

The original documents are located in Box 6, folder “China, unnumbered items - (33), 8/1/76 - 8/28/76” of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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FM USLB PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0899

INFO ANCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE 3568
ANEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 302
ANEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1436
ANEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 111

UNCLAS PEKING 1458

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: APER TPHY CH
SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF USLO PERSONNEL
REF: DEPT 198383

1. WE RECEIVED FOLLOWING TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 9:15 A.M. (LOCAL) AUGUST 1. THE SAME MESSAGE HAS BEEN GIVEN TO OTHER MISSIONS.

QUOTE: AFTERSHOCK HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY GOING ON SINCE THE QUAKE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN TANG SHAN AND FENG NAN AREA. THERE MIGHT BE STRONG EARTHQUAKE WITHIN THIS MONTH IN PEKING. THE EARTHQUAKE CENTRE IS LIKELY TO MOVE NEAR PEKING AREA. CONSIDERING THE SAFETY OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD LIKE TO INFORM THEM THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) THE MINISTRY WOULD PROVIDE ANY CONVENIENCE POSSIBLE FOR THOS DIPLOMATS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS WHO WISH TO LEAVE CHINA TEMPORARILY;
- (2) THOSE WISHING TO LEAVE PEKING FOR CANTON MAY SUBMIT REQUESTS FOR INTERNAL TRAVEL ACCORDING TO THE USUAL PROCEDURE;
- (3) THE MINISTRY ADVISES ALL DIPLOMATS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS TO STAY OUTSIDE OF BUILDINGS. UNQUOTE.

2. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT CHINESE ARE ADVISING US THAT AT MINIMUM PRESENT CONDITIONS IN PEKING (INCLUDING CLOSING OF APARTMENT BUILDINGS AND RESTAURANTS) AND POPULATION LIVING IN SHELTERS ON STREETS WILL CONTINUE FOR THE MONTH

***** WNSR COMMENT *****

SCONCROFT, HYLAND, LL

RECALLED
PSN:605502 PAGE 01 TOR:214/05:10Z DTG:010445Z AUG 76



OF AUGUST. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT THE CHINESE ARE ENCOURAGING MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY TO LEAVE THE VOUNTRY TEMPORARILY.

3. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I HAVE DECIDED TO EVACUATE ALL WIVES AND DEPENDENTS UNLESS THEY SPECIFICALLY CHOOSE TO REMAIN. ALSO INTEND REDUCE STAFF TO ESSENTIAL MEMBERS. NAMES OF THOSE WHO ARE TO LEAVE WILL BE SENT BY SEPTEL.

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RECALLED

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TOR:214/05:15Z

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FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6103

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1462

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CHINA EARTHQUAKE
REF: STATE 190430

1. NANCY TANG CALLED AT USLO EVENING JULY 31 TO ENQUIRE (ON BEHALF OF LEADERSHIP OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS) ABOUT WELFARE OF USLO PERSONNEL AND ABOUT OUR FUTURE PLANS. SHE ALSO TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THANKS FOR MY LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER EXTENDING USG OFFER OF ASSISTANCE. TANG SAID, QTE AS FOR YOUR MESSAGE, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR SYMPATHY BUT AS YOU KNOW OUR PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS RELIED ON OUR OWN EFFORTS AND THIS IS THE CASE NOW. UNQTE. SHE SAID THAT THE CHAIRMAN AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR SYMPATHY TO THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA AFFECTED BY THE EARTHQUAKE. TANG CONCLUDED BY THANKING US ONCE AGAIN FOR OUR SYMPATHY.

2. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION WHEN I AGAIN REFERRED TO OUR GENUINE OFFER OF ANY TYPE OF ASSISTANCE, NANCY TANG SAID, QTE OF COURSE YOU KNOW OUR CONSISTENT PRACTICE OF NOT ACCEPTING ASSISTANCE, BUT WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR SYMPATHY. UNQTE. SHE ADDED THAT THE CASUALTIES AND LOSSES AND DESTRUCTION FROM THE EARTHQUAKE WERE SEVERE BUT THAT GREAT RESCUE EFFORTS WERE UNDERWAY AND THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERCOME THE DAMAGE.

GATES
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY LSR, NARA, DATE 7/30/08

*****HHSR COMMENT*****

SCWCROFT, YLAND, LL

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APPROVED BY P:PC AGIB
EA-OVARMSTRONG
S/S-MR. BRIDGES
EA-RHMILLER

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DECLASSIFIED *State Dept. Rev.*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/21/04
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 1/30/08

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: PRC HARD LINE ON TAIWAN

REF: PEKING 1455

1. WE APPRECIATED YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE TOUGH LANGUAGE THE CHINESE ARE NOW USING ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION. WE ARE CONSIDERING THE ADVISABILITY OF RAISING THE MATTER WITH THE CHINESE ALONG THE LINES YOU SUGGESTED.

