

**The original documents are located in Box 2, folder “Chronological File, July - October 1975” of the National Security Advisor. Staff Assistant Peter W. Rodman Files, (1970) 1974-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

July 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

PETER RODMAN

SUBJECT:

Confidant of Miki Wants To See You

Kei Wakaizumi called me today.

Mr. Kazushige Hirasawa, independent political columnist for Japan Times and a commentator on NHK-TV Evening News, is coming to Washington July 25th to prepare the way for the Miki visit. He has been a confidant of Miki for 30 years. He wrote to Wakaizumi with a request to see you privately sometime before the Miki visit. Hirasawa wrote that this was Miki's desire.

Wakaizumi believes this true and also believes that Miki relies heavily on Hirasawa's advice. Hirasawa is also writing an article for the forthcoming Foreign Affairs. He writes and speaks English well.

He would like to meet you secretly, e.g. at the White House, sometime after the 25th, for a half an hour.


APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

**DECLASSIFIED**

EO 12958, Sec. 3.5

NBC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines  
By dal, NARA, Date 3/30/04



2

ACTION

July 19, 1975


**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER**

**FROM:** PETER W. RODMAN

**SUBJECT:** Philip Klutzaick and Guido Goldman

You told Philip Klutzaick, Nahum Goldman et al. in Geneva that you would inform them of the results of your meeting with Rabin. This is probably self-evident now from the newspapers, but if you wish, I could call Guido or Mr. Klutzaick to tell them in general terms that we are making progress on the interim.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ HK will take care of it \_\_\_\_\_



MEMORANDUM

3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

July 21, 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PMR*  
SUBJECT: Jerry Warren

Jerry Warren has sent you a very warm farewell letter.  
(Tab B). A warm reply for your signature is at Tab A.

Jerry invites you to meet with the editorial board of the San Diego Union, of which he will be the editor, whenever you are in Southern California after September 1. Your reply expresses a general willingness to do so if possible.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the reply to Jerry Warren at Tab A.



PWR chran

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1975

Dear Jerry:

Thank you for your kind note of July 18.

I will miss you. Your unshakeable loyalty, decency, and conscientious service were a great contribution to the two Presidents you served. I am proud to have had you as a colleague.

I am sure The San Diego Union will be an enlightened participant in the national debate on foreign policy. In this capacity you will be serving your country in the future as ably as you served it in the past. If I am in the area, I will be delighted to see you and, if possible, to meet your editorial board.


Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. Gerald L. Warren  
Deputy Press Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Re: Unshakable loyalty, and Kissinger and  
fence for the White House

AK



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 18, 1975

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As I prepare to leave Washington, D.C., I desire to settle my accounts, as my thrifty father would.

Throughout these past six and one half years of turbulence and wild swings in our national psyche there has been a constancy and brilliance in our evolving foreign policy which has helped, I believe, to keep us united.

It has been my great fortune to have been present during this evolution. I will always be grateful to President Nixon for this. I fear I was at times more an impediment than a help to this process, but it is comforting to see that vital sections dropped from important communiquees have not terminally damaged detente.

I will not forget your understanding and your many personal kindnesses to me. I would welcome an opportunity to reciprocate.


If The San Diego Union can assist in your enlightened stimulation of a national foreign policy debate please call on me. And, I would like to invite you to an editorial board meeting when you are in the Southern California area after September 1.

With my best wishes.

Sincerely,

*Jerry*  
Gerald L. Warren  
Deputy Press Secretary  
to the President

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



TALKING POINTS ON EUROPEAN TRIP1. NATO Allies

-- As you know, we held a NATO Summit meeting in Brussels at the end of May in order to display Western solidarity before the CSCE Summit. On this trip I stopped in Bonn, had bilateral talks with Giscard and Wilson in Helsinki, and attended a four-power luncheon. Our allies are our first priority and our alliance is in good shape.


-- One of the big topics of my talks with our allies was the economy. We all agreed on the need to maintain our recovery and also to restrain inflation. We will work in tandem.

2. Helsinki/CSCE

-- The CSCE turned out to be the biggest propaganda beating the Russians have taken in a long time. Every Western speaker emphasized the importance of human contacts and freer exchange of ideas; we and some of the Eastern European countries emphasized non-intervention. Everyone stressed the need to translate the fine words into deeds. But this illustrates that the document itself had nothing in it that the American people couldn't endorse wholeheartedly.

