The original documents are located in Box 19, folder "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (8)" of the National Security Advisor's Presidential Agency File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 28, 1975

10

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MIKE DUVAL

SUBJECT:

Proposed Executive Orders on the President's Advisory Board on the Foreign Intelligence Community and on Establishing Restrictions on Foreign Intelligence Activities

I have reviewed the proposed Executive Order on the President's Advisory Board on the Foreign Intelligence Community. I approve the proposed Executive Order and recommend alternative three which permits detailing Intelligence Community personnel to the PABFIC Staff for temporary service only.

I have also reviewed the proposed Executive Order on Establishing Restrictions on the Foreign Intelligence Community. I recommend that it be referred back to the drafting group to work out alternatives on points of disagreement.

William Hyland

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mille: A thule there two definitely ought to be essued by Pres. at some tome: see Ptra alme is a very weak opening gun,



November 26, 1975

MEMO FOR: WILLIAM HYLAND

FROM: Richard Ober M

I understand Mike Duval would like a response on this by control today.

Tob I to M. Duval



MEMORANDUM

Action

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 26, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: WILLIAM HYLAND

FROM: Richard Ober CD

SUBJECT:

Proposed Executive Orders on Restructuring and Revising the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and on Establishing Restrictions on Foreign Intelligence Activities

At Tab A is the latest version of the proposed Executive Order on the President's Advisory Board on the Foreign Intelligence Community (PABFIC). This Executive Order revises and restructures the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. You have been asked to give final approval to the proposed Executive Order and to indicate your support for one of three alternative positions on the issue of whether Intelligence Community personnel may be permitted to be detailed to PABFIC's Staff. You are to submit your response to Mike Duval, Jack Marsh's assistant.

The Executive Order on PABFIC has been under consideration for some time and several versions have been circulated in the past. The version at Tab A represents a consensus with the exception of one issue which is still unresolved. This issue is whether to allow Intelligence Community employees to be detailed to PABFIC's staff. The version at Tab A includes a section permitting detailing of Intelligence Community personnel (Section 7, paragraph (a)). The arguments for and against, plus a compromise proposal, are set out in the draft memorandum intended for the President at Tab B. The relevant section begins on the bottom of page two. General Scowcroft has seen several versions of this Executive Order. When his views were sought in late October, he was against allowing detailees from the Intelligence Community to serve on the PABFIC staff. On October 29, 1975, Bud McFarlane forwarded to Mike Duval the following language which expresses the General's views:

substitute Section 7 (a):

"Neither he nor any other permanent staff member shall be employed by or under contract with an agency or department within the foreign intelligence community during their tenure with the Board." C

This language was considered preferable because it strengthens the concept of the Board's independence from the intelligence agencies. This independence will make the PABFIC acceptable to the Congress and the public as an oversight body.

Since then, a compromise position to permit detailing for temporary service only has been suggested and is described under alternative three on page four of the draft memorandum at Tab B. Because it is a reasonable solution which, while prohibiting long-term detailing, will give the PABFIC some flexibility in having Intelligence Community personnel on a temporary basis when necessary, I recommend that you accept it. I understand that either General Scowcroft or Bud McFarlane indicated NSC's willingness to accept this compromise at a meeting of the Intelligence Coordinating Group.


A memorandum to Mike Duval has been prepared for your signature at Tab I which reports your approval of the Executive Order and your support for the compromise solution on the detailing question (alternative three).

Your comments have also been requested on the proposed Executive Order on Establishing Restrictions on Foreign Intelligence Activities at Tab C. Although several drafts of this Executive Order have been done, there is still little agreement as to what the final version should be. Because there is a lack of consensus on the Executive Order, I recommend that this version be referred back to the drafting committee for further work including the development of alternative language on disputed issues. The memorandum to Mike Duval at Tab I recommends that the Executive Order on restrictions be referred back to the drafting committee.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Mike Duval at Tab I.

