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1354 28

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

VIA LDX  
March 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State


SUBJECT: Presidential Message of Reply to Pakistani Prime  
Minister Bhutto -- S/S 7504012 (Letter from Bhutto)  
and LDX #69 of March 3 (Proposed Reply)

Attached is the revised cleared text of the President's reply (per LDX 69 of March 3) to the letter (S/S 7504012) from Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto on the decision of the U.S. Government to lift the embargo against the sale of arms to Pakistan and India. State is authorized to transmit the President's message of reply through appropriate channels.

*James M. Borner*  
Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary *for*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)  
NSC-ROakley

*wh 3/8/75*



213

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO OF PAKISTAN

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your message concerning the decision of the United States Government to lift the embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan and India. I share your hope that this action will further strengthen the excellent relations between our two countries.

At the same time, I will be most gratified if, as you have suggested, this decision contributes to the strengthening of security and stability in South Asia. This remains the underlying goal of our policies in the Subcontinent.

I was particularly pleased to learn that you have written to Prime Minister Gandhi to assure her of your Government's commitment to the Simla Agreement. As I emphasized during our meeting here, the United States strongly supports the political normalization taking place between your two countries. I hope that in the near future you find a way to move this process forward in some concrete way so as to alleviate concerns regarding the possible adverse effects our action might have on your bilateral relations with India

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

WA 3/8/04



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS) -- 2

and on regional stability.

I am confident that the personal understanding which we achieved in our recent talks will prove an important resource in maintaining the warm and cooperative relations which our two countries have traditionally enjoyed. I look forward with pleasure to the time when I may visit you in Pakistan in response to your kind invitation. Sincerely, [Gerald R. Ford]"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)



THE WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

TIME SENT

20

WHITE HOUSE LDX NR 20

CIA _____	DIA/G _____
STATE <u>✓</u> _____	DIA/H _____
NSCC <u>✓</u> _____	DASA _____
ADMCC _____	NPIC _____
NSA _____	

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

'75 MAR 10 PM 4:02

NUMBER OF PAGES 3

DESCRIPTION/COMMENT:

FROM: JEANNE DAVIS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

TO: GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN

**URGENT**

11 9 10 11  
STATE

RECEIVED  
BY: Jew

DATE/TIME:



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 10

FOR JEANNE DAVIS

Jeanne,

General Scowcroft has approved a revised text (Tab A of memo to President on left) of a Presidential message of reply to Prime Minister Bhutto.

This takes care of LDX 69 of March 3 which State submitted for clearance and is in response to S/S 7504012 -- incoming letter from Bhutto.

You could LDX the attached to George Springsteen advising State of the revised text.

Rosemary Niehuss

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)ACTION  
March 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
 FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY <sup>PRO</sup>  
 SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Prime Minister  
 Bhutto on South Asian Arms

At Tab I is a self-explanatory memo for the President recommending he send a message of reply to Prime Minister Bhutto in response to the latter's message expressing appreciation for the U. S. arms decision. The President's message expresses the hope that Bhutto will take action to move the Simla process forward "in some concrete way" but is otherwise non-substantive.

Mr. Springsteen has informed Jeanne Davis that Secretary Kissinger has cleared the substance of State's suggested reply (attached in cable form). All that remains is White House clearance. (immediately below)

RECOMMENDATION: That you clear the proposed Presidential reply at tab a of the package at Tab I.

APPROVE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE BO

Alternatively, that you forward the memo at Tab I to the President seeking his approval of the suggested reply. [Paul Theis has cleared the proposed message]

APPROVE FORWARDING MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

wa 3/8/04



LDX 69 of  
March 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NEA/PAB:RAPECK/MW  
2/26/75 X 22441  
THE SECRETARY

NEA - MR. SOBER  
WH:

S/S:  
P: MR. SISCO

*Paul Theris',  
Milton Friedman's  
(speechwriters)  
changes shown  
below*

ROUTINE ISLAMABAD  
ROUTINE NEW DELHI

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, PK, IN  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO PRIME MINISTER  
BHUTTO

HAK  
RAPECK  
SS  
S/S:  
WH:  
JJS

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER  
BHUTTO:

*to* QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: THANK YOU FOR YOUR ~~RECENT~~  
~~MESSAGE RELATING TO~~ THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES  
*Concerning* GOVERNMENT ~~LIFTING~~ THE EMBARGO ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN  
AND INDIA. I SHARE YOUR HOPE THAT THIS ACTION WILL FURTHER  
STRENGTHEN THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUN-  
TRIES.

*At the same time, I* WE WILL BE MOST GRATIFIED IF, AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED, THIS  
DECISION ~~WILL~~ CONTRIBUTES TO THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY  
AND STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA. ~~FOR~~ THIS REMAINS THE UNDER-  
LYING GOAL OF OUR POLICIES IN THE SUBCONTINENT. ~~I~~ I WAS  
PARTICULARLY PLEASD TO LEARN THAT YOU HAVE WRITTEN TO  
PRIME MINISTER GANDHI TO ASSURE HER OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S  
COMMITMENT TO THE SIMLA AGREEMENT. AS I EMPHASIZED DURING  
OUR MEETING HERE, THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE  
~~IMPORTANT PROCESS OF~~ POLITICAL NORMALIZATION TAKING PLACE  
BETWEEN YOUR TWO COUNTRIES. I ~~WOULD~~ HOPE THAT IN THE NEAR  
FUTURE YOU ~~MIGHT~~ FIND A WAY TO MOVE THIS PROCESS FORWARD  
IN SOME CONCRETE WAY SO AS TO ALLEVIATE CONCERNS REGARDING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

wh 3/3/04



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12

THE POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OUR ACTION MIGHT HAVE ON YOUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND ON REGIONAL STABILITY.

