

**The original documents are located in Box 3, folder “Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto (2)” of the National Security Adviser’s Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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~~SECRET~~/NODIS (GDS)

ACTION

October 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

*HAK thinks no  
reply now  
needed.  
RO*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Reply to Letter of August 17  
from Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan

You will recall Prime Minister Bhutto's messages to the President and you of June 13 following your meeting with Aziz Ahmed in Ankara [Tab II]. You replied to both of these via a message to Bhutto and oral instructions to Ambassador Byroade, which Byroade noted, effectively closed out the June 13 messages [Tab III]. In your message to Bhutto, you also acknowledged his new letter to the President of August 17, indicating that the President would respond after you had a chance to discuss it with him following your return from the Middle East.

The President has now seen Aziz Ahmed but he still owes Bhutto a reply to the August 17 letter. At Tab I is a memo transmitting that letter and proposing a reply. The suggested reply has been developed from a State draft and coordinated here, revised to reflect the fact of the Presidential meeting last week.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memo at Tab I to the President seeking his signature on a letter of reply to Bhutto.

\_\_\_\_\_ APPROVE


\_\_\_\_\_ APPROVE AS AMENDED

Concurrence in Presidential reply: Messrs. Solomon, *Cliff*

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652  
Automatically Downgraded at Two  
Year Intervals and Declassified on  
December 31, 1983.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS (GDS)

*Wa 3/9/04*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

10/9<sup>16</sup>

Bob -

Revise to take  
account of Aziz  
meeting with President

B

Bob -  
a decision  
at last  
for  
10/9



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

IC #3  
1/17  
Retyped TABS  
I & A

~~SECRET/NODIS~~ (GDS)

ACTION

~~September 23, 1975~~

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: ROBERT B. OATMAN *for Q&O*

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Letter of August 17 from Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan

You will recall Prime Minister Bhutto's messages to the President and you of June 13 following your meeting with Aziz Ahmed in Ankara [Tab II]. You replied to both of these via a message to Bhutto and oral instructions to Ambassador Byroade, which Byroade noted, effectively closed out the June 13 messages [Tab III]. In your message to Bhutto, you also acknowledged his new letter to the President of August 17, indicating that the President would respond after you had a chance to discuss it with him following your return from the Middle East.

The President <sup>has now seen Aziz Ahmed but he still</sup> owes Bhutto a reply to the August 17 letter. At Tab I is a memo transmitting that letter and proposing a reply. The suggested reply has been developed from a State draft and coordinated here. ~~You will be seeing Aziz Ahmed on September 30 in connection with the UNGA and can take up in more detail any of the issues he may raise which are reflected in Bhutto's letter. It would be desirable to have the President sign his reply prior to your meeting with Ahmed.~~ *in light of their meeting*

~~The proposed Presidential reply mentions, at the conclusion, the issue of a visit to Pakistan. You will recall having sent an interim message to Bhutto on this subject, promising an early reply as to what the President's schedule might permit this year [Tab IV]. The President's reply would definitively rule out this year.~~ *Revised to reflect the fact of the Presidential meeting last week.*

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memo at Tab I to the President seeking his signature on a letter of reply to Bhutto.

\_\_\_\_ APPROVE

\_\_\_\_ APPROVE AS AMENDED

Concurrence in Presidential reply: Messrs. Solomon, Clift *W. Oatman*

~~SECRET/NODIS~~ (GDS)

*3/9/04*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan

At Tab B is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his concern over the direction of Soviet policies in South Asia. These concerns are not new but they have been heightened by recent events such as the Helsinki Summit -- which Bhutto thinks will permit the Soviets to devote even more time to their ambitions in South Asia -- and statements allegedly made recently by the Soviet representative in Kabul implying sympathy for Afghan designs on Pak territory.

Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political and material support but does state that Soviet aggressive designs on Pakistan are encouraged by the lack of "credible evidence of support from the US."

Bhutto's letter is a further attempt to keep his security concerns before you and to elicit your personal reassurance and support. Within the framework of our current policy toward South Asia and our interest in avoiding any destabilizing moves, we are doing about as much as we can for Pakistan, including modest PL-480 and FMS programs. You and I have

*made this clear to Aziz Ahmed. economic assistance, military sales*

I believe that you should <sup>a written</sup> reply in general terms to Bhutto, giving broad reassurance on the issues he raises. ~~I also recommend that you use this reply to inform Bhutto personally that you do not believe a trip to Pakistan will be possible this year. Bhutto suspects as much but he has pressed repeatedly for you to visit Pakistan even if you are not going to India this year.~~

*If only for reasons of courtesy*

*Aziz Ahmed*

*although you have said as much to Aziz Ahmed.*



RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A. (The text has been cleared with Paul Theis.)

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

*ltd 3/9/04*

*Follow the same themes in his talks with you here and with me in New York.*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

12

opportunity to exchange  
views with your Minister  
of State, Aziz Ahmed.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of August 17. It is important that we maintain the close personal dialogue which we so effectively began in our very constructive meetings of last February. I know that Secretary of State Kissinger has also been in touch with you, and both of us <sup>now</sup> have had the

Let me assure you at the outset there is no question that the integrity and independence of Pakistan are important to the United States and essential to the stability of South Asia. In a period in which we are working to lessen tensions between the major powers, while safeguarding our vital security interests and those of our friends, my Government remains fully cognizant of its responsibility to insure that an easing of tensions in one area does not create opportunities for exploitation elsewhere. Nor can it in any way impact adversely on our relations with other countries in our objectives of regional stability and world peace. We have, therefore, made clear to the Soviet leadership that our continuing attention to improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union is heavily conditioned by developments in other parts of the world. I believe this position is well understood and will continue to benefit your Nation's security and independence.

Let me emphasize that there will be no lessening of our resolve to help our friends in South Asia. Secretary Kissinger has already made clear our appreciation for Pakistan's concerns. These have been the subject of



and as you have certainly heard from Aziz Ahmed and your Ambassador to Washington,

continuing attention in the United States Government for some time, as you know from our discussions here last February. I believe we have taken significant steps to help Pakistan, both through the lifting of the arms embargo and in our on-going economic assistance programs. In the months ahead there will be visible results, as we respond to specific requests for arms purchases and as we reach new agreements on various economic development programs.


We admire the progress you have stimulated in the process of normalization of relations among the countries of South Asia and we intend to continue to offer maximum encouragement to your efforts.

In closing, I want to reiterate my strong wish to visit Pakistan at an early date and to meet with you again. It now appears that my schedule through the remainder of this year will make it impossible for me to accept your warm hospitality at this time. As you know, I do plan to visit the People's Republic of China fairly soon. I intend to discuss with the Chinese leaders our common interests in promoting stability in South Asia and your important contribution to that end. I look forward to accepting your hospitality at a mutually convenient time next year. In the meantime, I remain grateful for and committed to the further strengthening of the close relations between our two countries.

With best personal wishes,

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto  
Prime Minister of the  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan  
Islamabad



~~We are gratified that your part of the world has managed to retain its equilibrium and stay relatively free of great power interference, despite various recent events which could have upset the regional balance. Let us hope that this will continue to be the case.~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/NODIS (GDS)

INFORMATION  
August 26, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

BUD MC FARLANE

FROM:

ROSEMARY DUEHUSS *RD*

SUBJECT:

Bhutto Message -- State of Play

I appreciated your response on the package at Tab A. Just to wrap this up, you may have seen the attached cables in which State went out to the party, conveying the text of the Bhutto letter and seeking guidance on handling it. You will note that, as we suspected, no replies to Bhutto's two previous messages have gone out and that State has now been instructed to come up with a new draft message taking into account all of Bhutto's letters. We will probably see a new package go by in the traffic, seeking the Secretary's approval for a proposed response. I will flag it for you.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS (GDS)

Cables Class. by State

*Mon 3/9/04*

*Mary Hanks  
Rosemary  
Bud*







# Department of State

# TELEGRAM ACTION COPY

~~SECRET~~

NOD692

PAGE 01 SECTO 10077 240947Z

21  
ACTION NOUS-00

INFO OCT-01 180-00 /001 W

053664

O 240935Z AUG 75  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN JERUSALEM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 10077

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PK  
SUBJECT: REPLY TO BHUTTO

FOR SOBER FROM ATHERTON

REF: TOSEC 100091

REPLY TO BHUTTO HAS NOT BEEN SENT. WILL APPRECIATE  
NEW DRAFT IN RESPONSE TO BOTH BHUTTO LETTER BY COB  
(WASHINGTON) MONDAY.  
KISSINGER

*Bhutto messages:*  
*June 13 to the President*  
*June 13 to the Secretary*  
*August 17 to the President*

~~SECRET~~

*aka 3/9/04*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NODS99

PAGE 01 STATE 201500 TOSEC 100091

60  
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:SSOBER:LAB  
APPROVED BY NEA:SSOBER  
S/S :JLHOGANSON  
NEA/PAB:RPECK  
NSC:RNIEHUSS (INFO)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, state review 9/17/03

By    , NARA, Date 3/9/04

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050913

O 231950Z AUG 75 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 201500 TOSEC 100091

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, PK, US

SUBJECT: NEW LETTER FROM BHUTTO.

