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WH-PR

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NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

September 1, 1976

Distribution: S-RA, S, S/S, WH-PR

SUBJECT: Ambassador Gates' Meeting with the Secretary,  
August 25, 1976

Ambassador Gates met with the Secretary for about 45 minutes. Also participating were Mr. Hummel, Mr. Lord and myself.

Meeting with Foreign Minister Chiao

After opening exchanges about Ambassador Gates' service in Peking and the effects of the earthquake, the Secretary asked Ambassador Gates if he planned to stay in the US until the meeting with Foreign Minister Chiao. In discussion of the probable date of the meeting, Ambassador Gates noted that Federal Reserve Chairman Burns was scheduled to arrive in Peking after the Manila meeting, which concludes October 7 or 8, and that a New York meeting after October 1 might put him (Ambassador Gates) in a time squeeze. The Secretary confirmed that Ambassador Gates "might as well sit in" on the Chiao meeting.


Chiao's Role; Hua's Potential

The Secretary asked Ambassador Gates to assess Foreign Minister Chiao's role in the PRC. Ambassador Gates said it is hard to fathom, that Chiao had recently been strangely quiet and not very visible. Ambassador Gates added that Chiao seems to be rather "unaligned", at least publicly, and remains a bit of a mystery. After the earthquake, Ambassador Gates said, Premier Hua Kuo-feng was much more visible than others.

The Secretary asked if Hua were smart enough to take charge of the country. Ambassador Gates said he didn't have such an impression, indicating that he thought that Chang Chun-chiao is a more likely candidate. The Secretary asked if this was the man who "beat up Scott," and this led to discussion of Senator Scott's visit.

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Rev. 3/2/04*  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY WR, *NRMA*, DATE 7/31/08

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### The Scott Visit; Chinese Hard Line


The Secretary noted that Senator Scott was "asking for it" from Chang; when Ambassador Gates mentioned Robert Barnett's unhelpful role, the Secretary characterized Mr. Barnett as a "horse's ass." Speaking of the Presidential letter that Senator Scott carried with him, the Secretary first suggested that it was a responsibility of the "bureau" to prevent such letters. Mr. Hummel or Mr. Lord said they didn't know about the letter before it was sent. The Secretary said that, in any event, Senator Scott had no real mission for the President. Ambassador Gates said that Senator Scott and Mr. Barnett had no judgment or discretion, recalling his talk with the Senator before the Chang meeting at which Ambassador Gates had tried to dissuade Senator Scott from raising contentious subjects. Ambassador Gates said that Mr. Barnett apparently had restimulated the Senator unhelpfully. Ambassador Gates asked if the Secretary had received his back-channel message on the Scott visit. The Secretary said he had and complimented Ambassador Gates on his handling of the problem. The Secretary went on to comment that now Scott had turned the Chinese hard line back onto the Taiwanese. He added that the Scott visit had not had the impact in the US that he, the Secretary, had anticipated.

Ambassador Gates said that he had at first thought that Chang had been needled by the Senator into the hard position. Ambassador Gates now felt that the Chinese before the meeting had intended to take the line and have it go public. The Secretary speculated that perhaps the Chinese had thought that both the Republican and Democratic Parties were trying to "pocket" peaceful liberation before the election and that they were determined to avoid having a bipartisan consensus in the US on this.

### US Response to Chinese Hard Line

Ambassador Gates thought that the Administration should now act, telling the Chinese that they are freezing US public opposition to normalization. The

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- 3 -

Secretary recalled that he had said this to the Chinese last week. Ambassador Gates said that it is important for the Secretary to do it more strongly. The Secretary asked if the idea would be to stop the Chinese from holding the view that military liberation will be required or to stop the Chinese from talking about it. It was agreed that the point is to stop the Chinese from talking about it. Ambassador Gates mentioned the Republican platform, wondering how the Administration could back off it. The Secretary noted that the platform means a two-China solution, adding that it would have been better to have said that Taiwan is the legitimate government of all China. He said that we will just have to ignore the Republican platform. He had told the Chinese last week not to pay any attention to the platform, although maybe they did not get the message clearly.

Ambassador Gates said that the Chinese now had to bear the responsibility for damaging our ability to progress on normalization. The Secretary recalled that Chou En-lai knew that the Chinese had to do something themselves to contribute to progress. He recalled that the most forthcoming meetings with the Chinese had been in 1973, as was reflected in that year's communique(s). Chou himself had pointed this out. But later, as soon as Chou was out of the picture, the Chinese dropped any effort to settle the claims issue. He lamented that if Nixon had stayed in office everything would have been easier. Ambassador Gates reiterated that it would be useful if the Secretary would say something further to the Chinese. The Secretary said he could do so to the Foreign Minister. Ambassador Gates urged that this be done before the election instead of during a possible lame-duck period.

The Secretary asked how Ambassador Gates thought the Taiwan issue should be settled. The Ambassador said that the only idea he had been able to come up with was a Congressional resolution expressing the sense of Congress on a peaceful solution. The Secretary characterized this as "ingenious". He went on to say that the question would have to be resolved probably by two

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unilateral statements--one by the PRC and one by the US. Reverting to the Scott visit, the Secretary said that even if the PRC had a peaceful liberation formula now they would still hold it back from us until one minute before final settlement. The Chinese are "not nuts," and therefore would not reveal their formula to Senator Scott.


Referring to earlier discussion of the Republican platform, Ambassador Hummel said he agreed with Ambassador Gates about the difficulty of going back on the platform, but he had noticed that Jimmy Carter had repudiated his adherence to the Democratic platform. Mr. Lord, in response to the Secretary's question as to how Governor Carter had done this, said that the Governor had announced that he was not bound by everything in the Democratic platform. The Secretary commented that if the President had repudiated the platform, it would have given Governor Reagan ammunition to assault him. The platform, nevertheless, is "an outrage," the Secretary said. Ambassador Gates said we could truthfully tell the Chinese that they had helped write the Republican platform. The Secretary responded that the "yahoos" would have written the platform that way anyhow. He went on then to confirm that he would "do it with" Chiao Kuan-hua.

#### Schlesinger Visit (first mention)

The Secretary, now referring to the Schlesinger visit, said that the Chinese were "bloody-minded", and that it was an outrage to invite him, particularly to invite a man they know to have been fired by the President. All the news coming out of the Schlesinger visit is going to be anti-Administration, he said. (This portion of the conversation concluded by a general exchange on the Chinese habit of inviting people who were out of office. Mr. Lord noted that in this sense Tanaka would now be a new hero, and the Secretary jokingly said that they might be inviting him next.)

#### USLO's Role

Ambassador Gates said that he had a "gripe" which he would like to raise with the Secretary. He said that the people in the Department ought to think up opportunities to facilitate more contact between USLO and



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
the Chinese. He said that USLO also should be more involved with the Secretary's meetings here with the Chinese. The Secretary agreed. Ambassador Gates said that it would have been helpful to know in advance that the Secretary was going to be seeing Ambassador Huang Chen. The Secretary said: "I want them to know in the future." He went on to add: "We should get the transcript to Peking within 48 hours and you should know about the meeting ahead of time." The Secretary said he didn't mind Ambassador Gates' getting this information if he could protect it. He added: "I just don't want country directors writing letters about it." (Referring presumably to the Official Informal letter transmitting the CDC memo, the letter which went by international mail.) Ambassador Gates reiterated that he should know ahead of time and should have an input in the preparations for the Secretary's meetings here with Huang Chen. The Secretary indicated agreement.

#### Events in China

the mood in

The Secretary asked about/Peking. Ambassador Gates said that a struggle is going on, so the leadership is talking for internal purposes. It is hard to understand what is going on and he thought that Wang Hai-jung, for example, was talking for the record, directed internally. He said that he thought the struggle was so intense that the leadership is marking time. The Secretary asked if Hua would last. Ambassador Gates said that Hua was the only visible figure following the earthquake and he might last if he doesn't get shot. Ambassador Gates said he didn't buy the coalition theory and thought that somebody, some individual, is going to emerge, either Hua or Chang. He said it is certain that the struggle is intense, and would be narrowing down both the players and ideological issues. He noted that the Chinese showed themselves to be really organized following the earthquake, mentioning effective security and effective cleanup of streets after the Peking residents moved out of their tents and back into their residences.

