Tab 3 - Arab-Israel
- Tab 4 - PRC Relations with South Asia
- Tab 5 - The Persian Gulf

EAST ASIA

- Tab 6 - Korean Question
- Tab 7 - Indochina
- Tab 8 - Japan
- Tab 9 - The PRC and Southeast Asia
(minus Indochina)
- Tab 10 - US Diplomatic Relations with Mongolia
- Tab 11 - Nuclear Suppliers' Conference

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
XGDS-2,3



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

By: HR NARS Date 7/21/10



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

U.S. AND USSR RELATIONSISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

Two major purposes should be served by your discussion with the Chinese of the Soviet Union and our recent dealings with Moscow: You should reinforce through a detailed discussion the reasons for our pursuing a "two-sided" approach to coping with the Russians (as you have explained to them many times); and you should probe for any variations in the Chinese orientation to the Soviets. The subject of the Soviet Union will of course continually come up in the tour d'horizon of various regions in the world as in the exchanges in Moscow itself. You will not be able to totally erase through discussion Peking's doubts about the wisdom of our policy, or convince them that the continuing domestic constraints on our international activities will not have some impact on our ability to constrain Moscow, but you should be able to give them clear examples of the purposefulness and continuing efficacy of our approach -- and in the process establish a strengthened intellectual basis for parallel, if not coordinated, U.S. and PRC actions to contain Soviet pressures. Ultimately, you will want to work into the communique for the President's visit some statement of common concern about "hegemony".

TALKING POINTS

-- We are engaged in a serious effort with the Soviet Union to develop a basis for our bilateral relations, and a framework for international behavior, which will stabilize the international system. This should be of benefit to all countries.

-- At the same time, we have no intention of permitting our relationship with the Soviets to be used against anyone else. I have made this point clear to the Soviets repeatedly. We have also stressed to them that we will not ignore any actions on their part to use their relations with third countries against our own interests.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
XGDS-3

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) 350 3.2 *State Review*
State Dept GDS/3/3
12/19/03

By NR DATE 7/21/10



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 2 -

-- We are under no illusions about Soviet intentions, or their manner of conducting themselves internationally. We know that Moscow will pursue its own interests under the aegis of detente. We will cooperate with them in areas that serve our interests and encourage a policy of restraint on their part.

-- At the same time, however, we fully intend to counter their hegemonic designs. Our 1973 alert during the Middle East crisis is only one example of our determination to resist the outward expansion of Soviet influence. As another example, last month in New York I detailed for the Foreign Minister our response to Russian involvement in Angola. We have, of course, been active in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Portugal, to cite other examples of countering Soviet designs.

-- I have repeatedly explained to you the logic of our strategy for dealing with Moscow. We are not taken in by their use of the rhetoric of "detente". If we are able to reach agreements with the Soviets which lower tension, we insure that our own and other interests are protected. Our problem is to convince our own people that all efforts have been made to pursue a policy of relaxation of tensions. If tensions increase, they will know who has broken the peace, and this will enable us to mobilize domestic support for resistance to Soviet expansionism. It is clear from our public debate that the American people are not taken in by the Russians' fine words; and I do not believe even our European friends are deluded either.

-- At the same time, we understand your reasons for adopting a more frontal approach to calling attention to the dangerous tendencies of Soviet policy. I have told the Foreign Minister on many occasions that I am rather agnostic about the primary focus of Soviet pressures; and in any event I believe that if Moscow is successful in extending its influence in either the East or West it will represent a strategic set-back for either of our two countries.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 3 -

-- From the beginning of these discussions I have made it clear that the security of the PRC is important to the United States as we seek to encourage the evolution of a more stable international balance. If you feel there are approaches to the problem of "hegemony" that we should be considering in either the East or the West, I am quite prepared to listen to your views.

-- In New York, the Foreign Minister and I exchanged some general ideas about prospects for the evolution of the Soviet leadership. I wonder if you have any additional views of likely trends in the development of their policies? Do you disagree with my view that Kirilenko is likely to be Brezhnev's successor?

-- (You might review the Ford-Brezhnev discussions in Helsinki, including your impressions of Brezhnev's physical stamina and political control.)

-- (You might also review your recent discussion with Gromyko in Washington with emphasis on your exchanges on SALT and the Middle East.)

-- We are involved, as you know, in a difficult negotiating process on strategic arms limitations. At this point, issues of verification, cruise missile development, and the significance of their "Back-fire" bomber, are central problems in these discussions. We are determined that there should be no loopholes in any future agreement which Moscow could use to gain unilateral advantage.

