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MEMORANDUM

X-1343

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 4, 1974

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W. R. SMYSER
RICHARD H. SOLOMON *WRS*

SUBJECT: UNC Termination

At Tab A is our redraft of State's instruction to Ambassador Habib authorizing him to undertake discussions with the ROKG on our negotiating package and strategy for termination of the UNC (Tab C). Our redraft is intended to:

--Separate the issue of successor U. S. and ROK military commanders from that of continued U. S. operational control of ROK forces. The State draft attempts to tie these issues together in a way that violates the intent of the NSDM. The State draft also tries to solve the procedural question of who would designate U. S. and ROK members on the MAC under the new arrangements. This procedural issue does not need to be addressed at this point -- and the State approach (that we appoint both U. S. and ROK representatives) would needlessly offend ROK nationalist sensitivities.

--Set out clearly the elements of our negotiating proposal as a package. The State draft obscures these by trying to weave the question of continued U. S. operational control of ROK forces into the description of the negotiating package.

--Clarify our basic negotiating strategy. The State draft, partly because of intentionally ambiguous language in the NSDM on this point, is not specific on the question of the interrelationship between our approaches to the PRC, the USSR, and Japan. In

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

XGDS 5b(2)

BYAUTH Gen Scowcroft

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/03, State Dept. Guidelines

By *W* NARA, Date *12/16/10**state review 9/17/03*

addition, the State draft tries to solve the question of timing between our approaches to the PRC, the Soviets, and the Japanese. We believe this tactical move should be left for later consideration and should be carefully controlled by the NSC.

2. At Tab B is a draft backchannel message from you to Ambassador Habib which would give him a more complete statement of our thinking on the negotiating package and strategy than we believe can be included in the front channel message.

Recommendation:

That you approve our redraft of the proposed State message at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you approve the draft backchannel to Ambassador Habib at Tab B.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

WALD R. FORD

16

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (Declassified) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 8/25/00, State Dept. Guidelines; *state rev. ew*
By WA NARA, Date 12/6/10 *9/17/09*

IMMEDIATE

TO: SEOUL

FROM: SECSTATE

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: Discussions with ROKG on UN Command

REF: STATE 35341 NOTAL

1. You are authorized to inform Foreign Minister Kim that USG has completed review of possible alternative arrangements to UNC and is prepared to work with ROKG toward this objective. As substitute for UNC, we would propose to offer the other side the following package as a basis for negotiations:

--Substitution of U. S. and ROK military commands for CINCUNC as our side's signatory to the Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North Korean representatives would become the principal members of MAC. Whether substitution of these successor signatories would be done by formal amendment of the Armistice Agreement, or by a unilateral declaration by our side which

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

XGDS 5b(2)



would be agreed to by the other side, is a tactical question that we would leave for the negotiations. The successor U.S. signatory presumably would be COMUSFK. The ROK commander would be for the ROKG to designate.

-- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force presence in South Korea for at least the intermediate term, in return for a Shanghai-type public statement or communique committing ourselves to reduce and ultimately to withdraw U.S. Forces from Korea as the security situation on the Peninsula is stabilized.

By "intermediate term," we mean at least until we are confident that substitute arrangements are formally in place -- which presumably would require a minimum of one to two years after the conclusion of substitute arrangements. During this time we would contemplate no substantial changes in the level or the missions of our forces in South Korea.

-- A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.

-- UN Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of substitute security arrangements.

-- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.



2. The essential element in this package is the continued effective direct U.S. -- and PRC -- involvement in the ongoing implementation of the Armistice Agreement.

3. Corollary Questions.

a. Operational control of ROK forces. Since operational control of the ROK Armed Forces has been given to CINCUNC by the ROKG, we propose that the ROKG agree to transfer operational control of ROK forces from CINCUNC, upon its termination, to a U.S. - ROK combined command under a senior U.S. military officer. We have not considered the details of such a combined command, but if the principle is acceptable to the ROKG, the appropriate U.S. and ROK military staffs could begin drafting proposals for consideration by our two governments.

b. FYI: Questions of U.S. use of Japanese bases for the defense of South Korea under the U.S. - Japan SOFA and of UN third country use of Japanese bases under the UN - Japan SOFA are being handled separately. END FYI.

4. Negotiating Strategy. We would intend to pursue this negotiation along two tracks: (a) Seoul - Pyongyang, this track being primary;



and (b) paralleling this, U.S. approaches to the PRC and USSR. We would also consult closely with Japan as well as with other members of the UNC Liaison Group and allies who have contributed forces to the UNC. We will be prepared to approach the PRC, USSR, Japan, and others after we have concerted with the ROK on the negotiating package and basic strategy. We will at that time address the question of the precise timing of these several approaches.

5. Our minimum immediate objective in these negotiations is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible debate of the Korean issue in the UN General Assembly this coming fall.

6. You are requested to discuss above on a close-hold basis with CINCUNC.

7. DOD concurs.



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (Excluded) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 05/03, 01/03, 02/03, Guidelines; State review
By MM NARA, Date 12/6/10 9/17/03

BACKCHANNEL

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY SEOUL

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

(Exclusively EYES ONLY for Ambassador Habib from General Scowcroft)


SUBJECT: UNC Termination

1. In a front channel message from State, you will be receiving the basic instruction for your approach to the ROKG on our negotiating package and strategy for the termination of the UNC. This backchannel is intended to elaborate on the State message by outlining our view regarding the basic negotiating strategy, our immediate objectives, and tactics in these negotiations.

2. Basic Strategy. We believe our fundamental approach in these negotiations should be that, while eliminating the UNC, we should hold the other elements in the security equilibrium constant, until we can be assured that the substitute arrangements are firmly in place. Thus, we

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

XGDS 5b(2)
BYAUTH Gen Scowcroft



want to keep the US -- and the PRC -- directly involved in the ongoing implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Given the present ineffectiveness of the SNCC and the unlikelihood that the US and PRC could operate in a meaningful manner in that forum, we believe the MAC and our involvement in it must not repeat not be transferred to the SNCC, at least at this time. Similarly, we want to keep both the level and missions of U. S. forces in South Korea constant, at least through the transition to post-UNC termination arrangements.

3. Minimum Immediate Objectives. As stated in the front channel, our minimum immediate objective should be to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position vis-a-vis a possible UNGA debate of the Korean question. We hope Pyongyang will agree to negotiate on the basis of our initial package (perhaps with PRC urging), although we have no illusions on this score. Thus, while pressing the other side to agree to negotiate our initial package, we should use the negotiating process as a means of exploring the range of new arrangements which might be acceptable to Pyongyang. We will consider fallbacks, but only after we find ourselves unable to get the other side to negotiate on the basis of our initial package. In particular, we want to avoid a fallback which would transfer the MAC into the SNCC. We do not



want to begin back-pedaling until we have a clear idea of the other side's position -- if we must back-pedal at all.