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
### Schlesinger Visit (second mention)

Mr. Hummel recommended that the Secretary, when he meets former Defense Secretary Schlesinger, ask him to request the Chinese to have USLO participate in any Schlesinger meeting with Chinese high officials. The Secretary said that he would "recommend" this to Schlesinger. However, he added, he knew what Schlesinger's answer would be (implying a negative answer). Ambassador Gates asked the identity of Schlesinger's host for the trip, and he was told that it was the Chinese Friendship group. (We have since discovered this to be an error; the host organization is the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.) The Secretary, referring again to Mr. Hummel's recommendation, confirmed that he would tell Schlesinger, but went on to note that the Government had changed since Ambassador Gates was in Washington and that people aren't working for the country any longer but rather for themselves. He repeated: "I'll request and let him turn it down." The Secretary added that he did not think that the Chinese should get away with inviting Schlesinger to Peking. Gates said (ironically) that Schlesinger was a "decent fellow", since Schlesinger had decided to postpone his trip until after the political conventions. The Secretary said he had not known that Schlesinger had been invited to go last spring. In any case, he said, Schlesinger overestimates his own influence.

### Japan Problems

Ambassador Gates said that he was worried about the effect of the Japanese now talking about Taiwan. The Secretary said that Tanaka had told former President Nixon that the US should take care of Taiwan and the Japanese would take care of China. He said that the new element is that the issue now has become involved in Japanese domestic politics. Referring to the Lockheed scandals, the Secretary said that what we've done to the LPD guarantees that the Japanese will be increasingly nationalistic. He said, "We're going to pay for this in Japan." Ambassador Gates referred to his recent talks with a leading business

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
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- 7 -

executive in Tokyo, who said the LDP is finished. The Secretary again made the point that the Japanese would be moving toward an intense nationalism and the U.S. had been responsible for it, the damage growing from Senator Church's political ambitions. The United States has done this to Japan, the Secretary repeated. In the case of the Netherlands we can survive, but "in Japan it is going to take some very ugly forms."

EA/PRCM:<sup>HT</sup>HETThayer:ebs

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4977

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR THOMAS GATES

Monday, September 6, 1976  
8:45 a. m. (30 Minutes)  
The Oval Office

From: Brent Scowcroft *BS*

I. PURPOSE

To review developments in US-PRC relations, to compliment Ambassador Gates on his performance, and, through announcement of the meeting to the press, to reinforce to the Chinese -- and to American audiences as well -- the continuing importance you place on our relationship with the PRC. Gates will find the fact of his having met with you very useful in his dealings with the Chinese.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

- A. Background: Ambassador Gates has been doing a good job since his arrival in Peking in May, although he is understandably restive over the lack of much substantive contact with the Chinese. He has been concerned over recent developments which tend to complicate normalization (e. g. Peking's stress on military liberation of Taiwan and extensive commentary in the United States about the need for post-normalization guarantees for the security of Taiwan.)
- B. Participants: Ambassador Gates, Bill Hyland.
- C. Press Arrangements: Meeting will be announced; press photo session.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2/08*  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *HRZ*, NARA, DATE *7/31/08*



III. ISSUES

A. Recent harder PRC line on liberation of Taiwan

Because of the PRC's harder line on forceful liberation of Taiwan as well as unhelpful developments here, such as the Republican Party Platform plank on China, Gates has raised the possibility of your making a fairly early statement reaffirming our commitment to the Shanghai Communique -- but including language about our position on a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. He may wish to discuss this with you.

B. Gates may also wish to discuss the question of his tenure in Peking.

C. VIP visits to the PRC in the near future include former Defense Secretary Schlesinger (who will be visiting many remote areas of defense importance not normally open to foreigners) and Senator Mansfield. A Congressional delegation, led by Senator Curtis may go in late September or after the elections in November. (This trip was postponed as a result of the Chinese earthquake).

IV. TALKING POINTS

A. I want to congratulate you on the excellent job you have been doing, including the efficient and thoughtful care given to Americans in Peking during the earthquake (July 28).

B. Your reporting has been interesting, particularly your account of your meeting with Premier Hua, who you seemed to feel might not have the personal qualities to hang on very long. I would be interested in your current impression of Hua and others in the Chinese leadership.

C. What are your impressions about how developments in China are affecting our interests there? For example, how do you read the hard line on Taiwan which the Vice Premier (Chang Chun-chiao) gave Hugh Scott in July and which was echoed by the Chinese Liaison Office here with a number of correspondents?



D. I imagine you feel that the Republican Party Platform references to China are troublesome. I am told that at a luncheon for the Deputy Chief of the Liaison Office at the State Department last week he criticized the platform in strong terms, saying it was really a two-Chinas position. How do you think we can best repair the damage done -- if you think anything at all should be done.



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UNCLAS CRITIC NO. 3-78  
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PEKING DOMESTIC SERVICE IN MANDARIN AT 0800 GMT ON 9 SEPTEMBER  
ANNOUNCES THE DEATH OF MAO TSETUNG. 09090801

BT



\*\*\*\*\*HH3R COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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AMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 1543  
AMBASSY SINGAPORE NIACT IMMEDIATE 123  
CINCPAC FOR POLAD NIACT IMMEDIATE

*Situation in Peking  
somber but orderly. No  
word on succession, funeral  
plans etc. reported.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PEKING 1778  
E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, CH  
SUBJECT: DEATH OF MAO TSE-TUNG  
REF: PEKING 1775

1. SITUATION IN PEKING AT 1800 LOCAL SEPTEMBER 9.

2. THE SCENE IN PEKING IS SOMBER BUT ORDERLY. UPON ANNOUNCEMENT AT 1800 HOURS OF MAO'S DEATH STATE FLAGS WERE LOWERED TO HALF MAST AND EXTRA PLA SECURITY AND PSB TRAFFIC CONTROL PERSONNEL WERE DEPLOYED ALONG CHANG AN STREET, AT TIEN AN SQUARE AND IN THE VICINITY OF MAO'S RESIDENCE. THEIR MAIN FUNCTION APPEARS TO BE KEEPING TRAFFIC ON THE MOVE AND PREVENTING EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATIONS OF PEOPLE AT SITES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CHAIRMAN. AT ABOUT 1700 HOURS THERE WERE A FEW HUNDRED PEOPLE SILENTLY WATCHING ACROSS FROM FORMAL ENTRANCE TO MAO'S RESIDENCE AND A FEW HUNDRED BY FLAG POLE AT NORTH END OF TIEN AN MEN SQUARE, BUT THESE HAVE SINCE BEEN DISPERSED. ALTHOUGH TIEN AN MEN SQUARE HAS NOT BEEN CORDONED OFF, LOITERING IS NOT PERMITTED.

3. HOUR AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT MANY PEOPLE IN STREET STILL HAD NOT HEARD NEWS, BUT MANY OTHERS WERE KEEPING AND ALREADY WEARING BLACK ARM BANDS. PEOPLE ARE ALREADY BUYING MATERIAL FOR WREATHS.

DEAN  
BT



\*\*\*\*\* W H S R COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

SCONCROFT, HYLAND, LL

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 1/R, NARA, DATE 7/31/08

NCNA ANNOUNCES MOURNING CEREMONIES FOR MAO

OW091006 PEKING NCNA IN ENGLISH 1001 GMT 9 AUG 76 OW

(TEXT) PEKING, SEPTEMBER 9, 1976 (HSINHUA)--

ANNOUNCEMENT

BY

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA,  
THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND  
THE MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST  
PARTY OF CHINA

TO EXPRESS THE BOUNDLESS RESPECT AND ADMIRATION AND DEEPEST  
MOURNING OF THE WHOLE PARTY, THE WHOLE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE OF THE  
WHOLE COUNTRY FOR OUR GREAT LEADER CHAIRMAN MAO TSETUNG, IT IS  
HEREBY DECIDED:

(1) MOURNING SERVICES WILL BE HELD AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE  
FROM SEPTEMBER 11 TO SEPTEMBER 17. MEMBERS AND ALTERNATE MEMBERS  
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, LEADING  
MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND ARMY ORGANIZATIONS  
AND OF VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS OF PEKING MUNICIPALITY, AND  
REPRESENTATIVES OF WORKERS, PEASANTS, SOLDIERS AND THE MASSES OF  
OTHER CIRCLES WILL ATTEND THE MOURNING SERVICES TO PAY THEIR LAST  
RESPECTS TO THE REMAINS OF CHAIRMAN MAO LYING IN STATE.


MEMBERS OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS, ARMY UNITS, FACTORIES, MINES,  
ENTERPRISES, SHOPS, PEOPLE'S COMMUNES, SCHOOLS, NEIGHBOURHOOD  
COMMUNITIES AND ALL OTHER GRASS-ROOTS UNITS WILL HOLD MEMORIAL SERVICES  
IN THEIR OWN UNITS.

(2) A SOLEMN MEMORIAL RALLY WILL BE HELD ON TIENANMEN SQUARE  
AT 3 PM PEKING TIME ON SEPTEMBER 18.

