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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN. *lsj*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

4947

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

October 28, 1974

*WRF*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *for*

SUBJECT: Message of Thanks from Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on Soviet Jewry Issue

Israeli Ambassador Dinitz has transmitted the attached formal message of thanks to you from Prime Minister Rabin on the Soviet Jewry issue.

I do not believe you need to send a formal written acknowledgement to this message, which is, in effect, a thank-you letter. We have expressed your appreciation for the message to Ambassador Dinitz.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL



*Tab A 10*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION  
4947

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL


October 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *for*  
SUBJECT: Message of Thanks from Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on Soviet Jewry Issue

Israeli Ambassador Dinitz has transmitted the attached formal message of thanks to you from Prime Minister Rabin on the Soviet Jewry issue.

I do not believe you need to send a formal written acknowledgement to this message, which is, in effect, a thank-you letter. We have expressed your appreciation for the message to Ambassador Dinitz.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL



*Added to Pres 10-28-74 (KM) 1:15 PM*

D  
100  
10

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION  
4947

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

October 21, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: A. DENIS CLIFT *AD*  
ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Letter of Thanks to the President from  
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin--Soviet Jewry

At Tab A is a memorandum you could forward the President transmitting for his information a message from Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on the Soviet Jewry issue. It expresses Rabin's gratitude for the President's support.

We do not feel that the President need send a written reply to Rabin. Any formal response would complicate our handling of this issue, especially if it emerged in Israel during the sensitive Mid-East negotiations. We recommend that General Scowcroft phone Ambassador Dinitz and express the President's appreciation orally. You might do the same during your next stop in Israel.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the information memo at Tab A to the President.

That General Scowcroft telephone Ambassador Dinitz to express the President's appreciation orally.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
 Prepare written reply \_\_\_\_\_  
 I will handle orally \_\_\_\_\_

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

4947  
10

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AO/534

18 October 1974

My dear Mr. President:

I have been instructed by the Prime Minister of Israel to transmit to you the following message:

"My dear Mr. President,

The announcement that agreement has been obtained facilitating immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel is causing great joy to the people of Israel and to Jewish communities everywhere. This achievement in the field of human rights would not have been possible but for your personal sympathy for the cause involved, for your direct concern and deep interest.

I would wish you to know, Mr. President, how deeply this has been appreciated. I would like to express to you our heartfelt gratitude.


With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister"

May I add my own personal thanks and appreciation.

Respectfully,

  
Simcha Dinitz  
Ambassador

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



1E

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION  
4947

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

October 21, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SUBJECT: Message of Thanks from Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on Soviet Jewry Issue

Israeli Ambassador Dinitz has transmitted the attached formal message of thanks to you from Prime Minister Rabin on the Soviet Jewry issue.

I do not believe you need to send a formal written acknowledgement to this message, which is, in effect, a thank-you letter, as any such response might complicate the handling of this issue against the background of the sensitive Middle East negotiations. We have expressed your appreciation for the message to Ambassador Dinitz.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

1F

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
NO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7404947	Oakley
10	18	10	19	11		

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X FROM: RABIN, YITZHAK / DINITZ, SIMCHA REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_ S/S \_\_\_\_\_

SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ ST EX SEC \_\_\_\_\_

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE  
 UNCLAS  LOG IN/OUT  
 LOU  NO FORN  NODIS  
 C  EYES ONLY  EXDIS  
 S  CODEWORD  
 TS  SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Ack ltr to Pres from Rabin & Dinitz re US Trade agreement w/ USSR & immigration of Soviet Jews

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK . . . . . ( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES . . . . . ( )
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR . . . . . ( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION . . . . . ( )
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	X			MEMO TO . . . . . ( )
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . ( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO . . . . . ( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO . . . . . FOR: . . . . . ( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? . . . . . ( X )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE . . . . . ( )
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: <u>10/30</u>
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (O/TAKEN):	CY TO
10/21/74	Oakley and Clift	HAK	X	Decision (10/30)	
10/28		Pres	CP	Info	
10/29			C	Noted by Pres	

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:  FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: \_\_\_\_\_

00750 1974 BY \_\_\_\_\_

CRT ID: \_\_\_\_\_ SA SF

OPEN \_\_\_\_\_ HP NS

CLOSE pay \_\_\_\_\_ WH EP

\_\_\_\_\_ PA DY





NOV-1974



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 05455 192032Z

BY THE U.S. CONGRESS A REQUEST FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO MEET ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY NEEDS.

REALIZING AS I DO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION AS A WHOLE, THE U.S. WILL MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO ASSIST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONDITIONS WHICH THE AGREEMENT WILL BE OBSERVED WITHOUT BEING SUBJECTED TO PRESSURES OR DEADLINES.

IN THE SPIRIT OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL, THE U.S. WILL NOT PUT FORWARD NOR SUPPORT, DURING THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, NEW PROPOSALS, INCLUDING PROPOSALS RELATING TO AN OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT WHICH ISRAEL WOULD CONSIDER UNSATISFACTORY. THE U.S. WILL CONSULT WITH ISRAEL IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL ON THE MODALITIES, NATURE AND SUBSTANCE OF SUCH PROPOSALS.

