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PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO PEKING
DECEMBER 1 to 5, 1975

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/68, State Dept. Guidelines
By NARA, Date 6/22/10





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO PEKING
December 1-5, 1975

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

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SOVIET UNION





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SOVIET UNION

I. OCTOBER 1975 TALKS

Chinese Position in October 1975: (Mao + Teng)

- (Mao:) The Soviet Union seems to be America's first priority. First the Soviet Union; then Europe, Japan, and China. The Soviet Union is a superpower. There are only two superpowers in the world. China is backward. The U.S. is leaping to Moscow by way of China's shoulders, and China's shoulders are now useless. The US has already jumped there, and now no longer needs China's shoulders.
- (Mao:) Maneuvering is allowable.
- (Mao:) The Soviet Union cannot be weakened without a fight.
- (Mao:) This world is not tranquil, and a storm--the wind and rain--are coming. And at the approach of the rain and wind the swallows are busy. It is possible to postpone the arrival of the wind and rain, but it is difficult to obstruct the coming.
- (Mao:) The US has confidence in, and believes in, nuclear weapons. The U.S. does not have confidence in its own army.
- (Mao:) China will adopt the Dunkirk strategy. China will allow the Soviets to occupy Peking, Tientsin, Wuhan and Shanghai, and in that way China will become victorious and the enemy will be defeated. Both World Wars were conducted in that way and victory was obtained only later.
- As Mao stressed on many occasions, there are certain problems of bilateral relations between us, but what is more important are the international problems. Only by looking at international problems from a political point of view can we have a common view and have coordination in some respects. Exactly on this point China appreciates the statesmanship of President Nixon. China never attached any importance to what is called the Watergate event. By political problems, China means how we should deal with the Soviet Union. This is a question of global strategy.

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(Chinese Position in October 1975 continued.)

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- The U. S. side says that it has a clear world view with regard to strategy, and that the issues are only issues of tactics. As China understands it, tactics are guided by strategy and serve strategy. The tactics manifest in various fields may conform to the strategy and may also deviate from strategy.
- The U. S. seems to believe the Chinese are intransigent in tactics. The US puts stress on flexibility. If China can make an assessment of itself, China would say that it has never been intransigent. China thinks that flexibility must conform to strategic needs; too much flexibility leads people to wonder what the strategy really is.
- China's and America's assessments are different in this respect: China believes the focus of Soviet strategy is in the West, in Europe, and in the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf -- all the places linked to Europe.
- Although the Soviet Union has one million troops along the Sino-Soviet border, the Soviet strategy remains toward the West: to make a feint toward the East while attacking in the West. The U. S. has stressed to China many times the danger of a Soviet attack against China. Mao had a deep talk with Dr. Kissinger in this regard [in November 1973] and concluded that the polar bear is out to fix the United States. Even the one million Soviet troops stationed in the East are directed against the US Seventh Fleet first of all, and then against Japan, and then China.
- The U. S. says it makes no difference whether the Soviet Union is making a feint in the East to attack the West or vice versa. China holds different views. How to assess Soviet strategy? This is not a matter of rhetoric but a matter of substance. This assessment is the starting point of the tactics formulated to deal with international matters.
- Before President Nixon's trip, Chou told Dr. Kissinger that China's strategy was to get prepared to deal with aggression from all sides. Chou said that even if the Soviet Union seizes the land north of the Yellow River, and Japan grabs Tibet, China is not afraid. That is what China thought at that time.

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(Chinese Position in October 1975 continued)

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- After the Shanghai Communique, China made no reference to these words. China has always believed that it should rely on its independent strength to deal with the Soviet Union, and China has never cherished any illusions about this. China has told this to Dr. Kissinger as well as other American friends. China does not depend on nuclear weapons, even less on nuclear protection by other countries. China depends on two things: (1) the perseverance of the 800 million Chinese people; if the Soviet Union wants to attack China it must be prepared to fight for at least two decades. China mainly depends on millet plus rifles. China pursues a policy of self-reliance in its economic construction and also in its strategic problems.
- As China has said many times, China fears nothing under heaven or on earth. China will not ask favors from anyone. China depends on the digging of tunnels. China relies on millet plus rifles to deal with all problems internationally and locally, including the problems in the East. There is an argument in the world to the effect that China is afraid of an attack by the Russians. Teng, as a friend, will be candid and tell the U. S. that this assessment is wrong.
- Border negotiations have been going on with the Soviet Union for six years. But the record of these negotiations is not very successful.
- The stark reality is not that detente has developed to a new stage, but that the danger of a new world war is mounting. We do not believe there is any lasting peace. Things develop according to objective laws independently of man's will. The only way to deal with hegemonism is to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against it. To base oneself on illusions, to mistake hopes or wishes for reality and act accordingly will only abet the ambitions of expansionism and lead to grave consequences. In this regard, the history of the Second World War provides a useful lesson. In the face of the growing danger of war, China's fundamental policy is to "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony," to persist in independence and self-reliance and make all necessary preparations. (Ch'iao's Banquet toast)
- Our common aim, as reflected in the Shanghai Communique, is to fix the polar bear, deal with the polar bear.
- The Russians now feel the West cannot restrain them. They are not reliable and cannot be restrained. The most effective way to deal with possible attack from the Russians is not agreements or treaties, not what is written on paper, but actual preparations.

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(Chinese Position in October 1975 continued)

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- China is also making solid preparations. But one should by no means be under the false impression when China proposes the theory that China wants to direct the Soviet Union westward so that the Soviet Union will not go to the East. China is concerned about the West because if the Soviets are to make trouble, their focal point is in the West. It is precisely proceeding from this strategic assessment that China is interested in a unified and strong Europe--including the improvement of relations between Europe and the US . It is because of this strategic assessment that China advised the US to use both of its hands in dealing with the Arabs and Israelis. It is out of this assessment that China does not understand the US attitude when the Soviet Union and India dismembered Pakistan. It is because of this strategic assessment that we have often told you, as well as Japan, that Japan should put a first priority on relations between Japan and the US and then between Japan and China. This not only concerns the West but also the East. Because of this assessment China often advised the US not to let itself bog down in the quagmire of Indochina. The US was trying to keep ten fleas under ten fingers.
- Out of this strategic consideration, when the US was building its military base on Diego Garcia, China did not criticize this.
- China's observation of the situation dates back to the first nuclear talks between the US and Soviet Union in 1963. The treaty was prepared by three countries, and it left a deep impression on Teng at that time. Teng made his last visit to the Soviet Union as head of the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party to negotiate with the Russians, and the non-proliferation treaty was made public on the day he left Moscow. At that time China's talks with the Soviet Union were completely bankrupt, and China was certain that a most important part of the treaty was directed against China. China doesn't doubt that at the time the attitude of the US and UK was to restrain the Soviet Union from nuclear development. This is a strategic problem and, in terms of tactics, after ten years, in this period things have changed. They show that the aim, the purpose, of these tactics has failed to be achieved.
- In 1972, when the US reached the SALT agreement, the Soviet Union drastically quickened its pace in the development of nuclear arms. Their pace was quicker than that of the US. And when the third agreement, on prevention of nuclear war was reached[in 1973], the strategic balance had reached equilibrium.

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(Chinese Position in October 1975 continued)

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- After the Vladivostok agreement, the US told China that the number of Soviet missiles had not yet reached the ceiling, and now the US tells us that the number of Soviet missiles has exceeded the ceiling--leaving aside the quality. In the race between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviet Union has far exceeded the US and Europe.

- Soviet weapons have far exceeded those of the West. They have reached an equilibrium of weapons. In terms of total military strength, the Soviet Union has a greater military strength than the US and Europe put together. But the Soviet Union has two big weaknesses: one, they lack food grains and two, their industrial equipment and technology is backward. In the long run, although the Soviet Union has a greater military strength, these two weaknesses have put them in a weak position. When a war breaks out they cannot hold out long. Therefore, China does not understand why the US and the West do not use their strong points to make up for the Soviet weakness. If the US and Europe had taken advantage of Soviet weaknesses, they might have been in a better negotiating position.

- From publications it seems that the amount of economic credits and dealings between the US and Soviet Union seems to have exceeded that of the European and other countries.

- Regarding grain sales, the Soviet's massive buying of grain from the US and other quarters is to fill their stomachs as well as to fill their strategic reserves.

- The Helsinki Conference and events before it indicate that it is worthwhile to recall history. The period from 1936 to 1939 is particularly worthwhile to recall. After the Germans entered the Rhineland, the British and the French, Chamberlain and Daladier, pursued a policy of appeasement toward Hitler, and shortly after that the Munich agreement was concluded. In pursuing these policies their purpose was obvious. Their first aim was to appease Hitler so that he would not take rash actions, and their second aim was to direct the peril eastward. Their policies failed; they brought the opposite of their wishes. They got neither international peace or stability nor achieved their purpose of directing the peril of Hitler to the East. Instead, the spearhead of Hitler was directed to the West--Czechoslovakia and Poland--and the Germans did not attack the Soviet Union first.