-- It looks very doubtful that we will have a SALT agreement or a summit meeting this year. (Preview possible scenarios for the Brezhnev visit, including your possible meeting with Gromyko and/or a trip to Moscow this fall.)

-- (NOTE: The Chinese might ask you about the status of our grain/oil negotiations with Moscow.)

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 4 -

-- We have paid close attention to recent Soviet initiatives in Asia, particularly their Asian Collective Security proposal, and their efforts to strengthen their position in Indochina. We do not support these efforts, as I have made clear to you and other governments on many times both publicly and privately. As I told the Foreign Minister, I recently told the Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on several occasions that we could have no objection to Tokyo signing a peace and friendship treaty with you that contained a clause about hegemony. As well, we gave your Liaison Office a copy of a press statement I made after the Helsinki Conference where I indicated that the U.S. would not support the idea of an Asian Collective Security arrangement.

-- We remain interested in the peaceful development of Asia, free from outside interference. We intend to maintain this interest. At the same time, it is evident that if tensions rise in one part or another of the Asian region, this could provide a context into which the Soviets would try to project themselves. While I know we have our differences on Korea, for example, we think we share a common interest in seeing developments on the Peninsula evolve through political changes. A turn to violence would only give Moscow an excuse to interfere.

-- When our discussions reach the point of talking about a communique, we are prepared -- as part of a series of statements on areas of continuing shared concern and agreement between our two countries -- to suggest some language which would indicate our common concern about hegemonic pressures, whether they are directed at the East or West. The language in our joint communique of November, 1973 was useful; but it might be of value now to go somewhat beyond it to indicate in more active terms our joint concern with the problem of hegemony.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

The Chinese will view your remarks on the Soviet Union within the context of their concerns that the

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 5 -

USSR may be increasing in strength relative to the U.S., and that we are "strategically passive". They fear that this process is already well underway, and that it will lead to Soviet adventurism and ultimately a new world war.

More immediately, they fear that American domestic political demoralization and Congressional constraints on Executive Branch initiatives may induce the Administration to make concessions to the Soviets (such as CSCE) and make arrangements with Moscow inimical to Chinese interests. They view American grain sales to Russia, for example, as strengthening an adversary. Chinese perceptions that we are "colluding" with Moscow have already stimulated debates in Peking about the value of China's relationship with the U.S. To the extent that they see us reaching additional cooperative agreements, they will probably have further doubts.

In this connection, you will want to reassure the Chinese that the U.S. is: (1) aware of PRC concerns; (2) that we are realistic in our appraisal of Soviet capabilities and intentions; and, in particular, (3) that we remain willing and able to play a role in the world relative to Russia which justifies the preservation and strengthening of U.S.-PRC relations.

Sino-Soviet rivalry has intensified since your last visit to Peking. Polemics have escalated. Fears of U.S.-USSR collusion are less pronounced in Peking's propaganda than the concern that the West is not sufficiently resolute in the face of Soviet carrot and stick tactics. The Chinese are fearful that the Soviets will replace the U.S. as a significant foreign influence in Indochina. (Whereas two or three years ago the Chinese ridiculed the notion of "power vacuums", in more recent days they have spoken rather frankly about Moscow trying to fill the vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal from Viet-Nam.)

The Chinese are particularly worried about Europe. They have attacked the Helsinki Agreement in the most vigorous terms, claiming that it lulls

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 6 -

the West to sleep and legitimates the Soviet presence in Central Europe. They also give considerable weight to Moscow's ability to maneuver in Western Europe through the "revisionist" Communist Parties. And they see serious unraveling of NATO's southern flank in Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Italy plus the uncertainties in Spain. In short, the Chinese fear the erosion of Europe as an effective counterweight to the Soviets, and they are likely to track with us in an effort to strengthen the resolve of the Europeans to resist Soviet blandishments and threats (as is indicated by the continuing travel of Central and Western European leaders to Peking).

At this point in time, we do not see any indications of a shift in Peking's policy toward the Soviet Union. As long as Chairman Mao exercises influence in Peking, we believe his very personalized distrust of the Russians will constitute an effective barrier to any flexibility in the PRC's orientation to Moscow. At the same time, however, the constant reiteration in PRC media and internal political campaigns of the need to combat revisionism and to denounce the traitorous "cappitulationism" to the Russians of Lin Piao, suggests that there are voices in Peking (which we believe are centered in the military) arguing for a diminution of Sino-Soviet tensions.

