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THE COUNSELOR  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*Peter Rodman*  
*JYI*  
*7400189*  
*Noted by HAK*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

October 17, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: Soviet Counterproposal on Grain Contracts to Simon

As I understand it from Simon's delegation, he made his pitch to the Soviets on the basis of the last set of instructions (500 tons of corn plus 500 more if crop reports warrant; 1.2 million tons of wheat for total of 2.2 million tons).

The Soviets continued to press for original total of 3.2 million. They proposed to reduce their previously contracted 2.3 million tons of corn to 1.5 million and to make up the rest of the 3.2 million total with 1.7 million tons of wheat. Delivery would be by June 30, 1975, with the Soviets indicating they want it earlier than that. They stated that in making these proposals they had "analyzed all the factors" and were displaying understanding for our political situation and that they could not see why we cannot make the above deliveries without adverse impact on our situation. Simon told them that his proposals were based on highest level consideration and that he would have to report the new Soviet proposals to the President and you, after which he would be back in touch.

I can't judge economic impact or actual availability of the amounts proposed. Butz, as you know, has been eager to meet the original Soviet total, if necessary on a stretched out basis. The negotiating history, as far as I can reconstruct it, justifies Soviet belief that a million tons of corn would be acceptable.

From the political and psychological standpoint, it seems to me we have to stick with something like the last instruction to Simon, to make clear to the Soviets that they can place orders of this magnitude only after consultation with the USG at responsible political levels. While this will irritate the Russians, who evidently feel they have valid contracts, and may sour your talks with Brezhnev, at least

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *KRZ*, NARA, DATE *3/16/04*

initially, I continue to feel over the long run it is essential to make this basic point.

I gather Simon wants to talk to you in greater detail.

Tab A -- Last Instructions to Simon



~~SECRET~~

Z 150353Z OCT 74 ZFFA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FLASH 6698  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 226209

CONTROL: 3863Q  
RECD: OCT 15, 1974  
12:20AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: EEWT, UR  
SUBJECT: SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASE  
REFERENCE: MOSCOW 15510

FOR SECRETARY SIMON

1. AFTER REVIEW OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND YOUR RECOMMENDATION, THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED THAT YOU OFFER THE FOLLOWING TO THE USSR:

- 500,000 TONS OF CORN FOR FIRM CONTRACT NOW;
- 500,000 TONS OF CORN FOR PURCHASE DURING THE SUMMER OF 1975, CONTINGENT UPON CROP REPORTS RECEIVED AT THAT TIME;
- 1.2 MILLION TONS OF WHEAT FOR IMMEDIATE CONTRACT, WITH DELIVERIES SCHEDULED OUT THROUGH JULY 1975.

2. TOTAL WOULD THUS BE 2.2 MILLION TONS. THIS IS 700,000 TONS ABOVE WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER TOLD DOBRYNIN ON OCTOBER 4. IN NO REPEAT NO CIRCUMSTANCES DO WE ENVISAGE COMMITTING OURSELVES NOW TO THE FULL 3.2 MILLION TONS THE SOVIETS HAD CONTRACTED FOR. IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET ARGUMENT ON SANCTITY OF CONTRACT YOU MAY WISH TO POINT OUT THAT AT NO POINT DID US

REPRESENTATIVES ENVISAGE MORE THAN 1 MILLION TONS OF CORN, AND THEN ONLY CONTINGENT ON FAVORABLE CROP REPORTS.

3. REQUEST YOU PRESENT THIS POSITION TO THE SOVIETS. IF THEY ACCEPT IT, ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF FURTHER CONSIDERATION ONLY SUBSEQUENT TO RELEASE OF THE CONTRACTS. SHOULD THEY ACCEPT, YOU SHOULD TELL THEM YOU WILL ACCEPT THEIR TERMS IN REGARD TO THE CONTRACTS.



INCERSOLL

NR 3116104

FOR TO SECRETARY



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 17, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT HORMATS *RH*

SUBJECT: Meeting with President on Grain Sales to USSR

At 5:00 the President will meet with the Executive Committee of the Economic Policy Board--Simon, Seidman, Butz, etc., to discuss the Soviet grain problem, and Simon's discussions in Moscow.

As you know, the Soviets did not accept our initial position--to supply 500,000 tons of corn and 1.2 million tons of wheat now and 500,000 tons of corn after November. The Soviets held out for the delivery of the full 3.2 million tons of grain (1.5 million tons of corn and 1.7 million tons of wheat) in the present crop year.