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(Chinese Position in October 1975 continued)

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- When Chamberlain visited Germany he carried an umbrella, but it neither shaded him from the rain nor the sun. France boasted they had the Maginot line, but Germany didn't attack the Maginot line. They attacked from Belgium and attacked France; then France fell and Chamberlain gave up all resistance. He mobilized all the ships at Dunkirk; that is, he wanted to slip away.

- This appeasement policy led to an earlier outbreak of World War II. A number of Europeans in their contact with China often raise the lessons of Munich. China's observation is that the danger of such historical tragedy is increasing.

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SOVIET UNION

US Position in October 1975

- (To Mao:) We come to Peking because we have a common opponent and because we think China's perception of the world situation is the clearest of any country we deal with and with which we agree on many points.
- (To Mao:) The Soviet Union is not America's first priority. It is a great danger to us, but not a high priority. We have nothing to gain in Moscow. Because the Soviet Union is a superpower, it is inevitable that it has much priority, and we have to deal with it very frequently. But in terms of strategy, the US is trying to contain Soviet expansionism, and this is why in strategy China has priority for us.
- (To Mao:) We don't want to use China to jump to Moscow because that would be suicidal. We have not jumped to Moscow. It is a tactical phase, which President Ford will also affirm to the Chairman.
- (To Mao:) It is important for us to pick the right moment to fight the Soviet Union. During Watergate we were in no position to do it. And that is why we had to maneuver. We agree with China that the wind and rain are coming or may come, and we try to put ourselves in the best possible position, not to avoid it but to overcome it.
- (To Mao:) Dunkirk is not our strategy and will not be our strategy in the future. There will be no Dunkirk strategy, either in the West or East. If there is an attack, once we have stopped the attack, after we have mobilized, we are certain to win a war against the Soviet Union. If there is a massive Soviet attack anywhere in the world, the US will become involved very quickly. We will never withdraw from Europe without a nuclear war.
- (To Mao:) Over the last five years, we have always confronted the Soviet Union and they always back down.

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued.)

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- (To Mao:) The US has to face the reality that we will not have so large an army as the Soviet Union. And no European country will build a large army. Therefore, we must build a strategy which is suited to that reality.
- Each country must pursue a policy suitable to its own circumstances. The United States will resist hegemony as we have already stated in the Shanghai Communique. But the United States will also make every effort to avoid needless confrontations when it can do so without threatening the security of third countries. In this policy we will be guided by actions and realities and not by rhetoric. (HAK Banquet Toast)
- We have never had any illusions about US-Chinese differences. But we also believe we were brought together by certain strategic necessities. And, therefore, to us our relationship is not that of two enemies using each other, but of two countries having a similar problem and working on it cooperatively. The strategic necessity which we both face is that of the Soviet threat.
- Our strategic assessment is that the Soviet Union is gaining in strength and that at some point it may be tempted to translate that strength into political adventures. The Soviet Union is gaining in strength, not as a result of detente policies, but as a result of the development of its technology and the general state of its economy.
- Since the Soviet Union is both a European and an Asian country, it is important to prevent it from achieving hegemony in either place. And since we are the principal element of defense against the Soviet Union, the US has to be strong in both places. We do not know whether the Soviets are feinting in the East to attack the West or feinting in the West to attack in the East. This makes no difference, however, because if they attack in the West and succeed, the East will eventually face a much more massive force. And vice versa. The US policy is to attempt to maintain the world equilibrium to prevent attacks in either the West or the East.
- As for the tactics to be pursued in carrying out this strategy, there is obviously a difference between the US and PRC. China believes in taking a public posture of great intransigence, though, it does not necessarily act, for a variety of reasons, in every part of the world. The US believes in taking a more flexible posture publicly, but we resist in any part of the world where the Soviet Union stretches

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(U.S. Position in October 1975 continued)

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- out its hands. Therefore, in the Middle East, in Angola, in Portugal and in other places, we have been quite active in order to prevent Soviet expansion, even when we had to do it alone and even when we were criticized for doing it.
- In order to pursue this policy after the domestic upheavals we have had in America as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, it is absolutely essential for us that we are in a public posture at home that we are being provoked rather than causing the tension. China must understand that Americans who talk most toughly are most likely to produce a paralysis of action in the various places around the world where we are not acting. Those Americans who are attacking us for detente are also telling us what is wrong in the Middle East is that we are not settling it cooperatively with the Soviet Union -- which has been our whole policy to avoid.
 - If we had done what some Americans have recommended, namely, to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, then the effect on our relative power would lead to the Finlandization of Western Europe. We do not believe it can be in the interests of any country to allow the Soviet Union to believe we would accept a major strategic change -- whether in the East or West -- concerning the use of nuclear weapons. It is in the US interest to make the Soviet Union believe that we will not acquiesce in an overturning of the equilibrium no matter what weapons are involved.
 - China need have no concern that the US is conducting detente with illusions; we are conducting it as the best method for resisting Soviet expansion. And the US is not prepared to pay a significant price for it. Our being in this position enables us to maintain high military budgets year after year and to act as a brake on our allies.
 - We have said publicly that we consider our relations with the PRC a very significant element in our overall policy because of our assessment of the world situation and because it is important to maintain the overall situation against aspirations to hegemony. We are not doing it in order to divide the world in two with the Soviet Union -- an opportunity which has often been offered to us, and which we have always rejected because we would become the ultimate victim of such a procedure. We told you about the treaty that Brezhnev offered to the President in Vladivostok.

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued)

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- China must understand our grain policy. In the past, the Soviet Union has bought grain in emergencies from the United States. Given the organization of our economy, we have no technical way of preventing this. In 1972 the Soviets bought 20 million tons; in subsequent years they bought very little. Thus when they bought grain they have had an extremely disruptive effect on our economy. We have had the problem of how to use their need for grain to bring about policies compatible with our interests, and how to do this is in an economy that has no technical means of preventing the sale, and to prevent pressures on us from our own agricultural interests.
- In 1975, the Soviets have had a catastrophic crop this year. It is about 160 million tons, below the normal of about 225. We sold them about 9.8 million tons of grain and brought about a stoppage of further sales by pressure on the private companies, which caused us enormous domestic difficulties. We used this period of stoppage to force the Soviet Union to ship a substantial part of the grain in American ships, at about double the world rate, and giving us an opportunity to control the rate of delivery. We then insisted on a long-term grain agreement for about 6 million tons annually for five years, which will probably be signed soon. This forces them to buy when they don't need it, and it places a ceiling on what we have to sell them when they are in an emergency.
- On food grains we have moved at the slowest pace that is politically possible for us, and have even held up our grain sales -- even while Canada, Australia, Argentina and West Europe have cleared out their bins in selling to the Soviets. The long-term program we are now negotiating precisely prevents them from storing large quantities because it puts a ceiling on what they can buy in one year on the American market.
- At Helsinki, Brezhnev asked to buy 15 million tons from us on top of the 9.8 million he had already bought. But we are only going to sell them about 5 million more this year. Our information is that they will have to slaughter cattle this year to reduce their livestock because of the grain shortage.
- The Soviets have a constant interest in acquiring modern equipment and technology. The US is not selling anything of significance or a great deal at this moment.

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued)

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- While we have talked more than we have done in economic credits to the Soviets, the Europeans have done more than they have said. The FRG and France have given about \$7.5 billion in credits. The US has given the Soviets about \$500 million over the years.
- The US has used the prospect of technology to moderate Soviet foreign policy conduct, and we are trying to employ a strategy of keeping the Soviets dependent by not selling plans but parts to them. It is the folly of the Europeans to sell plans. Unfortunately the small amount of US credits has had the effect of throwing the business to the Europeans who have no strategy at all. For the US it is not a business proposition but a strategic proposition.
- The amount of dealings the USG can control has been less than \$500 million. There may have been another 3 or 4 hundred million of private credits. The things we can control we do in such a manner that they can always be shut off and that they do not have rapid completion dates.
- We appreciate the references to President Nixon. The policy the US is pursuing today is the policy that President Nixon would pursue if it had not been for Watergate. There is no difference between President Nixon's policy toward the Soviet Union and President Ford's. If anything, President Ford is a nuance tougher toward the Soviet Union.
- Two countries, operating from the same perception, can operate using different tactics, and can understand each other's tactics. That causes no difficulty. But if there is not a common strategic perception, then one wonders what exactly the basis of policy is. If China seriously thinks that the US is trying to push the Soviet Union to attack in the East, then we are in grave danger of frittering away all our efforts with yourself and everyone else. If the Soviet Union feels strong enough to attack in either the West or the East, the policy will already have failed. The Soviet Union must not be in a position where it feels strong enough to attack at all.
- In the period 1936 to 1939, it is true that those in the West who tried to push the aggressor toward the East became the first victims of the attack. But it is also true that those in the East who sought to to escape their dilemma by pushing their aggressor toward the West eventually became the objects of the aggressor anyway.