4. Negotiating Tactics.

a. For obvious reasons, our front channel indicates that we would approach the PRC and Soviets as equals on this problem. In fact, we intend to work primarily in parallel with the PRC both to backstop and to restrain our respective Korean allies as necessary -- while still aiming to leave the primary negotiating role to the two Koreas. We have complex objectives with the USSR: to keep the Russians generally informed of our new position in hopes of discouraging them from attempting to play a spoiling role; but also to box them out of any direct part in the negotiations.

b. We believe our principle negotiating leverage will lie with two factors: first, our very willingness to go through with the termination of the UNC; and second, the presumed interest on the part of the PRC -- and secondarily




~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

the Soviets -- in limiting instability on the Peninsula, along with their probable distrust of North Korea's militant inclinations. We recognize that current PRC internal developments may have reduced Peking's influence with Pyongyang. We have not, however, concluded that any decline in influence has been so great as to vitiate our proposed approach.

5. As the imminent arrival in New York of a high-level PRC delegation to participate in the special UNGA session may afford the Secretary an opportunity to discuss the UNC package with Chinese leaders on a personal basis, we hope you can give us at least a provisional read-out of ROK thinking on the negotiating package by April 9 at the latest.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



FORM DS 322(OCR)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By WM NARA, Date 12/6/12

review 9/17/03

EA/K:PWKRIEBEL:LM
4/3/74 EXT 22332
D - KENNETH RUSH

EA - RSINGERSOLL
EA/K - BLRANARD
PM/ISP - LHBROWN {DRAFT}
DOD/JCS - BGAPHANKET {DRAFT}

EA - RLSNEIDER
IO/UNP - LTSTULL {DRAFT}
DOD/ISA - RADMTJBIGLEY {DRAFT}
NSC - WRSMYSER

IMMEDIATE SEUL

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR MARR KS

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH ROKG ON UN COMMAND

REF: STATE 35341 NOTAL

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER THAT USG HAS COMPLETED REVIEW OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO UN COMMAND AND IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH ROKG TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE. OUR PROPOSAL CENTERS AROUND GROUP OF RELATED AGREEMENTS WITH THE OTHER SIDE, INCLUDING A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE UN COMMAND, TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF A CONTINUED U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA, A NONAGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS, AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF THESE SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENTS. SPECIFICALLY, YOU MAY DISCUSS OUR PROPOSAL WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. WE WISH TO AVOID ANY CHANGE IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OTHER THAN DENOTING A SUCCESSOR TO THE UN COMMAND.

B. SUBSTITUTE FOR UN COMMAND. WE SUGGEST SUBSTITUTING U.S. AND ROK MILITARY COMMANDERS AS SUCCESSORS IN COMMAND TO THE UN COMMAND AS OUR SIDE'S SIGNATORY TO THE 1953 MILITARY ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IN EFFECT THIS WOULD MEAN

KR

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MILITARY
ADDRESS
ATTN:

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

ESTABLISHING NEW COMBINED U.S.-ROK MILITARY COMMAND. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE COMMANDER OF THIS COMBINED COMMAND WOULD DESIGNATE A ROK OFFICER AS THE SENIOR MEMBER OF THE MAC FOR OUR SIDE, AND THAT THE ROK AND NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD THUS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

*No - then
to be
ROK, in depth
commander, and
back up 1st
Lt and 2nd Lt*

C. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES. SINCE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN GIVEN TO CINCPAC BY THE ROKG, WE PROPOSE ROKG AGREE TO TRANSFER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES TO THE NEW U.S.-ROK COMBINED COMMAND WHICH WOULD BE HEADED BY A SENIOR U.S. MILITARY OFFICER. WE HAVE NOT CONSIDERED THE DETAILS OF SUCH A COMBINED COMMAND BUT, IF PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ROKG, THE APPROPRIATE U.S. AND ROK MILITARY STAFFS COULD BEGIN DRAFTING NECESSARY PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION.

D. ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. FORCES. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO SEEK A TACIT ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE OF A CONTINUED U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS STABILIZED. FYI. WE HAVE IN MIND A SHANGHAI-TYPE COMMUNIQUE COMMITTING US TO REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY WITHDRAW U.S. FORCES AS THE SECURITY POSITION IMPROVES. WE DO NOT INTEND ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OR MISSIONS OF OUR FORCES IN THE ROK DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION TO THE NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. END FYI.

E. OTHER ELEMENTS IN OUR PACKAGE: A NONAGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS; AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF THE SUBSTITUTE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. PRESIDENT PARK'S JANUARY NONAGGRESSION PACT PROPOSAL WOULD BE THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THIS POINT.



2. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. WE BELIEVE THAT TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE NECESSARY. THE FIRST AND PRIMARY WILL BE ROK NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NORTH. THE SECOND WILL BE U.S. PARALLEL APPROACHES TO THE MAJOR POWERS: PRC, USSR AND JAPAN. TIMING WILL BE IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING THE ACTUAL INITIATION OF THE APPROACHES. YOU MAY INFORM THE ROKG THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO APPROACH THE PRC AND USSR JUST AS SOON AS WE AND THE ROKG ARE IN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSULT WITH JAPAN, OTHER NATIONS CONTRIBUTING FORCES TO THE UN COMMAND, AND MEMBERS OF THE UNC LIAISON GROUP. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE INTEND TO CONSULT CLOSELY AND FREQUENTLY WITH JAPAN AND WE LEAN TOWARD CONSULTING WITH JAPAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PROBABLY JUST BEFORE WE TALK TO PRC AND SOVIETS.

*W - small copy
note of DPAC plan
US - PRC -
inform both of
country of Japan
we do not want
to feel PRC and
Soviet on equal
plane in
this case.*

~~TOP SECRET~~

13

3. TIMING. OUR MINIMUM OBJECTIVE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO PLACE OURSELVES BY EARLY SUMMER IN A DEFENSIBLE POSITION IN ANTICIPATION OF A POSSIBLE DEBATE OF THE KOREAN ISSUE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS FALL.

4. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO DISCUSS ABOVE ON CLOSE HOLD BASIS WITH CINCUNC.

