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TELEGRAM

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FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1310

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH US
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO "VERY PROBABLY" WILL ATTEND UNGA

DURING PEKING VISIT OF SENATOR SCOTT, I PRIVATELY ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO IF HE WOULD BE GOING TO THE UNGA THIS FALL. HE SAID, "VERY PROBABLY." I THEN MENTIONED POSSIBILITY THAT I MIGHT JOIN HIM AND SECRETARY WHEN THEY MEET IN NEW YORK.
GATES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

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TELEGRAM

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NODIS
CHEROKEE, FOR AMBASSADRGATES FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: CHANG CHUN-CHIAO'S MEETING WITH SENATOR SCOTT

REF: PEKING 1283, PEKING 1288, PEKING 1293

1. I APPRECIATED YOUR RAPID AND FULL REPORTING ON SENATOR SCOTT'S MEETING WITH VICE PREMIER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO JULY 13 AND YOUR PROMPT ANALYSIS. I WANT YOU TO HAVE OUR OWN INITIAL REACTION TO THIS DEVELOPMENT.

2. IN TERMS OF BASIC PRINCIPLES, CHANG NEITHER CHANGED NOR ADDED TO THE CHINESE POSITION ON TAIWAN AND US-PRC RELATIONS. HE EXPLICITLY STATED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD CONTINUE TO ACT IN ACCORD WITH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND AFFIRMED CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO DO SO. CHANG'S REFERENCE TO THE THREE POINTS IN THE SO-CALLED JAPAN

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DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2104*
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FORMULA WAS SIMPLY THE REITERATION OF A POSITION THAT THE CHINESE HAVE PRESENTED TO US ON A VARIETY OF OCCASIONS GOING BACK TO MY VISIT TO PEKING IN NOVEMBER 1974. ON THE CRUCIAL QUESTION OF A "PEACEFUL SOLUTION" TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION, NOT ONLY DO THE US AND CHINESE POSITIONS DIFFER IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, BUT NONE OF THE CHINESE LEADERS, INCLUDING CHOU, MAO, AND TENG, HAS EVER LIFTED THE THREAT THAT THE TAIWAN PROBLEM WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE TO

BE RESOLVED BY MILITARY MEANS. WHILE THEIR FORMULATIONS VARY, ON MORE THAN ON OCCASION, INCLUDING STATEMENTS AT THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE LEVEL, THEY HAVE REFERRED TO THE MILITARY LIBERATION OF TAIWAN AS PROBABLY INEVITABLE. THEY HAVE NEVER, HOWEVER, ADVANCED ANY PRECISE TIME FRAME IN WHICH THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE, AND WE NOTE THAT CHANG TOO DID NOT IMPLY THAT THERE WAS ANY DEADLINE FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE CHINESE POSITION ON TAIWAN REMAINS UNCHANGED. MOREOVER, FOR ALL HIS DISDAIN ABOUT THE US--E.G. ON ANGOLA--CHANG REMINDED SCOTT THAT IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WE HAVE MANY POINTS IN COMMON.

3. ON BALANCE, WHILE WE DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT CHANG'S OUTBURST REPRESENTS A HARDENING OF PRC ATTITUDES, BOTH CHANG AND CH'IAO WOULD NOT HAVE GONE AS FAR AS THEY DID IF SCOTT HAD NOT CONFRONTED THEM SO DIRECTLY ON TAIWAN AND PERSISTED IN ARGUING SO STUBBORNLY. (I PERSONALLY ADVISED SCOTT THAT HE SHOULD NOT PRESS THE CHINESE ON THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE.) PARTICULARLY AFTER READING THE FULL TRANSCRIPT OF SCOTT'S MEETING WITH CH'IAO THE DAY BEFORE, WE ARE STRUCK BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE CHINESE MAY HAVE FELT THEY WERE BEING PRESSED ON THE "PEACEFUL LIBERATION" ISSUE. SCOTT'S OWN EFFORTS BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR PEKING TO PLAY UP THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS MISSION AND TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS A PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY MAY WELL HAVE REINFORCED THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN CHINESE MINDS. IT WAS A PARTICULARLY TOUGH WEEK FOR THE CHINESE ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE IN VIEW OF THE OLYMPICS IMBROGLIO AND MIYAZAWA'S STATEMENTS ON US-PRC RELATIONS. MOREOVER, CHANG'S REACTION TO SCOTT MUST BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S

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PAGE 03

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EXPLICIT STATEMENTS THAT NORMALIZATION WILL NOT BE COMPLETED THIS YEAR AS WELL AS AN INCREASE IN PUBLIC COMMENTARY IN THE US REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING TAIWAN'S SECURITY.

4. CHANG HAS LONG HAD THE REPUTATION OF BEING CLOSE TO THE IDEOLOGICAL LEFT, BUT THE PICTURE OF HIM THAT EMERGES IN THE FLESH IS EVEN MORE ABRASIVE, MILITANT, AND POLEMICAL THAN WE HAD IMAGINED. (WE FOUND YOUR OBSERVATIONS ON HIS Demeanor VERY PERCEPTIVE.) EVEN THOUGH WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC ISSUES AND POWER RIVALRIES LIE AT THE ROOT OF THE DIVISIONS WITHIN PEKING'S CURRENT LEADERSHIP, CHANG'S PERFORMANCE GIVES US INSIGHT INTO THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS THAT A GREATER LEFTIST ROLE IN THE LEADERSHIP COULD HAVE ON CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY. IF CHANG'S STAR IS IN FACT RISING, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES DEALING INCREASINGLY WITH A MAN WHOSE STYLE

AND MANNERISMS DO NOT SIT WELL WITH AMERICANS AND WHO SEEMS REMARKABLY UNCONCERNED ABOUT ESTABLISHING PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH HIS GUESTS, AS YOU SO ACCURATELY POINTED OUT.

5. IF CHANG CONTINUES TO BE THE RANKING PRC LEADER WHO MEETS WITH US DELEGATIONS, OR IF OTHER CHINESE DEALING WITH AMERICANS BEGIN TO ECHO HIS REMARKS ON THIS OCCASION, WE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL HAVE A CUMULATIVELY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES REGARDING FURTHER NORMALIZATION. ROBINSON

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INFORMATION

SECRET - GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: The Passing of Chu Te and China's Domestic Politics

The death of Chu Te, the 90-year old Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress, has further reduced the ranks of the old guard. Chu Te, as the founder of the Peoples Liberation Army, was the only Chinese leader after the death of Chou En-lai whose historical role and prestige approached that of Mao. Although his formal role in the regime was only ceremonial, Chu probably represented an independent voice in the Politburo during critical decisions. Chu, for example, reportedly supported the moderate policies of Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Two poems by Chu, published in March, implicitly criticized the campaign against Teng and the resultant disunity in the Party.

The Central Leadership Organs

Chu's death brings to four the number of vacancies in the Politburo Standing Committee (out of a membership of nine) and probably enhances the strength of the two Shanghai leftist leaders in the Standing Committee, Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao and Wang Hung-wen. The only remaining moderate in the Standing Committee is the aging and ailing Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying. Premier Hua Kuo-feng, who is now Senior Vice Chairman of the Party, is presumably a Standing Committee member, although he has not been identified as such.

It is unlikely that the regime will in the near future be able to fill the vacant positions in the Politburo and the Standing Committee or to name a replacement for Teng Hsiao-p'ing as PLA Chief of Staff. The empty slots in the central leadership indicate the continuing standoff between the contending factions. It is problematical whether the Standing Committee itself is still functioning or whether an ad hoc group within the Politburo may currently be the ultimate decision-making body.

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The Left

In any event, the leftists, with Mao's support, appear to have the political initiative. They should obtain further leeway with the passing of Chu Te. In addition to the Standing Committee and Party headquarters, leftist political strength resides in the central media, the students, the militia, the PLA political department, and the industrial heart of China -- Shanghai.

There are still many constraints on the leftists, however. Most importantly, they seem to have little support among provincial leaders, military commanders, or the government bureaucracy. The leftists also would be unlikely to control a meeting of the Central Committee as presently composed.

Thus, the leftists, a disparate group apparently led by Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao, are probably anxious to exploit the advantage they currently enjoy at the center before Mao dies. They must move on two fronts -- seeking where possible to weaken their opposition and at the same time broaden their own support. The July 1 joint editorial marking the Chinese Communist Party anniversary, while relatively constrained, indicated the regime's preoccupation with the domestic political struggle, and clearly suggested the need for the removal of at least a small group of Teng and Chou supporters.

The left is most probably concerned about gaining allies among the military. The role of people like Chien Hsia-lien, the Commander of the Peking Military Region, will be critical. The alignment of military commanders, however, remains the murkiest element of the obscure Peking domestic scene. Most military commanders are probably biding their time until the Chairman dies.