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued)

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- When the US says the East and West have essentially the same strategic problem this is not because the US has an interest in participating in the defense of the East. We say it because strategically, wherever the attack occurs, it will affect the other. And China acts on these assumptions too. We are doing this out of our own national interest.
- Since 1969 the US has gone into a confrontation with the Soviet Union four times: once over a nuclear submarine base in Cuba; once over the Syrian invasion of Jordan, once over the question of the Middle East alert in 1973 and once on the question of access routes to Berlin. We did all of these things on our own, without knowing what any other country, much less China, would do.
- The Munich policy was conducted by governments who denied that there was a danger, and who attempted to avoid their problems by denying that they existed. The current US policy has no illusions about the danger, but attempts to find the most effective means of resistance, given the realities we face. A country that spends \$110 billion a year for defense cannot be said to be pursuing a Munich policy. But the reality we face is a certain attitude that has developed in the US and an attitude that exists also in Europe even much more.
- If the Soviet Union should stretch out its hands, the US will be brutal in our response, no matter where it occurs -- and we won't ask people whether they share our assessment when we resist. But to be able to do this we have to prepare our public by our own methods, and by methods that will enable us to sustain this policy over many years, and not go like Dulles from a period of intransigence to a period of excessive conciliation. The Administration of the 1950's started out not willing to shake hands with Communists and wound up almost giving away Berlin-- had it not been for Khrushchev's clumsiness.
- US strategy is exactly as we discussed with Mao three years ago. It has not changed, and it has the strategic advantage. But we have to be the best judge of the means appropriate to our situation. And we will not stand still for a strategic advance by the Soviet Union.

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued)

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- Nor is everyone in the US who talks against detente a reliable opponent of the Soviet Union, because without a strategic grasp of the situation much of the anti-detente talk is simply politics. To talk tough is easy; to act with strength and maintain support for a strong policy over a period of time in a democracy is a difficult problem.
- It is true that the Soviet Union has gained in relative military strength in the last decade. This is not the result of agreements that have been signed but the result of changes in technology and the erroneous decision of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations when the Soviet Union was building up its strategic forces. Since the 1972 SALT agreement the strategic strength of the US has increased considerably relative to that of the Soviet Union. Also, after some point in the strategic weapons field it is difficult to translate military superiority into a political advantage.
- There has been no change in Soviet strength since Vladivostok. Since the Soviet Union does not dismantle obsolete units, they have 2,700 units and they have had those for five years. After Vladivostok they would have to get rid of 200. Since the US does get rid of obsolete units we have somewhat less than 2400. But numbers are not so important because each US unit can carry more warheads. The US has been ahead by a ratio of 6 or 7 to 1.
- Moreover, the Soviets have about 85 to 90 percent of their forces on land, where they are vulnerable because the accuracy of our forces is improved. Less than 20% of our forces are on land, and they are less vulnerable. So the US is not behind in the strategic balance although there are many newspaper articles in America written for political purposes to assert this.
- In 1960 President Kennedy was elected by speaking of the missile gap, even though the Soviet Union had only 30 missiles, each of which took 10 hours to fire, and we had 1,200 airplanes. Ever since then it has been the secret dream of every American presidential candidate to run on a missile gap campaign, so we are in danger of this issue erupting every four years.
- In 1970 when we confronted the Soviets on the submarine base in Cuba, in 1970 in Jordan, in 1970 in Berlin and in 1973 in the Middle East, they always yielded within 36 hours when we made a military move. Their military calculations are not as optimistic as some of our European friends fear--such as Denmark.

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued)

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- If the US public finds too much discouragement around the world, and if everywhere we move we find the opposition of every country, then precisely this mood of isolationism which concerns so many other countries will develop.
- The US attaches great significance to our relationship with the PRC because we believe China conducts a serious policy and because we believe China's word counts. And the US believes the world is one entity from a strategic point of view and a political point of view.
- But China should have a correct perception of our objectives. If the PRC thinks we are engaged in petty tactical maneuvers, it would be a pity for both of us. China does not ask for favors and neither do we. The basis of a correct policy is an accurate perception of the national interest and respect by each side for the perception of the national interest of the other.
- We don't need theater and we don't need China to divert Soviet energies. That would be a total misconception and it might lead to the same catastrophe as in the 1930's.
- Our two countries are too self-reliant to need reassurance and too experienced to confuse words with reality or tactics with strategy. (HAK's Banquet Toast)
- China must not judge the mood of the United States by the atmosphere in Washington. You must not judge the attitudes of America by the mood of the most unrepresentative Congress we have ever had. I have been travelling through America systematically and am certain we will get wide support for the policy I have described. Your Liaison Office may not see that mood in Washington.
- Our policy toward the Soviet Union is quite clear; we have kept China informed by our many discussions and have never asked for anything from the PRC. Of course, China pursues its own policies and the US respects China's independence. We hope China will make its positions clear to every European visitor who comes to Peking. The US does not object to China's public posture; we think it is essentially correct and even helpful. But

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(U.S. Position in October 1975, continued)

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we do object when you direct it against the US, when you accuse us of betraying our allies and endangering the security of the world by deliberately promoting war and standing on the side lines -- when in fact the US is doing actual things to prevent war and preserve the world equilibrium.

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E.O. 12858 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/23/70, State Dept. Guidelines
By WH NARA, Date 6/22/70

state review

9/17/03

SOVIET UNION

I. NOVEMBER 1974 TALKS

Chinese Position in November 1974 (TENG)

- In the international situation Mao has said repeatedly to visiting guests that the present world is not tranquil. Ch'iao pointed out there is great disorder under heaven. There exists the danger of war. If the peoples and countries of the world are not prepared against this, they will suffer.
- China's general view and impression is that the Soviet Union is making a feint in the East to attack the West -- to attack in Europe. Mao's discussions on this with HAK can be summarized as: "The polar bear is after you."
- The Chinese character is to fear neither heaven nor earth, and China fears neither isolation nor embargo. Nuclear weapons are not of any use, since to speak of nuclear weapons is to speak of others attacking China with nuclear weapons, and in this sense, China fears nothing. As Mao mentioned to the Danish Foreign Minister, if a war should truly come, it would not necessarily be a bad thing; it might not be so formidable. There is the possibility that bad things can turn into good things. Mao said there is no use to be afraid. Anyway, China is going to make preparations: tunnels, millet and rifles.
- With the Russians, their habit is wherever there is a little hole [as in the Middle East], a little room, they will get in.
- The Russian attitude seems an established policy that goes back to Tsarist days. It is a policy of hegemony. And it seems it won't be remedied, at least in the Brezhnev days.
- The differences between the Soviet Union and China are profound. The Soviet policy of hostility against China has not changed.
- Brezhnev's Ulan Bator proposal of a nonaggression pact with China made no reference to the essence of the broader dispute. This shows that even the 1969 provisional agreement between the Prime Ministers is gone with the wind.



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(Chinese Position in November 1974)

- Their words about improvements in relations are all empty. Tricks like mediation attempts don't change the essence. The methods they continue to use are military threat and subversion.
- Tricks like the Asian Collective Security system are really aimed not against China, but at dividing and controlling all the countries of Asia. It is to help Soviet forces into the Indian Ocean and Pacific.
- As for the Soviet threat, China doesn't pay much attention, as it has said many times. Those one million troops cannot be of much consequence. Soviet military strength in the East is not just directed against China; it is also directed against Japan and the U. S. Seventh Fleet. To take over China would be impossible with just one million troops; it would require an additional million troops and a willingness to fight for 20 years. The Chinese have no great virtue, but they do have patience -- also millet, rifles, and tunnels.
- The Soviet goal in their proposed nuclear-war treaties with the U. S. is clear: to use the signing of the agreement to develop their own weapons, either to match or to surpass the U. S. The reason they are proposing such a new agreement is that they have tasted a sweet taste out of such agreements [in the 1973 Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War].
- The second goal is to divide the U. S. from its allies, and the third is to maintain the nuclear monopoly of the two countries. They will use this point not only to compare themselves with the U. S. but to intimidate countries with only a few nuclear weapons and thus reach their aim of hegemony.
- What is important with the Soviet Union is not treaties -- since China too has a treaty -- but the policy -- the principles and the lines. Treaties are not of much consequence. China doesn't attach much significance to them.

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- 3 -

(Chinese Position in November 1974)

- How reliable is the Vladivostok agreement? How reliable is the prospect of 10 years of detente and an end to competition in the nuclear field? China believes it is impossible to reach detente, and there is no agreement that can bind the hands of Russia.
- The next war might not necessarily be a nuclear war. The Soviets are building their conventional weapons, and their navy, while energetically expanding their nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons should not be neglected.
- China is in favor of the U. S. maintaining strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.
- If the Soviet Union should launch an attack with conventional weapons on not necessarily a large scale, for the U. S. to use nuclear weapons would be a difficult thing to make up its mind about.