*am confident*  
I ~~BELIEVE~~ THAT THE PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING WHICH WE ACHIEVED IN OUR RECENT TALKS WILL PROVE AN IMPORTANT RESOURCE IN MAINTAINING THE WARM AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE TRADITIONALLY ENJOYED. I ~~AM~~ LOOKING FORWARD WITH PLEASURE TO THE TIME WHEN I MAY VISIT YOU IN PAKISTAN IN RESPONSE TO YOUR KIND INVITATION.  
{SIGNED} GERALD R. FORD. UNQUOTE. YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



REMITTED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

URGENT

RECEIVED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp) SE  
DM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

'75 MAR 3 PM 12:33

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 69, CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, NO. PAGES 2

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. Telegram to Islamabad re Message fm President to  
PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

FROM: S/S  
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number

DELIVER TO: EXTENSION: ROOM NUMBER:

TO: Mrs. Jeanne Davis

CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS:

APPROVED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: [Signature]  
Executive Secretary Officer

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)ACTION  
March 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Reply to Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto  
on U.S. Arms Supply Policy

Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan has sent you a warm message of appreciation [Tab B] following the public announcement of your decision to lift the embargo on the sale of lethal military equipment to Pakistan and India. In this message, the Prime Minister reaffirmed his intention to continue the Simla process of negotiations with India and to avoid the escalation of an arms race in the Subcontinent. He also informed you that he is making these points in a separate message to Prime Minister Gandhi of India.

I regard Bhutto's messages to you and to Mrs. Gandhi, reaffirming principles central to your decision and to our overall South Asian policy, as a constructive gesture. I believe it would be desirable for you to round out your exchanges with Bhutto on this subject by responding to his message, taking note of his commitments -- which you and he discussed -- and encouraging him in his efforts toward reconciliation in South Asia.

A proposed message to be dispatched through the Department of State is at Tab A. [Paul Theis concurred in the suggested text.]

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the dispatch of the message from you to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

wa 3/8/04



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

*Approved  
by Gen. Scowcroft  
25*

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO OF PAKISTAN

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your message concerning the decision of the United States Government to lift the embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan and India. I share your hope that this action will further strengthen the excellent relations between our two countries.

At the same time, I will be most gratified if, as you have suggested, this decision contributes to the strengthening of security and stability in South Asia. This remains the underlying goal of our policies in the Subcontinent.

I was particularly pleased to learn that you have written to Prime Minister Gandhi to assure her of your Government's commitment to the Simla Agreement. As I emphasized during our meeting here, the United States strongly supports the political normalization taking place between your two countries. I hope that in the near future you find a way to move this process forward in some concrete way so as to alleviate concerns regarding the possible adverse effects our action might have on your bilateral relations with India

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

*3/8/04*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS) -- 2

and on regional stability.

I am confident that the personal understanding which we achieved in our recent talks will prove an important resource in maintaining the warm and cooperative relations which our two countries have traditionally enjoyed. I look forward with pleasure to the time when I may visit you in Pakistan in response to your kind invitation. Sincerely, [Gerald R. Ford]"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)



TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MR. ZULFIKAR  
ALI BHUTTO, PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN,  
ADDRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY GERALD  
R. FORD, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA.

As the lifting of the embargo on arms supplies from the United States to Pakistan and India has been announced, I take this opportunity to convey my government's deep appreciation of this decision of your Administration which will further cement the relations between the United States of America and Pakistan. This decision has been taken, we know with the object of removing a cruel anomaly and strengthening the security and stability of our region. I have stated publicly and am also writing to the Prime Minister of India that, in seeking an end to the arms ban, we wish neither to depart from the Simla Agreement nor to enter an arms race in the sub-continent. I am sure that no propaganda to the contrary will influence collective and responsible opinion and your decision will be impartially considered to be a valuable contribution to peace in a volatile and vital region of the world. May I, Mr. President, take

contd.....2



this opportunity to recall the warmth and mutual understanding which permeated our exchanges during my recent visit to express my confidence that, under your leadership, the U.S.A. will play a leading part in ending the insecurity of States less powerful than their neighbours and thus consolidating the foundation of international peace.

-----

EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN  
Washington, D.C.  
February 24, 1975.





No. SS/A-1/1/75

7504012

EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN  
2315 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

February 24, 1975

AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN

Excellency,

I have the honour to forward herewith two messages from the Prime Minister of Pakistan, one for the President and the other for you.

2. May I also take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to you for your contribution to the decision announced yesterday which, we are agreed, meets a long standing legitimate desire of Pakistan and which would contribute to the stability of the region. I would be grateful if you would convey my appreciation to the President.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Sahabzada Yaqub Khan)

The Honorable  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,  
Secretary of State,  
The Department of State,  
Washington D. C.





NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
3	7	3	5	10	7501354		Oakley

2M

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: KISSINGER, H \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_  
 SCOWCROFT X SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_  
 DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ ST EX SEC X

REFERENCE: 7504257 CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE  
 S/S \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT  
 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ LOU NO FORN NODIS  
 C EYES ONLY EXDIS  
 S CODEWORD  
 TS SENSITIVE


SUBJECT: *Message to Pres From PM Bhutto in appreciation of New Arms Policy*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOP	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK .....
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES .....
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR .....
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ... <u>X</u> .....
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>	MEMO TO .....
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS .....
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO .....
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: .....
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? .....
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE .....
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: 3/20
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				<del>Hold for...</del>
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
3/5	Oakley	Scowcroft	<u>X</u>	Decision (03/08)	
3/10				Script approved re: gov	
3/10	Oakley	Davis		Memo Pres to Springsteen (3-12)	
3/10	Oakley	Davis		Sign memo to Springsteen LDXing revised text.	
3/10				c Davis sgd memo to Springsteen	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH X done by LDX

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: \_\_\_\_\_

MAR 12 1975

CRT ID# 2145 SA SF

OPEN NS

CLOSE B EP

PA DY

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION  
June 26, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ROBERT B. OAKLEY

I am staffing, with Dick Soloman, a memo to accompany this letter from Prime Minister Bhutto to the President. The letter was stimulated by HAK's conversation with Aziz Ahmed (copy attached). The total exercise is very similar to that which transpired in June and July of 1974 when Prime Minister Bhutto wrote, asking President Nixon to raise the Pakistan security issue in Moscow. President Nixon replied to Bhutto on July 31 that he had made clear to the Soviet leadership our support for the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. President Nixon had already (on June 24) assured Prime Minister Bhutto in a letter that this was a "cornerstone" of our foreign policy (this was published by Aziz Ahmed in Islamabad on July 19).