LIVE TRANSMISSIONS OF THE MEMORIAL RALLY ON TIENANMEN SQUARE  
WILL BE CARRIED BY THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING STATION AND  
THE PEKING TELEVISION STATION. ALL ORGANIZATIONS, ARMY UNITS,  
FACTORIES, MINES, ENTERPRISES, SHOPS, PEOPLE'S COMMUNES, SCHOOLS,  
NEIGHBOURHOOD COMMUNITIES AND ALL OTHER GRASS-ROOTS UNITS SHOULD  
MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MASSES TO LISTEN TO OR WATCH THE BROADCASTS  
AND EXPRESS THEIR CONDOLENCES.

(MORE)

9 SEP 1339Z MJL/TN\*\*\*\*\*



FBIS 57'.....

ONLY ADD 56 (MAO MOURNING CEREMONIES)

XXX EXPRESS THEIR CONDOLENCES.

(TEXT) ALL LOCALITIES AT OR ABOVE THE COUNTRY LEVEL ACROSS THE COUNTRY SHOULD ARRANGE MEETINGS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF WORKERS, PEASANTS, SOLDIERS AND OTHER CIRCLES AT 3 PM ON SEPTEMBER 18 TO ENABLE THEM TO LISTEN TO THE LIVE TRANSMISSION OF THE MEMORIAL RALLY IN PEKING BEFORE HEARING MEMORIAL SPEECHES DELIVERED BY THE PRINCIPAL LEADING MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND ARMY ORGANIZATIONS.

(3) FROM SEPTEMBER 9 TO SEPTEMBER 18, THE NATIONAL FLAG WILL BE FLOWN AT HALF-MST IN MOURNING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND AT THE EMBASSIES, CONSULATES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS OF CHINA STATIONED ABROAD. IN THAT PERIOD ALL RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUSPENDED.

(4) AT 3 PM SHARP ON SEPTEMBER 18, PEOPLE IN ALL ORGANIZATIONS, ARMY UNITS, FACTORIES, MINES, ENTERPRISES, SHOPS, PEOPLE'S COMMUNES, SCHOOLS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD COMMUNITIES AND ALL THOSE MOVING OUTDOORS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE WHOSE WORK CANNOT BE INTERRUPTED, SHOULD STAND AT ATTENTION WHEREVER THEY ARE IN SILENT TRIBUTE FOR THREE MINUTES. AT 3 PM SHARP ON SEPTEMBER 18 ALL PLACES AND UNITS WITH SIRENS, SUCH AS TRAINS, SHIPS, MILITARY VESSELS AND FACTORIES, SHOULD SOUND THEIR SIRENS FOR THREE MINUTES IN MOURNING.

(5) TO THE GOVERNMENTS, FRATERNAL PARTIES AND FRIENDLY PERSONAGES OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHO WANT TO COME TO CHINA TO TAKE PART IN THE MOURNING, THE CHINESE EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES IN THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD EXPRESS DEEP GRATITUDE AND INFORM THEM OF THE DECISION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF OUR PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF OUR COUNTRY NOT TO INVITE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, FRATERNAL PARTIES OR FRIENDLY PERSONAGES TO SEND DELEGATIONS OR REPRESENTATIVES TO TAKE PART IN THE MOURNING IN CHINA. HENCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

SEPTEMBER 9, 1976.

(ENDALL)

9 SEP 1050Z MJL/TN'.....





3 Chi Exch  
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SCOW, HY, MCF, LL

FBIS 36

BULLETIN

MAO DEAD

OW090301 FOR YOUR INF94.-589,

PEKING DOMESTIC SERVICE IN MANDARIN AT 0800 GMT ON  
9 SEPTEMBER ANNOUNCES THE DEATH OF MAO TSETUNG,  
9 SEP 0810Z MJL/TM\*\*\*\*\*



Len S. T  
5327 7.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1976


Dear Mr. Premier:

Please accept my personal condolences, and those of the Government and people of the United States, on the occasion of the passing of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.


Few men in any era achieve historic greatness. Chairman Mao was one of these men. His leadership has been a decisive element in the shaping of the Chinese nation for several decades, and his works have left a deep imprint upon our civilization. He was truly a major figure of our times.

I was privileged to meet Chairman Mao during my visit to Peking in December 1975. Our discussion furthered the development of U.S. -China relations along the lines that our two countries had earlier envisaged. Let me affirm now, as I did then, the determination of the United States to complete the normalization of our relations on the basis of the Shanghai Communique. This would be a fitting tribute to his vision, and of benefit to the peoples of our two countries.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Hua Kuo-feng  
Premier of the State Council  
Peking



Gen. S. 105  
5027  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1976


Dear Madame Mao:

Mrs. Ford joins me in extending to you our deepest sympathy on the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao had a profound impact on his era. During my visit to Peking in December 1975, I was privileged to hold wide-ranging discussions with him. Our talks confirmed that we shared a common belief in the importance of strengthening the relations between our two countries. Chairman Mao will be remembered in this country for his leading role in restoring the traditional ties of friendship between the American and Chinese peoples.

Please accept my personal condolences.

Sincerely,



Madame Mao Tse-tung  
Peking  
People's Republic of China



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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/31/08

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: XGDS

TH  
SI: OVIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES), PFOR, NPH  
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER PARTY TALKS, PROVINCIAL GRAND TOUR CANCELLED  
REF: PEKING 1776  
ACTION REQUESTED: NOTIFY S OF INFO IN PARA 5.

1. WHEN NEWS OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S DEATH WAS ANNOUNCED, THE SCHLESINGER PARTY WAS OBSERVING A MARKSMANSHIP SHOW BY THE PLA'S 3RD DIVISION ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF PEKING. DESPITE THOISUDDEN INTERRUPTION OF THE INTERNATIONALE AND THE TEARS WELLING UP INH HE EYES OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER, THE PROGRAM WAS CARRIED THROUGH TO COMPLETION. IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, THE CHINESE ANNOUNCED THE NEWS TO THE AMERICANS INDIVIDUALLY. THE URBAN US DESK DIRECTOR TING YUAN-HUN G, NORMALLY FLUENT IN ENGLISH, COULD ONLY SOB OUT IN CHINESE THAT "CHAIRMAN MAO HAS DIED." OTHER CHINESE OFFICIALS UNASHAMEPLY WEPT.

2. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT THE HOST ORGANIZATION CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (CPIFA) BOWED OUT AS EFFECTIVE HOSTS, DEFERRING TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS PRESENT. AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING, WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED THE PARTY TO THE PLA UNIT, EXPLAINED THAT "UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES" THE MEETINGS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED WITH DEFENSE MINISTER YEH AND PREMIER HUA (REFTEL) HAD BEEN CANCELLED. LIN ADDED THAT THE GROUP'S ENTIRE PROVINCIAL TOUR WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE CANCELLED.

3. LIN, CLEARLY SPEAKING WITHOUT GUIDANCE, NOTED THAT FOREIGN DIGNITARIES NOT ALREADY IN CHINA WOULD NOT BE INVITED TO ATTEND THE MEMORIAL CEREMONIES AND SUGGESTED --"ON THE BASIS OF THE PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED FOR THE CHOU EN-LAI AND CHU TEN FUNERAL OBSERVANCES" -- THAT DR. SCHLESINGER MIGHT WISH TO REOAUIN IN PEKING TO PAY LAST RESPE

\*\*\*\*\*WHHR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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CTS  
TO CHAIRMAN MAD.

4. DR. SCHLESINGER INDICATED TO THE CHINESE THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW THEIR JUDGMENT AS TO APPROPRIATE ACTIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE CPIFA HAS ARRANGED FOR THE DELEGATION TO VISIT THE GREAT WALL ON SEPTEMBER 10.

5. ONE DELEGATION MEMBER HAS CONFIDED TO US THAT DR. SCHLESINGER WILL PROBABLY PLACE A CALL TO SECRETARY KISSINGER IN THE MORNING (APPROXIMATELY 0800 SEPTEMBER 10 LOCAL TIME) TO SOLICIT HIS ADVICE ON AN APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION.