U. S. Position in November 1974

- Soviet policy is still a policy of hegemony. If it can't be remedied, it can be resisted.
- The strategic situation is the same whatever the Soviet strategy. If they attack in the East, it will be a threat to the West, and if they attack in the West it will be a threat to the East. The danger and the practical consequences are the same either way. So we don't need to decide this question abstractly. It is not particularly fruitful to debate it. The principal necessity is to keep in mind Soviet overall objectives and the means to prevent them from being realized.
- China may have to fire cannons as the Vice Premier says. We recognize the necessity, and we have our own tunnels. But China should consider that it does not hit its own fortifications. It has not so far, and we rely on China for this.

TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

(U. S. Position in November 1974)

- We have to keep in mind a very complicated U. S. domestic situation. For the U. S. to take strong actions in a crisis, we must do so from a position of having demonstrated to our people that we have exhausted every avenue for peace. So we have to do a lot of shadow-boxing. China should distinguish between appearance and reality.
- The U. S. will not permit a strategic gain for Soviet power, and we will attempt to reduce Soviet power where we can. Simultaneously we go through many stages which create either diplomatic obstacles to the extension of Soviet power, or which create psychological and political obstacles against Soviet military action. The U. S. does not intend to create a condominium with the Soviet Union because the policy of removing all obstacles to Soviet expansion would eventually -- with certainty -- turn against the U. S.
- The Vladivostok Agreement is part of our strategy to isolate and paralyze our domestic left, who would undermine our defense program. And we can do this by pursuing policies which adopt some of their rhetoric.
- At Vladivostok the Soviets agreed upon equal numbers without counting U. S. overseas based systems, giving the U. S. a substantial advantage. The U. S. also has a substantial advantage in warheads for the entire period of the agreement. So Vladivostok demonstrates the Soviet Union is not as strong as it sometimes pretends or they would not have agreed to these conditions. The U. S. paid no price for the Vladivostok agreement, of any kind, in any area. This was evidence of Soviet weakness.
- It is important to be prepared for war and it is U. S. policy to prepare for all eventualities and not to rely on the words of others or their assurances for peace. We agree with Mao's analysis of the overall situation.

TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

-5-

(U.S. Position in November 1974, continued)

- At the same time, open confrontation with the Soviet Union would create the domestic situation that Secretary Kissinger described. In addition, in each European country, the European Left would be able to polarize the political spectrum by labeling us as the source of world tensions. Our present policy forces the Communist parties of Italy and France to support NATO and to fight their domestic battles on purely domestic issues.
- Vladivostok will hardly guarantee ten years of detente -- not for a minute. But if detente breaks down, or when it does, we can better mobilize our public opinion having made every effort for peace. If the USSR respects the agreement, we preserve a certain strategic advantage; if they violate it, we have the psychological and political possibility of a massive breakout ourselves, which we would not have otherwise, for domestic reasons. There is no doubt about the need for vigilance. Metternich said that in dealing with Napoleon, the trick is to appear a fool without being one. Strangely enough, domestically it is easier to get Congress to support levels specified in an agreement than to get the same funds without an agreement.
- Soviet expansion is a threat to our own long-term security, whether to the East or to the West, whether with nuclear or conventional weapons. The Soviet Navy is expanding in numbers but, from our analysis of their maneuvers in the Middle East war, they are clumsy and it would be an easy target. Their navy is absolutely no match for ours. In conventional ground strength, we do not underestimate them.
- It is inevitable [and not the result of U.S. policy] that a large industrial power like the Soviet Union would expand its nuclear arsenal over the last ten years. And it is also characteristic of nuclear weapons that because of their destructiveness, superiority beyond a certain point is not as effective as with conventional weapons. And in numbers, diversity, accuracy and flexibility, U.S. nuclear weapons will be considerably superior to the Soviet Union's for the entire period of the Vladivostok agreement.
- The U.S. fully agrees that conventional forces must not be neglected, and that NATO has a real problem in this area.

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-6-

(U.S. Position in November 1974, continued)

The U.S. has recently increased the number of its divisions.

- It would be extremely dangerous for the Soviet Union to start a conventional war in Europe, because it could not win a decisive victory without a very large battle, and in those circumstances we would use nuclear weapons.
- Using nuclear weapons against a Soviet conventional attack would be a more difficult decision than 10-15 years ago. But it depends on where the attack takes place.
- U.S. strategic forces are only 35% land-based. Soviet strategic forces are 85% land-based, and they are making their improvements in their most vulnerable forces. The U.S. is making its improvements in the least vulnerable sectors, such as the Trident which will be in serial production by 1979. They are planning their forces for the 1970's; we are planning for the 1980's. Vladivostok makes them reduce their forces -- but we have more than 2400 if you count FBS. Soviet sea-based missiles are very poor and won't be MIRV'd before 1980 -- so we will be, in accuracy and procedures, 10-15 years ahead. And we are planning to put long-range missiles on our airplanes, which the Soviet Union cannot do because they don't have airplanes large enough.
- Brezhnev made a proposal to us and repeated it in detail at Vladivostok: a bilateral U.S. -Soviet treaty to defend each other or each other's allies against nuclear attack by any other country, or to observe benevolent neutrality if physical help is not possible. We did not accept serious discussion of this proposal.
- The Soviet motive with this proposal was, first, to undermine NATO; second, to force Arabs who are afraid of nuclear attack by Israel into an alliance relationship with the Soviet Union; and third, against China. Together with creating the general impression of condominium.
- This is far different from the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, because that 1973 Agreement specifically refers to the obligation to avoid conventional wars. The 1973 Agreement has been invoked only once, and by the U.S. -- in the October alert as a warning to the Soviet Union. This latest Brezhnev proposal separates out nuclear war.

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-7-

(U.S. Position in November 1974, continued)

- In every discussion with the Soviet Union, when they make proposals directed against China, such as the CTB or NPT, we have always avoided formulations directed against third countries.

- We inform China of these Soviet overtures not because China should pay attention, but so that if the Soviets approach China, China will know what is happening. And also we have an understanding not to do anything with the Soviet Union without informing China.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

SOVIET UNION

I. NOVEMBER 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in November 1973 (MAO + CHOU)

- The Soviet expansion is a pitiful one. The US should not be afraid of them. They bully the weak and are afraid of the tough. (Mao)
- Kosygin came to China and Mao said the struggle would go on 10,000 years. But as a concession in return for Kosygin's coming to visit, Mao cut it down by 1000 years! (Mao)
- The US does a kind of shadow boxing. China does a kind of shadow boxing that is more energetic. (Mao) And more direct in its blows. (Chou)
- China believes that the US does react to the Soviet challenge. That is why HAK's trip to the Middle East was a good one. (Mao)
- The US's views seem approximately the same as China's, that is, there is the possibility that the Soviet Union wants to attack China. (Mao)
- China's nuclear capability is no bigger than a fly. It would take 30 or 50 years. It is impossible for a country to rise up in a short period. (Mao)
- The Soviet Union has a great ambition: to seize in its hands Europe and Asia, and North Africa and elsewhere. But they will have trouble doing that. Their ambitions are contradictory with their capacity. They have to deal with so many adversaries. They have to deal with the Pacific, with Japan, with China, with South Asia, with the Middle East, with Europe, and with the US. (Mao)
- China is holding down a portion of Soviet troops, which is favorable to the US in Europe and the Middle East. (Mao)
- It would be good if the US does not need to import Soviet natural gas. (Mao)

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By MA NARA, Date 6/22/10

State review 9/17/03

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

(Chinese Position in November 1973)

- It would not be good for the US and Soviet Union to fight a war. If the US and Soviet Union fight, it would be better to use conventional weapons, and leave nuclear weapons in the stockpile, and not to touch them. (Mao)
- The Soviet Union can evade the Nuclear War Prevention Agreement and engage in expansionism in other forms.
- The whole world has to be clear about the Nuclear War Agreement. Otherwise they will think the big powers will discuss other subjects behind their back. That's why there is a wave in the world. That's why China had to make a comprehensive assessment at the UN.
- On the whole it is right not to have an endless debate on this issue [i. e., to complete the treaty rather than have an endless debate].
- China will expose the Soviet Union in the UN.
- The Middle East crisis proved the effectiveness of the US-Soviet relationship. It also provides the US with an opportunity to speak to the Congress to increase the defense budget, not decrease it, during the crisis period. But that could be done without the Nuclear War Treaty.
- The US should not imagine that local wars will not arise.
- Does the US really believe the Soviet Union will reduce her quantity of nuclear weapons?
- It has been proved that expansionism in the world is doomed to failure. But the Soviets want to follow in the steps of their predecessors, and overtake them, and they are stretching their hands everywhere. Can this be stopped? It is a crucial issue.
- Brutality is perhaps the main aspect of Soviet policy, though sometimes they have put on many masks. But for their opponents, things will be complicated. For instance, it will not be so easy for the West European countries to share their common view.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-3-

(Chinese Position in November 1973)

- It is absolutely impossible for the US to go back to isolationism. Although some in the US might think of it, actually they would not be able to realize it. If they should become President themselves, they would have to pursue the present policies.
- The US has now contracted itself a bit, retracted itself on certain questions in order to concentrate on settling the main questions. As revolutionaries, the PRC would be in favor of the US spreading itself out, to be loose and vulnerable. But since now we have come together and we are discussing some realistic and practical questions, we must talk about politics.
- The sentence in the HAK visit communique about opposing hegemony in the whole world, not just in Asia, will be a point of major attention.
- When the Soviet Union gives loans, it determines what it must be paid back in -- for instance, in jute.
- Egypt had to pay the Soviet Union in hard currency for the ammunition it received. Because the Soviet Union told Egypt "Since you have so many friends who are rich in oil resources, you should pay us in money and not in goods."
- The US strategy of holding out the prospect of future investments in the Soviet Union, but not doing much, is a very complicated strategy.