This morning, Simon presented the results of his Moscow discussions to the Economic Policy Board. The group recommended the following:

- Advise the Soviets, through Dobrynin, that the US can supply 1 million tons of corn and 1.2 million tons on wheat for delivery between November 1974 and July 1975, provided deliveries are spread out evenly over the period.
- US export firms could either deliver an addition 1 million tons of foreign-origin grain (corn or wheat) during this period, or deliver 1 million tons of 1975 crop wheat after July 1975, or a combination of these two alternatives.
- The Soviets would be expected to agree that we can announce publicly that they will make no further purchases in the US market during this crop year, and that the two governments will work toward development of improved supply-demand data system for grains.

This recommendation would provide the Soviets the 3.2 million tons they want, but would spread them out over a longer period and permit

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 3/16/04

companies to fulfill their contracts from non-American grain. The Soviets could decide with which US export firms they would do business, thus the Administration would not appear to be endorsing Continental and Cook--the two firms which concluded the original deals with the Soviets.

On balance, this arrangement is probably the best we can do for the Soviets without completely stripping ourselves of available grain and pushing up domestic prices. (Although I am still concerned that there will be an adverse domestic reaction to even these amounts.) While not all Moscow would like, it is certainly far preferable from its point of view than the arrangement which HAK discussed with Dobrynin on October 4. It also provides the "contract sanctity" (i. e., delivery of the expected 3.2 million tons) which the Soviets insisted on with Simon in Moscow. While contract sanctity may sound peculiar coming from the Soviets, this precedent might be important in pursuing Soviet compliance on the terms of US investment in the USSR.

One possible problem is that the Soviets might want to demand the remaining \$200 million they have available to them under the terms of the infamous 1972 grain deal. This would make an unfortunate connection in people's minds between the two, and we should not go along with it.

If the President decides on this approach, it would be essential for HAK to be in contact immediately with Dobrynin. We will need a Soviet answer very soon. If this leaks, domestic prices will go up dramatically. Moreover, since the Soviets can decide from which export firm to purchase, all should have a chance to compete.



DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Grain Sales to the U.S.S.R.

The Executive Committee of the Economic Policy Board, with Secretary Butz in attendance, reviewed this morning the results of Secretary Simon's talks on grain with the Soviets in Moscow earlier this week. The Executive Committee, with the concurrence of Secretary Butz, recommends the following:

- (1) We advise the Soviets through Ambassador Dobrynin that at this time the U.S. can supply 1 million metric tons of corn and 1.2 million tons of wheat for delivery between November 1974 and July 1975 provided these deliveries are spread evenly over the delivery period;
- (2) In order to provide contract sanctity on the sales now completed (on which the Soviets are insistent), we would agree that U.S. export firms can either (a) deliver 1 million tons of foreign-origin grain (wheat or corn) against these sales during the period November 1974 - July 1975, or (b) deliver 1 million tons of new crop 1975 U.S. wheat with deliveries beginning no sooner than July 1975, or (c) a combination of these two alternatives.
- (3) We obtain from the Soviets their agreement that we can announce publicly that the Soviets will make no further purchases in the U.S. market this crop year and that the two governments will work toward the development of a supply/demand data system for grains.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

This recommendation, if accepted by the Soviets, would scale-back Soviet purchases in the current crop year by approximately one-third (from 3.2 million to 2.2 million tons) but still provide the contract sanctity insisted by the Soviets. The 2.2 million tons is near the figure (2 million tons) that the Department of Agriculture had expected the Soviets to take from the U.S. during this crop year.

Under this recommendation, we would permit the Soviets to decide with the U.S. export firms the quantities and mix of grains to be taken from each respective export firm (including those without current sales if the Soviets so prefer). Therefore, it is imperative that we make a public announcement within a few hours after we reach agreement with the Soviets. Congressional contacts will need to be made within the few hours between agreement and public announcement.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



Noted by Hax

Retyped

7400187

3

SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 17, 1974

MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Friday, October 18, 1974

3:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. (90 minutes)

The Cabinet Room

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To review alternative SALT proposals for discussion with the Soviets during my trip to Moscow next week.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: Since the last NSC meeting, we have continued with the analyses of alternative proposals for a SALT agreement. These proposals form the basis for discussion at this meeting.

The proposals fall into three basic categories:

1. An effort to achieve nominal parity by the two sides, by pressing for equal numerical limits on central strategic systems. Both sides would be free to make qualitative improvements. This option could result in a massive technological arms race in unrestrained characteristics, such as MIRVs.
2. An attempt to achieve a great degree of parity between the forces of the two sides, by proposing equal numerical limits, equal throw weight of missiles and equal throw weight of MIRVed missiles. This proposal, with any numbers that would be meaningful, would require a major restructuring of Soviet strategic forces. Its negotiability is therefore close to zero.