The role of Premier Hua Kuo-feng, and several others in the leadership who are apparently not factional partisans but essentially Mao loyalists, will also be vital to the course of the power struggle. Hua's control over the Public Security organs has obvious implications. In line with Mao's proclivities, Hua will presumably seek to protect the left. But, like Mao, the thrust of Hua's leadership may be to retain a dynamic balance between the left and the right. If so, Hua will probably not wish to see the left consolidate or expand its position at the Party center in the wake of the death of Chu Te.



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The Prospect

The political structure in the PRC is probably more fragile today than it has ever been -- including during the Cultural Revolution. Mao's presence remains the key, but it is now a lingering presence and the old Chairman presumably cannot assert a dynamic role. Yet, so long as he lives, he retains the aura of political authority and the leadership stalemate is likely to continue. Realignment that will determine the shape of the post-Mao regime, however, may already be taking shape.

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P 180033Z JUL 76
FM THE WHITE HOUSE//WASH 159//

TO USLO PEKING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH60997

WASH 159

TO: AMBASSADOR GATES, PEKING

FOR: SENATOR SCOTT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. WE APPRECIATED THE PROMPT REPORTING ON YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRC FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO AND VICE PREMIER CHANG. THE PRESIDENT HOPES TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE WITH YOU WHEN YOU RETURN TO WASHINGTON. THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY NEW AND WORRISOME ELEMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE VICE PREMIER'S REMARKS. IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS, I AM SURE YOU AGREE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MATTER REMAINING COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL YOU CAN DISCUSS IT WITH THE PRESIDENT.

WARM REGARDS
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
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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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PEKING 162 19 JULY 1976
FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: AMB. GATES, PEKING

1. SENATOR SCOTT LEFT PEKING JULY 14. HE IS NOW IN DAIREN AND LEAVES FOR SOOCHOW AND SHANGHAI JULY 20. HE WILL LEAVE SHANGHAI JULY 24 AT 1600 HOURS FOR HONOLULU ON U.S. AIR FORCE VC-135, TAIL NUMBER 624127, CAPTAIN: ROBERT E. LOWELL.

2. WHILE WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SEND USLO OFFICER WITH MESSAGE TO SOOCHOW, VISIT IS UNLIKELY SCOTT WILL SEE ANY MORE NEWSMEN UNTIL ARRIVAL GUAN OR HONOLULU. SUGGEST YOU REPEAT YOUR MESSAGE TO SCOTT TO PLANE COMMANDER FOR DELIVERY IN SHANGHAI.

3. SENATOR SCOTT LEFT PEKING BEFORE MEMCONS WERE WRITTEN BY USLO OFFICER. HE HAS NOT SEEN MEMCONS. THEREFORE, FIRST SENTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE TO SENATOR SCOTT SHOULD BE CHANGED. HIS STAFF HAS ASKED THAT BOTH MEMCONS BE SENT TO CINCPAC HONOLULU TO AWAIT HIS ARRIVAL. WE PLAN TO FORWARD MEMCONS AS REQUESTED UNLESS YOU OR SECRETARY HAVE OTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

WARM REGARDS
GATES

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
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BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

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DESCRIPTION re reported statements

CREATION DATE 07/19/1976

VOLUME 1 page

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COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE
FILES

BOX NUMBER 6

FOLDER TITLE China unnumbered items (32)

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE//WASH 160//

TO USLD PEKING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS WH61000

WASH 160

JULY 19, 1976

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO: AMBASSADOR GATES, PEKING

I APPRECIATED YOUR PEKING 162 INFORMING ME OF SENATOR SCOTT'S DEPARTURE JULY 14. I HAVE ARRANGED FOR THE MESSAGE TO BE CARRIED TO THE SENATOR BY THE PILOT, AS YOU SUGGESTED.

WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF MEMCONS, IN VIEW OF THEIR SENSITIVITY I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THEM TO BE RETURNED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT VIA POUCH TO BE HELD FOR THE SENATOR.

WARM REGARDS,

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

*****WHHR COMMENT*****

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
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DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/2104
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR ZA SF
SUBJ: SECURITY COUNCIL: ZAMBIAN COMPLAINT

REF: (A) USUN 2959, (B) PRETORIA 3086

1. WHEN I SAW BRAND FOURIE LAST WEEK (REFTEL B), I INDIRECTLY INQUIRED WHETHER SAG WAS IN TOUCH WITH GOZ TO DISCUSS ALLEGED INCIDENT AT SHESHEKE AND THEREBY LIMIT POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO SOUTH AFRICAN-ZAMBIAN RELATIONS WHICH COULD HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT ON CURRENT INITIATIVES. FOURIE DID NOT TAKE UP THIS OPENING.

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT WHEN PORTUGUESE WERE ENGAGED IN ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE THEIR FORCES OCCASIONALLY MADE INCURSIONS INTO ZAMBIAN TERRITORY. GOP QUICKLY FOLLOWED THESE UP WITH APOLOGIES AND OFFERS OF COMPENSATION WHICH MOLIFIED GOZ AND LIMITED DAMAGE TO RELATIONS.

3. I WOULD THINK THAT WITH GOOD RELATIONSHIP BUILT UP OVER PAST YEAR BETWEEN KAUNDA AND FOSTER, SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD HAVE QUICKLY APPROACHED ZAMBIANS AFTER SHESHEKE TO CLARIFY MATTERS AND TO MAKE AMENDS IF SAG FORCES WERE INDEED INVOLVED. MY INDIRECT QUESTION TO FOURIE WAS DESIGNED TO ELICIT THIS INFORMATION OR SUGGEST DESIRABILITY OF SAG

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PAGE 02

PRETOR 03215 211750Z

TAKING SUCH AN INITIATIVE.

4. IN FACE OF APPARENT GOZ DETERMINATION TO PRESS FOR UNSC CONSIDERATION OF ALLEGED SAG INCURSION (REFTEL A), I THINK IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ME TO SEE PM VORSTER TO INQUIRE WHETHER SAG HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GOZ ON INCIDENT AND WHAT STEPS SAG MIGHT HAVE TAKEN OR COULD TAKE TO PERSUADE GOZ NOT TO PUSH UNSC CASE. I THINK THIS COULD BE DONE IN FRIENDLY WAY WITHOUT ANTAGONIZING PM. ADVISE.
BOWDLER



~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/2104*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/11/08

PARTICIPANTS:


President Ford
Senator Hugh Scott (R. - Pa.)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary
of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, July 28, 1976
10:26 a.m. - 10:54 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office



[General Scowcroft joined the meeting when it was already in progress.]

Scott: I spent two delightful weeks in China.

Let me give you these Chinese stamps. [Discussion of the effect of Reagan choosing Schweiker on the other Pennsylvania delegates.]

I have written a letter to you with the transcript of my talks with Chang Chun-chiao. It is clear to us that the radicals -- Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hung-wen, etc. -- are in control of the propaganda machine and the security forces. The word is the same no matter who you talk to: "We must fight the right wing" -- attacks on Teng -- "liberate Taiwan." Chiao Kuan-hua is more of an old friend and tempered it a bit, but they went through the Taiwan thing. But Chang Chun-chiao was tough: Taiwan could only be liberated by force -- through the PLA, and with local forces rising in support.

I made the point that U.S. foreign policy would be constant to China regardless of the election result, but they kept repeating the Taiwan line. It was rather chilling. On Hong Kong they said it was different. There were treaty relations and they would move at an appropriate time and it was an internal matter but it was different.

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They said we had the wrong impression of the timeframe on Taiwan -- it would be soon.


My hunch is this is a campaign to get the jump on the moderates when Mao dies.

Chou's name was never mentioned.

The use of the PLA was sometimes sprinkled with references to the Japanese formula. The inference was maybe there would be no violence if we agreed to the Japanese formula.

The President: They said they wouldn't move before the election. Did they give you a time?

Scott: They said Chou En-lai had given an open time, and that was not correct. They clearly implied 1977 was the year of decision. But remember, they wanted all this to get to you.



The President: How about their attitude to the Soviet Union?

Scott: Still as bitter as ever. And they now used the Soviet Union by name, whereas in 1972 when I was there, they made only indirect references. They even took us into the tunnels under Dairen. The tunnels are equipped with supplies and for defense.

They told me war was inevitable and they had to be prepared.

The President: It is interesting that Teng Hsiao-ping talked aggressively against the Soviet Union and the successors do the same. Did you see Hua Kuo-feng?

Scott: There was one curious exception. In Suchow, no one went into the internal dialogue. I hope your intelligence people will look into that.

Kissinger: We should look into it. That is one of their largest provinces. That cannot be a coincidence. What did they say?

Scott: There were no attacks on Taiwan, or the right wing, or Teng. Just stories about the fruit crops, etc.

The President: Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister, last night pushed his thesis that we must do more to get the Chinese on our side.

Kissinger: That can't be. We can support the anti-Soviet policies and pursue parallel policies, but they don't operate on emotion.

Scott: I think we should use some kind of influence with Taiwan. There is no movement at all on their part to promote reconciliation. I am not sure there can't be a peaceful resolution to it.

The President: Do you have to report to the Senate? I would soften it somewhat.