US Position in November 1973

- We are not afraid of the Soviet Union. Every once in a while we have to take some strong measures, as we did in the October alert. (to Mao)
- Our tactics against the Soviet Union are more complex and may be less heroic than the Chinese, but our strategy is the same. We have no doubt who is the principal threat in the world today. When there is a real challenge, we react as China does. (to Mao)

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

(US Position in November 1973)

- We always tell China everything we are doing with the Soviet Union. China can count on this for the future. The Soviet Union likes to create the impression that they and we have a master plan to run the world, but that is to trap other countries. It's not true. We are not that foolish. (to Mao)
- We used to think it was only a theoretical possibility that the Soviet Union would attack China. Now, we think it is more a realistic possibility. They may above all want to destroy China's nuclear capability. (to Mao)
- If this eventuality were to happen, it would have very serious consequences for everybody. We are determined to oppose it, as our own decision, without any arrangement with China. (to Mao)
- It is important that Western Europe and China and the US pursue a coordinated course. Then nobody will be attacked. (to Mao)
- The greatest danger with the Soviet Union is where they either move land armies quickly, as in Czechoslovakia, or make a sudden air attack, in areas where they think we will not do anything. (to Mao)
- Our experience has been that if the Soviet Union knows we are going to war, they draw back. Up to now, they have always been afraid of us. (to Mao)
- We want to gain time, but we also want to be in a position that if the Soviet Union attacks any major areas we discussed, we can resist. And it's in those circumstances we have to be prepared. (to Mao)
- We have controlled US credits to the USSR very rigidly. We haven't given any credits. (to Mao)
- Soviet natural gas, even if developed, would take ten years to deliver and would cover only five percent of our needs. Within that time, we will have developed domestic alternatives. That makes it much less necessary, in fact probably unnecessary, to import gas in quantities. (to Mao)

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-5-

(US Position in November 1973)

- The Soviet Union and US are pursuing almost identical policies toward each other, and it remains to be seen whose judgment is better. The USSR is pursuing a policy of relaxation of tensions with the West for a variety of reasons. One of the reasons undoubtedly is their conviction that if they can create an appearance of detente, the unity of the West will disintegrate and the defense of the West will weaken.

- US policy, as expressed in HAK's Pacem in Terris speech is:
 - . We will resist any aggressive tendencies directed outward.
 - . We will not permit detente to be used to undermine or weaken our relationships with our friends.
 - . We will resist any attempts by the Soviet Union to use international trouble spots to expand its position.

- While these are our principles, we have a complex tactical problem about how to apply them. Many commentators in America are very heroic in intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries but are unwilling to face the consequences of what this would involve. We believe it is important for us to demonstrate that we have made a major effort for peace, in order to be in a position to resist when aggressive action occurs. We will react decisively and if necessary brutally, but we require the prior demonstration that we have been provoked. We proved this in our handling of the 1973 Middle East crisis.

- We do not quarrel with the arguments made by PM Chou and Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao about Soviet intentions.

- The public excitement in America about the October alert was the result of a combination of various forces that produced a contradictory pattern in the public discussion of foreign policy -- though not in the conduct of it. It was a combination of the intellectuals who dislike the President for other reasons, with the old professional anti-communists of the right, so that for the first time some of these right wing groups are being given intellectual respectability. But basically the alert had very wide public support; polls showed that the public favored it two-to-one.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-6-

(US Position in November 1973)

- The main reason we can maintain support for our policy is partly because of its record and partly because of this strategy of forcing the Soviet Union into the posture of provocation [if it acts aggressively]. Sometimes our judgment may be wrong but the strategy is clear.
- On the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War: our judgment was that it was better to deprive it of the significance that the Soviet Union wanted to give it and to remove it as an issue from public debate and from international forums, than to have an endless debate in which public opinion would suffer more damage than it did from the Treaty as in fact written. We linked all its obligations to third countries and we linked conventional war to nuclear war so that it is impossible to resort to conventional war without negating obligations with respect to nuclear war. Finally, it made it impossible to resort to any war without prior consultation.
- Therefore, with this Agreement, we have been given for the first time a legal basis to resist in areas where we have no formal obligation. For example, at the time of the Middle East alert we told the Soviets that a unilateral Soviet move would violate Article 2 of the Treaty and would be resisted accordingly. We showed this to US Senators. We said publicly that the invasion of Czechoslovakia, or massive movement of arms across a frontier, would be treated as violations.
- There is no illusion that legal obligations prevent Soviet expansionism. We do not imagine that local wars will not arise. Our problem is how to get into a position to resist.
- Our strategy toward long-term financial investment in the Soviet Union has been up to now, candidly, to do enough to give the promise of future investments but not so much as to make a strategic difference in their situation.
- The first problem in SALT is to stabilize the numbers of nuclear weapons because the Soviets are still increasing them, and then to bring about a gradual reduction. The Soviets have the theory that they need nuclear weapons for more than one threat.
- Soviet performance under SALT I has been ambiguous, to put it kindly. They have destroyed a few SS-7's but they appear to have replaced them with mobile missiles, which are technically not banned by the agreement but are certainly not in the spirit of the agreement. If this continues, we will put missiles into airplanes, which is also not banned by the agreement.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-7-

(US Position in November 1973)

- Major military expansionism by the Soviet Union can be stopped. The potential victims of expansion should, if not cooperate in a formal way, understand the main lines of each other's policy. That is our policy -- to resist if the Soviet Union engages in a major military movement.
- Political expansionism by the Soviet Union is more difficult to stop. But it can be stopped if one pursues an intelligent policy, if the countries against which it is directed keep in mind the principal requirement. If the US, PRC, and Western Europe understand each other, and if we behave intelligently in other parts of the world, we can contain Soviet expansionism.
- Soviet policy is very brutal, but not very intelligent.
- If we insist that discussions with the Soviets are very detailed so that they cannot have many symbolic successes, and if secondly we resist brutally whenever there is the slightest military threat, the danger can be reduced.
- The impression of our Navy people is that the Soviet Navy lacks a great deal of experience, from observing their maneuvering and their reaction to our action. Our impression is they could not stand up to our fleet on the open sea. We will never make our fleet movements depend on what they do.
- It may be objectively impossible for the US to go back to isolationism, but it is not subjectively inconceivable. The danger is that someone may attempt to pursue an isolationist policy and thereby permit expansion of other countries, and pay a very heavy price before realizing what the dangers are. The probability is that the policy we are now pursuing -- in these main outlines, not in its tactics, which are complex -- will be pursued in the future.
- The sentence in the HAK visit communique about opposing hegemony in all parts of the world, not only in Asia, will not go unnoticed.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLYSOVIET UNIONI. FEBRUARY 1973 TALKSChinese Position in February (MAO + CHOU)

- So long as the objectives are the same, we can work together to commonly deal with a bastard. (Mao)
- The goal of the Soviet Union is to occupy both Europe and Asia. (Mao)
- If Russia attacks, China will let them go where they want and will fight a guerrilla war and protracted war. (Mao)
- The West has the idea of making peace with Russia and pushing Russia eastward -- against China, Japan, and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. (Mao)
- Europe and the US would think it a fine thing if Russia got bogged down in China. After 6 months or 1-2-3-4 years, the US can then poke its finger in the Soviet back, in the name of peace, as a way to bring the Soviet Union down. The US would help them in doing business and offer help against China. (Mao)
- China must think of the worst eventuality -- that they would attack China and be defeated. (Mao)
- The Europeans do not appreciate the menace of Soviet military preparations.
- The Soviet Union has its weak points. It is strong militarily but weak economically. If they use their military power, there will be no end. This will be a mess for them.
- The new Czars are extremely sly. The Brezhnev doctrine has its timid aspects, e. g. on nuclear weapons, but in other aspects they are extremely aggressive. As soon as you slack your steps, they will step in.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By WA NARA, Date 6/22/10*State review 9/17/03*~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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-2-

(Chinese position, cont'd)