Attachments



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MIKE DUVAL

SUBJECT: Proposed Executive Orders on the President's Advisory Board on the Foreign Intelligence Community and on Establishing Restrictions on Foreign Intelligence Activities


I have reviewed the proposed Executive Order on the President's Advisory Board on the Foreign Intelligence Community. I approve the proposed Executive Order and recommend alternative three which permits detailing Intelligence Community personnel to the PABFIC Staff for temporary service only.

I have also reviewed the proposed Executive Order on Establishing Restrictions on the Foreign Intelligence Community. I recommend that it be referred back to the drafting group to work out alternatives on points of disagreement.

William Hyland

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mike: I thuk there two clifindels ought to be issued by Pres. at some tome: see Prop. alme is a very weak opening gun,



PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY BOARD ON THE FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

There is a need for improved review of the foreign intelligence community and advice to the President on the quality of the community's activities and its compliance with law and applicable Executive Orders. This order establishes the President's Advisory Board on the Foreign Intelligence Community to perform these tasks.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

<u>Section 1.</u> There is hereby established the President's Advisory Board on the Foreign Intelligence Community, hereinafter referred to as "the Board." It shall:

(a) advise the President concerning its review of the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the United States Government. The Board's areas of concern shall include quality of foreign intelligence collection and estimates, organization and management of the foreign intelligence community, and in consultation with the Attorney General, compliance of the foreign intelligence community with applicable provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States, executive orders, and directives of the National Security Council;

(b) receive, consider, and make recommendations with respect to matters identified to the Board by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Federal Burcau of Investigation and heads of other government departments of the foreign intelligence community.

(c) where appropriate, be utilized by the Director
 of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General in carrying out their
 responsibilities; and

submit interim reports and recommendations, at least (d)annually, to the President on its findings and appraisals. Section 2. The Board may receive, investigate, consider, and make appropriate recommendations with respect to allegations of improprieties involving agencies within the foreign intelligence community made by employees of such agencies. In this connection, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the heads of other departments, agencies and organizations comprising the foreign intelligence community, and the Inspectors General thereof, after notification to their organization heads, may seek the advice of the Board with respect to activities or categories of activities which in the light of the statutory authority of any such agency, or any restrictions imposed by law or Executive Order, may have been, or, if implemented, might be, improper or appear to be improper. The Board shall consult the Attorney General with respect to any questions of legality. As

appropriate, the Chairman of the Board may designate a special panel of the Board to receive and make recommendations to the Board on such allegations.

Section 3. As used in this order, the term "foreign intelligence community" means those organizations (or subdivisions thereof) which collect, disseminate or evaluate foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.

Section 4. (a) In order to facilitate performance of the Board's functions, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and heads of other government departments of the foreign intelligence community shall regularly:

(1) make available to the Board all information with respect to foreign intelligence, foreign counterintelligence, and related matters which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to the President in accordance with the terms of this Order;

(2) notify the Board of major issues in the foreign intel-ligence community;

 (3) identify to the Board specific operational issues or matters in which there is a potential for official or public concern;

(b) Each Inspector General (or other official with equivalent duties) of the foreign intelligence community shall have the authority to

report directly to the Board, after notifying the head of his organization concerning matters over which the Board has cognizance.

(c) The head of each organization in the foreign intelligence community shall designate in writing to the Board the name of an individual and office to serve as the primary point of contact in support of Board functions. In addition, the Board is authorized to call upon persons at all levels within the foreign intelligence community. Section 5. Members of the Board shall be appointed by the President from among persons outside the Government, qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of background and experience, and with a view toward achieving continuity. The members shall receive compensation and allowances consonant with law.

Section 6. The President shall designate from among the Board members a Chairman who shall devote substantial time to his duties with the Board.

Section 7. The Board shall employ a staff headed by an Executive Secretary, who shall be appointed by the President.

(a) If the Executive Secretary or any member of the staff of the Board is appointed from an agency or department within the foreign intelligence community, then during his tenure with the Board, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction or prohibition from such agency or department, and shall neither possess nor exercise


any supervision, control, powers or functions (other than as a member of the staff of the Board) with respect to such agency or department.