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON FROM SOBER

1. PM BHUTTO HAS WRITTEN ANOTHER LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT (TEXT IN FOLLOWING MESSAGE), EXPRESSING DEEP CONCERN OVER ALLEGED SOVIET PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN AND REPEATING THE STATEMENTS BY SOVIET REPS IN KABUL WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO US. SPECIFICALLY, THE SOVS WERE SAID TO HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE PAK TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS TO AFGHANISTAN.

2. RESPONSE TO BHUTTO'S TWO PREVIOUS LETTERS (TO PRESIDENT AND TO SECRETARY) IS PENDING IN S/S 7515991 WHICH IS WITH YOU. IF REPLY AS PROPOSED THEREIN HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT, I SEE NO PARTICULAR PROBLEM ALTHOUGH WE WOULD WISH TO SUPPLEMENT IT LATER WITH REFERENCE TO BHUTTO'S LATEST

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM


~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 201500 TOSEC 100091

LETTER. ON OTHER HAND, IF REPLY NOT YET SENT, I SUGGEST  
IT BE HELD UP UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO GIVE ADEQUATE  
CONSIDERATION TO BHUTTO'S NEWEST LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT.  
WILL TRY TO GET YOU FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE RECOMMENDATION  
WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS WITH REGARD BOTH TO PROPOSED WRITTEN  
REPLY FROM SECRETARY (WHICH WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE ONLY

SLIGHT MODIFICATION) AND TO POINTS TO BE MADE ORALLY  
BY BYROADE. MAW

~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Rec'd  
9/26

Rosemary  
The General  
assumes that a  
reply is being  
drafted. General  
found it was.

Bill



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NOD598

PAGE 01 STATE 201499 TOSEC 100089

60  
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:SSOBER:LAB  
APPROVED BY NEA:SSOBER  
S/S :JLHOGANSON  
NEA/PAB:RPECK  
NSC:RNIEHUSS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines *state review 9/16/03*  
By ila, NARA, Date 3/9/04

050864

D 231948Z AUG 75 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 201499 TOSEC 100089

NODIS

E.O. 116521 XGDS=3

TAGS: PFOR, US, PK

SUBJECT: TEXT OF AUGUST 17 LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY AHERTON FROM SOBER

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO DATED AUGUST 17, 1975. IT WAS DELIVERED TO THE WHITE HOUSE AUGUST 22 BY THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I AM WRITING TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR APPREHENSIONS OVER THE LIKELY SOVIET ROLE IN ASIA AFTER THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR REGION.

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 201499 T05EC 100000

WE FEEL DEEPLY DISTURBED OVER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM IN INDIA ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE GROWING HOSTILITY OF AN UNSTABLE AFGHAN REGIME TOWARDS PAKISTAN ON THE OTHER. OUR FEARS ARE HEIGHTENED BY OUR PERCEPTION OF THE INCREASING DEPENDENCE OF THESE TWO

REGIMES IN OUR IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURHOOD ON THE SOVIET UNION WITH WHICH THEY ARE ALLIED AND WHICH IS ENABLED BY THE HELSINKI ACCORD TO PAY GREATER ATTENTION TO OUR REGION IN PURSUANCE OF ITS HISTORIC OBJECTIVES AND GLOBAL AMBITIONS. WE FORESEE THAT, ASSURED OF SECURITY IN EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION WILL RELENTLESSLY EXERT PRESSURES ON THE SMALLER STATES OF ASIA AND ON PAKISTAN IN PARTICULAR, WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING ITS PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING AN UNCHALLENGABLE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN THIS CONTINENT.

SITUATED AS WE ARE, WE CANNOT BUT BE CONSCIOUS OF SOVIET DESIGNS AND THE NATURE OF SOVIET AMBITIONS IN ASIA, AND WHAT THESE PORTEND FOR US. DESPITE THE SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN THE DISMEMBERMENT OF OUR COUNTRY IN 1971, WE HAVE, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, LEFT NO STONE UNTURNED TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH IT IN ORDER TO REDUCE ITS HOSTILITY TOWARDS PAKISTAN WHICH, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, IT HAS REGARDED AS AN OBSTACLE IN THE PATH OF ITS AMBITIONS IN ASIA. THIS ABOVE ALL HAS THE PURPOSE OF MY VISIT TO MOSCOW IN MARCH 1972 AND AGAIN IN OCTOBER LAST YEAR.

SOVIET GOALS AND AMBITIONS ARE INFLEXIBLE AND HARDLY AMENABLE TO ANY BASIC CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE EFFORTS OF A SMALL COUNTRY SUCH AS OURS, WHICH IN THE INTEREST OF THE PRESERVATION OF ITS OWN SOVEREIGNTY, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, HAS STOUTLY DECLINED TO TUE THE SOVIET LINE. THE PASSAGE OF TIME MAKES CLEARER BOTH THE EVER-GROWING THREAT TO OUR EXISTENCE FROM MOSCOW'S EXPANSIONIST POLICIES AND THE WOEFUL INADEQUACY OF OUR RESOURCES TO MEET THIS THREAT.

THE SOVIET UNION IS DETERMINED TO SUBJECT US TO INTENSIFIED PRESSURES WHILE CONTINUING TO BE OUTWARDLY AFFABLE.

~~SECRET~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 201499 105EC 100009

THE MOST RECENT AND DISTURBING ILLUSTRATION OF THIS CAME DURING RECENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR DIPLOMATS AND THEIR SOVIET COUNTER PARTS IN KABUL. OUR MINISTER WAS ASKED BY HIS SOVIET COUNTER PART WHETHER PAKISTAN WOULD AGREE TO CEDE SOME TERRITORY TO AFGHANISTAN. ON RECEIVING A FIRM REPLY IN THE NEGATIVE THE SOVIET MINISTER THREW UP HIS HANDS AND SAID, "THEN GOD ALONE KNOWS WHAT WILL HAPPEN." WHEN OUR AMBASSADOR SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, THE LATTER NOT ONLY ACCUSED PAKISTAN OF NOT WANTING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN BUT WENT SO FAR AS TO ASSERT THAT THE DURAND AGREEMENT - DEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN - WAS A LEGACY OF THE COLONIAL TIMES WHICH PAKISTAN SHOULD NOT TRY TO DEFEND AND THAT THE DURAND LINE HAD BEEN FOISTED UPON THE AFGHANS, SINCE NO NATION WOULD, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, "WILLINGLY AGREE TO HAVE ITS OWN PEOPLE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS." THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE ASIAN SECURITY PACT WAS THE REAL AND THE ONLY ANSWER FOR ESTABLISHING PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIA.

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COGNIZANT OF THE SOVIET THREAT TO THE COUNTRIES OF THIS REGION AND IN PARTICULAR TO PAKISTAN WHICH HAS SO FAR STOOD ITS GROUND. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS OF POLITICAL SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN WHICH WERE GIVEN TO US BY THE UNITED STATES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT. THE FACT, HOWEVER, NEEDS TO BE REGISTERED THAT THESE DECLARATIONS, VALUABLE THOUGH THEY ARE, SEEM TO HAVE MADE LITTLE IMPACT ON SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. SOVIET POLICIES CONTINUE TO BE STRIDENTLY ASSERTED AND SOVIET PURPOSES AGGRESSIVELY REITERATED.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR ABILITY TO RESIST SOVIET PRESSURES WILL DEPEND NOT SO MUCH ON THE RELIANCE WE PLACE ON THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ASSURANCES AS ON THE CREDIBILITY THE SOVIET UNION ATTACHES TO THEM. THE LACK OF A CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FROM THE U.S. ENCOURAGES THE SOVIET UNION TO EXPECT THAT THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF PAKISTAN WOULD COMPEL US TO MAKE READJUSTMENTS DEMANDED BY THE CHANGING POWER EQUILIBRIUM IN OUR REGION.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 STATE 201490 T00EG 130089

I NEED HARDLY ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, OF HOW MUCH WE  
CHERISH OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. WE  
SINCERELY HOPE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO EXPAND AND GAIN  
STRENGTH IN THE COMING MONTHS AND WILL BE SUSTAINED BY  
OUR COMMITMENTS TO THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF PEACE AND  
STABILITY WHICH WE SHARE.

WITH MY BEST WISHES AND WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

YOURS SINCERELY, ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO.

END TEXT. MAW

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



MEMORANDUM

*General Scowcroft  
has seen.*

*Doc. 5743*

**TOSCO 211**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODIS

INFORMATION  
August 23, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ROSEMARY NIEHUS *RM*

SUBJECT:

New Message for the President from  
Prime Minister Bhutto

Ambassador Yaqub-Khan returned from Pakistan late yesterday with another letter to the President from Prime Minister Bhutto. The original was delivered here with the hope that it would be transmitted immediately. I believe it is safe to assume that the Ambassador will seek an early meeting with you (he has not requested this yet) on your return from Vail to discuss the range of Pakistani security concerns and such issues as (a) the President's trip to Pakistan and (b) a possible meeting for Aziz Ahmed with the President during UNGA (Chavan has asked for a meeting -- the Paks will be sensitive), as well as developments in South Asia (Bangladesh).