Kissinger: If you stress their insistence on a military solution, that is a two-edged sword. The right wingers might say, "Okay, forget it."

They clearly are trying to tell us that we don't have unlimited time. But they don't have the capability to take Taiwan over in the next few years.

Scott: I agree with all that. But I think Taiwan could do something to make the situation less intractable.

The President: In your report I would minimize the change to a more aggressive viewpoint.


Scott: I could say they insisted on discussing Taiwan and they wanted movement.

[Secretary Kissinger leaves]

Barnett was very helpful. I think if he separates himself from association with me and writes for Foreign Affairs, it is okay. He will probably stress that their patience is wearing thin.

The President: Can you control him?

Scott: I will do my best.



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DECLASSIFIED *State Dept.*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *Review 3/21/04*
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/30/08

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS:

SUBJECT: VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL
STAFF DELEGATION AND VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG
HAI-JUNG

REF: PEKING 1429

TIME: 4:00 PM TO 5:45 PM, WEDNESDAY JULY 28, 1976
PEKING HOTEL

PARTICIPANTS:

- CHINESE:
- WANG HAI-JUNG, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 - KE PO-NIEN, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 - KANG TAI-SHA, DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 - FAN KUD-HSIANG, RESPONSIBLE PERSON, CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 - CHENG WAN-CHEN, INTERPRETER FOR THE SESSION; RESPONSIBLE PERSON OF CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 - KU YI-JEN, CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 - KU KE-PING, CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 - YIN TSO-CHIN, CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 - TANG WEN-SHENG, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AMERICAS AND OCEANIA DEPARTMENT, CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY

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TING YUAN-HUNG, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES DESK, CHINESE FOREIGN
MINISTRY
CHIN KUI-HUA, CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY
WANG LI, CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY
HU FENG-HSIEN, CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY; NOTETAKER FOR SESSION
CHENG HUA-SHE, NCNA REPORTER


AMERICAN:

- PAT M. HOLT, CO-LEADER, CHIEF OF STAFF, SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE
- MARIAN A. CZARNECKI, CO-LEADER, CHIEF OF STAFF, HOUSE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
- MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, CHIEF COUNSEL, SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE
- JOHN R. STARK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
- ALISON SPENNER, STAFF CONSULTANT, HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
- HYDE H. MURRAY, COUNSEL, HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE
- ROBERT A. BEST, CHIEF ECONOMIST, SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE
- WILLIAM H. JORDAN, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER, SENATE
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
- LINDA KAMM, GENERAL COUNSEL, HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE
- HAROLD T. LAMAR, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER, HOUSE WAYS
AND MEANS COMMITTEE
- W. CLARK MCPADDEN II, COUNSEL, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
- RICHARD M. MOSSE, STAFF ASSOCIATE, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
- THOMAS R. SAYLOR, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER, SENATE AGRICULTURE
AND FORESTRY COMMITTEE
- JOHN H. SULLIVAN, SENIOR STAFF CONSULTANT, HOUSE INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS COMMITTEE
- KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, SWARTHMORE
COLLEGE
- JAN CAROL BERRIS, PROGRAM DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON
US-CHINA RELATIONS

DONALD KEYSER, USLO (NOTETAKER)

VICE MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG: WELCOME. TODAY, BECAUSE OF THE
SUDDEN EARTHQUAKE THAT OCCURRED THIS MORNING, THERE WAS UNEASI-
NESS CAUSED AMONG OUR FRIENDS. ARE YOU AFRAID NOW?

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CZARNECKI: AT 3:45 THIS MORNING WE WERE.

WANG: BUT NOT NOW?

CZARNECKI: NO.

WANG: THE EPICENTER WAS AT A PLACE 150 KMS. TO THE SOUTHEAST OF PEKING. IT REGISTERED 7.4 ON THE RICHTER SCALE. ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL LAW OF EARTHQUAKES, NORMALLY AFTER THE GUAKE THERE AFTER-SHOCKS, TODAY, TOMORROW AND THE FOLLOWING DAY. BUT THE DEPARTMENTS CONCERNED RESPONSIBLE FOR RESEARCH AND PREDICTIONS WILL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS WE HAVE ANY INFORMATION. THE MOST ORGANIZATION WILL LET YOU KNOW WHEN WE TRULY KNOW. THERE IS NO NEED TO BE AFRAID. WHERE DO EARTHQUAKES TAKE PLACE MOST FREQUENTLY IN THE UNITED STATES?

WANG: GENERALLY SPEAKING, WHAT IS THE DEGREE ON THE RICHTER SCALE?

CZARNECKI: I HAVE TO DEFER TO MY FRIEND FROM CALIFORNIA, MR. LIEBERTHAL.

LIEBERTHAL: I REALLY DON'T KNOW, OVER 6.

HOLT: EVERYTHING IS BIGGER IN CHINA.

WANG: NOT NECESSARILY. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN MINOR TREMORS, SOME HAVE BEEN 4 PLUS, SOME HAVE BEEN 5 PLUS. THIS TIME THE EPICENTER WAS CLOSER TO PEKING, ONLY 150 KMS. TO THE SOUTHEAST. WE FELT IT, THE TRMOP, MORE THIS TIME. WHAT VIEWS DO THE FRIENDS FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE HAVE?

CZARNECKI: MADAME VICE FOREIGN MINISTER, LET ME FIRST EXPRESS TO YOU OUR APPRECIATION FOR LETTING US MEET WITH YOU, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THIS MORNING'S EVENTS. ON BEHALF OF MY COLLEAGUES, LET ME EXPRESS OUR SYMPATHIES TO THE CHINESE PEOPLE WHO MAY HAVE BEEN HURT AND TO OUR CHINESE HOSTS, WHO HAVE SHOWN GREAT COURAGE AND GREAT CONCERN FOR OUR HEALTH STARTING FROM VERY EARLY THIS MORNING. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

WANG: BUT YOU ARE OUR FRIENDS WHO HAVE COME TO VISIT OUR COUNTRY.

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THIS IS OUR OBLIGATION.

CZARNECKI: YOU ARE VERY KIND. WE HAVE MANY ISSUES WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU. WITH YOUR PERMISSION I WOULD LIKE TO LEAD OFF WITH A GENERAL QUESTION, THEN ALLOW MY COLLEAGUES TO ASK THEIR OWN PERSONAL QUESTIONS.

WANG: ALL RIGHT.

CZARNECKI: I THINK ALL OF US ARE OF THE SAME MIND. WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO AND HOPING FOR A CONTINUATION AND AN INCREASE IN GOOD AND BETTER RELATIONS WITH CHINA. ONE AREA THAT IS VERY VITAL TO BOTH COUNTRIES IS ASIA, THE PERIPHERY ESPECIALLY OF ASIA. WHAT IS YOUR GOVERNMENT'S PERCEPTION OF THE PROPER AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN ALL REGIONS STRETCHING FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN TO JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC REGION? WHAT IS THE VIEW OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT?

WANG: THIS IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO ANSWER. THIS A MATTER WHICH IS THE AFFAIR OF THE UNITED STATES,

CZARNECKI: YET IN MANY PLACES IN THAT PARTICULAR REGION OUR INTERESTS CONVERGE AND SOMETIMES THEY SEEM TO BE OPPOSED. BUT LOOKING AT THE LARGER FRAMEWORK OF CONTINUING INTERESTS, WE WONDER HOW YOU VIEW OUR MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA.

WANG: OUR POSITION ON KOREA AND OUR STAND IS CONSISTENT AND YOU UNDERSTAND IT QUITE WELL. IN SOUTH KOREA, OUR STAND IS THAT WE FAVOR DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND THAT YOU WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA AND THAT THE KOREAN QUESTION BE LEFT TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES TO SOLVE AND WE ALSO SUPPORT THE STAND OF NORTH KOREA FOR INDEPENDENCE AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA. THIS STAND HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONSISTENT. IT IS CLEAR TO YOU. WE HAVE EXPLAINED IT TO OTHER AMERICAN FRIENDS WHO HAVE VISITED. TO YOUR PRESIDENT FORD WHEN HE WAS HERE. TO YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE, DR. HENRY KISSINGER. THIS STAND IS KNOWN TO ALL AND LAST YEAR DURING THE 30TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY OUR FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO EXPRESSED IT VERY CLEARLY. HE EXPRESSED THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ON KOREA.

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CZARNECKI: IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT YOU HAVE SAID, I WOULD JUDGE THAT THAT KIND OF PROPOSAL THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER MADE LAST WEEK FOR DISCUSSIONS THAT WOULD INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES, NORTH KOREA, SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA WOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES THAT YOU HAVE OUTLINED.

(NOTE: AT THIS POINT TING YUAN-HUNG AND TANG WEN-SHENG SIMULTANEOUSLY CORRECTED THE TRANSLATOR)

WANG: NO, WELL, I'M AWARE OF THE PROPOSAL BY SECRETARY OF STATE DR. HENRY KISSINGER IN HIS SEATTLE SPEECH LAST WEEK. HIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT AT ALL A NEW ONE. WHAT KIND OF NEW PROPOSAL IS THIS? OUR STAND ON KOREA IS CLEAR TO YOU ALL.