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INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 3697  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1776

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept.*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Rev. 3/2/84*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY Hr, NARA, DATE 7/3/08

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: XDS-3  
TAGS: OYIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES) PFOR CH US TW  
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO  
REF: (A) PEKING 1754, (B) PEKING 1761

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES SCHLESINGER AND "SUBSTANTIVE" MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY (ACCOMPANYING PRESS AND USLO WERE NOT INVITED) TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA ON THE AFTERNOONS OF SEPTEMBER 7 AND 8 FOR A TOTAL OF FOUR HOURS. A DELEGATION MEMBER PASSED US--IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE--HIS RECOLLECTIONS OF MEETING HIGHLIGHTS. (WE DO NOT YET HAVE MINUTES OF EITHER MEETING. WE HAVE A TENTATIVE OFFER OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS SUBJECT TO FINAL APPROVAL BY SCHLESINGER.) ON TAIWAN, CHIAO EXPOUNDED STANDARD, NONBELLICLOSE LINE: U.S. MUST FULFILL ALL THREE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION; LIBERATION OF TAIWAN IS AN INTERNAL CHINESE MATTER; AND THE U.S. OWES A "DEBT" TO THE PRC REGARDING TAIWAN. CHIAO WARNED AGAINST THE DANGER OF A MUNICH-TYPE WESTERN BELLOUT TO THE SOVIET UNION; AFFIRMED THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ENDURING SINO-SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT; AND ADDED A CRYPTIC--AND NOVEL TO US--REFERENCE TO "SOME WESTERN LEADERS" WHO SEEK TO DIVERT SOVIET AGGRESSION TOWARDS THE EAST. CHIAO REITERATED PRINCIPLED CHINESE SUPPORT FOR NORTH KOREAN POSITION ON REUNIFICATION AND HE APPLAUDED THE SUCCESS OF U.S. DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AT THE CLOSE OF THE SECOND SESSION, CHIAO ANNOUNCED THAT THE GROUP WOULD MEET DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY VICE-CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEH-YING ON SEPTEMBER 10, AND WOULD HAVE A SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 11 WITH ANOTHER TOP LEADER (THE GROUP SPECULATES THAT THIS WILL BE PREMIER HUA KUO-PENG). END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.



\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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2. ON SEPTEMBER 7 SCHLESINGER PARTY HELD THE FIRST OF TWO AFTERNOON SESSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO. THE TWO-HOUR SESSION WAS LARGELY CONSUMED BY READING OF FORMAL PREPARED STATEMENTS BY THE TWO SIDES. CHIAO'S REMARKS WERE STANDARD FARE, SETTING FORTH THE CHINESE WORLDVIEW, INTRODUCING NO NEW THEMES, AND FAILING TO MENTION EVEN IN PASSING EITHER THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OR TAIWAN.

*State Dept. Rec. 2/21/74*

3. THE SEPTEMBER 7 EVENING BANQUET HOSTED BY CHIAO (ADDRESSEES WILL HAVE SEEN NCNA COVERAGE) FOLLOWED THE PATTERN SET AT THE NOON WELCOMING BANQUET. CHIAO'S RECITATION OF FAMILIAR PRC POSITIONS IN HIS TOAST WAS LACED WITH THE USUAL METAPHORS. SCHLESINGER ADDRESSED THE POINTS AND THE METAPHORS ONE BY ONE. ("WE AGREE THAT THERE IS GREAT CHAOS UNDER HEAVEN, BUT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE SITUATION EXCELLENT.")

4. FOLLOWING A MORNING VISIT BY ALL DELEGATION MEMBERS TO HOTBED OF RADICALISM TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY, WHERE THE GROUP HEARD THE CANNED BRIEFING ON TSINGHUA'S ROLE IN SPEARHEADING THE ANTI-TENG CAMPAIGN, THE DELEGATION DIVIDED INTO SUBSTANTIVE AND PRESS CONTINGENTS. THE LATTER TREKKED AROUND SUBURBAN COMMUNES, WHILE THE FORMER REASSEMBLED AT THE GREAT HALL TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH CHIAO. AS DURING THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON, THE PARTY WAS SEATED IN NEGOTIATING STYLE, FACING THEIR CHINESE HOSTS ACROSS A LONG TABLE, RATHER THAN IN THE USUAL "RELAXED" MODE: SEMICIRCULAR ARRANGEMENT OF OVERSTUFFED CHAIRS. CHIAO HAD PREPARED NOTES IN FRONT OF HIM, AND SEEMED TO REFER TO THEM FOR SPECIFIC LANGUAGE FROM TIME TO TIME. HIGHLIGHTS OF THAT TWO-HOUR SESSION FOLLOW.

5. TAIWAN. AFTER EMPHASIZING THAT CHINA SEES THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF U.S.-PRC RELATIONS AS CENTRAL, CHIAO MOVED TO BILATERAL MATTERS AND RAISED THE TAIWAN ISSUE--"ALMOST PERFUNCTORILY" ACCORDING TO ONE DELEGATION MEMBER.  
--CHIAO DECLARED THAT THE U.S. MUST FULFILL ALL THREE COMPONENTS OF THE JAPANESE FORMULA AS A PRECONDITION FOR NORMALIZATION.  
--HE STRESSED THAT "LIBERATION" OF TAIWAN IS AN INTERNAL CHINESE MATTER, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.  
--HE INDICATED THAT THE U.S. "OWES CHINA A DEBT" ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE--HINTING THERE WAS A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT--AND MUST NOT "BACK AWAY" FROM THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. TO THIS SCHLESINGER (WHO HAD MADE A PREFATORY DISCLAIMER OF ANY ABILITY OR INTENT TO SPEAK FOR THE USG) REPLIED THAT HIS PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD COMMITTED ITSELF IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE TO A GRADUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES ON TAIWAN "AS TENSIONS IN THE AREA DIMINISHED" AND THAT THE U.S. HAD FULFILLED THIS COMMITMENT. CHIAO DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS.



6. PRC-USSR RELATIONS. CHIAO PRESENTED THE STANDARD HARD LINE ON THE

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SOVIETS: THE PRC HAS PREPARED FOR WAR, WILL ADOPT A STRATEGY OF LURING IN THE INVADERS AND "DROWNING THEM IN PEOPLE'S WAR", AND (QUOTING MAO) FORESEES TEN THOUSAND YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE ADDED THAT "WE MUST TRY TO IMPROVE OUR STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS." WHEN THE INTERPRETER INCORRECTLY RENDERED THIS AS "WE MUST IMPROVE OUR STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS," CHIAO CUT IN FORCEFULLY TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. CHIAO WARNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF A MUNICH-TYPE SELLOUT TO MOSCOW, AND ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN DUNQUERQUE. SCHLESINGER RIPOSTED THAT THE U.S. HAS MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SOVIET UNION IS WELL AWARE OF THIS, AND THE KREMLIN LEADERS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE RASH. IN CLOSING, CHIAO REFERRED CRYPTICALLY TO "SOME WESTERN LEADERS WHO SPEAK TO TURN THE FOCUS OF SOVIET AGGRESSION TO THE EAST." (COMMENT: IF ACCURATELY QUOTED, THIS LINE IS NEW TO US. OUR SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE ENTIRE U.S. SIDE TOOK THIS AS A BARR DIRECTED AT SECRETARY KISSINGER. SCHLESINGER IMMEDIATELY REBUTTED, DECLARING THAT HE WAS AWARE OF NO ONE IN THE WEST WHO HELD THAT POSITION.)

7. KOREA. CHIAO PASSED LIGHTLY OVER KOREA, MERELY REITERATING CHINESE PRINCIPLED SUPPORT FOR THE "VERY REASONABLE" NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA.

8. MIDDLE EAST. CHIAO TOOK CREDIT FOR SUGGESTING TO UNSPECIFIED U.S. LEADERS THAT WASHINGTON OUGHT TO ADOPT A MORE EVENHANDED APPROACH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MAINTAINING TIES WITH ISRAEL WHILE SEEKING A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. WHEN CHIAO COMMENTED APPROVINGLY ON THE SUCCESS OF THAT POLICY, SCHLESINGER OBSERVED THAT CHINA MIGHT ADOPT THE SAME POLICY WITH SIMILAR EFFECT. CHIAO DECLARED THAT "HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES" MADE THAT OPTION IMPOSSIBLE FOR CHINA TO CONSIDER.

9. ADDITIONAL MEETINGS. AT THE CLOSE OF THE SEPTEMBER 8 SESSION, CHIAO ANNOUNCED THAT A SEPTEMBER 10 MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED WITH DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEN-YING. SEPTEMBER 11 HAS BEEN LEFT OPEN FOR A SESSION WITH "ANOTHER SENIOR OFFICIAL," WHO THE GROUP SPECULATES WILL BE PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG. SINCE THE CHINESE USUALLY ORCHESTRATE OFFICIAL VISITS SO AS TO SAVE THE HIGHEST RANKING LEADER UNTIL THE FINAL DAY, IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE TO US THAT PREMIER HUA WILL INDEED MEET WITH THE GROUP.