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BY HRC, NARA, DATE 3/16/04



A variation of this proposal would replace the throw weight limits with equal limits on MIRVed missiles and with limits on bombers and heavy missiles. This would retain many of the advantages of the original and would be somewhat less obnoxious to the Soviets.

3. An effort at balancing our advantages in MIRVs against the Soviet advantages in throw weight and in numbers of missiles. This proposal could permit some progress toward a useful agreement. While the approach might have the appearance of inequality, any inequalities would be without strategic significance if they were properly balanced.

After your opening remarks, I suggest you confirm with Bill Colby that there is no significant new intelligence information and then ask me to present the results of the analytical work prepared by the Verification Panel. (VP paper at Tab B.)

(The SALT negotiations in Geneva have now been underway for four weeks, but have made little progress.)

- B. Participants: (List at Tab A)
- C. Press Arrangements: The fact of the meeting, but not the subject, will be announced. There will be a White House photographer.

### III. TALKING POINTS

- A. At the Opening of the Meeting
  1. The purpose of this meeting is to continue our review of alternative SALT proposals which we could give to the Soviets.
  2. Bill (Colby), can we assume there have been no developments of significance since our last meeting?
  3. Henry, would you give us a rundown on where we stand on the alternative SALT proposals which have been developed.





B. At the Close of the Meeting

1. Clearly, there are quite different concepts of how to attack the problem of achieving a reasonable strategic balance through SALT.
2. What we need to do is to try as best we can to find common ground with the Soviets for a mutually acceptable SALT agreement. We cannot be cynical, saying we want an agreement but making proposals which will not work.
3. Based on this discussion, I will decide how we should proceed. I may want to present only one proposal, all of them, or some hybrid combination.
4. Meanwhile, I expect all of you to insure that none of this ends up in the newspapers.

Gen S:wgh:17 Oct 74 (retyped all 3 pages)



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017864

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Henry A. Kissinger

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . The President

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re SALT

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/18/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 10 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Chronological File, October 17-31, 1974

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/20/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



MEMORANDUM

[Outside System]

50

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7400190

Noted by S. Croft

ACTION/INFORMATION

October 19, 1974

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: STEPHEN LOW *SL*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Echeverria--  
CIA Agent Agee matter

The attached is a single copy for separate handling between you, the Secretary, and the President. It relates to the current flap brought on by former CIA agent Agee's revelations of activity in Mexico and contains the wording of the kind of assurance which the President might give Echeverria in the unlikely event that the Mexican President would raise the matter in a private conversation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you bring the attached to the Secretary and the President's attention as appropriate.


Attachment:

3-page paper prepared by State dtd 10/74  
"Agee Affair"

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
 AUTHORITY NSC/State Guidelines;  
 NLG-CF-1-10-1  
 BY *SJ* NLG DATE 09/08

original filed w/ Ed Roberts  
 in Trip Folder 10-21-74  
 (KM)



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017866

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . W. E. Colby

CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Director

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Lt. General Brent Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re President's Meeting

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/18/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

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6a

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017867

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Jan M. Lodal

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re SALT

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/20/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017868

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Instruction

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Draft Cable to SCC Commissioner

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/19/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Chronological File, October 17-31, 1974

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/20/2004

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6c

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017869

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Talking Paper  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Commissioner Graybeal  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . draft talking points re Soviet missile  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/07/1974  
VOLUME . . . . . 1 page  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Chronological File, October 17-31, 1974  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/20/2004  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

OCT 22 1974

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROBERT McFARLANE

FROM: W. R. Smyser

SUBJECT: Urgent Matters for the Secretary

Please let me reiterate in writing the matters that I regard as absolutely top priority for the Secretary to handle, either before he leaves or on the first leg of his trip. Without them, I cannot continue with the planning of the President's trip or with several important aspects of policy toward countries in East Asia.

For the President's Trip

- . Memo to the President on the Japan trip (4921). *signed*
- . Memo to the President on the Korea trip (4941). *signed*
- . Moving the Japan NSSM (4822). *checked into route*

Basic Studies

- . Initiate new NSSM on Vietnam (4680). *signed*
- . Move Australian NSSM to the President. (Under no circumstances should this paper be taken to Eastern Europe or the USSR). (4913-X) *No action*

Vietnam Correspondence

- . The President's letter to Thieu (4636). *Still pending*
- . The Secretary's message to Le Duc Tho (4908-X). *"Too plaintive"*

*Action on 5 out of 7*  
*That's a .715 batting average; not bad considering it was a short haul out.*  
*W. R. Smyser*