5. DOD CONCURS. YY



TRANSMITTED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

12
TAL-
C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

'71

APR 3 PM 6:58

3 APR 74 18: 52

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S/S #

Man

LDX MESSAGE NO. 828, CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/NODIS, NO. PAGES 3

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. Telegram to Seoul re Discussions with ROKG on UN EXXXS
Command

FROM: _____ S/S _____
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number

LDX TO: _____ DELIVER TO: _____ EXTENSION: _____ ROOM NUMBER: _____
NSC MRS. DAVIS

FOR: CLEARANCE XXXXX INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: _____

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: *Am*
Executive Secretariat Officer



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTIONTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 9, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W.R. SMYER *WRB/jm*
RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT: UNC Termination

We believe that in this instance it would be highly useful to supplement our front channel instruction to Ambassador Habib on the negotiating package for UNC termination (Tab B) with a backchannel. The draft backchannel at Tab A gives Ambassador Habib our thinking behind the negotiating package and strategy. We believe this would be particularly useful in light of continuing differences in approach between ourselves and the bureaucracy, including Embassy Seoul. State, Defense, and Habib all would reduce U. S. involvement in the Korean Peninsula at a considerably faster pace than we believe wise -- and in a manner than would carry an excessive risk of destabilizing the political-security situation. This supplementary guidance to Habib should reduce divergences in implementing the policy on UNC termination outlined in our front channel.

We have, however, suggested that Habib use a front channel to make any comments he may wish to on the general thrust of our backchannel.

Recommendation:

That you approve the backchannel cable to Ambassador Habib at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

GDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (a) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/31/00, State Dept. Guidelines

By *lh* NARA, Date *12/6/10*

BACKCHANNEL

TO: American Embassy Seoul
FROM: Brent Scowcroft

(Exclusively EYES ONLY for Ambassador Habib from General Scowcroft)

SUBJECT: UNC Termination

1. In a front channel message from State, you have received the basic instruction for your approach to the ROKG on our negotiating package and strategy for the termination of the UNC. This back-channel is intended to elaborate on the State message by outlining our view regarding the basic negotiating strategy, our immediate objectives, and tactics in these negotiations.

2. Basic Strategy. We believe our fundamental approach in these negotiations should be that, while eliminating the UNC, we should hold the other elements in the security equilibrium constant, until we can be assured that the substitute arrangements are firmly in place. Thus, we want to keep the US -- and the PRC -- directly involved in the ongoing implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Given the present ineffectiveness of the SNCC and the unlikelihood that the US and PRC could operate in a meaningful manner in that forum, we believe the MAC and our involvement in it must not repeat not be

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
EO 13526 (rev. 10/13/2013) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, Security, State Dept. Guidelines
By W NARA, Date 12/16/10



transferred to the SNCC, at least at this time. Similarly, we want to keep both the level and missions of US forces in South Korea constant, at least through the transition to post-UNC termination arrangements.

3. Minimum Immediate Objectives. As stated in the front channel, our minimum immediate objective should be to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position vis-a-vis a possible UNGA debate of the Korean question. We hope Pyongyang will agree to negotiate on the basis of our initial package (perhaps with PRC urging), although we have no illusions on this score. Even if it does not, we think we can use the package to minimize damage in the UNGA.

4. While pressing the other side to agree to negotiate our initial package, we envisage using the negotiating process as a means of exploring the range of new arrangements which might be acceptable to Pyongyang in case ours do not float. But we are not trying to reach agreement quickly at the expense of substance. We will consider fallbacks, but only after we find ourselves unable to get the other side to negotiate on the basis of our initial package. In particular, we want to avoid a fallback which would transfer the MAC into the SNCC. We do not want to begin back-pedaling until we have a clear idea of the other side's position -- if we must back-pedal at all.

5. Negotiating Tactics.

a. For obvious reasons, our front channel indicates that we would approach the PRC and Soviets as equals on this problem. In fact, we intend to work primarily in parallel with the PRC both to backstop and to restrain our respective Korean allies as necessary -- while still aiming to leave the primary negotiating role to the two Koreas. We have complex objectives with the USSR: to keep the Russians generally informed of our new position in hopes of discouraging them from attempting to play a spoiling role; but also to box them out of any direct part in the negotiations.

b. We believe our principle negotiating leverage will lie with two factors: first, our very willingness to go through with the termination of the UNC; and second, the presumed interest on the part of the PRC -- and secondarily the Soviets -- in limiting instability on the Peninsula, along with their probable distrust of North Korea's militant inclinations. We recognize that current PRC internal developments may have reduced Peking's influence with Pyongyang. We have not, however, concluded that any decline in influence has been so great as to vitiate our proposed approach.

6. The arrival in New York of a high-level PRC delegation to participate in the special UNGA session may afford the Secretary an



opportunity to discuss the UNC package with Chinese leaders on a personal basis. Please give us as soon as you can at least a provisional read-out of ROK thinking on the negotiating package and any comments you want us to bear in mind.

7. We have no objection to your making any comments on the general thrust of the above by front channel reply, without of course citing this message.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

O P 071955Z APR 74 ZFFG
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUEHCK/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1217
 INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUADOPA/CINCUNC
 BT

CONTROL: 1 9 9 8Q

~~TOP SECRET~~ STATE 070275

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By Wn NARA, Date 12/6/10 *State review 9/17/03*

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
 TAGS: PFOR, MARR, XS
 SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH ROKG ON UN COMMAND

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 35341 NOTAL

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER KIM THAT
 USG HAS COMPLETED REVIEW OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE-
 MENTS TO UNC AND IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH ROKG TOWARD
 DEFINING A SUCCESSOR BODY. AS SUBSTITUTE FOR UNC, WE
 WOULD PROPOSE TO OFFER THE OTHER SIDE THE FOLLOWING PACKAGE
 AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS:

--SUBSTITUTION OF U.S. AND ROK MILITARY COMMANDERS FOR
 CINCUNC AS OUR SIDE'S SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
 THE ROK AND NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BECOME THE
 PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF MAC. WHETHER SUBSTITUTION OF THESE
 SUCCESSOR SIGNATORIES WOULD BE DONE BY FORMAL AMENDMENT OF
 THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, OR BY A UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY
 OUR SIDE WHICH WOULD BE AGREED TO BY THE OTHER SIDE, IS A
 TACTICAL QUESTION THAT WE WOULD LEAVE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.
 THE SUCCESSOR U.S. SIGNATORY PRESUMABLY WOULD BE COMUSFK.
 THE ROK COMMANDER WOULD BE FOR THE ROKG TO DESIGNATE.

--ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. FORCES. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO
 SEEK A TACIT ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE OF A CONTINUED
 U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION
 IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS SOLIDLY STABILIZED. FYI. WE
 HAVE IN MIND A SHANGHAI-TYPE COMMUNIQUE COMMITTING US TO
 RUCE AND ULTIMATELY WITHDRAW U.S. FORCES AS THE SECURITY
 POSITION IMPROVES. WE DO NOT INTEND ANY SUBSTANTIAL
 CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OR MISSIONS OF OUR FORCES IN THE ROK,

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- STATE 070275 7 APR '74

AT LEAST THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION TO THE NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. END FYI.