The full text of Bhutto's message is attached, but its main themes -- Soviet/Indian/Afghan pressures on Pakistan and the need for greater US support for Islamabad -- are consistent with Bhutto's previous two messages to the President and Secretary Kissinger of June 13. Two points are worth noting, however: (a) The linkage between the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit (paragraph 2) and prospects for accelerated Soviet efforts to carve out a sphere of influence in South Asia; (b) The assertion that US assurances to Pakistan to date (while greatly appreciated) have not curbed Soviet designs (paragraph 6) and particularly, that this situation only further encourages Moscow in its pressures on Pakistan (paragraph 7). While Bhutto makes no specific requests in this letter, by developing a negative line on US support for Pakistan, he is in effect asking for increased political and materiel support, arms being of foremost interest to Islamabad.

You will note that Bhutto makes no mention of having received replies to his two messages of June 13 and this has probably prompted his third letter. I have checked with State and understand that the Secretary has not (as of this writing) given final clearance to the proposed replies and that he has this action package with him. State is now aware of this


SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *state 9/12/03*

BY *lha*, NARA, DATE *3/9/04*



SECRET/NODIS -- 2

new message and Deputy Assistant Secretary Sober will be staffing the Secretary. I am also doing a daily briefing item. In sum, this action is now on the tracks.

SECRET/NODIS

Attachment: Message from the Prime Minister to the President dated August 17, received NSC late August 22.





12  
Islamabad,  
August 17, 1975.

PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to share with you our apprehensions over the likely Soviet role in Asia after the Helsinki Summit, particularly following recent developments in our region.

2. We feel deeply disturbed over the establishment of an authoritarian system in India on the one hand, and the growing hostility of an unstable Afghan regime towards Pakistan on the other. Our fears are heightened by our perception of the increasing dependence of these two regimes in our immediate neighbourhood on the Soviet Union with which they are allied and which is enabled by the Helsinki accord to pay greater attention to our region in pursuance of its historic objectives and global ambitions. We foresee that, assured of security in Europe, the Soviet Union will relentlessly exert pressures on the smaller states of Asia and on Pakistan in particular, with a view to achieving its purpose of establishing an unchallengeable sphere of influence in this continent.

3. Situated as we are, we cannot but be conscious of Soviet designs and the nature of Soviet ambitions in Asia, and what these portend for us. Despite the Soviet Union's role in the dismemberment of our country in 1971, we have, within the framework of our principles and policies,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By 1/1, NARA, Date 3/9/04

State Review 9/17/03

...2-



PRIME MINISTER

left no stone unturned to improve our relations with it in order to reduce its hostility towards Pakistan which, rightly or wrongly, it has regarded as an obstacle in the path of its ambitions in Asia. This above all was the purpose of my visit to Moscow in March 1972 and again in October last year.

4. Soviet goals and ambitions are inflexible and hardly amenable to any basic change as a result of the efforts of a small country such as ours, which in the interest of the preservation of its own sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity, has stoutly declined to toe the Soviet line. The passage of time makes clearer both the ever-growing threat to our existence from Moscow's expansionist policies and the woeful inadequacy of our resources to meet this threat.

5. The Soviet Union is determined to subject us to intensified pressures while continuing to be outwardly affable. The most recent and disturbing illustration of this came during recent exchanges between our diplomats and their Soviet counterparts in Kabul. Our Minister was asked by his Soviet counter part whether Pakistan would agree to cede some territory to Afghanistan. On receiving a firm reply in the negative the Soviet Minister threw up his hands and said, "Then God alone knows what will happen." When our Ambassador sought clarification of the Soviet attitude from the Soviet Ambassador, the latter not only accused Pakistan of not wanting to improve relations with Afghanistan but went so far as to assert that the Durand Agreement - defining the international frontier between Afghanistan and

low-level

*This is a recast of a recent message to Byroade - that Paks have "definite proof" of Soviet support for Afghan territorial ambitions in Pakistan and that this is a major change in the Soviet position. Both our Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad noted the low level of the Sov-Afghan exchange, concluded account was exaggerated and surmised it was Pak lead-in to pressing for US arms.*



PRIME MINISTER

Pakistan - was a legacy of the colonial times which Pakistan should not try to defend and that the Durand Line had been foisted upon the Afghans, since no nation would, according to the Soviet Ambassador, "willingly agree to have its own people divided into two parts." The Soviet Ambassador concluded by saying that the Asian Security Pact was the real and the only answer for establishing peace and security in Asia.

6. I have no doubt that the United States is cognizant of the Soviet threat to the countries of this region and in particular to Pakistan which has so far stood its ground. We greatly appreciate the various statements of political support to Pakistan which were given to us by the United States at the highest level to counter the Soviet threat. The fact, however, needs to be registered that these declarations, valuable though they are, seem to have made little impact on Soviet expansionism. Soviet policies continue to be stridently asserted and Soviet purposes aggressively reiterated.

7. In these circumstances, our ability to resist Soviet pressures will depend not so much on the reliance we place on the American political assurances as on the credibility the Soviet Union attaches to them. The lack of a credible evidence of support from the U.S. encourages the Soviet Union to expect that the security requirements of Pakistan would compel us to make readjustments demanded by the changing power equilibrium in our region.



Page -4

PRIME MINISTER

8. I need hardly assure you, Mr. President, of how much we cherish our relations with the United States. We sincerely hope that they will continue to expand and gain strength in the coming months and will be sustained by our commitments to the goals and objectives of peace and stability which we share.

9. With my best wishes and warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*  
(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)

His Excellency  
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,  
President of the United States of America,  
WASHINGTON D.C.



13 June 1975

Tak 4

TAB II

My dear Dr. Kissinger,

As you are aware, we have done, and will continue to do, our utmost to normalize our relations with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. Nevertheless, we are seriously concerned over the probability of India deciding to launch a war against Pakistan in which Afghanistan will also join and both will have the full backing of the Soviet Union. Such a war could come at any time the Soviet Union should judge the situation to be ripe. It is our assessment that it could be unleashed within two years, before we have had the time adequately to strengthen our defence capability. India could contrive a pretext on the basis of its brazen claim to Jammu and Kashmir being an integral part of India and Pakistan being in control of a part of the State.

Against this background, I was relieved to hear from Mr. Aziz Ahmed what you had told Gromyko and what you planned to tell the Chinese about the action the United States would take if the Soviet Union attacked China for coming to Pakistan's assistance in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan.

This latter assurance could have a most vital bearing on the balance of power in Asia and fortify peace and stability in this critical region. I consider it to be the most effective counter yet to the Soviet ambitions to extend hegemony over the region comprising the Persian Gulf and the sub-continent.

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
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

NARA, Date: 2/9/84

9/17/03

By



To Pakistan, which is the immediate target of these ambitions, it comes as a refreshing indication of a new determination in the United States Administration to safeguard peace and stability in South Asia.

I should also add that this assurance is another manifestation of the far-sighted statesmanship and clarity of vision which I, like many others, have always admired in you. Only such a perception of lurking dangers and the undistracted will to avert them can transform the fears of today into the hopes of tomorrow.

May I suggest that the question of Chinese assistance to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack may be taken up with the Chinese leaders while they are still considering the issue. It could help them materially to decide what China could do in that contingency.

Mr. Aziz Ahmed took up the matter of the Chinese press attacks on the United States with the Chinese Ambassador along the lines indicated by you soon after his return from Ankara.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

His Excellency Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
Washington D.C.



PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister's House  
Rawalpindi

13 June 1975

Dear Mr. President,

I have been wanting to write to you on a matter of vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the peace and stability of our vast and populous region. However, since you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating to Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until you returned home and had time to address your attention to other matters of importance to world peace.

On May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met in Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United States.

It is an established fact that practically all of India's armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons.

Moreover, in view of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, an armed attack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval and, indeed, direct involvement.

As you are aware, Mr. President, my Government is determined to further the process of normalization of relations with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. We will sustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

DATE 2/9/07

By [Signature]

State Dept. Review 9/17/03

DATE 2/9/07

PRIME MINISTER

- 2 -

Nevertheless, our considered assessment of the situation, as Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could come at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would have no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one. For instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India and prepare the stage for an invasion of Azad Kashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan's control. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.

Dr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely the same question to the Chinese Vice-Premier when he visited Pakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering this question but have given us no answer so far. Their decision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The constraint on China's freedom to act as a result of this Treaty was tragically demonstrated when India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while Pakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.

Dr. Kissinger then enquired whether he could ask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan and added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what the United States would do in such an event, it would be informed that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United States would not be able to stay out of that situation.

PRIME MINISTER

-3-

To Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming military threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and backed by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the determination of the United States to ward off a danger of vast and incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news.

I am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the clarity with which your Administration has perceived the implications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability of this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for the first time, a concrete step which could restore the power equilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive factor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting the vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the shadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the horizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it, a turning point would be reached in its history. The global balance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace in our critical region could become truly inviolable.

With best wishes and warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,  
President of the United States of America  
White House,  
Washington D. C.