- The Soviets are afraid of fighting a nuclear war, and they are even worried that conventional fighting might lead to nuclear war. That is why they have silly ideas like a nuclear treaty.
- To expose the deceptive nature of Soviet policy is a very complicated struggle. E.g., it is difficult to oppose Soviet non-use-of-force proposals. (In the UN, only Albania, China, Portugal and South Africa did. Many abstained. But 70 voted for it.)
- The US wants to reach out to the Soviets by standing on Chinese shoulders. The US thinks China is easy to talk to. E.g., sending Thieu 30 aircraft from Taiwan.
- Both world wars show historical examples of the West having the idea of pushing the aggressor eastward.
- US agreements with the USSR (e.g. Berlin) can be said to be consistent with the Soviet policy to lull or demoralize Western Europe.
- The Soviets want the nuclear agreement to deceive the people of the world; they want secret deals with the U.S. as a means to continue their competition with the U.S. and threaten areas they wish to threaten.
- The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty hasn't expired but it is non-existent. The Soviets seek a non-aggression treaty. This is absurd for allies, and neither sincere nor necessary. If they wanted to end the border conflicts, the first step would be to clarify the preliminary agreement on the border situation. This they won't do. Their motive is propaganda.
- The Soviet Union may have initiated the idea of having Waldheim attend the International Conference on Vietnam.
- The inevitable result of improving the Soviet economic position is to add to their military power. That is all they have thought about. How they realize it is another matter.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 3 -

(Chinese position, cont'd)

- It is not easy for the Soviet Union to achieve its goal [to surpass the US.] If they reach out their hands to the whole world, then they will be in the same position as the US before -- in a passive position. They want to gain the upper hand everywhere, but actually that is impossible for them.
- It is true that if the US thought China could be easily defeated [HAK's first case] there would have been no reason for the US to seek better relations with China. The second and third cases are two sides of one thing, because HAK too attached importance to the danger and to the need to prevent it.
- As Mao mentioned, China must be prepared for the worst. Therefore, China must "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony."
- China must be prepared to withstand an attack for 1-2-3-4 -5 years, until the world understands and reproaches the USSR. China must be prepared so that the attacker will be able to enter but not come out.
- But it is best to prevent the event before it happens.

U. S. Position

- It is not our policy to push Russia to fight China, because the danger to us of a war in China is as great as that of a war in Europe. (to Mao)
- If Russia attacks China, we would certainly oppose them, for our own reasons. If Russia overruns China, this would leave all countries less secure and the US isolated. (to Mao)
- The US wants to discourage and prevent a Soviet attack, not defeat it. (to Mao)
- We both face the same danger. We may have to use different methods sometimes, but for the same objectives. Even if we sometimes criticize each other, the US will coordinate its actions

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

(U. S. position, cont'd)

with China and will never participate in a policy to isolate China.
(to Mao)

- We will never knowingly cooperate in an attack on China. (to Mao)
- If a real danger exists or hegemonial intentions become active, we will resist them wherever they appear -- in our own interest, not as a kindness to anyone else. (to Mao)
- There is a strong community of interest that is operating immediately between us. (to Mao)
- There are certain factors pointing toward an era of peace (e. g. , possible tranquility in Southeast Asia), but in the long term there are countervailing factors: First, the intensive Soviet military buildup in all directions and in strategic and tactical weapons simultaneously; second, the intellectual confusion in Western Europe and Europe's weakness as a counterweight; a third problem area is Japan.
- Resisting a Soviet thrust eastward is politically and psychologically more difficult for us than resisting a thrust westward. But the consequences of not preventing a thrust eastward are equally dangerous for us.
- The intensive Soviet effort of military preparations -- not just in Siberia but in strategic forces pointed towards us -- can't be accounted for unless one assumes the option of their use is being prepared.
- It is too dangerous for the Soviets to attack Western Europe. They will try to create an atmosphere of peace to free themselves to move East or South.
- The Soviets do not like to take excessive risks.
- The Soviet Union has its weak points -- economically -- but this may give them an incentive to use their military machine while it is still so strong.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-5-

(U. S. position, cont'd)

- The US is not standing on Chinese shoulders to reach out to the Soviets. Our shipments of arms to Thieu from Taiwan had nothing to do with the USSR.
- The Soviets have again proposed a Nuclear Agreement and want to sign it when Brezhnev comes to the US. But there is no possibility the US will agree to a treaty obligation not to use nuclear weapons. The only question is tactical--whether to reject it completely or evasively. We have considered a draft on creating conditions in which nuclear weapons would not be used, which would amount to a renunciation of force. This depends on our basic strategy.
- HAK's trip to Peking in July 1971 gave the Soviets an incentive to improve their relations with us. We had expected the opposite. The most probable Soviet motive is to demoralize Western Europe, exploit US technology to build up their power, isolate weaker opponents and ultimately isolate the US.
- The US strategy, because of our difficult domestic situation resulting from Vietnam, is to maneuver rather than have a frontal confrontation. When necessary (Cienfuegos, Jordan), we have reacted with extreme violence to direct Soviet challenges.
- We have had to rally our people by some conspicuous successes in foreign policy. We had to end the war in an honorable way. We want to modernize our strategic power. We want to maneuver the USSR into the position of provocateur. We have to get our people used to some new propositions about US interests. This is determined by our own necessities.
- The only agreements we reach with the USSR are ones that either cost us nothing (Berlin), are in a general interest (SALT), or are nonpolitical (exchanges).
- In this context, the nuclear treaty is to play for time without giving away anything of substance.
- Since SALT, we have greatly accelerated the qualitative improvement of our strategic forces. Our preparations for SALT led us to study our defense posture in particular detail.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-6-

(U. S. position, cont'd)

- The collapse of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam would affect our ability to conduct any effective foreign policy. This is one reason the Soviets are moving into a position of undermining the Agreement. They are also trying to establish their position in Hanoi.
- Under no circumstances will we make any secret arrangements with the USSR. The PRC will be kept informed, and everything will be published.
- We will never accept that in case of a Soviet attack on Europe Soviet territory will be immune; that in case of war in the Middle East nuclear weapons cannot be used; or third, that it is possible to threaten the international balance without the risk of nuclear war.
- The Soviets want US technology to improve their economic position, not their military position. Though they also want to improve their military position.
- The lesson of two World Wars is that once a big war starts, its consequences are unpredictable. A country which encourages a big war in the hope that it can calculate its consequences is likely to produce a disaster for itself. In both wars the Germans moved westward first.
- As for the US pushing the Soviets toward the East, there are three possible causes: (1) that we want the Soviets to defeat China, (2) that we want a stalemate that exhausts both, or (3) that we produce such a result by incompetence, by permitting such demoralization in the West that the Soviets feel free to attack.
- The first case would be a disaster for the US because a victorious USSR would attract Japan, Finlandize Europe, and isolate the US.
- As for the second case, the President believes a Sino-Soviet war would have cataclysmic effects regardless of the outcome, and very unpredictable consequences. The Soviets could break out in some other direction to escape their dilemma. Japanese and Indian actions could not be predicted. It would demonstrate US

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(U. S. position, cont'd)

impotence and irrelevance, or force the US into extremely complex decisions.

--So if a Sino-Soviet war occurs as a result of our action, it will be the result of misjudgment, not deliberate policy. A morally disarmed West could tempt them to act. This is a real danger.

--If they attack China, it is very probable that we would poke them in the back, as Mao suggested. Our aim is to develop our policy so that we can take such measures.

--The greatest danger is that the Soviet Union will become so frustrated that it will do something rash. Their nervousness about HAK's visit to China indicated they do not feel they are gaining ground.

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SOVIET UNION

II. JUNE TALKS 1972

PM Chou's Position

- The PRC favors a relaxation of US-Soviet relations.
- The Soviets had made certain feelers toward Peking for better relations, but Peking was rejecting them. The Sino-Soviet border talks are getting nowhere; after 3 years the Soviets would not even agree to codify agreed-upon working principles.
- The PRC would never borrow from Moscow again.
- When dealing with the Soviets, one should have documents carefully prepared ahead of time.
- In contrast to Peking's restraint, Moscow was heaping abuse on the PRC for dealing with the US while the Vietnam War continued. But it was clear that the Soviets were not even attempting to move supplies through the US blockade.
- The Soviets were trying to free their rear in Europe so as to outflank us in the Mideast, using radical Arabs on one side and India on the other. They were spreading into Southeast Asia, from both Hanoi and Delhi, while maintaining their pressures on China's borders.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC. 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By

NARA, Date 6/22/10

Stalin v. us 9/17/83

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-- SALT and other arms control measures might limit arms in some fields, but there would be increases in others.

Disarmament is impossible.

-- The Soviets are determined to exceed the US in military terms, in spite of the economic burden this involves. The present leadership would never agree to cut back armaments.

-- The PRC appreciates Laird straightforwardness in making clear that the US needed to maintain its military strength.

HAK's Position

-- A strong US and strong US-PRC relations were in the mutual interest in this regard. At the same time, the US would continue to make specific agreements with Moscow that served US national interests.

-- The Soviets wanted to create the impression that one went to Peking for banquets, but to Moscow to do business.

-- The US would not join in any agreement directed against the PRC. The US would keep the PRC fully informed of all negotiations with Moscow, and was willing to conclude similar agreements with the PRC.

-- The Soviet strategy since July 1971 had been to accelerate agreements with the US in order to pressure the PRC. This highlighted the value to the PRC of increasing its bilateral contacts in trade and exchanges with us.