(b) The Executive Secretary shall be authorized, subject to the approval of the Board and in a manner consonant with law, to hire and fix the compensation of such additional personnel as may be necessary for performance of the Board's duties.

Section 8. Compensation and allowances of the Board, the Executive Secretary, and other members of the staff, together with other expenses arising in connection with the work of the Board, shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the heading "White House Office" in the Executive Office Appropriation Act or, to the extent permitted by law, from corresponding appropriations made in future years. Such payments shall be made without regard to the provisions of Section 3681 of the Revised Statutes and Section 9 of the Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 672 and 673).

<u>Section 9.</u> The Board shall succeed to the records held by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, established by Executive Order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969.

Section 10. Executive Order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969, is hereby revoked.



DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Proposed Executive Order restructuring and revising the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Attached for your approval is a proposed Executive Order restructuring and revising the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The Board -- tentatively renamed the President's Advisory Board on the Foreign Intelligence Community (PAEFIC) -- is proposed to have responsibilities significantly breader than those of its predecessor. These include:

- Advising the President concerning its review of the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the United States government, including the quality of foreign intelligence collection and estimates; organization and management of the foreign intelligence community; and, in consultation with the Attorney General, the community's compliance with law.
- Make recommendations to you with respect to matters identified to the Board by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of Defense and other components of the foreign intelligence community.

In addition, PABFIC would be authorized to receive, investigate, consider and make appropriate recommendations with respect to



allegations of improprieties by intelligence community agencies made by employees of those agencies. The heads of foreign intelligence agencies would be authorized to seek the advice of PABFIC with respect to activities which are or may be improper, or give the appearance of impropriety. The directors of each foreign intelligence agency would be required to make available to PABFIC all information it required. The Inspector General of each foreign intelligence agency would be authorized to report directly to the Board, after notifying his agency head, concerning matters over which PABFIC has cognizance.

The proposed Executive Order states that you will designate from among the Board members a chairman "who shall devote substantial time to his duties with the Board." The order also indicates that PABFIC shall employ a staff headed by an Executive Secretary who shall be appointed by the President. If you approve the proposed executive order, a public announcement will be timed to coincide with your appointment of a new Chairman and additional PABFIC members.

There is one substantive area of disagreement between your advisers concerning this proposed order. This issue, which requires your decision, is whether or net current employees of foreign intelligence community agencies may be detailed to the staff of PABFIC. (The entire staff of the current PFIAE are detailees. The current Executive Secretary is a reimbursable detailee from CIA, and the other professional staff member is a military officer detailed from the Navy. The clerical employees are reimbursable detailees from CIA, NSA and the State Department.)

As written, the proposed Executive Order would permit detailing of intelligence community employees to the staff of PABFIC, but provides a safeguard as follows:

"If the Executive Secretary or any member of the staff of the Board is appointed from an agency or department within the foreign intelligence community, then during his tenure with the Board, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction or prohibition from such agency or department, and shall neither possess nor exercise any supervision, control, powers or functions (other than as a member of the staff of the Board) with respect to such agency or department."

There are three alternatives:

- 1. Permit detailing because:
 - . Because all of the PABFIC members are part-time advisors they will require a staff with in-depth knowledge of, and access to, all aspects of the community; as a practical matter, this expertise is available to the Board only if detailing is permitted.
 - . The safeguards in the current draft are the same as those provided under the National Security Act, and will prevent detailed employees from being influenced by their parent agencies; use of detailees in the past has caused no serious problems.
 - . Detailing would permit staff continuity at a time when there are substantial changes in the Board.
 - . Because of its concern over the size of the White House staff, Congress may refuse to authorize new positions for PABFIC staff.
- 2. Prohibit detailing because:
 - PABFIC has been given new responsibilities which make it inappropriate for the "watch dogs" to be employees of an agency being overseen.