Tab

III



TAB III  
Pakistan 1p  
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TELEGRAM

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z

21  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISU-00 /001 W

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O 302913Z AUG 75 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA  
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 10198

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

EO. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, PK, US  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

REF: STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

*Reply to Bhutto  
Messages of Jond  
to President and  
Secretary*

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING FROM ME TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO,

2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

SINCE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PLAN TO VIST SAUDI ARABIA THIS COMING MONDAY, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GIVE YOU A BRIEF REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE COMING TO THE AREA, I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN THE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP EGYPT AND ISRAEL ACHIEVE A FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD THE JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH REMAINS OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT. THE ISRAELIS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND OIL FIELDS IN SINAI IN CIR-

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines state review 9/17/03

By WJ, NARA, Date 3/9/04



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z

CUMSTANCES WHERE AN END TO BELLIGERENCY AND PEACE STILL LIE IN THE FUTURE. THE EGYPTIANS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ENTERING POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS THAT ARE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE MUCH OF THEIR AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORY REMAINS OCCUPIED AND THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS REMAIN UNFULFILLED. DESPITE THESE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES, I BELIEVE WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS AND THAT THE CHANCES FOR ACHIEVING THIS AGREEMENT ARE GOOD. EVEN THOUGH A NUMBER OF OBSTACLES REMAIN TO BE OVERCOME AND A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IS NOT YET FULLY ASSURED. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS APPROACHED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENUINE STATESMANSHIP, AND THAT WE HAVE HAD HEARTENING SUPPORT FROM OUR SAUDI FRIENDS.

I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS CONCERN IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT THIS AGREEMENT, IF ACHIEVED, WILL LEAD TO DIMINISHED INTEREST IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM. IT IS OUR FIRM INTENTION, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MUST BE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS -- HOWEVER DIFFICULT THEY WILL BE AND HOWEVER MUCH TIME THEY MAY TAKE -- WITH RESPECT TO THE SYRIAN AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE NOTHING LESS. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE SAUDI LEADERS WOULD BE REASSURED BY ANY ENCOURAGEMENT YOU COULD GIVE THEM. THE PRESIDENT AND I ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT AND, DESPITE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE ARE EXPERIENCING AT HOME, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT OUR PEACE EFFORTS AND OUR POLICIES OF STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB FRIENDS. THE VERY ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE AND, IF IT IS SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTED AND OBSERVED, CAN BROADEN THE BASIS OF CONFIDENCE WHICH IS NEEDED FOR BOTH SIDES TO TAKE THE HARD POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS GOES FORWARD IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS OCCASION, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED THE PRESIDENT AND I WERE TO HEAR FROM YOU IN YOUR LETTERS OF JUNE 13 REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS FOR PAKISTAN'S SECURITY, I REGRET THAT

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z

THE DEMANDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS HAVE DELAYED MY SENDING YOU A CONSIDERED RESPONSE BEFORE THIS. I HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR LETTERS IN DETAIL WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DEEPLY SYMPATHETIC TO YOUR CONCERNS. IT WAS WITH THESE IN MIND THAT THE PRESIDENT ORDERED THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN LAST FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP MEET YOUR FOOD AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE YEAR AHEAD. THIS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO ASSURE PAKISTAN'S CONTINUED SECURITY AND WELL-BEING. I HAVE ALSO ASKED AMBASSADOR BYROADE TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS ON VARIOUS SPECIFIC POINTS YOU RAISED IN YOUR EARLIER LETTER.

Since MY DEPARTURE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PRESIDENT SHARED WITH ME YOUR AUGUST 17 LETTER TO HIM, RE- EMPHASIZING YOUR CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN KABUL. UPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I WILL DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND HE WILL, OF COURSE, BE RESPONDING TO YOU. MEANWHILE, I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY ITS OFFICIALS IN KABUL, AND I HOPE YOU WILL KEEP AMBASSADOR BYROADE INFORMED.

WARM REGARDS,  
HENRY A. KISSINGER  
END MESSAGE

3. IN CONVEYING THE ABOVE MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO,



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 301007Z

12  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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O 300913Z AUG 75 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA  
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 10198

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

WE WERE PLEASED TO NOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S EX-  
PRESSION, IN HIS JUNE LETTERS, OF CONTINUING SUPPORT  
FOR THE SIMLA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE WISE POLICIES  
OF CAUTION AND RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE GOP DURING THIS  
DELICATE PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES IN INDIA.

IT IS OUR VIEW THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS UNDER THE  
SIMLA PROCESS WILL REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED  
HOSTILITIES ON THE SUBCONTINENT. THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST  
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ONE WHICH WE FULLY SHARE WITH  
PAKISTAN, IS TO AVERT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT WAS WITH  
THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND THAT THE SECRETARY CONVEYED TO  
FOREIGN MINISTER GRUMYKO IN MAY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH  
THE UNITED STATES WOULD REGARD AN INDIAN ATTACK AGAINST  
PAKISTAN. ~~WE WERE~~ REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET  
LEADERSHIP HAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION OF THE UNITED  
STATES ON THIS QUESTION.

DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN A  
SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE IMPLICATIONS  
OF THE GRAVEST NATURE AND WOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO  
THE UNITED STATES. THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES  
WOULD BE A MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 301007Z

BRANCH IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTION AND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1959 MUTUAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD TALKS IN PEKING WITH LEADERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LATER THIS YEAR. THESE TALKS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE FULL RANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND PAKISTAN, AND WAYS IN WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONTINUE TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ITS SECURITY.

THE SECRETARY WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE THAT MR. AZIZ AHMED HAS COMMUNICATED TO THE CHINESE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT WHICH THEIR PROPAGANDA HAS ON OUR ABILITY TO MOBILIZE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRC'S SECURITY.

IN DISCUSSING YOUR LETTERS IN WASHINGTON, I FOUND A DEEP AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ADMINISTRATION IN PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND WELFARE, AND A STRONG DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL IN WAYS THAT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

AS I KNOW YOU ARE AWARE FROM YOUR OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICAN LEADERS, INCLUDING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL FORMAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS, OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR FORMAL TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.

WITH REGARD TO THE RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO PAKISTANI OFFICIALS IN KABUL CONCERNING THE DURAND LINE, IF THESE IN FACT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN, WE WOULD OF COURSE VIEW THEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN.

WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON THE SOVIET POSITION, FOLLOWING YOUR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 SECTO 10196 02 OF 02 361607Z

4. IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ABOVE, YOU SHOULD SEEK TO CORRECT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN WHAT I SAID TO AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA ON MAY 22 AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THESE REMARKS CONTAINED IN BHUTTO'S LETTERS OF JUNE 13. THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE SO THAT THE RECORD WILL BE CLEAR:

DURING MY WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I REVIEWED THE MINUTES OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. OUR RECORD CONTAINS SOME IMPORTANT NUANCES WHICH, IF NOT PRECISELY GRASPED, COULD LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WE BOTH WANT TO AVOID.

THE SECRETARY INFORMED AZIZ AHMED HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE USE MADE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY IN PAKISTAN.

(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER INFORMED MR. AHMED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO...GROMYKO IN VERY STRNG TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD INVITE A RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES.")

THE SECRETARY ASKED AZIZ AHMED IF WE COULD ASK THE CHINESE WHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF PAKISTAN IS ATTACKED. THE SECRETARY ALSO INDICATED THAT A GENERAL WAR FOLLOWING AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN AND INVOLVING THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WHOLE OF ASIA AND FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE AREA.

(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY STATES: "...I WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR FROM MR. AZIZ AHMED...WHAT YOU PLANNED TO TELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING TO PAKISTAN'S ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN.")

BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER ...ADDED THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTERQUESTION AS TO WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN SUCH AN EVENT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN), IT WOULD BE INFORMED THAT IF INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO ITS HELP AND IF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA, THE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM


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PAGE 04 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 301007Z

UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THAT  
SITUATION.)  
KISSINGER

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES



Department of State

Pakistan  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 2244

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 08056 021739Z

43  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISN-00 1026 W

R 020731Z SEP 75 ZDK  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1835

~~SECRET~~ ISLAMARAD 0056

FXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, US

SURJ: BHUTTO INFORMED OF USC POSITION CONCERNING POINTS  
RAISED IN HIS LETTERS TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

REF: SECTO 10198

1. I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAINING YOUR LETTER TO HIM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MY ORAL REMARKS IN CONNECTION WITH PAST LETTERS FROM HIM TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. BHUTTO WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED TO RECEIVE THIS DIRECT COMMUNICATION FROM YOU IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE OPPORTUNITY IT GAVE HIM TO BE UP-TO-DATE AND IN TOUCH WITH YOU JUST BEFORE VISITING SAUDI ARABIA.

2. AFTER HIS REMARKS TO ME ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY, I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A NUMBER OF POINTS TO HIM IN CONNECTION WITH THESE EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE. I SAID THE EXACT PHRASEOLOGY OF THE POINTS I WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT VERY CAREFULLY AND THAT SOME OF THE POINTS TO BE COVERED WERE COMPLEX, CONTAINING IMPORTANT NUANCES. I SAID THAT IN THE INTEREST OF COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING, AND AS A KINDNESS TO HIM, IT MIGHT BE BEST THAT HE READ THE TEXT OF THESE POINTS RATHER THAN JUST LISTEN TO AN ORAL PRESENTATION FROM ME.