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~-SENSITIVE  
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September 10, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

Information Items

Immediate Political Impact of Mao's Death: The themes struck by PRC officialdom in the immediate aftermath of Mao Tse-tung's demise are those of unity and continuity of policy. The carefully phrased official obituary touched on all current policies without giving a nod to any particular political viewpoint. It called for strengthened centralized leadership of the party, urged all the people to "resolutely uphold the unity and unification of the party and closely rally around the party central committee" and to "carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao." Specific mention was made of the need to continue to carry out Chairman Mao's "revolutionary line and policies in foreign affairs." That line has in the last few years always meant endorsement of the normalization process with the U.S., and we take this citation as endorsement of China's basic commitment to the Shanghai Communique. The selection and announcement of a successor to Mao as chairman of the party central committee is probably the most difficult issue faced by the Chinese in recent years. Competition between the two front runners -- Premier Hua Kuo-feng, perhaps best described as a "right centrist", and Vice Premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, a "left centrist" -- has been evident in the past and may reach a point of confrontation. A dark horse could thus assume Mao's chair perhaps under a formula which reduced the powers of that position. The makeup of the funeral committee leadership is a striking manifestation of Peking's concern about unity and balance. It consists of both Hua and Chang balanced on the one side by the young "radical" Wang Hung-wen and on the other by the "moderate" Minister of Defense Yeh Chien-ying. The need for stability and calmness in China is not only occasioned by Mao's passing but also by a certain restiveness which has been apparent throughout the country since spring.

[redacted] general mood of disenchantment and lack of enthusiasm for any of Mao's likely successors. It should be noted, however, that in the post-earthquake period Premier Hua Kuo-feng has done much to enhance his image, and his strong speech at a September 1 mass conference in Peking, which urged movement away from

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political activism and towards practical production work, may well have bolstered his position among various groups. Hua received the lion's share of association with Mao on that occasion.

Talk with Prime Minister Rabin: In a meeting yesterday to discuss the dispute over AMOCO oil drilling activities in the Gulf of Suez, Prime Minister Rabin told Ambassador Toon that he would like to see the matter resolved through quiet talks and a full exchange of information between U.S. and Israeli officials. He lamented the incident involving Israeli machine gun firing on American-placed buoys associated with the AMOCO rigs as an unauthorized act by an Israeli general, as well as the widespread press publicity that had conveyed a confrontational atmosphere which he wants to avoid. He urged a "cooling off" period of a week followed by bilateral talks either here or in Israel which he thought could reach a modus vivendi acceptable to all concerned. (Ambassador Eilts has reported that AMOCO might not totally rule out a compromise if legally permissible and if the Egyptians -- anxious for the oil -- grudgingly went along.)

Rabin indicated no give on the Israeli legal position that the AMOCO activities across the "median line" are unacceptable. Our legal position has supported AMOCO's rights under the concession granted by Egypt in 1964 and we have not viewed these activities as prejudicial to future negotiations on the status of the Occupied Territories, including the Gulf of Suez. We have not recognized Israel's unilateral act, following the 1967 war, of claiming control of the eastern half of the Gulf up to the "median line."

At a minimum, Rabin's comments set the stage for an improved atmosphere surrounding our talks on this matter. However, there remains a wide disparity of views, with the U.S. obligated to protect the legitimate interests of a U.S. firm as we legally interpret them, and with Egypt and Israel both determined to maintain their conflicting political and legal positions with respect to the Occupied Territories. The Israeli press has given widespread and negative coverage of the U.S. position but Rabin's personal concern may diminish the leaks which have inflamed the press.

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Bundesbank Loan for Italy: The renewal of the two billion dollar gold-backed loan to Italy was officially concluded by the Bank of Italy and the Bundesbank on September 3. Although the interest rate and terms remain the same as in the original loan, under the new conditions Italy will repay 500 million dollars, rather than increase the amount of gold collateral, which remains at 16.6 million ounces. The new loan also requires that the value of the guarantee be reviewed every three months (originally fixed for a two-year period) and that the gold price used in valuing the guarantee be based on the average price during the preceding 30 days (originally based on the preceding two months).

Elections in Cyprus Show Support for Makarios: The clean sweep of the pro-Makarios "Popular Front" in Sunday's elections is seen by Embassy Nicosia as a rallying to Makarios as the Greek Cypriot leader rather than voter support for any particular issue. The embassy comments that the victory attests to the Archbishop's continuing ability to control the Greek Cypriot political scene, although his image as an unchallenged leader has been tarnished. By failing to win any seats in the House of Representatives, Clerides has lost personal prestige and his major political platform. Additionally, the strong vote of confidence for Makarios and supporters of the "long struggle" will likely hurt prospects for the inter-communal talks.

Hanoi Criticizes U.S. Position on the MIA Issue: A Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesman criticized us September 9 for our "stubborn attitude" in demanding that North Vietnam account for all our missing men prior to normalizing relations. Calling their recent release of information on the fate of 12 U.S. pilots a "gesture...to create favorable conditions for early discussions between Vietnam and the U.S....", the spokesman said the U.S. lack of goodwill in responding will surely be condemned by world opinion. Moreover, Hanoi said the U.S. will have to "bear responsibility for its actions which prevent the normalization of relations between the two countries." Hanoi's statement was mild compared with previous condemnations of U.S. policy, no doubt reflecting a slim hope that we will not veto its admission into the UN. Security Council action on Vietnam's membership begins today, with a formal vote probably occurring this afternoon or Monday.

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EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: XGDS=3  
TAGS: OVIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES), PFOR, PINT, CH  
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER DELEGATION PARTICIPATION IN MAO TSE-TUNG  
FUNERAL OBSERVANCES

1. SUMMARY. THE SCHLESINGER PARTY WAS INVITED SEPTEMBER 10 TO REMAIN IN PEKING THROUGH SEPTEMBER 13 IN ORDER TO VIEW THE REMAINS OF CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG LYING IN STATE ON THAT DAY. (USLO PARTICIPATION, SEPT 13, WILL BE ON THE SAME DATE) A CHINESE MFA OFFICIAL TOLD DR. SCHLESINGER THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HAD PERSONALLY INVITED HIM TO VISIT CHINA AND WAS AWARE OF SCHLESINGER'S PRESENCE IN CHINA JUST PRIOR TO HIS DEATH. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING THE COURSE OF A VISIT SEPTEMBER 10 TO THE GREAT WALL AND MING TOMBS SPECIALLY LAID ON BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR DR. SCHLESINGER AND THREE MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY, MFA AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO THE ENTIRE DELEGATION TO REMAIN IN PEKING THROUGH MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 13. ON THAT DATE THE DELEGATION COULD JOIN FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS PRESENT IN PEKING TO VIEW THE REMAINS OF CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG LYING IN STATE AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE. (COMMENT: IT IS INDICATIVE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY COURTESIES EXTENDED DR. SCHLESINGER THAT HE WAS INFORMED OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS PRIOR TO NOTIFICATION OF USLO OR OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN PEKING.) LIN PING THEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE DELEGATION SHOULD PLAN TO DEPART PEKING EARLY THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

3. LIN ALSO REVEALED THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HIMSELF HAD DIRECTED

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STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 1/R, NARA, DATE 7/31/08



IN 1974 THAT A FORMAL INVITATION TO VISIT CHINA BE EXTENDED TO THEN-DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER. (NEITHER DR. SCHLESINGER NOR HIS FORMER STAFF ASSISTANT, A MEMBER OF THE CURRENT DELEGATION, COULD RECALL HAVING RECEIVED SUCH AN INVITATION.) IN A SENSE, LIN CONTINUED, DR. SCHLESINGER WAS CURRENTLY IN CHINA AT THE EXPRESS WISH OF CHAIRMAN MAO, AND CHAIRMAN MAO HAD ACCORDINGLY BEEN APPRISED OF DR. SCHLESINGER'S PRESENCE IN CHINA SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEATH.

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TO USDEL SECRETARY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6378

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EXDIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR GATES  
C.O. 11052: XGOS-3  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A) PPOR, CH  
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SCHLESINGER VISIT  
REFS: A) SECTO 27852, B) PEKING 1761, C) PEKING 1776  
D) PEKING 1782, E) PEKING 1800

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. THERE FOLLOWS MY PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SCHLESINGER VISIT (REF A) BASED ON MY PRIVATE ONE-HOUR TALK WITH HIM AT USLO SEPTEMBER 14 (HE CALLED ON ME AT HIS INITIATIVE) AND OUR EARLIER REPORTING ON HIS ACTIVITIES IN PEKING. AFTER MAO'S DEATH THE PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVES IN CHINESE HANDLING OF SCHLESINGER BECAME:

--TO DEMONSTRATE FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUITY. REINSTATEMENT OF SCHLESINGER'S PROVINCIAL TRIP, INCLUDING THE EXCURSION TO THE SINO-SOVIET FRONTIER, HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED CHINESE ADHERENCE TO "CHAIRMAN MAO'S REVOLUTIONARY LINE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS" WITH ITS ANTI-SOVIET TILT.

--TO REPUDIATE IMPLICITLY SPECULATION THAT MAO'S DEATH WOULD PROVE DESTABILIZING.

REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE MAY OTHERWISE FEEL ABOUT CHINESE HANDLING OF SCHLESINGER, THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE. EXCLUSION OF USLO FROM THE TALKS SEEMED TO ACCORD WITH SCHLESINGER'S OWN PREFERENCE. CHINESE FAILURE TO INCLUDE USLO IN CHIAO'S WELCOMING BANQUET IS ODD, BUT WE DO NOT YET HAVE ALL THE FACTS THAT PERTAIN. AS FOR SCHLESINGER'S FUNERAL ROLE, WE DO NOT SHARE VIEW OF SOME IN HIS PARTY THAT CHINESE MEANT THIS AS SNUB DIRECTED AT USG.

2. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE POTENTIALLY MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS--

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
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STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY WZ, NARA, DATE 7/31/08



BOTH SYMBOLIC AND SUBSTANTIVE--OF HIS VISIT ARE YET TO COME: HIS EXCURSION TO THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND HIS PROMISED SESSIONS WITH RANKING CHINESE LEADERS INCLUDING PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG. I SHALL SUBMIT A FINAL ASSESSMENT AFTER SCHLESINGER'S DEPARTURE FROM PEKING, PLANNED FOR SEPTEMBER 29. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

3. CHINESE DISPLAY EXTRAORDINARY ESTEEM FOR SCHLESINGER. FROM CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY TRIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE U.S. TO REINSTATEMENT OF THE TRIP FOLLOWING MAO'S FUNERAL, THE CHINESE HAVE MISSED NO OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY THEIR HIGH ESTEEM FOR SCHLESINGER:

--THEY CONFIRMED HIS ITINERARY PRIOR TO HIS DELEGATION'S DEPARTURE, AN UNPRECEDENTED BREAK WITH CUSTOMARY CHINESE NEGOTIATING PRACTICE WITH SUCH GROUPS. (SCHLESINGER'S INTERMEDIARIES WITH THE CHINESE HAD STRESSED THAT PRIOR APPROVAL WAS THE SINE QUA NON OF SCHLESINGER'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION.)

--THEY INCLUDED ON THE ITINERARY SENSITIVE AREAS OFTEN REQUEST BUT NEVER PREVIOUSLY GRANTED TO AMERICANS (LHASA, INING, JUHOMAOTE).

--THEY ARRANGED UNUSUALLY HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, ALLOCATING TO SCHLESINGER TWO AFTERNOONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO (ONE IS THE NORM) AND PLANNING, BEFORE MAO'S DEATH INTERVENED, SESSIONS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER YEH CHIEN-YING AND PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG.

--MEMBERS OF THE PARTY TOLD US THAT FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAO'S DEATH, FOREIGN MINISTRY AMERICAS AND OCEANIAS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING CONFIDED TO SCHLESINGER THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HAD PERSONALLY ORDERED AN INVITATION EXTENDED TO HINBIN 1974. LIN ADDED THAT MAO WAS INFORMED BEFORE HIS DEATH OF SCHLESINGER'S PRESENCE IN CHINA.

--AFTER CANCELLING THE TOUR AND REMAINING MEETINGS IN PEKING UPON WORD THAT MAO HAD DIED, THE CHINESE REVERSED THEMSELVES, REINSTATED THE WHOLE PROVINCIAL PROGRAM AND HINTED STRONGLY THAT SCHLESINGER ON HIS RETURN TO PEKING WOULD MEET WITH PREMIER HUA AND EITHER DEFENSE MINISTER YEH OR POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO.

4. ON HIS FIRST EVENING IN PEKING SCHLESINGER ASKED THE ACTING CHIEF FOR USLO'S ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE MOTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS FOR HIS VISIT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RATIONALE IS SELF-EVIDENT: THE CHINESE POSITION ON U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE PARALLELS SCHLESINGER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND WELL-KNOWN PRIVATE VIEWS ON THE ISSUE. THAT THESE VIEWS WOULD BE AIRED TO CHINESE AND WORLD AUDIENCES HAS A REASONABLE

EXPECTATION; THE POTENT COMBINATION OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, A NOVEL EXCURSION TO TIBET AND TO THE SINO-SOVIET FRONTIER, AND A CORPS OF ACCOMPANYING JOURNALISTS GUARANTEED HEAVY MEDIA PLAY IN THE U.S. AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. IN THIS SENSE THE CHINESE CAST SCHLESINGER IN THE FAMILIAR ROLE (E.G. THE FRG'S STRAUSS AND


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FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON) OF PRESTIGIOUS OPPOSITION STATESMAN WHO SHARES A KEY PART OF THE CHINESE WORLDVIEW.

5. WHETHER THE CHINESE SEEK MERELY TO GAIN ATTENTION FOR THEIR VIEWS, TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN ELECTION-YEAR POLITICS, OR TO REGISTER SOME GENERAL DISENCHANTMENT WITH CURRENT ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICIES IS CONJECTURAL. ALL PROBABLY ENTERED INTO INITIAL CHINESE CALCULATIONS TO SOME DEGREE. (POST-MAO CONSIDERATION ARE NOTED IN MY SUMMARY ABOVE.)

6. THE EXCLUSION OF USLO. USLO'S ONLY FORMAL ROLE IN THE SCHLESINGER VISIT HAS BEEN ATTENDANCE BY THE ACTING CHIEF AT A NOON-HOUR WELCOMING BANQUET THE FIRST DAY GIVEN BY THE NOMINAL HOSTS, CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ACCORDING TO ONE MEMBER OF THE PARTY, THE CHINESE SAID THEY DID NOT PLAN TO INVITE ACTING CHIEF TO CHIAO'S BANQUET THAT EVENING BEING TO THE BANQUET'S ALLEGED "SPECIAL NATURE." WE DOUBT THAT THE VISITORS URGED RECONSIDERATION. USLO WAS NOT INVITED TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS. WE DO NOT KNOW WHEN AND HOW EITHER DECISION WAS REACHED. BUT WE IMAGINE THAT THE CHINESE WELCOMED AND NURTURED SUPPOSITION ON THE PART OF SCHLESINGER AND SOME MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY THAT THESE OCCASIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE MORE CANDID AND PRODUCTIVE SANS USG OFFICIALS.

7. THE SCHLESINGER DELEGATION AND FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE ARE DISINCLINED TO ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO SCHLESINGER'S PLACE AMONG FOREIGNERS PAYING LAST RESPECTS TO MAO. --NCNA LISTS THE SCHLESINGER GROUP AMONG OTHER "FOREIGN FRIENDS" INCLUDING AN ALBANIAN METALLURGICAL GROUP, THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN SECRETARY, A VENEZUELAN CULTURAL GROUP, AND ATHLETES FROM JAPAN, TANZANIA, AND EGYPT. --SCHLESINGER IS LISTED LAST BY NCNA AMONG FOREIGNERS SENDING MEMORIAL WREATHS, BEHIND THE VENEZUELAN CULTURAL GROUP, JAPANESE PEASANTS, AND SHIRLEY AND DAVID DUBOIS. ON BALANCE, THE FACT THAT SCHLESINGER SHOOK HANDS WITH PREMIER HUA, VICE CHAIRMAN WANG HUNG-KEN, ET AL. AT THE CEREMONIES SEEMS THE PRODUCT OF AN OVERALL FUNERAL PLAN FOR DEALING WITH DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF FOREIGNERS. USLO WAS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS WESTERN AND JAPANESE EMBASSIES.

8. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE CHINESE WILL RAISE THE TAIWAN ISSUE WITH SCHLESINGER. SCHLESINGER CONFIRMED TO ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO SKINNED OVER IT IN PERFUNCTORY FASHION.

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TAGS: PFOR, CH, US


SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER VISIT TO PRC

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept.*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Rev. 3/2/04*  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *Hr*, NARA, DATE *7/3/108*

1. WE HAVE EXAMINED, AND ARE CONTINUING TO DO SO, A VARIETY OF STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR MESSAGE, TO GIVE THE CHINESE THE DESIRED SIGNALS IN REACTION TO THE SCHLESINGER EPISODE AND OTHER PRC ATTITUDES. WE DO AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR GATES' BASIC ASSESSMENT THAT THE CHINESE HANDLING OF THE SCHLESINGER VISIT WAS POINTED MORE AT THE SOVIETS THAN AT THE UNITED STATES AND YOURSELF, BUT WE ALSO AGREE WITH YOU THAT THERE ARE SOME THINGS WE CAN DO TO GET THE MESSAGE TO THE CHINESE THAT WE CANNOT BE TOTALLY PASSIVE BEFORE THESE AFFRONTS TO THE ADMINISTRATION. THERE IS, OF COURSE, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE CHINESE WILL RELATE ANY OF OUR ACTIONS TO THE SCHLESINGER AFFAIR UNLESS WE MAKE THE LINKAGE FOR THEM IN SOME WAY.

