

The original documents are located in Box 20, folder “November 28 - December 7, 1975 - Far East - Briefing Book - Peking - Talking Points for Meetings with Teng Hsiao-P’ing (2)” of the National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974-1976 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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
-- We share Yugoslav concern over the danger of Soviet moves against Yugoslavia when Tito dies. The Yugoslavs are reacting in a very healthy way to current Soviet efforts to subvert Yugoslavia but there may be more opportunity for the Soviets in the post-Tito era. We are beginning to sell Yugoslavia some military equipment, and are making contingency plans in case of Soviet military intervention.

Japan

-- We welcome China's support for close US-Japan ties. Our relations with Japan have greatly strengthened and have never been better. There is strong support within Japan for our security relationship and no significant bilateral problems at all. My visit to Japan last year and the Emperor's visit to the United States this year were highly successful in symbolizing the excellent relations we enjoy.

-- Our economic relations with Japan are of the greatest importance to both countries. Occasional difficulties are solved by compromise. Our relations with Japan are so well established that we have many agreed mechanisms to resolve any issues between us.

JAPAN



- The Japanese have been re-examining to some extent their defense thinking. They feel a greater vulnerability as the focus of tension in Asia has shifted away from Indochina. However, we do not see any major change in Japan's defense thinking. Even though there may be some improvements in Japan's defense posture, particularly in air and maritime defense, we foresee no basic shifts in the near term.
- We believe Japanese military restraint is a healthy phenomenon. It is linked directly to the closeness of US/Japanese ties.
- Of all the unsettled situations around them, Korea is the one that concerns the Japanese most actively at the present time. They see their future as closely identified with developments on the peninsula; dangers there could make Tokyo rethink its military posture.
- We favor close Sino/Japanese ties; we have explained our position on the "hegemony clause" to the Japanese in ways that should be helpful in completing your Friendship Treaty.

-- (Only if asked -- We expect the balance of forces within the Liberal Democratic Party will endure for some time. Even if there are early elections, they are not likely to alter Japanese policy in any fundamental way.)

Middle East

- We have taken seriously Chairman Mao's advice to Secretary Kissinger about the need for us to use two hands in the Middle East -- to work with the Arabs as well as with Israel. In our view the best way to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East is to achieve an Arab/Israeli settlement.
- One of our main purposes over the last two years has been to maintain control over the diplomatic process in the Middle East and thereby help the moderate Arabs to reduce their dependence on the USSR. We are committed to continuing that strategy. It has worked well to date.
- An important shift is taking place in American public opinion about the Middle East. As a result



of the strategy we have pursued, we now find growing support for an American effort to achieve an overall settlement in the area.

- We intend to move decisively as soon as our elections are over and bring about a comprehensive settlement. In the meantime we will use the next months actively in preparing the way for negotiations toward an overall settlement.

- Our strategy requires that we maintain a close relationship with both Israel and the Arab States. Obviously we are determined to help Israel survive. But our close relations with Israel have the additional benefit of permitting us to press Israel to cooperate in our peace-making effort. Sadat and Asad seem to accept this necessity.

- We recognize that a durable peace requires dealing with the issues of concern to the Palestinians in the negotiating process. You may have noticed the recent evolution in our public position. However, some evolution of the thinking in Israel and among the Palestinians is essential because it is im-

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possible to start a negotiation between two parties who still do not recognize each other's right to exist.

Korea

- In Korea, we seek the reduction of tensions and the prevention of the outbreak of hostilities. The future of Korea can then be resolved by the Koreans themselves by political means.

- We are not against Korean unification achieved by peaceful means but until it takes place we must deal with the reality of Korean governments in both the North and the South. We are convinced there is no substitute for direct North/South Korean contacts and we believe an active dialogue should be resumed.

- We understand Chinese strategic and political concerns. Although these differ in some respects from ours, we believe we share certain basic objectives, particularly a common desire for more durable arrangements to preserve peace and security.

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KOREA

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- Our proposal during the General Assembly Session for a meeting between North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China was a serious one. It still stands, and we are prepared to be flexible about the form.

- As Secretary Kissinger said in his speech in Detroit on November 24, we are willing to talk directly with North Korea, if such contacts take place in a forum which does not exclude South Korea. The concept of exclusive North Korean/United States talks on matters involving the security of South Korea makes no sense and is utterly unacceptable. We will not respond to North Korean pressure tactics, and we will not accept the exclusion of the ROK from negotiations relating to the future of the Korean peninsula.