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- EUR/CAN \_\_\_\_\_
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- LA \_\_\_\_\_
- NEA/SA \_\_\_\_\_
- PRC \_\_\_\_\_
- SEA \_\_\_\_\_
- NSC/PLNS \_\_\_\_\_
- PGM/ANL \_\_\_\_\_
- SCI/ENV \_\_\_\_\_
- ECON \_\_\_\_\_
- OPIL/INT \_\_\_\_\_
- SS/PR \_\_\_\_\_
- CONGR \_\_\_\_\_

*Secretary's reply closes  
out June 13 messages  
(acc to Byroads - par 5 ->)*

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines, state Sec. 9/17/03  
NARA, Date 2/19/04

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 08056 021739Z

3. BHUTTO READ CAREFULLY MY PREPARED TEXT WHICH HAD BEEN EXTRACTED VERBATIM FROM ABOVE REFTEL. WHEN HE FINISHED, HE TOLD ME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY AND WAS GLAD TO HAVE THIS MATTER SETTLED SO THAT NO FURTHER CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT BETWEEN US WOULD BE NECESSARY. HE SAID AGAIN HE REGRETTED HAVING ACCEPTED BAD ADVICE ON HIS LETTERS TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT GROWING OUT OF YOUR TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA. I HAVE NO DOUBT BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY THAT I WAS IN THE

W/AAA!

PROCESS OF A NECESSARY CORRECTION OF THE RECORD.

4. BHUTTO ASKED IF HE COULD KEEP THE COPY OF MY ADDITIONAL POINTS THAT HE HAD READ. WHILE I OBVIOUSLY DO NOT WANT TO BECOME A PARTY IN HIS FRICTIONS WITH AZIZ AHMED, I GAVE HIM MY PERMISSION TO DO SO THINKING THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO SERVE TO MAKE THE RECORD COMPLETELY CLEAR FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES. THERE WAS NO DOUBT BUT THAT HE PLANNED SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH BOTH AZIZ AHMED AND AGHA SHAHI ON THE PLANE TO SAUDI ARABIA ON BOTH YOUR LETTER AND MY ADDITIONAL POINTS.

5. YOU MAY REST ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT BHUTTO HOLDS NO RESENTMENT AT US ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED. IT IS A COMPLETELY CLOSED SUBJECT AND BEST NOT REFERRED TO AGAIN ON ANY LEVEL.  
RYROADE

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Department of State

Pakistan  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 1827

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 8047 021136Z

46  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISN-00 /026 W

R 021527Z SEP 75  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1831  
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~SECRET~~ ISLAMABAD 8047

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, PK, AF, UR  
SUBJECT: PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS; PM BHUTTO'S COMMENTS

REF: ISLAMABAD 7507 AND 7483

1. IN A DISCUSSION ON OTHER MATTERS WITH BHUTTO IN KARACHI, AUGUST 31, HE DIGRESSED TO GIVE ME WHAT HE SAID HE ACCEPTED AS THE FINAL SOVIET POSITION ON THE ALLEGED POLICY REMARKS OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN KARUL RE THE DURAND LINE AND OTHER MATTERS, AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT DOWNGRADING BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE (AND I SUSPECT IN MOSCOW). HE SAID THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT THEIR POLICY RE PAKISTAN REMAINED AS SET FORTH IN THEIR JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT THE TIME OF HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW IN OCTOBER 1970. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIETS, WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY ASREGARDS ANY ALLEGED REMARKS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

2. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY TALKED TO HIS AMBASSADOR KARUL AND THAT HE BELIEVES THE ALLEGED REMARKS WERE TRUTHFULLY AND ACCURATELY REPORTED. HE SAID IT APPARENT THAT OUR JOINT SPECULATION ON THIS MATTER (REFFTELS) WAS PROBABLY CORRECT. BUT HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN UP ON ANY EFFORT TO GET ANY PUBLIC REASSURANCE FROM THE SOVIETS TO

AFR/UN \_\_\_\_\_  
-EUR/CAN \_\_\_\_\_  
FE \_\_\_\_\_  
LA \_\_\_\_\_  
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SEA \_\_\_\_\_  
-NSC/PLNG \_\_\_\_\_  
PGM/ANL \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPNL/INT \_\_\_\_\_  
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
NARA, Date 3/9/04  
State Review 9/11/03



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ISLANA 08047 021136Z

COMPENSATE FOR THE DISQUIETING MANOUVER ON THEIR PART  
AS TOO MANY THINGS HAD HAPPENED IN THE INTERVAL (AN  
OBVIOUS REFERENCE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO BANGLADESH)  
AN HE WAS CERTAIN THEY WOULDNIT DO IT.  
BYRDAE



Pakistan

Department of State

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 08041 0108272

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ACTION NODS-00

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INFO OCT-01 ISD-00 /001 \* ----- 045140

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1829

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/03  
NARA, Date 3/9/04

~~SECRET~~ ISLAMABAD 8041

NODIS/CHERUKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PFCR, PK, US, XF  
SUBJ: BHUTTO'S COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

REF: SECTO 10198

1. I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPART-  
URE FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAIN-  
ING YOUR LETTER TO HIM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MY  
ORAL REMARKS IN CONNECTION WITH PAST LETTERS FROM  
HIM TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. THIS MESSAGE WILL COVER  
ONLY HIS REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF YOUR  
LETTER.
2. BHUTTO SAID HE WOULD BE MOST HAPPY TO PUT ACROSS TO  
THE SAUDIS THE POSITIVE VIEWS YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR  
LETTER. HE WAS HIMSELF IMMENSELY PLEASD TO NOTE YOUR  
EMPHASIS THAT OTHER MOVES SUCH AS ON THE SYRIAN PROBLEM  
AND THE PALESTINIANS NEEDED TO BE TACKLED, AND THE DETER-  
MINATION OF BOTH YOURSELF AND THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAD  
TO BE SO. HE HAD NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT YOU BOTH  
MEANT THIS AND WOULD LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED, AND AT WHAT-  
EVER ENERGY AND EFFORT REQUIRED, TO MAKE IT SO.
3. HAVING SAID THIS, HE THOUGHT THAT OUT OF OUR FRIEND-  
SHIP HE WOULD TELL US THAT HE DIDN'T THINK THINGS WOULD

~~SECRET~~





# Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 08041 010827Z

WORK OUT AS WE WISHED AND THAT THE NEXT STEP, ASSUMING YOUR PRESENT EFFORT SUCCEEDS AS REGARDS THE EGYPTIAN FRONT, WOULD LEAD TO AN IMPASSE. HE SAID HE WAS SPEAKING AS ONE WHO CONSIDERED RELATIONS WITH THE US AS VITAL AND WHO BELIEVED THAT ANY SETBACK IN THEM WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR PAKISTAN. IN THIS CONTEXT HE THOUGHT YOU AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER ALL FACETS OF EVERY PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERHAPS HIS OWN PESSIMISTIC FEELINGS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

4. BHUTTO SAID THAT, WHILE HE WOULD NOT MENTION IT IN CONNECTION WITH ANY OF THE SPECIFICS HE WAS ABOUT TO TELL ME, AN UNDERLYING FACTOR IN HIS THINKING WAS THE UNFORTUNATE TIMING OF OUR COMING ELECTIONS AS FAR AS THE MIDDLE EAST WAS CONCERNED. HE SAID HE WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST A POLITICIAN, AND KNEW FIRST HAND THAT THE EMOTIONS OF PEOPLE HAD A POWER OF THEIR OWN THAT COULD NOT BE IGNORED, PARTICULARLY IN A DEMOCRACY SUCH AS OURS.

5. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD HIGH REGARD FOR SADAT AND THOUGHT THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY ACCOMMODATING. BUT HE SAID HE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DESCRIBE THE CONCESSIONS HE HAD MADE AS STATESMANSHIP BUT MORE AS AN ACCOMMODATION. HE SAID (1) HE THOUGHT THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HAD LOST THEIR WILL TO FIGHT AND SADAT HAS HAD TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT, AND (2) THAT SADAT WAS STAKING EVERYTHING, ON BOTH HIS FIRST AND SECOND AGREEMENTS THROUGH YOUR GOOD EFFORTS, TO MAKE POSSIBLE AN ECONOMIC BOOM TO TURN ATTENTIONS AWAY FROM THE ISRAELI PROBLEM. HE SAID (1) ABOVE HAD INHERENT IN IT THE DANGER THAT SADAT COULD BE OVERTHROWN. AS REGARDS (2) ABOVE, BHUTTO REMINDED ME THAT HE WAS FROM AN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY AND HE KNEW THAT THE ECONOMIC MIRACLES SADAT WAS HOPING FOR JUST DIDN'T HAPPEN OVERNIGHT, WHETHER IN A VERY RICH UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY LIKE IRAN OR A VERY POOR COUNTRY. SO THERE WOULD BE NO GREAT QUICK CHANGE FROM POVERTY FOR THE EGYPTIANS. AFTER A PERIOD OF GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND BUDYANCY, IN WHICH THE PUBLIC POSTURE OF EGYPT MIGHT APPEAR TO TURN BELLICOSE OR EVEN CHAUVANISTIC, THE LETDOWN WHICH WOULD COME WOULD ALSO ENDANGER SADAT. IF HE TRIED TO RECOUP BY BOLDNESS AGAIN ON THE ISRAELI FRONT HIS MILITARY MIGHT GET RID OF HIM AS

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State

REF ID: A111  
CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 08041 010827Z

A PRETEXT FOR NOT FIGHTING AGAIN.