HOLT: THANK YOU. I'D LIKE TO REPEAT THE WORDS OF APPRECIATION FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU AND TO EMPHASIZE OUR GRATITUDE TO OUR HOSTS IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHO THIS MORNING TOOK EVERY STEP TO INSURE OUR COMFORT AND SAFETY. THERE ARE A GREAT MANY THINGS I'D BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING WITH THE VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUT WE HAVE A LARGE GROUP AND I'VE BEEN TAKING A LOT OF TIME ON THIS TRIP, AND I'D LIKE TO YIELD TO OTHERS IN THIS GROUP.

WANG: DO THE OTHER FRIENDS HAVE QUESTIONS?

LIEBERTHAL: IN 1973 AT THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS, PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI SAID THAT THE USSR IS FEINTING TO THE EAST, BUT ATTACKING TO THE WEST; BUT AT THE SAME TIME PREMIER CHOU WARNED AGAINST A SURPRISE ATTACK. DOES THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT STILL BELIEVE THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE ATTACK?


WANG: ARE THERE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS?

STARK: I'D LIKE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON CHINA-JAPAN TRADE RELATIONS AND ON UNITED STATES-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE OUTLOOK FOR THEM.

WANG: ANY OTHER QUESTIONS?

SAYLOR: WE HAVE SEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER MULTI-NATIONAL FOR OVER MANY YEARS TIED UP IN DISCUSSION AND DEBATE THAT SEEMED TO

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OBSTRUCT ANY ROLE THAT THESE ORGANIZATIONS MIGHT HAVE HAD. WHAT IS CHINA'S VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS?

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WANG: ANY OTHER QUESTIONS?

MOOSE: I'D LIKE TO HEAR FROM THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WHETHER SHE SEES ANY POLICY AREAS, EITHER IN THE FAR EAST OR ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, WHERE SHE BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA HAVE COMMON INTERESTS OR COULD WORK TOGETHER.

WANG: ARE THERE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS? NO? WELL, IN THAT CASE LET ME DISCUSS THE CONSISTENT STAND OF CHINA ON SOME OF THE ISSUES. FIRST, I'D LIKE TO DEAL WITH OUR VIEWS ON QUESTIONS OF THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. WE HOLD THAT THE OVERALL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CAN BE DESCRIBED AS: THERE IS GREAT CHAOS UNDER HEAVEN, BUT THE SITUATION IS EXCELLENT, AND TODAY THERE ARE VARIOUS FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTIONS WHICH ARE SHARPENING. THERE IS A GENERAL TREND. NATIONS WANT INDEPENDENCE, COUNTRIES WANT LIBERATION, PEOPLES WANT REVOLUTION. THIS TREND IS IRREVERSIBLE, THIS TREND IS IRRESISTIBLE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD SITUATION IS MORE AND MORE FAVORABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD. IT IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE UNFAVORABLE TO IMPERIALISM AND TO REVISIONISM. THE AWAKENING AND THE HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE BEING HEIGHTENED EVERY DAY. ACCORDING TO OUR CALCULATIONS, GENERALLY SPEAKING, FOLLOWING THE END OF WORLD WAR II MORE THAN 80 COUNTRIES HAVE GAINED INDEPENDENCE. OUR VIEW OF THE GENERAL WORLD SITUATION IS OPTIMISTIC. WE HAVE FAITH IN OUR VIEW OF THE GENERAL WORLD SITUATION. WHEN THE LATE PREMIER CHOU AT THE FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (HERE TANG HEN-SHENG BREAKS IN AND CORRECTS, SAYING THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS) GAVE HIS REPORT STATING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD FEINT TO THE EAST BUT

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STRIKE TO THE WEST, HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE FOCAL POINT OF CON-
TENTION IS IN EUROPE. BUT OUR VIEW IS THAT NO MATTER WHAT THE
SOVIET UNION DOES, ITS SPEARHEAD IS DIRECTED AGAINST YOU, THE UNITED
STATES. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEPLOYED (HEREHRANG WEN-SHENG
BREAKS IN, CORRECTING TO SAY "SOMEONE HAS SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE
SOVIET UNION HAS DEPLOYED) ONE MILLION TROOPS ALONG THE SINO-
SOVIET BORDER, WE STILL BELIEVE THAT THE SPEARHEAD IS DIRECTED
AGAINST YOU. IN OUR VIEW, THE POLAR BEAR WANTS TO FIX YOU (CHENG NI
AND BITE YOU (YAO NI). OF COURSE, THEY ARE FIRST AND FOREMOST
DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. BUT THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY THAT AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE ALSO DIRECTED AGAINST
US. OUR VIEW IS THAT THEY ARE DIRECTED FIRST AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES, SECOND AGAINST JAPAN AND THIRD AGAINST CHINA IN THE EAST.
THIS IS OUR GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION. REGARDING TRADE BETWEEN
OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WHEN OUR RELATIONS ARE STILL NOT NORMALIZED, IT
IS IMPOSSIBLE, JUDGING FROM THE GENERAL SITUATION, THAT THERE CAN
BE AN INCREASE IN TRADE. REGARDING THIS GENTLEMAN'S QUESTION
(POINTING AT THE GENTLEMAN) ON CHINA'S ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS.
ON THIS, OUR FRIENDS ARE VERY CLEAR. IN GENERAL, WE SUPPORT THE
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS. IN THE UNITED NATIONS,
TO PUT IT VERY FRANKLY, WE VERY OFTEN STATE THAT WE SUPPORT THE
THIRD WORLD IN OPPOSING THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. (TANG WEN-SHENG BREAKS
IN TO SAY, "THE TWO HEGEMONISTS) AS TO THE ROLE OF CHINA IN THE
UNITED NATIONS, EVER SINCE THE 26TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
WHEN CHINA'S LEGITIMATE RIGHTS WERE RESTORED IN THE UNITED NATIONS,
CHINA HAS PLAYED SOME ROLE. BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY THAT CHINA
PLAYS A BIG ROLE. BUT EVER SINCE WE HAVE ENTERED THE UNITED NATIONS
THE VOICES OF THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE BECOME MORE RESONANT,
INCREASINGLY HEARD. THAT GENTLEMAN (MEANING MOOSE) ASKED ABOUT
OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND AREAS OF COOPERATION (TANG WEN-SHENG BREAKS
IN TO CORRECT, "AREAS OF WORKING TOGETHER"). FIRST, I'D LIKE TO
SAY A FEW WORDS ON SINO-US RELATIONS. WHEN YOUR FORMER PRESIDENT
NIXON VISITED CHINA IN 1972, OUR TWO SIDES ISSUED THE SHANGHAI
COMMUNIQUE. PROVIDED THAT BOTH SIDES ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, OUR RELATIONS CAN BE CONTINUOUSLY IMPROVED.
BOTH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE MANY COMMON POINTS ON INTER-
NATIONAL ISSUES, BUT WE HAVE DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND DIFFERENT
IDEOLOGIES. THERE ALSO EXIST DIFFERENCES OF PRINCIPLE BETWEEN
US. LET US BOTH, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, EXERT OUR EFFORTS
ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. AS FOR
COOPERATION OR ALLIANCE, WE ARE NOT FOR SUCH A THING. FIRST OF

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ALL, WE HAVE A COMMON VIEWPOINT. BOTH CHINA AND THE US MUST COUNTER
OUR "ALLY" IN THE NORTH. BUT WE HAVE A KEY ISSUE IN THE QUESTION
OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN. REGARDING THE
QUESTION OF TAIWAN, OUR POSITION REGARDING TAIWAN IS VERY CLEAR.
I PRESUME THAT OUR FRIENDS PRESENT ARE VERY CLEAR. FIRST OF ALL,
IT IS THE UNITED STATES THAT OWES US A DEBT. IF NORMALIZATION OF
RELATIONS IS TO TAKE PLACE, WE MUST EXPLICITLY STATE OUR STAND.
THAT IS, WE HAVE THREE CONDITIONS. THEY ARE: ONE, SEVERANCE OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN? TWO, WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM

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TAIWAN; THREE, ABRIGATION OF THE TREATY WITH TAIWAN. THIS IS TO SAY, THE JAPAN FORMULA. LACKING ANY ONE OF THESE THREE CONDITIONS WOULD NOT DO. WE HAVE SAID THIS PREVIOUSLY VERY OFTEN. THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN IS JUST LIKE A NOOSE AROUND THE NECK OF THE UNITED STATES (THEIR TERM JIASUD IS USED FOR NOOSE). IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO TAKE OFF THE NOOSE FORTHWITH, THIS WOULD BE OF USE TO THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU DO NOT DO THIS YOURSELF FORTHWITH, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ONE DAY OUR PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY UNITS WILL USE THEIR BAYONETS TO HELP YOU TAKE IT OFF. WHY DO I SAY SO? ON THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN, WE BASE OUR FOOTING ON A FIGHT. ONE DAY THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A FIGHT. WE DON'T BELIEVE IN PEACEFUL TRANSITIONS. THIS IS OUR INTERNAL AFFAIR. AS TO WHEN CHINA WILL LIBERATE TAINAN AND WHAT METHOD IT WILL USE, THIS IS ENTIRELY OUR INTERNAL AFFAIR. NO OTHER COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE. (NOTE: HERE W/ HAI-JUNG DOES NOT COME ACROSS AS BELLICOSE AS CHANG CHUN-CHIAO DID; RATHER SHE SEEMS TO BE RECITING FROM HER BRIEFING PAPERS.) WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE GENERAL WORLD SITUATION? I'D LIKE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS.