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SECRET/NODIS

June 30, 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR:

GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT:

Draft Letter for Prime  
Minister. Bhutto

Would you please have the Department prepare a draft reply to the attached letter for the President from Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto.



Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY lp, NARA, DATE 3/8/04

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)





PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister's House  
Rawalpindi

13 June 1975

Dear Mr. President,

I have been wanting to write to you on a matter of vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the peace and stability of our vast and populous region. However, since you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating to Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until you returned home and had time to address your attention to other matters of importance to world peace.

On May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met in Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United States.

It is an established fact that practically all of India's armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons.

Moreover, in view of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, an armed attack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval and, indeed, direct involvement.

As you are aware, Mr. President, my Government is determined to further the process of normalization of relations with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. We will sustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India.

DECLASSIFIED


E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

State Review 9/16/07

NARA, Date 3/8/04

By [Signature]





PRIME MINISTER

- 2 -

Nevertheless, our considered assessment of the situation, as Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could come at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would have no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one. For instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India and prepare the stage for an invasion of Azad Kashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan's control. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.

Dr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely the same question to the Chinese Vice-Premier when he visited Pakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering this question but have given us no answer so far. Their decision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The constraint on China's freedom to act as a result of this Treaty was tragically demonstrated when India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while Pakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.

Dr. Kissinger then enquired whether he could ask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan and added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what the United States would do in such an event, it would be informed that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United States would not be able to stay out of that situation.



PRIME MINISTER

-3-

To Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming military threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and backed by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the determination of the United States to ward off a danger of vast and incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news.


I am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the clarity with which your Administration has perceived the implications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability of this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for the first time, a concrete step which could restore the power equilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive factor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting the vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the shadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the horizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it, a turning point would be reached in its history. The global balance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace in our critical region could become truly inviolable.

With best wishes and warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,  
President of the United States of America  
White House,  
Washington D. C.



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY ada, NARA, DATE 3/8/04 *stat review 9/16/05*

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

## PARTICIPANTS:

Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs of Pakistan.  
Mr. Mansur Ahmed, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PRM*

## TIME AND DATE:

Thursday, May 22, 1975  
11:50 a.m. - 12:25 p.m.

## PLACE:

CENTO Headquarters, U.S. Delegation Room  
Ankara, Turkey

Sisco: Mr. Secretary, there is a chance of Pakistan getting on the Security Council. It can't be that we can't have a country friendly to us! As our Ambassador said, you'd better get someone else to put your name forward. If we did, it's the kiss of death. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Is there a chance?

Sisco: Sure. ~~They're wisely putting the case on~~ its merits and not just because India has been on it three times.

Kissinger: The Chinese will support it.

Sisco: Sure.

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

Kissinger: That means there will be two votes [for us] on the Security Council -- ours and, occasionally, Pakistan. [Laughter] Occasionally.

Who is the Latin American?

Sisco: They haven't decided.

Kissinger: It is Peru this year. Unless they put Cuba on. [Laughter]

Ahmed: I appreciate this opportunity to greet you. On the whole you've done well with this ship [the Mayaguez incident].

Kissinger: It had to be done.

Ahmed: It was done efficiently.

Kissinger: Our press now is a bit sick. I never saw a more disappointed group than when our President stepped into the press room to announce that all the men were recovered.

Really, it was good. It was not a major event in history, but it helped psychologically. It also helped the President, and also internationally.

Ahmed: It was very good.

Well, you placed the ball in our court by lifting the ban. But we've placed no orders yet. No money!

Kissinger: We've talked to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Couldn't you arrange something with Saudi Arabia?

Ahmed: Our Prime Minister will be going to Saudi Arabia.

I've asked our Chief of Staff to prepare something.

Kissinger: ~~You should start in a modest way.~~ Because the Indians will make a huge racket anyway. They placed huge orders when Grechko was there, and we can make a fuss and make it look later as a reaction to it.

Ahmed: Our estimate is that we haven't more than two years to make good our deficiencies.





Kissinger: There is a good possibility, and that is because the Indians are basically a pacific nation. [Laughter] You know, the Indian Ambassador in Washington is your biggest asset. In a toast at one dinner I went to, he said, "Some people emphasize economic power, some emphasize military power, but we in India emphasize moral power." [Laughter] I said in reply, "I thought he was going to say nuclear power." [Laughter]

I wouldn't go to a dinner with him alone but he fixes it so I can't refuse. He makes it in honor of some senior Senator whom I couldn't offend. He goes around the table and makes a comment about everyone and gives a fifteen minute lecture against American foreign policy.

He's a friend of Atherton's.

Ahmed: Did the Shah show you our estimates?

Kissinger: Yes, he showed us estimates of what the Indians arranged with the Soviets. We told him we were sympathetic. We told him we would warn him [Gromyko] against making any move against Pakistan.

[To Sisco]: Tell this to the Shah. Add it to what already went.

I told Gromyko we would hold them responsible for the use made of their equipment anywhere, but especially in Pakistan.

Ahmed: They have some US equipment.

Kissinger: That they got since 1962?

Ahmed: Yes.

Kissinger: But where do they get spare parts?

Atherton: We don't give them any. I think it's from the international arms market; it's mostly old equipment. But they have some of yours.

Kissinger: My point to him was not to tell him to use non-Soviet equipment. It was to tell him they would be held responsible.

This is for your Prime Minister, not to make publicly.

How do you think they can start a war? Under what pretext?

Ahmed: They'll say they've waited 30 years to settle the border. As they did in 1965, they'll open the main front. It would be an all-out war.