--A NON-AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS.

--UN SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF THE AGREED-UPON PACKAGE OF SUBSTITUTE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

--AVOIDANCE OF OTHER CHANGES IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

2. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THIS PACKAGE IS THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVE DIRECT U.S. --AND PRC--INVOLVEMENT IN THE ONGOING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

3. COROLLARY QUESTIONS.

A. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES. SINCE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN GIVEN TO CINCUNC BY THE ROKG, WE PROPOSE THAT THE ROKG AGREE TO TRANSFER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES FROM CINCUNC, UPON TERMINATION OF UNC, TO A U.S. - ROK COMBINED COMMAND UNDER A SENIOR U.S. MILITARY OFFICER. WE HAVE NOT CONSIDERED THE DETAILS OF SUCH A COMBINED COMMAND, BUT IF THE PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ROKG, THE APPROPRIATE U.S. AND ROK MILITARY STAFFS COULD BEGIN DRAFTING PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

B. FYI: QUESTIONS OF U.S. USE OF JAPANESE BASES FOR THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE U.S. - JAPAN SOFA AND OF UN THIRD COUNTRY USE OF JAPANESE BASES UNDER THE UN - JAPAN SOFA ARE BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY. END FYI.

4. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. WE WOULD INTEND TO PURSUE THIS NEGOTIATION ALONG TWO TRACKS: (A) SEUL - PYONGYANG THIS TRACK BEING PRIMARY; AND (B) PARALLELING THIS, U.S. APPROACHES TO THE PRC AND USSR. WE WOULD ALSO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH JAPAN AS WELL AS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNC LIAISON GROUP AND ALLIES WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UNC. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO APPROACH THE PRC, USSR, JAPAN, AND OTHERS AFTER WE HAVE CONCERTED WITH THE ROK ON THE NEGOTIATING PACKAGE AND BASIC STRATEGY. WE WILL AT THAT TIME ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE TIMING OF THESE SEVERAL APPROACHES.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- STATE 070275 7 APR 74

5. OUR MINIMUM IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO PLACE OURSELVES BY EARLY SUMMER IN A DEFENSIBLE POSITION FOR POSSIBLE DEBATE OF THE KOREAN ISSUE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS COMING FALL.

6. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO DISCUSS ABOVE ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS WITH CINCUNC.

7. DOD CONCURS. RUSH

TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE:US

4/7/74 2151Z
S/S-0: R. ELTZ

EA:RSINGERSOLL
EA/K:DLRABARD
PM/ISP:LHBROWN (DRAFT)
DOD/JCS: BG APHANKET (DRAFT)

EA:RLSNEIDER
IO/UNP:LTSTULL (DRAFT)
DOD/ISA:RADN TJBIGLEY (DRAFT)
NSC:URSMYSER

ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES:

- 9. L - GHALDRICH (DRAFT)
- 10. S/S - RCO:RELTZ



~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

807

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 11, 1974

3a
J
②

MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. JULIE NIXON EISENHOWER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Invitation to You from the President of
People-to-People/Korea

We recommend you accept the invitation from Dr. Sanguine You, President of People-to-People/Korea, to attend the first worldwide conference of People-to-People International to be held in Seoul on October 13 and 14, 1974.

The State Department and Ambassador Habib, in response to our request, have reported that the organization involved has wide support throughout the Korean and American communities and that its plans for the conference are well-conceived. They include participation by affiliates from many other countries as well. The Ambassador believes your presence would be deeply appreciated by your Korean hosts.

As you know, there has been some turmoil in South Korea growing out of the political confrontation between President Park and many Korean students. This turmoil may deepen over the summer. We will keep you advised if the situation deteriorates to the point where it might be inadvisable for you to attend. In the meantime, however, there is no reason you should not accept the invitation.

Attached at Tab I is a draft response which you may wish to use to reply to Dr. You.

Please let me know if we can be of help in any way with regard to arrangements or briefings for your trip.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By *llh* NARA, Date *12/6/10*



Dear Dr. You:

I wish to thank you for your very kind invitation to attend the first worldwide conference of People-to-People International to be held in Seoul on October 13 and 14, 1974. The celebration of the People-to-People program--a program in which President Eisenhower believed so strongly and supported so vigorously--is appropriate and timely. It will be a pleasure to attend and to have the opportunity to visit your country.

I look forward to hearing further from you as more detailed plans for the conference develop. I also look forward to meeting you and joining you for the conference.

Sincerely,


Sanguine You, Ph. D. L LD.
President
People-to-People/Korea
Room 323, Grand Building
17-12 4-KA Namdaemun-Ho Chung-Ku
Seoul 100, Korea

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 5, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W. R. SMYSER 

SUBJECT: Invitation to Mrs. Julie Nixon Eisenhower to Visit Korea

Mrs. Julie Nixon Eisenhower has received an invitation (Tab D) to attend the first worldwide conference of People-to-People International to be held in Seoul on October 13 and 14, 1974. She indicated that she would like the visit to be "seriously considered" and asked Susan Porter to check with us.

The State Department asked Ambassador Habib for his views, which were positive (Tab C). Habib thought attendance by Mrs. Eisenhower would be "thoroughly appropriate" and that her presence would be deeply appreciated by her Korean hosts. The State Department has now advised us (Tab B) that it recommends Mrs. Eisenhower's accepting the invitation.

We concur with the Department and with Ambassador Habib, subject of course to the possibility of major disturbances in Korea arising out of President Park's confrontation with the students. We may need to reassess our thinking if the situation in South Korea turns very sour, but in the meantime there is no reason not to go ahead.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum to Mrs. Eisenhower.

Approve Disapprove ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, (a) (1) SEC 3.3
 NSC Memo, 3/21/74, CIA to Dept. Guidelines
 By MA NARA, Date 12/6/10



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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March 26, 1974


MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Invitation to Mrs. Julie Nixon
Eisenhower

Dr. Sanguine You, President of People-to-People/Korea, wrote to Mrs. Julie Nixon Eisenhower on January 25 inviting her to attend the first Worldwide Conference of People-to-People International to be held in Seoul, October 13-14, 1974. We advised you March 13 that we were requesting Embassy Seoul's views on the advisability of acceptance. The response indicates that the organization involved has wide support throughout the Korean and American communities. Its plans for the conference are well-conceived and the host organization anticipates participation by affiliates from several other countries. The Embassy believes Mrs. Eisenhower's attendance would be deeply appreciated.