(FYI: We have had one informal exchange with President Park on the possibility of a future limited U.S. contact with the North Koreans to ascertain directly whether they would negotiate in a forum including the ROK. Park was cautiously noncommittal in his response. END FYI)

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- Just as China thinks the United States should have some contact with North Korea, we believe North Korea's friends like China should have some contact with South Korea. We are prepared to improve our relations with North Korea on the basis of reciprocity.
- The presence of our troops in South Korea is a bilateral matter between ourselves and the South Koreans, and we do not intend to withdraw our troops in circumstances that would jeopardize peace in Korea. Sudden shifts of this kind would not only run grave risks in Korea but would be alarming to Japan. Obviously our military presence in Korea is not immutable, and we do not rule out changes if they take place within a context of reducing tensions and improved Korean security. We are willing now, moreover, to terminate the UN Command if a way can be found to do so without jeopardizing the present Armistice arrangements.

Southeast Asia and Indochina

- In Indochina we are opposed to efforts by any country to establish a position of hegemony. We are concerned



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that Hanoi, perhaps with outside encouragement, may have some hegemonic aspirations. We want to discourage this and encourage all the countries of Indochina to retain their independence.

- We are prepared to look to the future in our relations with the countries of Indochina but they must show understanding of our concerns and restraint toward their neighbors.

- We have taken Chinese advice in initiating contacts with the Cambodians although this has not yet led anywhere. We favor an independent Cambodia and an independent Laos to circumscribe Hanoi's influence in those countries. We have told Thailand that we will support their efforts to improve relations with Cambodia and Laos.

- Other nations in Southeast Asia are going through a period of transition toward greater self-reliance and lessened dependence on outside powers. Our own role is also changing, but we will continue to have important interests in

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the area for the indefinite future and it is with this thought that I will be visiting Indonesia and the Philippines. These and other countries of the area have told us they want to maintain their association with us. We assume China appreciates the value of our presence as a means of offsetting the extension of Soviet influence.

-- We remain opposed to efforts by any country to establish hegemony in Southeast Asia. We have publicly and privately stated our opposition to any Asian Collective Security scheme. And we are impressed by the determination of local governments to preserve their independence. We believe China shares this view. In any event, we want to ensure that our respective policies do not work at cross-purposes, which would play into Soviet hands or those who ally themselves with the Soviets.

-- In our recent discussions with the Thai in Washington they asked if we could encourage China to help in the improvement of their relations with Cambodia and the easing of

the hostility on the Thai-Laos border. I urge you to do so if you can because we believe such a development would assist Thai independence, which is in our mutual interest.

South Asia

- We consider the integrity of Pakistan indispensable to regional stability and important to our own interests in Asia and the Middle East. We still see a resolution of Indo/Pakistani differences as the best guarantee of Pakistan's security and regional stability.
- At the same time, we have taken positive steps to help Pakistan by lifting our arms embargo and by continuing our high levels of economic assistance. We expect to reach agreements on the delivery of equipment to meet Pakistan's priority defense needs, including TOW anti-tank missiles, air-to-air missiles, and the components of an air defense system. (FYI: We have not authorized thus far the sale of combat aircraft because we do not wish to stimulate an arms race on the subcontinent or to arouse Congressional opposition to the sales of less controversial equipment. end FYI)



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- Under current procedures we cannot provide credits to Pakistan for arms sales. However, our economic assistance has the effect of freeing some Pakistani foreign exchange for arms purposes. We have also urged Iran and Saudi Arabia to assist Pakistan financially with the purchase of arms.

- We know that China shares our concern for Pakistan's security. We would welcome Chinese views and a discussion of what measures China is taking and is prepared to take to assist Pakistan.

- To the extent that we improve relations with India it is designed to offset Soviet influence. But given Indian attitudes, we do not anticipate a dramatic improvement in our ties. Mrs. Gandhi continues to criticize us publicly for her own domestic political purposes.

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- We have used our influence in both India and Pakistan to encourage normalization of relations. We believe such a process would reduce Moscow's room for maneuver.

- During the recent disturbances in Bangladesh, we urged the Indian Government to use restraint and we encouraged the Bangladesh Government to behave in ways that would be reassuring to the Indians. We will have to watch Indian intentions closely.

- We will continue to provide generous amounts of economic and food aid to Bangladesh. But recent events illustrate that there is a basic instability in Bangladesh which will make it a volatile country for some time.

Persian Gulf

- The Persian Gulf is strategically important. Its geographic location is crucial with two-thirds of the oil in international trade transiting the Gulf. This oil is vital to Europe and Japan and important to our own economy.