MURRAY: MAY I THROW OUT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION AND THOUGHT A COMMENT. THERE ARE MORE AND MORE PEOPLE IN THE WORLD. THE GROWTH OF POPULATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD PRESENTS AN ENORMOUS PROBLEM FOR ALL MANKIND. I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING HOW THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT PLANS TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEM THAT THE WORLD POPULATION WILL INCREASE BY THREE TO FOUR BILLION IN THE LIFETIME OF MOST PEOPLE IN THIS ROOM.

WANG: POPULATION INCREASE IS A GOOD THING.

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MURRAY: THIS CAN BE A GOOD THING, IF THERE ARE RESOURCES AVAIL-
ABLE FOR THE PEOPLE. I WORRY NOT ABOUT CHINA, BUT ABOUT INDIA AND
BANGLADESH. HOW CAN OTHER COUNTRIES HALP TO ADJUST TO A MINIMUM
STANDARD OF LIVING?

WANG: THESE COUNTRIES MUST RELY ON HE PEOPLE OF THESE COUNTRIES
TO MAINTAIN THEIR LZANDARD OF LIVING. THIS IS NOT A MATTER IN
WHICH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF AID PROVIDED BY OTHER COUNTRIES WILL
SOLVE. AND IN CHINA THE POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY HAS INCREASED
CONTINUOUSLY SINCE LIBERATION. SOME SAY THAT CHINA NOW HAS A
POPULATION OF ALMOST 800 MILLION. THIS FIGURE IS DOUBLE THAT OF
PRE-LIBERATION DAYS. BUT THE STANDARO OF LIVING OF OUR 800 MILLION
CHINESE PEOPLE TODAY IS GREATLY IMPROVED WHEN COMPARED WITH THE
STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE 400 MILLION PEOPLE DURING THE PRE-LIBERAT
N
PERIOD. HOW COULD THIS COME ABOUT? WHY IS THE STANDARD OF LIVING
OF 800 MILLION CHINESE PEOPLE TODAY GREATHER THAN THE STANDARO OF
LIVING OF 400 MILLION CHINESE PEOPLE IN PRE-LIBERATION DAYS? THE
KEY FACTOR IS THAT EVER SINCE THE LIBERATION OF OUR COUNTRY, WE
HAVE IMPLEMENTED A CORRECT POLICY AND A CORRECT LINE
CHAIRMAN MAO, AND WE HAVE BUILT UP OUR COUNTRY CONSISTENTLY BY
FOLLOWING AND IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-RELIANCE. AS TO
BANGLADESH AND INDIA, THE DECISIVE FACTOR IS WHAT POLICY THESE
COUNTRIES PURSUE, AND AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELA-
TIONS WITH BANGLADESH, WE HAVE DONE OUR EST ACCORDING TO OUR
OBLIGATION TO RENDER THEM THE NECESSARY AID AND ASSISTANCE. AND
THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR POLICY TOWARD OUR FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS,
SUCH AS PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH. THAT IS, TO PROVIDE AID WITHIN
OUR CAPABILITIES. THIS IS ALWAYS UNILATERALLY WITHOUT OBLIGATIONS
AND IT IS SMALL, IT IS ON A SHALL SCALE. THE DECISIVE FACTOR IS TO
PURSUE A POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE AND INDEPENDENCE

MOOSE: I'D LIKE TO COME BACK TO THE QUESTION POSED, THAT IS THE
QUESTION OF THE AMERICAN VIEW OF OUR WORLD SITUATION. THIS IS A
VAST QUESTION AND NO ONE COULD UNDERTAKE TO SPEAK FOR THE ENTIRE
GROUP. WE REPRESENT A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS AND, OF
COURSE, WE SPEAK ONLY PERSONALLY, IN THAT SENSE, I DON'T BELIEVE
THAT MOST AMERICANS WOULD SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE WORLD IS BECOMING
MORE CHAOTIC. I BELIEVE THAT AMERICANS RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE
CERTAINLY DANGERS OF COLLISION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS AND THAT

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IN GENERAL AMERICANS MIGHT BE INCLINED AT THIS POINT IN HISTORY TO SEE THE SOVIET UNION AS THE FOCAL POINT OF THE GREATEST DANGERS, BUT NOT ONE THAT POSES AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES. BECAUSE WE DO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF DANGER, WE DO MAINTAIN A VERY LARGE AND A VERY STRONG DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. BUT THOUGH WE ARGUE ABOUT THE SIZE OF THIS DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, THE POINTS OF THE ARGUMENT ARE VERY SMALL. IN FINANCIAL TERMS THEY ARE VERY SMALL. BUT OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURE IS RATHER GREAT. WE SEE IT, OF COURSE, AS PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE AND PRIMARILY DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT AMERICANS SEE ANY DANGER FROM CHINA OR BELIEVE THAT WE WILL COME INTO CONFLICT WITH CHINA. I THINK THAT AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE GREAT POWERS TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF CONFLICT AND ALSO MORE COMMON EFFORT DIRECTED BY THE MAJOR POWERS IN THE WORLD TOWARD THE PROBLEMS OF FOOD AND POVERTY. IN THOSE AREAS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA MIGHT CONCEIVABLY HAVE CONFLICT, SUCH AS KOREA AND ELSEWHERE IN ASIA, I THINK THAT AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE DISCUSSION WITH CHINA. WITH REGARD TO KOREA, AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOME GUARANTEE OF THE LONG-TERM STABILITY IN THE AREA. IN TAIWAN, AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SITUATION RESOLVED IN SUCH A WAY THAT A CONFLICT AT SOME FUTURE TIME WOULD NOT RESULT BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I WOULD LIKE TO APOLOGIZE TO YOU AND TO MY COLLEAGUES FOR USING A LOT OF TIME IN SAYING SOME THINGS THAT MAY DISAGREE WITH WHAT WE HAVE SAID. AND ESPECIALLY SINCE YOU DID US THE GREAT HONOR OF COMING HERE TO MEET US (THIS PHRASE WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED IN TRANSLATION). I HOPE THAT WE CAN CARRY ON THE DISCUSSION FROM HERE.

WANG: ALL RIGHT. YOU MENTIONED THAT THE MAJOR THREATS COME FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THIS IS OUR VIEW AS WELL. THE SOVIET UNION IS THE MAIN DANGER TODAY. THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS EXPANSION. THE UNITED STATES HAS INTERESTS TO PRESERVE IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE

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WORLD. THERE IS NO WAY TO CHANGE THIS. AS FOR CHINA, CHINA CONSTITUTES NO THREAT TO ANYBODY. IT DOES NOT ASPIRE TO EXPANSIONISM. THE INSTRUCTIONS BY CHAIRMAN MAO ARE VERY CLEAR. DIG TUNNELS DEEP, STORE GRAIN EVERYWHERE AND NEVER SEEK HEGEMONY. WE HAVE NO TROOPS STATIONED ON THE SOIL OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. OUR CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS WERE COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN IN 1958 FROM KOREA. NOW IT IS THE UNITED STATES THAT HAS NOT WITHDRAWN ITS TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA. THE SOVIET UNION IS EXPANDING AND SEEKING HEGEMONY. THIS IS DETERMINED BY THE NATURE OF ITS SOCIAL IMPERIALISM. IT IS VERY AMBITIOUS, BUT ITS STRENGTH IS LIMITED. IN A SENSE THE SOCIAL IMPERIALISTS ARE VERY WEAK.

MCFADDED: YOU HAVE SAID THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE US WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM KOREA AND BREAK OUR TREATY WITH SOUTH KOREA. YOU HAVE SAID THAT YOU WOULD LIKE US TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM TAIWAN AND BREAK OUR TREATY WITH TAIWAN. WOULD YOU FAVOR US WITHDRAWING TROOPS FROM JAPAN AND ABROGATING OUR TREATY WITH JAPAN?