The Soviets obviously expect no early improvement in their relations with the Chinese. The border talks remain stalled, and the Chinese continue to hold the crew of a Soviet helicopter which strayed into their territory in 1973. Moscow has increased the intensity of its anti-Maoist propaganda, and cast its Asian policy in increasingly anti-Maoist terms, implying to other bloc leaders and European communist parties that fighting Maoism is more important than fighting imperialism.

Paralleling this tightening of rhetorical attention, Moscow continues to upgrade its military deployments along the Chinese frontier, and the Russians conducted two very large land and naval exercises during 1975 which were obviously targetted on the PRC.

Department of State
October 1975

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



5



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

THE CHINESE AND EUROPEISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

You will want to cover this subject in your tour d'horizon, particularly since Teng Hsiao-p'ing recently told former British Prime Minister Heath that he intended to ask you concerning the "true" US attitude toward European security.

TALKING POINTS

-- Relations with Western Europe and Japan have been the single highest priority concern of the President and myself during the past year. (Recall the various trips and meetings with European leaders.) We believe our ties with our principal allies are the strongest since I've been in Washington.

-- We are of course aware of the Chinese view that the Soviets have made inroads in Western Europe through manipulation of detente policy. However, neither the US nor its allies have been deluded into thinking that detente no longer requires defense. In fact, in some of the countries, public support for defense and for a hard-headed appraisal of the Soviets would be weakened if the governments abandoned what is called detente. In Europe as well as the US the public and parliaments must be convinced that every reasonable avenue toward reducing tensions is being pursued by the Governments if they are to be prepared for firm policies at the same time.

-- The NATO summit last May was remarkably successful in underscoring the mutual commitment of the Allies to one another's security. President Ford emphasized that the US considers the security of Western Europe as fundamental to its own interests.

-- We are proceeding with concrete military measures. For example, the FRG is engaged in a reorganization of its forces which will add considerably to its war fighting capability. The United

~~SECRET~~

GDS

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*

State Dept Guidelines

12/9/03

By HR KAPA DRS 7/21/10

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

States has improved its capacity to respond to an attack in Europe by reducing support forces and we will be adding two combat brigades to its army in Germany. France has improved its liaison and coordination with Allied military authorities. Further, the Allies are seriously engaged in an effort to rationalize their military effort through standardization of major weapons systems and specialization of defense function.

-- Of course there are problems, but we are dealing with them. Greek-Turkish animosity and the Portuguese situation have caused us difficulties in southern Europe. However, our Congress has recently modified the embargo on providing arms to Turkey, and the pro-Soviet element in Portugal has lost ground. In addition, we have reached agreement with the Spanish on a new base agreement.

-- MBFR continues to move rather slowly. The process has brought home to the Europeans the importance of a clear rationale for the defense structure against the USSR. Should MBFR succeed, it does not mean that the fighting capacity of conventional forces remaining will be reduced; on the contrary, the Allies are determined to improve that combat capability. In any event, the US will maintain substantial forces in Europe.

-- The US has consistently supported European integration as the best way to maintain Western Europe's political, as well as economic, strength. The British decision to remain in the Common Market was a positive step. We welcome your government's official recognition of the EC as well.

-- We know of the Chinese concerns about CSCE. We think they are exaggerated. Our view finally was that we should get the Conference finished as soon as

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

possible. We always guarded against false illusions about what was being accomplished. Indeed, the press and public in the West have clearly understood the limited significance of the exercise. If anything, it may have helped to increase vigilance. Nothing was agreed to on our side that was not already ratified by the postwar period and Ostpolitik. And it is the Soviet Union which is now on the defensive with regard to implementing the CSCE provisions.

-- We welcome closer Chinese-European ties and believe the many visits taking place can have a very useful effect.