6. AS A COROLLARY TO THIS SCENARIO HE SEES THE ISRAELIS SAYING "BAS" (ARABIC AND URDU FOR ENOUGH OR STOP) AS REGARDS FURTHER MOVES RE SYRIA, THE PALESTINIANS, ETC. (HE WAS POLITE ENOUGH NOT TO SAY SO BUT I THINK HE HAD OUR ELECTIONS IN MIND). THEN HE SAID THERE WOULD BE A DIVISIVE EFFECT AMONG THE ARABS. HE THOUGHT SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES WOULD TOLERATE A STATUS QUO FOR AWHILE AND POSSIBLY TUNISIA, MOROCCO MAYBE AND SUDAN PERHAPS. LIBYA WOULD DENOUNCE AND ALGERIA (UNLESS WE ARE MAKING MORE INROADS THAN HE KNOWS THERE). IRAQ OF COURSE WOULD BE IN THIS CAMP. SYRIA, AND ASSAD IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BE INTENSELY TROUBLED, CHINA WOULDN'T LIKE IT--AND THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AROUND SMILING LIKE CHESHIRE CATS!

7. BHUTTO RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER REMARK THAT HIS OWN PREDICTIONS WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT SUPPORTING YOUR VIEWS IN YOUR LETTER AND YOUR OBVIOUS DETERMINATION. HE SAID HE EARNESTLY HOPED HIS PREDICTIONS WERE WORKING, AS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS SO VITAL TO US, AND INDEED TO PAKISTAN AS WELL. BUT HE SAID HE COULD NOT GO BEYOND THE ROLE OF TRYING TO BE HELPFUL AS PAKISTAN WAS MUSLIM BUT NOT ARABIC, AND THE ARABS HAD TO MAKE THEIR OWN POLICY, BE IT WAR OR NEGOTIATIONS, STEP BY STEP OR GENEVA, PEACE OR CAPITULATION.

8. I SAID I WAS ENCOURAGED BY YOUR LETTER AND ITS OBVIOUS STRESS ON NECESSARY NEXT STEPS. HE AGREED BUT REMINDED ME AS A LAST THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE VERY SMART PEOPLE. I SAID I SUSPECTED YOU KNEW THEM PRETTY WELL YOURSELF BY NOW.

9. MY CONVERSATIONS WITH BHUTTO ON THE LETTERS TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING YOUR TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED WENT WELL. IN VIEW OF PAST TALKS WITH BHUTTO BY BOTH YAQUB AND MYSELF, THIS IS NO LONGER A LIVING SUBJECT HERE. MY NEXT MESSAGE WILL THEREFORE BE PRIMARILY TO COMPLETED AND CLOSE THE RECORD ON THIS SUBJECT.  
BYROADE

~~SECRET~~

15

Tab

IV





Department of State

Lat-01  
Pakistan  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
TAB IV

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 STATE 193876

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, US

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

REF.: ISLAMABAD 7272

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

AMBASSADOR BYROADE HAS TOLD ME OF YOUR DEEP PERSONAL DESIRE THAT PRESIDENT FORD VISIT PAKISTAN THIS YEAR. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE PRESIDENT YOUR CONCERNS AND THE HIGH IMPORTANCE BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS ATTACH TO THIS VISIT TO PAKISTAN AS A SYMBOL OF OUR CLOSE BILATERAL RELATION.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRE

Da 3/9/04



CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 193876

SHIP.

WE ARE STILL IN THE MIDST OF WORKING OUT A SCHEDULE FOR POSSIBLE FOREIGN TRAVEL BY THE PRESIDENT DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE STILL HOPEFUL THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT CHINA BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, BUT THE SCHEDULE IS STILL UNCERTAIN AND NO

DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITING OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE SAME TRIP. THUS THE TIMING OF A VISIT TO PAKISTAN REMAINS UNSETTLED, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT HE REMAINS MOST ANXIOUS TO VISIT YOUR COUNTRY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, IF NOT THIS YEAR AT LEAST NEXT YEAR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INVITATION.

WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AGAIN AS SOON AS WE HAVE A MORE DEFINITE VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END QUOTE.

2. FYI: ABOVE MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO ASSURE BHUTTO THAT THIS MATTER IS INDEED RECEIVING THE MOST CAREFUL ATTENTION, BUT ALSO TO CONVEY THOUGHT THAT THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SLIPPAGE IN PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL TO PAKISTAN.  
KISSINGER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NSC MEMO, 11/24/90, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES,  
BY l/h, NARA, DATE 3/9/04

*state review 9/17/00*

PARTICIPANTS:

Pakistan

Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs  
Yaqub Khan, Ambassador to the US  
Iqbal Riza, Minister, Pakistan Embassy  
Iqbal Akhund, Permanent Representative to the UN

United States

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs  
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff *RV*

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, September 30, 1975  
11:30 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

PLACE:

Suite 34-A, Waldorf Towers  
New York, New York

Ahmed:

Congratulations on your success in the Middle East.  
It must have been tough.

Kissinger:

It was rough but not nearly as rough as since I came  
back. We are in a nihilistic phase of Congressional  
behaviour. Of course, they are hurting themselves by  
this since the really damaging thing politically would be  
to attack the Administration on domestic policy rather  
than foreign policy. What do they think they are doing?  
In any event, I am relaxed since this cannot last.

Ahmed:

Look at the investigation of the CIA and everything else.

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652  
Automatically Downgraded at Two  
Year Intervals and Declassified on  
December 31, 1983.

Kissinger: It is typical of this stage of nihilism. I have refused to allow them to call up Foreign Service Officers to testify on what their policy recommendations were. This would be like the McCarthy period. My decision will cause a tremendous brawl.

Ahmed: We have submitted to you two lists of arms we need.

Kissinger: I hope the nuclear weapons are on the second list.

Ahmed: They are on the third list; we have the Pershing on the second list.

Kissinger: The Pershing issue is a big fraud. We never had any intention of giving it to Israel in any foreseeable time frame. The people who are pushing all this are the pro-Israelis who want to lock us into commitments to Israel. But you didn't want it anyway.

Ahmed: No, only the nuclear weapons.

Kissinger: The 1960 models are in surplus now so we should be able to give you some--but I had better watch what I say since there is no telling what you might report back to Bhutto.

Ahmed: We are being modest and restrained in handling the arms question.

Kissinger: Do you have the money yet?

Ahmed: We will find it from Saudi Arabia. But we think it will be easier to get answers first from you on just what is available and how much it costs. Then we can go to the Saudis.

Kissinger: I can inform you that we have approval to supply you with 24 TOW launchers and 450 missiles. You can get started on a training program while awaiting delivery of the rest. It is our intention to start slowly on our new military relationship with you, concentrating on defensive weapons, and get it going well before it can

Kissinger:  
(Continuing)

be disrupted. So let us not give any publicity to the TOW's or the invitation we are extending to your Air Marshal. Let us build up slowly but steadily--with maybe some artillery next--weapons that can reasonably be described as defensive.

Ahmed:

We have been very careful in compiling our lists.

Kissinger:

If you narrow the gap with India to 1 to 10 you will be in good shape. Seriously, we want you strong enough so that India will be afraid to attack.

Ahmed:

We want A-7 and other weapons in a hurry. India might well attack us the 2nd or 3rd week of November in Kashmir.

Kissinger:

Can they really attack there? I thought the terrain was too rugged, and it would seem as aggression anyway.

Ahmed:

According to the Indian Constitution, all of Kashmir is part of India. We can take them on in Kashmir but they will fight us all along the border. We cannot be certain but we think this will happen and we must look out for it. If it happens, it will be a two-front war with Afghanistan joining in anytime there is war with India. But we can handle this with the A-7.

Kissinger:

It has very long range and is an attack plane, isn't it?

Ahmed:

Yes. Are you saying it is not considered defensive? It is a fighter as well.

Kissinger:

I am simply stating facts about the plane.

Ahmed:

We have been very interested in this plane for a long time. We want about 110 of them. We also need weapons in a short time frame since ordinary delivery will never get them in our hands before the war in November. We will do our best by ourselves but we need arms. It all depends on the USSR. The Indians cannot move without Soviet approval because of their treaty which obliges the USSR to help India.



Kissinger:

The treaty is not so binding.