HANG: IN PRINCIPLE, WE ARE AGAINST ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY BASE OR STATIONING OF ANY TROOPS ON FOREIGN SOIL. THIS IS OUR CONSISTENT STAND. REGARDING TAIWAN, I'VE ALREADY SAID THAT THIS IS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. IT IS THE UNITED STATES THAT OWES US A DEBT. IT WAS MENTIONED VERY EXPLICITLY IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE THAT TAIWAN IS ONE OF CHINA'S PROVINCES. WITH REGARD TO JAPAN, OUR RELATIONS WITH IT TODAY ARE NOT SO GOOD AND ARE NOT SO BAD. BUT RECENTLY EVERYONE KNOWS THAT JAPAN'S MIKI (TING YUAN-HUNG CUTS IN TO CORRECT: FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA).. MIYAZAWA HAS MADE A STATEMENT THAT WE REGARD

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AS REGRETTABLE; THAT IS A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SINO-JAPANESE JOINT STATEMENT; AND IT CONSTITUTES CRUDE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA. THEREFORE, WE COULD NOT BUT EXPRESS REGRET AT THE STATEMENT.

CZARNECKI: MADAME VICE FOREIGN MINISTER, SINCE WE BOTH SEEM TO AGREE ON IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEMS EVEN THOUGH OUR PERSPECTIVE DIFFER VIEW POINTS ARE CLOSE HERE. THE SOVIET UNION IS EXPANDING IN MANY AREAS. IN VIEW OF THIS, HOW DO YOU REGARD THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICAN NAVY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WHEN THE SOVIET NAVAL MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN INCREASING IN RECENT YEARS. IS THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICAN NAVY A STABILIZING FACTOR OR A DESTABILIZING FACTOR?

WANG: THE SOVIET UNION'S NAVAL EXPANSION IN THE INDIAN IS FIRST OF ALL AIMED AND DIRECTED AT THE UNITED STATES. AS I HAVE STATED, OUR CONSISTENT STAND IS, WE OPPOSE ANY ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY BASES OR STATIONING OF TROOPS IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY BY ANOTHER COUNTRY.

CZARNECKI: WOULD THIS APPLY TO THE SOVIET UNION?

WANG: OF COURSE.

(TANG HEN-SHENG CUTS IN TO SAY, "THE INDIAN OCEAN IS NOT A COUNTRY.")

WANG: I WILL STATE AGAIN OUR CONSISTENT STAND. WE ARE AGAINST ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY BASES OR STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ABROAD. THIS IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION. AS I HAVE MENTIONED, THE NAVAL EXPANSION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IS FIRST AND FOREMOST DIRECTED AT THE UNITED STATES. BUT THE FOCAL POINT OF THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL EUROPE.

CZARNECKI: I THINK WE'LL AGREE ON THAT.

WANG: WE'VE TOLD OUR FRIENDS FROM EUROPE THAT WE HOPE THEY AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD MAINTAIN A RELATIONSHIP OF EQUALITY AND PARTNERSHIP.

BRENNER: MANY AMERICANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. IT IS BOTH DANGEROUS AND COSTLY. IS CHINA THINKING ABOUT WAYS TO

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PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

WANG: WE HAVE ALSO DEVELOPED OUR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT THOSE WE HAVE DEVELOPED ARE VERY LIMITED. THEY ARE MAINLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF SMASHING THE NUCLEAR MONOPOLY. IT IS AIMED AT DESTROYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS HAS BEEN OUR CONSISTENT STAND.

BEST: MY VIEW OF THE WORLD IS THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS PEACE, THAT IT IS TIRED OF PREJUDICES AND SO FORTH. THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE AT A CROSSROADS. SHOULD WE TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS? WE HOPE THAT WE CAN HAVE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND CAN HAVE CERTAIN UNDERSTANDINGS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS. BUT HOW DO WE GET THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND THERE IS A NEED FOR A STRONG DEFENSE? HOW CAN WE GET THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR A STRONG EUROPE? IF MY QUESTION AND MY STATEMENT IS A LITTLE UNCLEAR, I APOLOGIZE BECAUSE I'M VERY TIRED.

WANG: I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE TIRED. YOU DIDN'T SLEEP AT ALL LAST NIGHT. I HOPE THAT TONIGHT YOU ALL SLEEP WELL. WITH REGARD TO YOUR UNDERSTANDING ON MILITARY COOPERATION AND THE DILEMMA OF HOW YOU GET THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR A STRONG DEFENSE, THIS IS YOUR AMERICAN AFFAIR. MAYBE YOU CAN ASK PRESIDENT FORD HOW TO SOLVE IT.

MCFADDEN: RECENTLY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN A COVENANT TO MAKE THE MARIANAS A PROVINCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ALSO THE MARSHALL ISLANDS. THESE ARE TRUSTS AND WE WILL BE DISCUSSING THEIR STATUS IN THE FUTURE. THESE ARE STRATEGIC TRUSTS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. IF ACTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WERE REQUIRED TO DISPOSE OF THE TRUSTS, WHAT POSITION WOULD THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TAKE?
(TANG MEN-SHENG REINTERPRETS THE QUESTION AND EXPLAINS IT TO WANG HAI-JUNG)

WANG: WE SHALL WAIT AND WE SHALL STUDY THE QUESTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS BEFORE WE TAKE UP THE ISSUE.

CZARNECKI: I KNOW THIS HAS BEEN A VERY INTERESTING SESSION, BUT I FEAR THAT WE HAVE BEEN TAKING UP TOO MUCH OF YOUR TIME. WE APPRECIATE YOUR VERY CLEAR EXPOSITION OF THE VIEWS OF THE CHINESE

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GOVERNMENT ON A GREAT VARIETY OF ISSUES. YOU HAVE ALSO SAT PATIENTLY AND LISTENED TO OUR VIEWS. WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THIS KIND OF EXCHANGE.

WANG: WE HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS IN A FRANK MANNER. ON CERTAIN ISSUES WHAT I'VE SAID IS PERHAPS NOT VERY PLEASANT FOR YOU (MAN TING)

BUT THESE ARE OUR HONEST WORDS. WE THANK YOU FOR COMING TO VISIT OUR COUNTRY. THESE FRANK EXCHANGES OF OPINIONS AND VIEWS ARE USEFUL IN PROMOTING AND DEVELOPING OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. WE HOPE THAT IN THE COURSE OF YOUR TRAVEL TO OTHER PROVINCES OF THE COUNTRY YOU WILL WITNESS THE SPIRITUAL AND MENTAL OUTLOOK OF THE PEOPLE WHO AFTER THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION, THE MOVEMENT TO CRITICIZE LIN BIAO AND CONFUCIUS, THE ANTI-TENG HSIAO-PING MOVEMENT AND THE COUNTER BLOW AGAINST THE RIGHT DEVIATIONIST WIND TO REVERSE PREVIOUS VERDICTS HAVE ACHIEVED GREAT VICTORIES. LAST NIGHT ALL OF YOU DIDN'T SLEEP WELL. YOU MUST BE VERY TIRED. I HOPE THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS ARRANGED FOR A BETTER REST TONIGHT. WE ALL SHOOK FOR A WHILE, BUT WE ARE ALL STILL ON THIS EARTH. SHALL WE REACH AN AGREEMENT NOW THAT OUR DISCUSSION WAS OFF THE RECORD AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION?

CZARNECKI: YES, THAT'S FINE.

WANG: MR. KE PO-NIEN IS MY ELDER GENERATION. I CALL HIM REVERED KE (KE LAO).

CZARNECKI: HE WAS SO FULL OF VIM AND VIGOR LAST NIGHT AT THE BANQUET.

WANG: YES. THANK YOU FOR COMING. GOODBYE.
GATES



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PEKING 163 29 JULY 1976
FOR: SCOWCROFT & SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: AMB. GATES, PEKING

PLEASE NOTE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-RUNG'S COMMENT ON TAIWAN WITH VISITING CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DEL, AS REPORTED IN PEKING 1429 AND 1430, WHICH SHE INITIATED, ARE NEARLY IDENTICAL TO VICE PREMIER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR SCOTT. THIS POSES SAME POLITICAL PROBLEM AS BEFORE.

WARM REGARDS
GATES

BT

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept. Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/21/04*
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *KR*, NARA, DATE *7/30/08*

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

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DECLASSIFIED *State Dept. Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/2/04
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY W, NARA, DATE 2/30/08

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR CH US
SUBJECT: WANG HAI-JUNG ON SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

REF: PEKING 1283, PEKING 1288

1. MEETING JULY 28 WITH CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DELEGATION (TRANSCRIPT BY SEPTTEL), VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG LARGELY PARROTED THE STRONG REMARKS ABOUT TAIWAN THAT VICE PREMIER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO HAD MADE TO CODEL SCOTT. WANG IN ADDITION TWICE USED THE "U.S. OWES US A DEBT" LINE.

2. IN CONTRAST TO CHANG, WANG DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT PLA ACTIVITIES IN FUKIEN. AND IN MANNER SHE DID NOT PROJECT AS MUCH BELLICOSITY AS CHANG HAD. BUT HER ESSENTIAL MESSAGE WAS THE SAME: PEKING FORESEES A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE TAIWAN PROBLEM AND THE U.S. HAD BETTER NOT BE IN THE MIDDLE WHEN THAT TIME COMES. SOME QUALIFICATIONS IN HER REMARKS ON TWA, NOT CONTAINED IN CHANG'S, MAY BE SIGNIFICANT (THESE ARE SHOWN IN QUOTES). A. THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE OFF THE NOOSE AROUND ITS NECK (THE TAIWAN ISSUE) "FORTHWITH." B. IF WE DO NOT, THE "IT IS POSSIBLE" (OR "VERY POSSIBLE"--"HEN KE NENG") THE PLA "ONE DAY" WILL HELP US TAKE IT OFF.