THE U.S. WILL SUPPORT THE POSITION THAT AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT WITH SYRIA IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A PEACE AGREEMENT MUST ASSURE ISRAEL'S SECURITY FROM ATTACK FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE U.S. GIVES GREAT WEIGHT TO ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT ANY PEACE AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA MUST BE PREDICATED ON ISRAEL REMAINING ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE U.S. WILL NOT PRESS ISRAEL TO GO DOWN FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

SINCERELY,  
END TEXT  
TOON

~~SECRET~~

*Mr. Laurier to  
Mr. Shaver.*

1393

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1975

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to express my further thoughts on the terrorist outrage at the Savoy Hotel. I want you to know how deeply I feel about such senseless acts.

I also want you to know how strongly I believe that our progress toward peace must be maintained. We cannot permit this act of terrorism to attain the goal it seeks -- the disruption and collapse of our current peace efforts. I, therefore, hope that your Government's response to this tragedy will be consistent with our mutual interest in maintaining momentum toward a settlement.

Please be assured, Mr. Prime Minister, that the people of the United States fully share with you and your countrymen your grief at this tragic and outrageous event. We are determined to do all we can to attain a peace which will put an end to acts of this nature.

Sincerely,

*Gerald R. Ford*

His Excellency  
Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister of Israel  
Jerusalem



## MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~ACTION

March 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *B*

SUBJECT: Letter to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin  
on Terrorist Incident in Tel Aviv

The terrorist incident which occurred last night in Tel Aviv has resulted so far in the death of at least nine persons. Action has been taken on a message from you to Prime Minister Rabin and a statement to be read by Ron Nessen today deploring this tragedy.

It is important, however, that the Savoy Hotel incident not be permitted to impede the current round of settlement talks, which are only about to begin. Clearly, one purpose of the perpetrators of the incident was to disrupt these efforts by engendering an Israeli response against Lebanon or Syria, of a magnitude that would force the principal Arab parties to the negotiations to harden their positions or, possibly, to break off talks altogether. It is, therefore, important that we attempt to limit any response by cautioning the Israelis to that effect.

I recommend you send a further message to Prime Minister Rabin, to be delivered via the Israeli Embassy here, noting both our condemnation of this incident and our concern for its effects. A suggested letter is at Tab A. [Paul Theis has cleared the proposed text.]

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Rabin at Tab A.

*MAJ*

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *WJ*, NARA, DATE *3/5/04*

26

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION  
1393

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

March 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARTHUR HOUGHTON<sup>AH</sup>

SUBJECT: Presidential Messages to Prime Minister  
Rabin Per Secretary Kissinger's Instruction

The following actions are pursuant to your message (copy attached) from Secretary Kissinger; all messages have been cleared by Paul Theis:

1. We have separately forwarded for your clearance a message to be read by Ron Nessen today, per paragraph one of the Secretary's telegram (Tab III).
2. Per paragraph 2 of the Secretary's telegram, at Tab I is a proposed Presidential telegram to Prime Minister Rabin expressing sympathy over this incident. If you approve, this can be wired out through the normal State Department channels.
3. At Tab II is a self-explanatory memo to the President recommending he sign a letter to Prime Minister Rabin counselling restraint in the Israeli response to this latest incident (per paragraph three of the Secretary's cable). If signed, this letter should be handed to DCM Shalev (Ambassador Dinitz is now in Israel).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That you approve the Presidential message at Tab I. for wiring via State to Prime Minister Rabin.

        *B*         MESSAGE APPROVED                          AS AMENDED

That you seek the President's signature on the letter to Rabin at Tab II and that it be immediately delivered to Shalev.

        *OK*         APPROVE                          DISAPPROVE

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

*As Amended*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY         *M*        , NARA, DATE         *3/5/04*        

*Two  
NOTIFIED*

20

March 6, 1975

TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO PRIME MINISTER RABIN

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am shocked at the news of the incident at Tel Aviv. Both the American people and I strongly deplore this senseless event which has resulted in the tragic loss of innocent life.

Please accept my deepest sympathy to the families of your countrymen who have died, and my fervent hope that there will be no further acts of this kind.

Sincerely,

THE WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

**DAVIS**

TIME SENT

26

WHITE HOUSE LDX NR 994

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

CIA _____	DIA/G _____
STATE <b>X</b> _____	DIA/H _____
NMCC _____	DASA _____
ANMCC _____	NPIC _____
NSA _____	

'75 MAR 6 AM 11:48

NUMBER OF PAGES 1

DESCRIPTION/COMMENT:

FROM: **JEANNE DAVIS**

TO: **GEORGE SPRUNGSTEEN**

RECEIVED  
BY: **STATE**

DATE/TIME: **12:11**

**NSC/S**  
↑

1393

2F

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

URGENT VIA LDX

March 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR                   GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN  
  Executive Secretary  
  Department of State

SUBJECT:   Presidential Message to Prime Minister Rabin  
                  of Israel on Terrorist Incident

State is requested to transmit the following message  
through our Embassy in Tel Aviv from the President  
to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am shocked at the news of the incident at Tel  
Aviv. Both the American people and I strongly  
deplore this senseless event which has resulted  
in the tragic loss of innocent life.