- We have made major efforts over the past two years to strengthen our ties with the complex of nations around the Gulf. We have made significant progress in expanding our influence and reducing Soviet influence. Our relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, the key nations in this region, are excellent.

- We do differ strongly on oil prices, however. OPEC's pricing policy has hurt Europe and Japan badly, which is not in your interest, nor ours, nor that of Iran and the Gulf countries. It is also creating grave problems for many developing countries. We therefore hope that there can be a constructive dialogue between the major oil consumers and oil producers.

- US willingness to meet the defence needs of the Gulf countries -- e.g., in Iran and Saudi Arabia -- has reduced Soviet opportunities for penetration through arms sales.

- Our naval presence in the Gulf and at Diego Garcia enhances our ability to counter Soviet naval expansionism.

Africa (perhaps to be discussed by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Chiao)

- In Africa we have welcomed the creation of new African states and have supported respect for their independence and sovereignty.
- To the extent possible we have tried to keep Africa from being a battleground of outside rivalries. We have no military or territorial ambitions in Africa.
- The Soviet Union, however, has intervened on a massive scale in Angola.
- The Soviet Union, supported by the Cubans and East Europeans, is seeking to force a victory for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and a neutralization of the Angolan Front for National Liberation (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). They are providing substantial amounts of aid and equipment to the MPLA. The Cubans have sent thousands of troops. If Soviet objectives were achieved, we assume Moscow would reinforce



AFRICA

its presence in Angola and use that mineral and agriculturally rich country to pursue its political goals elsewhere in Central and Southern Africa.

- We believe stopping this Soviet power play is as much in the Chinese interest as in ours.
- The consequences of a victory for the Soviet Union and the Soviet-backed MPLA would be serious. The governments of Zaire and Zambia, with whom we and the Chinese enjoy good relations and both of which are experiencing internal stresses, would be vulnerable. The possibility of the Soviets pushing to upset the balance of power in strategically vital southern Africa would be greater.
- We seek a negotiated settlement in Angola -- one that would permit UNITA and FNLA to take their place in the government. In view of our policy in support of a government of national unity, we will not recognize any Angolan faction. This stance is in line with the OAU position. We are pleased the PRC has adopted a similar policy.

- It is our belief, however, that no settlement can be negotiated unless the military balance between UNITA and FNLA on the one hand and MPLA on the other can be maintained. We have worked in this direction, in cooperation with Zaire which is the most endangered by developments in Angola. The present military balance is fragile and substantial amounts of equipment will be required to keep FNLA and UNITA in the conflict. Certain types of equipment are critically needed, including such items as air defense equipment, artillery and automatic weapons.
- Diplomatically, we are pursuing two tracks. First, we are trying to encourage an African solution to what is essentially an African problem. We have sent the OAU Secretary General a message supporting the OAU quest for a negotiated settlement. The Chinese might consider a similar message of support. Second, we are working to discourage the Soviets and Cubans

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from their present policy of near unlimited support of the MPLA. We have taken some strong public positions recently.

-- We are concerned by the decision of President Nyerere of Tanzania to release approximately 1000 tons of Soviet arms for transshipment to MPLA in Angola. He had previously embargoed all arms, including about 90 tons of arms for UNITA and FNLA which the PRC had planned to transship through Tanzania. In our view Nyerere's favored treatment of the Soviet Union and MPLA should be of concern to the PRC and we urge they raise this with Nyerere.

-- We are prepared to increase our efforts to frustrate Soviet objectives in Angola. This is a purpose which we believe you should share. This is an example of a situation where we should work in parallel for a common purpose.

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TALKING POINTS ON BILATERAL ISSUES FOR
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRC LEADERS

Wednesday and Thursday
December 3 and 4, 1975
10:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
Great Hall of the People
Peking, People's Republic of China

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

While bilateral questions will not occupy a major proportion of your time in the substantive sessions with Chinese leaders, issues affecting normalization of U.S.-PRC relations will comprise some of the more sensitive matters to be discussed. The Chinese clearly understand that you are not prepared to complete the normalization process on this visit, but they will view your remarks on this set of issues as a measure of how seriously you take the relationship.

As noted in the scope analysis and normalization paper, in discussion of this issue over the past year the Chinese have tried to limit our flexibility by defining their conditions for a solution in ever more explicit and constrictive terms. They are not likely to press you on the matter, however; indeed, they have indicated they are prepared for the subject to not even be raised. At the same time, I believe your best course is to take the initiative on the issue, both to create an atmosphere of candor and to preserve as much elbow room as possible for detailed negotiations on a normalization agreement at some future time.