-- The CSCE "Final Act" is a declaration of general principles, not a legally binding document. It doesn't "ratify" Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe; on the contrary. (If the critics don't want us to agree to the "invioability of borders," they should tell us which borders they think we should violate.) The status quo in Europe was fixed by reality 30 years ago, and confirmed by West Germany's treaties with its neighbors five years ago. Peaceful change is not only still possible, but it is endorsed in the document.

-- The West not only stayed together remarkably during the whole process, but we obtained concessions from the Soviets during the negotiation of the document, and we had already extracted a Berlin settlement and MBFR talks as an entrance price. The Western allies agreed many, many months ago that we would have a ceremonial summit at the end if we got certain concessions from the Russians in the document. We got those concessions. In any case, I was not going to wreck an international conference just because of a press campaign three weeks before the meeting.




-- Helsinki was a good opportunity to have a series of bilateral meetings. I met with the leaders of Greece, Turkey, Spain, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Finland, the USSR. Secretary Kissinger met with many others.

-- With Brezhnev I discussed principally SALT. We settled some issues but we have more to do. We will follow up on this, and I am still aiming at an agreement this year.

3. Warsaw/Bucharest/Belgrade

-- My visit to the three Eastern European capitals is the clearest evidence of our attitude to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe: namely we don't recognize it. Our relationship with Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia is one of the dramatic new developments of this decade. They are the three that have displayed the most independence, and our ties with them demonstrate that we feel a stake in their preserving their independence.



MEMORANDUM

5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

August 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

PETER W. RODMAN *QMR*

SUBJECT:


Letter from a Kissinger Scholarship  
Recipient

At Tab B is a warm letter to you from Brian O'Connor, who will be a sophomore at Harvard and has just been awarded a Kissinger Scholarship as a dependent of someone killed, wounded or MIA in Southeast Asia. He thanks you, and notes that Claverly gives the best parties on campus these days.

You may want to send a brief reply. A draft is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the reply to Brian O'Connor at Tab A.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1975


Dear Brian:

Thank you for your kind note of July 23 telling me of your Scholarship Award. It was thoughtful of you to write, and I was very moved by it. I wish you the best success at Harvard. It gives me great satisfaction to know that the Scholarship Fund has been of such benefit, and to one who merits it.

Best Regards,

  
Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. Brian P. W. O'Connor  
17 Valley View Terrace  
Moorestown, New Jersey 08057



17 Valley View Terrace  
Moorestown, New Jersey 08057  
July 23, 1975

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.


Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I have recently been made the grateful recipient of a scholarship made possible by your munificence, one of the Kissinger Scholarship Awards for dependents of military personnel killed, missing-in-action, or disabled in the Southeast-Asian Theatre.

I would like to express to you my sincerest gratitude for this award. I will be a sophomore at Harvard College next fall, and, as you know, meeting the expenses of this institution constitutes a great financial strain on those of limited resources. You may be assured that my award will considerably ease the financial pressure on myself and my family, and enable me to continue my studies unburdened by worries of monetary limitations.

Once again, allow me to thank you for your generosity, and, incidentally, Claverly House gives the best parties on campus these days.

I remain,



Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive ink that reads "Brian P.W. O'Connor".


Brian P.W. O'Connor

To Sec 6 18<sup>6</sup>

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT , VAIL August 11, 1975  
FROM: BUD MCFARLANE *RCM*

At the staff meeting today we were invited to provide material to the speech writers for a Presidential address to the American Legion in Minneapolis on August 19th. Subject: "The Meaning of Detente."

Attached for your review are some basic themes as sketched out by Peter, which we could convey to Milton Friedman, who will be working on it. We would propose also to make sure he has copies of HAK's detente statement to the SFRC of September 19, 1974, and HAK's Birmingham and Minneapolis speeches, which cover some of these themes.



August, 1975

Relations with the Soviet Union

1. We start with our own strength, and with close relations with allies. These are the foundation of our foreign policy and the only reliable basis for any effort to ease tensions with the Soviet Union. [President attended NATO Summit in May before CSCE Summit in July.]

2. No relationship with the Soviet Union will ever be a substitute for our own effort -- strengthening our defenses, maintaining allied cohesion, supporting allies, maintaining our intelligence services, reacting vigorously to encroachment. If we fail to protect our own interest (Indochina, Portugal, Turkey), it is our fault, not a Soviet-caused setback.