-- Economically, the US has pressed efforts at greater coordination of US/European economic policies across the board. (Preview forthcoming high-level meetings on economic matters.) This includes energy-- frankly, you should recognize that higher oil prices have a clearly adverse effect on Western Europe (not to mention most of the developing countries), as well as strengthening Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

In view of the Chinese concern that Western Europe neither understands, nor is taking adequate steps to combat, the Soviet menace, your overall aim should be to persuade them that US policy in Europe is realistic and effective, that we have no illusions about the USSR, and that we are working closely with our allies to keep up NATO's political and military defenses. The Chinese desire to encourage East-West confrontation in Europe, in order to keep the Soviets from giving undivided attention to their adversary in Peking, provides you an opportunity to underline that US policy toward Western Europe serves Chinese aims.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

In his UNGA speech September 26, Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua reiterated the basic Chinese position on Europe: that the Soviets are feinting East while attacking West, that detente is a facade which will not stave off the inevitable world war, and that CSCE is really a "European Insecurity Conference." Ch'iao expressed particular concern about the "inviolability of frontiers" principle and the danger of the Soviets translating CSCE to the Asian context. His words are consistent with what the Chinese have told Western European visitors in Peking (they have favored politicians of conservative stripe, like Heath and Strauss), to whom they have also voiced support for Western European strength and unity. FRG Chancellor Schmidt will go to Peking within the weeks following your own visit. The French (Chirac) and British (Callaghan) will also be going to Peking fairly soon.

The Chinese concern that the West will succumb to "detente euphoria" can be countered by showing that we gave nothing substantial away at CSCE and noting that detente euphoria is singularly lacking in both the US and Europe. The Chinese dislike of MBFR is a more specific one; they are afraid it will free Soviet troops for use on the PRC border, particularly if Option Three becomes a live possibility. Little you say is likely to mitigate their distrust of MBFR.

In recognition of their support for Western European unity--and of the EC's position as their second largest trading partner--the Chinese in September accredited an Ambassador to the EC. They have, however, given uncritical support to the Arab oil price increases against Western European consumers. Your pointing out of this inconsistency would be useful.

The US favors Chinese interest in the EC and European unity. You will need to avoid giving a

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

blanket endorsement to Chinese involvement in European affairs, however, since we are not anxious to see Peking establish a diplomatic presence in Lisbon.

Most recently, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung discussed the Chinese view of Europe in an October 10 meeting with a private American delegation led by Cyrus Vance. Han delivered a standard discourse on the need for heightened unity and vigilance in Europe, adding that this might even require development of an independent European nuclear force. Han also stressed the need for a continued US military presence in Europe, saying that "all of the strength of a unified Europe would not be sufficient /to counter the USSR/ unless the strength of the United States were behind it."

On October 12, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing again touched on Europe with the same group by citing Germany (along with Korea, Viet-Nam, and China) as an example of divided countries which will persist in seeking reunification regardless of how long it takes.

Department of State
October 1975

~~SECRET~~





NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 031227

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBriefing Paper

TITLE ARAB-ISRAEL

CREATION DATE 10/1975

VOLUME 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035900299

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP
BRIEFING BOOKS AND CABLES OF HENRY
KISSINGER

BOX NUMBER 21

FOLDER TITLE October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic
of China - Briefing Book for China -
Bilateral Issues (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/07/2010

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

REDACTED

10/17/12

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
EO. 13526 (no onward) SEC 3.3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 BRIEFING PAPER

MRS 11-114 #4

State Use 214/03 CIA Ltr 10/17/12

By dal NARA Date 12/20/12

ARAB-ISRAEL

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

You will want to explain the rationale behind the latest Sinai agreement, your view of future Middle East peace efforts, and our relationship with the Soviet Union in this area. A brief summary of recent Chinese statements--public and private--about the Middle East follows the Talking Points.

TALKING POINTS

-- Since the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War we have pursued a strategy of helping the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to move in the direction of a settlement. We have done this because working in this context permits us to pursue a variety of United States interests, some of which are brought into sharp conflict in periods of tension. We have also taken advantage of the special position we have as the one major Power with the confidence of both sides. This has enabled us to demonstrate the inability of the USSR to help the Arabs achieve their objectives.

-- The objective of our strategy is the achievement of an overall Arab-Israeli settlement which would take into account the interests of each of the governments involved as well as the legitimate interests of the Palestinians. In order to gain some momentum for the process of peacemaking, we have attempted to isolate those issues which seemed susceptible of early agreement. These interim agreements are not ends in themselves but steps toward a larger settlement. We believe the three agreements that have been achieved demonstrate the validity of this approach.

-- Over the past year we have continued to pursue the step-by-step approach to the Middle East because of our conviction that neither side is willing--nor able--to confront all the problems which an overall settlement entails.

SECRET/NODIS
XGDS-2

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

-- The process faltered in March. Our subsequent reassessment of the alternatives led us to the conclusion that another attempt at an Israel-Egypt agreement in the Sinai had a better chance of success than a move toward an overall settlement.