2. YOU SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE OF FOLLOWING BACKGROUND CONCERNING GELB STORY THAT APPEARED IN NY TIMES AUGUST 3. STORY RESULTED FROM CONVERSATION THAT SEVERAL US CORRESPONDENTS HAD WITH PRCLO COUNSELOR HSIEN CHI-MEI APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS AGO DURING WHICH HSIEN INSISTED THAT THE ONLY WAY CHINA COULD "LIBERATE" TAIWAN IS THROUGH MILITARY FORCE. HSIEN, WHEN PRESSED, CLAIMED THAT THE PRC POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT TAIWAN'S LIBERATION WOULD



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Department of State

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HAVE TO BE BY MILITARY MEANS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, HSIEN SAID HE PRESUMED THE PRC POSITION ON MILITARY LIBERATION HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO USG. CORRESPONDENTS RECEIVED IMPRESSION THAT HSIEN'S TRANSPARENT PURPOSE IN

MEETING WITH THEM WAS TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE ON MILITARY LIBERATION. WHEN INFORMED THAT GELB INTENDED TO PUBLISH A STORY BASED ON HSIEN'S COMMENTS, HSIEN READILY AGREED ON CONDITION THAT GELB WOULD NOT IDENTIFY OFFICIAL CHINESE AS THE SOURCE.

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~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1582

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR CH
SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL STAFFDEL TRAVEL: THE TAIWAN ISSUE IN THE
PROVINCES

REF: (A) PEKING 1429, (B) PEKING 1580

1. SUMMARY. DESPITE GENERAL EXPECTATION BY HOLT-CZARNECKI STAFFDEL MEMBERS THAT CHINESE IN PROVINCES WOULD HAMMER AWAY AT THE TAIWAN QUESTION A LA WANG HAI-JUNG, THE ISSUE ALO E ONLY IN PASSING OR IN THE CONTEXT OF "CULTURAL" PERFORMANCES. END SUMMARY.

2. THE HOLT-CZARNECKI DELEGATION DEPARTED PEKING FOR THE PROVINCES ON JULY 29 AFTER SUFFERING TWO SHOCKS: THE EARTH-QUAKE, AND THE UNEXPECTEDLY TOUGH LINE ON TAIWAN DELIVERED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG (REF A). BUT IN THE PROVINCES THERE WERE NO FURTHER FORMAL POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AND THE PRIME TOPIC OF POLITE CNVERSATION WAS THE EARTH-QUAKE, NOT THE CONDITIONS OF NORMALIZATION (REF B).

3. ON THE DELEGATION'S FIRST FULL DAY OUT OF PEKING (7/30), A CHILDREN'S GROUP INCLUDED IN ITS PROGRAM THE SONG "TAIWAN COMPATRIOTS ARE OUR FLESH AND BLOOD BROTHERS" WHICH ENDS WITH AN EXPRESSION OF DETERMINATION OF "LIBERATE" TAIWAN. (COMMENT: INCLUSION OF THIS SONG IN PROGRAMS FOR AMERICAL VISITORS IS QUITE USUAL.) FOLLOWING IMMEDIATELY UPON THIS, THE DELEGA-

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Rev.*
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *3/2/04*
BY *KR*, NARA, DATE *7/30/08*





Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 PEKING 01582 120924Z

TION WAS INVITED TO REVIEW A FULL-DRESS DRILL IN BLISETERING HEAT BY THE COMMUNE'S ARMED MILITIA. STILL RECOILING AT THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER'S NOOSE-AND-BAYONETS ANABOPY, SEVERAL DELEGATION MEMBERS SAW IN THIS CONJUNCTION OF ITEMS A NONE-TOO-SUBTLE MESSAGE.


4. TAIWAN WAS NOT AGAIN MENTIONED, HOWEVER, UNTIL A VISIT ON AUGUST 3 TO THE 179TH INFANTRY DIVISION BASED IN THE SUBURBS OF NANKING. AND THERE THE CHINESE TOOK A STANDARD, NOT PARTICULARLY BELLICOSE LINE. ASKED ABOUT THE DIVISION'S MISSION, THE CHIEF OF STAFF RESPONDED: "SINCE WE ARE PART OF A FIELD ARMY, OUR PRIMARY MISSION IS COMBAT. . .TO WIPE OUT AGRESSION BY IMPERIALISM AND THE SOVIET REVISIONISTS . . . AND OUR TAIWAN PROVINCE IS NOT YET LIBERATED."

5. TWO SONGS CONCERNING TAIWAN--THE AFOREMENTIONED ONE AND ANOTHER ENTITLED "TAIWAN'S PEOPLE ARE HOPING FOR LIBERATION"--WERE PERFORMED AT A SHANGHAI CONCERT ON THE EVENING OF AUGUST 8. HERE THERE MUST BE A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF DELIBERATE ORCHESTRATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE VISITORS. TREMENROUS APPLAUSE ISSUED FORTH FROM THE CHINESE MEMBERS OF THE AUDIENCE AS THE EVENING'S STAR PERFORMER SANG THE FIRST FEW BARS OF HER FINAL --"TAIWAN COMPATRIOTS ARE OUR FLESH AND BLOOD BROTHERS." FOLLOWING THE PERFORMANCE, SEVERAL OF THE CHINESE HOST-ESCORTS POINTEDLY ASKED HOW DELEGATION MEMBERS HAD ENJOYED THE SHOW-- ESPECIALLY THE MAIN SINGER AND HER RENDITION OF THE TAIWAN SONG. (BY PRIOR AGREEMENT THE DELEGATION HAD APPLAUDED NEITHER TAIWAN COMPOSITION.)