From this perspective, there are a number of purposes to be served by your discussion of the normalization issue:

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By WA NARA, Date 6/24/10



- You should confirm your Administration's position that we seek to build an enduring and vital relationship with the PRC in order to strengthen the basis for parallel action on the security issues which have brought us together.

- Establish an atmosphere of frankness and candor in the discussions by stating that you recognize the Taiwan question remains the basic issue obstructing the full normalization of relations. Then review in a positive and non-defensive manner the genuine progress that we have made over the past several years in this area (such as by substantially reducing our military manpower level and removing all weapons with an offensive capability from Taiwan) and the degree to which we in fact have agreed on certain basic approaches to the eventual resolution of our differences on this issue.

- You will want to stress, however, our concern that the Taiwan issue be resolved peacefully and our belief that mutual efforts will be required to put our relationship on a constructive basis for the long-term. (In the talking points which follow, for example, we suggest some polite but firm language in response to the view that you may hear expressed by the Vice Premier that we owe China a debt for their patience on the normalization question.)

- You should express recognition of the position the Chinese took during my visit in October that, given "the present state of our relations," they see no need for further steps at this time to improve our bilateral relations in such areas as exchanges and trade. You should emphasize that while we are prepared to proceed with our bilateral relationship in its present form, we feel that the interests of both sides are served by conveying a sense of some vitality in our relations rather than stagnation. You should not get into a long debate on this point, however.

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- For domestic reasons you will want to touch very briefly on the question of MIAs. Vice Premier Teng indicated during my October visit that he had some information to give you on the matter of the remains of servicemen from the Indochina war killed in the PRC. You should also make a low-key reference to the continuing concern of our people for the fate of the MIAs in Indochina.
- (-- While we doubt that the Chinese will raise the following issue, it is barely possible they will mention to you a large petrochemical project in Hong Kong being put together by the Fluor Corporation of the U.S. and some pro-PRC businessmen in Hong Kong. This project would involve a very large investment of American capital and technology (conceivably on the order of \$5-\$7 billion). Details are provided in the State Department briefing book on bilateral issues.

In the unlikely event this issue is raised by the Chinese, you should do no more than indicate that we are quite favorably disposed to the PRC developing its petrochemical industry. As far as any American involvement in such a project is concerned, we believe this is best done on a basis which is seen as commercially viable by the private firms involved and acceptable to the people in the area where the refinery complex will be built.)

II. TALKING POINTS

Normalization

- I understand clearly that from your perspective the Taiwan issue remains the obstacle to creating a formally normal

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NORMALIZATION

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relationship in the sense of establishing diplomatic relations. What is my approach to this issue? First, I want to reaffirm the five principles which President Nixon stated during his discussions here in 1972. That is:

-- I affirm that we will support the principle of the unity of China. As you know from Secretary Kissinger's visit in October, we were prepared to do this in a more direct and public way than was done in the Shanghai Communique.

(MORE)

- We have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement.

- We will use our influence to discourage any third country from moving into Taiwan. Indeed, it is evident that the step-by-step pace with which we have proceeded in adjusting our policy has helped to keep the situation calm on Taiwan and has not given other countries an opportunity to replace our presence.

- My Administration will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out, and we will obviously not use the island to threaten your security directly or indirectly.

President Nixon committed the United States to the progressive reduction of our military presence on the island. You understand that there is no longer any American weaponry with an offensive capability on Taiwan. Our military manpower presence on the island has been reduced from about 10,000 at the time



the Shanghai Communique was issued to less than 2,800 men today. I will continue to reduce this manpower level -- as a manifestation of the continuing direction of our policy -- to less than 1,400 by the end of next year.

At the same time in the Shanghai Communique we indicated our concern that resolution of the Taiwan issue be by peaceful means. This question remains our basic concern. We do not need Taiwan for any military or economic purposes, but the manner in which our relationship with the island changes will have a profound significance for the credibility of our relationship to others, and to the way the American people view their new relationship with the People's Republic.

-- President Nixon's final point was that his Administration would work to complete the normalization process. Secretary Kissinger said last month that it is our intention to do this in a measurable period of time. I affirm that objective. I believe we should complete the process in the next several years.

-- I have no illusions about the difficulty for both governments of taking the final step to full normalization. It requires bridging an issue which affects the profound principle of your sovereignty and what for us is an equally basic principle: the integrity of our commitments to others.

We have no interest in compromising the sovereignty or territorial integrity of China. Even in the worst period of the Cold War the United States did not support the idea of independence for Taiwan.