3. THIS TIME IT CLEARLY WAS THE CHINESE WHO INITIATED THE TOPIC. EVEN THE STAFFDEL'S OFFICIAL HOST KO HO-NIEN, A RELATIVELY UNPOLITICAL VICE PRESIDENT OF THE CPIFA, INTRODUCED TAIWAN DURING WELCOMING BANQUET CONVERSATION JULY 29 WITH STAFFDEL.

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CO-LEADER PAT HOLT, ASKING HOW IT WAS THAT THE U.S. STILL HAD PEOPLE ON TAIWAN FOUR AND A HALF YEARS AFTER THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

4. AFTER THE STAFFDEL'S MEETING WITH WANG, NANCY TANG (TANG WEN-SHENG) WAS ASKED BY STAFFDEL MEMBER RICHARD MOOSE WHY WANG HAD TAKEN SUCH A TOUGH STANCE. TANG INDICATED PRC WAS REACTING TO STATEMENTS BY RESPONSIBLE FIGURES IN THE U.S. PRESSED ON WHOM SHE MEANT, TANG CITED ONLY TWO EXAMPLES: SENATOR GOLDWATER AND THE NEW YORK TIMES.

5. LIKE SCOTT'S GROUP, THE STAFFDEL WAS SURPRISED BY THE DISPLAY OF IMPATIENCE OVER TAIWAN AND THE STRESS ON A MILITARY SOLUTION. STAFFDEL MEMBERS HAVE BEEN CAUTIONED BY CO-LEADERS HOLT AND CZARNECKI TO TREAT WANG'S REMARKS AS CONFIDENTIAL PENDING REPORTS TO THE VARIOUS CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, BUT THIS PERFORMANCE WITH STAFFDEL, FOLLOWING THE ONE WITH SCOTT, DEFINITELY SUGGESTS THE CHINESE HAVE DECIDED TO "GO PUBLIC" WITH A LINE THAT (WHETHER CHINESE APPRECIATE IT OR NOT) WILL DISTURB MANY IN THE U.S. WHO FAVOR NORMALIZATION AND CAUSE REJOICING AMONG MANY WHO OPPOSE IT. THE STAFFDEL MEMBERS PERCEIVE THIS, ARE PUZZLED, AND HAVE PROBED US HARD FOR AN EXPLANATION. WHILE TRYING TO PUT THE MATTER IN CONTEXT (E.G. WE NOTED WANG'S POINTING OUT COMMON INTERESTS ASIDE FROM THE NORMALIZATION ISSUE), WE'VE BEEN FRANK TO SAY THAT WE'RE SORT OF PUZZLED, TOO. OUR SPECULATION ON CHINESE MOTIVATIONS FOLLOWS BY SEPTEL.
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DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/2/04
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/30/08

REF: PEKING 1429

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, CH, TW, US
SUBJECT: NANCY TANG ON POST-NORMALIZATION SUPPLY OF DEFENSE MATERIAL
TO TAIWAN

REF: PEKING 1429

1. JUST BEFORE LEAVING PEKING EVENING JULY 29 CONGRESSIONAL STAFFDEL "RESOURCE PERSON" PROF. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL (RAND CORPORATION AND POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, SHARPTHMORE) RELATED TO US SOME DETAILS OF A BRIEF DISCUSSION HE HAD ON JULY 28 WITH TANG WEN-SHENG (NANCY TANG) ABOUT THE ISSUE OF POST-NORMALIZATION ARMS SUPPLIES TO TAIWAN-- AN ISSUE ON WHICH HE HAD WORKED AT THE RAND CORPORATION. LIEBERTHAL INITIATED THE DISCUSSION. TANG'S RESPONSE WAS PREDICTABLY NEGATIVE.

2. LIEBERTHAL, LIKE OTHER STAFFDEL MEMBERS VERY TIRED FROM HIS EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE, HAD SOME DIFFICULTY RECALLING FULL DETAILS AND SEQUENCE OF THIS DISCUSSION. BUT HE SAID HE BEGAN BY REFERRING TO HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT U.S.-TAIWAN TRADE COULD CONTINUE AFTER U.S. PRC NORMALIZATION, AND THEN WENT RIGHT ON TO ASK WHAT PRC'S POSITION WOULD BE, IN THE PERIOD OF NORMALIZATION BUT BEFORE THE LIBERATION OF TAIWAN, TOWARD TAIWAN'S RECEIVING DEFENSE MATERIALS SUCH AS AMMUNITION AND SPARE PARTS. TANG ASKED AGAINST WHOM SUCH MATERIAL WOULD BE USED. LIEBERTHAL REPLIED TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WOULD BE FOR THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN. TANG

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ASKED IF LIEBERTHAL THOUGHT SOVEREIGN NATIONS PERMITTED THAT SORT OF THING. LIEBERTHAL SAID NOT TO HIS KNOWLEDGE. TANG TOLD HIM HE'S ANSWERED HIS OWN QUESTION.

3. AT ONE POINT IN THE EXCHANGE LIEBERTHAL ALSO ASKED IF PRC OBJECTION WOULD BE "IN PRINCIPLE" (HE MEANT ACROSS-THE-BOARD), OR IF PRC WOULD DECIDE ITS POSITION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. HER RESPONSE (APPARENTLY AGAIN A QUESTION ABOUT PRACTICE OF SOVEREIGN NATIONS AND THEN "YOU'VE ANSWERED YOUR OWN QUESTION") MADE CLEAR THAT PRC WOULD OPPOSE SUCH TRANSACTIONS ACROSS-THE-BOARD.

4. COMMENT: LIEBERTHAL APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE ONLY STAFFED MEMBER TO GET INTO THIS SUBJECT WITH THE CHINESE, BUT SOME REFLECTION OF THE DISCUSSION PRESUMABLY WILL APPEAR IN REPORT OF THE GROUP'S FINDINGS.

5. LIEBERTHAL REMARKED TO US HE FOUND IT INTERESTING THAT TANG HAD AVOIDED (BY USE OF RHETORICAL QUESTIONS) PUTTING HERSELF IN POSITION WHERE SHE COULD BE QUOTED AS CATEGORICALLY REJECTING POST-NORMALIZATION SUPPLY OF DEFENSE-RELATED MATERIAL TO TAIWAN BY THE U.S. OR OTHERS. ON BASIS OF HIS ACCOUNT, HOWEVER, TANG WAS IN NO DOUBT CONCERNING HER BASIC GUIDANCE FOR DEALING WITH THIS QUESTION: A PRINCIPLED TURN-DOWN AS AN INFRINGEMENT OF PRC SOVEREIGNTY.
GATES

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STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HJR, NARA, DATE 7/30/08

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PEKING 1455

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR CH US
SUBJECT: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE "CHANG CHUN-CHIAO LINE"

REF: PEKING 1429

1. WE OFFER SOME THOUGHTS ON (A) THE MESSAGE PEKING CURRENTLY IS TRYING TO SEND TO AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS (AND PRESUMABLY A WIDER AUDIENCE) AND ITS VERY TROUBLESOME IMPLICATIONS; (B) PEKING'S MOTIVES; (C) A POSSIBLE US RESPONSE.

2. AMERICANS, AND ANY OTHERS (THE SOVIETS AND THE FOLKS ON TAINAN INCLUDED) WHO RECEIVE A REASONABLE ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF CHANG CHUN-CHIAO'S REMARKS TO SENATOR SCOTT AND WANG HAI-JUNG'S TO THE CONGRESSIONAL STAFFDEL CAN SUM UP/INTERPRET THE CURRENT LINE AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE PRC AND THE US CONTINUE TO HAVE MANY POINTS IN COMMON (ESSENTIALLY, SHARED CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION) IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. OUR RELATIONSHIP ON THAT BASIS HAS A LOT GOING FOR IT.

-- NORMALIZATION IS ANOTHER MATTER, HOWEVER. FOR THAT, THE US WILL HAVE TO REMOVE ITSELF FROM INVOLVEMENT IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIR, THE TAINAN PROBLEM, BY COMPLYING WITH THE THREE CONDITIONS. MEANWHILE EXCEPT, AT BEST, ABOUT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF BILATERAL DEALINGS.



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(SO FAR, POINTS THAT ARE FAIRLY FAMILIAR TO A WIDE AUDIENCE. BUT WHAT COMES NEXT IS NOT SO FAMILIAR.)

-- WHILE CHINA HAS BEEN PATIENT, AND CERTAINLY STILL WANTS NORMALIZATION (ON ITS TERMS), IT IS NOW BECOMING IMPATIENT TO COLLECT THE "DEBT" THE US OWES IT.