6. THROUGHOUT THE TRIP VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE CHINESE HOST ORGANIZATION QUESTIONED DELEGATION MEMBERS UN-INFORMALLY ABOUT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION POLITICS, THE OUTLOOK FOR NOVEMBER, THE MOOD OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND CURRENT THINKING AT VARIOUS LEVELS ABOUT NORMALIZATION. WE ARE UNAWARE OF ANY IN-DEPTH CONVERSATIONS ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE.

7. DESPITE THIS RATHER LOW-KEY FOLLOWUP TO THE VICE

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Department of State

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PAGE 03

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FOREIGN MINISTER'S PRESENTATION, THE DELEGATION WILL DOUBTLESS DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE SPACE IN ITS FINAL REPORT TO ITS FINDINGS ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION. IF THEIR PRIVATE COMMENTS TO US ARE A GUIDE, THE REPORT MAY WELL HIGHLIGHT THE GREAT DISTANCE BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE US AND THE PRC.
GATES



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
CONTAINS CODEWORD

August 17, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:


THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

Information Items



Reasons For Castro's Absence From Nonaligned Conference: [redacted]
[redacted] the reasons behind the decision to have vice Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez head the Cuban delegation to the Nonaligned Conference in Sri Lanka. Originally Fidel Castro was to attend the conference, but Cuban authorities did not wish to expose him to any possible debate between African "progressists" and "moderates" about the continuing presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Additionally, it was feared that Castro's presence could compromise the Cuban leadership in debates on the Spanish Sahara and the Middle East.

Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities is Required

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BY WHO NARA, DATE 3/9/2011 9/7/2004

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED *State Dept.*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Review 3/2104*

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/31/08

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison
Office
Mr. Chien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison
Office
Ms. Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter, PRC Liaison
Office

Secretary Kissinger
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary, EA
Winston Lord, Director, S/P
William H. Gleysteen, National Security Council

DATE, TIME
& PLACE:

August 18, 1976
5:00 p.m.
Secretary's Office



Kissinger: When I asked to see you I saw no particular urgency but thought we would benefit from an exchange of views.

Huang: I agree.

Kissinger: We have already expressed our sympathy for the earthquake and the self-reliant approach you have taken in dealing with it.

Huang: Thank you.

Kissinger: It is certainly an unusual attitude in this day.

Huang: The earthquake was very serious, but under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of our Party and with the support of the people, we have learned to overcome great hardships.

Kissinger: Perhaps it would be helpful if I were to review a few issues and bring you up to date on our thinking.

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SECRET - XODS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Huang: Since our last meeting I think you have visited Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Kissinger: Correct. I think you may remember my talk with Chairman Mao where I emphasized the great importance and stabilizing influence of Iran in terms of the Soviet Union. During this trip we discussed continuing military relations and also a considerable expansion of our technological and industrial relations. I visited Afghanistan because the brother of the President said Afghanistan wanted to be more independent of the Soviet Union and hoped for more visible support from the United States. If we can conquer our bureaucracy, we will commence certain projects over the next few months. One of these is a power project and another is an engineering school. We need a cultural revolution in our bureaucracy. (Laughter) Seriously, you know the importance of Pakistan and Prime Minister Bhutto to us. We are also working with Pakistan to improve our various relationships but these are affected by the nuclear issue on which our Congress has inhibitions.


Huang: Dr. Kissinger must still remember Chairman Mao's comment about forming a horizontal curve. You have just visited three of the countries. This is fine.

Kissinger: My visit was very much in the spirit of my conversation with Chairman Mao.

Huang: During that talk Chairman Mao singled out Iraq as a point of particular interest. What is the current situation there?

Kissinger: Iraq is becoming somewhat more dubious about the value of its connection with the Soviets. When the head of our interests section returns to Iraq, he will talk to them on re-establishing relations. Throughout the Middle East the Soviets have proceeded with their usual method of threats such as cutting off aid. Where they do, it has always had a bad effect as we have seen in Syria.

We have also been somewhat active in Africa working particularly with Tanzania and Zambia as well as putting pressure on South Africa to bring about a settlement in Rhodesia and Namibia. A settlement is a possibility, and depending on the prospects I may go to Africa in the first half of September.



Huang: After Angola I have the impression that Soviet influence has been expanding in an even more pronounced way in Africa.

Kissinger: Correct, but we are trying to counteract it. That is why we are giving arms aid to Zaire and Kenya.

Huang: Some time ago Castro claimed, I think through the Swedes, that he would soon withdraw Cuban troops from Angola. By now we can see that this was nothing but a false profession.