Please accept my deepest sympathy to the families  
of your countrymen who have died, and my fervent  
hope that there will be no further acts of this kind.  
Sincerely, Gerald R. Ford"

*Jeanne W. Davis*  
Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary *lon*

28

172

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

FLASH  
VZCZCSAM017  
ZZ NTE  
DE #TE33 #0017 0651100  
Z 061100Z MAR 75  
FM SEC STATE HAKTO 03

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FLASH  
FM THE SECRETARY

1. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT OF SYMPATHY ABOUT THE TEL AVIV OUTRAGE. PLEASE PHRASE IT WITH SOME MODERATION KEEPING IN MIND THE NEED NOT TO INFLAME ARAB OPINION.


2. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD SEND A SIMILAR MESSAGE WITH A SIMILIAR TONE TO RABIN.

3. YOU SHOULD GIVE A SEPARATE REPEAT <sup>SHALEV</sup> SEPARATE MESSAGE IN WRITING FROM THE PRESIDENT TO RABIN VIA DINITZ CALLING FOR RESTRAINT IN ISRAELI REACTION BECAUSE THE PLO MAY HAVE DONE THIS PRECISELY TO PREVENT A NEGOTIATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. I HAVE SENT A SIMILAR MESSAGE.

4. FYI: I AM VERY WORRIED THAT SYRIA WILLI USE THE PRETEXT OF AN ISRAELI REACTION TO FORCE EGYPT INTO A SITUATION WHERE IT MUST SUPPORT THEM AND THUS THWART NEGOTIATIONS.

GRNC

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By lala, NARA, Date 3/5/04



\*\*\*\*\* W H S R C O M M E N T \*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, JANKA, RODMAN, SECFL



1393

(2nd revision - 3/6/75)

24

**Dear Mr. Prime Minister:**

**I am writing to express my further thoughts on the terrorist outrage at the Savoy Hotel. I want you to know how deeply I feel about such senseless acts.**

**I also want you to know how strongly I believe that our progress toward peace must be maintained. We cannot permit this act of terrorism to attain the goal it seeks -- the disruption and collapse of our current peace efforts. I, therefore, hope that your Government's response to this tragedy will be consistent with our mutual interest in maintaining momentum toward a settlement.**

**Please be assured, Mr. Prime Minister, that the people of the United States fully share with you and your countrymen your grief at this tragic and outrageous event. We are determined to do all we can to attain a peace which will put an end to acts of this nature.**

**Sincerely,**

**His Excellency  
Yitshak Rabin  
Prime Minister of Israel  
Jerusalem**

**BS:nm:3/6/75**



UNCLASSIFIED  
(CLASSIFICATION)

21

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S: 7504848

Date: March 8, 1975

**For:** Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft  
National Security Council  
The White House

Pursuant to referral dated \_\_\_\_\_, NSC No. \_\_\_\_\_ (if any)  
a copy of which is attached, we are enclosing the following:

Information copy  
of direct reply      Translation      Other

Draft reply for:      President's signature      Other signature

We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below

The attached item, which was sent directly to the Department  
of State, is being forwarded for your attention.

We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below

A draft reply is attached

A draft reply will be forwarded

A translation is attached

x Other

**REMARKS:**

This was LDXed 3/7/75, and the original is herewith forwarded  
for your information.

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:**

To: The President

From: Mordechai Shalev, Charge,  
Embassy of Israel

Date: 7 March 1975

Subject: Attack by Arab Terrorists

in Tel Aviv on March 6

*Carolee Sulman*  
George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AO/582

7 March 1975

Dear Mr. President:

I have been asked by the Prime Minister of Israel to transmit to you the following message:

"Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your kind message, following the savage attack by Arab terrorists on innocent people yesterday in Tel Aviv.

I would like to thank you, and the American people, for the sentiments of sympathy and support expressed to the bereaved families and to my countrymen.

The criminal outrage committed by Arab terrorists, for which the Fatah organization assumed responsibility, give further evidence of the murderous aims and methods of the P.L.O. terrorist organization.

Clearly, it reinforces the necessity to continue and intensify the campaign against the terrorist organizations wherever they may be found.

As it has been stated yesterday, the Government of Israel is determined to continue to act firmly and decisively against the terrorists and their organizations, and to take all proper measure to defend the people of Israel, and at the same time to proceed with the efforts in exploring avenues towards peace.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister"

Respectfully yours,

*Mordechai Shalev*  
Mordechai Shalev  
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

2\*

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7501393		
3	6	3	6	12			

*Houghton*

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: KISSINGER, H \_\_\_\_\_ S/S \_\_\_\_\_ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE  
 KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT  
 SCOWCROFT + \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_ C NO FORN (NODIS)  
 DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ ST EX SEC \_\_\_\_\_ (S) EYES ONLY EXDIS  
 TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Presidential Messages to PM Rabin re recent West guerrilla attacks in Israel*

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK .....
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES .....
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR .....
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION .....
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA		X	*	MEMO _____ TO _____
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS .....
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO .....
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? .....
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE .....
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

*Leonard, W*

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DTE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
3/6			X	<i>Decision (3-6)</i>	
3/6				<i>HAK Expedient Reply</i>	
3/6				<i>Plan of Memo to Springfield</i>	
3/6				<i>Split phy</i>	
3/6			X	<i>Staff x has to split to Skalen (3-13)</i>	
3/6				<i>Pres P spec ltr to RABIN</i>	
3/7				<i>C Pres ad ltr to RABIN</i>	
3/10				<i>Rec'd thank you ltr for Rabin</i>	