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY H2 NARA, DATE 3/14/04





NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017870

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . A. Denis Clift

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re East-West Germany

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/22/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE

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FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Chronological File, October 17-31, 1974

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/20/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

EXEMPTED 6/8/11

*His Jubba*

9

( -x- Outside the System)

~~SECRET~~

October 24, 1974  
URGENT ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Hal Horan

SUBJECT: Prayer Breakfast at White House November 5 - and  
Invitation to South Africans

On November 5 there will be a prayer breakfast in the White House Staff Mess which Liberia's President Tolbert is expected to attend. I have received a query from Mr. Nidecker of the White House Staff whether there would be any objection if an invitation to that breakfast were extended to South Africa's Minister of Mines, Immigration, Sport and Recreation, Piet Koornhof, one of two leading contenders for future Prime Ministership. He would be accompanied by a private South African citizen, Ross Main, a member of the Christian Fellowship Society in South Africa and a friend of Congressman Dellenback, who is, I understand, the prime mover of these breakfasts.

Mr. Nidecker said that President Tolbert had been informed of the possible attendance of the South Africans and had indicated he had no objections. Mr. Nidecker also indicated the chances that the press would become aware of the matter were slim.

I have asked Mr. Nidecker to withhold extending invitations to the South Africans until I had an opportunity to obtain guidance from you. My own view is that given the many press stories in recent weeks of a US tilt toward the white supremacist states and other suspicions aired in the press that the US is considering military links with South Africa, the Administration's interests would be little served by having the South Africans come to the White House, along with a Black African leader, even for a clearly non-political event. If this were leaked to the press it would fan the fires of suspicion. In addition, it should be noted that President Tolbert visited the same day with President Ford (the meeting November 5 has been confirmed, though the time has not been set.) If President Tolbert wishes to meet with the South African Minister while he is in Washington, there would be ample opportunities for him to do so at a different site.

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 3/16/04





~~SECRET~~

-2-

RECOMMENDATION

That I inform Mr. Nidecker the NSC prefers invitations to the prayer breakfast not be issued to the South Africans.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_.

ALTERNATE RECOMMENDATION

That I indicate to Mr. Nidecker NSC has no objection to their attendance, with the understanding that this attendance is approved by President Tolbert and is not publicized.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_.

cc - Les Janka



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 24, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

STEPHEN LOW<sup>SR</sup>

SUBJECT:

Report of the Commission on  
U.S. - Latin American Relations

I have now read a copy of the Report and the President's letter to Commission Chairman Sol Linowitz. In the latter the then Vice President states that he would be "very interested in the progress of the Commission's work."

The Report is in many ways a plea from the private sector for support for the initiatives of the New Dialogue. It contains some very positive and constructive suggestions for initiatives which the USG could take, particularly in the economic area, to improve our relations with Latin America. It starts out with the sentence, "The U.S. should change its basic approach to Latin America and the Caribbean." In its 54 pages it mentions a lot of things which we should not do and lists some 33 recommendations of things we should do. There is no specific articulation of just what our overall approach should be. Among the Report's recommendations are the following: elimination of legislation directed at punishing (Latin American) nations which purchase sophisticated arms, seize our fishing boats, or expropriate without adequate compensation; abandonment of our veto in the IDB; an OAS guided primarily by Latin Americans; increased cultural exchange; waivers on imposition of countervailing duties; exchange of information on commodity supply and demand; assistance to the poorest nations; development of a code of conduct defining rights and responsibilities of foreign investors and governments; and establishment of a publicly funded foundation to assist in transfer of scientific and technological information.

On the political side, however, the Report contains somewhat more controversial judgments. It states that "covert U.S. involvement in the domestic policy of Latin America, such as occurred more recently in Chile, is indefensible and should be ended." Regarding Cuba it states, "The Commission does not believe a continuation of the policy of isolation with regard to Cuba meaningfully advances any

7400214 P. 05  
Noted by Scowcroft  
10-25-74  
(KM)





current U.S. interests," and it recommends that "the U.S. should take the initiative in seeking a more normal relationship with Cuba." It suggests the U.S. unilaterally revoke Executive regulations restricting trade with Cuba after the Quito Conference. Finally, it calls for negotiation of a new Panama Canal Treaty on the basis of the February Statement of Principles, and transfer of Southcom to CONUS.

On balance, I believe the Report is a positive one and that it contains some constructive suggestions and useful support for our policies. I think that the President would add to his stature by accepting the Report and agreeing to study it, while making clear that he would not promise to follow all its 33 recommendations. It may be that the headlines on the Report itself will be focussed on Cuba and the CIA in Chile. The President's association with the Report could cause him some losses as well as some gain. An alternative might be to postpone presentation of the Report for two or three weeks. The contents of the Report would no longer be news; only its presentation would be. The full Commission might not be able to attend on such an occasion, however.