Kissinger: Right. That is why we will not accept them (Angola) in the UN. Angola is occupied by Cuba and they cannot maintain themselves without Cuban arms.

Huang: In the long run we believe that foreign forces cannot control and plunder countries such as Angola.

Kissinger: In the long run you are correct though we wish to avoid a repetition of the Angolan situation in Rhodesia and Namibia where the Soviets may otherwise be tempted.

Huang: In the press we have seen some discussion of this possibility.

Kissinger: Yes, but we think we have a chance of defeating such Soviet moves if we succeed with our policies.

I also wish to discuss the matter of communist party participation in West European governments. We oppose such participation. I recognize that you are perhaps not an ideal target for our views, because we once opposed communist participation in the Chinese government. (Laughter). People say that the West European communist parties are independent of Moscow. I don't know if one can judge this to be the case when it is so much in their (communist parties) interest to pretend this. I am suspicious, for example, of the French Communist Party which has always been one of the most loyal Stalinist parties, when it voted overwhelmingly 120 to 0 for a posture of independence. I would have been far more impressed by a closer vote. But the 120 to 0 vote suggests the largest mass conversion in history. I remember the time when the East European communist parties were saying the same thing that we are now hearing from the West European communist parties. I have had a compilation made of these statements and will send one along to you if you like. (Lord to send copy)



In any event our principal concern is that the communist parties will come into power with positions and the kind of public support that will undermine West European defense and lead to the Finlandization of Europe. This is what we are trying to prevent. If you believe the statements you have made to us that the Soviets' basic objective is to make a feint toward the East while attacking the West, I think you must share our concern.

Huang: During our last conversation we also talked about this. Our views are still the same. We think you are too worried about this matter. We believe the West European parties are not simply tools of the Soviets. In saying this I should point out, nevertheless, that we don't have connections with the French and Italian communist parties.

Kissinger: I just wanted to explain our position.

Huang: As we see it the problem faced by Western Europe is the Soviet expansionist threat. The Soviets operate under the banner of detente.


Kissinger: I agree that expansion is the Soviet strategy. The question is how do we deal with it.

Huang: Foreign Minister Chiao recently said to Senator Scott that a policy of detente with the Soviet Union is less and less effective. In any event we do not think the West European communist parties can be viewed simply as a Soviet fifth column.

Kissinger: I must say your Foreign Minister was effective in somehow managing to get his own views across during his discussions with the Senator. Senator Scott has his own ideas and his own solutions. I read with interest the reports of his conversations with your leaders.

Huang: What did you think of Senator Scott's report?

Kissinger: The Senator raised a number of topics too insistently and he advanced certain solutions we would not have proposed. He was so persistent that he seems to have prompted some of your people into firing off some cannons. I say this on the basis of our reports though I recognize it is possible the reports were not accurate.



Huang: I would like to say something about this (Taiwan). Recently people in the United States have made many official and non-official comments about Sino-U.S. relations.

Kissinger: Which have been official? I don't consider the Republican Party platform official.

Huang: (interrupting) I wish to say something. I have something to say. The United States invaded Taiwan (the interpreter incorrectly translated this as "committed aggression against Taiwan") thus owing China a debt. The U.S. must fulfill the three conditions of breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdrawing its military forces from Taiwan, and abrogating its defense treaty with Taiwan. There can be no exception about any of these conditions, and there is no room for maneuver in carrying them out. The delay in normalizing relations is entirely the responsibility of the United States. The method and the time for liberating Taiwan is an internal affair of China and is not discussable. The Chinese position was clear to you even before you sought to re-open relations with us. Now Americans are saying that China's liberation of Taiwan will cripple the development of Sino-U.S. relations. They (Americans) are saying that Sino-U.S. relations will prosper only if the Chinese side takes into account U.S. concerns. This is a premeditated pretext. It is a flagrant threat against China, and we cannot accept it.


Kissinger: What is a threat?

Huang: Vice Premier Chang Chun-chiao and Foreign Minister Chiao told Senator Scott very clearly (what is a threat). I think I should stop here.

Kissinger: I should point out that the statement about taking U.S. views into account doesn't apply principally to the Taiwan issue but rather to our broader cooperation. Certainly I thought reciprocity was a basic Chinese policy.

Huang: I hope we can proceed on the basis of the Shanghai Communique as Vice Premier Chang pointed out to Senator Scott.

Kissinger: It is our firm purpose to do so. We will act on this basis, and not on the basis of what is written in this or that platform. (This was translated in a way suggesting the Chinese did not make the connection to the party platforms.)



Huang: You remember Chairman Mao told you in 1973 that we would have to liberate Taiwan and that we do not believe in peaceful liberation. Vice Chairman Chang explained to Scott that the Shanghai Communique did not specify that the solution to the Taiwan problem would be peaceful or otherwise. May I remind you that I did not come (to see you) for this discussion but I had to say something (about the Taiwan issue).