-- We were particularly concerned that an attempt to move toward an overall settlement would lead to early stalemate which would, in turn, give Moscow fresh openings in the area, and probably lead to a war in which the Soviets would be sorely tempted to intervene.

-- And we have succeeded over the past year in further reducing Moscow's assets in the Arab world, keeping the Soviets at arms' length in Middle East diplomacy, while steadily broadening our involvement in the area.

-- We have periodically talked to the Soviets in a general way about the Middle East in order to keep them from becoming obstructionist to the extent possible and, from the most recent of these contacts, we sense that while they may cause some difficulties, the Soviets now are not sure what course would best serve their interests.

-- The new agreement removes Israeli forces from the Sinai passes, returns the oil fields to Egypt, and reduces the likelihood of another Middle East war for the next few years at least.

-- There should be no misunderstanding about the extent of support for the Sinai Agreement in the United States. The Congressional votes for United States participation in the implementation of the Agreement were substantially in favor. The debate dealt not mainly with this issue but with extraneous issues such as the declassification of certain documents and the legal nature of commitments made by the Executive Branch.

-- Though the cost to us in aid is relatively high, our Congress would have given Israel substantial amounts in any case; this way, we should be able to do much more for Egypt, weaning it further away from the Soviets. In any event we still retain significant leverage with the Israelis. Aid appropriations come up every year; we control the rate of deliveries of military equipment; and we can always present our own views of an overall settlement.

SECRET/NODIS



SECRET/NODIS

-3-

-- The important point to be understood about the current debate in the U.S. is that the public and Congressional mood is shifting on the Middle East. There is less unquestioning support for Israel and a greater understanding that the United States has interests in the Middle East that include but go beyond the survival of Israel.

-- We realize this latest Agreement must be followed by further steps; we are convinced that our interests demand continued movement toward and the achievement of an overall settlement. We will not allow stagnation.

-- Our task now is to work out with the parties involved how to move forward. We have said that we are prepared to help develop a negotiation between Syria and Israel. President Asad has said that Syria will move only alongside the Palestinians. We are studying what the substance of a negotiation within this context might look like. Procedurally, we are examining the relative merits of further U.S. mediation, an informal conference preparatory to the resumption of the full Geneva Conference, and resumption of the Geneva Conference itself. In the end, it would not be surprising to find that we would be working with some combination of all of these.

-- Your representative at the UN was correct in his view that the Soviets are less than committed to an overall settlement; but he was not correct in his statement that the United States is not so committed. We have appreciated China's understanding of our role in the Middle East in the past. The fact is that our strategy continues to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East and to demonstrate the limitations of Soviet policy to the governments of the Middle East. We regret the comment of your representative in New York; remarks such as that are not helpful to us, and frankly we were surprised.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

As you know, the Chinese representative at the UN attacked the Sinai Agreement and blamed the "no war, no peace" situation in the area on us and on the Soviets. He plagued both our houses, though the Soviets remain the worse villain: "In fact, while the United States has

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

-4-

no intention of bringing about a thorough settlement of the Middle East question, the Soviet Union is still less inclined to do so."

Privately, the Chinese are more sympathetic to U.S. diplomatic efforts, largely because those efforts lessen Soviet opportunities. However, the Chinese think U.S. policy unwisely favors Israel.

Within the Chinese government, [redacted] the Agreement is seen as a U.S. achievement which has weakened and angered the Soviets and put the issue of peace or war in the region firmly in U.S. hands. Teng Hsiao-p'ing told former British Prime Minister Heath in September that the U.S. had the upper hand in the Middle East at the moment, but he warned that the Soviets were planning a counterattack.

The PRC has tended to regard the Near East primarily as an area of struggle between two imperialist superpowers, the Soviet Union and the U.S. Peking is aware of its relative lack of economic and military assets with which to compete and, therefore, it largely restricts its political activities to encouraging the Arabs to keep up the struggle against Israel while avoiding subservience to either the U.S. or the USSR. Since Peking regards Moscow as the more immediate threat to its security, it has favored developments that weaken Moscow's position in various parts of Asia, including the Middle East. Hence, the resurgence of U.S. influence in the Arab world following the 1973 war--at the expense of the Soviet Union--pleased the PRC. Indeed they have encouraged us from the very outset of our efforts.

Peking's line with the Arabs since that war has stressed Arab unity, especially in face of perceived Soviet efforts designed to "split" Arab ranks over the question of cooperation with U.S. peace efforts.