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-- At the same time the Soviets acted aggressively in South Asia in 1971 to demonstrate US-PRC impotence.

-- The Soviets poured arms into Indochina after the first Podgorny visit. They probably would have liked the offensive to occur before the Peking Summit, to complicate US-PRC relations.

-- The US would conclude agreements with Moscow with the intention of influencing them toward constructive behavior.

If they turned aggressive, the agreements would not prevent us from acting to counter them.

-- The US could not rule out first use of nuclear weapons in at least two situations: an attack on Western Europe or one in Asia that affected basic forces there.

-- The question of US credits for the USSR is a difficult one.

We would like to strengthen the peaceful elements in the USSR; on the other hand, this aid may enable them to compete in ways they otherwise could not. If we give credits we will do it in ways that can be regulated according to their behavior.

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SOVIET UNION

I. FEBRUARY TALKS 1972

PM Chou's Position

- China does not oppose improvement of US-Soviet relations. China indeed hopes that US and USSR reach agreements on disarmament, etc. PRC even suggested President visit Moscow first.
- PRC is concerned at superpowers' expenditures on arms expansion.
- In 1962, the Soviet Union encouraged Indian attack on China and blamed China. USSR and India are the only two of PRC's neighbors who aren't willing to settle border issues peacefully; they want pretexts available for provocations.
- Policy of Soviet Union is policy of expansion. Soviets bitterly resent criticism because PRC criticism has influence in the world.
- USSR does not believe in five principles and peaceful coexistence.
- The "Socialist Camp" no longer exists because there are many different ideas.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By NARA, Date 6/22/10

-- PRC told Soviets in 1970 that: 1) PRC would not make provocations; 2) PRC would defend itself if Soviets attacked; 3) What PRC says counts; and 4) Soviet attacks from the air would constitute war. These points still govern PRC attitude.

-- China has no territorial claims on USSR or any wish to impose its will. PRC is willing to settle border issues on basis of 1) status quo; 2) begin talks free from threats of force; and 3) immediate disengagement of troops facing each other.

-- Soviets are really very frightened that US and PRC are coming closer. Actually PRC began talks with USSR before beginning with US.

-- Kosygin seemed interested in solving problems, but Brezhnev is stronger, more ambitious, more emotional. Kosygin is from time to time able to talk reason; but he has a technical mind and is not farsighted.

-- Because of their new nuclear strength, Brezhnev has larger ambitions than Khrushchev. Because he succeeded in Czechoslovakia, he has ambitions in Balkans, is trying to subvert Yugoslavia.

-- Gromyko told Fukuda there will be Sino-Soviet clash within 5 years.

The President's Position

-- It is not in US interest to have war between USSR and PRC. War could not be contained, and would involve the whole world.

-- US would also oppose Soviet attempt to engage in aggressive action against China.

-- US will keep PRC informed of US-Soviet accords and is willing to conclude similar accords with PRC. In Moscow, US will not negotiate about or discuss its relations with PRC without PM Chou's approval or knowledge.

-- US does not want to do anything with regard to China that embarrasses it in its relations with the USSR.

-- Arms race is wasteful, but USSR becomes interested in arms control only when US increases its programs.

-- US has put China on equal footing with USSR on trade.

-- China is no threat to USSR now because of Soviet nuclear superiority. Real Soviet concern is not the border, which is pretext, but leadership and doctrine of Socialist Camp. Soviets must also fear Chinese strength in future, because they do take long view.

-- Best US policy toward USSR is firmness without belligerency. South Asian crisis is example.

-- Mutual US-Soviet interest in avoiding conflict or confrontation is best assurance of long-term peace.

ISSUES PAPER



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

THE SOVIET UNION

The Problem

Your scope paper already provides you with a detailed treatment of the central issue in Sino-American relations--the Soviet Union. This paper recaptures the basic themes of that paper and the lines that should emerge in your talks in Peking.

Chinese criticism--both public and private--of our detente policies toward the Soviet Union has reached a point where it is beginning to suggest to various audiences that Sino/American relations are stalemated or even deteriorating. The impression of a growing Sino/American quarrel over these issues is unhelpful in our strategy of dealing with the USSR and, if carried too far, could undercut domestic support for improving relations with Peking. Even though you cannot realistically expect to change the Chinese view, it is essential that you forcefully counter Chinese charges that we are allowing ourselves to become militarily weak, that we lack realism in our understanding of the Soviets, or that we can be diverted from careful pursuit of our detente with the Soviet Union. Your basic theme should be that we have the same strategic perspective as the Chinese but must pursue different tactics. Neither side should presume to instruct the other on its policies.

Background

Mutual concern about the dangers of Soviet expansionism has been a centerpiece of our discussions with the Chinese. From the start in 1971, the Chinese have exhibited considerable criticism and suspicion of our Soviet policies, but we did not find this surprising in light of Chinese strategic interests and their virulent

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines, State review 9/17/03

By Date 6/22/10

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hostility toward the Russians. In public, moreover, they tended to mute the extent of their disagreement with us, and in private they adopted a reasonable tone of criticism. In fact, the most constructive phase of our new relationship with Peking was 1971-73, which coincided with the period of our most active effort to achieve detente with the Soviets. Although other important factors were involved, the shift to a far more critical and vocal PRC stance began after our troubles over Watergate, Congressional restraints, and Indochina.

Hardened Chinese Line. The Chinese now characterize our policy toward the Russians as naive appeasement of a powerful and aggressive Soviet Union. They believe that the US/Soviet military balance is shifting perceptibly in favor of the Soviets, that the process is already well under way, and that we are wittingly and unwittingly aiding and abetting it by our military and economic decisions. They seem convinced that if we persist with our "strategic passivity," the growth of Soviet strength will lead to military adventurism and a new world war.

In essence the Chinese want us to pull ourselves together, increase our defense efforts, and drop our search for reduced tensions in favor of a more confrontational "containment" of the Soviet Union. Such a shift would of course have the immediate advantage to the Chinese of diverting some of the Soviet military threat from China to the West along with the longer term benefit of hampering the growth of Soviet power. The Chinese always disguise their direct concern about this question of focus, arguing that the Soviets are feinting toward the East while actually directing their forces toward the West; even Soviet forces on the Chinese border are sometimes described as primarily directed against US forces in East Asia and Japan. They also assert that they can cope

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with any Soviet threat to China and that they neither need nor want anyone's help. Yet it is obvious from almost all conversations with them that the Chinese fear the evolution of detente will permit the Soviets to direct even more of their aggressive attention toward China. In the case of arms control, for example, the Chinese charge that our agreements with the USSR have emboldened Soviet policy against China.

We are uncertain why the Chinese have chosen to raise the tempo of their quarrel with us over detente at a time when they remain anxious about the Soviet military threat and almost paranoically concerned about Soviet political inroads in many parts of the world. Without doubt they feel less constrained about criticizing us in the absence of movement on SALT and other US/Soviet dealings. Within limits, moreover, they probably discount the utility, in balance of power terms, of a United States which they see beset by internal preoccupations and uncertainties. The Chinese may well be reacting to their disappointed hopes of progress in normalization of relations and concern that US/Soviet agreements are not simply tactical moves by the US. They may believe we attach so much importance to our relationship with China that we will do everything possible to maintain it, regardless of what the Chinese say. Leadership changes in China have also contributed to a more dogmatic quality in Chinese policies. Age may have intensified Mao's tendency to generalize about the sweep of history with a certain detachment from mundane aspects of reality, while Chou En-lai's illness has removed the one man with sufficient sophistication and stature to implement Mao's edicts in ways that did not cause excessive damage. Whatever the precise motivation--and there is probably a mixture of factors--the Chinese are now attacking our policies in public as well as in private discussions.

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Sino/Soviet Relations. While the hardened Chinese line on detente and the cooler atmosphere in US/PRC relations during the past year reflects obvious Chinese disappointment over our steadiness and weight as a world power, the change does not signify a PRC intention to abandon its US connection or change its policy toward the Soviet Union. Sino/Soviet rivalry has, if anything, intensified. Polemics have escalated.

Fears of US/USSR collusion are less pronounced in Peking's propaganda than the concern that the West is not sufficiently far-sighted and resolute in the face of Soviet carrot-and-stick tactics. The Chinese are fearful that the Soviets will become a significant foreign influence in Indochina, indeed in Asia generally. They have attacked the Helsinki Agreement in the most vigorous terms, claiming that it lulls the West to sleep and legitimizes the Soviet presence in Central Europe; they also see it as a forerunner to an Asian security scheme directed against Peking. They give considerable weight to Moscow's ability to maneuver in Western Europe through the "revisionist" Communist parties. And they see serious unraveling of NATO's southern flank in Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Italy, plus the uncertainties in Spain. The Chinese fear the erosion of Europe as an effective counterweight to the Soviets and they want us to strengthen the resolve of the Europeans to resist Soviet blandishments and threats.