Kissinger: I appreciate your comments. Basically Vice Premier Chang did not say anything new. Chairman Mao and others have made the same points to us before. We appreciate that this is your basic view. Quite frankly we would not have recommended that Senator Scott open this issue with you as he did. As we told you last year, these election months in the United States are not the time for working out an agreement on normalization of our relations. We must instead move not long after our elections. I assure you we will maintain our support for the Shanghai Communique and will work to complete normalization. Nobody is authorized to speak for us. When we do it, we will do it at this level. I recognize there is not unlimited time. On our side we are doing our utmost to curb unhelpful discussion. We feel private discussion is better than public discussion.

Huang: Is there anything else? Are you going elsewhere in the near future?

Kissinger: Maybe to Africa, depending on the progress of discussions. And I am playing with the idea of going to the Philippines in October to discuss our base negotiations.

Huang: The Philippines also had an unfortunate earthquake.

Kissinger: We have offered them assistance. May I raise one or two bilateral matters. I remember a conversation with your trade minister and the President also mentioned that in certain special trade matters such as the sale of computers, we wish to be helpful to you. But the trouble is that you deal at a very low level through commercial channels. If you approach Mr. Lord or Mr. Hummel we will do our best to make special arrangements to help you. We have problems such as our procedures for dealing with the Soviets, but if we know what you want, we may be able to make exceptions.

Huang: (Following a query to Chien) As Chien says, President Ford did raise this issue with us, and he also points out that we have already replied that we will deal with these matters through commercial channels.



Kissinger: Yes I understand, but this creates infinite problems. I suggest instead that you informally tell Mr. Lord so we can watch and try to be helpful. We know your attachment to private enterprise (laughter), and we are not saying that you should avoid commercial channels. We are simply suggesting that you supplement these by keeping us privately informed.

Huang: All right. I understand and will report your suggestion to Peking.

Kissinger: On Korea. It would of course be best if we could avoid a confrontation. I realize you don't have instructions on the matter, but I should note that there was an event in Korea today in which two Americans were beaten to death. This is a serious matter which could have grave consequences if restraint is not shown.

Huang: I heard about it on the radio, but I don't have any details. As for solution of the Korean question, I think our respective views are well-known to each other. Although I am not informed about the latest incident I can say that we know the Koreans pretty well since they are friendly to us. The Korean people will put up a strong self-defense when they are provoked.

Kissinger: Two U.S. officers are dead and we know from very good pictures that no Koreans were killed. The U.S. officers couldn't have beaten themselves to death.

Huang: Why were the cameras ready?

Kissinger: That is a good question.

Huang: Having the cameras there makes it look as though you were prepared for the incident.

Kissinger: The reason for the cameras is that the observation post nearby the site of the incident takes photographs constantly. Our people were trying to cut down trees which obstructed their view.

Huang: I see.

Kissinger: When is the Foreign Minister coming to the United Nations for the General Assembly?

Huang: I have no news of it so far.



Kissinger: Will you invite him to come down to Washington? I know he will not accept my invitation but he may accept yours.

Huang: As long as the Chiang Kai-shek Embassy is here, he will not come.

Kissinger: We can offer him Camp David.

Huang: We would prefer to come in through the front gate.

Kissinger: I hope we can have our annual exchange.

Huang: Sure we can in New York!

Kissinger: Of course.

Huang: Are you going to Kansas City? We have watched quite a bit of television lately. Last night I watched until 12, although I gave up after the voting.

Kissinger: All the rest was quite unimportant.

Huang: I won't take any more of your time.

Kissinger: You have had many visitors. I think you will have many visitors in September, won't you?


Huang: To whom are you referring?

Kissinger: I think Senator Mansfield is going, and I understand that my former colleague Schlesinger will be inspecting your fortifications during September.

Huang: He will not be making an inspection; rather he has asked to get around the country, and we are trying to accommodate him. Moreover, Senator Mansfield will go to even more places.

Kissinger: I don't object.


Huang: You remember that we invited him (Schlesinger) in 1974. Don't be jealous. You have been to China nine times I believe. You even said you yourself wanted to go to Inner Mongolia.



Kissinger: But I didn't get there. I wanted to go see the musk ox of Mongolia.

Huang: There is only one left. The Mayor of San Francisco offered us a second one, and it was reported to the State Department. But, there has been no action. I understand that the musk ox in San Francisco is related to the one we have in China.

Kissinger: Either we didn't like the musk ox's political attitude or we feared incest. (laughter) But, we will look into it.



MEMORANDUM

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bB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

ACTION

August 23, 1976

[Eyes Only]

→ Pouch

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN *WJ*

SUBJECT:

Secretary Kissinger's Discussion with
Ambassador Huang Chen on U. S. -PRC
Relations and the Taiwan Question

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President which summarizes and analyzes Secretary Kissinger's August 18 conversation with the PRC Ambassador, Huang Chen. At Tab A is the memorandum of conversation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

[Brent: I am not clear that we ever do this kind of thing; giving HK report to Pres; you may just want to brief him.]