Accordingly, the Department recommends that Mrs. Eisenhower accept the invitation.

Paul H. Wachsberg
for George S. Springsteen, Jr.
Executive Secretary





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 01699 150405Z

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ACTION EA-14

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EO 11652 NA

TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, SCUL, KS, US

SUBJ: ATTENDANCE OF MRS. JULIE NIXON EISENHOWER AT
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONFERENCE

REF: STATE 050078

EMBASSY VIEWS ATTENDANCE MRS JULIE NIXON EISENHOWER AS THOROUGHLY APPROPRIATE. HER PRESENCE WOULD BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED BY KOREAN HOSTS. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE/KOREA IS BONA FIDE ORGANIZATION ENJOYING WIDE SUPPORT THROUGHOUT KOREAN AND AMERICAN COMMUNITY BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY. OCTOBER MEETING WILL INCLUDE PARTICIPATION BY AFFILIATES FROM MANY COUNTRIES, AND PLANS FOR THE OCCASSION ARE WELL-ADVANCED AND WELL-CONCEIVED.
HABIB

- COOPER _____
- ELLIOTT _____
- FROEDL _____
- HORAN _____
- HYLAND _____
- JORDEN _____
- KENNEDY _____
- LEHMAN _____
- LODAL _____
- RATLIFF _____
- SAUNDERS _____
- SMYER _____
- SOLOMON _____
- STEARMAN _____

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韓国国際人民友誼會 韓國本部
 KOREA NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
 PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INTERNATIONAL

ROOM 323, GRAND BUILDING
 87-12 4 RA, NAMDAE MUN-HO CHUNG KU
 SEOUL 110 KOREA
 TEL 21-1002 21-4170 9 EXT 74
 KPO BOX 301 KANGI PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE SEOL

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Mrs. Julio Nixon Eisenhower
 The White House
 Washington, D. C.
 U. S. A.

January 25, 1974

Dear Mrs. Eisenhower:

We most cordially extend our official invitation to you to attend the
First World Wide Conference of People-to-People International to be held in
 Seoul on October 13-14, 1974.

Your participation in this historical event is respectfully requested in
 order to further the cause of International Understanding. We hope that you
 will bring many outstanding delegates of your country with you to this significant
 event. Further details of the Conference will be sent to you in the near future.


We have planned a most active and colorful program for you in this,
 our land of the Orient, and look forward to welcoming you to Seoul. We hope
 that you will have a wonderful memory-making stay here in Korea.

Very sincerely yours,

Sanguine You, Ph.D.LL. D.
 President
 People-to-People/Korea

SGY/sjk

FROM
 THE WHITE HOUSE
 WASHINGTON, D.C.



*Send to NSC
 for opinion
 to be seriously
 considered*



7404370

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 26, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Jedime Davis*
FROM: *Susan Porter*

Julie Eisenhower has asked for an opinion on the attached letter inviting her to attend the First World Wide Conference of People-to-People International to be held in Seoul on October 13-14, 1974. You will note she feels it should be seriously considered.

I look forward to receiving your assessment.

Thank you.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

*Tab A
(Korea in the
UN)*

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 26, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: W. R. SMYSER
SUBJECT: Termination of UN Command in Korea


At Tab A is a draft State cable instruction to Embassy Seoul, responding to the Government of the Republic of Korea's (ROKG) comments (Tab B) on our proposed negotiating package and strategy for the termination of the UN Command (UNC). The ROKG agrees with the basic elements of our proposed negotiating package and strategy, except that they hope that we, rather than they, would carry the main burden of the negotiations.

The draft State cable notes the agreement between ourselves and the ROKG on these basics, and states that we are both therefore in a position to proceed with our approaches to the other side -- but asks Ambassador Habib for his confirmation of this. The draft State cable also notes for Ambassador Habib's information some divergence on the questions of coordinating with Japan and other countries and of the comparative burden that we as opposed to the ROK will carry in negotiations.

I believe that the draft State cable is adequate as far as it goes, and that we do not have to delay our initial approaches to the other side in order to try to compose the differences between ourselves and the ROKG at this point. Nevertheless, I believe it would be useful to convey to Ambassador Habib at this point, for his information, our position on several particular aspects of the negotiation. If Ambassador Habib in his on-going discussions with the ROKG perceives a substantial divergence on any of these points, he can on the basis of this guidance discuss these matters with them.

--We should underscore with the ROKG our belief, as expressed in the original instruction (Tab C), that the Seoul-Pyongyang track will be primary in this negotiation.

--The ROKG has taken the position that all elements of our negotiating package are "inter-related." If necessary, we should make clear that this does not imply that all elements are inseparable. As pointed out



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; State review
By WJ NARA, Date 12/6/10 9/17/03

in our basic instruction, the essential element in this package is the continued effective direct U. S. -- and PRC -- involvement in the on-going implementation of the Armistice Agreement.

--The ROKG has expressed the view that it would be "desirable" to obtain the other side's understanding that, once the UNC is terminated, they will not raise at the UN General Assembly the question of the continued presence of the U. S. forces in Korea. If necessary, we should point out to Seoul that while this might be desirable, it is not essential that the other side desist from raising the question. What is essential is that the other side not press seriously for the removal of U. S. forces from Korea.

--As regards the means by which the successor's signatories would formally subscribe to the Armistice Agreement, the ROKG prefers that each side sign the Agreement separately, for immediate tactical reasons which are somewhat obscure. I believe, as we stated in the original instruction to Ambassador Habib, that we should keep this tactical question open until we get a better feel during the course of negotiations for what means will be tactically feasible with as well as adequately binding on the other side.

Paragraph 3 of the draft State cable asking Ambassador Habib to confirm that the ROK is substantially in agreement with our approach is useful -- not so much because we believe there are significant differences in this respect but rather to make sure no approach is made to the PRC before you return.

I have included proposed changes in the draft State cable to reflect the above recommendations.

Messrs. Solomon, Froebe, and myself are proceeding to draft a detailed scenario for an initial approach to the other side and the others concerned. This should be ready for your consideration on your return from your upcoming trip.

Recommendation:

~~That you approve the draft State cable at Tab A as revised.~~

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

ROUTINE SEOUL

[Material in square brackets is my addition to State cable.]

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS ON UN COMMAND

REFERENCE: (A) SEOUL 2457 (L) STATE 70275

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. We have the following comments with respect to ROK memorandum on alternative arrangements to the UNC (ref A).

A. We appear to be in general agreement with the ROKG regarding the package and the scenario to be followed, except mainly as concerns operational control.