As long as Chairman Mao exercises influence in Peking, we believe his highly personal distrust of the Russians will constitute an effective barrier to any flexibility in the PRC's orientation to Moscow. Over time, the situation may change. The PRC's stress on the need to combat revisionism and to denounce traitorous "capitulationism" suggests that there are voices in Peking (which we believe are centered in the military) arguing for a diminution of Sino/Soviet tensions.

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The Soviets expect no early improvement in their relations with the Chinese. The border talks remain stalled, and the Chinese continue to hold the crew of a Soviet helicopter which strayed into their territory in 1974. Moscow has increased the intensity of its anti-Maoist propaganda and cast its Asian policy in increasingly anti-Maoist terms, implying to other bloc leaders and European Communist parties that fighting Maoism is more important than fighting imperialism. Paralleling this rhetorical attention, Moscow continues to upgrade its military deployments along the Chinese frontier, and the Russians conducted two very large land and naval exercises during 1975 which were obviously targeted on the PRC.


Chinese Position

The essentials of the Chinese view are as follows:

-- The United States correctly recognized in the early 1970's that it was in its own national interest to find common ground with China in opposing Soviet expansionism. Profound differences of philosophic view and policy should not be permitted to obscure this shared perception of danger. This was reflected in the Shanghai Communique, especially the anti-hegemony clause, which is still the best charter for US/PRC behavior.

-- The United States should build up its military strength; refuse help to the USSR in overcoming its weakness in food and technology; strengthen and mobilize Europe against Soviet encroachment; consolidate relations with Japan; "use two hands" in the Middle East (i.e., reduce Soviet/Arab collaboration by displaying less partiality for Israel); and concentrate its strength on key fronts rather than becoming bogged down in quagmires, such as Indochina and Korea. The US should stop trying to "catch ten fleas with ten fingers."

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-- The United States gives higher priority to its relations with the USSR than those with the PRC. Indeed it has stood on Chinese shoulders to get to Moscow (i.e. used our China opening as leverage on the Russians).

-- The United States has confused tactics and strategy. Flexibility may have some limited advantages for the United States as a tactic but if the tactics of detente become a strategy, the United States and Western Europe will be the losers and the process will lead to world war. Detente creates illusions which lead to appeasement of an aggressive Soviet Union, much the way the United Kingdom and France under Chamberlain and Daladier appeased Hitler at Munich. The ultimate victims of this appeasement will be the West because the Soviet Union is only feinting in the East toward China, while preparing to strike against Europe, US forces in Asia, and Japan.

-- There is a storm coming and US maneuvering, while it may delay its arrival, cannot stop it. The best way to deal with Moscow is not through agreements but by making preparations.

-- China is not trying to divert the Soviets toward the West and recognizes that it would be involved in a world war. But the Russians know they don't have enough forces to subdue the 800 million people of China. It would take two decades if they should try. Regardless of US policy, China can handle any Soviet threat; it follows a policy of self-reliance. It fears nothing under heaven or on earth. Nuclear weapons will not be as important as an aroused population armed with "millet and rifles."

-- The United States is in the process of endangering world security by its policies toward the Soviet Union. In conventional weapons, the Soviet Union has long exceeded the combined forces of the United States and Western Europe. The

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United States has now reached agreements which allow the Soviets to increase their strategic nuclear forces to a point matching those of the United States. Overall military superiority has therefore shifted to the USSR.

-- A new kind of isolationism seems to be developing in the United States along with muddle-headedness in Europe. The United States and Europe are openly assisting their most dangerous adversary. The United States has sold large amounts of grain, permitting the Russians to build their strategic reserves. Along with Europe it has provided the USSR with modern technology and helped finance the sales by massive credits.

US Position

You should explain why we seek better bilateral relations with the Soviets and international equilibrium, while we simultaneously maintain the world's most powerful military forces and remain ready to counter Soviet expansionism. You should emphasize that we pursue these policies because we consider them in our national interest. We recognize that the Chinese have disagreements with us because of what they consider their national interest. We in turn are in a different situation than China and have to follow policies we think are in our national interest. We don't lecture China on its policies; it should not presume to lecture us on ours. We should agree to disagree on tactics and do so in ways that do not undermine our common strategic objective, i.e., opposition to Soviet hegemony.

-- We are engaged in a serious effort with the Soviet Union to improve our bilateral relations and stabilize the international system because we consider such developments to be in our national interest. Tactically, we also pursue these policies because a serious effort to relax tensions enables us to mobilize public support for

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a strong military capability and for firmer measures when we find it necessary to resist Soviet expansionism. We will resist hegemony; but we will also avoid needless confrontations and pursue detente in ways that do not threaten the security of third countries.

-- We have no illusions about the Soviet Union and recognize the substantial growth of Soviet power as well as the worldwide danger of Soviet efforts to achieve hegemony. We have always resisted such Soviet efforts in the past, e.g. Berlin, Jordan and Cuba in 1970; the Indian subcontinent crisis in 1971; and the Middle East alert in 1973. And we are active now in such areas as the Middle East, Angola, and Portugal, even though others (e.g. China) do not help us and sometimes criticize us. We will remain militarily and politically strong to act forcefully in the future. And we will continue to place the highest emphasis on our alliances with NATO and Japan.

-- We recognize Soviet hostility to China. We will not permit the USSR to dictate our policies toward China nor will we make any moves with Moscow that could be turned against China. Secretary Kissinger has kept China meticulously informed about our dealings with Moscow.

-- We share a common perception with China about the danger of hegemony. We understand that China disagrees with our policies of detente. But we are convinced it is in the mutual US-Chinese national interest to convey an impression internationally of two states cooperating with each other within certain limits rather than of two powers seeking to use each other. Regrettably some of the publicity surrounding recent contacts has given the impression that our quarrel far exceeds our agreement. This only benefits the USSR.

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-- We inevitably have many dealings with the Soviet Union because it is a superpower. But in terms of strategy we are trying to contain Soviet expansion and share parallel interests with Peking. We do not use China to get to Moscow.

-- It is not fundamentally important whether Soviet power is initially directed against the West or the East. Global defense requires an integrated concept; if the Soviets were able to successfully attack the United States and Europe, China would subsequently face a far greater threat, and the reverse is also true. The essential thing is to maintain world equilibrium to prevent a Soviet attack in the West or the East.

-- We would certainly defend Europe, and use nuclear weapons if necessary, in response to a Soviet attack.

-- China underestimates US power and the resilience of the American people. Even though Soviet military power has increased relatively because of technology and an earlier US decision not to build up our power, the fact is that the US retains impressive military superiority.

-- We are continuing the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. If we complete the agreement, the main accomplishment will be the setting of definite limits on overall Soviet strategic weapons levels and on their MIRVs. It will give us a surer basis on which to plan for our own forces, and could be a base line for mutual reductions thereafter.

-- In this process, the Soviets have made major concessions. They accepted the principle of equality in aggregate levels of strategic weapons. They also set aside their demands that US forward based forces (e.g. in Europe and on carriers) and the nuclear weapons of our Allies be taken into account.

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-- There remain two serious unresolved problems: cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire aircraft. The US cruise missile programs represent a technological breakthrough which the Soviets seek to block off entirely; we wish to protect potentially useful technological options, but can accept some numerical limitations. The Backfire has the capability to reach US territory on one-way missions, and on two-way missions as well with suitable refueling and basing capability. But its strategic impact is minor as an addition to Soviet MIRV forces, so there may be some possibility of accommodation.

-- However SALT turns out, our strategic position is secure and it will remain so. We are determined to take all necessary measures to maintain force effectiveness both in fact and in the perceptions of our friends and enemies. Our very strong defense budget illustrates this. Our MIRVed weapons carry many thousands of warheads; our new ballistic missile submarine program will assure even greater survivability, reliability and accuracy; and we are adding thousands of missiles to our bomber force. These are forces of the highest technical sophistication and their effectiveness cannot be significantly offset by any combination of foreseeable Soviet programs. We hold a sizeable lead in these categories over the USSR. True, the Soviet force is also powerful. But we remain capable of negating, through retaliation, any military advantage the Soviets could hope to achieve through an attack at any conventional or nuclear level of force.

-- Our people have been through confused times, but there is demonstrable support for defense, and the great majority of our people reject withdrawal from the world. The Chinese should not mistake a temporary mood in Washington for the real mood of the American people around the country.

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-- We do not assist Soviet capabilities for aggression. Our long-term grain agreement with the USSR gives us an assured market for our grain surpluses and prevents Moscow from manipulating the international grain market to their advantage. No government credits are involved, and the Soviets are forced to draw down their gold and hard currency reserves to pay for what they are getting.

-- Under US trade legislation, no new Export-Import Bank credits can be extended to the Soviet Union pending a resolution of the emigration question and even then a \$300 million ceiling is imposed for a four-year period. Although Exim credits extended previously amount to \$469 million, only \$130 million have been drawn upon. The Soviets are looking for commercial credits, but so far have not met with great success.

-- Our controls on technology transfer effectively prevent the Soviets from gaining strategic advantage from trade with us, and we will continue to administer these controls vigilantly. For example, we have just refused permission to sell an IBM computer to Intourist.

Department of State
November 1975

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