Dismissed verbally.
[Signature]

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY 1472, NARA, DATE 7/31/08



bc

I



FBI



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Discussion with
Ambassador Huang Chen on U.S. -PRC
Relations and the Taiwan Question

Introduction and Summary


In his conversation with Secretary Kissinger last week, PRC Ambassador Huang Chen emphasized that there has been no change in the PRC position on "liberation" of Taiwan as it has been stated to us in recent years by Chairman Mao and other leaders. Unlike the conversations with Senator Scott in Peking, he did not brandish the threat of military liberation, but he said flatly that there was no scope for any modification of the PRC's stance on Taiwan. The Ambassador's remarks revealed the extent to which the PRC has been provoked into its recent statements by what they consider to be an orchestrated U.S. attempt to stress the need for post-normalization assurances regarding Taiwan's security.

Background

As you will recall, Vice Premier Chang Chun-chiao told Senator Scott in mid-July that there was "very little possibility" the liberation of Taiwan could be achieved peacefully and he characterized the Taiwan issue as a noose around the neck of the U.S. which, if necessary, the People's Liberation Army would cut off. Although some of the Vice Premier's sharpest remarks to Scott appeared to be a reaction to the Senator's aggressive defense of American interests on Taiwan's security, the Vice Premier's hard line was strikingly tough. He virtually abandoned the element of ambiguity which the Chinese have maintained in recent years on the question of whether Taiwan's liberation would be military or peaceful.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Rev. 3/2/04*
NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY LSN, NARA, DATE 7/31/08



Shortly after the Scott visit, a PRC liaison office official took essentially the same line in discussions with correspondents in Washington, and since then knowledge of the hard line has spread through public media. Members of a Congressional staff delegation which has just returned from China were treated to the same tough stance, which some of them are planning to highlight in reports to their committees.

In this context, and with sufficient advance notice so that he could receive necessary instructions from Peking, Secretary Kissinger asked to see Ambassador Huang on August 18.

Summary of Conversation

After referring to "many official and non-official comments" made recently in the United States about U.S. -PRC relations, Huang repeated the standard PRC litany that:

-- the United States invaded Taiwan and thus owes China a debt;

-- in order to normalize relations with the PRC, the United States must fulfill the three conditions of breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdrawing our military forces from Taiwan, and abrogating the defense treaty -- "There can be no exception about any of these conditions, and there is no room for maneuver in carrying them out";

-- the delay in normalizing relations is entirely the responsibility of the United States; and

-- as made clear even before the United States sought to reopen relations with China, the method and the time for liberating Taiwan is an internal Chinese affair "and is not discussable."

Huang then went on to deliver the thrust of his message. "Now Americans are saying that China's liberation of Taiwan will cripple the development of Sino-U.S. relations. They are saying that Sino-U.S. relations will prosper only if the Chinese side takes into account U.S. concerns. This is a premeditated pretext. It is a flagrant threat against China, and we cannot accept it." (Huang declined to identify what he meant by "threat", but presumably he had in mind recent U.S. emphasis on Taiwan's security such as Senator Scott's comment to Vice Premier Chang that "Our policy is not to interfere in your internal



affair -- but we stand ready to back up our commitment to Taiwan. We believe it would be in default of the Shanghai Communique if there were a resort to arms. Any such action would arouse 215 million Americans. I would continue to urge progressing along the path of peace. While we recognize your rights, I ask you to recognize our difficulties. ")

Huang reminded Secretary Kissinger of Chairman Mao's statement to the Secretary in 1973 that Taiwan must be liberated and that the Chinese do not believe this can be done peacefully. Huang noted that the Shanghai Communique does not specify whether the solution to the Taiwan problem would be peaceful or otherwise.

Noting that Scott's remarks seem to have provoked Chang into "firing some cannons", Secretary Kissinger acknowledged that Chang's remarks were not basically new. He assured Ambassador Huang that we did not approve of Scott's having raised the issue of Taiwan; no one below Kissinger's own level was authorized to speak for the United States on this issue. He said that we recognize there is not unlimited time and that we must move not long after our elections to work out an agreement on completing normalization on the basis of the Shanghai Communique. In an effort to bring a halt to the continuing echoing of Chang's hard line on Taiwan before various American audiences, the Secretary also noted that we thought private discussion of such issues is better than public discussion.

Conclusion

Huang, who was obviously speaking with careful instructions from his government, went out of his way to emphasize that the position on Taiwan taken by Vice Premier Chang with Senator Scott was not new and was in fact consistent with comments the Chinese had made to us since the Shanghai Communique and even before. While indicating no greater flexibility than Vice Premier Chang, Huang seemed to be softening the Vice Premier's bluntness, reverting to the more familiar formulation that the method of Taiwan's liberation was strictly an internal Chinese matter which probably could not be achieved by peaceful means. Moreover, the Ambassador's comments indicated clearly that the PRC's recent tough line on Taiwan reflects Chinese concern about slippage in the U. S. position on Taiwan, even to the point of believing there is a concerted -- and probably U. S. Government-inspired -- attempt to stress the need for assurances about the security of Taiwan after full



normalization of relations. While it is clear the Chinese have been using shock treatment to counteract what they consider an unhelpful trend in U.S. opinion, it is still not clear whether they fully calculated in advance the risk that such tactics might intensify anxieties in the U.S. and strengthen the very trends which they object to.