-- How can our principles be bridged? I think we each clearly understand the views the other has put forward over the past four years on the question of normalization. A year ago in his discussion with the Vice Premier, Secretary Kissinger expressed basic acceptance of your three principles for normalization, or what you also call "the Japanese model." In a sense, we have agreed with your terms. But this does not go to the heart of the problem as far as we are concerned. For me, and indeed I believe for any incumbent in my job, the basic issue is whether the Taiwan question can be resolved peacefully. If we normalize with you without



concern for this matter, the American people will not support such a policy.

The other aspect of this issue is how other countries -- Japan, our allies in Europe, even the Soviet Union -- perceive our policy. Given the fact that it is questions of security that have brought us together, it would make little sense for us to normalize with you in a way that made others doubt the integrity of our commitments. I do not think such a course would serve your interests, and I know it would not serve those of the United States.

-- I am aware of the attitude of patience the Chinese side has shown on this issue. I am not complacent because of your attitude, but we must have the right overall political context as well as certain understandings with you to complete the process. Frankly, I believe that the way we have proceeded on this issue has benefitted both our countries. While



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Taiwan's formal ties to the rest of the world have eroded since 1971, the island has not been driven into rash actions which would present both the United States and the People's Republic very difficult problems. At the same time, I understand full well this is a matter of basic principle to you, and an issue of great emotional significance as well.

-- (If the Vice Premier comments that the U.S. owes China a "debt" on the Taiwan issue:)

As I have just indicated, I believe the measured pace in which we have proceeded has been helpful to your interests as well as to ours; and we have never tried to split Taiwan away from China. In any event, I remain hopeful that through mutual efforts we will be able to overcome our differences.

-- As I said earlier, I intend to order further reductions in our residual military presence on Taiwan. These will indicate to everybody concerned the continuing direction of our policy.

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- OPTIONAL POINT: I authorized Secretary Kissinger before his visit here last month to see if we could take certain partial steps which would sustain the momentum toward full normalization. I understand from your response to our proposals that you are not prepared to follow this approach. Frankly, I disagree with your view that a direct public American statement of support for the unity of China is not a meaningful, if partial, step forward. I can tell you that it would have had a significant impact on American public opinion, and in Taiwan. But since you are not prepared to proceed in this manner, that is acceptable to us.
- I also understand that you are not prepared to take certain steps which would indicate vitality in our bilateral relations, as through expanded exchange programs or certain developments in the trade area. Here again, we are prepared to accept your position, but frankly we do not think it serves your own interests. My intention was to show our people and the world that considerable momentum exists in the normalization process and our determination to sustain it.



Trade between our two countries is unlikely to be much more than one percent of our overall foreign trade for a long time; so this is not a matter of economics for us. But some development in this area would have had a significant impact on the way our people think about our new relationship. It would give important elements in our society a greater stake in a normal relationship with China. Similarly, exchanges in the cultural and scientific fields are not ends in and of themselves. They sustain the interest of important and vocal elements in our society -- the intellectual community, the press, and the business world -- in normalization. As you have indicated that you wish to keep the structure and number of such activities at their present level, we can only agree to do so. But I would not be frank if I did not say that some people will interpret this as a sign of stagnation, or even a backward step, in our relationship.

MIAs

-- Let me briefly mention one issue that I know is of deep concern to the American people. I raise this in part



MIAs

because I understand Vice Premier Teng mentioned to Secretary Kissinger last month that you have some new information on American servicemen missing in action in China. Any information you can provide will be a great relief to the families concerned. I know this question has been raised with you on a number of occasions in the past, and I appreciate your responsiveness.

-- Let me add that the American people are deeply concerned about the fate of more than 2,300 of our servicemen still unaccounted for in Indochina. There are also about 30 journalists who disappeared in Cambodia and who have never been heard from. I understand your view that this question is basically for us to resolve with the countries of Indochina. I am also aware, however, of your suggestion to Secretary Kissinger that the U.S. should forget the past and establish normal relations with Cambodia and Vietnam. We are prepared to move in this direction, but our ability to do so will be affected in no small measure by progress we can make in accounting for these missing servicemen. Thus, it would be very helpful if you could use your good offices with the

leaders of the countries of Indochina to be as forthcoming to us on this issue as you have been.

Fluor Petrochemical Project

[NOTE: You should not raise this issue. The following talking points are provided in the very unlikely event that the Vice Premier mentions this project.]