11 a

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017871

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Richard T. Kennedy

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Brent Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re bombs for Israel

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/24/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Chronological File, October 17-31, 1974

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/20/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



*Israeli Arms*

110

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Oct. 23

✓  
RO:

George Perlman came by to ask the status of an Israeli request for laser-guided ordnance delivery equipment. He said that he understood DOD had made a favorable recommendation to HAK, but wanted to know what was holding up the decision process in the NSC. He mentioned that you had told him you didn't know of the DOD recommendation.

I told him that I was not familiar with the matter, and that ~~you~~ since you would have had the latest word, I wouldn't be of much help beyond what you said ~~it~~ in any case. I told him that if anything further could be said, I would let him know.

This response was coordinated in advance of Perlman's visit, with David Ransom - who wondered what part of DOD the leaks had come from.

AH

*Bob Basel,  
Working for Dr. Curry,  
OX 74172 -*

MARTIN MARIETTA AEROSPACE

1800 K Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20006  
Telephone (202) 833-1900  
TWX (710) 822-1978

*Ext. 245-6*

GEORGE H. PERLMAN  
Director, International Operations

→ *MALCOLM GREEN*



4105  
116  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


September 23, 1974

Dear Mr. Peterson:

This will acknowledge and thank you for your letter of September 10 in which you urged that the U.S. Government grant an export license to permit the release to the Government of Israel of avionic pods containing guidance and control components for a laser guided air to surface weapon system.

I can assure you that your recommendation will receive careful consideration.

Sincerely,

  
Brent Scowcroft  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Dan A. Peterson  
Vice President, Marketing  
Martin Marietta Aerospace  
1800 K Street, N. W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 24, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

*MS*  
↑ 10-25-74

*B*

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass you the following report on his meeting in Copenhagen:

"Before arriving in Moscow, I met briefly at the Copenhagen Airport Royal Lounge with Danish Foreign Minister Ove Guldberg who was good enough to interrupt his participation in a parliamentary debate to join me briefly for an exchange of views. We had a very good talk. He mentioned his Prime Minister's eagerness to meet you in Washington sometime early in 1975. I told him I would check with you.

"Guldberg, like most of his European colleagues, is disturbed by the world economic situation. Denmark has been friendly to our initiatives on consumer cooperation in the energy field and I took the opportunity to explain to him what we felt the next steps should be after we establish our emergency sharing scheme. I told him that the severe financial problem which we had identified could only be solved by consumer nation cooperation and the creation of a structure that assures the re-cycling of large producer foreign exchange holdings to the areas of greatest need, e.g., Italy. I told him that we would have some specific proposals in 6-8 weeks.

"He asked about my Moscow trip and the Middle East. I told him my conversations in Moscow would deal mainly with SALT and bilateral questions, with no likely developments on the Middle East or CSCE or MBFR. I explained our Middle East strategy and also our vote on the PLO question at the UN. I also urged on him the importance of Europe's supporting us in the UN on the question of Cambodian representation."

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 3/16/04



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

ACTION  
October 25, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following message concerning his speech before the World Food Conference.

"We are continuing to work on the draft of my speech for the World Food Conference in Rome on November 5. We have sought ideas from the Department of Agriculture as well as from others, and showed Agriculture drafts containing all the principal ideas. I will be checking the speech with Earl Butz again once it is in good shape, but there is one important concept in it on which he has already indicated opposition.

"This is the proposal that the major food exporters get together to plan and coordinate efforts of production to enable them to meet global deficits.

"Secretary Butz believes the group might get us into obligations we wish to avoid. He believes that the present informal consultation is all that is required, and he believes that the proposal to convene such a group might appear provocative to outside countries.

"I believe that establishing a group of this sort is an important step which could have significant political and economic advantages:

-- From the political perspective two things are clear: first, formation of such a group would be a signal to the oil producers that we also have special strengths and can unite to use them. Second, we cannot demand that the oil producers make concessions in the global interest if the United States is unwilling to pursue a cooperative policy to use its dominance in food to constructive ends. Other nations are conscious that food prices have increased about as rapidly as energy prices and that the value of U.S. food exports almost doubled in a single year. Collective efforts to insure production are consistent with your UN speech.