We think they cannot start a war without Soviet concurrence, because of the Treaty of 1971. Because in case of any attack on India, the Soviets are obligated to respond.

Kissinger: What will the Chinese do?

Ahmed: They say, "We will resolutely respond." Their Vice Premier came through and we put this question to him: "We'd like to know exactly what you'll do if Pakistan is attacked." We didn't expect an immediate answer. We also asked them to step up military supplies.

Kissinger: And their answer?

Ahmed: He said they'll consider it seriously. There already is a program of supply. He said they'll insure the delivery of everything that has been promised; as to new deliveries, he'd suggest it to his Government. They have limited capacity. With the end of the war in Vietnam and Cambodia, they may have more.

We need sophisticated equipment. Because a man can fight, but he needs equipment. Manpower is important, but nevertheless, we must keep up with technology. And we need to train them, and it's important for morale. They see Iran -- we welcome it -- and India with the finest arms.

If our assessment is correct, we've at the most two years.

Kissinger: What do you base that assessment on?

Ahmed: On a number of things -- these comings and goings, Grechko and others. The Romanian Ambassador told me he thought that there might be an agreement, an understanding reached between Daoud and Indira.

Kissinger: Why would Afghanistan want India as a neighbor?

Ahmed: I think it's madness. The Indians say their line is on the Hindu Kush, not the MacMahon line.

Kissinger: Do you think there is no chance of a negotiation with the Afghans?

Ahmed: It is very unfortunate. The Prime Minister invited Daoud and said, "Don't announce it. These will be preliminary talks." And suddenly came the assassination of Sherpao. The students who put a tape recorder on the table fled into Afghanistan. At a press conference.

Atherton: Another reason not to have press conferences. [Laughter]

Ahmed: The police couldn't find any traces, because there were thousands of little pieces.

Kissinger: Where was he assassinated?

Ahmed: At the Peshawar University Historical Society. The two students who did it escaped into Afghanistan. Some others who were involved were detained.

This was very unfortunate, apart from anything else, because it created a deadlock in our talks. They said, "We won't talk unless you lift the ban and release the students." This would mean allowing their right to interfere in our affairs. This deadlock is of their creation.

Kissinger: I had the impression when I was in Kabul that they were ready for talks. This was before the assassination.

Ahmed: At that time things were moving very well. We were talking of the principles of peaceful coexistence, which was fine, because one of the principles is non-interference.

To show you how dishonest the Soviets can be: When we were negotiating the communique with the Soviets, I negotiated with Kuznetsov. I suggested, "How about -- on Afghanistan -- talking about 'on the basis of non-interference.' " He said they can't do that. I said, "How about on the basis of 'the principle of peaceful coexistence,'" thinking he'd say no. But he said all right.

They were eager to placate the Prime Minister because the insurgency in Baluchistan had collapsed. They might have come to the conclusion they could try and woo this country a bit. But it was just a change of tactics.

They've been quite rough to us. They said we had to agree to the line in Baluchistan and the Northeast as drawn by Kaul, and also agree to join the Asian Security System. Then this assassination.

Kissinger: Do you mind if we put this same question to the Chinese? Perhaps some assurance against Soviet attack. If the Soviets attack them after an Indian attack on you, we might be able to do something. In our present

situation, until there is a presidential election, we couldn't use force ourselves. But we would certainly urge the Shah to help. If there is an Indian attack on you, and then China tries to give assistance and the Soviets attack them, I don't see how we could avoid doing something. It would look like a massive attack on the whole structure in Asia.

Ahmed: We can take care of ourselves and don't need your manpower. What we need really is the tools, and we'll do the job. We have excellent material. We have no trouble finding the men; they can be trained.

We need the funds. Three billion dollars is the minimum requirement over the next two years, because of the big gaps in our armed forces. I put it to the Shahanshah. Between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the most we can get is \$1 billion. The Prime Minister got some from the Shahanshah and now he will go to Saudi Arabia. If there is an attack....

Kissinger: Then we'd have a new situation. Why don't you let us know how it comes out.

On other issues, I don't think we have anything [to discuss]. We got you more PL 480.

Ahmed: With the high cost of food.

Our main worry is what the Indians and Soviets and Afghans are up to. We get intelligence, and we give some to your Ambassador. He's a fine man.

Kissinger: Byroade.

Ahmed: He's personally convinced we have a case. He came in and asked after three months and said, "Where's your list?" We showed him one.

Kissinger: We didn't get it.

Ahmed: I told him not to send it! Because the State Department would say, "What are they up to?" But he looked at it and said he would look into delivery times, etc. I said we'd check first with Iran. So it's only a tentative list.

[The meeting ended]



## Department of State

## TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines *state rev. ex 9/16/03*  
By *Cal*, NARA, Date *3/8/04*

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS3  
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US  
SUBJECT: TEXTS OF LETTERS FROM PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO  
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE TEXTS OF THE LETTERS TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO DATED JUNE 13, 1975. THESE WERE DELIVERED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY.

2. QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I HAVE BEEN WANTING TO WRITE TO YOU ON A MATTER OF VITAL INTEREST BOTH TO THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN AND TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF OUR VAST AND POPULOUS REGION. HOWEVER, SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH MOMENTOUS ISSUES RELATING TO EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, I THOUGHT IT BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL YOU RETURNED HOME AND HAD TIME TO ADDRESS YOUR ATTENTION TO OTHER MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO WORLD PEACE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ON MAY 22, SECRETARY KISSINGER AND MY MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. AZIZ AHMED, MET IN ANKARA. IN THE COURSE OF THAT MEETING, DR. KISSINGER INFORMED MR. AHMED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN VERY STRONG TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT


AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD INVITE A RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES.