- The public and its Constructs may question the credibility of 1999 (C'r oversight functions if the Bound is stated by employees of the forcian__ intelligence constructly.
- . The safeguards in the proposed Order are insufficient because any employee who continues to maintain a connection with an intelligence agency will inevitably be influenced in his work with the Board.
- . To keep PABFIC "pure," Congress will authorize whatever ceiling spaces are necessary.
- 3. Permit only temporary detailees. There is a middle course under which temporary details of intelligence community employees might be authorized on a case-by-case basis by the Chairman of PABFIC. If you approve this approach, the applicable provision of the draft Executive Order would be revised to read as follows:

"Neither the Executive Secretary nor any other permanent staff member shall be employed by or under contract with an agency or department within the foreign intelligence community during their tenure with the Board. However, the Chairman of the Board may, from time to time, appoint for temporary service with the Board an employee of an agency or a department within the foreign intelligence community. In the event of such temporary appointment by the Chairman, such employee shall, during his tenure with the Board, be subject to no supervision, control, restriction or prohibition from such agency or department, and shall neither possess nor exercise any supervision, control, powers or functions (other than as a temporary member of the Staff of the Board) with respect to such agency or department."

Decision:

Prohibit detailing of intelligence community employees to the start of PABFIC (recommended by:

Approve Disapprove

<u>Permit</u> decailing under the sufequards set forth in the proposed Order (recommended by:

Approve Disapprove : -


Permit detailing for temporary service only (recommended by:

Approve Disapprove

Subject to your resolution of the issue of whether intelligence agency employees may be detailed to serve on the PABFIC staff, all of your advisers recommend that you approve the proposed Executive Order.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

FOR



DRAFT: October 28, 1975 EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Previous guidance on the relationship between the intelligence agencies and United States citizens was unclear. This order clarifies that relationship by detailing those activities which are prohibited. Without setting forth all restrictions under which foreign intelligence agencies are obliged to operate, nor derogating from any other laws, rules, regulations, or directives further restricting the activities of these agencies, it is hereby ordered as follows:

<u>SECTION I.</u> Definitions. As used in this Order the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them below:

(a) "Collection" means the gathering and storage,or the gathering and forwarding, of information.

(b) "Domestic activities" means activities within the United States.

(c) "Foreign intelligence" means information, other than foreign counterintelligence, on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign nations, organizations or persons.

> (<u>Note:</u> Justice would refer to "activities of foreign powers or their agents," to assure that INS is not defined as a foreign intelligence agency.)

(d) "United States citizen" means United States citizens and other persons who have been accorded the legal rights of United States citizens.

(Note: CIA would include only citizens and "permanent resident aliens" in the definition.)

(e) "Foreign counterintelligence" means activities con-

ducted to protect the United States and United States citizens from

foreign espionage, sabotage, subversion, assassination, or terrorism.

(Note: OMB would have foreign counterintelligence mean "information on the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers or their agents with respect to their collection, evaluation or dissemination of intelligence about the United States.")

(f) "Incidental reception" means the receipt of informa-

tion, collection of which by an agency is otherwise prohibited by this order.

(Note: OMB and the Vice President would add to the definition. "and which is collected in the course of an agency's authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities and without specific intent to secure such information from United States citizens.")

(g) "Foreign intelligence agency" means any department or

agency of the United States government, or component thereof, which is primarily engaged in foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activities.

SECTION II. The following activities shall not be conducted either by any foreign intelligence agency or by any other department or agency in pursuit of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence: (a) Collection, evaluation, correlation or analysis, of information concerning the domestic activities of United States
 citizens; proyided, however, that nothing herein shall preclude:
 (1) the collection, evaluation, correlation and

analysis of information of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence interest derived from public sources; or

analysis of:

(2) the collection, evaluation, correlation and

(i) information on current or former employees (including military personnel and employees of other Federal departments or agencies detailed for service with the foreign intelligence agency); applicants for employment with such agency; voluntary sources or contacts or individuals who in good faith are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts; current and former contractors and current or former employees or applicants for employment by such contractors; and all persons not included above who must be given access to classified information which could disclose foreign intelligence

or foreign counterintelligence sources and methods; provided, however, that collection of such information is done only in accordance with law and by written authority from the head of such agency to determine the fitness of such persons to become or remain associated with such agency or to have such access, or in the case of a voluntary source or contact, to determine suitability or credibility.