-- From the economic perspective, the basic theme that you and I have been setting forth recently is that in the current economic crisis

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HRC, NARA, DATE 3/16/04





nations cannot control inflation and meet their national interests for energy and food without greater consultation. Events of the past year have made it clear that we need not only better domestic but also better international coordination to avoid sharp disruptions between supply and demand. The group we propose imposes no obligations upon us -- its purpose is to initiate a dialogue among and coordinate the efforts of the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, and the European Community, which together control 85 percent of the world's grain exports. More coherent planning could help avoid both sharp drops in returns for our farmers and sharp rises in prices that consumers must pay.

"Accordingly, I recommend that you approve the proposal that we launch consultations among the major food exporting nations."

Approve SRJ

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Strongly



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

OS  
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Has Seen  
10-25-74  
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SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION  
October 25, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report of his meeting with Brezhnev this morning.

"I had another two and a half hours with Brezhnev in the Kremlin with the same participants as yesterday. He had just received your message which he read through in my presence and then commented on very positively. He said he liked its positive spirit and would answer, probably after our current meetings are finished. He reverted to the message a second time later in our session, again with favorable comment saying he laid great stress on his relationship with you.

"Brezhnev today was in a dark blue suit and white shirt, probably because he is to meet Bhutto later today. He was not at his most cogent or precise and in fact at times seemed almost frivolous in his banter. He failed to focus seriously on our SALT proposal, though I finally had an opportunity to give him a detailed summary of it. Before that I spent about an hour answering Brezhnev's "two questions," whether we wanted strategic superiority and what I thought of the prospect for nuclear war. I explained our strategic force planning and concerns about Soviet weapons developments and noting the irrationality of initiation of nuclear war by either side, I stressed that if the Soviet strategic build-up continued in the absence of a SALT agreement we were certain to match it and, given our technological lead, probably exceed it. Thus, this was a crucial moment for coming to an agreement. I did point out the danger of local conflicts resulting in escalation.

"In his typical debating style, Brezhnev complained of the technical nature of my responses and then launched into a rambling response of his own, the upshot of which was that there can be no nuclear war. In the process he complained about our MIRV programs and rejected the assertion that the Soviets have more missiles than we. It was rather defensive and amateurish performance, though delivered without rancor.

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BY HK, NARA, DATE 3/16/04



"Brezhnev raised virtually no serious and systematic issues about our SALT proposal but what he did say seemed to reflect a misapprehension that we are trying to curtail Soviet SS-17 and SSA-19 programs by our proposed restriction on "heavy" Soviet missiles. He was also apparently leading up to rejecting MIRV prohibition for the SS-18. Again in typical style, he diverted our discussions to complain about our placing netting over our silos.

"Finally, after his desultory comments he did make two specific comments on our proposal: (1) he did not like our breaking up the period until 1984 into stages and wants a single stage from 1977-1984; and (2) he objected to our equal 2200 aggregates and proposed instead 2000 for us and 2400 for them. He will take this up later this afternoon in greater detail.

"We are to continue at 6:30 this evening but I must say from Brezhnev's performance today I find it very difficult to see how even a set of principles can be worked out before your meeting with him in November. Brezhnev has stalled and his comments have been unfocussed, sometimes even frivolous and uninformed. So far, they have not even been calculated to draw me out. This may change in three remaining sessions but even then we would have to break all past records to arrive at meaningful conclusions by Saturday night. I do intend to impress on Brezhnev the need for concrete progress if we are to avoid new U.S. programs in reaction to major Soviet building programs now underway, a point I have already made explicitly. If this remains the Soviet position it is clear that we are paying a price for our domestic disarray, especially the Congressional irresponsibility. The Soviets may calculate (1) that Congress has circumscribed our ability to give them credits and trade by placing a ceiling on credits and by the Jackson Amendment which they consider a profound insult; and (2) that Congress will not vote increases in the Defense Budget so that they risk nothing by stonewalling on SALT.

"In these conditions a \$1 billion cut to meet our \$300 billion goal would reinforce their convictions."



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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 25, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

*HR*  
*B*  
*R 10-25-74*

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following message:

"Once again the French have unilaterally gone public with a major initiative without any prior consultation. Giscard has invited selected producers, consumers and Less-Developed Countries to discuss the energy problem. Giscard also proposes a system of indexing which because of continued inflation in consuming countries will certainly lead to higher oil prices. Such a meeting is contrary to our strategy -- and the strategy agreed by most of France's partners -- that the consumers must first develop a common program before they will have anything to talk to producers about. This France rejects by refusing to join the energy coordinating group.