IT IS AN ESTABLISHED FACT THAT PRACTICALLY ALL OF INDIA'S ARMED FORCES ARE EQUIPPED WITH SOVIET WEAPONS. MOREOVER, IN VIEW OF THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1971, AN ARMED ATTACK ON PAKISTAN BY INDIA WOULD NECESSARILY CARRY SOVIET APPROVAL AND, INDEED, DIRECT INVOLVEMENT.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, MR. PRESIDENT, MY GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH INDIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SIMLA AGREEMENT. WE WILL SUSTAIN THIS POLICY AS LONG AS IT IS RECIPROCATED BY INDIA. NEVERTHELESS, OUR CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, AS MR. AHMED CONVEYED TO DR. KISSINGER, IS THAT WAR COULD COME AT ANY TIME THE SOVIET UNION WANTED IT, AS INDIA WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN CONTRIVING AN EXCUSE FOR STARTING ONE. FOR INSTANCE, INDIA COULD BRAZENLY ASSERT ITS SPURIOUS CLAIM TO THE WHOLE OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF INDIA AND PREPARE THE STAGE FOR AN INVASION OF AZAD KASHMIR ON THE PRETEXT THAT IT SOUGHT TO RELEASE IT FROM PAKISTAN'S CONTROL. ALL-OUT HOSTILITIES WOULD BE INELUCTABLE RESULT.

DR. KISSINGER ASKED WHAT CHINA WOULD DO IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN. WE HAD PUT PRECISELY THE SAME QUESTION TO THE CHINESE VICE-PREMIER WHEN HE VISITED PAKISTAN RECENTLY. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ARE CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION BUT HAVE GIVEN US NO ANSWER SO FAR. THEIR DECISION IN THIS REGARD CANNOT BUT BE INFLUENCED BY THE EXISTENCE OF THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY. THE CONSTRAINT ON CHINA'S FREEDOM TO ACT AS A RESULT OF THIS TREATY WAS TRAGICALLY DEMONSTRATED WHEN INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN IN 1971. CHINA WAS HAMSTRUNG WHILE PAKISTAN WAS DISMEMBERED

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WITH SOVIET INSTIGATION AND SUPPORT.

DR. KISSINGER THEN ENQUIRED WHETHER HE COULD ASK CHINA WHAT EXACTLY IT WOULD DO IF INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND ADDED THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTER-QUESTION AS TO WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN SUCH AN EVENT, IT WOULD BE INFORMED THAT IF INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO ITS HELP AND IF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA, THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THAT SITUATION.

TO PAKISTAN, CONFRONTED WITH AN OVERWHELMING MILITARY THREAT FROM INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN, BOTH ARMED AND BACKED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THIS FORTHRIGHT ENUNCIATION OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO WARD OFF A DANGER OF VAST AND INCALCULABLE PROPORTIONS COMES AS MOST WELCOME NEWS.

I AM DEEPLY IMPRESSED, MR. PRESIDENT, BY THE CLARITY WITH WHICH YOUR ADMINISTRATION HAS PERCEIVED THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN FOR THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THIS STRATEGIC AREA. THIS UNCLOUDED APPROACH ENVISAGES, FOR THE FIRST TIME, A CONCRETE STEP WHICH COULD RESTORE THE POWER EQUILIBRIUM IN THIS REGION. THIS COULD OPERATE AS A DECISIVE FACTOR IN MAINTAINING PEACE, DEFENDING FREEDOM AND PROTECTING THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH ASIA. IF THE SHADOW OF BLACKMAIL AND THE SPECTRE OF WAR WHICH DARKEN THE HORIZONS OF THIS STRIFE-TORN SUBCONTINENT WERE REMOVED FROM IT, A TURNING POINT WOULD BE REACHED IN ITS HISTORY. THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER WOULD GAIN REALITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE IN OUR CRITICAL REGION COULD BECOME TRULY INVIOLEABLE.

WITH BEST WISHES AND WARM REGARDS, YOURS SINCERELY,  
ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO. END QUOTE

3. QUOTE: MY DEAR DR. KISSINGER,

AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE HAVE DONE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO, OUR UTMOST TO NORMALIZE OUR RELATIONS WITH INDIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SIMLA AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, WE

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ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER THE PROBABILITY OF INDIA DECIDING TO LAUNCH A WAR AGAINST PAKISTAN IN WHICH AFGHANISTAN WILL ALSO JOIN AND BOTH WILL HAVE THE FULL BACKING OF THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH A WAR COULD COME AT ANY TIME THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD JUDGE THE SITUATION TO BE RIPE. IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT IT COULD BE UNLEASHED WITHIN TWO YEARS, BEFORE WE HAVE HAD THE TIME ADEQUATELY TO STRENGTHEN OUR DEFENCE CAPABILITY. INDIA COULD CONTRIVE A PRETEXT ON THE BASIS OF ITS BRAZEN CLAIM TO JAMMU AND KASHMIR BEING AN INTEGRAL PART OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN BEING IN CONTROL OF A PART OF THE STATE.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR FROM MR. AZIZ AHMED WHAT YOU HAD TOLD GROMYKO AND WHAT YOU PLANNED TO TELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING TO PAKISTAN'S ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN.

THIS LATTER ASSURANCE COULD HAVE A MOST VITAL BEARING ON THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA AND FORTIFY PEACE AND STABILITY IN THIS CRITICAL REGION. I CONSIDER IT TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE COUNTER YET TO THE SOVIET AMBITIONS TO EXTEND HEGEMONY TO PAKISTAN, WHICH IS THE IMMEDIATE TARGET OF THESE AMBITIONS, IT COMES AS A REFRESHING INDICATION OF A NEW DETERMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION TO SAFEGUARD PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA.

I SHOULD ALSO ADD THAT THIS ASSURANCE IS ANOTHER MANIFESTATION OF THE FAR-SIGHTED STATESMANSHIP AND CLARITY OF VISION WHICH I, LIKE MANY OTHERS, HAVE ALWAYS ADMIRERD IN YOU. ONLY SUCH A PERCEPTION OF LURKING DANGERS AND THE UN-DISTRACTED WILL TO AVERT THEM CAN TRANSFORM THE FEARS OF TODAY INTO THE HOPES OF TOMORROW.