Just before your shuttle last March, the Chinese military attache in Cairo opined that your approach would succeed and noted that the U.S. was gaining ground in the Middle East, while the USSR, which he considered more dangerous, was losing. In April, after the suspension of the Sinai talks, the PRC's Foreign Ministry instructed its missions abroad that the USSR's campaign to sabotage unilateral U.S. peace efforts was a major cause of the breakdown of negotiations.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

-5-

Since then the Chinese have been working hard to improve relations with Iraq and the Palestinians so as to dilute Soviet influence. Peking has apparently not wished to risk undercutting its efforts to court Arab militants by giving too visible signs of support for U.S. peace initiatives. This may have been a factor in Peking's virtual ignoring of your August/September shuttle. Peking's sole commentary, which preceded the actual agreement, provided few details but indicated the U.S. had retained the initiative in a manner implying approval rather than criticism.

In recent months, Peking is believed to have begun training Fatah officers in guerrilla tactics especially tailored for operations within Israel. China appears to be seeking to bring all fedayeen activity into the PLO framework, which Peking would support with arms.

Department of State
October 1975

SECRET/NODIS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

PRC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH ASIA

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

The President and you have indicated to the Pakistanis that we would discuss with the Chinese our mutual concern for Pakistan's security. The Chinese will wish to know what we are doing for Pakistan in terms of military supply. They may also seek our views on the implications of the coup in Bangladesh and may want to know how our relations with India are developing.

TALKING POINTS

Pakistani Security

-- We are giving continuing attention to Pakistan's security concerns and needs. The USG considers the integrity of Pakistan indispensable to regional stability and essential to our own interests in Asia and the Middle East.

-- The President has written Prime Minister Bhutto to assure him that our efforts to lessen tensions among the major powers will in no way reduce the resolve of the United States to oppose attempts to undermine the security of friends and allies in any part of the world, including South Asia.

-- The Pakistanis have sought to draw us out concerning our willingness to contest the USSR in third-country situations because they fear that India may attack them within two years with Soviet support. We offered to discuss with you what your response would be in such a situation and would be interested in your views.

-- In a more general vein, we have taken positive steps to help Pakistan through the lifting of the arms embargo and in our continuing high levels of economic

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
XGDS-1

DECLASSIFIED
EQ 12003 01/27/03 23
By HR 7/21/10
State Review
12/9/03



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 2 -

assistance. In the months ahead we expect to reach agreements on deliveries of equipment to meet many of Pakistan's priority defense needs, including TOW anti-tank missiles, air-to-air missiles, and the components of an air defense system.

-- (If raised.) We have not at this time authorized the sale of combat aircraft because of our concern to avoid stimulating an arms race on the subcontinent as well as to avoid arousing Congressional opposition to our sales of less controversial equipment.

-- (If raised.) Under current guidelines, we cannot provide credits to Pakistan for arms sales, though our economic assistance has the effect of freeing some foreign exchange for arms purchases. I have, however, urged the Iranians and the Saudis to provide Pakistan with financial assistance for the purchase of arms.

Bangladesh

-- We have noted your decision to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the new Government in Bangladesh and would be interested in your views of how your relations with that country are likely to develop.

-- I have told the new Bangladesh Foreign Minister that we want his Government to succeed. We will do what we can to support them with economic assistance and food aid, but no one can assure the stability or survival of governments in Dacca.

-- It is still too early to be able to predict whether President Mushtaque will succeed in fully establishing his authority. The army is not a dependable institution, nor does Mushtaque have a strong political base or organization. His greatest advantage at the moment is a general concern within Bangladesh to avoid giving India an excuse to intervene.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 3 -

-- The Indians have the capability to bring down this government either through covert action or direct military intervention. We think they will not hesitate to do so if they think their interests are threatened, especially if there were a large exodus of Hindu refugees, such as might be triggered by internal disorder in Bangladesh.

India

-- The US is trying to work out a more realistic and productive relationship with India, although not at the expense of our friendship with Pakistan.


-- Given Indian attitudes and India's current unpopularity in the US, our expectations for improved relations are modest. Nonetheless, we are interested in steps that would be helpful in balancing Soviet influence in the region.