Ahmed:

Yes it is since if India is attacked, the USSR is obliged to come in until the threat is removed. Really, this would bring the Soviets in even if India went first and we hit back. So whenever India wants to start something, she must have Soviet support. We think India will probably start a war. Mid-November to mid-December is the probable time. This year is unlikely, but we must be watchful, and next year is more certain. If we seem to be in trouble, the Afghans will join in. We have told our chaps to be ready to do their best on two fronts and not to expect anyone to come to their help. Outside help is a bonus and they should not count upon it. Iran could stop the Afghans by moving some of its units up to the borders but it would not do so for fear of the USSR. So what they will really do to help us is questionable. Nor have we been able to get China to assure us of support. That is why we need weapons off the shelf.

Kissinger:

We have serious problems with our own army on rapid delivery. Don't you have a team coming soon? We can discuss all this when they come in October.

Ahmed:

Thank you. That is the best approach. Also, concerning the Soviet threat, you know about the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul. When Bhutto had the Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad in to ask about this, he had us all present. The Soviet Ambassador said he would report immediately to Moscow and was sure it would be cleared up soon. He would let us know. But he has never returned. When our Ambassador to Moscow took it up there, the Foreign Ministry expressed surprise that we would credit any such statement. But when our Ambassador asked the Soviets about the Durand line, they said they were "not empowered" to discuss borders. It is not conclusive but it is very worrisome and worthy of note. We have informed you and the Iranians and the Chinese.

Kissinger:

As I told you in Ankara, we would take a grave view of Soviet machinations and you can be certain that the Soviets understand that. The Indian Foreign Minister will be in Washington next week and I will tell him that any Indian pressure on Pakistan will ruin Indian efforts at friendlier relations with the United States. They are trying hard to improve their relations with us at the present time, due to their internal developments. It is nothing spectacular, but it is interesting.

Ahmed:

Will there be a Communique in connection with Chavan's visit?

Kissinger:

An agreed minute of the Joint Commission meeting, words but no real substance. The biggest question concerning the visit is whether I will be able to survive a dinner given by Ambassador Yaqub's colleague, Ambassador Kaul. He insists upon making some sort of comment about each of his guests after dinner, and since he takes at least half a minute for at least forty guests, that is already twenty minutes and then he gives a long toast in which he attacks United States policy. It is very boring. The last time I was at one of his affairs he gave a toast saying that some nations like economic power and some like military power but India likes spiritual power. I replied that I was surprised that he came out with spiritual power since I had expected him to say India has chosen nuclear power. In Bhutto's recent letter to President Ford he said that Pakistan may have to adjust its policy to meet the political realities in the area. What does that mean?

Ahmed:

There will be no change in our relationship with you or with the Chinese, you can be sure of that.

Kissinger:

What is the Chinese mood?

Ahmed:

We hope we can get more support from them. They have been hard to pin down. They defer to you so I hope that you will talk to them about Pakistan when you go to China.

Kissinger: What is their attitude toward the United States?

Ahmed: Last night, Chou gave me the impression that it is about time something happened as a follow-up by you to the Shanghai Communique. As you know, they have been very cautious and patient on this issue but for the first time I detected a bit of impatience. In the past he has always said he appreciates the problems of the United States. This time he did not say that and he hinted that China is impatient. But they clearly want to continue to have good relations with you.

Kissinger: I will get eager on October 17 or 18.

Ahmed: Will you also visit Pakistan?

Kissinger: I simply do not have the time although I would love it. On this subject, I notice that your Prime Minister is excited over the visit by President Ford. You know we never set a date for the visit and whether or not President Ford visits Pakistan is not dependent upon what he does with India. We have a special relationship.

Ahmed: Can he come in connection with his visit to China?

Kissinger: This was never planned and I cannot imagine how anyone got this idea. You know how the Chinese are. Certainly we would never consider going to India or even to Pakistan in connection with a visit to China. It has always been seen as a separate trip. The President may visit Southeast Asia after China, perhaps the Philippines. They need to be shored up after what happened in Indo-China. Is it true that you are buying arms from North Vietnam?

Ahmed: We have made some inquiries but there is nothing definite. The article in Newsweek saying we are interested in buying arms from North Vietnam upset them very much although the leak did not come from us. We have no details of what they can supply and we have made no decision but we are checking. It appears that almost everything belongs to South Vietnam. We shall have to see what happens.

Kissinger: I do not know what they have to sell. Some things in some categories but I do not believe they have large overall totals. Also, I do not know what kind of shape it is in.

Ahmed: We are having more trouble with the Tarbela Dam. Last year we had to empty the reservoir in order to repair damage to the tunnels. This has been fixed but it now turns out that the river bed has been scarred by closing the tunnels and this must be repaired. This means a delay in refilling the reservoir with a subsequent loss of water for irrigation. We had been counting on a good crop this year, especially for wheat, in 1976 but it now looks as if we shall have to wait for another year. Can you help us with more PL 480 wheat?

Kissinger: What do we have already planned?

Atherton: 500,000 tons in the planning figure. The same as for India.

Ahmed: We needed at least one million before learning of the Tarbela problem. Now we need more.

Kissinger: We shall review the problem and see what can be done. Who built the dam with which you are having so much trouble? Repairing a big dam is a very tricky problem.

Ahmed: It was a French, Italian construction with some participation by the United States. It is the biggest dam in the world and they may have taken on more than they could handle.

Kissinger: We shall see what we can do with PL 480.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

5743

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan

*which Bhutto thinks will permit*

*B over the direction of*

*These measures are not new but they have been highlighted by*

At Tab A is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his concern about Soviet policies in South Asia. ~~The themes are not new but they are pegged on recent events -- i.e., that the effect of detente in other areas (Helsinki Summit) will motivate the Soviets to devote even more time to their ambitions in South Asia.~~ Bhutto provides specific evidence <sup>and</sup> statements allegedly made <sup>recently</sup> by the Soviet representative in Kabul, ~~to illustrate that the Soviets are already in a more aggressive mode.~~

*implying sympathy for Afghan charges on Pak territory.*

Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political and material support. ~~although we know these are his principal concerns and we will doubtless hear them expressed more bluntly when Aziz Ahmed is here in connection with UNGA (I have recommended you meet with him). He approaches these issues indirectly in his argumentation that Soviet aggressive designs on Pakistan are encouraged by the lack of "credible evidence of support from the US!" to back up our verbal commitment to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity.~~


*but does state*

Neither the Bhutto letter nor its timing reflect any new departure from Pakistan's foreign policy line and its continuing search for external support to offset Indian pre-eminence and fears of Soviet/Indian/Afghan designs against Pakistan. However, this summer Bhutto has been unusually active in pressing these themes and making a case for greater US support of all kinds. (He has sent parallel messages to me.) In part this may be due to some recent developments in South Asia where the emergency in India (the Paks fear a diversion campaign against Islamabad), the coup in Bangladesh and somewhat increased tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have combined to refresh traditional Pakistani security concerns. In part, it seems due to concern that the US may not be able or willing to provide the degree of support which Bhutto had expected.

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

*On 3/9/04*



when he was here last February. Since then, the collapse of Indochina, Congressional blockage of arms deals with Turkey and Jordan, and our continued pursuit of detente have added to doubts in Islamabad. But it all seems to add up to a strong Pakistan desire to get all they can in the way of economic and military support from the US. Bhutto has asked for 1 million tons of PL 480 food this year and is also pressing for our agreement to an arms supply program.

*and support*  
On balance, I believe <sup>before you</sup> Bhutto's letter is mainly a further attempt to keep his security concerns ~~on the front burner~~ and to have your personal reassurance ~~that this is the case~~. Within the framework of our current policy toward South Asia and our interest in avoiding any destabilizing moves, we are doing <sup>about</sup> as much as we can for Pakistan, including ~~affirmative action on these urgent arms requests which fall within the framework of your earlier policy decision on the lifting of the embargo and continuing our economic assistance and PL 480 programs while things in India and Bangladesh are so unsettled.~~ *Under*


I believe that you <sup>should</sup> ~~can~~ reply in general terms to Bhutto, <sup>simply</sup> giving broad reassurance on the issues he raises ~~but avoiding details, which I can deal with in my meeting with Aziz Ahmed at the UNGA.~~

*PL-480 and FIVIS programs.*

*wo?* I also recommend that you use this reply to inform Bhutto personally that you do not believe a trip to Pakistan will be possible this year. Bhutto suspects as much but he has pressed repeatedly for you to visit Pakistan even if you are not going to India this year. ~~This is the kind of minor problem that could be removed by a personal word from you.~~

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A. [~~Mr. Theis' office coordinated in the text.~~]

*(The text has been cleared with Paul Theis)*



Gen Srwgh:26 Sep 75 (retyped)

ACTION - 5743

~~SECRET/NODIS (GDS)~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister  
Bhutto of Pakistan

At Tab B is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his concern over the direction of Soviet policies in South Asia. These concerns are not new but they have been heightened by recent events -- such as the Helsinki Summit -- which Bhutto thinks will permit the Soviets to devote even more time to their ambitions in South Asia -- and statements allegedly made recently by the Soviet representative in Kabul implying sympathy for Afghan designs on Pak territory.

Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political and material support but does state that Soviet aggressive designs on Pakistan are encouraged by the lack of "credible evidence of support from the US."