MAY I SUGGEST THAT THE QUESTION OF CHINESE ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK MAY BE TAKEN UP WITH THE CHINESE LEADERS WHILE THEY ARE STILL CONSIDERING THE ISSUE. IT COULD HELP THEM MATERIALLY TO DECIDE WHAT CHINA COULD DO IN THAT CONTINGENCY.

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**


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MR. AZIZ AHMED TOOK UP THE MATTER OF THE CHINESE PRESS  
ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES WITH THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR  
ALONG THE LINES INDICATED BY YOU SOON AFTER HIS RETURN  
FROM ANKARA.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, YOURS SINCERELY, ZULFIKAR ALI  
BHUTTO. END QUOTE. KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: The Situation Room  
SUBJECT: Message From Prime Minister Bhutto

Aeronautical Radio in New York City relayed the following message from Prime Minister Bhutto to President Ford as the prime minister's plane was leaving the United States at 9:30 P.M. tonight.

"To His Excellency Gearld R. Ford, President of the United States of America:

As I leave the United States of America on the conclusion of my visit, I wish to express on behalf of my delegation and myself of my sincere thanks and gratitude of the warm hospitality extended to us throughout our stay in your country. In terms of relations between our two countries, as well as from me personally, it was a memorable visit. It gave me invaluable opportunity to meet you and useful exchange of views on matters of multiple interest. I return with renewed confidence that the special friendship of our two countries will continue to grow and develop in the coming years. I wish you Mr. President personal health and well being and every success in realizing goals for your country and the world.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto"



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

August 23, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROSEMARY NIEHUS *RN*

SUBJECT: New Message for the President from  
Prime Minister Bhutto

Ambassador Yaqub-Khan returned from Pakistan late yesterday with another letter to the President from Prime Minister Bhutto. The original was delivered here with the hope that it would be transmitted immediately. I believe it is safe to assume that the Ambassador will seek an early meeting with you (he has not requested this yet) on your return from Vail to discuss the range of Pakistani security concerns and such issues as (a) the President's trip to Pakistan and (b) a possible meeting for Aziz Ahmed with the President during UNGA (Chavan has asked for a meeting -- the Paks will be sensitive), as well as developments in South Asia (Bangladesh).

The full text of Bhutto's message is attached, but its main themes -- Soviet/Indian/Afghan pressures on Pakistan and the need for greater US support for Islamabad -- are consistent with Bhutto's previous two messages to the President and Secretary Kissinger of June 13. Two points are worth noting, however: (a) The linkage between the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit (paragraph 2) and prospects for accelerated Soviet efforts to carve out a sphere of influence in South Asia; (b) The assertion that US assurances to Pakistan to date (while greatly appreciated) have not curbed Soviet designs (paragraph 6) and particularly, that this situation only further encourages Moscow in its pressures on Pakistan (paragraph 7). While Bhutto makes no specific requests in this letter, by developing a negative line on US support for Pakistan, he is in effect asking for increased political and materiel support, arms being of foremost interest to Islamabad.

You will note that Bhutto makes no mention of having received replies to his two messages of June 13 and this has probably prompted his third letter. I have checked with State and understand that the Secretary has not (as of this writing) given final clearance to the proposed replies and that he has this action package with him. State is now aware of this

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E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 9/17/03  
BY: *h*, NARA DATE *2/8/04*



~~SECRET~~/NODIS -- 2

new message and Deputy Assistant Secretary Sober will be staffing the Secretary. I am also doing a daily briefing item. In sum, this action is now on the tracks.

SECRET/NODIS

Attachment: Message from the Prime Minister to the President dated August 17, received NSC late August 22.





Islamabad,  
August 17, 1975.

PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to share with you our apprehensions over the likely Soviet role in Asia after the Helsinki Summit, particularly following recent developments in our region.

2. We feel deeply disturbed over the establishment of an authoritarian system in India on the one hand, and the growing hostility of an unstable Afghan regime towards Pakistan on the other. Our fears are heightened by our perception of the increasing dependence of these two regimes in our immediate neighbourhood on the Soviet Union with which they are allied and which is enabled by the Helsinki accord to pay greater attention to our region in pursuance of its historic objectives and global ambitions. We foresee that, assured of security in Europe, the Soviet Union will relentlessly exert pressures on the smaller states of Asia and on Pakistan in particular, with a view to achieving its purpose of establishing an unchallengable sphere of influence in this continent.

3. Situated as we are, we cannot but be conscious of Soviet designs and the nature of Soviet ambitions in Asia, and what these portend for us. Despite the Soviet Union's role in the dismemberment of our country in 1971, we have, within the framework of our principles and policies,

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State Dept. Guidelines

By led, NARA, Date 3/8/04 *State Review 9/17/03*

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PRIME MINISTER

left no stone unturned to improve our relations with it in order to reduce its hostility towards Pakistan which, rightly or wrongly, it has regarded as an obstacle in the path of its ambitions in Asia. This above all was the purpose of my visit to Moscow in March 1972 and again in October last year.

4. Soviet goals and ambitions are inflexible and hardly amenable to any basic change as a result of the efforts of a small country such as ours, which in the interest of the preservation of its own sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity, has stoutly declined to toe the Soviet line. The passage of time makes clearer both the ever-growing threat to our existence from Moscow's expansionist policies and the woeful inadequacy of our resources to meet this threat.

5. The Soviet Union is determined to subject us to intensified pressures while continuing to be outwardly affable. The most recent and disturbing illustration of this came during recent exchanges between our diplomats and their Soviet counter parts in Kabul. Our Minister was asked by his Soviet counter part whether Pakistan would agree to cede some territory to Afghanistan. On receiving a firm reply in the negative the Soviet Minister threw up his hands and said, "Then God alone knows what will happen." When our Ambassador sought clarification of the Soviet attitude from the Soviet Ambassador, the latter not only accused Pakistan of not wanting to improve relations with Afghanistan but went so far as to assert that the Durand Agreement - defining the international frontier between Afghanistan and



*This is a recast of a recent message to Byroade - that Paks have "definite proof" of Soviet support for Afghan territorial ambitions in Pakistan and that this is a major change in the Soviet position. Both our embassies in Kabul and Islamabad noted the low level of the Sov-Afghan exchange, concluded account was exaggerated and surmised it was Pak lead-in to pressing for US arms.*

low-level




## PRIME MINISTER

Pakistan - was a legacy of the colonial times which Pakistan should not try to defend and that the Durand Line had been foisted upon the Afghans, since no nation would, according to the Soviet Ambassador, "willingly agree to have its own people divided into two parts." The Soviet Ambassador concluded by saying that the Asian Security Pact was the real and the only answer for establishing peace and security in Asia.