2. YOU ARE AWARE THAT NO QUESTIONS ABOUT SCHLESINGER HAVE

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COME UP AT EITHER THE WHITE HOUSE OR THE DEPARTMENT BRIEFINGS SINCE YOUR MESSAGE TO SCOWCROFT.

3. THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR US-CHINA RELATIONS IS SPONSORING A LUNCH OCTOBER 7 AT WHICH SCHLESINGER WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL SPEAKER. WE ARE TAKING STEPS TO ENSURE THAT STATE REPRESENTATIVES DECLINE INVITATIONS TO THIS LUNCH.

4. WE WILL NEED TO DISCUSS OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES AFTER YOUR RETURN, BUT WE HAVE SEVERAL ITEMS ON WHICH WE NEED YOUR IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE.

5. CDC COMPUTER. WE ARE CLOSE TO RESOLVING THE BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS FLOWING FROM THE SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS AND MAY BE IN A POSITION BY THIS WEEKEND TO GO TO THE NSC WITH REQUEST FOR AN EXCEPTION TO NSDM 247, WHICH WOULD THEN PERMIT US TO TAKE THE LAST STEPS, INCLUDING HUMMEL'S APPROACH TO HAN HSU. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE CHINESE SUMMONED CDC REPRESENTATIVES TO PEKING TO PRESS CDC TO FISH OR CUT BAIT. CDC, AT OUR INSTIGATION, POSTPONED THE VISIT FROM THIS MONTH TO OCTOBER 11; IN DOING SO, CDC APPARENTLY TOLD THE CHINESE THEY HOPED TO COME WITH "FAVORABLE" NEWS. IN ACCEPTING THE POSTPONEMENT, THE CHINESE POINTEDLY UNDERLINED THEIR EXPECTATION OF "FAVORABLE" NEWS. IT WILL BE AN UNPLEASANT BUSINESS TO TELL THE CDC, WHO WILL FEEL IT HAS BEEN LED DOWN THE GARDEN PATH, THAT WE CANNOT, AFTER ALL, PERMIT THE COMPUTER SALE, AND THE CHINESE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL REACT BADLY TOWARDS CDC. BUT IF WE ARE TO GIVE NEGATIVE SIGNALS IN OTHER AREAS, IT WOULD CONFUSE THE SIGNALS IF WE LET THE CHINESE KNOW THAT WE HAVE TAKEN THE EXCEPTIONAL STEP OF PERMITTING THE CDC COMPUTER SALE. IF WE ARE GOING TO BE CONSISTENT, THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CALL A HALT TO THE CDC EFFORT, AND THAT AFTER INFORMING OTHER CONCERNED AGENCIES THAT STATE HAS CHANGED ITS MIND (WITHOUT MENTIONING THE SCHLESINGER AFFAIR), WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE CDC THAT WE CANNOT APPROVE THE SALE. WE SHOULD ALSO, OF COURSE, CANCEL PLANS FOR HUMMEL'S MEETING WITH HAN HSU TO TALK ABOUT THE CDC COMPUTER. WE NEED YOUR DECISION ON THIS.

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6. CHINESE VOLLEYBALL TEAMS. THE PRC MEN'S AND WOMEN'S VOLLEYBALL TEAMS WILL HOLD THEIR WASHINGTON AREA MATCHES OCTOBER 7. THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON US-CHINA RELATIONS, THE SPONSORING HOST, HAS INVITED SOME THIRTY USG OFFICIALS, RANGING FROM THE PRESIDENT DOWN, TO THE MATCH AND A RECEPTION AFTERWARD. CUIS JOHN RICHARDSON WAS THE HIGHEST RANKING DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TO ATTEND THE COMPANABLE SOFTBALL MATCH LAST WINTER. THE PRESIDENT,

YOU WILL RECALL, DID RECEIVE THE CHINESE SOFTBALL TEAM AT THE WHITE HOUSE. WE NEED YOUR GUIDANCE ON THE FOLLOWING:

A. LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION AT MATCH AND RECEPTION. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO LIMIT THE LEVEL OF US OFFICIALS ATTENDING THE MATCH AND RECEPTION TO JOHN RICHARDSON, OSCAR ARMSTRONG AND PERHAPS-BILL GLEYSTEN, PLUS A LIMITED NUMBER OF SUBORDINATES.

B. WHITE HOUSE RECEPTION. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT WILL BE OUT OF TOWN WHILE THE VOLLEYBALL TEAMS ARE IN THE AREA, THE WHITE HOUSE IS STILL CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TEAMS BEING RECEIVED BY ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE FORD FAMILY. IF YOU HAVE VIEWS ON THIS, WE WILL CONVEY THEM TO SCOWCROFT.

7. OCTOBER 1. YOU ATTENDED THE CHINESE NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION IN NEW YORK LAST YEAR, AND DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL ATTENDED PRCLO'S RECEPTION HERE. FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER LI CHIANG AND VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG ATTENDED USLO'S BICENTENNIAL RECEPTION THIS JULY.

A. YOU ARE SCHEDULED TO BE IN WASHINGTON THIS OCTOBER 1. YOU COULD DECLINE THE PRCLO RECEPTION, HAVING IN MIND THAT THIS WOULD BE WELL-NOTED BY THE PRESS AND OTHERS HERE. IF YOU DO NOT ATTEND, AT WHAT LEVEL DO YOU WANT US REPRESENTED HERE: ROBINSON, HABIB OR HUMMEL?

B. THERE MAY WELL BE SEVERAL OTHER CABINET MEMBERS (E.G. RICHARDSON, BUTZ) AND THEIR SUBORDINATES WHO WOULD PLAN TO ATTEND. DO YOU WANT TO PRESS THEM TO DECLINE?

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
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C. AMBASSADOR SCRANTON, HAVING IN MIND HIS WORKING RELATIONS WITH HUANG HUA, MAY WANT TO ATTEND THE PRC RECEPTION IN NEW YORK. FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO MAY BE PRINCIPAL HOST IN NEW YORK. AT WHAT LEVEL DO YOU WANT US REPRESENTED AT THE NEW YORK RECEPTION: SCRANTON, BENNETT, A LOWER-LEVEL US DELEGATION MEMBER? ROBINSON

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STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
*W/R*, NARA, DATE *7/3/08*

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RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT PASS HONG KONG, MOSCOW, TAIPEI AND TOKYO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, CH, US, OVIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES)

REFS: A) PEKING 1776 B) PEKING 1948

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION (PERLE, WHITSON, WEST AND BENNETT) MET FOR TWO HOURS AND FORTY MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 28 WITH PRC PREMIER AND PARTY FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN HUA KAO-FENG. THE CHINESE SIDE ALSO INCLUDED FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA, MFA AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING, AND NANCY TANG (INTERPRETER). ACCORDING TO AN ORAL BRIEFING FROM NOTES BY ONE DELEGATION MEMBER (SUPPLEMENTED BY OBSERVATIONS FROM SCHLESINGER AND OTHERS), THE SESSION WAS DOMINATED BY AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON GLOBAL STRATEGY. FOLLOWING IN THE MAIN FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO STANDARD BRIEF (REF A), HUA SCORED SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, CONDEMNED THE "MUNICH MENTALITY," AND CALLED FOR A "POOLING OF EFFORTS" TO CONTAIN MOSCOW. THIS VIEW, HUA ADDED, HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED BY THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY V. SSINGER. HUA INDICATED CHINESE SATISFACTION AT PRESIDENT FORD'S DROPPING OF THE WORD "DETENTE"; HE CITED APPROVINGLY THE POLICIES EXEMPLIFIED AND PROMOTED BY THE WEST GERMAN CDU, FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF MERY, THE "PRESENT GOVERNMENTS" OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, THE BRITISH OPPOSITION LEADER THATCHER; BUT HE

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SCATHINGLY DENOUNCED MIKI-MIYAZAWA POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. HUA DID NOT RAISE SINO-US BILATERAL RELATIONS, NEVER MENTIONED TAIWAN, AND EVIDENCED NO CURIOSITY ABOUT THE US PRESIDENT L ELECTION. NO LIGHT WHATSOEVER WAS SHED ON THE PRC LEADERSHIP OR HUA'S ROLE WITHIN IT, THOUGH SCHLESINGER AND OTHERS WERE IMPRESSED BY HUA'S AURA OF COMMAND AND APPARENT INTELLIGENCE. END INTRODUCTIVE AND SUMMARY.