Bhutto's letter is a further attempt to keep his security concerns before you and to have your personal reassurance and support. Within the framework of our current policy toward South Asia and our interest in avoiding any destabilizing moves, we are doing about as much as we can for Pakistan, including modest PL-480 and FMS programs.

I believe that you should reply in general terms to Bhutto, simply giving broad reassurance on the issues he raises. I also recommend that you use this reply to inform Bhutto personally that you do not believe a trip to Pakistan will be possible this year. Bhutto suspects as much but he has pressed repeatedly for you to visit Pakistan even if you are not going to India this year.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A. (The text has been cleared with Paul Theris.)

~~SECRET/NODIS (GDS)~~

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

Wm 3/9/04



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

*which we did effectively begin*  
*the close personal*

Thank you for your letter of August 17. It is important that we maintain ~~a sound dialogue on matters of mutual concern, following~~ our very constructive meetings of last February. I know Secretary of State Kissinger has also been in touch with you.

*that*

Let me assure you at the outset there is no question that the integrity and independence of Pakistan are important to the United States and essential to the stability of South Asia. In a period in which we are working to lessen tensions between the major powers, while safeguarding our vital security interests and those of our friends, my Government remains fully cognizant of its responsibility to insure that an easing of tensions in one area does not create ~~an opportunity~~ <sup>opportunities</sup> for exploitation elsewhere. Nor can it in any way impact adversely on our relations with other countries in our objectives of regional stability and world peace. We have, therefore, made clear to the Soviet leadership that ~~we do not regard~~ our continuing attention to improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union ~~as an effort isolated from~~ developments in other parts of the world. ~~Threats to peace, stimulated or supported by the Soviet Union, would have an adverse impact on our bilateral relations and cause us to question the prospects for further progress in detente.~~ There should be no mistaken belief that the fact of the Helsinki Summit will in any way reduce the resolve of

*is heavily conditioned by*



the United States to oppose attempts to undermine the security of friends and allies in any part of the world. This includes South Asia and our determination to pursue our long-standing and constructive relationship with Pakistan. I believe this position is well understood and will continue to carry weight to the benefit of your Nation's security and independence.

Let me <sup>emphasize</sup> add, too, that there will be no <sup>lessening of</sup> reduction in our resolve to help our friends in South Asia. Secretary Kissinger has already <sup>made clear our</sup> assured you of my appreciation for Pakistan's concerns. These have been the subject of continuing attention in the United States Government for some time, as you know from our discussions ~~during our meeting here~~ <sup>last</sup> in February. I believe we have taken significant steps to help Pakistan <sup>with</sup> through the lifting of the arms embargo and in our on-going economic assistance programs. In the months ahead, ~~our efforts~~ <sup>there</sup> will ~~achieve~~ <sup>be</sup> visible results, as we respond to specific requests for arms purchases and as we reach new agreements on various economic development programs.

*We admire the progress you have stimulated in the process of normalization of relations among the countries of South Asia and*  
Finally, we intend to continue to ~~lead~~ <sup>offer</sup> maximum encouragement to your efforts to ~~normalize relations among the countries of South Asia.~~ We admire the progress you have stimulated. I realize there will always be problems involved in the process of reconciliation but there can also be immense benefits essential to the stability of your area and the security and well-being of Pakistan. You will continue to have the support of my Government in your efforts to pursue better and more constructive relations with the nations of South Asia.

*strong wish to*  
In closing, I want to reiterate my ~~deep interest in~~ <sup>with</sup> visiting Pakistan at an early date and ~~in~~ <sup>to</sup> meeting you again. It now appears that my schedule through the remainder of this year will make it impossible for me to accept your warm hospitality at this time. ~~In~~ <sup>As you know,</sup> the foreseeable future, I do plan to visit the People's

*family soon.*

Republic of China <sup>^</sup> ~~Given our desire to further improve relations with Peking and in view of the events of this year in Indochina and the effect they have had in East Asia, I know you will fully understand the reasons for such a visit at this particular time. You can be certain that Secretary Kissinger and I will <sup>intend to</sup> discuss with the Chinese leaders in Peking what we can do to assist Pakistan. I do look forward to accepting your hospitality at a mutually convenient time in the next year. In the meantime, I remain grateful for and ~~have full confidence in the relations which exist between our two countries, under your leadership.~~~~

With best personal wishes,

Sincerely,

*our common interests  
in promoting stability  
in South Asia and  
your important  
contribution to that goal  
and.*

His Excellency  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto  
Prime Minister of the  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan  
Islamabad

*committed to the further strengthening of  
the close*



SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister  
Bhutto of Pakistan

At Tab B is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his concern over the direction of Soviet policies in South Asia. These concerns are not new but they have been heightened by recent events such as the Helsinki Summit -- which Bhutto thinks will permit the Soviets to devote even more time to their ambitions in South Asia -- and statements allegedly made recently by the Soviet representative in Kabul implying sympathy for Afghan designs on Pak territory.

Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political and material support but does state that Soviet aggressive designs on Pakistan are encouraged by the lack of "credible evidence of support from the US."

Bhutto's letter is a further attempt to keep his security concerns before you and to elicit your personal reassurance and support. Within the framework of our current policy toward South Asia and our interest in avoiding any destabilizing moves, we are doing about as much as we can for Pakistan, including modest PL-480 and FMS programs.

I believe that you should reply in general terms to Bhutto, giving broad reassurance on the issues he raises. I also recommend that you use this reply to inform Bhutto personally that you do not believe a trip to Pakistan will be possible this year. Bhutto suspects as much but he has pressed repeatedly for you to visit Pakistan even if you are not going to India this year.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A. (The text has been cleared with Paul Theis.)

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

Wa 3/9/04



100  
#5743

Gen Srwgh:26 Sep 75 (retyped)

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of August 17. It is important that we maintain the close personal dialogue which we so effectively began in our very constructive meetings of last February. I know that Secretary of State Kissinger has also been in touch with you.

Let me assure you at the outset there is no question that the integrity and independence of Pakistan are important to the United States and essential to the stability of South Asia. In a period in which we are working to lessen tensions between the major powers, while safeguarding our vital security interests and those of our friends, my Government remains fully cognizant of its responsibility to insure that an easing of tensions in one area does not create opportunities for exploitation elsewhere. Nor can it in any way impact adversely on our relations with other countries in our objectives of regional stability and world peace. We have, therefore, made clear to the Soviet leadership that our continuing attention to improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union is heavily conditioned by developments in other parts of the world. I believe this position is well understood and will continue to benefit your Nation's security and independence.

Let me emphasize that there will be no lessening of our resolve to help our friends in South Asia. Secretary Kissinger has already made clear our appreciation for Pakistan's concerns. These have been the subject of



continuing attention in the United States Government for some time, as you know from our discussions here last February. I believe we have taken significant steps to help Pakistan, both through the lifting of the arms embargo and in our on-going economic assistance programs. In the months ahead there will be visible results, as we respond to specific requests for arms purchases and as we reach new agreements on various economic development programs.

We admire the progress you have stimulated in the process of normalization of relations among the countries of South Asia and we intend to continue to offer maximum encouragement to your efforts.

In closing, I want to reiterate my strong wish to visit Pakistan at an early date and to meet with you again. It now appears that my schedule through the remainder of this year will make it impossible for me to accept your warm hospitality at this time. As you know, I do plan to visit the People's Republic of China fairly soon. I intend to discuss with the Chinese leaders our common interests in promoting stability in South Asia and your important contribution to that end. I look forward to accepting your hospitality at a mutually convenient time next year. In the meantime, I remain grateful for and committed to the further strengthening of the close relations between our two countries.

With best personal wishes,

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto  
Prime Minister of the  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan  
Islamabad



166

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

MO		DA		HR		RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
8	28	25	18				7505743	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: Mohr KISSINGER, H \_\_\_\_\_ S/S \_\_\_\_\_ REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT \_\_\_\_\_

SCOWCROFT X \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN NODIS

DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ ST EX SEC \_\_\_\_\_ S S \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_

TS \_\_\_\_\_ CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Msg to Pres for let Bluntto of Pakistan re USSR / India & Afghanistan pressures & need for greater US support

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK .....
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES .....
FAR EAST			<u>X</u>	REPLY FOR .....
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION .....
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			<u>X</u>	MEMO _____ TO _____ .....
EUROPE / CANADA			<u>X</u>	RECOMMENDATIONS .....
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO .....
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ .....
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? .....
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE. ....
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: _____
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
5/23				Subj OI Info	
8/28				NSC15C noted by RCM	
9/23	Oakley	HK		Memo for Pres.	
9/23				Reopened	
9/23		HAK	X	Pres to sign ltr to Bluntto (9/23)	
10/16		NSC15C		HAK disapproved recom	
10/17		JS Oakley	S	Further action (11/10)	
10/20				No further action at this time	
10/20				C See 7506981 for Action	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ 7506981

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: \_\_\_\_\_ FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: \_\_\_\_\_

M/FILED BY AUG 27 1975

CRT ID: \_\_\_\_\_

OPEN OCT 23 1975 HP NS

CLOSE \_\_\_\_\_ WH EP

\_\_\_\_\_ PA DY

OCT 23 1975