-- AT ANY RATE, THE MESSAGE TO US GOES ON, CHINA IS GETTING READY TO SOLVE THE TAIWAN PROBLEM BY FORCE, PROBABLY THE ONLY WAY THE JOB CAN BE DONE. CHINA NATURALLY DOES NOT SAY HOW LONG THESE PREPARATIONS WILL TAKE, BUT SOONER OR LATER, IF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE, THE PLA WILL LIBERATE TAIWAN -- NOTWITHSTANDING THE US SECURITY COMMITMENT (IF BY THEN THE US SHOULD BE SO UNWISE AS TO STILL HAVE ONE). THUS THE COMMON INTERESTS WE HAVE INTERNATIONALLY ARE NOT DETERRING PEKING FROM FINISHING THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR. (FOR THOSE IN THE AUDIENCE WHO ARE AWARE OF THE GRADUAL INCREMENT IN PRC MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA, AND/OR AWARE OF CHANG'S REMARKS ABOUT THE CURRENT EXERCISES, THIS POINT TAKES ON JUST A BIT MORE PLAUSIBILITY. WHICH IS, WE SUPPOSE, ONE FUNCTION OF THESE ACTIVITIES.)

3. WE FEAR THAT WANG'S SO CLEARLY TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO GIVE THE CONGRESSIONAL STAFFDEL A CANNED VERSION OF CHANG CHUN-CHIAO'S LINE WITH SCOTT SIGNALS AND END TO THE PATTERN OF THE CHINESE TALKING WITH SUCH GROUPS ABOUT TAIWAN (AND THEN RATHER AMBIGUOUSLY) ONLY WHEN THEY ARE PUSHED INTO IT. EVEN SO WE WOULD LIKE TO THINK THE CHINESE INTEND THE TOUGH LANGUAGE FOR JUST A FEW INFLUENTIAL EARS -- A LITTLE EDUCATING WHERE IT COUNTS JUST NOW ON PEKING'S NOT NEW BUT NOT WELL-KNOWN EXPECTATIONS THAT THE LIBERATION OF TAIWAN WILL BE BY FORCE. THIS IS CERTAINLY ONE PURPOSE, BUT MORE DISCREET MEANS ARE AVAILABLE. THE CHINESE ARE WELL AWARE OF HOW OUR SEMI-OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS HANDLE "CONFIDENTIAL" REMARKS (CHANG'S EXPERIENCE WITH COUL PRICE IS A RECENT EXAMPLE). THEY MUST REALIZE THE NUCSE-AND-SAYONETS IMAGE IS STRIKING ENOUGH THAT IT WILL NOT BE LONG IN FINDING ITS WAY INTO THE US MEDIA, TOGETHER WITH THE MORE GENERAL PROPOSITION THAT (IN WANG'S WORDS) "ONE DAY THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A FIGHT" TO REGAIN TAIWAN.

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4. IN SUM, THEREFORE, THE CHINESE PRESUMABLY ARE PREPARED TO HAVE THEIR WORDS REACH JUST AS BIG A PUBLIC AS -- TO USE NANCY TANG'S EXAMPLES OF THE KIND OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES TO WHICH CHINA IS REACTING -- RECENT STATEMENTS ON SINO-US RELATIONS BY SENATOR GOLDBATER AND THE NEW YORK TIMES. NANCY REFRAINED FROM SAYING SO, BUT SHE MAY HAVE HAD IN MIND ALSO MR. CARTER'S STATEMENT TO TIME (CARRIED IN NCPA'S JULY 26 "NEWS FROM FOREIGN AGENCIES AND PRESS") CALLING FOR ASSURANCES THAT TAIWAN WILL BE FREE OF MILITARY PERSUASION OR DOMINATION FROM MAINLAND CHINA.

5. WE THINK IT IS NO FEAT OF IMAGINATION TO SAY THAT THE EFFECT OF THE TOUGH CHINESE PUBLIC LINE COULD -- REPEAT COULD -- WRECK OUR CHINA POLICY. MOREOVER, IT COULD LEAD TO THE VERY OPPOSITE OF WHAT THE PRC WANTS BY SERVING TO PROMOTE A "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA ONE TAIWAN" SITUATION. THE AMERICANS WHO CARRIED INTO THE MEETINGS WITH CHANG AND WANG THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT CHINA IS PATIENT AND CHINA ENVISAGES A PEACEFUL SOLUTION LEFT THE MEETINGS IN VARYING DEGREES OF SHOCK. REMARKS SEVERAL OF THE VISITORS MADE TO US LATER INDICATED THEY SAW ONLY BAD EFFECTS ON PRC-US RELATIONS.

6. THERE MUST BE THOSE IN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT WHO REALIZE THIS POTENTIAL EFFECT AND MIGHT HAVE ARGUED AGAINST GOING PUBLIC WITH THE TOUGH LINE. HOWEVER, IT NOW SEEMS LIKELY THE DECISION HAD



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BEEN TAKEN BY THE TIME CHANG MET WITH SCOTT.

7. DOES THIS DECISION MEAN THAT PEKING NO LONGER SEES BILATERAL ISSUES -- AND SPECIFICALLY TAIWAN^{HAAA} IN THE TERMS HUA KUO-FENG EXPRESSED THEM TO ME, AS "MINOR ASPECTS" OF OUR RELATIONSHIP? IT COULD, THOUGH I DOUBT IT. NOR DO I THINK THE CHINESE HAVE CAST AWAY THE APPRECIATION OF THEIR BASIC SELF-INTEREST THAT BROUGHT THEM INTO THE NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH US IN THE FIRST PLACE. AS I SHALL NOTE AGAIN LATER, THESE ARE POINTS WE SHOULD BE AUTHORITATIVELY CLARIFIED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT ASSUMING ESSENTIALLY THE SAME OVER-ALL CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES, IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT THE LEADERSHIP IS GENUINELY CONCERNED THAT THE US MAY BACKTRACK ON TAIWAN, AND PERHAPS IRRITATED AT THE PROSPECT THAT COLLECTING THE "DEBT" WILL TAKE MUCH LONGER THAN ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED. THEY MAY ESTIMATE THAT THEY CAN DO SOMETHING ABOUT THIS DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, OR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AT LITTLE RISK TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE US/PRC RELATIONSHIP; IN PART BY STIMULATING SUPPORT IN THE US FOR THE VIEWPOINT EXPRESSED IN THE JULY 26 BALTIMORE SUN "THE CHINA BULLET" EDITORIAL. (THIS WAS CARRIED IN THE JULY 27 "NEWS FROM FOREIGN AGENCIES AND POSTS".) AND THEY MAY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT, IN ANY EVENT, IT IS TIME TO INTRODUCE GREATER "REALISM" IN THE WAY US PUBLIC OPINION WEIGHS RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN AS AGAINST THOSE WITH THE PRC.



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8. WE SUSPECT THERE ARE ALSO INTERNAL FACTORS. THE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS IN THE PRC THAT PERMITTED THE NEW US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP TO BEGIN MAY HAVE RESTED IN PART ON AN EXPECTATION THE US WOULD IN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME END ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WITH TAIWAN. THERE COULD BE PRESSURES ON HUA AND CHANG FROM WITHIN THE MILITARY, FOR EXAMPLE, TO ENSURE AT LEAST THAT US FAILURE TO DO SO IS NOT A PRODUCT OF INADEQUATE COMMUNICATION. DR CHANG, FOR ONE, COULD BE USING A MILITANT LINE ON TAIWAN'S RECOVERY AS A MEANS OF STIMULATING XENOPHOBIC SUPPORT IN THE PLA. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT CHANG COULD HAVE SPOKEN AS HE DID TO SCOTT (AND THEN WANG TO THE STAFFDEL) WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE REST OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP.

9. THE US CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDABLY EXPECT SOME FORM OF REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT TAIWAN WILL NOT FALL VICTIM TO PEKING UPON OUR BREAKING RELATIONS. CHANG'S AND WANG'S COMMENTS TO SCOTT AND THE STAFFDEL CLEARLY WILL MAKE SUCH ASSURANCE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. WE SHOULD QUIETLY TAKE THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THE CHINESE REAFFIRM THE PRIORITIES WE HAVE AGREED TO IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. THEN WE SHOULD NOTE, IF ONLY FOR THE RECORD, THAT REGARDLESS OF THEIR PURPOSE AND MOTIVATION COMMENTS SUCH AS CHANG'S TO SCOTT WILL HAVE A SERIOUS EFFECT ON THE PROGRESS OF NORMALIZATION -- IN FACT COULD WIRE IT FOR SELF-DESTRUCT. YOUR FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH CHIAO KUAN-HUA AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK MAY BE THE FIRST SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY ALTHOUGH I AM CONCERNED THAT BY THEN MOST OF THE DAMAGE WILL ALREADY HAVE BEEN DONE BY PUBLICITY FOR CHANG'S AND DR WANG'S REMARKS ABOUT MILITARY LIBERATION OF TAIWAN.

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