7504848

*OK done by hand*

NSC/S INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_  
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_  
 NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_  
 CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_  
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: \_\_\_\_\_ FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:  
 #/FID \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 MAR 12 1975  
 CRT ID: *MJK* SA SF  
 OPEN *WZ* HP NS  
 CLOSE *WZ* WH EP  
 PA DY

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Delivered by Embassy messenger  
to L. Eagleburger  
11:00 a.m., 3/31/75  
מסירת מכתב  
ד"ר אגלברגר

AO/505

30 March 1975

Dear Mr. President:

I have been instructed by the Prime Minister of Israel to transmit to you the following letter:

"Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you today in response to your communication of March 21, 1975.

I share your deep disappointment over the failure of the negotiations that were so tirelessly pursued by Dr. Kissinger. As I indicated to the Secretary, Israel remains ready to persist in the effort to reach an agreement with Egypt that will move our area closer to peace.

The approach our two governments had long shared was that the step-by-step policy was clearly meant to achieve visible progress towards peace. With this as the goal, we proposed our withdrawal from the most strategic sector in Sinai, the western mountain passes, as well as the oil fields, in return for fair Egyptian political commitments that would include an undertaking to terminate the state of war.

Once, however, Egypt rejected this approach and it became clear that it would not change its basic position, that the arrangement had to be of an essentially military character, we had no option but to give due weight to considerations of national defence.

Nevertheless, we demonstrated a readiness to compromise over those considerations as well, going far beyond our original intentions, short of surrendering the most vital security interests. We agreed to evacuate the western part of the strategic passes in favor of U.N. control. We were even willing to consider a limited Egyptian military presence in the form of an alert system to be located within the evacuated sections. And this, in addition to our readiness to hand over the oil fields to Egyptian control.



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/16/03  
By blg, NARA, Date 2/5/04

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AO/505

30 Bateh 1976

The President,  
page 2.

I want you to know, Mr. President, that throughout my colloquies and I were acutely sensitive to the importance you and the Secretary of State attached to the achievement of an agreement for the sake of the American initiative. Indeed, this was one of the important considerations on our part in proposing concessions that were, for us, recognizing, entailing as they did grave military risks.

I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that we toiled arduously for the success of Dr. Kissinger's mission, leaving nothing unexplored and exhausting every possible avenue for a positive outcome. This we did both in our own interest and in the spirit of the deep ties of friendship that are the traditional hallmark of our relationship.

In this connection, may I say that I am personally very sorry that the contents of your letter leaked out to the press. As you know, I took the first public opportunity in the form of a press conference to react sharply to the reports and mollify their impact. I will not deny to you that leakages of this kind are a serious problem emanating from the acute public sensitivity and anxiety over all matters that relate to the relations between our countries. This has been especially true during the course of these past talks when leakages became particularly difficult to control.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to express my deep appreciation to you for all that you have done in support of the effort for peace. I likewise wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, for the conduct of a mission that was both difficult and strenuous and whose goals we in Israel yet hope to see materialize.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושיכון

AD/585

30 March 1975

The President,  
page 3.

It is my hope and wish that our joint efforts to achieve progress towards peace will continue within that relationship of understanding and trust that has, for so long, bound our two countries and peoples, and which, I am confident, will continue in the future.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister

Respectfully yours,



Simcha Dinitz  
Ambassador


The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4430

July 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT   
SUBJECT: Thank-you Note from Prime Minister Rabin

Prime Minister Rabin has transmitted, through Ambassador Dinitz, a message expressing his appreciation for the hospitality accorded him and Mrs. Rabin during their recent visit to Washington (Tab A). This is merely a courtesy message and there is no need for a reply.





EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

A0/600

25 June 1975

Dear Mr. President:

I have been instructed by the Prime Minister of Israel to transmit to you the following message:

"Dear Mr. President:

Permit me to tell you how much Mrs. Rabin and I appreciate the warm hospitality accorded to us during our recent visit to Washington.


I need hardly tell you how greatly I value the hours you set aside for the discussions we had together. This afforded me an opportunity to present to you my views in a comprehensive manner and in an atmosphere of candor and friendship. For this I wish to express my gratitude, as well as for the sympathetic interest you displayed throughout.

My wife joins me in expressing sincere thanks to Mrs. Ford and yourself for the cordiality of your reception which we shall always remember. I look forward to the time when we will be permitted to reciprocate.

Yours sincerely,

Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister"

Respectfully yours,

  
Simcha Dinitz  
Ambassador

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4430

*HC 200*  
*Tab I added*  
*7-2-75*

ACTION

June 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*  
SUBJECT: Thank-you Note from Prime Minister Rabin

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President covering the courtesy message to the President from Prime Minister Rabin expressing appreciation for the hospitality accorded him and Mrs. Rabin during their recent visit to Washington. There appears to be no need for a reply, particularly since the President just signed (June 27) a letter to Rabin thanking him for gifts he presented during his visit.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memo attached at Tab I to the President.