-- We would be interested in your assessment of prospects for an improvement in your relations with India.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

Relations among the nations of South Asia are more unsettled now than at any time since 1971, and Chinese attitudes may reflect heightened Pakistani anxieties over the implications the current situation may have for Pakistan's security. Pakistan thinks Mrs. Gandhi might embark upon a foreign "adventure" in order to shore up her position at home (although we see no convincing evidence to support this contention), and Aziz Ahmed has told you they expect an Indian attack within two years. The Indians have resented such speculation, reports of which have reached their ears, and their strong protests have helped bring the Simla Process to a virtual standstill. Bangladesh has also interjected serious new uncertainty. The Indians fear an enhanced Chinese and Pakistani presence there, while the Pakistanis worry that

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 4 -

the Indians might seek a pretext for intervening in Bangalee affairs. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have also deteriorated following a series of uprisings in July against the Daoud regime, which Kabul thinks Pakistan supported.

The Pakistanis, as usual, have perceived a Soviet hand behind their worsening relations with their neighbors. Bhutto has written you and the President to warn of increased Soviet pressure directed against Pakistan in the wake of the Helsinki Summit. While we do not fully share Bhutto's analysis of recent events, the President has written him to express in strong terms our support for Pakistan's security and our determination not to permit detente to impact adversely on the position of allies such as Pakistan.

The Chinese role in South Asia has changed only slightly in the past year, with the PRC action in recognizing and establishing diplomatic relations with the new regime in Bangladesh the only substantial recent departure. Prospects for improved Chinese relations with India seem as distant as ever. In contrast, China's relations with Pakistan remain solid and mutually supportive, highlighted by the visit to Pakistan last April of PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, the highest-level Chinese visitor in nearly ten years.

Pakistani Security

Sino-Pakistani fears about Indian intentions and Soviet machinations are mutually reinforcing, though Chinese readiness and ability to support Pakistan in the event of hostilities remains very limited. Peking recognizes its limitations, however, and considers USG political, economic, and military support for Pakistan as complementary to its own efforts and essential to limiting the further spread of Soviet influence. Aziz Ahmed told you in Ankara last May that the GOP had asked the

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



SECRET/NODIS

- 5 -

Chinese what they would do if Pakistan were attacked by India acting with Soviet support. The Chinese apparently replied, "We will resolutely respond," an answer the GOP found insufficiently specific. At that time you asked Aziz Ahmed if we might ourselves put the same question to the Chinese. When you met again with Aziz Ahmed on September 30 in New York, he reiterated that the GOP had not yet received concrete assurances from the PRC.

Bangladesh

The Chinese have opened a dialogue with the new Bangladesh Government and followed Islamabad's lead in establishing diplomatic relations with the new regime in Dacca. They may be interested in your assessment of prospects for the new regime, as well as of the likelihood of Indian intervention.

India

We see little prospect of an improvement in Sino-Indian relations in the near term. Delhi failed to respond to PRC political overtures in connection with the visit of a Chinese ping-pong team in March 1975 and seems unlikely to take any initiative under present circumstances, especially after Peking's criticism of Mrs. Gandhi's emergency measures. An intelligence source recently reported, however that Defense Minister Swaran Singh now believes that India should take the initiative to improve relations by appointing an Ambassador to Peking. We see no need to inject ourselves into this issue.

Department of State
October 1975

SECRET/NODIS





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

THE PERSIAN GULFISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

You may want to cover this area in your tour d'horizon.

TALKING POINTS

-- We agree with Chairman Mao's view that the Persian Gulf is strategically important. Its geographic location is crucial. Two-thirds of the oil in international trade transits the Gulf; this oil is vital to Europe and Japan and important for our own economy. As we have seen, what happens in this area can have serious consequences for the global economy. The complex of nations around the Gulf constitutes a new center of influence on the rest of the world.

-- The United States has made major efforts over the past two years to strengthen our ties with the countries of the region. We have made significant progress in expanding our influence and reducing that of the Soviet Union.

-- Although the Vienna OPEC meeting gave the appearance of bitter differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran, we believe at this time that they are not serious. Since the death of King Faisal, the Shah and the Saudis have drawn closer together. There are, of course, longer-term possibilities of rivalry for regional pre-eminence but at this time their basic interests--a good price for oil, economic and social development, and blocking Soviet influence--are similar.

-- The agreement between Iran and Iraq was a surprise to us. The Shah had been assured by Arab leaders that settlement of the border and Kurdish issues would contribute to a slow and careful move by Iraq away from dependence on the Soviets. The Shah was skeptical but in the light of the gains

~~SECRET~~
XGDS-3

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 *State Review*
State Dept Guidelines 12/9/03

By UR NARA, Date 7/2/10



~~SECRET~~

-2-

for Iran went ahead with the agreement. He is concerned that the Iraqis do not now want a broad Persian Gulf security pact, as the Iraqis had led him to believe, and wants any such pact limited to freedom of navigation. He suspects that the changed Iraqi position is due to heavy Soviet pressures.