"While this initiative may cause a certain amount of confusion, it cannot really get anywhere. A meeting with producers without a common consumer position is an invitation to confrontation or surrender. Giscard invites the EC-9 to act as a unit. This gives the Europeans a dilemma which may cause the FRG, UK and Italy to waffle in dealing with us without being able to work with France, for in the end, these countries will have to cooperate with us because that is the only way to meet the financial crisis. In short, the French initiative is characteristic of French policy over the past decade; it is vain, useless and destructive of any cooperative effort. No possible good can come of it.

"Our strategy should be to let the producer-consumer meeting take its course and proceed to organize our consumer group. The French saw that we were beginning to succeed and that is why they moved at this time. They obviously prefer being bailed out by OPEC than by the US. Yet in time we shall prevail despite French sabotage. This is an area where we have had a consistent, imaginative policy and your Administration can take credit for what we have been trying to accomplish behind the scene."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 3/16/04





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/  
SENSITIVETHE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONACTION

7400212

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October 26, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Public Release of the Peers Report

Secretary Schlesinger has recommended that Volume I of the report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident (Peers Report) be released to the public. This is the second time Defense has made such a request, the first having been turned down by General Haig approximately eight months ago. Since the time of that earlier turndown, of course, some of the concerns which were then prominent obviously no longer obtain.

At Tab A is the memorandum of the Secretary of the Army presenting the rationale for release of the report, and at Tab B is the report which would be released. The arguments for release of the report can be summarized as follows:

- The Army has several times indicated that the report, or portions thereof, would at some time be made public.
- Publication would still public criticism that the Army is "covering up" the real facts or trying to protect its people or its image.
- The circumstance of a new President completely unconnected with the incident provides an opportunity to put the ugly affair behind us once and for all.
- The public has a legitimate right to be fully informed about the incident and to have the opportunity to formulate its own judgments.

Alongside these favorable arguments, however, there are several factors which militate against release of the report.

- It has long been the policy of the government not to release investigative reports. In this case, the individuals named in this report who were not charged would have no real opportunity to respond to the accusations in the report.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *3/16/04*

*forwarded to Jones w/ attachments 10-26-74 / to go to Rumsfeld*



- It has been alleged that the Peers investigation picked up rumor and hearsay and tended to report them as fact. In other words, far from being "the full story," the Peers report may be much exaggerated.
- The fact that the Army's record of conviction was only one individual out of the 30 names in the report could result in accusations that the Army had perpetrated a white wash.
- The gruesome details included in the report could reopen for the country very painful wounds which appear at the moment to be fairly well healed.
- DOD does not, in fact, intend to release the full report, but only the summary volume, thus remaining subject to the charge that its still incomplete disclosure demonstrates it still has something to hide.

The Secretary of the Army has been especially interested in the release of the report. His memorandum makes clear that, in his view, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. While Secretary Schlesinger has not submitted a formal memorandum, he has expressed himself verbally to be of like mind.

There are several alternatives for dealing with the issue of the release of the report.

- (1) Approve release.
- (2) Disapprove release.
- (3) Leave the decision to Secretary Schlesinger.
- (4) Consult further on the issues involved, with individuals such as Phil Buchen, Mel Laird (Secretary of Defense at the time of the report) and Fred Buzhardt (General Counsel of the Defense Department at the time of the report).

In view of the emotionalism attached to this subject, careful analysis of all the ramifications of release seems warranted, and I would therefore recommend option (4).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve further consultation on the merits of releasing the Peers Report.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove, prefer Option \_\_\_\_\_



*faded 10-28-74 Km (1:05 PM)*

*7400218 17*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 3/16/04

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

October 28, 1974

**MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT**

**FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER**

**SUBJECT: Decisions Needed on World Food Conference Speech**

We are continuing to draft the World Food Conference speech. There are two additional initiatives on which I need your approval:

(1) Announcement that the USG is launching a survey of future U. S. agricultural investment requirements, which will also determine what actions may be necessary to insure that these requirements are met. The need for significant increases in U. S. food production will necessitate large amounts of new agricultural investment. This survey would examine how much and what type of investment will be needed (e.g., increased fertilizer production capacity, new technology) and what new policies (e.g., tax incentives, subsidies) are required to insure that such investment takes place.

(2) Announcement that the President is requesting that the National Academy of Sciences design a food and nutrition research program directed to both America's and the world's needs. This would bring together the top scientific experts in the U. S. in a major effort to determine how to increase U. S. production, and how to increase production abroad -- particularly in the developing countries where nutritional requirements are far in excess of food availabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That you approve announcement of the survey of U. S. agricultural investment needs, and of what actions may be necessary to insure that such needs are met.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

(2) That you approve announcement that you are requesting a NAS food and nutrition research program.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



I am asking Bill Simon, Earl Butts, Bill Eberle, and Roy Ash for clearance on key points in their areas, and will submit another memo to you if there are differences which you need to resolve.