B. Agree that problem of operational control is a bilateral issue and will be interested in receiving ROK Study.

C. In the meanwhile, however, we are prepared to initiate discussions with the PRC and USSR along the lines of our package proposal.

2. FYI. Following items are those which appear to be in question or at some variance with our position, but are not substantial enough to delay progress of negotiation.



A. Coordination with Japan and other countries. We agree that such coordination will depend on response of other side, but believe consultation with Japan in particular should be at the earliest practical date. We can determine subsequently how and when to approach allies and who should take the initiative.

B. Parallel discussions with the north. We are in complete agreement with your views as expressed to Kim Dong Jo that we should keep open option of using direct Seoul-Pyongyang channel at any stage. We note ROK willingness to be flexible on this point and hope you will be able to impress on them need to be prepared to move in parallel with U. S. [We should make clear that, although we recognize the problem they are up against with Pyongyang and because of which we will do our best to backstop them in our own approaches to the PRC and USSR, we cannot assume the main burden of negotiations.

C. Package Approach. We note (para 1, ref A) that ROKG has emphasized the "inter-related" character of the negotiating package. We agree with this as long as "inter-related" is not construed to mean "inseparable." As pointed out in paragraph 2, reference b, the essential element in this package is direct U. S. -- and PRC -- involvement in the on-going implementation of the Armistice Agreement.

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D. U.S. Force Presence. The ROKG has expressed the view that it would be "desirable" to obtain the other side's understanding that, once the UNC is terminated, they will not raise at the UN General Assembly the question of the continued presence of the U. S. forces in Korea. If necessary, we should point out to Seoul that while this might be desirable, it is not essential that the other side desist from raising this question in at least a pro forma way. What is essential is that the other side not press seriously for the removal of U. S. forces from Korea.

E. Means By Which Successor's Signatories Subscribe to Armistice Agreement. ROKG has expressed preference (para 4, ref A) that both sides should subscribe to successor Armistice Agreement by signing separately. We understand ROKG concerns, but believe that other factors must also be taken into account -- legal and political insufficiency and political feasibility. We believe, as stated in paragraph 1, reference b, that this question should be left open for present time.] END FYI.

3. Before initiating approaches to PRC/USSR would appreciate confirmation we are in substantial agreement.





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 (a) SEC 3.3

State Dept. Review; State review 9/17/03

By *MA* NARA Date 12/6/12

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, KS
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN ON UN COMMAND

REF: A) STATE 070275; B) SEOUL 2246

SUMMARY: ROKG HAS REPLIED TO OUR PROPOSALS ON UN COMMAND BY GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THEM, WHILE EXPLICITLY LEAVING OPEN QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES WHICH THEY RETAIN UNDER REVIEW FOR LATER DISCUSSION. THEY ARE HOPEFUL WE CAN BEGIN EXPLORATION WITH PRC AND USSR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY

1. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KIM DONG JO APRIL 17 TO RECEIVE ROKG REPLY TO PROPOSALS I HAD SUBMITTED TO HIM REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. HE OPENED DISCUSSION BY REMARKING THAT BEFORE GIVING ME HIS GOVERNMENT'S DETAILED VIEWS HE WISHED TO NOTE TWO THINGS: (A) HIS GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE PROPOSALS AS A QUOTE PACKAGE UNQUOTE IN THE SENSE THAT THEY ARE ALL INTER-RELATED; (B) HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THAT QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS WERE MULTILATERAL. THE QUESTION OF THE EXERCISE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL WAS A BILATERAL QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED BETWEEN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES AND NOT A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE CHINESE, SOVIETS OR NORTH KOREANS.

2. HE THEN HANDED ME A MEMORANDUM THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS (REFERENCES IN TEXT ARE TO TALKING PAPER I HAD GIVEN KIM):

QUOTE

1. THE ROKG HAS STUDIED CAJEFULLY THE U.S. PROPOSED PACKAGE WHICH WE WILL OFFER THE OTHER SIDE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. IT REGARDS THE PACKAGE AS CONFORMING IN GENERAL TO ROK'S POSITION ON THIS MATTER. HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS ARE SUGGESTED:

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

-2- SEOUL 2457

A. (RE PARA. A) WITH REGARD TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF OUR SIDE'S SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS SUGGESTED IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL, OUR SIDE WILL FORMALLY NOTIFY THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENTS. IN THIS CASE, THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAKE A FORMAL RESPONSE WITH THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE ARRANGEMENTS.

B. (RE PARA. B) IN ADDITION TO SECURING AN ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE OF A CONTINUED U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS SOLIDLY STABILIZED, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE ALSO TO ACQUIRE AN UNDERSTANDING FROM THE OTHER SIDE THAT THE QUESTION REGARDING U.S. FORCES IN KOREA SHALL NOT BE RAISED AT THE UN ONCE THE UNC IS DISSOLVED.

C. (RE PARA. E) IT IS ROKG'S INTENTION TO KEEP THE PRESENT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT INTACT. THEREFORE, THE ROKG DOES NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

2. WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY, THE FOLLOWINGS (SIC) ARE SUGGESTED:

(1) AT THE INITIAL STAGE, THE MAIN CHANNEL OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE BETWEEN U.S.-PRC AND U.S.-USSR;

(2) THE PROBLEM OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS MATTER BETWEEN SEOUL AND PYONGYANG WILL BE CONSIDERED ONLY AFTER SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IS MADE IN U.S.-PRC AND U.S.-USSR NEGOTIATIONS;

(3) THE TIME OF CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE UNC LIAISON GROUP AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UNC WILL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROGRESS IN U.S.-PRC AND U.S.-USSR NEGOTIATIONS AND IN CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE ROK AND U.S.

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO UNDERTAKE CONSULTATION WITH SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND, BOTH THE CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION, SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN DUE COURSE.

IN UNDERTAKING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, THE ROK WOULD PLAY A PRINCIPAL ROLE WHILE THE U.S. WOULD ASSIST IN THE EFFORT.

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Department of State

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-3- SEOUL 2457

3. WITH REFERENCE TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO TRANSFER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES FROM CINCUNC TO A U.S.-ROK COMBINED COMMAND, THE ROKG NEEDS MORE TIME TO MAKE FURTHER STUDY OF THE PROBLEM. THE ROKG'S POSITION ON THIS MATTER WILL BE NOTIFIED TO THE U.S. AS SOON AS THE STUDY IS COMPLETED.

4. IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE ROK AND U.S. WILL CONSIDER IN DUE COURSE OF TIME VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC MEASURES NEEDED IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNC.

5. IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE IMPASSE IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS DUE TO NK'S NEGATIVE ATTITUDE, APPROPRIATE UN STRATEGIES SHOULD BE FORMULATED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE ROK AND U.S.