MEMORANDUM

24D

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Thank-you Note from Prime Minister Rabin

Prime Minister Rabin has transmitted, through Ambassador Dinitz, a message expressing his appreciation for the hospitality accorded him and Mrs. Rabin during their recent visit to Washington (Tab A). ~~There is no substantive content to this~~ courtesy message and no need for a reply, ~~from you.~~

there is

This is merely a



4E

Rewrite: BS:mb  
7/1/75

4430

**MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT**

**FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT**

**SUBJECT: Thank-you Note from Prime Minister Rabin**

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Rewrite: BS:mb  
7/1/75

4430

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**FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT**

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48

**Rewrite: BS:mb**  
**7/1/75**

**4430**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT**  
**FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT**  
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**Prime Minister Rabin has transmitted, through Ambassador Dinits, a message expressing his appreciation for the hospitality accorded him and Mrs. Rabin during their recent visit to Washington (Tab A). This is merely a courtesy message and there is no need for a reply.**



WH

**Rewrite: BS:mb  
7/1/75**

**4430**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT**  
**FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT**  
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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X FROM: RABIN, FITZMAK REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: KISSINGER, H. \_\_\_\_\_ S/S \_\_\_\_\_

SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ COLBY, W. \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER, J. \_\_\_\_\_

ST EX SEC \_\_\_\_\_

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE  
 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT  
 LOU NO FORM NODI  
 C EYES ONLY EXDI  
 S CODEWORD  
 TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Thank you ltr from PM Rabin of Israel for hospitality rec'd during state visit*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT.

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOP	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT		X		MEMO FOR HAK .....
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES .....
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR .....
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION .....
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	X			MEMO _____ TO _____
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS .....
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO .....
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? .....
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE .....
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: <u>7/10</u>
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				<i>me</i>
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
6/30/75	OKley	Scowcroft	X	Pres for info (7/10)	
7/02		Pres		CI/ info	
7/3		NSC/SC		Noted by Scowcroft & Pres	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

CY REQTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: \_\_\_\_\_ FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE REQTS: \_\_\_\_\_

M/F'D \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

JUL 08 1975

OPEN \_\_\_\_\_

CLOSE \_\_\_\_\_

SA SF  
 HP NS  
 WM EP  
 DA DY





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

6377

~~SECRET~~

December 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from Prime Minister Rabin  
to President Ford

Attached is a letter from Prime Minister Rabin  
of Israel to President Ford, delivered to Under  
Secretary Sisco on December 17 by Amb. Dinitz.

The letter makes reference to President Ford's  
letter to Prime Minister Rabin of December 1.

*George S. Springsteen*  
George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Rabin-Ford letter

~~SECRET~~  
GDS

W 3/5/04

~~SECRET~~EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.שגרירות ישראל  
ושיננטון

AQ/673

16 December 1975

My dear Mr. President:

I have been instructed by the Prime Minister of Israel to transmit to you the following message:

"Dear Mr. President,

I wish to thank you for your communication of December 1. May I say at the outset that I am looking forward to our meeting in Washington at the end of next month when we will be enabled to conduct an overall review of how best to proceed in the pursuit of our common goals.

Meanwhile, I would like to address some thoughts on the forthcoming Security Council debate to which you refer in your letter. I share your concern over the failure to get a serious negotiation started in the aftermath of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement. That agreement, which your diplomacy helped so vitally to bring about, continues to provide a point of departure for potentially positive trends which both of us yet hope to see materialize.

It is my <sup>w</sup> considered view that such developments have not unfolded because of the current Syrian effort, assisted by the Soviets, to make barren the purposes of the Agreement and, in fact, to wreck them. My assessment is that Syria and the Soviet Union are pursuing a common political strategy -- evidently agreed upon during Assad's October visit to Moscow -- to press for an imposed settlement by shifting the process of negotiations into the Security Council and away from Geneva. As I see it, the tactical means being employed are to make the Council, not the parties, the framework of a settlement and, in this context, the PLO is to be elevated as an instrument to influence both the nature of the settlement and the condition for its achievement. By adopting this gambit in consort with Syria, the Soviet Union is able to intrude itself actively into the political process thereby wresting from the United States the singular role it has pursued thus far.

2/..

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines *State Review 9/16/03*  
By WJ, NARA, Date 3/5/04

~~SECRET~~EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

-2-

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

These considerations lead me to conclude that the Security Council Resolution of November 30 represents a considerable Syrian-Soviet tactical success. ✓ The reason is that it made conditional the renewal of UNDOF upon a special Council debate with an agenda giving the PLO prominence alongside U.N. resolutions that support the Soviet-Syrian purposes.

I believe that, having won that agenda, they will want to employ the Council to undermine the two central pillars upon which U.S.-Israel policy has long been founded -- that no settlement can be imposed from the outside, meaning that peace must be negotiated between the parties, and that a negotiated peace must be based upon Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. ✓

These, Mr. President, are, to me, the broader implications of the forthcoming Security Council session and which led me to express concern over the vote that made this session possible. In the spirit of our intimate relationship I cannot but express to you my feeling that the failure to block ✓ that Security Council Resolution has served to encourage Syria and the Soviet Union in the belief that they can make of the Council a substitute for negotiations between the parties and undermine, thereby, the purposes of the Interim Agreement and the objectives of the Geneva Conference.