-- I have heard in very general terms that an American firm, the Fluor Corporation, is now talking to some people in Hong Kong about the construction of a very large petrochemical complex that would require substantial amounts of crude oil and natural gas from your country to be a workable operation. I cannot judge the merits of this issue. I believe the company and other people whose interests are involved should make the decision primarily on the basis of commercial considerations; that is, whether the substantial amount of capital involved is a wise investment in view of the demand for such products. In addition, I understand that an important issue is whether the petroleum and gas feedstocks will be somehow guaranteed to them in a way that protects the security of their investment.



This is not an issue for us to decide. I can say, however, that as far as the United States Government is concerned we believe the expansion of China's petrochemical industry and the availability for export of refined petroleum products from the PRC would be a positive thing. Hence, we have no reason not to welcome this type of project, but I believe it is basically a matter for our private sector to work out with the other parties involved.



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 25, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

VIA: MR. RICHARD B. CHENEY

FROM: TERRY O'DONNELLS ^{TOP}

SUBJECT: Summary Schedule for Trip
to the Pacific Basin
Saturday, Nov. 29 to Monday, Dec. 8, 1975.

This summary schedule is still subject to minor adjustments in times and sequence. All times are local.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1975 (WASHINGTON/ALASKA)

7:55 a.m. You, Mrs. Ford and Susan depart South Lawn via helicopter en route Andrews, board AF-1, and depart en route Eielson AFB, Fairbanks, Alaska. (Guests: Senator Gravel, Congressman Young, Mr. and Mrs. Lynn and Mr. Zarb) (7-1/2 hour flight) (-5 hrs. time change)
(Possible Departure Statement)

10:45 a.m. Arrive Eielson AFB, Fairbanks, Arrival Ceremony (Remarks)

11:25 a.m. Mrs. Ford's motorcade departs en route guest quarters.

11:50 a.m. Depart via motorcade en route Alyeska Pipeline Pump Station #8 (40 min. drive). En route you will stop to view pipeline construction.

12:30 p.m. Motorcade arrives Pump Station #8. Tour pipeline construction and equipment maintenance shack. Refreshments in Mess Hall.

1:35 p.m. Motorcade departs site en route Eielson AFB. (30 min. drive).

2:25 p.m. AF-1 departs Eielson AFB en route Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, Alaska. Guests: Sen. Gravel, Congressman Young, Gov. and Mrs. Hammond, Sen. and Mrs. Stevens). (50 min. flight)

3:10 p.m. Arrive Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage. Depart via Motorcade en route Anchorage Westward Hotel. (10 min. drive)

3:30 p.m. Arrive Suite in Westward Hotel. (Personal time: 3 hrs., 10 min.)

6:40 p.m. Depart Suite en route function room for private GOP meeting. (Attendance: 30, Duration: 30 minutes) Return to Suite.

7:30 p.m. You and Mrs. Ford attend Senator Stevens' Birthday Party, Grand Ballroom, Westward Hotel. (Attendance: 750- Duration: 1 hour)
(Remarks) (Business Suit)

8:35 p.m. Arrive Suite. OVERNIGHT.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1975 (ALASKA/JAPAN)

- 8:45 a. m. Depart Suite, board motorcade en route Elmendorf AFB. (10 min. drive)
 8:00 a. m. Arrive Elmendorf AFB, board AF-1, and depart en route Haneda International Airport, Tokyo, Japan. (7 hours, 20 minutes flight)
 (-5 hours time change and lose 1 day)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1975 (JAPAN/CHINA)

- 10:30 a. m. AF-1 arrives Haneda International Airport, Tokyo. Refreshments in VIP Lounge with For. Min. Miyazawa, Ambassador Uchida and Amb. and Mrs. James Hodgson. Reboard AF-1. (Personal Time: 30 min.)
 11:30 a. m. AF-1 departs Haneda International Airport, Tokyo, en route Peking, People's Republic of China. (4 hours, 30 min. flight) (-1 hour time change)
 3:00 p. m. Arrive Peking Capital Airport. Arrival Ceremony. No Remarks.
 3:30 p. m. Depart Peking Capital Airport via motorcade en route Guest House #18. (30 minutes drive) (You will ride with Vice Premier in his car.)
 4:00 p. m. Arrive Guest House #18. Refreshments with both Official Parties.
 4:25 p. m. Arrive Residence Quarters. (Personal Time: 2 hours; 50 minutes)
 7:15 p. m. You and Mrs. Ford depart via motorcade en route Great Hall of the People. (Business Suit)
 7:25 p. m. Arrive Great Hall of the People. Photo Session with Chinese and U.S. Official Parties and USLO Personnel
 8:00 p. m. Dinner begins. (Toast)
 10:15 p. m. Dinner concludes. Depart via motorcade en route Guest House #18.
 10:30 p. m. Arrive Residence. OVERNIGHT.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1975 (CHINA)