The Ambassador's remarks threw no light on the extent to which current Chinese domestic events are affecting Chinese policy toward the United States. On balance, however, they reinforce our impression that recent events in China have not altered the PRC's appraisal of the strategic advantage of its U.S. connection or led to any significant stepping up in its timetable for resolving the Taiwan problem. But at the same time the whole affair reflects a new power structure in Peking and new personalities resulting in considerably less subtlety and sophistication than associated with former Premier Chou En-lai. Moreover, whether Peking is conveying either the blunt line of Vice Premier Chang or emphasizing the continuity of its position along the lines of Ambassador Huang, the message in both cases underscores Peking's determination to leave us minimal scope to deal with our concern about the security of Taiwan and the problem of peaceful settlement.



6E



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
8	23	8	24	16	76047674

INITIAL ACTION 0 6F

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: SECSTATE Gleystes S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT _____
 SCOWCROFT F _____ SECDEF _____ LOU NO FORN NODIS _____
 HYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS _____
 DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC _____ S CODEWORD _____
 OTHER _____ TS SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Kissinger Decision w/ Genl Henry on 18 Aug 1976 - LA

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH						MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. _____
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES. _____
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR _____
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION. _____
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS						MEMO _____ TO _____
FAR EAST/ PRC						RECOMMENDATIONS. _____
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO. _____
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE. _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: _____
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
8/23		Staff	X	Decision	8/31	
8-30		USO's	C	Scroft discussed verbally w/ Pres		

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

SPECIAL INDEXING: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED

MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODISACTION

August 23, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN *WJ*

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Discussion with
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Relations and the Taiwan Question

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
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY LSR, NARA, DATE 7/31/08

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSECRET/NODIS*Did not go forward*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Discussion with
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SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept.*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Rev. 3/2/04*
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 142, NARA, DATE 7/31/08



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
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
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
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OP IMMED
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DE RUFNPS #5060/01 2411740
O 281738Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4422

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 25060

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XDS=3
TAGS: PFOR VN US
SUBJECT: U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM
REF: A) STATE 177234; B) PARIS 21018

1. VIETNAMESE FIRST SECRETARY, DO THANH, ACCOMPANIED BY SECOND SECRETARY, LE NGOC LUAN, CAME TO THE EMBASSY AT 1600 LOCAL AUGUST 28 TO DELIVER THE SRV FOREIGN MINISTRY'S NOTE IN ANSWER TO OUR NOTE OF JULY 19 (REF A). SRV NOTE IS NOT DATED, BUT DO THANH SAID WE CAN CONSIDER THE DATE TO BE AUGUST 28, THE DATE OF THE SRV EMBASSY COVERING NOTE. DO THANH SAID THAT THE ONLY TEXT RECEIVED WAS THE VIETNAMESE TEXT; HENCE THE SRV EMBASSY PREPARED A QTE NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION ENDQTE INTO FRENCH, PARA 2. WE HAVE PREPARED OUR INFORMAL TRANSLATION FROM THE FRENCH, PARA 3. THE ORIGINAL VIETNAMESE VERSION IS BEING POUCHED TO EA/VLC. DO THANH'S ORAL COMMENTS ABOUT SUBSEQUENT STEPS ARE COVERED IN PARAS 4 AND 5.

2. TRADUCTION NON-OFFICIELLE. LE MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE LA REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTE DU VIETNAM A L'HONNEUR D'ACCUSER RECEPTION DE LA NOTE EN DATE DU 19 JUILLET 1976 DU DEPARTEMENT D'ETAT DES ETATS-UNIS AMERIQUE.

LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTE DU VIETNAM A, EN MANTES OCCASIONS, EXPRIME SON POINT DE VUE SUR L'ACCORD DE PARIS AT AUR LA NORMALIZATION DES RELATIONS ENTRE LE VIETNAM ET LES ETATS-UNIS. CE POINT DE VUE A ETE AUSSI REAFFIRME DANS LA NOTE DU 19 JUIN 1976 ADRESSEE AUX ETATS-UNIS.

EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES RENCONTRES ENTRE LES REPRESENTANTS DES DEUX PARTIES A PARIS, LA REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTE DU VIETNAM SUGGERE COMME SUIV: LE CONSEILLER

***** *HHSR COMMENT *****

HYLAND,LL

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY KTR, NARA, DATE 7/31/08



MEETING SAYING THAT TALKS WOULD TAKE PLACE, OR SOME ANNOUNCEMENT OR COMMUNIQUE AFTER THE FIRST MEETING. A THIRD ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE COMPLETE SILENCE CONCERNING THE INITIAL CONTACTS. THE RTE LIAISON OFFICERS ENDOTE COULD DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WHEN THEY DISCUSSED THE DATE AND PLACE OF THE FIRST MEETING.