-- Our relations with Iran are fundamentally excellent, although we differ strongly on oil prices. Europe and Japan have been hurt badly by the OPEC pricing policy, and this in the long term affects negatively the overall security of Iran and the Gulf countries. Iran and Saudi Arabia have been very supportive of our Middle East peace efforts, although the new Saudi leadership does not yet carry the weight of Faisal.

-- Oman has made progress, with substantial Iranian assistance, against the Dhofar rebels but the campaign could be a long one unless the PDRY is led to diminish its support for the rebels. Soviet, East German, and Cuban support to the rebels continues.

-- The Saudis, Egyptians and others are attempting to draw the PDRY out of the Soviet camp. We are encouraging this effort and are working at improving our own relations. (Fill in the Chinese on the course we are on with the PDRY.)

-- US arms sales to the regional countries have grown substantially in recent years and are in keeping with our efforts to meet the defense needs of the countries involved. US willingness to meet such needs reduces Soviet opportunities for penetration into the areas through arms sales.

-- US facilities at Diego Garcia are designed to bolster the US naval presence and capability in the Persian Gulf region to counter an increasing Soviet naval capability in the region.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3-

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

Chinese policies and actions in the Persian Gulf remain a function of their overriding national concern to thwart the expansion of Soviet influence in the area. They have few direct immediate interests; their trade with the Persian Gulf States is minimal and the pro-Chinese wings of the various Communist movements are weak. The Chinese pragmatically recognize that at this time their influence and power--military, economic, or political--do not permit them to have a direct major impact on the course of events. As a consequence, they have not attempted to the best of our knowledge to interfere in the question of the continuation of COMIDEASTFOR at Bahrain, have continued to develop cordial ties with Iran which they realistically view as the predominant regional power, have maintained a hands-off policy with respect to the Dhofar rebels (a condition for good relations with Iran) and have been carrying out a modest and low key, but effective, aid program in North Yemen in direct competition with the Soviets. Their support for the Arab side vis-a-vis Israel is undiminished, but they have recently shown more sympathy for Sadat in his clash with Syria than might have been expected. The Chinese have vocally supported the various OPEC price increases but would probably be concerned if it could be convincingly shown that these prices are causing sufficient hardship to Europe and Japan to weaken resistance to Soviet pressures.

The Gulf area has been remarkably stable in the last year. Iranian and Saudi relations are improving. We do not yet know how much the highly publicized Iranian-Saudi confrontation at the Vienna OPEC meeting was a charade and how much was substance. Kuwait and the various Sheikdoms are stable and Oman is making slow and limited progress against the rebels. The Kuwait economy is booming and its border problem with Iraq is currently quiescent. Iraq is providing major business opportunities for US and European firms--to the annoyance of the Soviets--but in political and military fields the Iraqi Government remains very close to the Soviets.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

The Iran-Iraq border accords appear to have been worked out amicably and Iran has kept its part of the bargain by not fomenting or aiding Kurdish armed opposition. Iraq has about ceased its propaganda against Iran and appears to be keeping the activities of anti-Shah expatriates restricted. However, the glow of the accord is receding and the Shah is annoyed that the Iraqis wish to restrict a Persian Gulf security agreement only to freedom of navigation. The Shah thought that he had Iraqi support for a much broader agreement and believes that the Iraqi reneging is due to Soviet pressure.

The United States has taken a number of initiatives in recognition of the increased importance of the Gulf to our interests. We have increased the size of our diplomatic missions in the area and now have representation at the ambassadorial level with all of the Gulf states. We no longer have aid programs with the oil-producing states, but the Joint Commissions which we have created with Iran and Saudi Arabia have a strong technical assistance component and also provide a means for intensifying our economic, cultural and political ties with these countries. Our long-standing military assistance relationship with Iran has blossomed into a major military sales and advisory program. We have also agreed to assist Saudi Arabia in the modernization of its armed forces and have a modest program with Kuwait.

Our relations with Iran are extremely close, as they have been for some time, and cover a multitude of fields. Our relations with Saudi Arabia have weathered the coolness that entered with the October War and the oil embargo; we now have much deeper relations than ever before, with the Saudis looking for close US involvement in their economic development plans. Relations with the other Arab countries have not evolved as swiftly as with Saudi Arabia, but there are no major problems.

Department of State
October 1975

SECRET