- 9:45 a. m. Depart via motorcade en route Great Hall of the People.
 10:00 a. m. Head to Head Meeting. (Duration: 2 hours) Susan - possible visit to Great Wall.
 12:00 Noon Head to Head Meeting concludes. Return to Residence via motorcade.
 12:20 p. m. Arrive Residence. (Personal Time: 2 hours, 10 minutes)
 2:30 p. m. Depart Guest House #18 via motorcade en route Temple of Heaven. (25 min. drive) Mrs. Ford - free afternoon. Susan - possible visit to Ming Tombs.
 2:55 p. m. Arrive Temple of Heaven. Tour.
 3:40 p. m. Depart Temple of Heaven via motorcade en route Guest House #18.
 4:05 p. m. Arrive Guest House #18. (Personal Time : 3 hours)
 7:05 p. m. You and Mrs. Ford and Susan depart Guest House #18 via motorcade en route Great Hall of the People.
 7:15 p. m. Refreshments/Ballet.
 8:45 p. m. Ballet concludes. Return to Residence via motorcade.
 9:05 p. m. Arrive Guest House #18. OVERNIGHT.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1975 (CHINA)

- 9:15 a. m. Depart Residence via motorcade en route Great Hall of the People.
 :30 a. m. Head to Head Meeting. (Duration: 2 hours) Mrs. Ford - possible AM visit to Palace Museum. Susan -- possible AM visit to Commune.
- 11:30 a. m. Meeting concludes. Return to Residence via motorcade.
 11:50 a. m. Arrive Residence. (Personal Time: 2 hours, 10 minutes)
 2:00 p. m. You board motorcade at Guest House #18 and depart en route Agricultural Exhibition Center. Mrs. Ford - possible visit to Peking Dance school. Susan - possible PM visit to Summer Palace.
- 2:25 p. m. Arrive Agricultural Exhibition Center. Tour. (Duration: 1 hour)
 3:25 p. m. Motorcade departs tour site en route Guest House #18.
 3:50 p. m. Arrive Guest House #18. (Personal Time: 3 hours, 50 minutes)
 7:40 p. m. You and Mrs. Ford and Susan depart via motorcade en route Sports Arena.
- 7:45 p. m. Refreshments/Sports Exhibition. (Attendance: 12,000)
 9:15 p. m. Sports Exhibition concludes. Return to Residence via motorcade.
 9:30 p. m. Arrive Guest House #18. OVERNIGHT.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1975 (CHINA)

- 9:15 a. m. Depart Guest House via motorcade en route Great Hall of the People.
 9:30 a. m. Head to Head Meeting begins. (Duration: 2 hours) Mrs. Ford and Susan - possible AM tour of carpet factory.
- 11:30 a. m. Head to Head Meeting concludes. Motorcade departs Great Hall of the People en route USLO. Mrs. Ford arrives USLO via separate motorcade.
 12:00 Noon Attend Buffet Luncheon in Bush Residence for USLO Personnel.
 1:45 p. m. Depart USLO via motorcade en route Summer Palace.
 2:05 p. m. Tour Summer Palace. (Duration: 1 hour)
 3:05 p. m. Tour of Summer Palace concludes. Proceed via motorcade to Residence
 3:20 p. m. Arrive Residence. (Personal time: 3 hours, 25 minutes)
 6:45 p. m. Depart Guest House #18 via motorcade en route Great Hall of the People.
 7:00 p. m. U. S. Reciprocal Dinner hosted by President and Mrs. Ford. (Toast) (Business Suit)
- 9:50 p. m. Motorcade departs Great Hall of the People en route Guest House #18.
 10:00 p. m. Arrive Guest House. OVERNIGHT.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1975 (CHINA/INDONESIA)

- 8:30 a. m. Depart residence via motorcade en route Peking Capitol Airport. (30 minutes drive)
 9:00 a. m. Arrive Peking Capitol Airport. Departure Ceremony. (No Remarks.)
 9:30 a. m. AF-1 departs Peking Capitol Airport en route Jakarta, Indonesia. (7 hour, 45 min. flight) (time change: -1 hour)
- 4:15 p. m. Arrive Jakarta International Airport. Arrival Ceremony. (No Remarks)
 4:50 p. m. Depart Airport via motorcade en route Istana Merdeka (Presidential Palace) 30 min. drive) President Suharto will ride with you -- Mrs. Ford with Mrs. Suharto. Crowd situation.
- 5:20 p. m. Arrive Presidential Palace. Brief conversation prior to President Suharto's departure. (Personal time: 1 hour, 30 mins.)