There is no doubt in my mind that the forthcoming Council session constitutes a battle of concepts ✓ in which the integrity of Resolutions 242 and 338 will be put to the test. You are, I know, familiar with our position, that we can tolerate no modification whatsoever in the wording or interpretation of those resolutions, including the endorsement of other resolutions that would be tantamount to a reinterpretation. Were this to occur, it would destroy the foundations upon which the instruments of the peace process have been so laboriously constructed over the years.

I believe, therefore, that both before and during the Security Council debate a firm stand is imperative on three issues:

- 1) To thwart the effort to transform the Council into an instrument of negotiation on the Israel-Arab dispute in any form whatsoever,

3/..

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

-3-

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

- 2) To protect from change, direct or indirect, the wording and meaning of Resolutions 242 and 338, and
- 3) To entertain no change of policy with respect to the PLO.

I am convinced, Mr. President, that herein lies the key to neutralizing the political offensive that is directed against our common policies and to getting the political process back on the road of negotiation and movement towards peace.


In this regard I am gratified at the opportunity, afforded by Secretary Kissinger's invitation to Minister Allon, to concert the positions of our Governments on the forthcoming Security Council debate.

May I take this opportunity of extending to you my warmest Seasonal Greetings and my best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister"

Respectfully yours,

  
Simcha Dinitz  
Ambassador

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

**NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE**

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
12	18	12	19	20	750 8377	<i>Cahley</i>

**SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION**

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: KISSINGER, H \_\_\_\_\_ REFERENCE: 7524856 CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_ S/S \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

SCOWCROFT *+* \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ LOU NO FORN NODIS

DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ ST EX SEC *+* \_\_\_\_\_ C EYES ONLY EXDIS

*S* CODEWORD

*TS* SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Re Rabie ltr to Pres re Middle East situation*

**DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT**

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			MEMO FOR HAK ( )
STAFF SECRETARY			MEMO FOR PRES ( )
FAR EAST			REPLY FOR ( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			APPROPRIATE ACTION ( )
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<i>+</i>		MEMO TO ( )
EUROPE / CANADA			RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO ( )
UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO FOR: ( )
ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY? <i>+</i> ( )
SCIENTIFIC			CONCURRENCE ( )
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			DUE DATE: <i>12/30</i>
NSC PLANNING			COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			
INTELLIGENCE			

**SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS**

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>12/23</i>	<i>Niehuss</i>	<i>NSC/S</i>		<i>Close out. This message covered in daily brief for President so he knows what is in Rabie letter. This is also a thank you. No further action.</i>	
<i>12/23</i>			<i>C</i>	<i>NFAN per Cahley</i>	

**NSC/S INSTR DISP**

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: *X* FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: \_\_\_\_\_

FILED: *DEC 30 1975* BY: *AOC*

CRT ID: \_\_\_\_\_ SA SF

OPEN: *6903* HR NS

CLOSE: *6* EP

PA DY

*PA*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7525192

December 29, 1975

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Israeli Prime Minister's Letter of  
December 16 to the President

Attached is the original of Prime Minister Rabin's letter of December 16 to the President under cover of a transmittal letter from Ambassador Dinitz. A proposed reply to Rabin was transmitted to you by Under Secretary Sisco on December 27.

*Int. M. Sisco*  
George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary  
fr/

✓  
DATA  
AOC  
DEC 30 1975  
PA \*  
5

~~SECRET~~  
GDS  
WA 3/5/04



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

AO/674


23 December 1975

My dear Mr. President:

Further to my communication of 16 December 1975,  
I have been asked by Prime Minister Rabin to transmit  
to you the enclosed letter signed by him.

Please accept my best wishes for the Holiday  
Season.

Respectfully,



Simcha Dinitz  
Ambassador

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By lck, NARA, Date 2/5/04

~~SECRET~~

ר א ש ה מ מ ש ל ה  
THE PRIME MINISTER

~~SECRET~~

Jerusalem, December 16, 1975

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to thank you for your communication of December 1. May I say at the outset that I am looking forward to our meeting in Washington at the end of next month when we will be enabled to conduct an overall review of how best to proceed in the pursuit of our common goals.

Meanwhile, I would like to address some thoughts on the forthcoming Security Council debate to which you refer in your letter. I share your concern over the failure to get a serious negotiation started in the aftermath of the Egyptian-Israel agreement. That agreement, which your diplomacy helped so vitally to bring about, continues to provide a point of departure for potentially positive trends which both of us yet hope to see materialize.

It is my considered view that such developments have not unfolded because of the current Syrian effort, assisted by the Soviets, to make barren the purposes of the agreement and, in fact, to wreck them. My assessment is that Syria and the Soviet Union are pursuing a common political strategy - evidently agreed upon during Assad's October visit to Moscow - to press for an imposed settlement by shifting the process of negotiations into the Security Council and away from Geneva. As I see it,

Gerald R. Ford  
The President of the United States  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By l/a, NARA, Date 3/5/04 state review 9/16/03



- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

the tactical means being employed are to make the Council, not the parties, the framework of a settlement and, in this context, the PLO is to be elevated as an instrument to influence both the nature of the settlement and the condition for its achievement. By adopting this gambit in consort with Syria, the Soviet Union is able to intrude itself actively into the political process thereby wresting from the United States the singular role it has pursued thus far.