6. DO THANH SAID THAT LE NGOC LUAN HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM HANOI WHERE HE HAD BEEN WORKING ON OTE WESTERN COUNTRIES ENDOTE. HE WAS THEREFORE UP ON ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND WOULD BE ONE OF THE SRV PARTICIPANTS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON LUAN AS WELL AS TRAN HOAN.

GAMMON

BT

RECALLED

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:241/17:56Z

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OF IMMED
FJL954
DE RUFNPS #5868/02 2411740
O 281738Z AUG 76
FM ANEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4423

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 25860

EXDIS
MISSION IS THE COUNTERPART OF MINISTER GAMMON. AS FOR THE SITES, THE SRV BELIEVES WE SHOULD HAVE CONVENIENT, CENTRAL LOCATIONS, NOT THE SUBURBS. FOR ITS PART, THE SRV IS THINKING IN TERMS OF ONE OF THE BUILDINGS, OTHER THAN THE CHANCERY, WHICH IT OWNS; DO THANH MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY AS A POSSIBILITY THE BUILDING ON AVENUE MADRID IN NEUILLY WHICH HAD FOR A TIME BEEN THE PRG HEADQUARTERS. EMBOFF ASKED WHETHER THE SRV WOULD ACCEPT, AS SITE PROPOSED BY OUR SIDE, A RESIDENCE, SUCH AS THAT OF THE MINISTER; DO THANH TOOK NOTE AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

5. DO THANH SAID THAT WE COULD NOT MOVE FORWARD IN DISCUSSING PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS UNTIL AFTER WASHINGTON HAD AGREED TO THE GENERAL PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN THE NOTE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO BASIC PROBLEMS. HE THOUGHT WE COULD EASILY WORK OUT WHETHER WE SHOULD USE VIETNAMESE AND ENGLISH AS LANGUAGES FOR THE TALKS (DO THANH SAID THEY COULD PROVIDE VIETNAMESE/ ENGLISH INTERPRETERS) OR WHETHER BOTH SIDES WOULD USE FRENCH. HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD SUPPLEMENT THE TALKS WITH MORE SPECIFIC QTE AIDES MEMOIRE ENDQTE OR QTE BOUTS DE PAPIER ENDQTE REFLECTING VIEWS FROM THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS WHEN THERE WERE THORNY QUESTIONS REQUIRING PRECISE QUESTIONS OR ANSWERS. DO THANH ASKED ABOUT HOW MANY PERSONS MIGHT PARTICIPATE ON OUR SIDE; HE THOUGHT THAT, DEPENDING ON THE LANGUAGE USED THERE WOULD BE ABOUT FOUR ON THE SRV SIDE. EMBOFF SAID WE DID NOT HAVE PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT, BUT THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD NOT BE NUMEROUS. AS FOR PRESS RELATIONS, THE SRV CONTINUES TO HAVE AS BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT ALL RELEASES TO THE PRESS SHOULD BE AFTER MUTUAL AGREEMENT. WE COULD HAVE GENERAL COMMUNIQUE BEFORE THE FIRST

***** *WHSR COMMENT *****

HYLAND,LL

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PAGE 01



DE L'AMBASSADE DU VIETNAM A PARIS SERA LE REPRESENTANT DE LA REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTE DU VIETNAM; LES RENCONTRES AURONT LIEU EN DEHORS DE LA CHANCELLERIE DE CHAQUE PARTIE ET SERONT ALTERNATIVEMENT ARRANGEES PAR LES DEUX PARTIES.

SI LA PARTIE AMERICAINE EST DU MEME AVIS, LES OFFICIERS DE LIAISON DES DEUX PARTIES POURRONT SE RENCONTRER EN VUE DES DISCUSSIONS SUR LA DATE ET LE LIEU DE LA PREMIERE RENCONTRE.

3. EMBASSY'S INFORMAL TRANSLATION FROM FRENCH INTO ENGLISH: QTE THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS THE HONOR TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE NOTE DATED 19 JULY 1976 FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, HAS, ON MANY OCCASIONS, EXPRESSED ITS POINT OF VIEW ON THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND ON THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES. THIS POINT OF VIEW HAS ALSO BEEN REAFFIRMED IN THE 19 JUNE 1976 NOTE ADDRESSED TO THE UNITED STATES.

CONCERNING THE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO PARTIES IN PARIS, THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SUGGESTS AS FOLLOWS: THE COUNSELLOR OF THE EMBASSY OF VIETNAM IN PARIS WILL BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM; THE MEETINGS WILL TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE THE CHANCERIES OF EACH PARTY AND WILL BE ALTERNATELY ARRANGED BY THE TWO PARTIES.

IF THE AMERICAN PARTY AGREES, THE LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE TWO PARTIES CAN MEET WITH A VIEW TO DISCUSSIONS OF THE DATE AND PLACE FOR THE FIRST MEETING.

4. DO THANH SAID THAT THE SRV REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE COUNSELLOR TRAN HOAN, WHO AS NUMBER TWO MAN IN THEIR

BT



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PAGE 02

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