3. The policy called detente is an attempt to build on the balance of power to serve American objectives in other concrete ways:


-- to achieve reliable arms control agreements limiting the arms race on a secure basis.

-- to solve concrete political disputes such as Berlin and restrain big-power interference in such areas as the Middle East.

-- to engage Soviet society in contacts and exchanges with the outside world, at every level, and to give the Soviet Government a stake in maintaining improved political relations.

-- to maintain a dialogue with the Soviet leaders on a regular basis, to further our negotiations and to reduce the dangers of conflict in crisis situations.

4. It has always been our policy to measure progress by concrete agreements, not cordial atmosphere. We pursue this policy because we understand the profound moral and political conflict between our system and theirs, and because in the thermonuclear age managing the US-Soviet relationship is the central foreign policy issue of our time. [President said April 10: "There should be no illusions about the nature of the Soviet system -- but there should also be no illusions about how to deal with it."]



5. Arms Control:

-- SALT I froze the numerical buildup, at a time when the Soviet Union was building 200 ICBM's a year and 100 SLBM's a year, and we were building nothing in the 5-year period. Thus it was totally in our interest -- and in a mutual interest.

-- The Vladivostok accords in SALT II put us on an equal level -- even though the Soviet Union presently has more strategic systems than we have. Thus this accord is unmistakably in our interest. The accord will leave it open to us to develop the numbers and types and throw weight and mix of weapons that we need, subject to the agreed limits.

-- We will maintain our defenses.

6. European Study:

-- It was not we who were on the defensive in Helsinki, being challenged by every delegation to live up to the principles being signed. The President's speech made clear our principles. The document signed spelled out principles of non intervention and freer movement of people and ideas that represent our hopes for Europe's future.


-- Stability in Europe has been an American and Western objective for 30 years. The borders have already been settled by postwar international and bilateral agreements for many years.

-- A ceremonial summit meeting to end the Conference was agreed to by all the Western allies many months ago. In return, we obtained from the Soviet Union a Berlin agreement in 1971, a period of greater tranquillity in Europe, and the beginning of MBFR talks-- which we will pursue.

-- We have nothing to fear, and everything to be confident of. The winds of change are blowing from the West in Europe. The peoples of the West are not being lulled into a false sense of security. On the contrary.

7. Economic Relations

-- We have always proceeded on the principle that economic relations must be linked with improved political conditions. The vast economic attraction of Western technology and Western



agricultural production are a diplomatic asset, and we have always used them so. Our trade relations with key Eastern European countries are a new and important feature of our policy. The Soviet Union's abandonment of its Stalinist policy of economic autarky is a welcome change, tying the Soviet Union to the rest of the world in many ways. The complementary nature of our economies and the interdependence of all nations in the world's global trading system can be forces for peace and we will use them so.

-- This Government needs flexibility to use this economic power in constructive ways to serve our interest.

-- The agreements we make will be a two-way street, with equal benefits for both. We will do it on no other basis.

7. A strong foreign policy depends not on rhetoric but on the capacity to act effectively. Some of those who now criticize our policy toward the Soviet Union have themselves been assaulting over 10 years every instrument and institution of our government that makes a strong foreign policy possible -- our defense budgets, our intelligence services and activities, military and economic assistance to allies, the ability of the government to conduct its deliberations and negotiations in private, and the diplomatic flexibility of the President.

8. Key Sources:

-- The President's Address to the Congress on Foreign Policy, April 10, 1975


-- The President's Remarks to the CSCE, Helsinki, August 1, 1975

-- The President's Remarks to the DAR Continental Congress, April 14, 1975

-- Secretary Kissinger's Statement on Detente before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 19, 1974

-- Secretary Kissinger's Address at Minneapolis, July 15, 1975

-- Secretary Kissinger's Address at Birmingham, August 14, 1975



PW&L 7

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1975

Dear Mr. Wheelwright:

Secretary Kissinger has asked me to thank you for your kind letter of April 10, 1975 and to apologize for the delay in replying. He is honored by your request to include his remarks at Brigham Young in 1964 in your record album. He approves your including the following excerpt in your record album.