These considerations lead me to conclude that the Security Council resolution of November 30 represents a considerable Syrian-Soviet tactical success. The reason is that it made conditional the renewal of UNDOF upon a special Council debate with an agenda giving the PLO prominence alongside UN resolutions that support the Soviet-Syrian purposes.

I believe that, having won that agenda, they will want to employ the Council to undermine the two central pillars upon which US-Israel policy has long been founded - that no settlement can be imposed from the outside, meaning that peace must be negotiated between the parties; and, that a negotiated peace must be based upon Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

These, Mr. President are, to me, the broader implications of the forthcoming Security Council session and which led me to express concern over the vote that made this session possible. In the spirit of our intimate relationship I cannot but express to you my feeling that the failure to block that Security Council resolution has served to encourage Syria and the Soviet Union in the belief that they can make of the Council a substitute for negotiations between the parties and undermine, thereby, the purposes of the interim agreement and the objectives of the Geneva Conference.



- 3 -

SECRET

There is no doubt in my mind that the forthcoming Council session constitutes a battle of concepts in which the integrity of resolutions 242 and 338 will be put to the test. You are, I know, familiar with our position, that we can tolerate no modification whatsoever in the wording or interpretation of those resolutions, including the endorsement of other resolutions that would be tantamount to a reinterpretation. Were this to occur it would destroy the foundations upon which the instruments of the peace process have been so laboriously constructed over the years.

I believe, therefore, that both before and during the Security Council debate a firm stand is imperative on three issues: 1) to thwart the effort to transform the Council into an instrument of negotiation on the Israel-Arab dispute in any form whatsoever; 2) to protect from change, direct or indirect, the wording and meaning of resolutions 242 and 338; and 3) to entertain no change of policy with respect to the PLO.


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In this regard I am gratified at the opportunity, afforded by Secretary Kissinger's invitation to Minister Allon, to concert the positions of our Governments on the forthcoming Security Council debate.

May I take this opportunity of extending to you my warmest seasonal greetings and my best wishes for the new year.

Sincerely,

*Y. Rabin*  
Yitzhak Rabin



CONTROL: 6869Q



# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

NO0871

# TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 000170 T0SEC 250126

COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES

ORIGIN 0005-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 N

DRAFTED BY NEA:SSOBER  
APPROVED BY NEA:SSOBER  
S/S :RKUCHEL  
M/C: ROAKLEY  
S:JLOVEY

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TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 000170 T0SEC 250126

00015

L.011652: XG03-3

TAGS: PFOR, IS, US, XF, UN

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO RABIN  
FOR AMBASSADOR

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT  
FORD TO PRIME MINISTER RABIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 16, 1975.  
IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTIONS BEGINNING JANUARY 12, I BELIEVE IT IS  
ESSENTIAL FOR ME TO HAVE A FURTHER EXCHANGE WITH YOU  
REGARDING U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY. I AM SHARING SOME  
TENTATIVE VIEWS NOW SO THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES CAN

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines *State Review 9/16/03*

By lbr, NARA, Date 3/5/04



NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 00017w TOSEC 250126

REFLECT UPON THEM BEFORE AND IN CONNECTION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON'S MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER. WE DO NOT WISH THE VERY DIFFICULT SECURITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS IN JANUARY TO BECOME A SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US. AS YOU YOURSELF HAVE OFTEN SAID, MR. PRIME MINISTER, THERE IS MUCH THAT IS COMMON AND PARALLEL IN ISRAELI AND

U.S. POLICIES, BUT THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN AND CANNOT BE IDENTICAL.

WE HAVE STUDIED YOUR DECEMBER 1 LETTER WITH GREAT CARE AND UNDERSTANDING. ISRAEL NEED HAVE NO CONCERN REGARDING AN IMPOSED SOLUTION.

... A SETTLEMENT MUST COME AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES CONCERNED. WE ARE ALSO KEENLY AWARE THAT SYRIA IS SEEKING TO MAKE THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE PRIMARY AND MORE OR LESS PERMANENT INSTRUMENT OF DIPLOMACY. HERE, TOO, YOU SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT WE WOULD VIEW SUCH A DEVELOPMENT AS CONTRARY TO OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE STRONGLY AND FIRMLY THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE FRAMEWORK IS BEST SUITED FOR FUTURE DIPLOMACY.

HAVING SAID THIS, MR. PRIME MINISTER, I KNOW YOU FULLY REALIZE THAT WE FACE A MOST DIFFICULT AND DELICATE SITUATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. YOUR NON-PARTICIPATION WILL MAKE MORE DIFFICULT AN OUTCOME SATISFACTORY TO YOU, BUT THIS IS A JUDGMENT FOR ISRAEL TO MAKE.

OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERNS ARE THAT THE COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS NOT DEEPEN. THE STALEMATE SO IT BECOMES UNBREAKABLE, THAT THEY NOT DESTROY THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE DIPLOMACY OF THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THEREFORE DIM, IF NOT EXTINGUISH, THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND BRING THAT AREA CLOSER TO A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR, SO AS TO AVOID ANY FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDING, THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION REGARDING RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, AS DESCRIBED IN YOUR LETTER, IN WHICH YOU SAY "WE CAN TOLERATE NO MODIFICATION

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

# TELEGRAM

PAGE 03 STATE 000170 T0SEC 250126

WHATEVER IN THE WORDING OR INTERPRETATION OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS... DOES NOT ACCORD WITH OUR VIEW. WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY MADE CLEAR TO YOU THAT WE WILL OPPOSE AND, IF NECESSARY, VOTE AGAINST ANY INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ALTER ADVERSELY THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE OR TO CHANGE RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 IN ANY WAY WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE. I DO NOT CITE THIS TO RAISE SEMANTICAL POINTS. I MERELY WANT TO SAY THAT WHETHER 242 OR 338 IS CONSIDERED TO BE UNDERMINED OR ALTERED ADVERSELY OR CHANGES ARE CONSIDERED INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE WILL REQUIRE A JUDGMENT ON A SPECIFIC TEXT--A JUDGMENT THAT WE FEEL HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AS WELL THE CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS I HAVE OUTLINED IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPHS OF THIS LETTER.

OUR ABILITY TO GET SUPPORT OF OTHERS FOR A SATISFACTORY RESULT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL ALSO BE INFLUENCED BY WHAT THEY BELIEVE ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS THROUGH EXERCISE OF VARIOUS AVAILABLE OPTIONS OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL. THERE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE AN OVERWHELMING SC MAJORITY--PARTICULARLY IN THE NEW SECURITY COUNCIL COMPOSITION OF 1976--FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH PROVIDES FOR PLO PARTICIPATION AT A GENEVA CONFERENCE. WE HAVE THOUGHT OF A NUMBER OF FORMULATIONS WHICH WE MAY FACE, ALL OF WHICH IN GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE WILL SEEK TO INJECT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. SOME FORMULATIONS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY AFFECT ADVERSELY 242 AND 338, OTHERS MAY NOT. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT IF THE U.S. IS FACED WITH A SIMPLE RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING 242 AND 338 AND ADDING TO THIS RESOLUTION LANGUAGE WHICH THE U.S. HAS USED IN ITS POLICY STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT A DURABLE AND JUST PEACE HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT "THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE." WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT SUCH FORMULATIONS BE DEALT WITH IN SUCH A WAY IN THE COUNCIL THAT THEY NOT DESTROY OTHER FUTURE NEGOTIATING OPTIONS.

THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IS DIFFICULT FOR BOTH OF US, MR. PRIME MINISTER. EVEN IF THIS ISSUE CAN BE DEALT WITH SATISFACTORILY IN THE COUNCIL, IT IS NOT ONE THAT CAN BE AVOIDED ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS IF THE

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES INHERENT IN A GENEVA CONFERENCE OR IN AN INFORMAL PREPARATORY TALK OF THE KIND SUGGESTED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER IN HIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPEECH ARE TO BE FURTHER PURSUED.

I HAVE MADE NO FINAL JUDGMENTS, MR. PRIME MINISTER, BUT I FELT IT IMPORTANT TO SHARE MY DEEP CONCERNS WITH YOU AND TO UNDERSCORE THAT WHEN YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER COMES TO WASHINGTON, HE BE PREPARED TO SPEAK SPECIFICALLY AND CONCRETELY ON THE DIFFICULT ISSUES REFERRED TO IN THIS LETTER.

FINALLY, MR. PRIME MINISTER, I KNOW THAT YOU ARE AWARE THAT PLANNING IS PROGRESSING SPEEDILY AND SMOOTHLY FOR YOUR VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. IT IS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE, MR. PRIME MINISTER, THAT IN THIS BICENTENNIAL YEAR--ISRAEL'S PRIME MINISTER, REPRESENTING A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY THAT SHARES FULLY OUR IDEAS AND FIRM DEDICATION TO INDEPENDENCE--WILL BE THE FIRST HEAD OF GOVERNMENT BEING RECEIVED IN 1976. ISRAEL AND THE U.S. HAVE BEEN TOGETHER THROUGH MUCH PERIL AND PROMISE. I KNOW THESE ARE DIFFICULT ISSUES I AM POSING IN THIS LETTER; BUT I DO SO AS A FRIEND WHOSE FIRM SUPPORT FOR

ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND SURVIVAL REMAINS UNDIMINISHED.

I WISH YOU, YOUR FAMILY, AND ALL OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL A YEAR OF PROGRESS AND TRANQUILITY AS THE SEARCH FOR PEACE CONTINUES.

SINCERELY, GERALD R. FORD, END TEXT. ROBINSON

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TAGS:

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT  
FOR TOON FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. I HAVE JUST GIVEN MINISTER BAR-ON THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT: QUOTE " DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE JOIN ME IN EXPRESSING OUR GREAT SATISFACTION THAT THE PASSENGERS OF AIR FRANCE FLIGHT SEIZED EARLIER THIS WEEK HAVE BEEN SAVED AND A SENSELESS ACT OF TERRORISM THWARTED. SINCERELY, GERALD FORD. " UNQUOTE.

2. WE INTEND TO GIVE THE MESSAGE NO PUBLICITY HERE, ROBINSON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

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By ldg, NARA, Date 2/5/04