6. I have no doubt that the United States is cognizant of the Soviet threat to the countries of this region and in particular to Pakistan which has so far stood its ground. We greatly appreciate the various statements of political support to Pakistan which were given to us by the United States at the highest level to counter the Soviet threat. The fact, however, needs to be registered that these declarations, valuable though they are, seem to have made little impact on Soviet expansionism. Soviet policies continue to be stridently asserted and Soviet purposes aggressively reiterated.

7. In these circumstances, our ability to resist Soviet pressures will depend not so much on the reliance we place on the American political assurances as on the credibility the Soviet Union attaches to them. The lack of a credible evidence of support from the U.S. encourages the Soviet Union to expect that the security requirements of Pakistan, would compel us to make readjustments demanded by the changing power equilibrium in our region.





PRIME MINISTER


8. I need hardly assure you, Mr. President, of how much we cherish our relations with the United States. We sincerely hope that they will continue to expand and gain strength in the coming months and will be sustained by our commitments to the goals and objectives of peace and stability which we share.

9. With my best wishes and warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*  
(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)

His Excellency  
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,  
President of the United States of America,  
WASHINGTON D.C.





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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 24, 1975

~~SECRET~~/NODIS (XGDS-3) ATTACHMENT

NSC/S:

Attached is the original letter to the President from Prime Minister Bhutto dated June 13, 1975. Bhutto also sent a parallel message to the Secretary. Replies to both June 13 messages were contained in the attached State cable and take care of the original message at back. Therefore, you can close out the attached documents.

There is a new message from Bhutto dated August 17, 1975, which has been handled in Log #5743-Addon #2 dated September 23, 1975.

*RN*  
Rosemary Niehuss

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E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY    , NARA, DATE 3/9/04



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**TELEGRAM**

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NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

EO. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFDR, PK, US  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

*Reply to Bhutto*  
*Messages of Jone*  
*to President &*  
*Secretary*

REF: STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING FROM ME TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO.
2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

SINCE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PLAN TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA THIS COMING MONDAY, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GIVE YOU A BRIEF REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE COMING TO THE AREA, I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN THE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP EGYPT AND ISRAEL ACHIEVE A FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD THE JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH REMAINS OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT. THE ISRAELIS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND OIL FIELDS IN SINAI IN CIR-

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/03

By *lib*, NARA, Date *3/5/04*



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CUMSTANCES WHERE AN END TO BELLIGERENCY AND PEACE STILL LIE IN THE FUTURE. THE EGYPTIANS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ENTERING POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS THAT ARE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE MUCH OF THEIR AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORY REMAINS OCCUPIED AND THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS REMAIN UNFULFILLED. DESPITE THESE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES, I BELIEVE WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS AND THAT THE CHANCES FOR ACHIEVING THIS AGREEMENT ARE GOOD. EVEN THOUGH A NUMBER OF OBSTACLES REMAIN TO BE OVERCOME AND A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IS NOT YET FULLY ASSURED. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS APPROACHED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENUINE STATESMANSHIP, AND THAT WE HAVE HAD HEARTENING SUPPORT FROM OUR SAUDI FRIENDS.

I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS CONCERN IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT THIS AGREEMENT, IF ACHIEVED, WILL LEAD TO DIMINISHED INTEREST IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM. IT IS OUR FIRM INTENTION, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MUST BE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS -- HOWEVER DIFFICULT THEY WILL BE AND HOWEVER MUCH TIME THEY MAY TAKE -- WITH RESPECT TO THE SYRIAN AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE NOTHING LESS. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE SAUDI LEADERS WOULD BE REASSURED BY ANY ENCOURAGEMENT YOU COULD GIVE THEM. THE PRESIDENT AND I ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT AND, DESPITE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE ARE EXPERIENCING AT HOME, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT OUR PEACE EFFORTS AND OUR POLICIES OF STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB FRIENDS. THE VERY ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE AND, IF IT IS SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTED AND OBSERVED, CAN BROADEN THE BASIS OF CONFIDENCE WHICH IS NEEDED FOR BOTH SIDES TO TAKE THE HARD POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS GOES FORWARD IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS OCCASION, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED THE PRESIDENT AND I WERE TO HEAR FROM YOU IN YOUR LETTERS OF JUNE 13 REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS FOR PAKISTAN'S SECURITY, I REGRET THAT

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THE DEMANDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS HAVE DELAYED MY SENDING YOU A CONSIDERED RESPONSE BEFORE THIS. I HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR LETTERS IN DETAIL WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DEEPLY SYMPATHETIC TO YOUR CONCERNS. IT WAS WITH THESE IN MIND THAT THE PRESIDENT ORDERED THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN LAST FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP MEET YOUR FOOD AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE YEAR AHEAD. THIS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO ASSURE PAKISTAN'S CONTINUED SECURITY AND WELL-BEING. I HAVE ALSO ASKED AMBASSADOR BYROADE TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS ON VARIOUS SPECIFIC POINTS YOU RAISED IN YOUR EARLIER LETTER.

Since MY DEPARTURE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PRESIDENT SHARED WITH ME YOUR AUGUST 17 LETTER TO HIM, RE-EMPHASIZING YOUR CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN KABUL. UPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I WILL DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND HE WILL, OF COURSE, BE RESPONDING TO YOU. MEANWHILE, I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY ITS OFFICIALS IN KABUL, AND I HOPE YOU WILL KEEP AMBASSADOR BYROADE INFORMED.