"As somebody who has had experience both in academic life and in Washington, I can assure you that this difference in perspective is absolutely crucial. The political leader has to decide before he can be sure what the likely trends are going to be: where history is likely to be moving. He can always avoid difficult decisions by making the most favorable assessments about the likely course of events. In the 1930's many in the democracies assumed that Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist. They thought that he had legitimate grievances, and in the 1930's one could not know. The dilemma of anyone engaged in foreign policy is this: If he wants to avoid great disasters the only certainty he can find is within himself. He cannot be sure at the time that action can still be effective whether what he does is, in fact, necessary. If he wants to be sure, he may have to pay a heavy price later on.

"In the 1930's the democracies could not be sure whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist, or a maniac. By the time they had clear proof, a great catastrophe had come upon the world."

I hope this is not too late for your deadline.

Sincerely,



Peter W. Rodman  
Staff Assistant  
National Security Council

Mr. Lorin F. Wheelwright  
Centennial Center  
Jacobs House  
Brigham Young University  
Provo, Utah 84602



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

April 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

PETER W. RODMAN *PR*

SUBJECT:

Brigham Young: Excerpt from your  
1964 Lecture

Brigham Young University is celebrating its centennial this year. They plan to issue an album featuring excerpts from outstanding addresses given at their forum assemblies. They sent you a cassette recording of a 3 minute - 45 second excerpt from your lecture of March 26, 1964, on "Conjecture in Foreign Policy."


At Tab B is a transcription of the excerpt which they wish to use.

At Tab A, on their incoming letter, they would like your signature indicating your permission to use it.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign their letter at Tab A, granting permission.

No - would  
have the ~~sign~~ difficulty  
significant  
to - day



A

DEDICATED TO LOVE OF GOD PURSUIT OF TRUTH SERVICE TO MANKIND

1875•BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION•1975

Lorin F. Wheelwright  
Centennial Director

April 10, 1975

The Honorable Henry M. Kissinger  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520


Dear Sir:

Our university is celebrating its Centennial this year, and as a lovely feature, we plan to issue an album of "Sounds of a Century." It will include a series of short excerpts from outstanding addresses at our forum assemblies. Our committee would like to use the enclosed excerpt from your memorable appearance here.

We plan to give the record album to those who contribute to our Second Century Fund. We will be delighted to send you a copy when completed. Later in the year, we plan to make the records available to our students at cost through the BYU Bookstore.

Will you please grant permission for us to use this excerpt in the manner described? If so, just sign and return the enclosed copy of this letter. Your kindness will help us advance the growth of our university and also to extend your message to our generous friends. Our deadline is urgent.


Sincerely,

  
Lorin F. Wheelwright  
Assistant to the President

LFW:da

Enclosure

Permission Granted: \_\_\_\_\_




P.S. If you wish to keep the enclosed cassette, feel free to do so. This recording is from our archives.

B

Excerpts from HAK's Speech at Brigham Young University - 1964

"As somebody who has had experience both in academic life and in Washington, I can assure you that this difference in perspective is absolutely crucial. The political leader has to decide before he can be sure what the likely trends are going to be; where history is likely to be moving. He can always avoid difficult decisions by making the most favorable assessments about the likely course of events. In the 1930's many in the democracies assumed that Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist. They thought that he had legitimate grievances, and in the 1930's one could not know. The dilemma of anyone engaged in foreign policy is this: If he wants to avoid great disasters the only certainty he can find is within himself. He cannot be sure at the time that action can still be effective whether what he does is, in fact, necessary. If he wants to be sure, he may have to pay a heavy price later on.

"In the 1930's the democracies could not be sure whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist, or a maniac. By the time they had clear proof, a great catastrophe had come upon the world. [In our dealings with the Communists we face the same problem. I do not believe that it is possible to negotiate a final settlement with the Communists as so many of our public officials do. I believe that the Communist leaders are convinced of an irreconcilable hostility. The only way we will ever be able to deal with the Communists is to create a world structure of free people which is so dynamic that the young people in Russia, looking at the outside world, will feel that they are living in a backward society.]



August 15, 1975

TO: WINSTON LORD  
FROM: PETER RODMAN

1. I have made an effort to include ideas from Moynihan, Buffum, myself, the original draft, and our meeting yesterday. The result is too long. I would appreciate suggestions on what is expendable and what is especially worth keeping.
2. I leave it to you to distribute to Enders, Moynihan, Buffum, et al.
3. We might give HAK the introduction to read on the plane. What do you think?



9

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 10, 1975


Dear General Dayan:

I am sending you the Chinese animal that I promised to obtain for you. Its historical and zoological pedigree is inscrutable. I do know that it is a reproduction.