(Note: CIA would add: "or in the case of a former employee to investigate matters related to his period of employment.")

(ii) information about a United States citizen who in good faith is reasonably believed to be involved in international terrorist or narcotics activities or working in collaboration with a foreign nation or organization, but only if the information is collected abroad or from foreign sources in the United States in the course of an authorized foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activity.

(Note: OMB would substitute "working for" in place of "working in collaboration with.")
(iii) Foreign intelligence from United States
citizens provided on a witting and voluntary



basis. The foreign intelligence agency
shall disclose its identity when seeking such
foreign intelligence within the United States
from United States citizens. When collection
of foreign intelligence within the United States
results in the incidental reception of informtion from or about unknowing United States
citizens, however, the receiving agency shall
be permitted to make appropriate use of such
information as permitted under this Order.
(iv) Administrative information of the kind
customarily developed and utilized by most
departments and agencies of the Federal govern-

(v) Information provided by another Federal
 Agency which had been lawfully compiled by
 that agency in furtherance of its authorized
 mission and responsibility, when such information is provided:



(a) in furtherance of the authorized mission and responsibilities of the receiving agency;

(b) in good faith under a reasonable belief that the information is relevant to the receiving agency; and

(c) under such guidelines and procedures as may be issued by the Attorney General designed to ensure the protection of the constitutional and statutory rights of United States citizens.

(<u>Note:</u> OMB and the Vice President would delete subsection (v).)

(3) the transmission to any law enforcement agency with appropriate jurisdiction of any information concerning criminal activities that is received through incidental reception.

(b) Physical surveillance of United States citizens except to the extent that such surveillance is in accordance with law and is:

(1) Surveillance, upon written approval by the head of the foreign intelligence department or agency, of individuals currently or formerly employed by that agency, its present or former contractors, or such contractors' employees, for the purpose of protecting foreign intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; or

(2) Surveillance of a person having contact with any persons described under subparagraph (1), or foreign nationals in the United States in connection with foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations, but only to the extent necessary to identify such person.

(c) Electronic surveillance of United States citizens except in accordance with law and under procedures approved by the Attorney General.



(Note: The Vice President would refer to "monitoring the communications of United States citizens by electronic means except . . .")



(Note: Justice would substitute a new Section II(c): "Electronic surveillance of United States citizens except in accordance with law and under procedures approved by the Attorney General, and in no instance shall the Central Intelligence Agency engage within the United States in the electronic surveillance of United States citizens."

(d) Testing of electronic surveillance equipment within the United States except in accordance with law and under procedures approved by the Attorney General.

(e) Any opening of United States mail or examination of envelopes except in accordance with the provisions of United States postal laws and regulations.

(f) Access to Federal income tax returns or tax information except in accordance with statutes and regulations.

(g) Infiltration or secret participation in any organization composed primarily of United States citizens for the purpose of reporting on its activities or membership.

(h) Experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent of each such human subject and in accordance with the guidelines of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavorial Research.

(i) Operation of a proprietary company on a commercially
 competitive basis with United States businesses except to the minimum
 extent necessary to establish commercial credibility. No investments
 by a proprietary company shall be made on the basis of any substantive

intelligence not available to the public.

SECTION III. Nothing in this Order shall prohibit the retention of information collected inviolation of this Order as required by law for possible court action.

(Note: Justice would have Section III read: "Nothing in this Order prohibits an agency from retaining information when retention is required by law, such as retention required to preserve evidence or other information for possible court action.")

SECTION IV. No foreign intelligence agency shall:

(a) provide services, equipment, personnel or
 facilities to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration or state
 or lo police organizations of the United States except as expressly
 authorized by law; or

(b) participate in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United States except as may be authorized by law.