ONE POSSIBLE MOVE WOULD BE FOR THE U.S. TO TAKE UP THE QUESTIONS OF THE UNC AND THE ROK'S ADMISSION TO UN MEMBERSHIP (TOGETHER WITH NK IF IT SO WISHES) AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THUS COUNTERING ANTICIPATED NK MOVES AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IT IS REMINDED THAT THE ADOPTION OF ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS PREREQUISITE TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNC.

6. IT IS ADVISABLE FOR THE ROK AND U.S. TO MAKE A CAREFUL STUDY OF PROBLEMS ENSUING FROM THE TERMINATION OF THE UN SOFA WITH JAPAN AND THE EXPIRATION OF ACHESON-YOSHIDA NOTES OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1951.

UNQUOTE.

3. I SAID I WOULD FORWARD HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS TO WASHINGTON BUT WOULD MAKE A FEW BRIEF COMMENTS AND ASK SOME QUESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION AT THIS STAGE. FIRST OF ALL I COULD ASSURE HIS IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WE ALSO LOOKED UPON THE PROPOSALS AS A PACKAGE DEAL. SECONDLY, THE QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL WAS A MATTER FOR BILATERAL DECISION SINCE IT ONLY AFFECTED UNITED STATES AND KOREAN INTERESTS.

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~~TOP SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4- SEOUL 2457

4. WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 1A OF HIS MEMORANDUM I ASKED IF THIS MEANT THE SOUTH DID NOT INTEND TO SIGN A SUCCESSOR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BUT MERELY TO INFORM THE OTHER SIDE OF ITS ACCEPTANCE. HE SAID THE SOUTH WAS WILLING TO SIGN THE SUCCESSOR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BUT DID NOT WISH TO DO SO AT A MEETING WITH THE NORTH. IT PREFERRED MERELY THAT EACH SIDE SEPARATELY SIGN AND ACCEDE TO THE SUCCESSOR AGREEMENT AND THEN FORMALLY NOTIFY THE OTHER SIDE OF THAT ACT. HE SAID THIS WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE SOUTH DID NOT WISH TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH PYONGYANG WHICH WOULD ALLOW NORTH KOREA TO RAISE QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ITSELF.

5. I ASKED HIM IF HE COULD DEFINE WHAT WAS MEANT BY THE STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH 2 (2) WHICH REFERRED TO QUOTE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS UNQUOTE IN U.S. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MAJOR COMMUNIST POWERS BEFORE CONSIDERING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SEOUL AND PYONGYANG. HE SAID THEY HAD IN MIND THAT THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST SOME INDICATION THAT OUR PROPOSALS WERE LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED BEFORE THEY WOULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES DIRECTLY WITH PYONGYANG. I REPLIED THIS SEEMED TO ME TO BE TOO RIGID AND THAT WHILE I COULD UNDERSTAND WHY THEY WISH TO HAVE US BEGIN THE PROCESS WITH MAJOR POWERS, WE SHOULD LEAVE OURSELVES THE OPTION OF USING THE DIRECT SEOUL-PYONGYANG CHANNEL AT ANY STAGE. HE SAID THEY WOULD BE FLEXIBLE ON THIS POINT.

6. I ASKED HIM WHEN THE ROKG STUDY OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON OPERATIONAL CONTROL, MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF HIS MEMORANDUM, WOULD BE READY. HE SAID THE MATTER WAS CURRENTLY BEING REVIEWED IN HIS GOVERNMENT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SUCH THINGS AS THE NATO ARRANGEMENTS, AND THOSE WHICH EXISTED IN VIET-NAM. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN DETAIL AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, HE WISHED TO POINT OUT TO ME THAT WITHOUT THE COVER OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IT WAS POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY DIFFICULT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT DESIGNATED U.S. COMMAND OF ROK FORCES. THEY WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO ACCUSATIONS, BY NORTH KOREA AND OTHERS, THAT THEY DID NOT EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY OR OVER THEIR OWN PEOPLE. THIS COULD BE USED AGAINST THE SOUTH IN MANY WAYS. HE CONSIDERED THE PROBLEM TO BE HIGHLY POLITICAL AND IT WOULD REQUIRE SOME MORE TIME BEFORE THEY COULD GIVE US AN ANSER. I NOTED THAT WE HAD PROPOSED A COMBINED COMMAND WHICH WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE THE SAME

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-5- SEOUL 2457

CONNOTATION OF WHICH HE SPOKE. I POINTED OUT THAT MOREOVER THERE WERE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THIS QUESTION WHICH I WAS SURE HE RECOGNIZED. HE REPLIED THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM BUT THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THE MATTER IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS. THE QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL POLICY WERE INVOLVED.

7. I ASKED HIM WHAT WAS MEANT IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF HIS MEMORANDUM WHICH SPEAKS OF CONSIDERATION OF DIPLOMATIC MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. HE SAID THIS REFERRED MERELY TO THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WOULD BE DONE AFTER AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, I.E., HOW IT WOULD BE HANDLED IN TERMS OF NOTIFICATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES.

8. REFERRING TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF HIS MEMORANDUM, I POINTED OUT THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT MEASURES HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PROPOSING, IT MIGHT STILL BE POSSIBLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HIS PROPOSAL IMPLIED THAT BY MOVING IT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WE COULD AVOID DEALING WITH THE RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I WAS NOT SURE THIS WAS POSSIBLE.

9. REFERRING TO PARAGRAPH 6, I SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE ANY FORMAL ARRANGEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE RIGHTS IN JAPAN WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. HE AGREED AND SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE SOME KIND OF TACIT UNDERSTANDING TO REPLACE THE EXISTING AGREEMENT.

10. IN CLOSING, HE REFERRED AGAIN TO THE QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL, SAYING THAT THIS WAS A MATTER TO BE DECIDED BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AND WHILE IN ABEYANCE IT NEED NOT HOLD UP OUR GOING AHEAD AND CONSIDERING THE PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS TO BE EXPLORED WITH THE OTHER SIDE. HE WAS HOPEFUL WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT AND MOVE QUICKLY SO AS TO BE PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY.