WARM REGARDS,  
HENRY A. KISSINGER  
END MESSAGE

3. IN CONVERTING THE ABOVE MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO,

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY


YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

WE WERE PLEASED TO NOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S EX-  
PRESSION, IN HIS JUNE LETTERS, OF CONTINUING SUPPORT  
FOR THE SIMLA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE WISE POLICIES  
OF CAUTION AND RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE GOP DURING THIS  
DELICATE PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES IN INDIA.

IT IS OUR VIEW THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS UNDER THE  
SIMLA PROCESS WILL REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED  
HOSTILITIES ON THE SUBCONTINENT. THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST  
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ONE WHICH WE FULLY SHARE WITH  
PAKISTAN, IS TO AVERT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT WAS WITH  
THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND THAT THE SECRETARY CONVEYED TO  
FOREIGN MINISTER GRUMYKO IN MAY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH  
THE UNITED STATES WOULD REGARD AN INDIAN ATTACK AGAINST  
PAKISTAN. ~~WE WERE~~ REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET  
LEADERSHIP HAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION OF THE UNITED  
STATES ON THIS QUESTION.

DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN A  
SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE IMPLICATIONS  
OF THE GRAVEST NATURE AND WOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO  
THE UNITED STATES. THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES  
WOULD BE A MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE

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Department of State

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BRANCH IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTION AND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1959 MUTUAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD TALKS IN PEKING WITH LEADERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LATER THIS YEAR. THESE TALKS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE FULL RANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND PAKISTAN, AND WAYS IN WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONTINUE TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ITS SECURITY.

THE SECRETARY WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE THAT MR. AZIZ ARMED HAS COMMUNICATED TO THE CHINESE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT WHICH THEIR PROPAGANDA HAS ON OUR ABILITY TO MOBILIZE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRC'S SECURITY.

IN DISCUSSING YOUR LETTERS IN WASHINGTON, I FOUND A DEEP AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ADMINISTRATION IN PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND WELFARE, AND A STRONG DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL IN WAYS THAT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

AS I KNOW YOU ARE AWARE FROM YOUR OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICAN LEADERS, INCLUDING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL FORMAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS, OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR FORMAL TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.

WITH REGARD TO THE RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO PAKISTANI OFFICIALS IN KABUL CONCERNING THE DURAND LINE, IF THESE IN FACT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN, WE WOULD OF COURSE VIEW THEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN.

WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON THE SOVIET POSITION, FOLLOWING YOUR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.

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4. IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ABOVE, YOU SHOULD SEEK TO CORRECT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN WHAT I SAID TO AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA ON MAY 22 AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THESE REMARKS CONTAINED IN BHUTTO'S LETTERS OF JUNE 13. THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE SO THAT THE RECORD WILL BE CLEAR:

DURING MY WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I REVIEWED THE MINUTES OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. OUR RECORD CONTAINS SOME IMPORTANT NUANCES WHICH, IF NOT PRECISELY GRASPED, COULD LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WE BOTH WANT TO AVOID.

THE SECRETARY INFORMED AZIZ AHMED HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE USE MADE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY IN PAKISTAN.

(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER INFORMED MR. AHMED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO...GROMYKO IN VERY STRNG TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD INVITE A RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES.")

THE SECRETARY ASKED AZIZ AHMED IF WE COULD ASK THE CHINESE WHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF PAKISTAN IS ATTACKED. THE SECRETARY ALSO INDICATED THAT A GENERAL WAR FOLLOWING AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN AND INVOLVING THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WHOLE OF ASIA AND FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE AREA. (BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY STATES: "...I WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR FROM MR. AZIZ AHMED...WHAT YOU PLANNED TO TELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING TO PAKISTAN'S ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN." BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER ...ADDED THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTERQUESTION AS TO WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN SUCH AN EVENT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN), IT WOULD BE INFORMED THAT IF INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO ITS HELP AND IF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA, THE

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
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UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THAT  
SITUATION.)  
KISSINGER

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His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,  
President of the United States of America,  
White House,  
Washington D.C.





GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY



PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister's House  
Rawalpindi

13 June 1975

Dear Mr. President,

I have been wanting to write to you on a matter of vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the peace and stability of our vast and populous region. However, since you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating to Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until you returned home and had time to address your attention to other matters of importance to world peace.

On May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met in Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United States.

It is an established fact that practically all of India's armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons. Moreover, in view of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, an armed attack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval and, indeed, direct involvement.

As you are aware, Mr. President, my Government is determined to further the process of normalization of relations with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. We will sustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/16/03

By           , NARA, Date 3/8/04





PRIME MINISTER

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Nevertheless, our considered assessment of the situation, as Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could come at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would have no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one. For instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India and prepare the stage for an invasion of Azad Kashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan's control. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.

Dr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely the same question to the Chinese Vice-Premier when he visited Pakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering this question but have given us no answer so far. Their decision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The constraint on China's freedom to act as a result of this Treaty was tragically demonstrated when India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while Pakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.

Dr. Kissinger then enquired whether he could ask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan and added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what the United States would do in such an event, it would be informed that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United States would not be able to stay out of that situation.





PRIME MINISTER


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To Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming military threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and backed by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the determination of the United States to ward off a danger of vast and incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news.

I am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the clarity with which your Administration has perceived the implications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability of this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for the first time, a concrete step which could restore the power equilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive factor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting the vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the shadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the horizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it, a turning point would be reached in its history. The global balance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace in our critical region could become truly inviolable.

With best wishes and warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,  
President of the United States of America  
White House,  
Washington D. C.



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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**SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION**

*Shultz, Helmut*

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SUBJECT: *State reply to Shultz 13 Jan 75  
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**DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASMT**

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**SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS**

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**NSC/S DISP INSTR**

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