180

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017872

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Richard T. Kennedy

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Brent Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re reply to Ambassador Eilts

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/29/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Chronological File, October 17-31, 1974

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/21/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017873

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . BG Guay

CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . AmEmbassy Cairo

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . General Scowcroft

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Port Said

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/22/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Chronological File, October 17-31, 1974

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/21/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017874

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . General Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Ambassador Eilts

RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . AmEmbassy Cairo

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Port Said

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/29/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034800011

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
OUTSIDE-THE-SYSTEM CHRONOLOGICAL FILE

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Chronological File, October 17-31, 1974

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/21/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

**THE WHITE HOUSE**  
**WASHINGTON**

Please dex to Col. Graves. Then  
give to Kathy Meehan for dispatch.





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19  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY  
CONFIDENTIAL

October 30, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR

Lt. Colonel Howard Graves  
Military Assistant to the  
Secretary of Defense


SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Congress  
on Security Assistance

It is anticipated that the President will send to the Congress soon after its return on November 18 a message on security assistance. The purpose of the message will be to urge early enactment of acceptable foreign assistance legislation.

In order to prepare for this message, it is requested that the Department's views be submitted on the bill, with particular regard to the impact of Committee funding levels on the security posture of recipient countries, our relations with them and the continuing impact of the restrictive amendments on the operation of the overall security assistance program. In addition, the Department is requested to offer thematic material suitable for incorporation into the message which places our military assistance programs within the context of our overall national security policy. Further, the Department's suggestions are solicited generally as to approaches that could be taken in the message that would respond to Congressional concerns that have surfaced since the legislation was submitted.

If at all possible it is requested that this material be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by close of business Friday, November 1.

ADMINISTRATIVELY  
CONFIDENTIAL

  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Major, USMC

Military Assistant to the Assistant  
to the President for National Security  
Affairs



THE WHITE HOUSE

SIGNATURE MUST BE SECURED

TO: Lt. Col. Howard Graves DATE 10/30/74  
Military Asst. to Sec. of Defense  
3E880 Pentagon NUMBER  
NSC - PMttCoSA Time Rec'd

RECEIVED BY

DELIVERED BY

RETURN RECEIPT TO Dr. Henry A. Kissinger



MEMORANDUM

( -x- Outside the System)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-GDS

October 30, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Hal H. *HH*

*Segue* *completeness*  
*B.*

SUBJECT: Attached telegram

I want to bring to your attention the attached message to Dar es Salaam, which I knew nothing about until I saw the hard copy. After determining from Mulcahy (Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa) whether or not he had discussed it with you, I indicated we would have liked to have had a chance to clear. And, given that chance, I would have been opposed to putting this information in a cable, and also would have corrected Mulcahy's inaccurate impressions of the exact scenario.

I have asked Mulcahy to make sure Easum knows the information should be for his use only.

*I have discussed with J. Davis, who has taken up with Springsteen the lack of 9th floor clearance*

Attachment

Deptel to Dar es Salaam 237688, October 29. (LOU)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-GDS

*HR 3/16/04*





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 237688

13  
ORIGIN AF-07

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 H-01 RSC-01 /030 R

DRAFTED BY AF:EWMULCAHY:RJP  
APPROVED BY AF:EWMULCAHY

----- 033181

R 292354Z OCT 74  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO ANEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 237688

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PFOR, SF  
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY - OCTOBER 29

TO EASUM FROM MULCAHY

YOU WILL BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THAT, SHARING MISGIVINGS WITH NSC OVER THE VENUE AND COMPOSITION OF A PROPOSED WHITE HOUSE PRAYER BREAKFAST DURING PRESIDENT TOLBERT'S ONE-DAY VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK WE WERE PLEASED THAT GENERAL SCOWCROFT HAS PREVAILED ON THE INITIATOR, CONGRESSMAN DELLENBACK, TO CANCEL IT. ON HIS OWN THE CONGRESSMAN HAS INVITED SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF YOUTH AND CULTURE KOORNHOF TO ATTEND THE BREAKFAST. WE FELT HIS PRESENCE MIGHT BE AN EMBARRASSMENT TO PRESIDENT TOLBERT. KOORNHOF WILL BE HERE ON A "PRIVATE" VISIT NEXT WEEK. HE IS BEING TOUTED AS MOST LIKELY SUCCESSOR TO VORSTER. CANCELLATION OF THE BREAKFAST WILL NOT AFFECT PRESIDENT TOLBERT AND PRESIDENT FORD'S MEETING NEXT TUESDAY MORNING. INGERSOLL



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