11. COMMENT: I BELIEVE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESPONSE IS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. I RECOMMEND THAT FOR THE PRESENT WE PROCEED TO ADDRESS HIS COMMENTS AND THEN MOVE ALONG LINES GENERALLY AGREED IN APPROACHES TO PRC AND USSR. I WOULD PROPOSE THAT WE NOT PRESS ROKG ON ISSUE ON OPERATIONAL CONTROL UNTIL WE RECEIVE THE STUDY PROMISED IN THE ROK MEMORANDUM. HABIB

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Department of State

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines
By *[initials]* NARA, Date - 12/6/10

review 9/17/10

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E.O. 11652: XCUS
TAGS: PFOR, MAHR, KS
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH ROKG ON UN COMMAND



EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 35341 NOTAL

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER KIM THAT USG HAS COMPLETED REVIEW OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO UNC AND IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH ROKG TOWARD DEFINING A SUCCESSOR BODY. AS SUBSTITUTE FOR UNC, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO OFFER THE OTHER SIDE THE FOLLOWING PACKAGE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS:

--SUBSTITUTION OF U.S. AND ROK MILITARY COMMANDERS FOR CINCUNC AS OUR SIDE'S SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THE ROK AND NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BECOME THE PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF MAC. WHETHER SUBSTITUTION OF THESE SUCCESSOR SIGNATORIES WOULD BE DONE BY FORMAL AMENDMENT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, OR BY A UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY OUR SIDE WHICH WOULD BE AGREED TO BY THE OTHER SIDE, IS A TACTICAL QUESTION THAT WE WOULD LEAVE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SUCCESSOR U.S. SIGNATORY PRESUMABLY WOULD BE COMUSFK. THE ROK COMMANDER WOULD BE FOR THE ROKG TO DESIGNATE.

--ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. FORCES. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO SEEK A TACIT ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE OF A CONTINUED U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS SOLIDLY STABILIZED. FYI. WE HAVE IN MIND A SHANGHAI-TYPE COMMUNIQUE COMMITTING US TO RUCE AND ULTIMATELY WITHDRAW U.S. FORCES AS THE SECURITY POSITION IMPROVES. WE DO NOT INTEND ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OR MISSIONS OF OUR FORCES IN THE ROK,

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AT LEAST THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION TO THE NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. END FYI.

--A NON-AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS.

--UN SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF THE AGREED-UPON PACKAGE OF SUBSTITUTE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

--AVOIDANCE OF OTHER CHANGES IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

2. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THIS PACKAGE IS THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVE DIRECT U.S. --AND PRC--INVOLVEMENT IN THE ONGOING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

3. COROLLARY QUESTIONS.

A. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES. SINCE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN GIVEN TO CINCUNC BY THE ROKG, WE PROPOSE THAT THE ROKG AGREE TO TRANSFER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES FROM CINCUNC, UPON TERMINATION OF UNC, TO A U.S. - ROK COMBINED COMMAND UNDER A SENIOR U.S. MILITARY OFFICER. WE HAVE NOT CONSIDERED THE DETAILS OF SUCH A COMBINED COMMAND, BUT IF THE PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ROKG, THE APPROPRIATE U.S. AND ROK MILITARY STAFFS COULD BEGIN DRAFTING PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

B. FYI: QUESTIONS OF U.S. USE OF JAPANESE BASES FOR THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE U.S. - JAPAN SOFA AND OF UN THIRD COUNTRY USE OF JAPANESE BASES UNDER THE UN - JAPAN SOFA ARE BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY. END FYI.

4. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. WE WOULD INTEND TO PURSUE THIS NEGOTIATION ALONG TWO TRACKS: (A) SEUL - PYONGYANG THIS TRACK BEING PRIMARY; AND (B) PARALLELING THIS, U.S. APPROACHES TO THE PRC AND USSR. WE WOULD ALSO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH JAPAN AS WELL AS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNC LIAISON GROUP AND ALLIES WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UNC. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO APPROACH THE PRC, USSR, JAPAN, AND OTHERS AFTER WE HAVE CONCERTED WITH THE ROK ON THE NEGOTIATING PACKAGE AND BASIC STRATEGY. WE WILL AT THAT TIME ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE TIMING OF THESE SEVERAL APPROACHES.

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5. OUR MINIMUM IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO PLACE OURSELVES BY EARLY SUMMER IN A DEFENSIBLE POSITION FOR POSSIBLE DEBATE OF THE KOREAN ISSUE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS COMING FALL.

6. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO DISCUSS ABOVE ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS WITH CINCUNC.

7. DOD CONCURS. RUSH

TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE:US
4/7/74 2151Z
S/S-0: R. ELTZ

EA:RSINGERSOLL
EA/K:DLRANARD
PM/ISP:LHBROWN (DRAFT)
DOD/JCS: BG ARHANKET (DRAFT)

EA:RLSNEIDER
IO/UNP:LTSTULL (DRAFT)
DOD/ISA:RADN TJBIGLEY (DRAF
NSC:URSMYSER

ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES:

- 9. L - GHALDRICH (DRAFT)
- 10. S/S - RCO:RELTZ



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FROEBE

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

April 29, 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: W.R. Smyser
John A. Froebe, Jr. *JAF*

Thanks B (P)

SUBJECT: Why We Belabor the Obvious on Korea

You may wonder why we have added several paragraphs straight out of the NSDM to State's cable for Habib. We have not bothered to explain this earlier because we felt the explanation would be too lengthy, but we want you to have it in case you have any doubt about what we are doing.

There are three subjects on which we and the ROK have different views. State also has its own views, but for the moment these are not a crucial element, though they lead to somewhat different tactical approaches:

-- The negotiating package. The ROK is not eager to conclude an agreement with the North; that is why it insists that all points in the package should be "inseparable." We are not sure that an agreement can be reached, but we would be prepared to go for one if the North accepted our major points but refused to agree to something minor like, for example, a non-aggression pact. We do not want to finesse this issue now because it might become important later, if the North takes up our offer. This is far from certain, as you know, but we are not prepared to exclude it.

-- The channel. The ROK wants our contact with Moscow and China to be the main channel for two reasons. First, Seoul would be spared the considerable burden of negotiating. Second, the ROK thinks we can again save the UN situation by working with Peking. We believe the negotiating process between the two Koreas can have a healthy effect all around and thus we want to encourage it. We also think we can have a much better position

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/74, State Dept. Guidelines
By *h* NARA, Date *12/6/10*



at the UN next year if there have been actual South-North contacts rather than just U.S. -Peking-Moscow contacts, since the latter must perforce be kept discreet.

-- The signature question. This is a murky issue involving complex matters of prestige and mutual political recognition. We are not sure we fully understand South Korea's reservations to signing an agreement with the North, but this is one issue where we think we can let the situation evolve. It is less likely to determine the outcome than the first two problems, though at some point we may have to review the bidding.

State does not quarrel with our wish to reiterate all this in a message. It has its own backchannel going to Habib. Sneider has told me they have a pretty good understanding of where they want to go. Our problem is to make sure that the front channel does not begin wobbling.