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1975 (CHINA/INDONESIA) - Continued

- :40 p. m. Escorted by F. M. Malik and Mrs. Malik, you and Mrs. Ford depart Suite en route motorcade. (3 min. drive)
- 7:45 p. m. Arrive Istana Negra for State Dinner (Black Tie) (Toast)
- 10:55 p. m. Arrive Presidential Palace on foot. OVERNIGHT.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1975 (INDONESIA/PHILIPPINES)

- 7:55 a. m. Depart Presidential Palace on foot en route Istana Negra for Head to Head Meeting.
- 8:00 a. m. Head to Head commences. Mrs. Ford - A.M. Tour Mini-Indonesia?
- 10:00 a. m. Head to Head concludes. Return to Presidential Palace on foot. (Personal Time: 20 mins.)
- 10:30 a. m. Accompanied by President Suharto, depart via motorcade en route Jakarta International Airport. (30 min. drive) Mrs. Ford and Mrs. Suharto will have arrived Airport independently. (Departure Ceremony) (No Remarks)
- 11:30 a. m. Depart Jakarta International Airport via AF-1 en route Manila (3 hour, 30 min. flight) (+1 hour time change)
- 4:00 p. m. Arrive Manila International Airport. Arrival Ceremony. Remarks. Board motorcade with President and Mrs. Marcos, depart en route Rizal Monument. (Crowd situation along route.) Lay wreath at Rizal Monument. (20 min. drive)
- :15 p. m. Arrive Malacanang. Refreshments. (Personal Time: 10 mins.)
- 5:45 p. m. Meeting with President Marcos. (Duration: 30 minutes)
- 6:15 p. m. Return to Suite. (Personal Time: 1 hour, 45 minutes)
- 8:00 p. m. Gift Exchange. State Dinner at Palace. (Toast) (Black Tie)
- 11:00 p. m. Dinner concludes. OVERNIGHT.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1975 (PHILIPPINES/HAWAII)

- 7:55 a. m. You and Mrs. Ford depart Palace via motorcade en route Yacht at pier.
- 8:00 a. m. Yacht departs Manila en route Corregidor. Breakfast on board. (1 hour Head to Head) (2-1/2 hour sail)
- 10:30 a. m. Arrive Corregidor. Wreath-laying Ceremony. (No Remarks.)
- 11:30 a. m. Depart Corregidor en route Manila with lunch on board. (Staff time: 1 hr.)
- 2:00 p. m. Arrive Manila. Motorcade to airport. (20 min drive) Departure Ceremony. (Remarks)
- 3:15 p. m. AF-1 departs Manila en route Hickam AFB, Honolulu, Hawaii. (10 hour flight) (+6 hour time change - gain 1 day)
- 7:15 a. m. AF-1 arrives Hickam AFB, Honolulu, Hawaii. Crowd.
- 7:20 a. m. Depart via motorcade en route CINCPACFLT Aiea Boat Dock.
- 7:35 a. m. CINCPACFLT Launch departs en route USS Arizona Memorial.
- 7:45 a. m. Wreath Laying Ceremony at USS ARIZONA Memorial. Remarks.
- 8:15 a. m. Proceed via boat/motorcade to Kahala area residence.
- 9:00 a. m. Private breakfast with community leaders in Kahala area.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1975 - Continued

- 10:00 a.m. Breakfast concludes. Depart via motorcade en route John F. Kennedy Theatre of the East-West Center, University of Hawaii.
- 10:10 a.m. Arrive John F. Kennedy Theatre. (Personal Time: 40 minutes)
- 11:00 a.m. Remarks at East-West Center.
- 11:30 a.m. Reception (Informal) for East-West Cultural Center leadership group. (Attendance: 30 - Duration: 20 minutes)
- 11:55 a.m. Depart East-West Center via motorcade en route Hickam AFB. (Driving Time: 30 minutes)
- 12:25 p.m. Arrive Hickam AFB. Board AF-1 and depart Hickam AFB en route Andrews AFB. (Flying Time: 8 hours, 45 mins.) (Time change: +5 hrs. (Mrs. Ford will remain behind.))

MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1975

- 2:15 a.m. AF-1 arrives Andrews AFB.
- 2:35 a.m. Arrive South Lawn.

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