2. THE INVITATION. HUA OPENED THE SESSION BY REVIEWING THE BACKGROUND OF THE CHINESE INVITATION TO DR. SCHLESINGER. THE NEW SINO-US RELATIONSHIP HAD BECOME POSSIBLE THROUGH THE "WISE DECISION OF CHAIRMAN MAO"; PRESIDENT NIXON, HUA ADDED, HAD "ALSO MADE HIS CONTRIBUTION." IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP EVOLVING "BY TWISTS AND TURNS," CHAIRMAN MAO HAD PERSONALLY DIRECTED IN 1974 THAT THEN-DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER BE INVITED TO VISIT CHINA. (SCHLESINGER SAYS THAT HE FIRST LEARNED OF THIS INVITATION FROM PRC LO CHIEF HUANG CHEN JUST BEFORE DEPARTING FOR CHINA. THROUGHOUT HIS TRIP CHINESE OFFICIALS ALLUDED OFTEN TO "CHAIRMAN MAO'S INVITATION.") WHEN SCHLESINGER LEFT OFFICE IN 1975, CHAIRMAN MAO INDICATED THAT THE INVITATION SHOULD REMAIN OPEN.

3. COOPERATION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. HUA EMPHASIZED THE INSATIABLE EXPANSIONIST APPETITE OF THE SOVIET UNION NOW MORE GREEDY THAN THE OLD TSARISM WITHOUT CALLING FOR A FORMAL PACT OR SYSTEMATIC COOPERATION AMONG COUNTRIES OPPOSED TO SOVIET HEGEMONY, HUA IMPLICITLY ARGUED FOR AN ANTI-SOVIET FRONT INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- A "POOLING OF OUR EFFORTS TOGETHER AGAINST THE POLAR BEAR." WITH THIS IN MIND:

--THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP HAD PROPOSED TO PRESIDENT NIXON "A LINE" RUNNING THROUGH CHINA, JAPAN, PAKISTAN, IRAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, THE THIRD WORLD, WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES "TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM."

--CHAIRMAN MAO HAD "TRIED TO PERSUADE DR. KISSINGER TO STAY IN JAPAN" AND "TO WORK WITH JAPAN." (HUA DID NOT SPECIFY THE TIME FRAME, BUT DELEGATION MEMBERS INFERRED THAT HE MEANT 1973.) WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN, HUA CONCLUDED, RELATIONS WITH

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THE UNITED STATES CAME FIRST AND WITH CHINA SECOND.

--CHINESE LEADERS HAD "URGED" SECRETARY KISSINGER TO "HELP" PAKISTAN "WHEN HE WAS HERE" -- BUT "HIS-RECENT TRIP INDICATES THAT HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL."


--THE CHINESE HAD "URGED" THE UNITED STATES "TO USE BOTH HANDS" IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BZO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES WHILE MAINTAINING ITS TIES WITH ISREAL. HUA EMPHASIZED THAT THE CHINESE BELIEVED "COMPLETE" SUPPORT OF ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE IN AMERICAN INTERESTS.

THOUGH ALL OF THESE EVENTS WERE DESCRIBED IN THE PAST TENSE, HUA LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT CHINESE THINKING HAS NOT ALTERED, THAT THIS SORT OF INFORMAL ENTENTE TO CONTAIN SOVIET EXPANSIONISM IS THE CORRECT AND ONLY VIABLE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY.

4. STATE OF THE WORLD. HUA DELIVERED A TOUR D'HORIZON FOCUSSING ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE CONTEMPORARY ANTI-SOVIET STRUGGLE; HUA ADHERED CLOSELY TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO'S STANDARD BRIEF AND DIFFERED FROM PUBLIC CHINESE POSITIONS ONLY IN THE SOMETIMES ACIDUOUSLY CANDID DISCUSSION OF WORLD PERSONALITIES.

5. HUA DERIDED THE "SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE," CRITICIZE THE HELSINKI ACCORDS AND CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE AS CREATING THE "FALSE IMPRESSION" THAT THERE EXISTS EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND CONDEMNED ALL AS EVIDENCE OF "MUNICH THINKING" -- A CAPITULATION TO THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IS "OUT TO FINLANDIZE" EUROPE. (TO THIS, DR. SCHLESINGER SUGGESTED THAT "POLANDIZE" MIGHT BE A MORE ACCURATE CHARACTERIZATION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS.) JUST AS IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CRITICIZE AND EXPOSE THE "MUNICH MENTALITY,"

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SO THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS SHOULD NOT BE "COMPLETELY RELIANT ON THE US, FOR THIS WOULD SURELY ERODE THEIR SELF-CONFIDENCE.

6. HUA SPOKE CONTEMPTUOUSLY OF JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER MIKI'S POLICIES AND OBSERVED ACIDLY THAT FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA "WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF SURRENDER HAD HE BEEN A CHINESE LEADER." HUA MADE CLEAR THAT HE REFERRED TO THE MIKI-MIYAZAWA STANCE ON THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE SPECIFICALLY AND TO JAPANESE POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION MORE GENERALLY. ASKED BY DR. SCHLESINGER IF MIYAZAWA'S TOUR OF THE NORTHERN ISLANDS AREA DID NOT CONSTITUTE A HARDENED -- AND THEREFORE IMPROVED -- JAPANESE POSTURE, HUA REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE, TERMING THE INSPECTION "ONLY A SHOW." WITHOUT ELABORATING, HUA INDICATED THAT THE CHINESE FAVOR "DEVELOPMENT" OF THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE.

7. ELSEWHERE HUA SAW ENCOURAGING GLOBAL TRENDS:

--PRESIDENT FORD PUBLICLY DROPPED THE WORD "HEGEMONY" FROM HIS VOCABULARY.

--SOVIET PLUMPING FOR AN ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM HAD HAD "NO EFFECT." MOREOVER, HUA EXTOLLED "THE PRESENT GOVERNMENTS" OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND FOR REMAINING "VIGILANT" AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT.

-IN WEST GERMANY, OSTPOLITIK HAD GRADUALLY "FALLEN APART." HUA PRAISE THE CDU FOR ITS "LUCID" STANCE ON THE QUESTION

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OF RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.

-IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER THATCHER HAD "PUT THE MATTER (OF POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS) FORWARD VERY ACUTELY."

--FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF MERY HAD POINTED OUT DURING HIS JUNE VISIT TO CHINA THAT THE FRENCH DEFENSE EFFORT WAS INCREASING.

8. CHINESE SELF-RELIANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. HUA DELIVERED AN IMPASSIONED DEFENSE OF CHINESE SELF-RELIANCE ALONG FAMILIAR LINES: IMPERIALISTS HAD INFLICTED OPIUM UPON CHINA, CHINA WAS ALL-TOO-ACCURATELY CHARACTERIZED AS THE "SICK MAN OF ASIA," AND CHINESE SELF-CONFIDENCE WAS CONSEQUENTLY IMPAIRED. BUT FOLLOWING 27 YEARS OF "EARTHSHAKING CHANGES," THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAD SHED THEIR INFERIORITY COMPLEX AND BEGUN TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD ACHIEVE WHAT FOREIGN COUNTRIES HAD. YET CHINESE SELF-CONFIDENCE WAS STILL INCOMPLETE EVEN TODAY. FOR THIS REASON, AND BECAUSE THE POST-LIBERATION "YOUNGER GENERATION" COULD NOT WHOLLY COMPREHEND THE SITUATION EXISTING BEFORE 1949, THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP ATTACHED A HIGH PRIORITY TO EDUCATING THE MASSES CONSTANTLY IN THE MEANING OF "SELF-RELIANCE." THE CHINESE, HUA SAID, ARE STRIVING "TO BUILD A MODERN CHINA BY THE END OF THE CENTURY." (DELEGATION MEMBERS AGREE THAT HUA DID NOT ADD THE WORD "SOCIALIST" HERE BEFORE CHINA AS IN THE STANDARD FORMULATION.) IN SO DOING, THE FOCAL POINT OF DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE THE SMALL TOWNS IN THE CHINESE INTERIOR, NOT THE DEVELOPED URBAN CENTERS.

9. IMPRESSIONS OF HUA. DR. SCHLESINGER AND HIS DELEGATION WERE FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY HUA. EXPECTING A RATHER UNSOPHISTICATED AND TENTATIVE APPARATCHIK UNSCHOOLED IN THE INTRICACIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THEY DETECTED INTELLIGENCE, CONFIDENCE, AND AN AURA OF LEADERSHIP. CHINESE OFFICIALS PRESENT TREATED HUA WITH DEFERENCE AND RESPECT (THE PRECEDING DAY, DR. SCHLESINGER OBSERVED, SOME OF THE SAME OFFICIALS HAD REGARDED YEH CHIEN-YING WITH "VENERATION") (REF B). HUA HAD MASTERED HIS BRIEF, REFERRING RARELY TO THE TEXT BEFORE HIM BUT LOOKING TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO FOR OCCASIONAL GUIDANCE WHEN REQUIRED TO ADDRESS UNANTICIPATED

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