I have been following your American lecture tour with great interest.

As usual, you seem to be receiving a warmer reception at American universities than I would.

Warm regards,

  
Henry A. Kissinger

General Moshe Dayan  
% Embassy of Israel  
1621 22nd Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20008



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*  
SUBJECT: Dragon for Moshe Dayan

Twice in your State Department office Moshe Dayan admired the Chinese dragon, or whatever, that sits on the top shelf. You promised to try to get him one. You signed a letter to George Bush asking him to get it.

The animal arrived a few weeks ago and is now sitting in a vault in the Department. I have paid for it and expect to get reimbursed from Dayan. In view of Dayan's shitty behavior, I did not feel any compulsion to rush it to him. I have not mentioned its arrival to any Israelis. Nevertheless, with Dayan in this country now, you now may want to have it delivered to him.

A few weeks ago Dayan was quoted in the paper as saying on his speaking tour that the Sinai agreement wasn't a solution to the Mideast problem but it was "better than no agreement." This is some improvement. Peres' ADC, Col. Aryeh Bar-On, told me that this was no accident. Peres had asked him (Bar-On) to call Dayan and tell him that criticizing his own government's policy in Israel was one thing, but criticizing the Agreement here, since we had negotiated it, was inadvisable.


RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my calling the Israeli Embassy and making arrangements to give Dayan his dragon.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

*K. H. [Signature]*



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1975

Dear George:

The enclosed photograph is of a Chinese reproduction of an unidentifiable animal, that now sits on my shelf in my office at the Department. It was obtained on my trip to Peking in November, 1973, at a shop that sells reproductions, on the street with a number of shops that sell artifacts to foreigners.

A friend of mine has admired this piece a number of times in my office and would like to obtain one.

I would be extremely grateful if as a personal favor you could obtain one for me and ship it to me in Washington. Please send the bill for all charges to Bonnie Andrews in my office at the Department.


Many thanks and best wishes to you and Barbara.

Warm regards,

  
Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassador George Bush,  
United States Liaison Office  
Peking

Enclosure (1)



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

April 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

PETER W. RODMAN *(RM)*

SUBJECT:


Chinese Dragon for Dayan

Moshe Dayan has twice admired the reproduction of the Chinese dragon or whatever it is, on your shelf in your office at State. You instructed me to see about getting one.

With some assistance from Planning Staff Director Lord and his wife, I have drafted a letter for you to send by pouch to George Bush (Tab A). The most reliable way to let him know what it looks like is to send him a picture. Therefore, I took one with my Pocket Instamatic. This should ensure success -- unless the Chinese have closed down some of these shops.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to George Bush at Tab A.



October 11, 1975

Dear John and Marina:

A promise is a promise is a promise.

Unfortunately, when they reach majority, they  
will have to split it three ways.

Did we get their names right?

All the best,



Peter W. Rodman

Prof. and Mrs. J. E. Vainey  
24 Heathfield Terrace  
London, W 44 JE  
England



October 17, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

PETER W. RODMAN *DNR*

SUBJECT:

Kishi to Invite President Nixon to Visit Japan?

Professor Kei Wakaizumi, the Secretary's special channel to several important Japanese, called me the other day.

Nobusuke Kishi, former Prime Minister of Japan, is thinking of inviting President Nixon to make a private visit to Japan next year some time. Kishi asked Wakaizumi to ask if we had any particular view of whether such an invitation would be appropriate. Kishi is a friend of President Nixon, and of the US, and believes a private invitation would be no problem in Japan.

I told Wakaizumi that we did not get involved in President Nixon's scheduling, and President Nixon freely determined his own activities. Nevertheless, Wakaizumi thought Kishi would value your or the Secretary's opinion of whether an invitation was advisable or not. I said I would ask.

My inclination is to stick with the same line: that Kishi is free to invite him and we have no view one way or the other. It might provoke the vultures here and thereby embarrass US-Japanese relations; on the other hand, it's a private invitation. If there are White House sensitivities, you might ask Don Rumsfeld or even the President on a private basis whether we should take any different line. We could shade the reply to hint approval, or to discourage it.

Wakaizumi will be back in Tokyo in time for the Secretary's second stepover on October 24. So you could cable me any advice you have.

RECOMMENDATION

That we stick to the line of taking no position, leaving it open to Kishi to invite President Nixon.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
R.O. 12958, Ser. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines  
By dal, NARA, Date 3/30/04