Provided, that this prohibition shall not preclude:

(1) Cooperation between a foreign intelligence

agency and appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the personnel and facilities of the foreign intelligence agency or preventing espionage or other criminal activity related to foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence; or

(2) Provision of specialized equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other Federal department or agency.

(Note: The Vice President would delete equipment" in subsection (a), and have subsection (b) prohibit participation in or funding of "any police, law enforcement or internal security function within ...")

SECTION V. Foreign intelligence agency personnel may be detailed elsewhere within the Federal government as authorized by law. 'Employees so detailed shall be responsible to the host agency and shall not report to their parent agency on the affairs of the host agency except as may be directed by the host agency. The head of the host agency and any subsequent successor shall be informed of the detailee's association with the parent agency.


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(Note: NSC would reverse the order of IV and V.)

SECTION VI. Nothing in this Order shall prohibit any agency having law enforcement responsibilities from discharging such responsibilities pursuant to law. Nor shall this Order apply to any activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction	
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum	
CREATOR'S NAME William G. Hyland for General Scowcro RECEIVER'S TITLE Chairman	ft
DESCRIPTION re PFIAB recommendations for revision of the NIE process	S
CREATION DATE	
VOLUME 1 page	
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034900229 COLLECTION TITLE	AL
DATE WITHDRAWN	

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
CREATOR'S NAME Boverie, Molander, Ober RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft
DESCRIPTION re response to PFIAB suggestions
CREATION DATE
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034900229 COLLECTION TITLE
BOX NUMBER
DATE WITHDRAWN




REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction	
TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇLetter	
CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft RECEIVER'S NAME George W. Anderson, Jr. RECEIVER'S TITLE Chairman	
DESCRIPTION re response to PFIAB suggestion	3
CREATION DATE	
VOLUME 1 page	
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034900229 COLLECTION TITLE	
DATE WITHDRAWN 02/26/2010 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR	

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
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22

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
CREATOR'S NAME W. E. Colby CREATOR'S TITLE Director RECEIVER'S NAME The President
DESCRIPTION re response to PFIAB suggestions
CREATION DATE
VOLUME 5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034900229 COLLECTION TITLE
DATE WITHDRAWN 02/26/2010 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR




REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL		ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL		ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME		Brent Scowcroft for Henry Kissinger Director
DESCRIPTION	• •	re possible revisions in the NIE process
CREATION DATE		09/08/1975
VOLUME		3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID		034900229
		NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY FILE
BOX NUMBER		
FOLDER TITLE		President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (8)
DATE WITHDRAWN		02/26/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST		



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WITHDRAWAL ID 029570

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL		ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL		ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME		
DESCRIPTION	• •	re possible revisions in the NIE process
CREATION DATE	• •	11/24/1975
VOLUME		1 page
	• •	NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY FILE
BOX NUMBER		19 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (8)
DATE WITHDRAWN		



22

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
CREATOR'S NAME George W. Anderson CREATOR'S TITLE Chairman RECEIVER'S NAME The President
DESCRIPTION re NIE process
CREATION DATE
VOLUME 7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034900229 COLLECTION TITLE
DATE WITHDRAWN



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2-2

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL	. ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL	. ÇLetter
CREATOR'S NAME	
DESCRIPTION	. re proposed directive for improving intelligence estimates
CREATION DATE	. 08/15/1975
VOLUME	. 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID	. 034900229
	. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY FILE
BOX NUMBER	
FOLDER TITLE	. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (8)
DATE WITHDRAWN	. 02/26/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST	. HJR

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .	• • •	ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL		ÇMemorandum
DESCRIPTION		draft NSDM re NIEs
CREATION DATE		08/15/1975
VOLUME		1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER	TD .	034900229
		NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
		AGENCY FILE
BOX NUMBER		19
FOLDER TITLE		President's Foreign Intelligence
		Advisory Board (8)
DATE WITHDRAWN		02/26/2010
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST .		